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CHINA

CARTER ON RELATIONS WITH
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA



Carter favors eventual normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, but says he does not want to reach that goal until he has full assurances that Taiwan will be "free of military persuasion or domination". Carter has urged that the U.S. examine the Japanese formula -- diplomatic ties with Peking, trade ties with Taiwan. On at least one occasion, he has said that he would explore stronger U.S.-PRC ties more aggressively than the Administration.

CARTER QUOTES ON CHINA

Q. So far as relations with China go, would you take the next step and send an ambassador there?

A. Yes, I would. But how soon it happened would depend on the attitudes of the Chinese Government. I would be cautious about it. We have an obligation to the government of Taiwan not to abandon it. Japan is taking an approach with heavy trade mission commitments in Taiwan but with relationships being established with the Chinese Government. Whether we would want to go that far I do not know, but a natural friendship does exist between the Chinese people and our own. There has always been, in my mind, a subconscious feeling that the Chinese are our friends. I don't know the latest attitude of the Chinese Government toward us, but if I found out that the friendship was reciprocal, then I think that would be the basis upon which we could predicate more progress.

Newsweek (European Edition)
May 10, 1976

Q. Would you envisage moving quickly to normalize relations with Peking -- perhaps involving recognition?

A. No. I don't envision that. It's an ultimate goal that's good for us to maintain.

Eventually we're going to have to recognize the existent of the People's Republic of China. But I would want to have an assurance in some way, to my satisfaction, that there would not be a military attack on Taiwan and that the Taiwanese people would be relatively independent and our commitment to them respected.

U.S. News and World Report
September 13, 1976

"Our relations with China are important to world peace and they directly affect the world balance. The United States has a great stake in a nationally independent, secure, and friendly China. The present turmoil in Chinese domestic politics could be exploited by the Soviets to promote a Sino-Soviet reconciliation which might be inimical to international stability and to American interests. I believe that we should explore more actively the possibility of widening American-Chinese trade relations and of further consolidating our political relationships."

Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations
March 15, 1976

"It is important to continue to seek agreements with the Russians and the Chinese, especially in the control of weapons. Success there could mean life instead of death for millions of people. But the divisions between us are deep. The differences of history and ideology will not go away. It is too much to expect that we can do much more in these relationships than reduce the areas of irritation and conflict and lessen the dangers of war."

Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations
March 15, 1976

"For many nations, we have two policies: One announced in public, another pursued in secret. In the case of China, we even seem to have two Presidents."

He accused Kissinger of "slapping in the face all those Americans who want a foreign policy that embodies our ideals, not subverts them."

Chicago Tribune
May 16, 1976

"At the present time ... our ambassador is in Taiwan. We have a trade officer in the People's Republic of China. That's the way I would prefer to keep it at least for the time being ... I would like to see us in the long run establish full relationship with China itself."

Speech, Akron, Ohio
June 3, 1976

- On relations with China, he wants "normalization" or full diplomatic relations with Peking, as does Kissinger. Carter urges the "Japan formula" - diplomatic relations with Peking while maintaining trade relations with Taiwan.


Los Angeles Times
July 18, 1976

Asked how soon he would move to full recognition of Communist China: "That is an ultimate goal, but the time is undefined. I would like assurances that the people of Taiwan -- the Republic of China - or whatever it might be called -- be free of military persuasion or domination from mainland China. That may not be a possibility; if it is not, then I would be reluctant to give up our relationship with the Republic of China."

Time
August 2, 1976

UNITED NATIONS

CARTER ON THE UNITED NATIONS



Consistent with his call for a "new world order," Carter expresses strong support for a strengthened U.N. The organization has suffered, he says, because of drift and because it has been relegated to the status of a debating society. "We should make a major effort at reforming and structuring the U.N. systems."

Among his suggestions:

-- Cost-benefit analysis of all U.N. organizations to determine appropriate U.S. funding levels;

-- Appointment of a high-level U.S. representative who "spoke for me as president;"

-- Strengthening of America's bilateral relations with developing nations in U.N.; he says our poor relations with them are reflected in U.N. voting;

-- World Energy Conference under U.N. auspices.

CARTER QUOTES ON THE UNITED NATIONS

"If our aim is to construct an international order, we must also work through the international bodies that now exist. On many of these issues, they are the only places where nations regularly come together. We have all been deeply disturbed by the drift of the United Nations and the other international organizations, and by the acrimony and cliquishness that seems to have taken hold. But it would be a mistake to give up on the United Nations.

"In the future, we should make multilateral diplomacy a major part of our efforts so that other countries know in advance the importance the United States attaches to their behavior in the United Nations and other international organizations. We should make a major effort at reforming and restructuring the U.N. systems.

"We should undertake a systematic political and economic cost-benefit analysis of existing international institutions in the United Nations systems and outside, with a view to determining the appropriate level of United States support."

Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations
March 15, 1976

"I think we have treated the United Nations as a debating society and therefore, in our treatment of it in that respect, that is all it is. I would make a major effort as president to elevate the importance of the United Nations, still retaining, of course, a veto power within the Security Council to make sure they didn't carry out any actions that were contrary to the best interests of our country."

Boston Advertiser
July 25, 1976

"Contrasting the present function of the United Nations with its original concept in 1946, it has not measured up to expectations...it has deteriorated into a debating society...The Security Council is almost entirely a negative entity where vetoes prevent decisions from being

consummated. I have a strong belief that the United Nations should be continued, that we should give it our support, that if it were not there it would be advisable to create a similar organization from scratch...under Moynihan we saw vividly the possible use of the United Nations as a forum to express our ideas."

"I would, first of all, put the person that I thought was the best diplomatic official in the United Nations. I would like to have someone that I thought would have a worldwide acceptance as being a superb spokesman for our country. I would also make sure that the world would know that our U.N. Ambassador spoke for me as president and for the Secretary of State so there would be no semblance of doubt that this was the voice of the United States when a major statement was made."

Boston Advertiser
July 25, 1976

"I would strengthen our relationship with the other members of the United Nations by dealing bilaterally with the smaller and developing nations of the world. We have neglected the Third World nations and arrived at a point where, on a showdown vote on a controversial issue, we can't get much more than 20 or 25 percent support."

Boston Advertiser
July 25, 1976

"Let us hold a World Energy Conference under the auspices of the United Nations to help all nations cope with common energy problems -- eliminating energy waste, and increasing energy efficiency; reconciling energy needs with environmental quality goals; and shifting away from almost total reliance upon dwindling sources of non-renewable energy to the greatest feasible reliance on renewable sources."

New York Times
May 14, 1976

"I deplore the actions taken recently in the United Nations. I reject utterly the charge that Zionism is a form of racism."

"For years the vision of Israel has embodied the dream that there could be at least one place on earth where racism could never exist. Now that dream has come true....America has a special responsibility, not only to oppose this baseless charge wherever it appears, but to keep that dream alive."

Speech in New Jersey
June 6, 1976

TERRORISM

CARTER ON TERRORISM



Carter has spoken out strongly against international terrorism, says that he will solicit the aid of the developing nations in curbing it but has offered few other specifics. He has also praised the Israelis for their anti-terrorist actions and has indicated disinclination for U.S. intervention to solve terrorist problems in the Middle East.

Carter Quotes on Terrorism

The issue of international terrorism must be a priority item for the entire international community. If I become president, I intend to recommend strong multinational sanctions against guilty nations as a necessary and productive means for crushing this intolerable threat to international law and peace. International terrorism must be stopped once and for all!

American Legion Speech
Seattle, Washington
August 24, 1976

"The foremost responsibility of any president is to guarantee the security of our nation -- a guarantee of freedom from the threat of successful attack or blackmail and the ability with our allies to maintain peace.

"But peace is not the mere absence of war. Peace is action to stamp out international terrorism. Peace is the unceasing effort to preserve human rights. Peace is a combined demonstration of strength and good will. We will pray for peace and we will work for peace until we have removed from all nations the threat of nuclear destruction."

Acceptance Speech
Washington Post
July 16, 1976

"Recently at Entebbe, the Israelis reaffirmed courageously the old principle that every state has the right to defend its citizens against brutal and arbitrary violence. Violence, that in this case, was even based on collusion and cooperation between the terrorists and the government of the nation. The international terrorism must be a priority item for all nations.

American Legion Convention
Seattle, Washington
August 24, 1976

The United States should neither send troops to Lebanon nor interfere in Lebanese investigations of the "very regrettable deaths of the American officials there," Carter said.

"I am sure the (Lebanese) government did not encourage it, and they regret it very much themselves. I don't think that our own government ought to get more deeply involved than Lebanon's."

"I think it would be a mistake for us to get involved militarily."

"Almost invariably," the solution of terrorist attacks in the Mideast civil wars is best left to the governments there."

Atlanta Constitution
June 17, 1976

"I think the Israelis took the right action (at Entebbe)" he said. "I think it was a good move... I think their opposition to appeasing terrorists is a good deterrent to terrorism."

AP
Hershey, Pennsylvania
July 6, 1976

CARTER ON NUCLEAR POLICY



SALT Negotiations: Carter has frequently criticized the Vladivostok agreement, charging that the U.S. was out-traded and that Vladivostok-- along with other agreements -- has only converted a "quantitative" arms race into a "qualitative" one. He has made two proposals in this area:

(1) He proposes that the U.S. and the USSR move beyond an agreement on ceilings to negotiations on actual reductions in strategic weapons and forces -- "the centerpiece of SALT" as he calls it. He has not given any specifics. The ultimate goal, he says, is zero nuclear weapons.

(2) Carter proposes that the U.S. and USSR conclude a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear explosions -- military and peaceful -- for a period of five years and encourage other nations to join the pact. Carter says that national verification techniques have advanced to the point where this would be safe.

Nuclear Proliferation Issue: Twice in the last six months, Carter has given major speeches on the dangers of nuclear proliferation and he clearly plans to make it an issue during the remainder of the campaign.

Addressing a special gathering at the U.N. this May, Carter said that "nuclear energy must be at the very top of the list of global challenges that call for new forms of international action." Higher prices and dwindling supplies of fossil fuels, he argued, are making many nations much more dependent on nuclear energy. There are many obvious dangers: nuclear accidents, improper disposal of radioactive wastes, terrorism, and the spread of nuclear weapons. By the year 2000, he says, the world will have enough plutonium to build 100,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs a year -- and half of that capacity will lie outside the U.S.

Carter called for a three-part program of international action:

(1) International action to help developing nations meet their energy needs while also limiting their reliance on nuclear energy. He says too many countries are making a premature commitment to nuclear energy because they have no apparent alternatives, and as in the case of India, that commitment can lead to the development of nuclear weapons capacity. Carter would call a World Energy Conference under the UN auspices (similar to the food conference) and seek to stimulate more research and better energy plans for the developing world. Eventually, he would like the developing nations to rely heavily upon renewable energy resources such as solar heating, wind, cooling and "bioconversion." This would reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons.

(2) International action to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. Carter says that the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which took effect in 1970, was a good beginning and 95 nations have joined, but the developing nations have not fully lived up to their obligations under the treaty: they haven't done enough to share nuclear power benefits with the developing nations, as promised, and they haven't lived up to their pledge to limit and then reduce nuclear weapons. His proposals: a comprehensive five-year agreement between the U.S. and USSR to ban all nuclear explosions, peaceful and military, and a new SALT agreement actually reducing the number of nuclear weapons held by each.

(3) International action to limit the spread of dangerous nuclear processing plants. The danger, says Carter, arises not from the sale of nuclear reactors to other nations (nuclear reactor fuel by itself is not directly suitable for weapons) but from the sale of facilities for the enrichment of uranium and facilities for the processing of spent reactor fuel -- both of these plants produce materials that can be used to produce nuclear weapons. In this general area, Carter proposes:

-- A voluntary moratorium among both sellers and buyers banning the sale of uranium enrichment

plants and reprocessing plants. The U. S. has consistently refused to engage in such sales, but West Germany and France have recently agreed to sales and the U. S. should have exercised more influence to stop the sales, says Carter. A moratorium would serve that purpose.

-- So that developing nations will have an assurance of enriched uranium after the moratorium takes hold, Carter proposes that serious consideration be given to developing centralized multinational enrichment facilities that would provide fuel to more than one country. This would not only be more economical but much easier to safeguard.

-- He also proposes that the U. S. initiate a multinational program to develop technology for plutonium recovery and recycle. If the need for plutonium reprocessing is demonstrated, the first U. S. reprocessing plant nearing completion in Barnwell, South Carolina, could become the first multinational reprocessing facility under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

-- The U. S., he says, should also fulfill its decade-old promise to put its peaceful nuclear facilities under international safeguards of the IAEA. This would bolster the world's safeguard system.

-- Finally, he proposes that the U. S. step up its program for dealing with radioactive waste materials.

* * *

This past Saturday in San Diego, Carter expanded upon the themes and points he made in the UN speech, accusing the Administration in more forceful terms of inattention to the dangers of nuclear proliferation. He also made two new proposals:

-- He pledged to embargo American nuclear technology to countries that insist on achieving the capacity to make nuclear fuel suitable for explosive weapons or otherwise forego nuclear weapons development.

-- He also said that the voluntary moratorium on sales of uranium enrichment plants and reprocessing plants should be applied retroactively to agreements already made by West Germany (to sell such facilities to Brazil) and by France (sale to Pakistan).

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CARTER VOWS A CURB ON NUCLEAR EXPORTS TO BAR ARMS SPREAD

HE SAYS FORD FAILS TO LEAD

Urges That Sales Be Halted Unless a Nation Agrees to Restrictions on Weapons and Fuel Plants

By CHARLES MOHR
Special to The New York Times

SAN DIEGO, Sept. 25—Jimmy Carter said today that, if elected President, he would halt further sales of nuclear power technology and nuclear reactor fuel to any nation that refused to forgo nuclear weapons development or insisted on building its own national plant for reprocessing reactor fuel.

Mr. Carter said that the United States should provide vigorous leadership in attempting to achieve international safeguards against nuclear weapons proliferation. He accused President Ford of failing to exert such leadership and said, "We ought not to accept the timid, cowardly and cynical assumption that we have no responsibility."

In an address to the San Diego City Club this morning, the Democratic Presidential candidate repeated a number of proposals and arguments he made in a speech on nuclear proliferation May 13 in New York, but the pledge to embargo American nuclear technology to countries that insist on achieving the capacity to make nuclear fuel suitable for explosive weapons or devices appeared to be a new proposal by Mr. Carter.

'Voluntary Moratorium' on Plants

He also appeared to make one of his May proposals in stronger form. Mr. Carter said today that, should he reach the White House, he would call on all nations to accept a "voluntary moratorium" on the sale or purchase of nuclear fuel enrichment or reprocessing plants, which can be used to produce explosive nuclear weapons fuel.

Mr. Carter said that such a moratorium "should apply retroactively" to agreements already made by West Germany, to sell such facilities to Brazil, and France, to supply Pakistan with such technology. "The contracts have been signed, but the deliveries need not be made," Mr. Carter said.

Last May Mr. Carter did not mention any nation specifically in this regard, and said only that he "hoped" such a moratorium could apply to "recently completed agreements."

Suggests Complacency Peril

Mr. Carter's address today was a complex and at times technical discussion of nuclear questions, but he managed to give it an emotional, human tone by suggesting that a dangerous complacency about the nuclear era had overtaken the world.

People, he suggested, had become accustomed to the nuclear threat, had forgotten the devastation of Nagasaki and

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CARTER QUOTES ON SALT

Unfortunately, the agreements reached to date have succeeded largely in changing the buildup in strategic arms from a "quantitative" to a "qualitative" arms race. It is time, in the SALT talks, that we complete the stage of agreeing on ceilings and get down to the centerpiece of SALT -- the actual negotiation of reductions in strategic forces and measures effectively halting the race in strategic weapons technology. The world is waiting, but not necessarily for long. The longer effective arms reduction is postponed, the more likely it is that other nations will be encouraged to develop their own nuclear capability.

There is one step that can be taken at once. The United States and the Soviet Union should conclude an agreement prohibiting all nuclear explosions for a period of five years, whether they be weapons tests or so-called "peaceful" nuclear explosions, and encourage all other countries to join. At the end of the five year period the agreement can be continued if it serves the interests of the parties.

I am aware of the Soviet objections to a comprehensive treaty that does not allow peaceful nuclear explosions. I also remember, during the Kennedy Administration, when the roles were reversed. Then the U.S. had a similar proposal that permitted large-scale peaceful explosions. However, in order to reach an accord, we withdrew our proposal. Similarly, today, if the U.S. really pushed a comprehensive test ban treaty, I believe the United States and the world community could persuade the USSR to dispose of this issue and accept a comprehensive test ban.

The non-proliferation significance of the superpowers' decision to ban peaceful nuclear explosions would be very great because of its effect on countries who have resisted the Non-Proliferation Treaty's prohibition of "peaceful" nuclear explosives, even though they are indistinguishable from bombs.

A comprehensive test ban would also signal to the world the determination of the signatory states to call a halt to the further development of nuclear weaponry. It has been more than a decade since the Limited Test Ban Treaty entered into force, and well over 100 nations are now parties to that agreement.

It now appears that the United States and the Soviet Union are close to an agreement that would prohibit underground nuclear tests above 150 kilotons. This so-called threshold test ban treaty represents a wholly adequate step beyond the limited test ban. We can and would do more. Our national verification capabilities in the last twenty years have advanced to the point where we no longer have to rely on on-site inspection to distinguish between earthquakes and even very small weapons tests.

Finally, such a treaty would not only be a demonstration on the part of the superpowers to agree to limit their own weapons development. As President Kennedy foresaw in 1973, the most important objective of a comprehensive treaty of universal application would be its inhibiting effect on the spread of nuclear weapons by prohibiting tests by every signatory state.

Address on Nuclear Energy
and World Order at the U.N.
May 13, 1976

"I stand by my proposal ... if elected president I am going to propose to the Russians that a five-year moratorium be placed on all peaceful nuclear testing. I feel a deep sense of commitment. The moratorium on peaceful testing is something which would lead to complete control, then reduction and finally complete elimination of all nuclear weapons."

United Press International
May 20, 1976

The recent arms agreement (Vladivostok) between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is a "ridiculous commitment which almost encourages and puts a burden on us to continue a nuclear escalation."

New York Times
December 13, 1976

Carter said he favors the passage of legislation which would give the President "almost unlimited authority to restrain" the sale of American technological products. The restraints would be used as a bargaining tool for restriction of nuclear weapons, if not total disarmament, he said, adding that he favors disarmament.

Atlanta Constitution
November 14, 1974

"I think also that in the Vladivostok agreement, on nuclear arms control, the Soviet Union simply out-traded us."

Chicago Tribune
May 8, 1976

"Negotiations with the Soviets on strategic arms are at dead center, while the costly and dangerous buildup of nuclear weapons continues."

Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
March 15, 1976

"We should negotiate to reduce the present SALT ceilings on offensive weapons."

Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations
March 15, 1976

"It is important to continue to seek agreements with the Russians and the Chinese, especially in the control of weapons. Success there could mean life instead of death for millions of people. But the divisions between us are deep. The differences of history and ideology will not go away. It is too much to expect that we can do much more in these relationships than reduce the areas of irritation and conflict and lessen the danger of war."

Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations
March 15, 1976

Questioned in Chicago, Mr. Carter said the Soviet Union had benefitted by exploiting the Vladivostok accords; the tentative outline on nuclear arms control reached by U.S. and Soviet negotiators in 1974. When he cited details, however, Mr. Carter appeared to be talking about an earlier treaty, somewhat diluting his response.

Baltimore Sun
Henry L. Trewhitt
March 12, 1976



His declared goal is an "alliance for survival" where "balance of power politics must be supplemented by world order politics."

He contends that the main business of the strategic arms talks between Washington and Moscow should be "the reduction in strategic forces. The world is waiting, but not necessarily for long. The longer effective arms reduction is postponed, the more likely it is that other nations will be encouraged to develop their own nuclear capability."

"Of one thing I am certain -- the hour is too late for business as usual, for politics as usual, or for diplomacy as usual."

New York Times
May 14, 1976

"The biggest waste and danger of all is the unnecessary proliferation of atomic weapons throughout the world. Our ultimate goal should be the elimination of nuclear weapon capability among all nations. In the meantime, simple, careful and firm proposals to implement this mutual arms reduction should be pursued as a prime purpose in all our negotiations with nuclear powers present or potential."

National Press Club Speech
December 12, 1975

Our nation must adopt as a firm and ultimate goal the reduction of nuclear weapons to zero for all nations. We can marshal worldwide public opinion to force all other countries to join us in a step-by-step mutual nuclear disarmament."

Undated Solicitation Letter
For Funds From Jimmy Carter

"I would pursue on a private and public basis fairly drastic reductions in nuclear weapons. I think this nation ought to have as its ultimate goal zero nuclear weapons for any nation in the world."

Meet the Press
December 15, 1974

The "dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons" is the biggest waste of all, and he promises to work towards the ultimate goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world."

Atlanta Constitution
March 7, 1976

Asked about possible Soviet advantages in certain strategic areas, he answered, "I think that the overwhelming capability of both nations to wreak havoc on the other nation is such an overwhelming consideration compared to whether or not one nation has a slight disadvantage in a subjective analysis, to me removes that as a major consideration."

On the use of force generally -- "If the altercation was international, a struggle for the control of the government, I can't envision any circumstance under which I would send troops," but he would use force where "national security interests were directly endangered," to evacuate American citizens, or if the Russians invaded a country like Costa Rica.

New York Times
July 7, 1976

"I think this rough equivalency is a very good posture to maintain. The inability of either nation to defend itself against a first strike is probably the greatest deterrent to nuclear war and so I don't feel concerned about it."

Q. We spent over \$6 billion developing ABM, supposedly with a view toward using the development as a way of getting the Soviets to limit ABMs. Do you think that is an effective and sensible way to bargain on strategic arms?

A. Well, anyone who thinks that the ABM construction effort was well advised -- looking at it in retrospect -- to me is foolish. So my answer is no, I don't think that is an advisable procedure."

New York Times
July 7, 1976

He wants to eliminate nuclear weapons all over the world but says it is a goal that probably cannot be realized in his lifetime.

New York Times
February 11, 1976

The Russians didn't want to build as many ABMs as we did. We wanted to build 12, I think it was, finally we agreed to build two, finally we built one, \$6 billion worth, now we are disassembling it. So there are a lot of things our country can do to hold down on atomic weapons races which we are not presently doing in a very tangible, very effective way.

Louisville Forum
November 23, 1976

CARTER QUOTES ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

A. Reducing Reliance on Nuclear Energy

We need new international action to help meet the energy needs of all countries while limiting reliance on nuclear energy.

In recent years, we have had major United Nations conferences on environment, population, food, the oceans and the role of women -- with habitat, water, deserts, and science and technology on the schedule for the months and years immediately ahead. These are tentative first steps to deal with global problems on a global basis.

Critics have been disappointed with the lack of immediate results. But they miss an important point: a new world agenda is emerging from this process -- an agenda of priority problems on which nations must cooperate or abdicate the right to plan a future for the human condition.

The time has come to put the world energy problem on that new agenda. Let us hold a World Energy Conference under the auspices of the United Nations to help all nations cope with common energy problems -- eliminating energy waste and increasing energy efficiency; reconciling energy needs with environmental quality goals; and shifting away from almost total reliance upon dwindling sources of non-renewable energy to the greatest feasible reliance on renewable sources. In other words, we must move from living off our limited energy capital to living within our energy income.

A World Energy Conference should not simply be a dramatic meeting to highlight a problem which is then forgotten. Rather, it should lead to the creation of new or strengthened institutions to perform the following tasks:

-- improving the collection and analysis of worldwide energy information;

-- stimulating and coordinating a network of worldwide energy research centers;

- advising countries, particularly in the developing world, on the development of sound national energy policies;
- providing technical assistance to train energy planners and badly needed energy technicians;
- increasing the flow of investment capital from private and public sources into new energy development;
- accelerating research and information exchange on energy conservation.

Such a worldwide effort must also provide practical alternatives to the nuclear option. Many countries, particularly in the developing world, are being forced into a premature nuclear commitment because they do not have the knowledge and the means to explore other possibilities. The world's research and development efforts are now focused either on nuclear energy or on the development of a diminishing supply of fossil fuels.

More should be done to help the developing countries develop their oil, gas, and coal resources. But a special effort should be made in the development of small-scale technology that can use renewable sources of energy that are abundant in the developing world -- solar heating and cooling, wind energy, and "bioconversion" -- an indirect form of solar energy that harnesses the sunlight captured by living plants. Using local labor and materials, developing countries can be helped to produce usable fuel from human and animal wastes, otherwise wasted wood, fast growing plants, and even ocean kelp and algae.

Such measures would be a practical way to help the poorest segment of humanity whose emancipation from grinding poverty must be our continuing concern.

And all countries could reap benefits from worldwide energy cooperation. The costs to any one country would be small if they were shared among nations; the benefits to each of us from a breakthrough to a new

energy source anywhere in the world would be great. We have tried international cooperation in food research and it has paid handsome dividends in high-yielding varieties of corn, wheat, rice and sorghum. We could expect similar benefits from worldwide energy cooperation.

The exact institutional formula for coping with energy effectively on a world level will require the most careful consideration. The IAEA is neither equipped nor staffed to be an adviser on energy across the board; nor would it be desirable to add additional functions that might interfere with its vitally important work on nuclear safeguards and safety.

One possibility to be considered at a World Energy Conference would be the creation of a new World Energy Agency to work side by side with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. A strengthened International Atomic Energy Agency could focus on assistance and safeguards for nuclear energy; the new agency on research and development of non-nuclear, particularly renewable, sources.

Speech at the United Nations
May 13, 1976

B. Limiting Spread of Nuclear Weapons

We need new international action to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.

In the past, public attention has been focused on the problem of controlling the escalation of the strategic nuclear arms race among the superpowers. Far less attention has been given to that of controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities among an increasing number of nations.

And yet the danger to world peace may be as great, if not greater, if this second effort of control should fail. The more countries that possess nuclear weapons, the greater the risk that nuclear warfare might erupt in local conflicts, and the greater the danger that these could trigger a major nuclear war.

To date, the principal instrument of control has been the Non-Proliferation Treaty which entered into force in 1970. By 1976 ninety-five non-weapons states had ratified the Treaty, including the advanced industrial states of Western Europe, and prospectively of Japan. In so doing, these nations agreed not to develop nuclear weapons or explosives. In addition they agreed to accept international safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, developed by themselves or with outside assistance, under agreements negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency -- a little appreciated, but an unprecedented step forward, in the development of international law.

Important as this achievement is, it cannot be a source of complacency, particularly under present circumstances. There are still a dozen or more important countries with active nuclear power programs which have not joined the Treaty. Hopefully, some of these may decide to become members; but in the case of several of them, this is unlikely until the underlying tensions behind their decision to maintain a nuclear weapons option are resolved.

The NPT was not conceived of as a one-way street. Under the Treaty, in return for the commitments of the non-weapons states, a major undertaking of the nuclear

weapons states (and other nuclear suppliers in a position to do so) was to provide special nuclear suppliers in a position to do so) was to provide special nuclear power benefits to treaty members, particularly to developing countries.

The advanced countries have not done nearly enough in providing such peaceful benefits to convince the member states that they are better off inside the Treaty than outside.

In fact, recent commercial transactions by some of the supplier countries have conferred special benefits on non-treaty members, thereby largely removing any incentive for such recipients to join the Treaty. They consider themselves better off outside. Furthermore, while individual facilities in these non-treaty countries may be subject to international safeguards, others may not be, and India has demonstrated that such facilities may provide the capability to produce nuclear weapons.

As a further part of the two-way street, there is an obligation by the nuclear weapons states, under the Treaty, to pursue negotiations in good faith to reach agreement to control and reduce the nuclear arms race.

We Americans must be honest about the problems of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Our nuclear deterrent remains an essential element of world order in this era. Nevertheless, by enjoining sovereign nations to forego nuclear weapons, we are asking for a form of self-denial that we have not been able to accept ourselves.

I believe we have little right to ask others to deny themselves such weapons for the indefinite future unless we demonstrate meaningful progress toward the goal of control, then reduction, and ultimately, elimination of nuclear arsenals.

Unfortunately, the agreements reached to date have succeeded largely in changing the buildup in strategic arms from a "quantitative" to a "qualitative" arms

race. It is time, in the SALT talks, that we complete the stage of agreeing on ceilings and get down to the centerpiece of SALT -- the actual negotiation of reductions in strategic forces and measures effectively halting the race in strategic weapons technology.

There is one step that can be taken at once. The United States and the Soviet Union should conclude an agreement prohibiting all nuclear explosions for a period of five years, whether they be weapons tests for so-called "peaceful" nuclear explosions, and encourage all other countries to join. At the end of the five-year period the agreement can be continued if it serves the interests of the parties.

United Nations Speech
May 13, 1976

We had the first atomic capability and on us falls a tremendous additional responsibility to control and to limit the spread of atomic weapons, but in the last two years we have had a complete absence of leadership in this major field. Our non-nuclear proliferation policy has consisted of faith, foot-steps and secret diplomacy and a constant yielding to the manufacturers of atomic products. And to those who very cynically say to this whole wide control, the spread of nuclear capabilities we have failed miserably, we don't have any clear policy of our own for the control of reprocessing, for the shortage of atomic waste or for the control of the enrichment of uranium. Our security has been weak. The recent report of the General Accounting Office to Congress said that we have lost one hundred thousand pounds of atomic matter, six thousand pounds of weapons quality.

Two-thirds of all our research and development money has gone into atomic power -- most of this for the Breeder reactor. Now we have failed to place our own peaceful atomic plant on international safe guard.



President Ford has held the non-proliferation treaty hostage in his insistence that private industry should take over reproduction or increased production of, at least, uranium. We have fought all non-proliferation efforts. And it's been a tragic retreat for us....to remember the progress that our nation made under the Kennedy and Johnson years. We refuse to increase our government capacity to produce enriched uranium that can provide peaceful atomic power. And there's little emphasis, as you well know, for research development of America's skill for solar energy, geothermal supplies, a clean burning or safe instructions of coal.

San Diego Speech
September 27, 1976

Of one thing I am certain -- the hour is too late for business as usual, for politics as usual, or for diplomacy as usual. An alliance for survival is needed -- transcending regions and ideologies -- if we are to assure mankind a safe passage to the twenty-first century

United Nations Speech
September 13, 1976

C. Limiting the Spread of Nuclear Facilities

We need new international action to make the spread of peaceful nuclear power less dangerous.

The danger is not so much in the spread of nuclear reactors themselves, for nuclear reactor fuel is not suitable for use directly in the production of nuclear weapons. The far greater danger lies in the spread of facilities for the enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of spent reactor fuel -- because highly enriched uranium can be used to produce weapons; and because plutonium, when separated from the remainder of the spent fuel, can also be used to produce nuclear weapons. Even at the present early stage in the development of the nuclear power industry, enough materials are produced for at least a thousand bombs each year.

Under present international arrangements, peaceful nuclear facilities are sought to be safeguarded against diversion and theft of nuclear materials by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. As far as reactors are concerned, the international safeguards -- which include materials accountancy, surveillance and inspection -- provide some assurance that the diversion of a significant amount of fissionable material would be detected, and therefore help to deter diversion.

The United States should fulfill its decade-old promise to put its peaceful nuclear facilities under international safeguards to demonstrate that we too are prepared to accept the same arrangements as the non-weapon states.

That would place substantial additional demands on the safeguards system of the IAEA, and the United States should bear its fair share of the costs of this expansion. It is a price we cannot afford not to pay.

But in the field of enrichment and reprocessing, where the primary danger lies, the present international safeguards system cannot provide adequate assurance against the possibility that national enrichment and reprocessing facilities will be misused for military purposes.

The fact is that a reprocessing plant separating the plutonium from spent fuel literally provides a country with direct access to nuclear explosive material.

It has therefore been the consistent policy of the United States over the course of several administrations, not to authorize the sale of either enrichment or reprocessing plants, even with safeguards. Recently, however, some of the other principal suppliers of nuclear equipment have begun to make such sales.

In my judgment, it is absolutely essential to halt the sale of such plants.

Considerations of commercial profit cannot be allowed to prevail over the paramount objective of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. The heads of government of all the principal supplier nations hopefully will recognize this danger and share this view.

I am not seeking to place any restrictions on the sale of nuclear power reactors which sell for as much as \$1 billion per reactor. I believe that all supplier countries are entitled to a fair share of the reactor market. What we must prevent, however, is the sale of small pilot reprocessing plants which sell for only a few million dollars, have no commercial use at present, and can only spread nuclear explosives around the world.

The International Atomic Energy Agency itself, pursuant to the recommendations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference of 1975, is currently engaged in an intensive feasibility study of multinational fuel centers as one way of promoting the safe development of nuclear power by the nations of the world, with enhanced control resulting from multinational participation.

The Agency is also considering other ways to strengthen the protection of explosive material involved in the nuclear fuel cycle. This includes use of the Agency's hitherto unused authority under its charter to establish highly secure repositories for the separated plutonium from non-military facilities, following reprocessing and pending its fabrication into mixed oxide fuel elements as supplementary fuel.

Until such studies are completed, I call on all nations of the world to adopt a voluntary moratorium on the national purchase or sale of enrichment or reprocessing plants. I would hope this moratorium would apply to recently completed agreements.

I do not underestimate the political obstacles in negotiating such a moratorium, but they might be overcome if we do what should have been done many months ago--bring this matter to the attention of the highest political authorities of the supplying countries.

Acceptance of a moratorium would deprive no nation of the ability to meet its nuclear power needs through the purchase of current reactors with guarantees of a long-range supply of enriched uranium. Such assurances must be provided now by those supplier countries possessing the highly expensive facilities currently required for this purpose.

To assure the developing countries of an assured supply of enriched uranium to meet their nuclear power needs without the need for reprocessing, the United States should, in cooperation with other countries, assure an adequate supply of enriched uranium.

We should also give the most serious consideration to the establishment of centralized multinational enrichment facilities involving developing countries' investment participation, in order to provide the assured supply of enriched uranium. And, if one day as their nuclear programs economically justify use of plutonium as a supplementary fuel, similar centralized multinational reprocessing services could equally provide for an assured supply of mixed oxide fuel elements.

It makes no economic sense to locate national reprocessing facilities in a number of different countries. In view of economies of scale, a single commercial reprocessing facility and a fuel fabrication plant will provide services for about fifty large power reactors. From an economic point of view, multinational facilities serving many countries are obviously desirable. And the co-location of reprocessing, fuel fabrication and fuel storage facilities would reduce the risk of weapons proliferation, theft of plutonium during transport, and environmental contamination.

There is considerable doubt within the United States about the necessity of reprocessing now for plutonium recycle. Furthermore, the licensing of plutonium for such use is currently withheld pending a full scale review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the economic, environmental, and safeguards issues. And there is a further question to be asked: If the United States does not want the developing countries to have commercial plutonium, why should we be permitted to have it under our sovereign control?

Surely this whole matter of plutonium recycle should be examined on an international basis. Since our nation has more experience than others in fuel reprocessing, we should initiate a new multinational program designed to develop experimentally the technology, economics, regulations and safeguards to be associated with plutonium recovery and recycle. The program could be developed by the U. S. in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

If the need for plutonium reprocessing is eventually demonstrated--and if mutually satisfactory ground rules for management and operation can be worked out, the first U. S. reprocessing plant which is now nearing completion in Barnwell, South Carolina, could become the first multinational reprocessing facility under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Separated plutonium might ultimately be made available to all nations on a reliable, cheap, and non-discriminatory basis after blending with natural uranium to form a low-enriched fuel that is unsuitable for weapons making.

Since the immediate need for plutonium recycle has not yet been demonstrated, the start-up of the plant should certainly be delayed to allow time for the installation of the next generation of materials accounting and physical security equipment which is now under development.

One final observation in this area: We need to cut through the indecision and debate about the long-term storage of radioactive wastes and start doing something about it. The United States could begin by preparing all high-level radioactive wastes currently produced from our military programs for permanent disposal. Waste disposal is a matter on which sound international arrangements will clearly be necessary.

We should refuse to sell nuclear power plants and fuels to nations who do not sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty or who will not agree to adhere to strict provisions regarding international control of atomic wastes. The establishment of additional nuclear free zones in the world must also be encouraged.

American Chamber of Commerce
Toyko
May 28, 1975

Under Johnson, Kennedy before him, this thrust (toward limiting nuclear proliferation) was a major effort of our future. Under Nixon and Ford, that thrust has been forgotten. As a matter of fact, as indicated by the Indian situation, we have really favored the countries that have refused to sign the Non-proliferation Treaty in preference to those who've actually signed it. This Republican indifference is serious to all of us and to the world.

San Diego Speech
September 27, 1976

DEFENSE POLICY

CARTER ON DEFENSE ISSUES



1. Differences with the Administration: Carter's most obvious differences with Administration policy are these:

-- He would cut the defense budget by \$5-7 billion;

-- He is against construction of the B-1, although he favors continued R&D for the aircraft;

-- He would undertake a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea (while assuring absolute protection to Japan) and would consider replacing some U.S. troops in Europe with European troops;

-- He does not consider limited nuclear war to be a realistic possibility so that he would expect -- and plan -- for a massive nuclear exchange;

-- He would also seek great reductions in the sales of U.S. weapons abroad.

2. Cutting the Defense Budget: In March of 1975, Carter said the Ford defense budget could be cut by \$15 billion without endangering national security. In November of 1975, he said it could be cut by \$7-8 billion. Today, he says the budget could be cut by \$5-7 billion.

Carter does not specify exactly how all the money would be saved, but he has indicated where he thinks money is being wasted:

-- Too many bases overseas;

-- Top heavy with military brass;

-- Too many instructors per pupil in training schools;

-- Cost overruns;

-- Too many transfers of service personnel;

Evans and Novak have recently asserted that many of Carter's assumptions about savings, borrowed from

Brookings, are wildly optimistic. Excerpts from article are included in quotes material that follows.

3. Rough Equivalency in Military Strength: Carter agrees with the Defense Department's view that the U.S. has a "rough equivalency" with Soviet military strength. We are far behind, he says, in land-based missiles, roughly equivalent at sea, and ahead in manned bombers. He wants to maintain general equivalency, but he rejects the idea that the U.S. must keep up with or exceed the Soviets in every weapons system.

In specific areas, Carter:

-- Would not cut the Navy budget because he believes that Naval equality or superiority is essential for the U.S.;

-- Would continue the Trident program, but he has vacillated on how many he would build each year;

-- Would give priority to building smaller, less vulnerable ships;

-- Would not proceed with the B-1 bomber, but says he may change his mind after he knows more classified information; he would maintain R&D for the B-1,

-- Would reduce ratio of officers to enlisted and of support troops to combat troops

4. Development of Forces: Carter has raised many eyebrows by his frequent statements that he would withdraw most U.S. combat troops from Korea on a phased basis -- over three, four or five years. He would also withdraw U.S. atomic weapons.

Carter cautions that he would want to ensure Japan were protected, that air cover would remain, and that the South Koreans be able to defend themselves. But he has still caused concern, and he knows it. Before conservative audiences likely to be offended,

Carter disguises his policy: "I do not believe we should withdraw Americans from Korea except on a phased basis." Sometimes he gets away with the artful rephrasing.

Carter has also said that he would accommodate requests from the Philippines and Thailand to withdraw whatever U.S. troops they want out of their countries.

As to Europe, Carter has said that he would like NATO to assume more and more responsibility for the defense of Western Europe but any withdrawal would be slow and very careful. He promises a review of NATO strategy, greater standardization in the NATO arsenal, more accurate air defense and anti-tank weapons, and an effort to agree upon stockpile arrangements. Carter is also committed to a strong American military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

5. Use of Strategic Weapons: Carter says that he would have to consider using atomic weapons if there were a threat to the security of the U.S. or to the security of a nation with whom we have "a binding alliance." He would use a pre-emptive first strike only if the security of the U.S. itself were threatened.

Carter raised questions in Europe with a fuzzy interview with the Boston Sunday Herald Advertiser on July 25, 1976 when he said that he would not contemplate using atomic weapons in Europe without prior agreement with nations that might be hit by the Soviets. "I certainly couldn't imagine us using nuclear weapons in Europe without Germany and Austria and perhaps France approving their use." Two questions: what sort of approval is he talking about? And Austria?

Carter has also raised questions among nuclear strategists with his views that a limited nuclear war is unlikely to occur. His own interpretations of Soviet intentions is that that would quickly move to an all-out war, and thus we must be prepared for

such. For many observers, Carter's statements revive memories of "massive retaliation" of John Foster Dulles. Europeans also wonder where the massive retaliation approach would leave them.

6. Foreign Arms Sales: Carter has been a persistent critic of foreign arms sales by the U.S. and its allies. He promises to work with both allies and the Soviets to reduce the commerce in weapons of war. When he is careful, he adds that he would not cut off any vital flows of arms to countries such as Israel.

CARTER'S RECOMMENDED DEFENSE SPENDING



Carter said McGovern's advocacy of reduced spending is "a radical departure" from America's 200-year old desire "to be able to defend itself."

Atlanta Constitution
June 2, 1972

Carter said he thinks the Ford defense budget could be reduced by about 15 billion without sacrificing national security.

Beverly Hills News Conference
Los Angeles Times
March 20, 1975

"I would not agree that we need a cut in the major expenditures for our defense below a figure such as \$7 or \$8 billion. The cuts that are made ought to leave us with a tough, muscular, simply organized, effective fighting force able to defend our country instantly if we are attacked. I don't think we've got that now. What we have is kind of a bloated bureaucracy in the Pentagon, too many troops overseas, too many military bases overseas, too many support troops per combat troop, too many major military officers and generals, Selective Service system still intact, the Corps of Engineers building dams we don't need, excessive levels of bureaucracy, and no control from the White House."

National Democratic Issues
Conference, Louisville, Kentucky
November 23, 1975

Carter wants to trim Pentagon waste but accelerate naval spending. His aides say that it must be recognized that in the long run the defense budget must increase or else it will be eroded by higher costs including those for the volunteer army.

Washington Post
April 12, 1976

Responding to questions as to how defense spending under a Carter administration would compare with the present defense budget under the Ford administration, Carter stated, "Well. I would say about the same, maybe 5 percent less. We've got too many military bases overseas. We've got too many support troops per combat troop."

Washington Post
March 21, 1976



Carter and his running mate, Senator Mondale, were briefed here by defense policy experts. During a break in the briefing, the Democratic nominee met with reporters, and also edged away from his commitment to lower defense spending by \$5 billion to \$7 billion.

Monday, in answer to two separate questions on whether this later commitment still held, Carter refrained from saying that it did.

Instead, he simply said that his "belief has been... that compared to a given defense budget, for instance this year, that through more effective analysis of management techniques and a limitation on the broad range of responsibilities of the Defense Department that a \$5 to \$7 billion decrease in the defense budget could be realized."

Los Angeles Times
July 27, 1976

Carter is on record as favoring a 5 to 7 percent reduction of defense spending. The pledge has brought some important liberals to his campaign. The possibility of another technical truth: Carter has never identified the base figure for the cuts; as president, he could cut 5 to 7 percent from the Ford trendline budget for 1978. Spending could rise by billions, but Carter could insist he kept his word. Not the spirit perhaps, but the words.

New Times (Robert Shrum)
1976

Brookings, a prestigious Washington think-tank which has housed a liberal Democratic government-in-exile since 1969, is clearly calling the tune on Carter defense policy.

Despite his U.S. Naval Academy education and early career as a regular Navy officer, national security is his weakest area of expertise; his experience with nuclear submarines two decades ago scarcely equips him to wrestle with global military policy.

Nor did he have time to immerse himself in defense complexities while beginning his amazing run for the presidential nomination. Consequently, his proposed \$5-7 billion defense spending cut was not based on careful budget analysis but seemed a good, round figure somewhere between McGovern and Reagan.

When pressed to specify defense cuts, Carter would reply that the experts at Brookings called a \$5-7 billion reduction reasonable.

Largely overlooked sections of the Seattle speech proposed, first, saving \$400 million a year by increasing the average military tour of duty by two months and, second, saving \$1 billion a year by raising the military teacher-pupil ratio from 1.5:1 to 3:1. Then Carter exploded his bombshell by implying he could save \$10.7 billion in cost overruns during the next five years.

The staff work was obviously hurried. An extra two months on duty tours, the principle of which is included in current Pentagon reforms, would save not \$400 million but \$180 million. The present teacher-pupil ratio is not 1.5:1 but 5:1. Total cost overruns on 45 weapons systems now being developed are \$13.4 billion, not \$10.7 billion. But that represents an annual overrun rate of 3 percent which compares favorably with acquisition programs in private industry and elsewhere in government.

Some Democratic defense experts on Capital Hill feel Carter erred basically in swallowing old Brookings schemes.

Carter can get an immediate \$5-7 billion cut only by major manpower reductions, which could change the world balance of power, or by radically reducing pay benefits and closing bases, areas where congressional consent is both necessary and unattainable.

Washington Post (Evans and Novak)
September 6, 1976

Carter said the respect for the nation's armed forces must be rebuilt and that the words, "national security" must again be spoken with respect. "Too often those words are now viewed with scorn, because they have been misused by political leaders to hide a multitude of sins, and because they have been used to justify inefficiency and waste in our defense establishment."

Military training programs are inefficient, and an estimated \$1 billion could be saved each year by moving to a ratio of 3 students for each instructor instead of the present 1.5 to one.

He has not proposed absolute reductions in defense spending. His call for 5 to 7 percent cut in the Pentagon's proposed \$115 billion budget, according to his aides, would still allow a modest increase in military outlays over last year.

New York Times
July 7, 1976

"I don't believe that our basic strategic interests have been reassessed since 1950. That needs to be done in a long-range fashion. We need to have a simplification of the purposes of the military. The military duplicates. There's an unbelievable bureaucratic hierarchy that's been established since the Second World War. Some management improvements, I think, would restore to a great degree the confidence of our people in the military. I think these management-improvement efforts would result in roughly a 5 to 7 billion dollar decrease in the defense budget."

U.S. News and World Report
May 24, 1976

Asked if he would have to spend more than the Ford Administration is asking for defense, or less, or about the same, he said "I would say about the same, maybe 5 percent less...I would like to see our Defense Department changed into a much more effective fighting force within the present

budgetary limits. We're wasting enormous quantities of money. We've got too many military bases overseas: about 2,000. We've got too many support troops per combat troop -- about twice as many as the Soviet Union. We've got too top-heavy a layer of personnel assignments. We've got more admirals and generals than we had at the end of the Second World War."

Washington Post
March 21, 1976

Strict management and budgetary control over the Pentagon should reduce the ratio of officers to men and of support forces to combat troops. I see no reason why the Chief of Naval Operations needs more Navy captains on his staff that we have serving on ships!

"Misdirected efforts such as the construction of unnecessary pork-barrel projects by the Corps of Engineers must be terminated."

National Press Club
December 12, 1974
(Carter Campaign Issues
Reference Book - March 15, 1976)

"We haven't had a president who actually tried to supervise closely and manage a defense budgetary process in a long time."

National Democratic Issues
Conference, Louisville, Kentucky
November 23, 1975

The President has got to be the one to stand with the American people against the unwarranted influence of the so-called military industrial complex, which has gotten out of control, because an average Congressman, if he or she disagrees with the military budget, finds it very hard to prevail, even in his home district, against the joint commitment of the President and the Pentagon. So I think the President once again has to reassert authority over it. But I would not favor

CARTER QUOTES ON DEFENSE



Excerpts from Recent Seattle Speech

Including my time at the U.S. Naval Academy, I spent 11 years in the Navy, most of my sea duty in submarines. I had the good fortune to serve under Admiral Rickover on the development of one of the first atomic submarines, and I have tried to carry over into my business career and my political life the high standards of dedication and competence that I learned from that remarkable military leader.

We must maintain adequate military strength compared to that of our potential adversaries. This relative strength can be assured:

-- by a commitment to necessary military expenditures;

-- by elimination of waste, duplication among forces, excessive personnel costs, unnecessary new weapons systems, inefficient contracting procedures;

-- and by a mutual search for peace so that armament levels can be reduced among nations, because the most important single factor in avoiding nuclear war is the mutual desire for peace among the superpowers.

We seek friendship with the unaligned and developing nations of the world. Many of them are weak and vulnerable and they need allies who can contribute to their peace, security and prosperity. Yet we must remember that excessive foreign commitments can overtax our national ability. We must therefore be cautious in making commitments, but firm in honoring them.

I have spoken recently with many experts in national defense matters, and I believe we have, overall adequate ability to defend ourselves, to meet obligations to our allies, and to carry out a legitimate foreign policy. But we must be constantly vigilant to recognize and correct adverse trends.

Our total American ground combat forces are less than half those of the Soviet Union, and the number of men under arms in that country has increased by a million while ours have decreased by 1-1/2 million since 1968. During the same period the number of U.S. ships has been cut in half. For every tank we have, the Soviets have at least eight. Because of our greatly improved anti-tank weapons, this heavy Soviet investment in tanks may prove to have been an unwise investment.

Of course there are counterbalancing factors of strength such as superior quality of our weapons, the relative security of our own borders, our more ready access to the sea, and the trustworthiness and military capability of our allies.

There is now, in my opinion, an overall rough equivalency in direct military strength. This balance must be maintained.

In any given annual budget, now or in the future, there is a limited amount of money available for national defense. When any resources are wasted, our nation's security is weakened. We now have an excessive drain on defense funding from waste and unnecessary expenditures.

We must recognize that our military personnel are transferred too much. At any given moment, about one out of seven of those personnel is in the process of moving or away from their family on temporary training duty. This year \$2.5 billion will go simply to move service personnel, their families, television sets and furniture from one base to another. Such frequent moves not only eat up money, they undermine morale. If we extend the average tour of duty by just two months, we could save \$400 million per year.

Cost overruns have become chronic. The Pentagon itself estimates that the total current cost of overruns on the 45 weapons systems now in the process of development in the three services -- exclusive of inflation -- is \$10.7 billion. Over the next five years that would approximate the cost of the proposed B-1 bomber program over the same period.

We need sound, tough management of the Pentagon not only to eliminate waste, but to ensure that force structures are correlated with foreign policy objectives. Tough management will mean that overlaps are eliminated between Pentagon programs and similar programs of civilian agencies. It will mean that we cooperate closely with our allies in our mutual defense, that our weapons systems are integrated with each other, technically and strategically, and that we put a stop to the dubious practice of arms giveaway programs for potential adversaries.

Ever since I was Governor of Georgia, when I attended National Guard training sessions every summer, I have been concerned that our reserve forces, both the regular reserve and the National Guard, do not play a strong enough role in our military preparedness. We need to shift toward a highly trained, combat-worthy reserve, well equipped and closely coordinated with regular forces -- always capable of playing a crucial role in the nation's defense.

If we can get the flab out of the Pentagon's budget, I believe that the public will evaluate questions about weapons systems and force levels on their merits in a calm and rational manner. Our people will support an adequate defense establishment without complaint, so long as they know that their tax dollars are not being wasted.

Remarks to American Legion - Seattle
August 24, 1976

CARTER QUOTES ON MILITARY STRENGTH

Q. On defense, Governor, would you make any fundamental changes in our military structure?

A. Possibly. I do favor the continuation of our three delivery systems for atomic weapons until we can negotiate some over-all reduction of weapons with the Soviet Union.

We are inferior to the Soviets in our land-based intercontinental missiles--greatly inferior. We have a rough equivalency at sea, and we are strongly superior in manned bombers. I think in general we have what is called rough equivalency. I certainly want to maintain that. But I don't think we could give up any of those three elements of international strategic defense.

As far as redeployment of forces is concerned, I don't think we have had a substantive reassessment of strategic deployment since President Truman's time. In the past, a basic presumption has been that we had to be prepared for a major land war in the Far East and in the Western Pacific. I'm not sure that that's still a good supposition.

I don't want to be more specific, but I think a reassessment of our strategic deployment of non-nuclear weapons and delivery systems is needed now.

U.S. News & World Report
September 13, 1976

"I don't think we're second-best militarily. As you know, we've got some areas wherein we are second best. The total amount of throw-weight for atomic weapons is one area where the Soviet Union is superior to our own. Ground forces, the total number of personnel and total number of tanks is superior with the Soviet Union.

"We are superior, I think in the deployment of strategic weapons at sea. We have much higher accuracy per weapon. We're much further advanced in the MIRV (Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle) missiles. We also have cruise missile capabilities that the Soviet Union does not have. We are far superior to them in manned bomber fleets, primarily B-52s.

"So the overall statement is that we do have rough equivalancy and in some areas we're superior and in some areas they are superior."

Los Angeles Times
July 27, 1976

"I think the cumulative strength of our own military forces, plus those of NATO and others, are still superior to the Soviet Union. I think that our vast economic capabilities in agricultural production, electronics and so forth gives us a decided edge and will for the next 15 years.

"I think that we're still superior to Russia even in the Navy....

"...I think that ability to control the seas in a benevolent way is very important.

"We're still predicating our plans that the next war is going to be in the Far East. I think that's a mistake in basic premise."

Washington Post
March 21, 1976

Carter said that a general concern had also been expressed about "the ineffectiveness of reserve forces. There is very little correlation among the reserve forces with each other or with the regular forces. The readiness of reserve forces is doubtful.

New York Times
July 28, 1976

Carter closeted himself with eight defense experts in Plains and later said they unanimously concurred with his opinion that the United States has not become a "second rate" military power. He said the defense panel, including several former Johnson administration Defense Department executives that the United States has a "rough equivalency" in strategic weapons with the Soviet Union and that the defense budget should seek to maintain that level.

"As long as we understand and the Russians understand that the right equivalency is there, and that nuclear war would be a holocaust...we have the chance of avoiding that tragedy."

Washington Post
July 27, 1976

He believes the nation should have weapons systems sufficient "to meet the strategic needs of our country and to meet our legitimate obligations to our allies." But he rejects the notion that the United States need keep up with or exceed the Soviets in all weapons systems.

Washington Post
July 18, 1976

Carter said Mondale favors a strong defense, is eager to end waste in the budget and voted against some weapons systems he felt were inadvisable or improper on the list of priorities. Carter termed this "my same position."

UPI (Pippert)
July 8, 1976

Naval Spending

"I'm afraid if we have a confrontation with Russia in the maintenance of open sea lanes to effectuate our peaceful purposes of trade and purchase in a showdown, the Russian Navy might very well prevail today."

Manchester Union Leader
February 14, 1975

Carter declared the only trend in U.S.-Soviet military balance "that concerns me is in the naval strength. I think that we're still superior to Russia even in the Navy."

Washington Post
March 16, 1976

"I have a deep belief that our most important strategic element in the entire defense mechanism of our country is nuclear-powered submarines. They are almost completely invulnerable to missile attack and their deterrent value is superb."

Boston Advertiser
July 25, 1976

Carter says he favors current plans to build 11 highly advanced Trident submarines at the rate of 3 every 2 years.

Chicago Sun Times
July 27, 1976

I would try to build about one Trident submarine per year. I think we are getting into a dangerous position with respect to the Soviet Union on naval strength.

They have had a rapid escalation in the strength of their navy. It is basically a landlocked nation and to perform a certain function in naval control they require more ships than we do for coverage of the world's seas. I don't think we are in (a) vulnerable position now.

The Soviet Union does have superior ship-to-ship missiles and they are beginning to challenge us now by putting out their first aircraft carriers.

I have a deep belief that our most important strategic element in the entire defense mechanism of our country is nuclear-powered submarines. They are almost completely invulnerable to missile attack and their deterrent value is superb.

With the MIRV missiles we have now we have a vast security strength to the Soviet Union. They are overcoming that superiority by their own missiles.

Boston Sunday Herald Advertiser
July 25, 1976

Carter supports the Trident submarine because it was a pet project of Admiral Hyman Rickover whom Carter has ties with; because missiles on the Trident are made by Lockheed; aerospace company which flew Governor Carter in 1972 to Latin America and on whose behalf Carter tried to sell some of its transport planes; and when he was Governor, Carter encouraged the idea that Georgia might become a Trident base.

New York Village Voice
April 19, 1976

Carter has promised a stronger maritime fleet.

Baltimore Sun
July 1, 1976

Carter said that as President he would favor
"an aggressive shipbuilding program."

New York Times
June 6, 1976

Carter on the B-1 Bomber

"We don't need the B-1 bomber, more Trident submarines or two more divisions."

Wisconsin State Journal
February 9, 1975

Carter stated that "the B-1 bomber may or may not be justified."

The Oregonian
April 7, 1975

Carter wants to cut spending. He feels that defense could stand a healthy going-over. He wants to scrap the B-1 bomber, cut foreign troop commitments (Carter did think defense cutbacks a dangerous course when McGovern advocated them, but he never supported the war in Vietnam).

Nation Magazine
May 17, 1975

Regarding the B-1 bomber, Carter said, "I would not favor it."

WETA Candidates on the
Line
February 16, 1976

Addressing the Democratic Governors Conference in Washington, D. C. on December 2, 1975, Carter told the State Executives that "I believe we should cancel the B-1 bomber. It's too expensive and it's an unnecessary new system."

Address to the Democratic
Governors Conference,
Washington, D. C.
December 2, 1975

"Exotic weapons which serve no real function do not contribute to the defense of this country. The B-1 bomber is an example of a proposed system which should not be funded and would be wasteful of taxpayers' dollars."

Carter's Platform
Page 35

However, Carter has also announced that he would continue research and development of the plane, because "it might be after I become President I would change my mind." Carter's shift to continuing development of the B-1 was hardly accidental, made as it was in Omaha, Nebraska, headquarters of the Strategic Air Command, and a city whose population and economy are highly dependent upon the Air Force.

Quoted by Mary McGrory
Washington Star News
May 10, 1976

"I don't favor the construction of the B-1 bomber at this point. I will keep the project alive in the research and development stage, but I would not finance it at this point. I might change my mind when I am completely acquainted with the secret information that I don't have. I would try to build about one Trident submarine per year. I think we are getting into a dangerous position with respect to the Soviet Union on naval strength."

Boston Advertiser
July 25, 1976

Carter Quotes on Conventional Forces

"We can reduce the ratio of officers to men and of support forces to combat troops.

We should put more stress on new sensors and armaments, and give priority to a navy consisting of a greater number of smaller and less vulnerable vessels.

Modern, well-equipped and highly mobile land forces are more important than large numbers of sparsely-equipped infantry divisions."

Democratic Platform
July 2, 1976
Congressional Record

Carter said it might be necessary to reinstitute the military draft, "but I don't anticipate that necessity."

He said that as President he would meet with the nation's governors to discuss increasing strength in national guard units and would consider offering regular military enlistments of a year or less to maintain manpower.

UPI
August 24, 1976

Carter said he would consult the Commerce Department and local, state or city agencies about relocating Federal operations into areas hit by unemployment because of military base closures. But he said he would not keep bases open just to maintain employment, even in such areas of military concentration as New Jersey.

UPI (William Cotterell)
July 13, 1976

CARTER QUOTES ON DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

Deployment in Asia

On the subject of requests by Thailand and the Philippines that the U. S. remove or reduce troops in their countries, Carter said: "I would certainly accommodate their requests and, in carefully staged withdrawals, would remove most of our troops from South Korea."

"We still have too many military bases and too many troops overseas."

Common Cause
Edition I
Issue Profile Number 10
February 1976

"I would remove all atomic weapons from Korea."

"I cannot see any circumstances imaginable under which we need or would use atomic weapons in the Korean area."

"But I would not be rash about the withdrawal of troops from South Korea ... I'd make sure the Japanese knew what we were doing ... I would make sure that in the four or five years when we get our troops in Korea substantially removed that Korea would still be able to defend itself against North Korea."

(Note: He would have air support)

Washington Post
March 21, 1976

"I think Park is much too autocratic and has very little concern about human freedoms and human rights. Our commitment is not to Park. Our long-standing commitment has been to the people of South Korea. I think that to reduce our land forces in South Korea gradually over a period of years would be an appropriate action to take. The South Koreans would have a competitive force with that of the north."

Newsweek
May 10, 1976

"We have a commitment made by the Congress, the President, the people and the United Nations in South Korea. I would prefer to withdraw all of our troops and land forces from South Korea over a period of years -- three, four years, whatever. But, obviously, we're already committed in Japan. We're committed in Germany."

Los Angeles Times
May 16, 1976
(Moyers Interview)

"It will be possible to withdraw US forces from South Korea over a time span to be determined after consultations with both South Korea and Japan, but the United States should make clear that "internal oppression" in South Korea is "repugnant to our people."

AP
June 23, 1976

Pointing out the way that Carter shades meanings to fit audience Time reported that Carter has told conservative audiences:

"I do not believe we should withdraw Americans from Korea except on a phased basis." He had not actually misstated his position -- he favors a US withdrawal from South Korea over a period of 5 years -- but he stated it in such a way that his audience could easily have gained a different impression. Indeed, at least one reporter came away thinking that Carter had said he wanted the US military to remain in Korea.

(The NY Times has also reported this.)

Time
May 31, 1976

Carter and his aides have indicated US aid would be used as a lever to fight repression in such countries as South Korea, Chile, and Brazil. This would put him in a touchy position on Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, because his stated intention is to increase trade with that nation.

Chicago Tribune
July 30, 1976



"... we do anticipate substantial reductions in defense expenditures as we withdraw our troops back to this country, both from Europe and from Vietnam, but we must maintain a viable, progressive, ever changing defense capability."

Testimony before Democratic
Platform Committee Hearing
June 9, 1972

Carter advocated withdrawing all U. S. troops from Thailand, Taiwan, and South Korea. However, maintaining a military presence in Japan and Western Europe.

Wisconsin State Journal
February 9, 1975

"We've got too many military bases overseas, too many troops overseas ... The Defense Department now overlaps many functions of civilian agencies with a great waste of money..."

Speech, Terre Haute, Indiana
May 2, 1976

Protecting the Security of Japan

"With regard to our primary Pacific ally, Japan, we will maintain our existing security arrangements, so long as that continues to be the wish of the Japanese people and government.

I believe it will be possible to withdraw our ground forces from South Korea on a phased basis over a time span to be determined after consultation with both South Korea and Japan. At the same time, it should be made clear to the South Korean Government that its internal oppression is repugnant to our people and undermines the support for our commitment there."

JCPC , Address, "Relations Between the World's Democracies given to the Foreign Policy Association, New York, New York, June 23, 1976

"The relationship between Japan and the United States is based on both firm pillars of interest -- our mutual security and our great economic relationship.

The security of Japan is vital to the United States and we will maintain our commitment to Japan's defense. The sensitive question of the level and deployment of military forces here will, of course, be shaped in a continuing dialogue with Japan."

JCPC, Address, on Foreign Policy, to the American Chamber of Commerce, Tokyo, Japan, May 28, 1975

Q: Would you support an increase in Japan's ability to defend itself?

A: "Yes, but I don't want to quantify it. I think one of the main concerns about Korea is to make sure that Japan does not equate a lessening of our military presence in Korea with a lessening of our commitment to Japan. I would make sure that that did not happen because I feel very strongly committed to Japan."

Newsweek May 10, 1976

European Deployment



"I would like to see the NATO countries assume more and more responsibility for the defense of Western Europe. But I would not make an immediate withdrawal of troops. It would be a slow, very careful change in relative strength."

Newsweek (European Edition)
May 10, 1976

Carter has said several times he favors keeping a strong U. S. Naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Washington Star
July 7, 1976

Carter said he would be "very, very cautious" in approaching any question of troop withdrawals from Europe, tied only to equivalent replacement by European forces, which he said was not likely now.

Washington Post
March 17, 1976

"There is, in short, a pressing need for us and our allies to undertake a review of NATO's forces and its strategies in light of the changing military environment."

National Observer
July 3, 1976

"The Soviet Union has in recent years strengthened its forces in Central Europe. The Warsaw Pact forces facing NATO today are substantially composed of Soviet combat troops, and these troops have been modernized and reinforced. In the event of war, they are postured for an all-out conflict of short duration and great intensity.

NATO's ground combat forces are largely European. The U.S. provides about one-fifth of the combat element, as well as the strategic umbrella, and without this American commitment Western Europe could not defend itself successfully.

Unfortunately, NATO's arsenal suffers from a lack of standardization, which needlessly increases the cost of NATO, and its strategy too often seems wedded to past plans and concepts. We must not allow our alliance to become an anachronism.

There is, in short, a pressing need for us and our allies to undertake a review of NATO's forces and its strategies in light of the changing military environment.

A comprehensive program to develop, procure, and equip NATO with the more accurate air defense and anti-tank weapons made possible by new technology is needed to increase NATO's defensive power. Agreement on stockpiles and on the prospective length of any potential conflict is necessary. We should also review the structure of NATO reserve forces so they can be committed to combat sooner.

In all of this a major European and joint effort will be required. Our people will not support unilateral American contributions in what must be a truly mutual defense effort."

JCPC, Address, "Relations
Between the World's
Democracies " to the Foreign
Policy Association, New York,
June 23, 1976

"Where the hell does Jimmy Carter think a President gets the authority to take troops out of NATO?" he (Gene McCarthy) asks. "They are there as part of a national commitment sustained by treaty."

The New Republic
July 3 & 10, 1976

CARTER QUOTES ON STRATEGIC POLICY

Carter said Monday that if he becomes President and the security of the United States or a treaty ally is threatened, the U.S. government "would have to consider using atomic weapons."

He told reporters it would be a "serious mistake" to indicate under what conditions the United States might choose to use nuclear weapons.

"But I felt that the security of our own nation or the security of a nation with whom we had a binding alliance was threatened, under those circumstances, I think we would have to consider using atomic weapons."

Carter has said he would authorize a "preemptive" nuclear strike only if he were convinced the security or existence of the United States were threatened.

He said he believes the Soviet Union's position is that the use of tactical nuclear weapons on a battlefield would lead to "all out war. And the presumption on my part is that that would lead to strategic warfare (the firing of inter-continental nuclear ballistic missiles)," he said.

Chicago Sun Times
July 27, 1976

Mr. Smith: On the subject of foreign policy which relates to nuclear weapons, under what circumstances would you, as President, order the use of strategic nuclear weapons?

Do you think that the United States should, if necessary, risk its own nuclear destruction to save Western Europe from Soviet military conquest?

Do you foresee any circumstances in which we would be justified in resorting to a first strike with nuclear weapons, strategic or tactical?

Governor Carter: I don't know the answer to those questions. I think it would be inappropriate to spell out precisely what circumstances might prevail that would cause me to use atomic weapons. The only general response I can give is that if I was convinced that the security or existence of our own nation was threatened, under those circumstances I would use atomic weapons.

The agreements that we have in Europe are binding on us. The use of atomic weapons in Europe would certainly not be contemplated by me without agreement of the nations who would be most directly affected by retaliatory nuclear actions against the Soviet Union.

I certainly couldn't imagine us using nuclear weapons in Europe without Germany and Austria and perhaps France approving their use.

We are committed, along with European nations, to the balance of power being maintained with nuclear weapons as a major factor. We can't equal the Soviet Union now in the number of troops or tanks or airplanes in Europe, and we never have since the second world war was over. The stand-off nuclear strength between us and the Soviet Union, where both of us have substantial overkill capabilities, is a major deterrent to war in Europe.

If there was a massive invasion in Europe by the Soviet Union, I think the likelihood would be that atomic weapons would be used. My own belief is that limited nuclear war would be unlikely. I have read some of the statements made by Soviet leaders, and I think their commitment to limited nuclear war is very doubtful.

We have predicated a lot of our new weaponry acquisition on the premise that we need to have both first-strike and retaliatory capability with a presumption that massive strategic attacks on population centers would not follow. That certainly is a possibility, but I think a doubtful one.

Pre-emptive strike, again, would only be used, to keep my answer deliberately in very general terms, if I was convinced that the existence or the security of our nation was threatened.

Boston Sunday Herald Advertiser
July 25, 1976

Most Americans, he said, "tend to forget the unbelievable destruction of human beings in any sort of nuclear war." In reply to questions, he said he believed that there was no possibility of nuclear "first strike" without "unbelievable destruction on the originator of the attack." He said he would seek a "mutual commitment" with the Soviet Union to avoid any use of atomic weapons.

New York Times
July 28, 1976

The candidate also disassociated himself from the position of Nitze and former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger that limited and selective nuclear strikes could be conducted without necessarily leading to all-out thermonuclear war.

Washington Post
August 11, 1976

Carter said if he was President a "pre-emptive" nuclear strike would only be used if he were convinced the security or existence of the United States was threatened.

New York Times
July 26, 1976

"I would never again get militarily involved in the internal affairs of another country. Unless our own security is directly threatened."

Los Angeles Times
(Moyers Interview)
May 16, 1976

CARTER QUOTES ON FOREIGN ARMS SALES

"The fact is that we cannot have it both ways. Can we be both the world's leading champion of peace and the world's leading supplier of the weapons of war? If I become President, I will work with our allies, some of whom are also selling arms, and also seek to work with the Soviets, to increase the emphasis on peace and to reduce the commerce in weapons of war."

Los Angeles Times
July 18, 1976

"I think that our country is best served by minimizing as much as possible our dependence on military exports for stabilizing our economy and balancing the trade relationships. And in every instance, as President I would minimize those sales. There are some cases where we can't make a flat statement about that. We obviously have a commitment which I think has been maintained and shared by the American people throughout the last 30 years or so to insure, for instance, that Israel has the military strength to exist in peace."

National Democratic Issues
Conference
Louisville, Kentucky
November 23, 1975

Carter has promised to reduce U.S. arms sales abroad which run at a level now of about \$10 billion a year, as well as to urge Western Europeans and Soviets to cut down their sales.

"Can we be both the world's leading champion of peace and the world's leading supplier of the weapons of war?"

Chicago Tribune
July 30, 1976

CARTER QUOTES ON A CARTER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

"I would want one committed to the proposition of peace. I would want one to share my commitment that we should not become militarily involved in the internal affairs of another country unless our security was directly threatened. I would want one who could withstand the pressures from special interest groups, including munitions manufacturers. I would want one who is an outstanding administrator, recognizing the complexities of the Defense Department organizational structure. I would want one who could reduce the involvement of the Defense Department in matters that can be equally well addressed by the civilian agencies of government, to remove the overlapping functions and singly address the Defense Department toward the capability to fight. I would want one who was willing to reduce waste in personnel allocations and also in unnecessary weapons systems that don't corollate with the long-range purposes of our own security and foreign policy. And one who could work harmoniously with the other Cabinet members. Those are some of the characteristics that come to mind at this moment."

National Journal
July 17, 1976

CARTER QUOTES ON TERRORISM


"The foremost responsibility of any President is to guarantee the security of our nation--a guarantee of freedom from the threat of successful attack or blackmail and the ability with our allies to maintain peace.

"But peace is not the mere absence of war. Peace is action to stamp out international terrorism. Peace is the unceasing effort to preserve human rights. Peace is a combined demonstration of strength and good will. We will pray for peace and we will work for peace until we have removed from all nations the threat of nuclear destruction."

Acceptance Speech
Washington Post
July 16, 1976

VIETNAM WAR

CARTER ON THE VIETNAM WAR



The evolution in Carter's views on the Vietnam war has raised a number of questions in the press about his credibility. Carter was an early and persistent supporter of the war, but on the 1976 campaign trail he has said it was a "racist" war and that we should never have gotten into it. The "racist" slur has not been appreciated in every quarter.

The press has also raised questions about Carter's views on William Calley, saying that he once supported him but has since backed away. Our records do not sustain that charge.

While the flap in the press on both subjects has died down, it may be resurrected in the debates. Here is a short summary of the background.

1. Carter on the Vietnam War" According to the NY Times (May 21, 1976), "Mr. Carter's support of the war was one of the most prolonged and persistent of any major political figure. He attempted to dissuade fellow governors from condemning American involvement in the conflict and told journalists as late as 1974 that he favored continued Administration requests for more appropriations for the war."

There are not a great number of Carter quotes to sustain this view, but there are several scraps of evidence to show his early support for the war:

-- On August 8, 1971, as governor, Carter wrote a column for a small Georgia newspaper which justified the original decision to intervene in Vietnam to fight "Communist aggression". It added that "since we are not going to do what it takes to win, it is time to come home." Evans and Novak, July 7, 1976, point out that this was the hawkish Southern position supported by others such as George Wallace



-- In June of 1971, Carter offered a resolution to the Democratic Governors Conference which opposed making the war an issue in the 1972 Presidential campaign. A watered-version was adopted.

-- When President Nixon ordered the bombing of North Vietnam and the mining of its harbors, Carter supported these steps but expressed fear "we are heading for a major defeat in South Vietnam." Two days later, he asked people to support RN whether or not they agreed with him. Evans and Novak, July 7, 1976.

-- Reviewing the record, the Atlanta Constitution on May 26, 1976, reported that "close associates of Carter during the war said that he supported the war effort 'very vigorously'." The paper also reported that as early as October, 1969, Carter was on record supporting RN's handling of the war while also saying that he would like the earliest possible end to the war.

Given this history, the question is why Carter on the campaign trail has often been quoted as condemning the racist nature of the war:

-- He began down this path at the National Democratic Issues Conference in Louisville on November 23, 1975, when he said that the U.S. showed "unconscionable ... racial discrimination in international affairs. I don't believe, for instance, that we would have ever bombed or strafed villages in France or Germany as we did in Vietnam; and this kind of attitude, of concentrating our emphasis in foreign policy on the white-skinned people, is felt throughout the world."

-- In Indianapolis in May of 1976, speaking in a black church, Carter expanded upon the theme, saying that the war was indeed "racist." He spoke of the daily spectacle on the TV screen of American bombers going out to "firebomb villages and killing every man, woman and child in the village to save it." He went on: "We did not think it was racist (at the time), but it was." Apparently, his speech was a great success. NY Times, May 21, 1976.

-- On _____, the Baltimore Sun reported Carter said he had believed "for a long time" that the war was racist, but he conceded he never said so publicly until six months after it had ended. Said the newspaper: "Mr. Carter repeated previous statements that he first called for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam shortly after becoming Governor in 1971. He added the only time he had backed additional U.S. aid was to protect American troops during the 1975 pull-out and said 'it was a bad war and I think we should never have become involved in it'."

How does Carter explain his evolution? He doesn't. He says "I have never made any apology" for my views. Concludes Evans and Novak, (July 7, 1976): "Put bluntly, Carter on Vietnam has abandoned old positions without apologizing for them or, indeed, even admitting he ever held them ... Jimmy Carter, far from acknowledging any conversion, edits the past ..."

2. Carter on Calley: Critics have charged that Carter showed a similar shifting on the Calley case, but the record at hand does not support that charge. On the heels of Calley's conviction, Carter proclaimed American Fighting Man's Day in Georgia and said the conviction was "a blow to troop morale". But Carter's point then and now is that Calley was a "scapegoat" and that his superiors should have received similar treatment. He says today that he never felt anything but "abhorrence" toward Calley, that Calley should be punished, but that it was not right to equate what Calley did with the actions of other American servicemen. There is nothing in our records to contradict this view.

These are the first several pages of the "strategy" book
for President Ford's 1976 election campaign.

Gerald Ford Library. Michael Raoul-Duval Papers. Box 13. "Campaign Book"

3 7 7

I - BACKGROUND

OVERVIEW

PHOTOCOPY FROM GERALD FORD LIBRARY

This book presents an analysis of the problems you face in your efforts to win the 1976 election. It concludes that there is a "best chance" strategy to win.

The book consists of this memorandum, followed by tabs broken into two parts. Part I contains some details on the strategy. Part II contains background materials, such as analysis of constituency groups and historical analysis.

This memorandum is broken into the following chapters:

I - BACKGROUND

- Overview (Page 1)
- Major Constraints (Page 8)
- Definition of Problem (Page 10)
- Elements of Perception Problem (Page 12)
- Targets of Opportunity (Page 34)

II - CONCLUSIONS/GOALS

- Conclusions (Page 49)
- Goals for Campaign (Page 56)



III - DESCRIPTION OF STRATEGY

- The Strategy (Page 61)
- Analysis of the Recommended Strategy (Page 79) and Alternatives
- Themes (Page 86)
- Synopsis of Implementation Plan (Page 93)
- Pre-nomination Implementation Plan (Page 104)
- Attack and Carter's Reaction (Page 111)

As the following analysis shows, you face a unique challenge. No President has overcome the obstacles to election which you will face following our Convention this August. For example, President Truman trailed Dewey in August 1948 by 11 points, whereas we expect to be trailing Carter by about 20 points after our Convention.*

Of course, the Ford-Carter gap will begin to close (perhaps even before our Convention) on its own almost irrespective of what we do.** However, although the point

*There really is very little similarity between the Truman situation in 1948 and President Ford today. Truman's challenge was markedly different and, accordingly, so were his strategy options. See Tab II- for an analysis of the Truman campaign and excerpts from Clark Clifford's 1947 election strategy memorandum.

**

There are three important caveats -- the gap could widen if (1) the President makes a highly visible mistake; (2) the Convention turns sour and the TV viewers see the President portrayed unfavorably; or (3) Carter is able to go back on offensive.


spread may close over time fairly easily down to a point where Carter is 5 to 10 points ahead, the remaining distance to victory will be very difficult.

Because you must come from behind, and are subject to many constraints, no strategy can be developed which allows for any substantial error.

We firmly believe that you can win in November. During times when you and your Administration pulled together and projected a positive image of action and accomplishments, your standing in the national polls rose accordingly. Furthermore, your national support has solidified somewhat. However, although you have been able to positively influence the voters, efforts to do this in the past have resulted in very limited and temporary increases. Most importantly, your national approval rating declined during the periods when you were perceived as a partisan, particularly when we campaigned. (See Chart 1.)



TREND OF APPROVAL RATINGS
(Gallup & Harris)



= Intensive campaign/political activity



If we avoid past errors and improve upon our many strong points, the primary campaign will have made a very positive contribution to your election chances.

It is possible that Jimmy Carter will go through much the same phenomenon as you did: his rapid rise in national popularity will be followed by a steady and pronounced decline. Notwithstanding Carter's enormous (media) popularity at the present, it must not be forgotten that he never got more than 54% of the vote in any of the contested primaries, and never won in a head-to-head race. Furthermore, Carter was beaten in eight out of the last eleven contested primary fights. There is ample historical precedent for the proposition that such a rapid rise in national popularity (one of the most rapid ascendancies according to Lou Harris) is generally followed by a decline. We believe that much of Carter's rise in the polls is due to his "media" image as a winner. However, between now and the election, he will not be able to rely on these "victories".

There are six points that we wish to emphasize at the beginning:

1. The Nation is at a crossroad. We are in the process of making a choice (consciously or not) between



greater self-reliance to govern our lives, or even greater reliance on government. There can be little doubt about which road we will travel under the leadership of a Democratic President and Congress. For many Americans who believe that unconstrained government is a threat to individual freedom, your election in November is a national imperative. For them and for us, the campaign is not simply a fight for power. We are fighting for principle. Your supporters welcome whatever discipline and hard work is necessary to win because they believe in you and because you stand for the principles they think are important.

2. If past is indeed prologue, you will lose on November 2nd -- because to win you must do what has never been done: close a gap of about 20 points in 73 days from the base of a minority party while spending approximately the same amount of money as your opponent.
3. You cannot overcome the Carter lead on your own no matter what you do. Of course, your "offensive" campaign is a crucial element, but to win, Carter's position must be changed by a strong attack launched by the Vice Presidential nominee and others.



4. You are not now perceived as being a strong, decisive leader by anywhere near a majority of the American people. Our campaign must change this perception, but it cannot unless some current problems such as in-house staff fighting are corrected.
5. You cannot possibly win without a highly disciplined and directionalized campaign. The first step is to develop and adopt a basic strategy. Once adopted, your strategy must not be changed unless clearly justified by hard data. If the strategy is not followed, or if it constantly changes, your campaign will become chaotic.
6. In preparing this memorandum, we have tried to be completely candid. We have viewed our strengths and weaknesses in the context of the election challenge. We recognize that a "weakness" in this context may be a "strength" in normal times. Thus, this paper is not intended as criticism of anyone, but rather we have tried to present a hard, realistic analysis of the obstacles to your victory and how they can be overcome. We firmly believe that you can win.



MAJOR CONSTRAINTS

The purpose of this section is to outline the major constraints facing the President's campaign. We believe that the campaign strategy must accept these constraints as given, and not attempt to attack them as solvable problems. With the very limited resources available to the President, it is crucial that all our efforts and funds be directed at achieving clearly defined objectives which can be accomplished and which are selected solely on the basis of their contribution to the election effort.

By way of providing perspective, President Ford faces almost the reverse situation that Richard Nixon confronted in '68 and '72. In both cases, Nixon had a substantial margin over his challenger (12% points in '68 and 25% in '72) going into the general election. Thus, the Nixon strategy of holding onto his lead or, more accurately, managing the inevitable erosion, simply is not applicable to today's problem.

The President's strategy must recognize and deal with the following constraints:

1. The Democratic Party enjoys a 43% to 21% advantage. A GOP candidate will always have difficulty closing a large gap on a Democratic opponent.



2. Campaign expenditures for both candidates will be the same. We no longer have the previous advantage of being able to outspend our opponent. This is a particular handicap when we are behind.
3. Given the dollar limitation, any dollar wasted cannot be recouped. Limited resources is a major restraint.
4. The GOP Convention is late; the Party will be divided after the nomination fights and will have little time to bind its wounds.
5. A campaign designed to woo various voter blocs through extensive government programs and patronage is not in the cards in 1976.
 - a. Budget dollars are not available to fund extensive new program initiatives.
 - b. The broken promises of 1972 have made the buyable voter blocs wary of promises.
 - c. The President's most basic philosophy has been to ask the people to sacrifice short-term benefits in return for long-term gains. Changing this philosophy now is too late:
 - to be credible to the recipients
 - to escape a media storm.



DEFINITION OF PROBLEM

As a basic approach, it is helpful to view our electorate in two parts:

1. The base of our support, which is made up of Republicans and Republican-type Independents.
2. The "swing vote" which can be attracted from a position of neutrality or pro-Carter into our column.

In the following section, we analyze the specific elements of the problems we face. Although we have organized this section by dividing the elements among the two general classes of voters identified above, it's important to remember that there are substantial interrelationships and trade-offs between the two groups.

Our election goal must be to win enough popular votes in enough States to get over 270 electoral votes. In broad terms, we have to close a nearly 3-to-2 gap in seventy-three days from the base of a minority party.

On the other hand, Carter's popularity is based almost exclusively on his awareness factor. His support is very thin and clearly vulnerable to deterioration. See Tab II-D for analysis of Carter's current popularity and weaknesses.



Accordingly, a major shift in the national polls is possible. In all likelihood, Carter has reached his peak of popularity and will now begin to show signs of erosion. If the Republican Convention is perceived by the television viewer as positive for the President (or at least neutral), we should expect to see a closing of the gap, and thus the building up of momentum in favor of the President.

President Ford's perception must change and Carter's perception must change. In order to win, we must persuade over 15% (or about 10 million people) to change their opinions. This will require very aggressive -- media-oriented efforts. We must pull together and wage a very active and determined fight. If the President sits back as Richard Nixon did in '68 and '72, he will certainly lose. As demonstrated in the following pages, the President can run hard without relying on the traditional campaign "hoopla". Thus, he can be an active candidate and yet be perceived as a working President.



MISCELLANEOUS

MISCELLANEOUS QUOTES FROM CARTER



Excerpts from Playboy Interview

- Q. We are asking not so much about hindsight as about being fallible. Aren't there any examples of things you did that weren't absolutely right?
- A. I don't mind repeating myself. There are a lot of those in my life. Not speaking out for the cessation of the war in Vietnam. The fact that I didn't crusade at a very early stage for civil rights in the South, for the one-man, one-vote ruling. It might be that now I should drop my campaign for President and start a crusade for black-majority rule in South Africa or Rhodesia. It might be that later on we'll discover there were opportunities in our lives to do wonderful things and we didn't take advantage of them.

The fact that in 1954 I sat back and required the Warren Court to make this ruling without having crusaded myself -- that was obviously a mistake on my part. But there are things you have to judge under the circumstances that prevailed when the decisions were being made. Back then, the Congress, the President, the newspaper editors, the civil libertarians all said that separate-but-equal facilities were adequate. There are opportunities overlooked, or maybe they could be characterized as absence of courage.

Detente

- Q. In some reports, your foreign policy seems similar to that established by Kissinger, Nixon and Ford. In fact, Kissinger stated that he didn't think your differences were substantial.

How, precisely, does your view differ from theirs?

A. As I've said in my speeches, I feel the policy of detente has given up too much to the Russians and gotten too little in return. I also feel Kissinger has equated his own popularity with the so-called advantages of detente. As I've traveled and spoken with world leaders -- Helmut Schmidt of West Germany, Yitzhak Rabin of Israel, various leaders in Japan -- I discerned a deep concern on their part that the United States has abandoned a long-standing principle: to consult mutually, to share responsibility for problems. This has been a damaging thing. In addition, I believe we should have stronger bilateral relations with developing nations.

Q. What do you mean when you say we've given up too much to the Russians?

A. One example I've mentioned often is the Helsinki agreement. I never saw any reason we should be involved in the Helsinki meetings at all. We added the stature of our presence and signature to an agreement that, in effect, ratified the takeover of eastern Europe by the Soviet Union. We got very little, if anything in return. The Russians promised they would honor democratic principles and permit the free movement of their citizens, including those who want to emigrate. The Soviet Union has not lived up to those promises and Mr. Brezhnev was able to celebrate the major achievement of his diplomatic life.

Q. Are you charging that Kissinger was too soft on the Russians?

A. Kissinger has been in the position of being almost uniquely a spokesman for our nation. I think that is a legitimate role and a proper responsibility of the President himself. Kissinger has had a kind of Lone Ranger, secret foreign policy attitude, which almost ensures

that there cannot be adequate consultation with our allies; there cannot be a long-range commitment to exchanging principles; there cannot be a coherent evolution on foreign policy; there cannot be a bipartisan approach with support and advice from Congress. This is what I would avoid as President and is one of the major defects in the Nixon-Ford foreign policy as expressed by Kissinger.

Vietnam/Kissinger

- Q. Then what about the administration that ended that war? Don't you have to give credit to Kissinger, the Secretary of State of a Republican President, for ending a war that a Democratic President escalated?
- A. I think the statistics show that more bombs were dropped in Vietnam and Cambodia under Nixon and Kissinger than under Johnson. Both administrations were at fault; but I don't think the end came about as a result of Kissinger's superior diplomacy. It was the result of several factors that built up in an inexorable way; the demonstrated strength of the Viet Cong, the tremendous pressure to withdraw that came from the American people and an aroused Congress. I think Nixon and Kissinger did the proper thing in starting a phased withdrawal, but I don't consider that to be a notable diplomatic achievement by Kissinger. As we've now learned, he promised the Vietnamese things that cannot be delivered -- reparations, payments, economic advantages, and so forth. Getting out of Vietnam was very good, but whether Kissinger deserved substantial diplomatic credit for it is something I doubt.

Foreign Intervention

- Q. Anyway, you said earlier that your foreign policy would exemplify your moral and ethical standards. Isn't there as much danger in an overly moralistic policy as in the kind that is too pragmatic?
- A. I've said I don't think we should intervene militarily, but I see no reason not to express our approval, at least verbally, with those nations that develop democratically. When Kissinger says, as he did recently in a speech, that Brazil is the sort of government that is most compatible with ours -- well, that's the kind of thing we want to change. Brazil is not a democratic government; it's a military dictatorship. In many instances, it's highly repressive to political prisoners. Our Government should justify the character and moral principles of the American people, and our foreign policy should not short circuit that for temporary advantage. I think in every instance we've done that it's been counterproductive. When the CIA undertakes covert activities that might be justified if they were peaceful, we always suffer when they're revealed -- it always seems as if we're trying to tell other people how to act. When Kissinger and Ford warned Italy she would be excluded from NATO if the Communists assumed power, that was the best way to make sure Communists were elected. The Italian voters resent it. A proper posture for our country in this sort of situation is to show, through demonstration, that our own Government works properly, that democracy is advantageous, and let the Italian people make their own decision.



- Q. And what if the Communists in Italy had been elected in greater numbers than they were? What if they had actually become a key part of the Italian government?
- A. I think it would be a mechanism for subversion of the strength of NATO and the cohesiveness that ought to band European countries together. The proper posture was the one taken by Helmut Schmidt, who said that German aid to Italy would be endangered.
- Q. Don't you think that constitutes a form of intervention in the democratic processes of another nation?
- A. No, I don't. I think that when the democratic nations of the world express themselves frankly and forcefully and openly, that's a proper exertion of influence. We did the same thing in Portugal. Instead of going in through surreptitious means and trying to overthrow the government when it looked like the minority Communist Party was going to assume power the NATO countries as a group made it clear to Portugal what it would lose in the way of friendship, trade opportunities, and so forth. And the Portuguese people, recognizing that possibility, decided that the Communists should not lead their government. Well, that was legitimate exertion of influence, in my opinion. It was done openly and it was a clear statement of fact.

- Q. You used the word subversion referring to communism. Hasn't the world changed since we used to throw words like that around? Aren't the west European Communist parties more independent of Moscow and more willing to respect democracy?
- A. Yes, the world's changed. In my speeches, I've made it clear that as far as Communist leaders in such countries as Italy, France and Portugal are concerned, I would not want to close the doors of communications, consultation and friendship to them. That would be an almost automatic forcing of the Communist leaders into the Soviet sphere of influence. I also think we should keep open our opportunities for the east European nations -- even those that are completely Communist -- in trade with us, understand us, have tourist exchange and give them an option from complete domination by the Soviet Union.

But again, I don't think you could expect West Germany to lend Poland two billion dollars -- which was the figure in the case of Italy -- when Poland is part of the Soviet government's satellite and supportive-nation group. So I think the best way to minimize totalitarian influence within the governments of Europe is to make sure the democratic forces perform properly. The major shift toward the Communists in Italy was in the local election, when the Christian Democrats destroyed their reputation by graft and corruption. If we can make our own Government work, if we can avoid future Watergates and avoid the activities of the CIA that have been revealed, if we can minimize the joblessness and inflation, this will be a good way to lessen the inclination of people in other countries to turn away from our form of government.

Q. What about Chile? Would you agree that that was a case of the United States, through the CIA, intervening improperly?

A. Yes. There's no doubt about it. Sure.

Q. And you would stop that sort of thing?

A. Absolutely. Yes, sir.

Q. What about economic sanctions? Do you feel we should have punished the Allende government the way we did?

A. That's a complicated question, because we don't know what caused the fall of the Allende government, the murder of perhaps thousands of people, the incarceration of many others. I don't have any facts as to how deeply involved we were, but my impression is that we were involved quite deeply. As I said, I wouldn't have done that if I were President. But as to whether or not we ought to have an option on the terms of our loans, repayment schedules, interest charges, the kinds of materials we sell to them -- those are options I would retain depending upon the compatibility of a foreign government with our own.

- Q. In preparing for this interview, we spoke with your mother, your son Chip and your sister Gloria. We asked them what single action would most disappoint them in a Carter Presidency. They all replied that it would be if you ever sent troops to intervene in a foreign war. In fact, Miss Lillian said she would picket the White House.
- A. They share my views completely.
- Q. Then would you summarize your position on foreign intervention?
- A. I would never intervene for the purpose of overthrowing a government. If enough were at stake for our national interest, I would use prestige, legitimate diplomatic leverage, trade mechanisms. But it would be the sort of effort that would not be embarrassing to this nation if revealed completely. I don't ever want to do anything as President that would be a contravention of the moral and ethical standards that I would exemplify in my own life as an individual or that would violate the principles or character of the American people.

Mayaguez

- Q. What about more limited military action. Would you have handled the Mayaguez incident the same way President Ford did?
- A. Let me assess that in retrospect. It's obvious we didn't have adequate intelligence; we attacked an island when the Mayaguez crew was no longer there. There was a desire, I think, on the part of President Ford to extract maximum publicity from our effort, so that about 23 minutes after our crew was released, we went ahead and bombed the island airport. I hope I would have been

capable of getting adequate intelligence, surrounded the island more quickly and isolated the crew so we wouldn't have had to attack the airport after the crew was released. There are some of the differences in the way I would have done it.

- Q. So it's a matter of degree; you would have intervened militarily, too.
- A. I would have done everything necessary to keep the crew from being taken to the mainland, yes.

Carter's Foreign Policy Advisers

- Q. Do you feel it's fair criticism that you seem to be going back to some familiar faces -- such as Paul Warnke and Cyrus Vance -- for foreign policy advice? Isn't there a danger of history's repeating itself when you seek out those who were involved in our Vietnam decisions?
- A. I haven't heard that criticism. If you're raising it, then I respond to the new critic. These people contribute to foreign-affairs journals, they individually explore different concepts of foreign policy. I have 15 or 20 people who work with me very closely on foreign affairs. Their views are quite divergent. The fact that they may or may not have been involved in foreign-policy decisions in the past is certainly no detriment to their ability to help me now.

VIETNAM

Q. You mentioned Vietnam. Do you feel you spoke out out at an early enough stage against the war?

A. No, I did not. I never spoke out publicly about withdrawing completely from Vietnam until March of 1971.

Q. Why?

A. It was the first time anybody had asked me about it. I was a farmer before then and wasn't asked about the war until I took office. There was a general feeling in this country that we ought not to be in Vietnam to start with. The American people were tremendously misled about the immediate prospects for victory, about the level of our involvement, about the relative cost in American lives. If I had known in the Sixties what I knew in the early Seventies, I think I would have spoken out more strongly. I was not in public office. When I took office as governor in 1970, I began to speak out about complete withdrawal. It was late compared with what many others had done, but I think it's accurate to say that the Congress and the people -- with the exception of very small numbers of people -- shared the belief that we were protecting our democratic allies.

Q. Even without holding office you must have had some feelings about the war. When do you recall first feeling it was wrong?

A. There was an accepted feeling by me and everybody else that we ought not to be there, that we should never have gotten involved, we ought to get out.

Q. You felt that way all through the Sixties?

A. Yeah, that's right and I might hasten to say that it was the same feeling expressed by Senators Russel and Talmadge -- very conservative Southern political figures. They thought it was a serious mistake to be in Vietnam.

Q. Your son Jack fought in that war. Did you have any qualms about it at the time?

A. Well, yes, I had problems about my son fighting in the war period. But I never make my son's decisions for them. Jack went to war feeling it was foolish, a waste of time, much more deeply than I did. He also felt it would have been grossly unfair for him not to go when other poorer kids had to.

Q. You were in favor of allocating funds for the South Vietnamese in 1975 as the war was coming to a close, weren't you?

A. That was when we were getting ready to evacuate our troops. The purpose of the money was to get our people out and maintain harmony between us and our Vietnamese allies, who had fought with us for 25 years. And I said yes. I would do that. But it was not a permanent thing, not to continue the way but to let us get our troops out in an orderly fashion.

Q. How do you respond to the argument that it was the Democrats, not the Republicans, who got us into the Vietnam war?

A. I think it started originally, maybe with Eisenhower, then Kennedy, Johnson and then Nixon. It's not a partisan matter. I think Eisenhower probably first got us in there thinking that since France had failed, our country might slip in there and succeed. Kennedy thought he could escalate involvement by going beyond the mere advisory role. I guess if there was one President who made the most determined effort, conceivably, to end the war by massive force, it was certainly Johnson. And Nixon went into Cambodia and bombed it, and so forth.

It's not partisan -- it's just a matter that evolved as a habit over several administrations. There was a governmental consciousness to deal in secrecy, to exclude the American people, to mislead them with false statements and sometimes outright lies. Had the American people been told the facts from the beginning by Eisenhower, Kennedy, MacNamara, Johnson, Kissinger and Nixon, I think there would have been different decisions made in our government.

At the Democratic Convention you praised Johnson as a President who had vastly extended human rights. Were you simply omitting any mention of Vietnam?

A. It was obviously the factor that destroyed his political career and damaged his whole life. But as far as what I said at the convention, there hasn't been another President in our history -- with the possible exception of Abraham Lincoln -- who did so much to advance the cause of human rights.

Q. Except for the human rights of the Vietnamese and the Americans who fought there.

A. Well, I really believe that Johnson's motives were good. I think he tried to end the war even while the fighting was going on and he was speaking about massive rehabilitation efforts financed by our government to help people. I don't think he ever had any desire for permanent entrenchment of our forces in Vietnam. I think he had a mistaken notion that he was defending democracy and that what he was doing was compatible with the desires of the South Vietnamese.

Interview - Playboy Magazine
October 1976

CARTER QUOTES ON EMBARGOES

"I decided...to go to the White House: to stop embargoes once and for all...It's not my idea of a fair shake when the government promotes foreign sales, and then cuts them off for political convenience...Agricultural international trade is the gas and oil for the United States...Every time Nixon, Ford and Butz have imposed a new export embargo it has caused permanent damage to our export market."

Speech at Iowa State Fair
August 25, 1976

Q. Governor, in connection with this, you said the Arabs should not be permitted to embargo future shipments of oil. Now how would you propose to enforce that? Military intervention, or something like that? ✓

A. No, not military intervention...I would let the Arab countries know that we want to be their friends, that we are heavily dependent upon oil being imported from them, that if they declare an embargo against us, we would consider it, not a military, but an economic declaration of war, and that we would respond instantly and without further debate in a similar fashion, that we would not ship them any food, no weapons, no spare parts for weapons, no oil drilling rigs, no oil pipes. Not to be belligerent against us again. We yielded to it in 1973. I don't think this country ought to yield to an embargo again. And I think this would be the best way to avoid it, rather than to wait until after it occurs, and then flounder around trying to decide what we should do in retrospect.

Face the Nation
November 30, 1975

Q. In the case of the Soviet Union doing things like intervening in Angola, would you favor using our economic leverage and urging our allies to use their economic leverage to try to get the Russians to cease and desist?

A. Yes I would.

Q. Would that include the cancellation of grain sales?

A. Well, obviously the earlier that you can have a leverage applying, the better your chances are of success. If you wait until a commitment by Russia is already confirmed it makes it very difficult if not impossible for them to withdraw that commitment because of any detectable pressure from us...If we want to put economic pressure on another nation under any circumstances, to use it as a lever by withholding our products, I would not single out food as a singular product. It would be a total withholding of trade.

Q. Then you would put them on notice in advance?

A. Yes....Once you wait until the situation gets in extremis, it is almost impossible to resolve it, short of force.

Interview with New York Times
July 7, 1976

ARTICLES

Tom Dragen

Carter and Kissinger: Similar Views . . .


If you look closely at Gov. Carter's speech about what our foreign policy should be, you come up with the gratifying conclusion that Carter thinks our present foreign policy is pretty good.

This is gratifying for two reasons: First, it means that during the campaign ahead we shall be spared nonsensical debates, such as that in which Richard Nixon and John Kennedy engaged over Quemoy and Matsu or in which Ronald Reagan and Gerald Ford are now engaged over the Panama Canal.

Second, it means that Carter does not intend to play the role of the saber-rat-

The same is true of Carter's criticism that our policy has been conducted too secretly. In his days as Richard Nixon's errand boy, Kissinger was guilty of some swift end runs around Congress and the press. Since Gerald Ford assumed office, he has not been guilty.

In any event, as Carter undoubtedly knows, pledges of openness in foreign policy are subject to common sense, and common sense dictates that negotiations must often be kept secret. "Open covenants openly arrived at" was intended to ban secret national alliances. It was not intended to suggest that the bargaining process could be,



Clayton Fritchey WP 3/27/76

... And on Detente and Diplomacy

After meeting Jimmy Carter for the first time recently, Clark Clifford, former Secretary of Defense, and an adviser to several Presidents, remarked to the press that he had found the former Georgia governor "well-informed on foreign policy and perceptive."

A careful reading of the full text of Carter's first major foreign affairs speech, made in Chicago the day be-

international failures under recent administrations, Democratic as well as Republican.

These failures, in Carter's view, are merely the consequences of an underlying policy that is not only misguided, but violates the American democratic tradition of openness. This is the way the Georgian puts his finger on it:

"Every time we have made a serious

ratorially, entered into furtively, and executed deviously.

In contrast, as Carter notes, "Every successful foreign policy we have had — whether it was the Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin Roosevelt, the Point Four of President Truman or the Peace Corps and Trade Reform of President Kennedy — was successful because it reflected the best that was

ular consensus behind his foreign initiatives before putting them into effect. As historian William McNeill recently noted, Roosevelt "often left the impression of being indecisive and dilatory, but when the crisis came, he had the support of the overwhelming majority of the American people." Carter's critics complain of ambiguities in his stand on some domestic issues, but

Do we want a disarming VP?

PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

WASHINGTON—For 45 seconds the Legionnaires hooted and booed Jimmy Carter. The Democratic candidate had just told them of his “blanket pardons” for the draft dodgers who fled to Canada and Sweden, while other young Americans lost limbs and lives in an Asian conflict Jimmy Carter suddenly discovered was a “racist” war waged by the United States.

MACKEY



The New York Times
May 14, 1976

CARTER GIVES PLAN FOR NUCLEAR CURB

New York Times

5/14/76

He Calls for Moratorium
in the Transfer of Fuel
Processing Plants

By KATHLEEN TELTSCH

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y.,

May 13—Jimmy Carter called today for a voluntary moratorium by all nations on the purchase or sale of nuclear fuel enrichment and reprocessing plants as a means of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons.

Speaking here at a privately sponsored conference on nuclear energy and international

*Excerpts from Carter talk
are printed on page A12.*

order, the former Georgia Governor, who is seeking the Democratic Presidential nomination, declared:

"An alliance for survival is needed, transcending regions and ideologies, if we are to assure mankind a safe passage to the 21st century."

Mr. Carter described as "wholly inadequate" the Soviet-American treaty initialed

Continued on Page A13, Col. 1