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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 10, 1976

Mike--

I am setting forth below some thoughts on the organization of the theme issues for the campaign, and the platform.

First of all, I think the two needs should not be too closely linked in our minds. Their objectives are different, and they require substantially different forms of organization. The platform is in many ways similar to a book or extended article, and pretty much has to be organized around major topics of governmental responsibility. (At least once, to my knowledge, the platform was organized around thematic ideas, which seemed fairly imaginative, but actually did not work very well. One of the major purposes of the platform is to provide the interest groups with an opportunity to look up what we say we are going to do for them. If "education", for interest, is scattered all over the platform, it is very confusing and irritating to the education interest groups-- which serves no useful purpose, and leads them to suspect we are trying to put one over on them.) The campaign, on the other hand, is more like a parade than a book. I think this is why I have reservations about giving ~~XXX~~ a week to, say, "foreign policy." It would bunch things up too much-- ~~JFK~~ just as, in a parade, you do not put all the bands and all the floats together, but spread them out over the length of the procession. Anyway, in determining the theme issues for the campaign, we should not feel bound by the same kind of subject-matter headings that are appropriate for the platform.

good point
I will take up the theme issues for the campaign first. Two areas that seem to require a theme category each are the broad subjects of FOREIGN POLICY and ECONOMIC POLICY. Defense policy, in my opinion, should not be a separate category-- and foreign policy should not be dealt with without discussion of defense needs. The two are interdependent-- if you deal with defense separately, you come out sounding too militaristic, if you deal with foreign policy separately, you run the risk of sounding bering or soft.

FOREIGN POLICY should be organized around the four major objectives of foreign policy:

- National security
- Economic objectives benefitting our own economy
- Support for ~~XXX~~ free democracies (but NOT seeking to impose democracy where social and political conditions are not ripe)
- Humanitarian objectives, including both disaster relief and aid to long term development of developing countries (which also has economic and political benefits)

Our various foreign policy ~~objectives~~ initiatives can be developed neatly around these objectives.

ECONOMIC POLICY should set forth our own economic program for prosperity,



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and carry the major weight of our attack on the Democrats (other than Carter's inexperience, Congress's irresponsibility, etc.) Points to be made:

- ~~We~~, not the Democrats, offer the cure to unemployment. Inflation causes unemployment. By fighting inflation, we are fighting unemployment. Point with pride to current recovery of the economy.
- Sharply attack Democratic spending proposals-- but do NOT disparage needs most of these proposals are meant to fill. We will fill these needs less expensively, more fairly-- though perhaps we will take a little longer. Our way does not endanger freedom.
- Sharply attack Humphrey-Hawkins-- an inflation engine, guaranteeing ~~future~~ future recession, ultimately regimented economy.
- Tax cut provides funds for investment. Investment means jobs. Also, investment is needed to buy new equipment which is environmentally safe.
- Deregulation will foster competition, lower prices for consumers.
- ~~NEVERMIND~~ While we regard the market as an efficient device for making most economic needs, we recognize the need for government intervention in some areas. Our proposal to channel investment into areas of high unemployment (ignored by the Democrats). Our request for job-training for one million unemployed and economically disadvantaged. Anti-trust.

Beyond here, the category lines become less obvious. I think we should devote one category to LAW ENFORCEMENT, one of the three responsibilities that everybody assigns to government (the others being, of course, defense and maintenance of a sound currency). Much crime under our system is dealt with by state and local authorities, but we should indicate how we plan to give them support. Strong emphasis on our anti-drug proposals. ~~WHITE-COLLAR~~ Attack on organized crime. Governmental corruption. White-collar crime. International crime (bribes, etc.)

✓ Another pretty obvious category is GOVERNMENTAL REFORM. We should point with pride to all OMB has done-- cutting waste, eliminating overlap, etc. I think revenue sharing comes in here-- our whole philosophy of federalism. Some cracks at Carter's vague, artificial proposals. Any other ideas for reform that we may be planning to take up-- one-step offices for people with government problems?

Then I think we should organize a general category dealing with domestic policy around the AMERICAN DREAM, as it pertains to the average individual. Begin, as we discussed yesterday, not with lofty government programs, but with the individual himself. What does he want from his society? A job. A decent income. A good education for his children. A secure family life. A decent community environment. Health care at affordable cost. A home. Secure retirement benefits. Adequate transportation to get him where he wants or needs to go. A healthy natural environment of air and water, and wilderness, seashore, or countryside where he can refresh his spirit. And, finally, all of this without sacrifice of personal freedom. How should government help him achieve these goals? What should be left to the individual, the private sector, or local government? Wrap in our programs and proposals for education, health care, transportation, housing, Social Security, law enforcement. This where busing comes in, too.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



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The other theme issues, some of which can be dealt with in a single major address, perhaps supplemented by a position paper, should be organized around ~~the~~ our appeals to the most important constituency groups in the country: the AGRICULTURE community, the EDUCATION community, the CIVIL RIGHTS community, and the AGING community. (Business and labor, obviously, are important constituency groups, also, but I think these are best addressed through our general Economic Policy category.) Not all of these constituency groups are very large, but they are cohesive, or strategically located, and if they vote as blocs they can swing states. Obviously, with some of these groups, we can not hope to win majority support. But we must prevent them from becoming united against us. Therefore we should plan an issue category, built around our programs, new or proposed, directed at each— and stress areas of common interest— with the educators, freedom from governmental control and redtape, increased aid wherever possible and practical; with the aging (never aged or elderly), secure Social Security, our proposal for catastrophic health insurance, etc. Another constituency group we might target is the ENVIRONMENTAL community— we are in trouble there, and we badly need ~~the~~ some support— which we won't get by being against gun control. But we must have something to say to them. Alan Greenspan has a good idea for comparing ~~polluting~~ businesses that pollute to people who throw their garbage on other people's lawn— society, which means us, must be prepared to force them to clean up.

With regard to the platform, any traditional scheme of organization will probably work. I have an idea for a somewhat imaginative scheme of organization, which may not be practical, given the tactical situation, but let me give it to you. I think the platform might be organized around a "New Bill of Rights," set forth in the Preamble, and then used as section headings, as:

- I- The Right to Peace. Foreign and defense policy.
- II- The Right to Economic Opportunity. Economic policy.
- III- The Right to a Fair Start in Life. Education. Civil rights.
- IV- The right to Protection against Crime and Violence. Law enforcement.
- V- The Right to Decent Health Care at Affordable Cost.
- VI- The Right to a Healthy Environment.
- VII- The Right to Adequate Transportation Facilities
- VIII- The Right to Decent Housing in a Secure Community Setting.
- IX- The Right to Honest and Efficient Government. Governmental reform.
- X- The Right to Fulfillment in Family Life. Support for moral values.
Social Security.

The point would have to be made that many of these "rights" ~~will~~ have to be secured through local government or the private sector, which may put a strain on our negotiations with the Reaganites, but I think it would give the platform a bit of a lift.

—Jim R.

[ca. August 76]

THE PRESIDENT'S CAMPAIGN

I. Style

- A. Project a Presidential-leadership image, do not appear political or partisanly Republican.
- B. Forego campaign stump appearances until late in the campaign; and then only if necessary.
- C. Strive to project that the President is the following:
 - Knowledgeable
 - Solid
 - Stable
 - Decisive
 - Compassionate
 - Trustworthy
 - Future Oriented
 - Experienced
 - Positive
- D. Do not project that he is:
 - Political
 - Indecisive
 - Partisan
 - Vicious/Vitriolic
 - Republican
- E. The bottom line - We must show that the President is a better man than Candidate Carter by playing to the President's strengths and staying away from the things he doesn't do well.



II. Content of Presidential Campaign

- A. The debates will overshadow all other Presidential campaign activity; this activity must have the priority call on the President's time.
- B. The President has four other major ways to get across to the people what kind of a man he is:
 - I. Major speeches which focus on his goals for America. Each major topic should be laid out in a speech.

2. Meetings with various groups
 - To demonstrate concern and understanding of people's problems
 - To address the needs of various special interests
3. Performing his Presidential duties with authority and crispness.
4. Frequent Press Conferences.
- C. Under any circumstances, the President should not lead the attack on Carter nor should he campaign in the partisan, stumping style used in the Primary Campaigns.
- D. In the last 2 or 3 weeks of the campaign, it will probably be necessary for the President to travel to key swing states that are close or require shoring up.

III. The President's Schedule

- A. Between now and Mid-October:
 1. Prepare for debates.
 2. Make at least one major speech per week to a key audience in a key state. The trips would be one day efforts and would include few events other than the speech. These speeches should tie into the issue cycle as outlined in the Campaign Strategy book. Also, the Advertising plan should reinforce the speech message. ✓
 3. Hold Press Conferences at least 1 per week. These should also tie into the issue cycle.
 4. Meet with key leaders of special interest groups.
 5. Schedule activities which highlight the family and his compassion for the less fortunate.
 6. Highlight the President performing the duties of office.

- B. From Mid-October to November 2nd
 - 1. Continue activities outlined above.
 - 2. In addition, schedule campaign trips into key states to deal with swing groups required to carry the state. This travel will probably require three or four days a week for this two to three week period.
 - a. The groups which require focus based on our present information are:
 - Catholics
 - Jews
 - Young Voters
 - Upper blue collar voters
 - Lower White collar voters
 - Middle and Upper Middle Class
 - good Government suburbanites
 - b. At least one of these campaign swings should be a whistle stop train trip.
 - c. This travel must be done well with a minimum of partisan heat; the people like the President as President but not as a campaigner.

IV. Use of the First Family

- A. The principal task of the First Family should be to reinforce those personal qualities of the President that we are trying to get across to the electorate. We should not ask them to deal with campaign issues or to attack Candidate Carter.
- B. Since the President will not be travelling extensively early in the campaign. First Family members should be used in political forums the President cannot reach. This travel should concentrate on key states and key groups.
- C. Mrs. Ford is greatly respected because she is independent from the President, we should not try to discourage this independence.



- D. We should seek out major events where the Family can be used together. As a group, they make a stronger impression than they do separately.

V. Key Questions to Resolve

- A. Where, when and how should the President launch the campaign?
- B. Where should the President end the campaign?
- C. How do we deal with Grand Rapids and the home state?
- D. How do we deal with other Republican office holders and their requests for Presidential campaigning assistance?
- E. How do we deal with requests for fundraising assistance from the RNC, the Congressional Campaign Communities, the State Parties?
- F. How much press exposure beyond the Press Conferences do we want the President to have? Should we discourage or encourage one-on-one interviews by major press figures?




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John HART

H
file
Campaign
Strategy

- P is honest - greatest asset. People can trust him.
- Carter is duplicitous; people don't trust him; all things to all people.
- P should fire all staff + run on own instincts.
- Carter is a "gut" (instincts) politician. ∴ Mondale.
∴ mistakes? or reacts to mood of country.
- Best thing P has done - his press conf. on RN Pardon: "I did it in National Interest + I'd do it again" - very open - honest - ∴ TRUST.
- Q on Carter weaknesses -
① Catholics; ② Independent Unions. - what states??

- Carter hurt himself w/ mtg in NYC w/ Business leaders - compare to Convention.
[Theme: New Yorkers find the True Carter]
- Most (all) press think Ford can't win - John thinks he can. Press misread country like they did in primaries.
- Country - in their stomach - wants someone they can trust.
- Hamilton dinner - at dinner told John about govt. reorgn. - very vague - will begin ~~work~~ in 18 mos. & will do all at once. John not impressed.
- Carter very ambitious - wants power - but why. His Democratic ~~rep~~ support based only on thirst for power.



July 5, 1976

*Campaign
Strategy*

MEMORANDUM FOR: DAVE GERGEN
FROM: GEORGE VAN CLEVE
SUBJECT: THE GENERAL ELECTION -- PART I

In February, 1976, a New York Times survey showed that, when the issues positions of supporters of various candidates were examined and averaged, Gerald Ford was very close to the center on the right side of a liberal conservative spectrum, and Jimmy Carter was very close to the center on the left side of the spectrum. Recent political science theory and survey data indicates that the relative positioning of the two candidates in October, 1976 will determine which of them is the next President.

The initial Times political spectrum survey was done before the Presidential primaries. In those primaries, NBC survey data shows that Jimmy Carter received most of his votes from people who identified themselves as moderates or conservatives, while other Democratic candidates received the lion's share of the liberal votes. President Ford received most of his votes from liberals and moderates, generally losing heavily to Governor Reagan among Republican conservatives. I strongly suspect that the primaries had the following effect on public perceptions of the spectrum positioning of Ford and Carter: Carter is now seen as closer to the center, while the President is now seen as further to the right (I don't have any data to confirm this).

The primaries, and later events, have had additional effects on the public images of the two candidates. Carter is now seen as a strong, successful candidate (nothing succeeds like success) who can lead his party (and therefore, perhaps, the country). The Democrats have given up, for the time being, their fratricidal warfare. The Republicans, on the other hand, are clearly internally split, with powerful emotions (if very little in the way of issues) dividing them. The President, whose strong suit has never been his perceived leadership abilities, is now seen as weaker than ever.



A NOTE ON THE ISSUES

Barring some change in the current international situation, nothing could be clearer than that domestic issues will be the major voting issues in the general election. All current poll data indicates that economic concerns are far more important to the general public than are foreign policy questions. While perceptions of relative foreign policy ability and expertise will affect public views of the candidates, whatever strategy ~~we~~ develop must depend for its success far more on domestic programs than on foreign policy. This is not to say that steps should not be taken to strengthen the President's position in the foreign policy area, but the steps I would recommend are dealt with largely in another memorandum.

CARTER'S DILEMMA AND PROBABLE DEMOCRATIC STRATEGY

Carter's dilemma is an easy one to describe: he must attempt to become more specific on the issues in order to avoid a terminal case of Deweyitis without alienating too much of his current support.

Carter's strategy for the center has been a simple one: straddle the fence on every issue, while reassuring the center that you believe in the old American virtues -- patriotism, hard work, God and motherhood -- that they believe in, and that you fully intend to bring them back to America when you are President.

And, sure enough, the center has responded. Note, however, that in a series of contested Democratic primaries held in the same states that held primaries in 1972, about 10% less votes were cast than were cast in those primaries in 1972 (while the voting population increased substantially). Much of this dropoff was no doubt due to the fact that Republicans who had crossed over decided to vote in GOP primaries. But some of it was also due to the fact that all the candidates looked a lot less attractive this year, particularly to former Wallace voters. So Carter's current problem with the Democratic center is apathy, an apathy he can ill afford. If Carter's support is confined to traditionally Democratic groups, he needs a relatively high turnout to win, and current data supports the view that turnout will not be very high this Fall.



Carter's problem with center apathy is certainly part of the reason he is wooing George Meany. Carter needs more than a labor endorsement -- he needs labor out there hustling for him. And Meany seems to be holding out until Carter is ready to go down the line with labor on Humphrey-Hawkins and/or 14-B.

Carter's other, and bigger, problem is with the liberals. They're the ones who keep worrying about specificity. And, of course, what they mean by specificity is specific endorsements of their traditional panaceas, which they haven't been getting from Carter. Here Carter seems to have a good deal more bargaining leverage (as the platform meetings clearly showed, with Joe Duffy and Anne Wechsler out hustling for Carter) -- where else can the liberals go? McCarthy doesn't seem like a serious threat at this point, and the possibility of liberal defections to Ford seems relatively remote. Still, Carter has two problems: (1) If there is enough ranting about his lack of specificity, it may scare away some of his center support, and (2) the liberals may decide to sit out part of a close election. While their decision to do so no longer has any real impact on the campaign itself because there are no serious financing problems, it does have an impact on voter turnout.

CARTER'S PROBABLE STRATEGY

A large part of Carter's strategy will be an attempt to avoid the problems just described. He'll probably use the following tactics!

1. Tie Nixon and Ford together.

Watergate and the Nixon pardon are a couple of very important Democratic issues. Carter knows that. In keeping with his "nice guy" strategy, he seems to have indicated that he doesn't believe the pardon should be a campaign issue. Instead, he's figured out a clever way of keeping it alive in the public mind -- and that is to tie Nixon and Ford together whenever this is possible. A good example of what's in store was the New York foreign policy speech Carter gave two weeks ago, in which he condemned the "Nixon-Ford" foreign policy by attacking the "secretiveness, etc." of HAK. If that type of approach isn't calculated to keep these issues alive, I don't know what is. Add to this Carter's talk about "open government" and you can see the outlines of an attempt to milk this issue for all it's worth.



2. Attack Ford and the Washington establishment, and all other large and powerful institutions (except big labor, if possible)


This must be done nicely, by telling people that you're going to "green" the bureaucrats and by tying yourself to FDR's ghost's coattails. Carter's whole "unresponsive government" approach is really just a clever, more socially acceptable, twist to George Wallace's "pointy-headed bureacurats" line. And Carter really hasn't attempted to sell anything but compassion and concern on this issue -- and, among Democrats, it seels very well. The "common touch" has always been a big asset for a Democrat, and Carter's religion gives him just that. Carter's announcement that the New Deal will rise again to the Mayor's conference was an example of this approach.

3. When you can't think of anything else to say, or when you need to move left and want to cushion the effect, talk religion.

By now, the press and most of the public are completely convinced that Carter really is religious. More than that, it means something to them that he is religious. Quite simply, what it means to many people is that Carter is getting divine guidance, that he is less likely to be crooked, and more likely to be truthful, etc. But Carter's religiosity also has another very important effect. beyond the lift it gives ~~xxxx~~ anti-Semites of various hues to know that they're about to get a true believer in the White House. To conservatives, Carter's religiosity makes Carter look more conservative, thus reassuring them that he is no "wild-eyed radical and dampening the effect of certain liberal positions which Carter has taken or will take to hold the liberals (a little bit like Nixon going to China). At the same time, to the liberals it seems that Carter is a "social gospeller" whose compassion extends to the poor and needy, for whom he can be counted on to do something even though he occasionally sounds rather conservative (like Gene McCarthy).

4. Make sure the Congress and Democratic bureaucrats like the people at the BLS give the President all the trouble they can.

If Congress decides, for example, to investigate Henry Kissinger's conduct of the office of Secretary of State in order to see whether Kissinger has been telling Americans the truth for the last eight



years -- well, so much the better. One can easily think of half a dozen nice things the Congress could do which would bring back the good old days when Sam Ervin and company were getting all that great TV coverage.

5. Keep announcing that certain programs are going to be undertaken the day after you become President.

This certainly makes one sound Presidential, and it has the added advantage of being the best way to avoid certain controversial issues. Announce that you intend to introduce legislation, now being drafted, just after you're elected. It's too early to say specifically what the legislation will look like, but if folks will come back right after the election they can look all they please. A great variation on the old "secret plan" move.

CARTER AND THE INTEREST GROUPS


To the extent that the various ploys described above don't seem to be working well enough to complete the job, Carter will have to deal with various interest groups. Analyzing the programmatic interests of the various groups gives some clues as to the potential issues which Carter will stress.

1. The Blacks.

Carter may feel that his black support is so solid that he can ignore the blacks. As the politically most liberal group in the population, they may have no place else to go. Certainly Carter's busing position to date (and the Atlanta program on which it is based) have been less than enthusiastically received by the NAACP, but Carter hasn't changed it. Carter's "ethnic purity" remark and his anti-big government theme both reinforce the impression that Carter doesn't think he can lose the black vote. If this analysis is correct, then Carter will have more freedom of movement for dealing with other groups, particularly the white ethnics.

2. The Jews.

Carter moved swiftly to mollify Jewish leaders after publication of the Shrum comments, an event which followed hard on the overwhelmingly negative reaction among Jewish leaders to Carter's "ethnic purity" comments. But Carter's move to



conciliate this group may have been more of an attempt to stave off wholesale defections than the beginning of a real campaign to win the Jews over. So far, Carter has taken a standard pro-Israel line, and he has opposed aid to religious schools, but he does not seem to have exhibited any great enthusiasm about dealing with this group. Again, the Jewish, as the second most liberal group in the population, may have no place else to go, unless they become as outraged with Carter as they were with McGovern. And I think it possible that if Carter feels confident of black support he would be willing to write off the Jews in order to gain support elsewhere.

Catholics -- This really is an important northern vote for Carter if we get the Jewish vote. As I indicate elsewhere in this memo, there should be a fairly good "fit" between Carter's image and the positions of these traditionally Democratic voters. Yet, as I have indicated in another memorandum, Carter has taken certain positions which should damage him with these voters.

Senior Citizens --

Because senior citizens, who are a population as large as young voters, vote three times as heavily, they are extremely important. Their national organization has indicated that their priority concerns are: (1) Inflation/Social security and (2) National Health Care.

Although many of these voters are conservatives, right now Carter is probably in a better position with them than we are.

Northern Rural Protestants

This group is another extremely important one for Carter. These traditionally Republican farmers and small businessmen are attracted by Carter's religiosity, the fact that he is a farmer, and his perceived fiscal conservatism. Carter received a heavy rural vote in the primaries.

Labor

Carter's problem with labor was discussed above. There is, of course, an overlap between his approach to the Catholics and his approach to the labor vote.



THE PROGRAM


Based on Carter's sense of where his potential support lies, I would imagine that some or all of the following positions would be likely to be ones which Carter would either take or want badly to finesse:

1. Carter will continue to take a "hard" line in foreign policy, suggesting that we have been outraded by the Russians. His call for strengthening of European alliances is essentially a conservative position.
2. Carter will not take any dramatically pro-Israel position for fear of alienating non-Jewish groups.
3. Carter has a difficult choice to make on economic policy. He would like to convince people that we can have full employment without inflation, but since that won't be possible, he's got to choose between concentrating on jobs and concentrating on the cost of living.

If Carter chooses jobs (and deficit spending), he stands to gain support from labor, the blacks, and the urban ethnics. At the same time however, he is likely to lose some Jewish support, part of his rural Protestant support, and part of his support among senior citizens. If Carter does not choose jobs, then he risks defections by traditional Democrats (or does he?) as the price for an attempt to cut into our traditional support.

Part of the way Carter apparently proposes to resolve this dilemma is through the use of wage/price controls, which may be a politically popular position.

4. Because of the cost questions involved, the politics of the health care issue look somewhat similar. Again, Carter has choice to make here.
5. Carter will, because of the importance of the rural vote, support a program involving heavy farm subsidies of the usual Democratic variety.
6. Another difficult problem for Carter may be his position on oil company divestiture. The oil industry is concentrated heavily in the South, and a pro-divestiture position (which Carter has not taken) would hurt him badly there. But an anti position



like the one he is currently on record with will certainly cost him in the Northeast, where prices are high and expected to become higher.

7. Because of his problem with the liberals, criminal justice issues should be particularly hard ones for Carter. A tough position here, which would have broad public support, would cost Carter dearly with the liberals. And the issue is an important one to the urban ethnics.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 25, 1976

*File
Campaign
Strategy*

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK CHENEY
FROM JIM REICHLEY
SUBJECT CONSTITUENCY ANALYSIS

At Mike's request, I am setting forth here an analysis of constituencies whose support the President will need to attract in order to win in November, with some suggestions on the kinds of appeals that might be directed to these constituencies to put together a winning coalition.

Mike has suggested that I might describe four constituencies as examples, selected from the categories of ethnic groups, religious groups, states, and age groups, and then give detailed suggestions on what is needed to win the support of each of these groups. After mulling it over for awhile, however, this exact approach did not seem to work, as the kind of appeal that you make to any one group is heavily conditioned by the other groups that you are trying to attract. I have therefore attempted a somewhat broader analysis, which I think nevertheless accomplishes Mike's objective.

First, let me make a few general points about constituency groups. The first thing to keep in mind about constituency groups is that they do not exist. Voters exist -- constituency groups are generalizing labels that help us think about how and why voters behave, but the groups have no objective reality of their own. All so-called blocs have many divisions within themselves. Most differ only in emphasis from the general population. It is worth recalling that 41 percent of Catholics favor the Supreme Court ruling on abortion, and a narrow majority of blacks oppose busing -- or at least did until the controversy heated up. (Such gross figures do not of course measure the intensity which either side brings to their feelings on the subject -- an issue that strongly motivates a relatively small group, such as opposition to gun control or aid to parochial schools, may be politically more important than an issue which attracts moderate or passive support from the great majority.)



Most people belong to a number of constituency groups, and the most that can be said is that their voting is to some extent influenced through their identification with some of these. There is no "Catholic vote". There are Catholic voters who are to varying degrees influenced by identification with the values and attitudes of their church. This should always be kept in mind when we speak of the Catholic vote, etc. as a shorthand.

Constituency identification is generally most influential when members of a group feel that a candidate is hostile to their group's interests. Few Jewish voters, for instance, would be likely to vote for a candidate perceived as anti-Israel. Labor unions have been able to exert considerable control over their members in state elections where right-to-work was a burning issue. But if all candidates are perceived as more or less friendly to Israel, or if right-to-work is not a clear and present issue, voters identifying with the groups aroused by these issues make their choices on other grounds.

The closest thing we now have to constituency groups that are actual electoral forces, rather than helpful generalizations, are voting blocs that are simply voted by their leaders. But these are now few and far between, particularly in general elections. Remember, Charles Percy came close to carrying Chicago four years ago against a loyal adherent of the Daley machine. And even blacks -- the most cohesive voting bloc -- are increasingly selective about which candidates they will support.

The second thing to remember is that President Ford's greatest single advantage is his appeal to the American people as a whole. The most important thing that the President has going for him is that he has been a good President -- his foreign policies have improved chances for peace, his economic policies have worked, he has acted -- and promises to continue to act -- in the best interest of all the people. If he should be perceived as deviating from this course to favor a particular group or groups, his chances for reelection would be greatly reduced. Our most important political, as well as governmental, objective, therefore, is that the President should continue to be regarded as the representative of the national interest, in contrast to our opposition's tendency to speak for particular, special interests.



We particularly should avoid the temptation to cast ourselves in the role of spokesmen for special interests that appear to be antagonistic to special interests that are pushed by the Democrats. If the Democrats, that is, claim to be the party of the blacks, we should not counter by trying to become the party of the whites; if the Democrats claim to promote women's rights, we should not aim a contrasting appeal to male chauvinists; if the Democrats claim to represent labor, we should not agree to become the party of business. The President, again and again, should stress that he acts for the good of all.

This being said, it must be conceded that the President's overall record, plus the solid Republican vote, brings us up to only about 40 percent. The extra 10 percent -- or 10.1 percent -- must be won by motivating people to vote for Ford because they believe that he will advance concerns that are of special interest to them. The most important group to which we have to appeal is of course the loose group that is concerned by the effects of Democratic liberalism. (This is not the same as hard core conservatives -- a group that comprises no more than 30 percent of all voters.) Polls consistently show inflation to be the number one concern of the nation's voters. Taxes are a somewhat less urgent concern just now, but there is no doubt that many middle-class and working-class voters are strongly resistant toward any further rise in taxes. The implications of the liberal Democratic program are not lost on most voters. To take only three major items, the combined costs of Humphrey-Hawkins, Kennedy-Corman health insurance, and federalization of welfare would be astronomical. (We should have -- if we do not have -- exact figures.) These costs can be paid only through inflation or higher taxes or both. If Humphrey or one of the liberals had been the Democratic candidate, I think the President could have won on voter rejection of the liberal program almost alone. With Carter, the problem is more difficult. Carter has edged toward the left, but he is still perceived as significantly more moderate than Humphrey, Kennedy, and friends. We should hang the liberal program on him to the extent that we can. We should nail him with Humphrey-Hawkins, which he privately opposes but publicly endorsed after "ethnic purity". Humphrey-Hawkins, as the Democrats have begun to realize, is a political loser -- I understand they are now afraid to bring it to a vote on the House floor. Carter has publicly stopped short of endorsing Kennedy-Corman, but Leonard Woodcock is circulating a letter to liberals saying that the Democratic platform, which Carter accepts, endorses it.


Carter is also ambiguous on welfare, but the Democratic platform promises that welfare will be "substantially financed" by the Federal government. We should tie all of this to Carter, and ask how he plans to pay for it. (I think the attack role, at least in the early stages of the campaign, should be carried out by somebody other than the President.) The fact is, however, that Carter is more moderate than Humphrey, et al. We should not lose credibility by becoming too strident in attempting to portray him as an extreme liberal.

Against Carter, we will have to present positive reasons why it would be a good thing to have Gerald Ford President for another four years. Again, the chief answer to this need is that the President's policies are good for the entire country. But to win, we will also need some additional specialized appeals. This is where the constituency groups come in.

There are several ways to divide the country into constituencies: states, income groups, age groups, religious groups, ethnic groups, sexes, issue groups, etc. Let's begin within the states, as these are the actual counters in Presidential electoral politics.

STATES

The New Majority strategy was to build a coalition based on the so-called Sun Belt, stretching from Florida to California, adding the basic Republican strength in the Mountain States and the Plains States and Upper New England, picking up most of the Border States, and counting on the conservative, mainly Catholic blue-collar vote to tip a few of the industrial states such as Illinois and Ohio Republican. This is still Reagan's strategy today. Against Carter, it will not work. I think Carter is almost assured of carrying the Deep South -- Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and South Carolina, and probably North Carolina as well. We must fight for Texas, Florida, Virginia, and the Border States -- but all will be tough. Carter appears weak in California, but the state is bound to be a battleground. Ford will have a better than usual chance, for a Republican, of carrying Lower New England against Carter (Reagan would have no chance), but realistically it will be a long-shot proposition, except perhaps Connecticut. This means that the key to the election will lie in the belt of industrial states that stretches from New Jersey to Minnesota.



If either candidate carries most of these states, he will win the election. Logic therefore suggests that these industrial states, plus California, should be primary targets. Texas, Florida, the Border States, and the Northwest should be secondary targets. Upper New England, Lower New England, the Mountain States, the Plains States, and the Deep South, for various reasons, should be tertiary targets. New York City, whether or not the state is winnable, will be important to the campaign as the media capital of the nation.

Concentrating then, for the moment, on the industrial states -- how can they be won? Consider the kind of Republicans who in recent years have won elections in these states: Ogilvie, Percy, Bill Scott, Milliken, Romney, Griffin, Knowles, Taft, Scranton, Shafer, Scott, Schweiker, Case, Cahill. These individuals differ in many ways (some, of course, eventually lost), but they share in common the quality of projecting an essentially progressive image -- not of runaway spending, or of extending government controls, but of holding out a positive vision for their constituencies' future. The New Majority strategy has almost never worked in these states. Jim Buckley doesn't count, since he represents New York -- a state with characteristics and problems that set it off from the rest of the industrial states of the East and Middlewest. (Anyhow, Buckley won with less than a majority in a three-way race.) Jim Rhodes is perhaps an exception, but his particular formula is too highly individualistic to have general application. Nixon's victory in 1972 is the only real exception -- but the nation's rejection of McGovern was too universal to tell us much about any particular region; anyhow, Carter does not arouse the kind of fears that McGovern caused.

The answer then seems to be that the best way for the President to carry the industrial states is to hold out a progressive image of the nation's future. This does not mean contradicting the basic conservatism of his economic approach, but showing ways in which this approach can lead to economic and social progress in the future. The primaries show that this goal can be achieved. These are all states (except Indiana, the least typical among them) in which the President ran well -- and progressive and moderate Republicans were the mainstays of his support in each of these states. Characteristics that most of these states have in common are: above average proportions of Catholics, Jews, blacks (for the north), second generation Americans, persons over 65, and political independents. It should be noted, however, that the largest single ethnic or religious group in all of



these states, except New Jersey, is composed of white Protestants. Special thought, therefore, should be given to the interests of these constituency groups. Obviously, there is something to be gained through attention to the direct economic interests of these states, wherever this can be done consistent with the genuine priorities of the government and the overall national interest. More fundamentally, however, the Ford effort in these states can be aided by programs and appeals shaped to attract their internal constituency groups.

ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS

Ethnic and religious groups are among the most important constituency groups in the U. S. Their internal structures and attitudes are, however, much more complex and subtle than is sometimes imagined. The groups split on economic and social issues on the basis of income, education, and age, though often in different proportions from group to group. Among politically independent Catholics, for instance, 39 percent of non-college graduates over 35 regard themselves as conservatives on economic issues, compared to 27 percent economic conservatives among non-college graduates under 35. (Among Northern white Protestant non-college graduates, the figures in these two categories are 51 percent economic conservatives over 35 and 30 percent economic conservatives under 35.) Prominent "leaders" of ethnic and religious groups are often quite unpopular with large parts of the groups they are supposed to represent.

This being said, the following generalizations may be applied:

WHITE PROTESTANTS remain, of course, not only the largest single ethnic-religious group in the United States, but also a majority of the total -- roughly 55 percent. They are the largest group in most of the key industrial states. They are also the most diverse, dividing not only on lines of economic interest and age but also of denomination. Roughly the denominations divide among the doctrinally more conservative, though politically more liberal, so-called "main line" groups, such as Episcopalians and Presbyterians; and the more evangelical fundamentalists, such as Baptists; with Methodists and Lutherans, two very important groups, falling somewhere in between. The main-line groups are more common in metropolitan areas and small cities, while the fundamentalists are more common in rural areas and small towns; but both are found in both geographic areas.

Republicans, to win, must carry the Protestant vote by very large majorities -- Nixon received 70 percent in 1972. What polling evidence we have shows Ford and Carter now running about even among Protestants. Some of this is due to Carter's disproportionate strength among Southern Protestants, but we must substantially improve Ford's standing with Northern Protestants. Carter appears relatively weak among suburban, main-line type Protestants, who recently have shown the greater tendency to swing Democratic. But he has special appeal, because of his Baptist religion, for the rural fundamentalists, who have generally been the most staunchly Republican. In the primaries, he swept the rural counties and small towns - without this vote he would have been soundly beaten in Michigan and Wisconsin. This vote must be denied him in the general election -- without large majorities in the "upstate" counties, Republicans have no chance of carrying Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, or Wisconsin.

Protestants have a tendency to be moralistic in their political attitudes -- they like to believe that they support a cause because it is "right." This is particularly true of rural fundamentalists, but also of Methodists and Presbyterians. It will be well for the President to stress the moral objectives of his policies -- not only that they enhance the individual voters self-interest, but also that they will help to make a better world. This should not be leaned on to the point of becoming sanctimonious, obviously.

Rural and smalltown Protestants, in particular, feel that they are being shut out by the current trend of national politics. Remember, this group virtually dominated the first 150 years of our national history. It was not until the twentieth century that the Episcopalian Roosevelts and the Catholic Kennedys were able to break their near monopoly on political power. Recently, they have felt that Republicans in particular, in their efforts to reach out to other groups, are passing them by. This is particularly true in the northern industrial states which are among our primary targets. The President can achieve much with this group simply by showing that he values their support -- that his origins are close to theirs, and that his attitudes are shaped by the same basic beliefs that they hold.



This group can also be reached through an economic appeal. Though population is now moving as a result of natural forces back to small cities and small towns, many of these areas still have serious economic problems. Helpful farm policies have political importance here, but a declining proportion of the rural and smalltown populations are tied to the farm economy. Most of these areas are now seeking other forms of economic development. A Ford "rural development" program would be most helpful. But most of all, the President should show, without slighting the cities, that he regards the small cities and shall towns as the areas where much of the nation's future growth lies. (Remember, polls show that a majority of city-dwellers and suburbanites would prefer to live in small towns.)

CATHOLICS, while still leaning Democratic, have been increasingly open to Republican appeals. Nixon carried 52 percent in 1972 -- the first time in this century that a Republican candidate for President had a majority of Catholics. Polling evidence now shows Carter about ten percentage points ahead of Ford. ^(among Catholics) Catholics, generally, did not vote for Carter in the primaries, but they do not seem to view him with the same hostility as they regarded McGovern four years ago. They are a key element in most of the industrial states, and we must cut substantially into Carter's current margin.

Any attempt to appeal to supposed anti-Baptist feelings among Catholics would of course be most ill-advised. Religious differences among Catholics and Protestants have not disappeared, but they are now much less pronounced than they were even ten years ago. Catholics who are not particularly religious probably have little feeling about Baptists one way or another. Religious Catholics, like religious Protestants -- and to some extent religious Jews -- are tending to draw together in a common "religious front", to combat what is viewed as an increasingly secular society. Carter's religion is a plus with most religious Catholics. We should aim to make the President's basically religious outlook a plus for us as well.

Catholics have some special concerns -- particularly abortion and parochial schools. (Abortion, incidentally, is not exclusively a Catholic issue. Many Protestants, particularly of the older generation, view abortion with horror -- though not in so uncompromising a way as the official Catholic position. On the other hand, it is a mistake to think that Republicans have nothing to lose by taking a strong stand against abortion. Many middle-class Republicans and independents, particularly among women, are strong pro-abortionists, and some will vote on this issue alone.)

The President's position on abortion does not satisfy the extremes on either side, but I think it seems basically right to most people who take some kind of religious view of the subject. He can go a long way toward satisfying Catholic opinion by indicating that he believes the unborn baby -- I did not say fetus -- has some kind of "rights."

Aid to parochial schools, to the extent that Supreme Court rulings leave it still an issue, is a difficult subject. It still arouses strong opposition among many Protestants, Jews and public school teachers of all denominations. On balance, I think there is more politically to be gained than lost through favoring some kind of aid, if a constitutional means can be found. The possible corruption that might be introduced by a voucher system bothers me, but it certainly deserves study.

Catholics are located predominantly in metropolitan areas -- though there are many rural Catholics in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan -- and are therefore particularly concerned about city issues. We should push the crime package much more strongly than we have so far done. More fundamentally, some kind of coordinated program to "save our cities" is most desirable, politically as well as governmentally. Our approach is that this must be done basically at the state and local levels, but we should set forth a program on how it is to be done -- telling how much of the cost can be borne by the federal government, how much locally. We should claim more credit for this year's housing initiative. The busing issue is important to many Catholics, though some are insulated against it by the parochial schools. My feeling is that the President's position on the busing issue is essentially right, is shared by the great majority of Americans -- but we should not proceed as though we viewed it as the major domestic issue in the campaign. It should be one element in an overall array of Ford legislative initiatives.

Most of all, Catholics -- as well as Protestants and Jews -- can be reached through appeals to family values. Much of this is a matter of setting limits beyond which government should not intrude, but also government should contribute to a moral atmosphere in which cohesive families can flourish. Bill Baroody has written with great insight on this subject.



Some comments on particular predominately Catholic ethnic groups:

IRISH, despite their long ties to the Democratic party, are now most tending toward the Republican Party. The Irish are basically conservative, very patriotic -- concerned about maintaining a strong defense; angry over pornography, other manifestations of "permissive" society. We can appeal to them on some of these issues. For foreign policy reasons, if for no other, the less said about Northern Ireland, the better.

ITALIANS have always been more politically independent than the Irish, are now more upwardly mobile. Many respond to economic conservatism, are concerned about erosion of family values. I would handle saving Italy from the Communists with care -- again primarily on foreign policy grounds, of course; but many Italians in this country as well as in Italy regard the Christian Democrats as incompetent crooks. But prominent Italian-Americans should of course be brought in on any projected aid program.

POLES are a tough nut for Republicans to crack, except in some areas where the Democratic Party has been dominated by the Irish. Best way to appeal is through arguments for economic, social conservatism -- joined to generally progressive vision of the future.

GREEK ORTHODOX, who are not of course Roman Catholics, are deeply concerned over the Cyprus issue -- which is tough to deal with on foreign policy grounds. I suggest that the President might give the Medal of Freedom for religion to Archbishop Iakobos. It would save us the problem of choosing among the three major faiths, and would be much appreciated among Greeks.

Needless to say, appearances at ethnic festivals, conventions, etc. -- any form of recognition -- will be most helpful.

JEWS edged toward Nixon last time, and are now disturbed over Carter -- but polls show them going for Carter over Ford by about three-to-one. Though relatively few in number, they are articulate and strategically located in such target states as California, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Illinois. We should definitely aim to build Ford strength in the Jewish community. Jews are basically concerned about recognition (like all other groups, but particularly those that have traditionally felt insecure), Israel (toward which we should stress

our friendship, within limits set by national policy), and a progressive attitude toward government. Jews tend to be liberals. They will not agree with us on many issues, but I think against Carter we can win a significant number of them to our side.

Let me here express some thoughts about liberals in general. I think we can -- and must -- win a portion of the liberal vote against Carter. To win, a Republican must obviously capture a large share of the independents and also win over a sizable number of Democrats. In the primaries, the Democrats divided, roughly, into a Carter vote, a Jackson-Wallace vote, and a Udall-Brown vote. (I am not sure where Church fits in.) I would argue that the Jackson-Wallace vote is the least budgeable Democratic vote in November. The moderate-to-conservative Democrats most available to a Republican appeal -- those who voted for Nixon in 1972 -- voted predominantly for Carter. We would have had them again against Humphrey. Against Carter, whom some of them supported in the primaries (many did not vote), this group will be hard to crack. We must and will win back some of them, as we point out Carter's leaning toward liberal measures, but Carter will probably keep many of them. We need to get Democrats from one or both of the other two blocs. The Jackson-Wallace vote, outside the South, are the hard core Democrats, who vote Democratic in November, regardless of who the Democrats put up -- a liberal, a conservative, whatever. The South Boston Irish who voted for Wallace in this year's primary voted for even McGovern four years ago. Carter goes down comparatively easy with them. The Democratic liberals, the Udall-Brown voters, on the other hand, are deeply disturbed about Carter. We should aim to get some of them -- not so much on the issues, as on the ground that if Carter wins, they are likely to be frozen out of control of the Democratic Party for eight years. Similar considerations have led liberals in Texas to vote for John Tower in several elections. Our part should be mainly to keep in mind that part of this vote is now available, and not campaign in such a way that Democratic liberals would feel it impossible to cast a vote for Ford. (They would certainly never vote for Reagan.) Getting even a small share of this vote in the industrial states could be critical.



BLACKS are very difficult for any Republican, and appear to have a special affinity for Carter, with whom many of them share a common Baptist background. It is noteworthy, however, that polls show Ford doing a bit better among blacks -- about five percentage points -- against Carter than Nixon did four years ago. Some of the black leadership is suspicious of Carter, and some -- in Philadelphia and Cleveland -- were able to turn substantial blocs of black voters away from him in the primaries. We should do what we can here, again through recognition, and by stressing opportunity for black businessmen. Pushing aid for Africa also probably helps some. The "Clean Up America" proposal would help with the problem of unemployed black teenagers. To hold on to even that five percent gain among blacks would be extremely valuable in almost all the industrial states.

AGE GROUPS

Poll evidence shows the President doing best against Carter among the middle-aged, ages 36-55. The advantage that he enjoyed among young voters against Humphrey disappears against Carter. Ford also does not do well among older age groups.

To recapture support of youth, Ford needs to stress the underlying idealism of his program -- also how his economic policies will lead to a more prosperous future. The peace issue is also important among young people.

Among older voters, we must overcome the impression that Ford has slighted the elderly. We can appeal to underlying social conservatism, but we should also push much harder on catastrophic health insurance. The President should make this one of his top priority legislative items, and hold the Democrats' feet to the fire if they fail to pass it. We also should stress the President's proposals to assure the fiscal soundness of the Social Security system.

SEXES

The President receives about the same poll ratings from men and women -- but Carter's rating is almost ten points lower among women than among men! I have noticed among my own acquaintances that many women seem to distrust Carter -- the smile turns them off. Obviously, we will just have to hope that this chemistry continues to work.


Mrs. Ford is very helpful to the President with women -- also the Ford family. The President clearly should not take extreme feminist positions. His support for ERA is well known. I think we should make more of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The strong presence of women in the Ford Administration should be publicized. Beyond that, the President should stress his support for family values -- still the most important consideration with a majority of women.

SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS

BUSINESS in general supports the President -- or Reagan -- but businessmen are not particularly frightened of Carter, as they were of McGovern. We must hammer home the remarkable job the President has done for the economy. Committees of business groups should be organized in all industries and all over the country, if this is not already under way. The President should always stress that his economic policies are designed to benefit the entire country -- not business alone. But our economic approach, unlike that of the Democrats, rests on encouragement of growth and investment in the private sector.

ORGANIZED LABOR, by the large, will be for Carter -- though in some sectors with considerable suspicion and without marked enthusiasm. Fooling around with the kind of insurgent labor leaders who for their own purposes can sometimes be persuaded to support Republicans has never seemed to me to be very productive. Our main objective should be to appeal to the rank-and-file on the basis of the President's general program, and keep the established union leadership from building too much of a head of steam for Carter. Above all, we should not embark on a "crusade" against "union bosses."

SCHOOL TEACHERS are a key group moving closer to the unions and the Democrats, but with strong ties still at the member level to the Republicans. At least half of the nation's school teachers are Republicans or lean Republican in state and local elections. Endorsement of Carter by the NEA would be a very serious blow, which we should seek strongly to head off. Obviously, the President is not going to meet the NEA's demand that the federal government pay one-third the cost of education - but neither is Carter. The Supreme Court, fortunately, has taken federal regulation of state and local employee relations off our backs -- the President should say as little as possible about strikes by public employees; it is now mainly a state and local issue.



Since the President favors the teachers' position on portability of pensions, we should turn out a proposal on that subject -- unless the Supreme Court ruling prohibits that, too. I think we should consider proposing a separate Department of Education -- I realize it goes against the Administration's position, but I think the need to appeal to teachers, at least symbolically, is exceptionally important.

NURSES are another middle-class group, leaning Republican in the past, now growing increasingly militant, increasingly Democratic. I don't know specifically what they want from the federal government, but we should try to meet their reasonable aims.

FARMERS obviously must be kept heavily Republican to hold the Plains and Mountain States, and also are important in most of the key heavy population states from New Jersey to Minnesota. The politics of agriculture are beyond me -- although some of the farmers in the Middlewest are said to be mad at us.

ENVIRONMENTALISTS are down on the Ford Administration. Some of them need to be won back. There are many middle-class conservationists and working-class sportsmen who lean toward the Republicans on other issues. We must at least avoid allowing the environmental issue to become so aggravated that environmentalists will vote against Ford on that issue alone. A part of this is going strongly on record in support of a clean environment -- with a minimum of modifying conditions. We should make the point that our economic policies provide for the kind of investment that will be needed to pay for environmental protection, accompanying growth. We should make more of the ongoing environmental activity being carried on by the Administration. I am told that the environmentalists' current top priorities are: amendments to the Clean Air Act; the toxic substances control bill; and strip mine regulation. I am not familiar with the policy issues involved, but wherever we can responsibly lean toward them, it would be politically helpful. The "Clean Up America" proposal should also be favorably received by environmentalists.

cc:

✓ Mike Duval

Foster Chanock

Points to Include from Reichley memo

- Constituency groups do not exist
- Constituency identification is generally most influential when members of a group feel that a candidate is hostile to their group's interest.
- Must maintain base of support by stressing the positive things P has done for good of the country as a whole.
- The "New Majority" strategy (Sun Belt - Fla to Calif - , plus Republican Mountain ^{and Plains} States and Upper N.E., plus conservative, blue-collar Catholics to tip a few industrial states such as Ill + Ohio) won't work against Carter. Carter will carry deep South - GA, Ala, Miss., La, Ark, S.C. + probably N.E. . We can win Tex, Fla, Va and Border States - but tough. Calif a fight but winnable.
 - Primary targets: industrial states plus California
 - Secondary : Texas Fla, Border states and N.W.,
 - Tertiary Gerald R. Ford Library New England, Mountain and Plains States and Deep South.

- Largest single ethnic or religious group in industrial states (except N.J.) is White Protestants. Most diverse group.

Broken into:

- 1) Episcopalians + Presbyterians - "main line" doctrinally conservative but politically liberal
- 2) Methodists + Lutherans - in between
- 3) Baptists - evangelical fundamentalists

- Carter appears relatively weak among suburban, main-line Protestants (traditionally vote Democrat) but strong among rural fundamentalists (generally staunchly Republicans).

- To appeal to Protestants, P should stress the moral objectives of his policies.


- Can reach Catholics (and Protestants + Jews) through appeals to family values.

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The Election Could Be Close

Despite Jimmy Carter's wide lead over Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan in all the national polls, Americans are far from sold on the Georgian as their next President. Doubts about him persist even among registered Democrats: while 47% are satisfied with him as their party's nominee, 44% would prefer someone else. Thus the election may be far closer than predicted, particularly if the Republicans nominate Ford, who is far more popular among the voters than Reagan. This is the chief message of a nationwide telephone poll of 1,007 registered voters conducted for TIME from June 21 to 24 by Yankelovich, Skelly and White, Inc., an opinion-research firm.

The survey found that Carter's lead over Reagan has widened since the early primaries. If the election were held today, Carter would trounce him by 51% to 31%, up from 46% to 36% in a poll in March. But Carter's edge over Ford has remained almost the same since late



April, 47% to 38%. The reason seems to be Carter's failure to overcome the antagonism of many Democrats and independents, particularly those who have liberal views on the issues.

Among the Democrats and independents who would like next week's convention to nominate someone else, 62% regard Carter's positions as fuzzy, and 58% believe that he changes them depending on his audience. More than a third of this group fault him for lack of experience in national office, and 40% feel that he does not understand regions of the country outside the South. By contrast, there is not much concern about Carter's evangelical religious beliefs or lack of a sense of humor.

Of five possible Democratic nominees for Vice President, Senator Frank Church of Idaho emerged as the most popular, followed by Senators Adlai Stevenson of Illinois, Walter Mondale of Minnesota and John Glenn of Ohio and Governor Michael Dukakis of Massa-




chusetts. A net of 14% of those polled said they would be more likely to vote for Carter if Church were on the ticket; any one of the other four men made much less difference to them. Church would strengthen Carter in those regions where he needs help the most: the West and Midwest.

On the Republican side, the poll found that Reagan's aggressive campaign has cut into Ford's support among the party's rank and file; he now leads Reagan among Republicans 53% to 36%, down from 65% to 27% in April. Reagan has also persuaded significant numbers of voters that Ford is "too soft" on the Russians (a view held by 45% of all voters interviewed), has no program for the country (38%), and has been a weak President (37%). Moreover, 45% are still upset about Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon.

But Ford remained a much stronger potential candidate than Reagan, even in the Sunbelt states. For example, in the West, Ford's support was almost the same as Carter's (42% to 44%), while Reagan trailed the Georgian 37% to 46%. In the Midwest, Ford led Carter, 43% to 41%, but Reagan was far behind Carter, 34% to 47%.

Large numbers of voters also have



PAUL J. PUGLIESE

Carter's Character

As a Leader, Georgian
Is Strong and Capable;
Flaw: Huge Ambition

He Cares About Poor People,
Justice, but at the Moment
He Cares About Winning

No Favors for His Friends

By JAMES P. GANNON

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
NEW YORK — The Democratic Party, hungry for victory in 1976, has found the right man in Jimmy Carter: he is the hungriest politician of our time.

The former Georgia governor's awesome appetite for the presidency and his willingness to go to almost any lengths to satisfy it have propelled him from the obscurity of rural Plains, Ga., to a sure first-ballot nomination at the Democratic Party's national convention, which opens here today. Mr. Carter's victory is the triumph of an indomitable will over a reluctant party.

Determined. Disciplined. Self-confident. Combative. Shrewd. Humorless. Vindictive. Those are the adjectives that seem to fit the man, yet they are inadequate. The words don't capture the Spartan self-denial, relentless drive, brassy brilliance, moralistic fervor and scary sense of destiny that blend, in larger-than-life quantities, to make up the Carter character. Such strong attributes create a twin-pole magnetism around the candidate that simultaneously attracts zealous believers and repels doubters.

Little things are revealing of the man. Obsessed with punctuality, he becomes angry at being even five minutes late to anything. Iron-willed, he has decided not to take a single alcoholic drink—not even a cold beer offered by his mother on a hot weekend off in Georgia—during his grueling, two-year presidential campaign. Doggedly meticulous, over three years ago he plotted down to a decimal point the precise percentage of effort to devote to each of the 50 states in his nomination drive. A stickler for scheduling, he advised his successor as Georgia governor, it is said, to be sure his secretary designated times to go to the bathroom.



But the little things leave big questions unresolved. Is Jimmy Carter a man of principle or an unprincipled opportunist? Is he trustworthy or not? Is he as filled with decency and compassion and love as his soulful speeches are? Is he, at last, a leader who will raise up a new standard of morality in government or a pious phony capitalizing on a country's vulnerability—its aching urge to feel decent again after Vietnam and Watergate?

Central Issue: His Character

These questions, so difficult to answer, are the crucial ones about Mr. Carter because they go to the core of his unorthodox but spectacularly successful campaign. Shunning ideology, soft-pedaling issues, 51-year-old Mr. Carter has captured his party's presidential nomination by preaching a morality message: that he is the one to restore competence, compassion and decency in government.

The central issue, then, is Jimmy Carter's character. More than most politicians, he must convince voters of his own basic decency or risk mocking his main reason for running.

The best that can be offered here is a tentative appraisal of the man, admittedly somewhat subjective and certainly not definitive. This article represents one reporter's analysis of Mr. Carter as a person, based on a study of his record, his campaigns, and interviews with family, friends, aides and others.

The bottom line on Mr. Carter is this: He is a strong, serious, immensely capable leader with humanitarian instincts and firm moral convictions whose flaw is an enormous ambition that sometimes overwhelms his better qualities. Above all, Mr. Carter wants to win, to achieve. His only loss in politics, in the 1966 race for governor of Georgia, plunged him into a mid-life crisis from which he emerged as the nonstop runner, determined never to lose again, no matter what.

"He's Expedient"

"Jimmy very seriously believes in his ability to help this nation," says an Atlanta friend who worked for him as governor. "But he has to get to the White House to do it, so he's expedient, and he rationalizes." The rationalization appears to lead candidate Carter to the notion that the end justifies the means: He intends to do good for the country as President; therefore, whatever he must do to win is justifiable.

This may help explain the evasiveness that Mr. Carter displays in handling some issues or his amazing ability to weave words so that he sounds conservative to a conservative group and liberal to a liberal audience without really contradicting himself. It helps explain his controversial "redneck" 1970 gubernatorial campaign that contrasts so starkly with his generally applauded record as a progressive governor.

"His attitude," says a former aide who worked for Mr. Carter in his 1970 campaign, "was to take the high road. But if it took the low road to win, then (he felt), 'Go do it, but don't tell me about it.'" This former aide, still an admirer of the Georgian, contends that Mr. Carter "didn't want to know about" the ethically questionable television ads and campaign literature designed by his strategists to paint his opponent, Carl Sanders, as an ultraliberal friend of the blacks.



Wednesday, July 14, 1976

Carter's Strategy

Democrat Plans to Act More Like a President, Keep 'Outsider' Image

He Intends to Put Emphasis On 13 Key States, Work Closely With Party Aides

Is There a Typo in the Polls?

By ALBERT R. HUNT

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

NEW YORK — Jimmy Carter, already charting his fall campaign, is planning a clever balancing act.

As in the primaries, he will run as an anti-Washington outsider, stressing the non-ideological themes of integrity, trust and love. But he also will try, through both policy pronouncements and media imagery, to look more like a President and less like a peanut farmer.

"The public wants to see him acting as a very competent person, even presidential," suggests Patrick Caddell, the Carter pollster. "But we don't want him to look like he has been captured by the very forces he's running against."

"We don't want to lose our outsider image," concurs Gerald Rafshoon, Mr. Carter's advertising man. "We want to look presidential, but not too presidential."

By sewing up the Democratic presidential nomination over a month before the convention vote tonight, the Carter camp has freed itself to start meticulous preparations for the general election effort. And despite the current commanding lead in the polls, Mr. Carter and his aides say they anticipate a close, hard-fought election. "A lot of the support we now see is fluffy," Mr. Caddell acknowledges. "We know we aren't going to have a 14-point lead going into October," says Hamilton Jordan, the Carter campaign manager, referring to polls showing that margin over President Ford. "We hope to keep at least a five-to-six-point lead."

Elements of the Strategy

Still, the Carter camp remains supremely confident that the Republicans can't win the election; the only possible danger these Democrats see is that Mr. Carter could somehow blow it. This feeling dictates a careful, cautious strategy with these central ingredients:

—A calculated effort to make Mr. Carter look more like a President. There will be more formal speeches, many more policy position papers and possibly television commercials that emanate from his Plains, Ga., study instead of the peanut fields that often were seen during the primaries.

—The Carterites intend to center their energies and money on 13 pivotal states, including New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania, most of which they feel Mr. Carter has an excellent chance of winning. They see certain victory in 14 lesser states and the District of Columbia, and anticipate likely losses only in a half-dozen small states.

—The Carter campaigners hope to work closely with the Democratic National Committee, state and local parties, and labor leaders in order to whip up maximum enthusiasm for their man. Mr. Carter (whose post-nomination campaign will be financed mostly by U.S. Treasury funds) will send out a huge fund-raising appeal on behalf of the Democratic National Committee this week.

Solidifying the Base

Close cooperation with party leaders may be extra-important for this year's presidential candidate; Mr. Carter remains highly suspect in some traditional Democratic circles. "Our challenge is different than most Democratic nominees," Mr. Caddell says. "Usually a candidate has a base and, after the convention, starts to reach over to bring in independents and independent Republicans. We already have the reach-over, so what we have to do is solidify our base."

Despite generally upbeat prospects, Mr. Carter has potentially serious problems with fellow Democrats in such major states as California and New York. The "born-again" Baptist apparently faces a genuine "cultural gap" with the more secular-minded California electorate and with the heavily Catholic and Jewish populations in New York.

Still, on a state-by-state basis, Carter aides feel that their man is comfortably ahead of either President Ford or Ronald Reagan now. "The popular vote might wind up fairly close," one aide says, "but electorally we should win a landslide." This count assumes that almost all the South will go for a native son, along with traditionally Democratic Northern States and at least some big swing states, such as Ohio and Illinois.

Varying the Strategy

The Carter strategy will vary slightly depending on whom the Republicans nominate. If they choose President Ford, Carter strategists will try to depict him as an old-hat Washingtonian who simply isn't doing a good job of running the government. "We will make the case that he's just not in charge," says Jody Powell, Mr. Carter's press secretary.

If the Republicans pick Ronald Reagan, the Democrat will seek to paint his opponent as an extremist. "We would make the point you really don't want Ronald Reagan to be running the country," Mr. Powell says. Mr. Caddell suggests questions could be raised such as whether Mr. Reagan would "A-bomb the Ditch," in reference to Mr. Reagan's hard-line stand on the Panama Canal—even though Mr. Carter's present position on that issue is strikingly similar. Neither man is willing to relinquish U.S. control of the canal to the Panamanians.

STRATEGY DETAILS

BACKGROUND PAPERS

History

Constituency Groups

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 13, 1976

MEMO FOR MIKE DUVAL

FROM: Tim Hardy *TH*

SUBJECT: Intelligence Reform as a Campaign Issue

As far as I can tell from looking at the President's recent speeches, he has not been mentioning his intelligence community reforms. It seems to me discussion of the steps he has taken could be a valuable addition to his official statements. (I recall the able way in which you presented the reforms to the groups you briefed in February and March as good examples of the way in which to present the President's intelligence accomplishments.)

It seems to me that the only persons unlikely to be impressed with the reforms are Eastern liberals -- and they're not exactly the persons the President is playing to now.

In discussing the Intelligence Package, the President could stress:

-- An ability to tackle hard issues -- the kind a President must tackle -- such as the line to be drawn between effective intelligence and protection of civil liberties.

-- An understanding of the crucial needs of the U.S. for foreign intelligence to have effective defense and foreign policy.

-- An ability to restructure government decision-making processes to ensure that resource decisions are made that allow federal monies to be expended in the most efficient and effective manner.

-- An example of an area where Congress is unable to act effectively, but the President can and has seized the initiative.



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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MAY 26 1976

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 26, 1976

file -
Campaign

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MARSH
FROM JIM REICHLEY
SUBJECT ADMINISTRATION AGENDA

Jim Cavanaugh, Paul O'Neill and I have met as you asked and identified the following general areas as those covered by the President's program, already in place or under consideration:

- Tax cut with control on spending
- Defense
- Attack on big government, through consolidation of grant programs and General Revenue Sharing
- Problems of the aging - Social Security and Medicare amendments
- Energy
- Crime
- Drug abuse and control
- Foreign policy
- Welfare reform - under study
- Health insurance - under study
- Regulatory reform
- Job Creation - with emphasis on private sector, with help of tax incentives
- Estate tax relief
- Environment
- Urban development
- Rural development
- Equal rights
- Housing
- Privacy
- Veterans - using new VA hospitals as concrete examples
- Transportation
- Small business



After surveying these general areas, we recommend that the President zero in on the following specific items, as the "core" of the Administration program:

1. Tax cut with ceiling on spending
2. Defense budget
3. Consolidation of Health Care grants
4. Child Nutrition Reform
5. Catastrophic Health Insurance
6. Secure financing of Social Security
7. Consolidation of Education grants
8. Mandatory sentencing
9. Narcotics Sentencing and Seizure Act
10. Food Stamp Reform
11. Tax incentives to help create jobs
12. Estate tax relief
13. General Revenue Sharing

We suggest that the President set forth this package as a single program of "must" legislation, and that he then follow up with four or five talks, probably over radio, on his objectives in some of the more general areas listed above. We will work on developing recommendations for these follow-up talks.

cc:
Paul O'Neill
Jim Cavanaugh



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: DICK CHENEY

May 25, 1976

FROM: JIM REICHLEY

RE: NEW BILL OF RIGHTS



I suggest that at some point-- perhaps July 4-- the President propose a "New Bill of Rights" or "Bill of Rights" for the Third Century" or something like that. This will give him an opportunity to present some of his themes in a news-catching way, to identify with patriotic enthusiasm, and, most important, to make headway at controlling the agenda for the coming campaign. We, not the Democrats or the Reaganites, should lay out the issue framework on which the campaign will be fought.

There are, of course, a number of possibilities for inclusion in the New Bill of Rights, but I would suggest the following:

- I- The Right to Live in a Peaceful World. The need for strong defense and skilled, flexible diplomacy.
- II- The Right to Economic Opportunity. Policies that encourage economic development, while withstanding the danger of inflation. A free economy in which enterprise and endeavor pay off. Governmental policies that support the growth of capital, which results in jobs.
- III- The Right to a Fair Start in Life. Educational opportunities which initiative. enable each student to advance to the limits of his abilities and ~~interests~~. A job market free of bias. Child Nutrition Reform.
- IV- The Right to Protection against Crime and Violence. Safe streets. Protection of property and personal security. A harmonious social order.
- V- The Right to Decent Health Care at Affordable Cost. The President's proposal for protection against catastrophic illness among the elderly. Support for medical research. Policies that reduce pressures on medical costs. Consolidation of health care assistance.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



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VI-- The Right to the Preservation of a Natural ~~EM~~ Environment that Makes Possible Full Development of the Physical, Mental, and Spritual Resources of the Individual. National parks. Progress against pollution.

VII-- The Right to the Availability of Transportation ~~EMEM~~ Facilities that Provide Ready Access to Places of Work, Education, and Recreation. The Interstate. Aviation Regulation Reform. The President's Urban Transit Investment Policy. Soundly conceived Amtrak.

VIII-- The Right to the Availability of Adequate Housing in a Decent Community Setting. Revenue sharing. Additional housing assistance for 500,000 families in this year's budget. Consolidation of assistance for community services.

IX-- The Right to Honest and Efficient Government at the Lowest Possible Cost. Tax reduction. Tax reform. Program consolidation. Honesty and candor in government.

X-- The Right to Oppertunity for Continued Fulfilment in Retirement Years. Soundly financed Social Security. Protection against costs of ~~EMEM~~ catastrophic illness.

~~Each of these rights-- like the original Bill of Rights-- carries with~~

All of these rights-- like the original Bill of Rights-- carry with them commensurate responsibilities and obligations. They can be secured and maintained only through individual effort and through government that is dedicated to unleashing the energies of a free society.

This idea may be criticized by traditionalists (on the ground that it is gimmicky) and legalists (on the ground that "rights" suggest claims that can be legally enforced through the courts.) Both of these criticisms, however, I think are outweighed by the opportunity that it would give the

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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President to set forth his program in an inspirational, positive-- perhaps
even memorable-- context.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 26, 1976

11:00 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK CHENEY
FROM JIM REICHLEY
SUBJECT ADMINISTRATION PROGRAM

After reviewing and thinking over the legislation and administrative initiatives that have been proposed by the President, my principal conclusion is that the Administration now has on the boards an excellent program, well designed to meet the real needs of the people, but that it is not sufficiently identified as a coherent program, and is not adequately understood by the voters. Some new initiatives may be appropriate. I suggest that the Domestic Council's examination of welfare options (due in about four months) and of health perspectives (due around the end of September) be accelerated if possible. Also, I suggest that two or three of Jim Lynn's array of proposed projects be selected out and pushed to rapid completion. Jim tells me that this is feasible. Of the new initiatives included in the current policy updater, several might be considered for inclusion in the Administration program. To me, the two most promising appear to be the Reform of the Sentencing Process in the Federal Criminal Justice System suggested by the Attorney General, and the Urban Development Bank. The White House Conference on Drugs and Crime suggested by the Justice Department also sounds like it might be a good idea. The educational aspects of the Children's Health Project suggested by HEW have obvious appeal, but of course costs would have to be carefully studied.

In general, however, I think that our major effort should be directed toward pushing the program the President has already proposed, toward showing the ways in which that program is directed at dealing with the problems that people experience in their everyday lives, and toward identifying the program as a bold and comprehensive approach by the President to meet the nation's essential needs.



At Jack Marsh's request, Jim Cavanaugh, Paul O'Neill and I have put together a proposed list of "core" items in the Administration program, with the recommendation that these be strongly promoted by the President, and by all Administration spokesmen and officials. These include: Tax cut with a ceiling on spending; Defense budget; Consolidation of Health care grants; Child Nutrition Reform; Catastrophic Health Insurance; Secure financing of Social Security; Mandatory sentencing; Narcotics Sentencing and Seizure Act; Food Stamp Reform; Tax incentives for jobs; Estate tax relief; Consolidation of Education grants; and General Revenue Sharing. Nobody in the public, of course, will remember all of these items, but a relatively large number is desirable as a means of making the point that the Administration's program is both comprehensive and complete. To include all major items in the program, on the other hand, would become unwieldy.

Once the list of items to be included in the "core" program is decided on, the President should launch an all-out offensive, pointing out that the nation's progress depends on enactment of this program, and demanding that Congress move. (Incidentally, I notice that we have a tendency to refer to the problem as "Congress". I suppose this is purposefully done, but I think it would be helpful to morale among Republican members if we referred to the "Democratic majority in Congress" or perhaps simply to the "opposition in Congress". Also, I think we should not go too far in accenting our difficulties in getting along with Congress. Remember, when Truman ran against Congress in 1948, it was with some realistic prospect that the voters would elect a Democratic Congress -- which in fact happened. A Republican majority, unfortunately, is not a credible possibility at this time. In general, the President should proceed as though he assumes that Congress, once it understands the urgent need for his program, will meet its responsibilities).

In addition to the President's direct efforts, there are a number of ways to bring the program before the people. I would suggest, for instance, that the core program items be listed on a card, given to all Cabinet members and other Administration spokesmen, with the request that they plug these in all of their public appearances. Even if they just rattle them off, it will leave an impression of comprehensiveness. Also, consideration might be given to issuing a status report on fifteen or so major administrative bills every Friday afternoon. Some papers might carry this as a kind of box score. We might even include



status of other major bills, such as Humphrey-Hawkins and Kennedy-Corman, with notations that we oppose them. I realize that this might present a discouraging picture, but at least it would set before the public the fact that we have a program on which Congress is failing to act.

In presenting the program, we should emphasize its positive effects: nutrition reform will provide more help for needy children, health care consolidation will produce a better health care delivery system, education consolidation will mean better education for children, tax incentives for industry will mean more jobs, etc. Also, of course, we will do these things at less expense to the taxpayers than the alternative approaches.

The Ford program is designed to meet a number of simply stated basic needs: more jobs, control of inflation, solving the energy problems, fighting crime, improving the delivery of services. Most of all, maintaining world peace. These should be the themes around which presentation of the program is built.

There are two areas in which our program now seems to me rather thin: protection of the environment and rural (or non-metropolitan) development. Both have important constituencies -- in the first of which we should aim to at least hold our own, and in the second we must aim for massive majorities. Perhaps we should try for some additional ideas in these areas.

