

The original documents are located in Box 133, folder “Scowcroft, Brent (2)” of the Ron Nessen Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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April 9, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: RON NESSEN

May I have your views on this request from the BBC for a television interview with the President later this week?

My inclination is that he should not do it, unless you feel there is some important foreign policy reason for him to do it.

RN:jg



THE BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION

C. B. S. BUILDING, 2020 M STREET, N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT

TELEPHONE 223-2050
CABLES: NEWSCASTS, WASHINGTON

8th April 1975

Dear Ron,

I called your office this morning and left a message but thought it best to reconfirm the reason for my calling in writing,

The BBC would like to submit a request for an interview with President Ford for later this week, after his address to Congress, for use on a BBC current affairs programme "Panorama" airing this Monday evening 14th.

The subject of the interview would be the future of American foreign policy following the events of the last few weeks and months. As you know there is increasing speculation and questioning now with regards to America's commitments and interests abroad. Doubts are being expressed both here and in Europe by the press and politicians as to whether the United States will continue to live up to its commitments, maintain its traditional alliances or retreat into isolationism. In broad terms these are the areas we would like to cover with the President.

David Dimpleby would fly to Washington to do the interview should Mr. Ford agree to our request. If we could film on Friday, Saturday or Sunday we would transmit the interview in the United Kingdom on Monday evening at 8.10 p.m. In addition should we obtain an interview with Mr. Ford we would make that interview available to the other European broadcasters through the European Broadcasting Union.

It strikes me that the time is now right for an interview with the President by a European television network like the BBC since the Administrations and the European Communities concerns are very much intertwined at the moment. And a one to one interview would have much more impact and also receive wider exposure than the usual press conference format which tends to be diffuse and to be used in a fragmented manner by broadcasters.

cont ...

I look forward to hearing from you and hope we can work something out. I can be reached at the BBC New York office on (212) 581 7100. Hope you enjoyed the California sun shine and again many thanks for the pizza.

Sincerely,

Sheila Osbarn

PP

(Ann Watson)
Television Producer,
BBC New York

Mr. Ron Nessen,
Press Secretary to the President,
The White House,
Washington, DC 20050.

THE BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION

C. B. S. BUILDING, 2020 M STREET, N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

PERSONAL AND URGENT

Mr. Ron Nesson,
Press Secretary to the President,
Old Executive Office Building,
(17th Street entrance)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: RON NESSEN

Here is a list of questions most likely to be asked at my news briefing growing out of the President's speech last night.

May I have the answers by 11 a.m.?

Thank you.

April 10, 1975

PRESS QUESTIONS - THE PRESIDENT'S STATE OF THE WORLD SPEECH

1. The President called upon Hanoi to cease military operations immediately and to honor the terms of the Paris Agreement. How does the United States plan to do this?
2. He said that the United States is urgently requesting the signatories of the Paris Conference to meet their obligation to use their influence to halt the fighting and to enforce the 1973 Accords. Will he call for a plenary meeting of the signatories?
3. He said that diplomatic notes have been sent to all members of the Paris Conference including the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China. When were these notes sent, through what channels and what, in reality, do you expect to come out of this initiative, particularly in the case of China and the USSR who are the principal suppliers of the enemy. Release text of notes?
4. President Ford spoke of "permitting the chance of a negotiated political settlement between the North and South Vietnamese." Are we promoting or arranging such a settlement and does this mean that we are prepared to agree to an arrangement, if necessary, for the removal of President Thieu?
5. When will the bills requesting an additional \$722 million for emergency military assistance and an initial sum of \$250 million for economic and humanitarian aid for South Vietnam be submitted to the Congress?
6. The President says that he will work with the Congress in the days ahead to develop additional humanitarian assistance. Is the President speaking of a bilateral program or would he be willing to channel these funds through international organizations?
7. Specifically, how will the President ask Congress to clarify immediately its restrictions on the use of U. S. military forces in Southeast Asia for the limited purposes of protecting American lives by ensuring their evacuation? Will he submit recommended draft legislation to this effect or how does he expect the Congress to proceed?

8. What has happened to aid to Cambodia? The President said that "it may be soon too late." Does he still want \$222 million in assistance for Cambodia?

9. When and where will the scheduled meetings with the leaders of Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Indonesia take place. Will it be a joint meeting? When and where will he meet with "leaders of other Asian countries?" Will he visit those countries or invite their leaders to Washington? Will they be bilateral sessions or is he calling for an emergency summit of Asian powers?

10. Where and when will the Western summit be held? What will the agenda cover?

11. When will the President submit specific requests to the Congress for economic and military assistance to Greece? What are the amounts and categories of assistance?

12. With respect to the Middle East, the President said we have agreed in principle to reconvene the Geneva Conference but we are prepared as well to explore other forums. Is he talking about sending Secretary Kissinger back to the Middle East? Or is he considering asking Middle Eastern leaders to come to Washington? What would be the timing? Is the U.S. now prepared to offer detailed settlement proposals of its own?

13. What does the President intend to do specifically with respect to requesting "remedial legislation" to deal with the matter of trade with the Soviet Union?

14. Why didn't the President mention the critical situation in Portugal at any point in this major speech on foreign affairs?

15. The President said that it has been traditional for the Executive to consult with the Congress through specially-protected procedures that safeguard essential secrets but that recently those procedures have been altered in a way that makes the protection of vital information next to impossible. In what way have those procedures been altered? Who is responsible for such alteration? As a result of this action has any vital information become public? How will the President work with the leaders of the House and Senate to devise new procedures? Will he include in his recommendation safeguards to make certain that our intelligence services can no longer be used for unconstitutional domestic spy operations.

16. How many endangered South Vietnamese would have to be evacuated? Where would they be taken?
17. Why didn't the President talk about evacuating Cambodians who have been associated with the United States? Does he plan to evacuate any Cambodians? If so under what authority? Why didn't the President ask for a clarification of the law relating to military forces in connection with an evacuation of Americans from Phnom Penh?
18. Why did the President select April 19 as the deadline for Congressional approval of his Indochina proposals?
19. If Congress gives permission for American troops to be used for the evacuation of Americans and Vietnamese would these American troops be authorized to shoot back if shot at? Could American air power be used as part of an evacuation plan?
20. What did the President mean when he said, "We cannot expect the Soviet Union to show restraint in the face of United States weakness or irresolution?"

April 12, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: RON NESSEN RNV

The three American television networks have asked me to obtain the following assurances before they undertake their own evacuation of their Vietnamese employees in Saigon:

- 1. What would the American reaction be if a plane load of Vietnamese employees of the networks showed up by charter plane at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines without proper visas or passports?**
- 2. Will the United States Government give some official assurances to Bird Air or other charter lines that they will not be penalized in future dealings with the American government if they airlift, on contract, the Vietnamese employees of the networks without proper exit visas?**
- 3. Will the United States government intervene with the government of the Philippines to arrange transportation to Clark Air Force Base in case Vietnamese employees of the networks show up at Manila or another port in the Philippines by charter ship?**

The networks have talked about some of these items with Phil Habib. But the networks would now like a firm answer on each point before proceeding with their plans.

RN/cg



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RN/cg



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ND18/CO163
PR16 2327
ND18-2/CO165-1
PR16-1

April 21, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR RON NESSEN

FROM: Brent Scowcroft *BS*

With reference to your memorandum of April 12, there is no way we can make exceptions to U.S. laws and regulations for the employees of the U.S. networks, and we should not overtly encourage them to violate Vietnamese laws and regulations.

I suggest the networks contact the evacuation center at the State Department which is dealing with many similar problems. State will do the best it can with the networks' request.

RECEIVED

APR 24 1975

GENERAL FILES

Dispatched from WB 4/21/75 (KRM)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
April 14, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: W. R. SMYSER 

SUBJECT: Special Privileges for Vietnamese
Employees of U. S. Networks

I think it would be highly improper to give a positive answer to Ron Nessen on any of the three questions that he has posed.

As you know, we are having great difficulties on the Hill and in Manila because of the undocumented Vietnamese who have shown up there. For us to encourage this sort of thing seems highly questionable.

It would be even more questionable to do so at a time when even the relatives of Americans cannot leave Vietnam. They are much more in jeopardy than the employees of our networks.

I recommend, therefore, that you tell Mr. Nessen that we cannot circumvent U. S. laws and regulations for the benefit of these network employees. You may wish to tell him this orally; if not, I have attached a memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you either sign the attached memorandum to Mr. Nessen (Tab A), or inform him orally that we cannot meet the requests of the networks with regard to special privileges for their Vietnamese employees.

Requests from media for help in getting employees
out of Vietnam

Networks

Phone calls from:

Dick Wald Tues, April 8 RN returned call at 2:44 pm
RN attempted to call at 6:15p. Left word
(Subject of calls unknown)

Small

Sandy Socolow Sat, April 12 Called as pool chairman, "to carry on
talks started by Dick Wald and Tom
Brokaw"

Stimmer - Dick Swanson

Memo from RN to Scowcroft (attached) outlining networks questions about
evacuating employees from South Vietnam

Dick Wald Tues, April 22 RN called Wald and they talked at 2:32 pm

Print Media

I seem to recall Dick Growald mentioning something something
to you about it

No telegram in the files from Time Magazine. I don't recall having
seen any - neither does anyone else out there



April 22, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RON NESSEN

May I have your views on this proposal from USIA? I personally am opposed to it unless there is a compelling foreign policy reason to grant it.

Attachment: Memo from Jim Keo requesting interview with President and Fujh TV

RN/cg



April 22, 1975

Dear Jim:

I have your memo concerning your request for an interview with the President on Japanese television in August.

I hope to have a definite answer soon, and I will be back in touch with you then.

Sincerely,

Ron Nessen
Press Secretary to the President

Mr. James Keogh
Director
United States Information Agency
Washington, D. C.

RN/cg





DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

April 18, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RON NESSEN

FROM:

JIM KEOGH

JK

SUBJECT:

Request for Presidential
Appearance on Japanese
Television

The American Embassy in Tokyo has come in with a strong recommendation to support the request of one of Japan's major TV stations (Fuji TV) for the President to appear on a special prime-time program with Prime Minister Miki. The program will be telecast on August 15, 1975, to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the end of World War II. The Prime Minister has already agreed to participate.

While we understand the many demands on the President's time, we support this proposal.

The 30th anniversary will find the Japanese reflecting on our special relationship since the war's end and looking into the future against the background of Indochina developments. The program would offer an excellent opportunity for the President to reaffirm the importance of our relations while at the same time reinforcing the very positive and favorable image with the Japanese public as the result of his visit to Japan last November. It would also help to set the stage for the Emperor's October visit to the U.S.

Fuji proposes that the August program focus on the close cooperative relationship that has evolved between Japan and the United States during the past 30 years and the important role which our partnership has played in building a stable, peaceful and prosperous Japan.

The format of the program is flexible. Fuji TV would prefer a 30-minute dialogue between the President and Prime Minister Miki. The dialogue could be thoroughly scripted in advance, prerecorded via satellite at a mutually convenient time, and edited prior to actual telecast. If a dialogue is not possible, Fuji proposes filming a prepared statement by the President. In either case, the Japanese prefer an informal setting, such as the office of the two leaders, to convey an atmosphere of dignity but also of familiarity and friendliness.

Fuji TV is one of Japan's largest and most influential commercial networks. Its president, Nobutaka Shikanai, is a close associate of Prime Minister Miki and the present conservative leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party. He has consistently been sympathetic to U.S. global policies, is a staunch opponent of communist aggression both in Asia and Europe and has great respect for U.S. efforts since WW II to stem this aggression. In the late sixties, he worked closely with USIA at a time when Japanese leftists were attempting to influence public opinion against the U.S. The Agency arranged for Secretary of State Rusk and other leaders to appear by satellite on Fuji TV with the Japanese Foreign Minister and leading Japanese writers and commentators to review American policy in depth. USIA also worked with Shikanai to produce a special TV series using Japanese correspondents in Washington to interview leading American officials on important policy developments. All of this illustrates the degree to which Shikanai has demonstrated a strong commitment to presenting objectively and fully the American point of view. There is, therefore, every reason to expect that the proposed program would meet the high standards required for Presidential participation.

May 2, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: RON NESSEN

Now that the President's trip to Brussels and elsewhere in Europe is taking shape, I would like to bring up with you again the numerous requests for interviews we have from various European publications and broadcasters.

May I have your thoughts on the usefulness of a joint interview by the President with -- say -- a half dozen to a dozen journalists representing the top European publications just prior to the President's European trip.

I am holding off replying to the many requests until I hear back from you.

RN/cg



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RON NESSEN

SUBJECT: Meeting of May 3 on Upcoming European Trip

That was a good meeting we had this morning to anticipate press problems on the European trip. This kind of pre-planning and cooperation should help us avoid the kind of criticism and uninformed stories we had on the Far East trip.

My notes indicate that the following items need to be arranged in order to make sure the press has factual information from which to cover the President's trip.

1. A pre-trip briefing sometime during the week of May 18 so that the reporters will have information to write their stories for the news magazines and newspapers the weekend before the trip.
2. A briefing or at least some pre-meeting information in Brussels the night of arrival.
3. A read-out of some kind on the night of May 29 after the first NATO Heads of Government meeting.
4. An advance copy of the President's remarks at the NATO meeting on May 30 or at least a paraphrase if the speech is confidential.
5. A final communique and briefing on the NATO meeting May 30.
6. A briefing on Air Force One on the way to Madrid wrapping up the NATO meeting and looking ahead to the Spanish visit.

7. A read-out or briefing following the President's meeting with Juan Carlos and President Arias Navarro on May 31.
8. A read-out after the first Sadat meeting on June 1; major wrap-up briefing and final communique following the last Sadat meeting on June 2.
9. Some information following the meeting with the Italians on June 3.
10. A wrap-up briefing on the whole trip, possibly on Air Force One coming home, with the press pool carefully selected to include reporters well versed on the subject.

One lesson I learned from the Far East trip was that I am so busy attending official functions on these foreign trips that somebody in my office needs to be designated to keep up with the hour-to-hour information and to act as a contact between the substantive people and the press. On the European trip this will be my new Deputy, Bill Greener. I would appreciate any help you can give Bill before we go and during the trip.

May 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: RON NESSEN
SUBJECT: Attached Letter from Leonid Buz, Tass

What is your advice on this request for an autographed photo of the President from a Tass news correspondent in Washington?

Attachment

RN/pac



How -
what do you think?
Note - enclosure attached.
— Yes
— No

May 2, 1975

The President
White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

As a correspondent in Washington for the Tass News Agency, I am making a collection of photographs of prominent U.S. officials. Naturally, I would like to have an autographed photo of you to head my collection.

I wanted to ask you personally, but was unable to get my request in at your press conference on Friday. I would appreciate it very much if you would find time to sign a photograph to Leonid Buz.

I am one of your sincere admirers.

Sincerely yours



Leonid Buz





With the compliments of the
FOREIGN PRESS CENTER

Mr. Leonid Buz of the Tass news agency is well
and favorably known to this office

Hoyt N. Ware,
Hoyt N. Ware
Director

NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING, ROOM 202, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 (202) 382-7701
the United States Information Agency

May 6, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: L. DEAN BROWN

Hyman Bookbinder sent us the attached resolution.
You might send copies to Ron Nessen and Ted Marrs.
Many thanks.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
STATEMENT ON INDO-CHINA REFUGEES

The American Jewish Committee views with profound concern the human tragedy that has unfolded in Indo-China, where the horrors of war, and social and political upheaval have once again claimed the innocent as victim. As an organization with a long-standing commitment to the principle of fundamental human rights for all people and to humanitarian relief wherever it is needed, we urge the United Nations to call upon the present governmental authorities in Indo-China to respect the right to every person to leave and to seek asylum and resettlement in the country of their choice. This basic human right is clearly enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which guarantees to everyone "the right to leave any country, including their own," and in other international agreements.

We further urge the United Nations to call upon these governments to protect the peoples within their jurisdiction from reprisals and to admit a United Nations committee of impartial observers into the area.

We commend the United States Government for receiving those refugees of Indo-China who have sought admission as immigrants. We hope that our government will continue to follow its traditional policy of granting such rights under the appropriate

Continued -

The American Jewish Committee/Statement on Indo-China Refugees

provisions of our existing immigration statutes. And we also call upon other governments to open their doors to the new refugees.

We welcome the recently announced United States program to facilitate absorption of the new immigrants in a fair and compassionate manner and call upon our government to assist the agencies currently engaged in relief and humanitarian efforts in INdo-China.

We are confident that Americans will respond generously to those agencies' appeals for assistance. And we join with men and women of good will everywhere in the fervent desire for an end to the war and suffering in Indo-China and with it, true peace and reconciliation in the area.

Adopted by
69th Annual Meeting
American Jewish Committee
Waldorf Astoria
New York City
May 3, 1975

75-105-1

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 10, 1975

TO: RON NESSEN

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

The President asked that the
attached article be called
to your attention.



THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN *dy.*

EURO BYLINER BY

Mr. Arnauld de Brochgrave

The U.S. "defeat and retreat" theme has been pounded day in and night out on Europe's air waves. Top honors, as usual in this type of contest, went to the French. French-speaking Vietnamese kept repeating "les Américains nous ont trahi (The Americans have betrayed us)." "What are you afraid of?" one of them was asked. "Only Communism," the Vietnamese replied and then quickly added, "but don't count on the Americans to save you. They are treacherous friends."

Marxist-influenced writers have barely managed to conceal their glee over America's "historical decline." Le Monde's editorials have long referred to U.S. "imperialism." Now France's most important paper editorialized that the era of U.S. fascism abroad, "at least in Southeast Asia, had come to a close. No small wonder that not one West European government dares respond to a U.S. request that they denounce Communist aggression in Indochina.

"America now faces its first defeat in its 200 years of independent history," said the Financial Times. Frank Giles, a senior editor of the Sunday Times, wrote that "for the Europeans and other allies of the U.S. the greatest cause



for concern in the future...is not the fear of American isolationism or bad faith or unreasonable self-interest, but the sheer confusion and element of unpredictability now prevailing over the formulation of foreign policy."

The subliminal impact on European decision-makers, policy-planners and the man and the woman in the street has been tremendous. To argue that the final victory of the black-pajamed disciples of Karl Marx over the greatest power the world has ever known will not affect the trans-Atlantic connection, said one British Conservative M.P., "is either naive or a distortion of the facts."

The most pro-NATO parliamentarians in all of West Europe are in West Germany and they are now asking questions never posed before. Said Karl-Heinz Lemmrich, as CDU specialist on European security: "When World War II ended I was a teenager in Stadtilm and to our great relief U.S. troops beat Soviet forces into our town in the nick of time. The commanding U.S. general summoned the population to the city square and solemnly assured us that U.S. troops were there to stay. Two days later that same general turned our town over to Soviet occupation forces and it has been in East Germany ever since. I dismissed this unhappy experience over the years as part of the fortunes of war.

Now it has come back to haunt me. The Americans did nothing to interfere with the erection of the Berlin Wall 15 years later. Now, 30 years later, I am convinced they would not go to war if the Soviets decided to straighten out what they would doubtless call a 'cold war abnormality' and made an overnight grab for West Berlin."

Dozens of almost completed reports on NATO and European Security for WEU and various strategic institutes are now being redrafted or amended. They will contain more alarm bells than before. The Soviets are speaking with several voices. On a government to government level they are busy reassuring everyone about detente and how anxious they are to maintain the European status quo. But at every other level, they are waging a major de-stabilization campaign -- from Portugal to Norway -- emphasizing the unreliability of the present security system, talking up the dismantling of the two military blocs and vaunting the merits of a Pan-European collective security pact. Governments are not taken in. But public opinion -- and a growing number of parliamentarians looking for pretexts to cut defense spending -- is listening with renewed interest. Britain's major cuts in defense spending are already having a ripple effect on the continent. "If Britain can cut, why can't we?" they ask.

Lionel Bloch, writing in the Daily Telegraph, said "the era of that nefarious admixture of half-Soviet anaesthetic, half-Western alibi, is drawing to an end. What will we find on the cold morning of our awakening? A Western world with depleted remnants of under-equipped armies, unable to protect its relative opulence, its much-abused freedoms, its indispensable trade routes and its sources of raw materials."

Policy planners woke up long ago. But national concensus politics dictate a sort of fatalistic acceptance of a drift into neutralism. Government leaders feel they can only lose votes by blowing the whistle while opposition leaders (Britain's Sir Keith Joseph is now drafting an anti-appeasement appeal for delivery in late May) occasionally raise the alarm but their utterances are buried on the inside pages. Russia's biggest ever global naval exercise (220 ships deployed in five oceans -- Pacific, Atlantic, Mediterranean, Indian Ocean and Arctic) was similarly buried in three or four paragraphs of minor news items.

Patriotism has long been dead in Europe. The alternative faith in self-preservation -- supranationalism -- never took hold. In quick succession two weeks ago, Jean Monnet, "Europe's" founding father disbanded his "Action Committee

for a United States of Europe" and finally retired; an EEC-commissioned report by Robert Marjolin was, in effect, a death certificate for the attempt to create a European economic and monetary union; and Sir Christopher Soames, EEC's "foreign minister", decided to quit and go back to British politics.

Pacifism is now spreading. Moscow's friends and sympathisers are strategically placed to make sure that any serious moves on the political and defense fronts will quickly be denounced as a revival of the cold war. Policy planners fear that it is too late to reverse course. The long shadow of growing Soviet military power, coupled with America's shrinking shadow, has already achieved a large part of its objective -- the demoralization of NATO theologians. Even if the Soviets continue to increase their military power five to ten per cent a year as they have been doing in Europe and on the high seas, the Europeans have come to the conclusion that there is nothing they can do to keep up militarily with inflation -- let alone come up with a credible deterrent.

There is a feeling in Europe that great mutations are now in gestation. It is not the resolve of the U.S. government that concerns the decision-makers. They accept the



Ford administration's reassurances at face value. But even the most pro-Americans feel they have become pretty meaningless in terms of planning for the years ahead.

What Thailand and the Philippines have been saying publicly is precisely what European officials have been telling me privately. They are shocked and appalled, not at the Communist victory in Indochina, which they had been expecting, but at Congress' behavior which made the U.S. defeat that much more spectacular. What concerns them is Congress and the U.S. mood and what the Sunday Telegraph's Peregrine Worsthorne described, after a trip to the U.S., as "Senators seeming to take pride in proclaiming their faith in American impotence...as if their recognition of the inevitability of defeat was a form of high courage which would earn them an honored place in history...porturing proudly before the TV cameras, for all the world as if sealing the fate of South Vietnam was their finest hour, the moment when they walked with destiny. What is extraordinary and shocking about the manner in which the U.S. has observed the collapse of its client-state is its undertones of self-congratulation; not so much a trauma, more a cause for satisfaction."

"If Congress had made some wise decisions in the past few months," said one of Kissinger's opposite numbers, "it

would only be a demi-mal. But they have triggered an unraveling process that will come back to haunt us much sooner than any Congressman seems to realize."

Decision-makers are more concerned with the 1973 War Powers Act, which they feel was the signal to Hanoi that they were now free to complete their conquest of Indochina, than with the final defeat. "We have come a long way from the days when Senator Fulbright argued (in 1960) that 'the source of an effective foreign policy under the American system is Presidential power. The President has the full responsibility, which cannot be shared, for military decisions in a world in which the difference between safety and cataclysm can be a matter of hours or even minutes'," said one of the foreign ministers privately. "The U.S. umbrella over Europe," he continued, "can be closed by Congress when it is most needed and without that umbrella West Europe becomes the very exposed Westernmost tip of the Eurasian land mass." Congress, as they see it, has usurped the President's foreign policy-making powers and the U.S. has now become an unreliable partner.

There is bound to be a closing of ranks with the U.S. at the NATO summit in Brussels at the end of the month and a reaffirmation of the now ritualistic fidelity to the basic

principles of collective Western security. But the planners already concede that the exercise will be largely cosmetics inspired by internal political considerations in the U.S. The drift on both sides of the Atlantic, clear for some time, is now accelerating. What the polls say these days is more important than what Ford may say at a NATO summit - and that is that most Americans are not prepared to fight for West Europe, even if the Soviets tried to take over. And in the field of trade, Congress has obtained oversight powers unmatched in any other Western democracy -- which to Europeans can only spell nationalistic protectionism.

They still believe in the U.S. commitment, at least on paper, and they realize the difference between Europe and Southeast Asia. But they also believe that disenchantment with all foreign entanglements runs very deep in the U.S. where commitments are contingent on a strong executive. Gerald Ford says there will be no unilateral withdrawal from Europe but no one believes a U.S. President can make such a decision stick in the future. More important is the American people's opposition to interventionist policy anywhere.

Europe's planners know that their U.S. opposite numbers have concluded there is little that can be done to stop countries like Portugal today and perhaps Italy and Greece

tomorrow from going Communist or little England from falling prey to Marxist economic influences. The U.S. no longer sees its security tied to the survival of democratic regimes in West Europe but on its bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union (e.g., SALT) which, in turn, encourages neutralism in Europe. Washington does not appear to be as concerned with the kind of political regimes that are now, or may in the future, rule allied countries. Moreover, NATO is not equipped to deal with "inside" jobs or flanking political movements.

They agree with Ford's description of U.S. foreign policy -- a collection of special economic, ethnic and ideological interests. Bipartisanship is dead. They have seen the past year as a succession of U.S. fiascos -- Cyprus, followed by Greece's exit from NATO's military structure (and the end of Sixth Fleet homeporting arrangements this week), the Turkish military aid cutoff and the final dismantling of NATO's southern front, and the collapse of Mideast peace efforts that many believe will lead to yet another regional war this summer or fall and yet another oil embargo.

The Belgian Prime Minister scores more points at home shaking hands with Mao in Peking or on a state visit to Poland than he does trying to carry out his mandate to relaunch European political union. Belgium's King Baudouin and Denmark's Queen Margrethe will become the first reigning European monarchs to make state visits to the Soviet Union this summer. All this reflects a growing belief that there are East-West panaceas that are going to make large defense expenditures unnecessary. Political leaders tend to take the line of least resistance because they don't believe they can rely on the U.S. much longer. Politicians privately concede that they can see all the dangers and pitfalls but they are also thinking of their next election campaign and of short-term policies that will enable them to siphon defense funds to cover yawning deficits in social services.

Thus the stage has been quietly set for the progressive "Finlandization" of West Europe. Rightly or wrongly, planners and experts look at what they call the paralyzed American giant, and irresponsible and increasingly isolationist Congress, and can now see that their political leaders, in the event of political pressure from Moscow in the future, would probably decide that it would be unwise

to do anything that the Soviets might regard as "provocative." Under this scenario, NATO would gradually wither away while Western countries retrained the illusion of freedom. Next, said one, the Kremlin will want the unacknowledged right to veto the appointment of ministers they consider unfavorable (as they now do in Finland).

One Danish politician was laughed at a few months ago when he suggested disbanding the armed forces and substituting an answering machine which would say in Russian, "we surrender." But that is increasingly the European mood. Youth sees no point to military machines. Some 35,000 Belgian youngsters recently demonstrated against the purchase of any kind of warplane to carry the Belgian air force through the next 15 years. Belgium's Etienne Davignon, the man who runs the International Energy Agency and who tries to coordinate policy among the nine common marketees, engaged some of these youths in a dialogue. They argued that their air force would not make a particle of difference in case of war and it might as well be disbanded. Davignon rejoined that Belgium was committed to supply one of the components of the overall NATO defense and that if all NATO members followed their argument to its logical conclusion Europe would become a very tempting vacuum for the Soviet Union. "So what," university students

replied, "if the Russians take over West Europe, sooner or later they will have to leave, just as the Germans did. Soviet occupation won't destroy Belgium anymore than the German occupation did." When Davignon asked them who would push the Soviets out, they shrugged their shoulders and didn't answer.

Under normal circumstances this could be put down to political immaturity. But a few weeks later, the Dutch Socialist Party Congress came out with a resolution that disowned its own ministers in the government -- and rocked NATO circles. The Dutch Premier, in turn, disassociated himself from his party's strictures which had ordained stringent terms for continued NATO membership. Dutch socialists emulated the Belgian students and came out against either the U.S. F-16 or the French Mirage as a replacement for the aged F-104. Instead, the party platform decreed, Holland should opt for a light, strictly defensive plane which could not carry tactical nuclear weapons.

Other party demands:

-- Pull out of NATO if by 1978 alliance members have not made a contribution to detente by solemnly declaring that they will never be the first to use nuclear weapons (even in the event of a Soviet conventional attack). NATO members should also agree to include America's 7,000 tactical nukes now in Europe, which include "dual-key" weapons shared with some allies, in MBFR negotiations (a principal deterrent against Russia's overwhelmingly superior conventional capability).


-- Holland to withdraw from NATO if the French nuclear deterrent plays a role in Central Europe under any sort of joint European defense arrangement to which West Germany would be a party.

-- Holland must oppose any merger of the French and British nuclear arsenals in a common European deterrent.

-- No increase in NATO's military potential for the next four years.

-- Creation of a Europewide zone free of atomic, bacteriological and chemical weapons.

The script could have been written in Moscow. Dutch ministers were so worried by the implications of these resolutions that they debated privately the advisability of fighting the next election over the NATO issue. They are convinced they would win. But others can see a dangerous precedent; if an election can be fought and lost on the same issue in Holland or elsewhere in the future. Britain's House of Commons now contains eighty Marxist sympathisers



and so-called "fundamental socialists" vs. 40 at the last nose count. Britain's referendum on whether Britain should get out of EEC is now a straight fight between Marxists and anti-Marxists and Harold Wilson, paradoxically, now depends on conservative support.

Such is the mood and temper of Europe, largely unreported in the U.S. where attention was focused on the Mideast and Indochina. There is no positive vision in the Western world which makes it easier for Marxists to maneuver Europe's social democrats further than they feel it prudent to go.

The European Security Summit Conference (33 European nations from east and west, plus the U.S. and Canada), Leonid Brezhnev's cherished dream before retirement, now assumes greater importance than ever before. The West had hoped it would become a genuine breakthrough to real detente. But the planners are now convinced it will be snare and delusion. The Soviets have made a few minor concessions during the last 29 months of negotiations on a freer exchange of people, ideas and information. But the preamble of the charter to be signed at the summit (probably in September) says the implementation will remain the voluntary prerogative of national governments -- i.e., Moscow is not committed to deliver. Eastern diplomats even had the audacity to argue that a freer exchange would be a one-way street because Bulgaria, for example, had already printed one million copies of the translated works of Shakespeare but that Britain had not yet guaranteed that a million

copies of Bulgaria's classics will be sold in Britain in English.

The east has agreed to more travel (but only in organized groups), an end to radio jamming (if the West pledges to control what's broadcast) and advance notification of military maneuvers (on a voluntary basis).

The Soviets will continue to exude sweetness and light and open up new vistas of a new Pan-European era which will, inevitably, accelerate pressures for major defense cutbacks. For Western opinion, detente means the end of the cold war. For the Soviets, it is a vehicle for (1) "peaceful intensification of the international class struggle against Western social systems" and (2) access to advanced technology to strengthen Russia's economic base and military capability. Confirmation has now come from the horse's mouth when A.I. Sobolev of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism wrote in "Working Class and Contemporary World" that "peaceful coexistence" makes it easier "for the socialist countries to render considerably greater aid to all peoples who are embarking on the path of revolutionary transformations."

The Kremlin is less inclined than ever to liberalize. Its military buildup on the European front continues from year to year (now 17,000 frontline Warsaw Pact tanks on the central front vs. 6,800 for NATO; with another 23,000 Soviets tanks on other fronts and in reserve). And everyone is convinced that this tremendous power is not destined to roll over West Europe but to back up Moscow's political "wishes" after U.S. troops have finally

phased out of the continent. Europe's planners speculate gloomily that their military weakness, lack of political will to create a viable European entity, economic recession, and widespread social unrest fanned by irresponsible union leaders, will leave their political masters little alternative but to go through a negotiating charade and, in effect, give in.

To resist these pressures will be tantamount to casting oneself in the role of cold warrior. Wildcat strike actions by militant Marxists have become deliberate attempts to plunge economies into deeper recession in the hope that this will lock them into Marxist "reforms" from which there will be no turning back. After days of urban guerrilla warfare between Marxist and Fascist extremists in Italy recently, the Communist Party enhanced its image as the moderate law and order party that could keep the restless masses under control -- if only it could share power with the Christian Democrats.

Anti-Communism has long been out in Europe. But anti-capitalism is now very "in" and Marxism has been revived as a counter-religion. The Marxist label does not carry the opprobrium of communism. The thrust of Marxist action is increasingly clear on European TV channels where Marxist sympathisers acquired junior jobs in the heady days of the 1968 revolution and have now become influential. A soon to be published report on "The New Dimensions of Security in Europe," has come to contribute to the Marxist revival and to the reduced self-confidence of the advanced, non-communist countries...

for the first time since the world depression 'capitalism' itself seemed to be in danger...((true or false)) is not the issue. The point is that the proposition that 'capitalism' was entering its final, general crisis, gained a new credibility in the eyes of the adherents of the various Marxist groups, swelling the number of new recruits."

Again the subliminal message of Marxist-oriented programs on TV has contributed to the steady demoralization of established institutions and their leaders. I have met several prominent private bankers and captains of industry in recent weeks who believe that if this Marxist campaign continues unchecked, free enterprise will be dead within ten years.

A sampling of Marxist-inspired productions on Europe's air waves in recent weeks (that I have seen personally):

-- A bitter denunciation of the allegedly vicious exploitation of Scottish oil riggers in the North Sea by their wicked Yankee capitalist bosses, later broadened to an indictment of the capitalist ruling classes -- the Play of the Week on BBC-TV.

-- the exciting, purposeful life of a Palestinian female teacher in a revolutionary society who goes on to become a hijacker contrasted with the purposeless, empty life of a Belgian female factory worker in the consumer society whose only excitement is to enter a local beauty contest -- a Belgian "Reportage-Fiction" shown on Swiss TV.

-- A nostalgic, evocative recreation of the Communist-Socialist

alliance in France in 1936 in which anyone opposing the experiment was cast in the role of a fascist (or a dodo) -- a documentary titled "Power to the Left" on French TV.

-- A debate on the media during which journalists argued there would be no real press freedom as long as papers are privately-owned and have to show profits to survive and suggested instead "an independent status for the media in the public sector" -- on French radio.

In Britain last week, militant Marxist leaders railroaded the 28,000-strong National Union of Journalists into resolutions which, unless reversed, will sharply curtail press freedom by forcing all editors-in-chief to join the union and ban outside contributions written by non-union people.

In order to undermine non-communist societies, the ISC report (to be published later this month) says that "Marxists of all categories seek and obtain employment in educational establishments at all levels, in the media and in publishing; penetrate Western parliamentary institutions, either ((via the CPs)) as in France and Italy, or as members of social democratic parties, as in Germany and Britain. In some countries, entire universities have been 'Marxicized' in this way; in others faculties have been taken over, especially in departments of politics and sociology, with consequent changes in curriculum.

The danger, as all of Europe's key policy planners see it today, is that slowly, almost painlessly, Russia's de-stabilization

efforts in a much weakened and divided West Europe, will lead the continent into a kind of Pan-European limbo as it continues to slip into Moscow's political orbit.

Rox - I'm being asked to confirm this story. Any guidance I can give reporter?

BB0984J1
RHA 781

URGENT 1111 INDOCHINA - THIRD NIGHTLEAD SHIP
BY RALPH HARRIS AND WALTER ANDREWS

← Pentagon reporter?

WASHINGTON, MAY 13, REUTER - A U.S. NAVY RECONNAISSANCE PLANE WAS HIT BY GUNFIRE AS IT FLEW YESTERDAY OVER CAMBODIAN GUNBOATS HOLDING AN AMERICAN MERCHANT SHIP CAPTIVE IN THE GULF OF THAILAND, GOVERNMENT SOURCES SAID TODAY.

THE FIRING INCIDENT WAS DISCLOSED AS U.S. PLANES, WARSHIPS AND MARINES WERE ON ALERT IN THE PACIFIC AND PRESIDENT FORD PONDERED WHETHER TO USE FORCE IF DIPLOMACY FAILED TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE 10,000-TON CONTAINER VESSEL MAYAGUEZ.

NOPE 1434



BB0984)L
RHA 783

INDOCHINA - THIRD NIGHTLEAD SHIP 2 WASHINGTON
ACCORDING TO THE SOURCES, THE UNARMED RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT SUSTAINED ONLY MINOR DAMAGE FROM WHAT APPARENTLY WAS SMALL ARMS FIRE.

THE PLANE FLEW OVER THE MAYAGUEZ A FEW HOURS AFTER THE SHIP WAS FIRED AT BY THE CAMBODIAN GUNBOATS AND THEN BOARDED EARLY YESTERDAY IN THE GULF OF THAILAND.

TODAY, THE MAYAGUEZ WAS REPORTED BY THE WHITE HOUSE TO BE RIDING AT ANCHOR IN THE CUSTODY OF THE GUNBOATS OFF THE CAMBODIAN ISLAND OF KOH TANG, 30 MILES (48 KILOMETERS) FROM THE CAMBODIAN COAST.

THE REUTER SOURCES SAID.....3RD GRAF RHA/RNA 783.

Brent:
Let's confirm this but say nothing more.
____ OK
____ No. Say nothing.
____ other

RHN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 22, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

RON NESSEN

So that you can be fully prepared for your interview with the foreign correspondents on European television tomorrow, I have obtained a list of the subject areas about which you will be questioned:

1. Purposes of your visit to Europe.
2. Foreign policy implications of the MAYAGUEZ episode. (Not a rehash of tactics and criticisms.)
3. Foreign policy implications of the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia.
4. Congress and foreign policy.
5. Detente.
6. The status of NATO (problems involving Greece, Turkey, Portugal, France, England, etc.).
7. The Middle East.
8. Energy and oil.
9. The European economic community.

cc: Don Rumsfeld
General Scowcroft

May 26, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
DON RUMSFELD

FROM: RON NESSEN

The Press Office will need help from the NSC and the State Department in providing the following items to the newsmen in order to assure adequate press coverage of the President's European trip:

Wednesday, May 28, 1975

A brief report on the President's evening meeting with the Belgium Prime Minister.

Thursday, May 29, 1975

A briefing of some kind at mid-day, following the meetings with Caramanlis and Demiral.

A report of some kind following the President's meeting with the Portugese Prime Minister.

A briefing sometime before the King's dinner on the first day's NATO meetings and the bilateral meetings. (This is necessary for the evening TV shows and morning papers in the U.S.)

Friday, May 30, 1975

A report at mid-day on the President's meeting with Prime Minister Wilson and the morning NATO session.



A wrap-up briefing in the evening on the entire NATO meeting either at the Press Center at the Sheraton Hotel or the NATO Press Center.

Advance texts of the following:

Arrival remarks for Madrid

"Thank you remarks" for presentation of keys to the city in Madrid

Toast for the luncheon in Madrid

Toast for the dinner in Madrid

Saturday, May 31, 1975

A report on the President's meetings with Franco and the Prime Minister sometime before the dinner starts

Advance texts of the following:

Arrival remarks for Salzburg

Lunch toast for Salzburg

Dinner toast for Salzburg

Sunday, June 1, 1975

Report on the President's meeting with Chancellor Kriesky

Report on the President's lunch and meeting with President Sadat

Advance text for lunch toast on Monday

Monday, June 2, 1975

Briefing after final meeting with Sadat, preferably by 8 or 9 pm in order to make nightly TV shows and morning papers in the U.S.

(Live TV cameras will be available at the Press Center in Kongress Haus.)

Remainder of trip:

We don't have the detailed schedule yet for Rome. When we get it, I will send a list of the items on which we need help there.



June 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

RON NESSEN

Attached is a petition from a group of Israeli correspondents for an interview with the President during Prime Minister Rabin's visit.

Their argument is since the President allowed himself to be interviewed by a group of Egyptian editors in Salzburg, the Israeli correspondents should have equal opportunity.

How should I reply?

Attachment




June 11, 1975


Mr. Ron Nessen
Press Secretary to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Nessen,

We the Israeli correspondents in Washington covering Prime Minister Rabin's visit due hereby respectfully request an interview with President Ford. We would hope that such an interview could take place this week in conjunction with the Premier's visit.




Wolf I. Blitzer
The Jerusalem Post



Nisim Kivity
Yedioth Ahronoth



Gershon Jacobson
Yedioth Ahronoth




Dan Margalit
Haaretz



Nahum Barnea
Davar




Samuel Segal
Maariv




Philip Ben
Maariv



Jacob Ahimeir
Israel Broadcasting



Yoram Ronen
Israel Broadcasting



Yaacov Saar
Photographer
Israel Government Press
Office

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Please add my
name to the list
of Israeli reporters
for a briefing by
the President:

Connie Lawton

for the
English Div. of Israeli
Broadcasting Co.

Thank you,
Connie

RN saw 6/11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: RON NESSEN *RHN*

Attached is a petition from a group of Israeli correspondents for an interview with the President during Prime Minister Rabin's visit.

Their argument is since the President allowed himself to be interviewed by a group of Egyptian editors in Salzburg, the Israeli correspondents should have equal opportunity.

How should I reply?

6/11/75
Ron -
No way.
Burt

Attachment

June 11, 1975


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Press Secretary to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Nessen,


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Wolf I. Blitzer
The Jerusalem Post




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
Dan Margalit
Haaretz



Nahum Barnea
Davar




Samuel Segal
Maariv




Philip Ben
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Yaacov Saar
Photographer
Israel Government Press
Office

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Please add my
name to the list
of Israeli reporters
for a briefing by
the President:

Connie Lawton
for the
English Div. of Israeli
Broadcasting Co.

Thank you,
Connie

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 11, 1975

MEMO FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: RON NESSEN *RAN*

Could you draft an answer to this if
any is needed?

Attachment: Letter from Dr. Byung
Kyu Kang

OFFICE OF CONGRESSMEN
DR. BYUNG KYU KANG (D. R. P)
K.P.O. BOX 196, SEOUL, KOREA



JUN 1 1975
TELEPHONE:
OFFICE : 73-7163
PARTY : 62-7801, 1695

The Honorable Ron Nessen
Presidential Press Secretary
White House
Washington, D.C., 20050
U.S.A

May 28th, 1975

Dear Sir:

First of all, I cordially express my deep thanks for the assurance of the defense commitments toward the Republic of Korea proclaimed by H.E. President G. Ford including Mr. Schellenging, Secretary of Defense, Dr. Kissinger, Secretary of State are really encouraged.

I also appreciate the facts that Congressmen including leaders of the House and Senate and members of Subcommittee also proclaimed with the strong will and resolution to keep the public pledge for the Free Nations.


However, the problems have been rising to the security of Korea by the recent situation of Southeastern Asia and tragedy of Indochina happened in April. Especially, the recent visit of Red China and the Eastern Europe by Kim, Il Sung of North Korea are the actual proof of the outspoken aggression plan to R.O.K.

As you well understand, the strategic value of the Republic of Korea for the freedom and security of Asia and Western Pacific is very significant.

Accordingly, the joint defense system among U.S.A., Japan and the Republic of Korea should be more solidified and the 5 years plan of modernization of R.O.K. armed forces should be actualized as soon as possible.

Thanks you very much, I remain

Very truly yours,


Dr. Byung Kyu KANG

June 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: RON NESSEN

Would you please draft an answer to the attached letter from Mrs. Charles McMahon regarding the body of her son, who was one of the two Marines killed in South Vietnam on the last day of the withdrawal from Saigon.

Thank you.

RN/cg

Attachment in central files



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NOTE FOR: Brent Scowcroft

FROM : RON NESSEN

What, if any
answer, should
we give?

RAN

6-23-75

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO RON NESSEN

FROM: JACK HUSHEN *JDH*

John Osborne submitted the following question which he would like to have answered by Wednesday, if possible:

Has President Ford had any serious study done, or had such a study been done when he took office, to determine whether any practical non-military sanctions against OPEC countries are available to the U.S. Government, either to prevent further oil price increases or to induce rollbacks in present prices?

Has the possibility of such sanctions been discussed with the President in the Cabinet, NSC or individually with such people as Zarb - Schlesinger - Simon - Kissinger, etc.?