

**The original documents are located in Box 125, folder “USSR (3)” of the Ron Nessen Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

### **Copyright Notice**

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Ron Nessen donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

## NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. background	Background on US-Soviet relations (1 p.) <i>paralyzed 3/04</i> <i>summarized 9/29/04</i>	4/7/76	A

## FILE LOCATION

Nessen Papers; Foreign Guidance Series;  
Box 124; USSR 10/1/75 - 1/20/77

LET 3/85

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12065 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

October 2, 1975

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ON SALT

Q. Yesterday in Omaha the President seemed to imply that a SALT II agreement may not be a possibility soon. Is that in fact, a correct interpretation, and if so, does this mean that General Secretary Brezhnev may not be visiting this year?

A. I would not place that interpretation on the President's remarks. The situation is unchanged; neither is our position on the desirability for attaining an agreement. As far as General Secretary Brezhnev's visit is concerned you will recall Secretary Kissinger's remarks on this question at his last press conference: *Sept 9*

"As far as SALT is concerned, the basic issues of principle were settled at Vladivostok. Several other issues of great consequence have been settled in the meantime. We are now down to two or three issues of great importance on which agreement has not yet been reached, but on which, if agreement were reached, the negotiation could be concluded within 6 to 8 weeks after that.

" We expect to discuss those issues with Foreign Minister Gromyko when he is here, and we still expect to receive the General Secretary in Washington before the end of this year."  
At this time we still expect a visit from Brezhnev this year.



X  
X

October 7, 1975

PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH DIRECTORS OF THE  
US-USSR TRADE AND ECONOMIC COUNCIL

The President met this morning at 11:00 a. m. with the Directors of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council. The meeting gave the President an opportunity to commend the Council on its efforts to develop trade and improved relations between the U. S. and the Soviet Union. The President reaffirmed his support for the normalization of economic ties as an important element in our overall effort to build a more constructive US-USSR relationship. The President said that he was disappointed that the Trade Agreement of 1972 has not yet entered into force. He expressed the hope that obstacles to implementation of the Agreement can be overcome and said that the Administration will continue consultations with Congress to that end.

FYI: List of participants attached.

BACKGROUND: -- For dissemination on an IF ASKED BACKGROUND BASIS.

The Directors of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council are holding their third meeting this week in Washington. The Council is an outgrowth of a protocol signed at the June 1973 US-Soviet Summit which looked to the establishment of a US-USSR Chamber of Commerce to assist in the development of mutually beneficial trade. Pepsico Chairman Donald Kendall and Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Alkhimov have served as Co-Chairmen of the Council since its founding. The President sent a message to the Council last October on the occasion of its meeting in Moscow.

There are 28 American business executives and the same number of Soviets on the Board of Directors of the Council. The Council has pressed hard for Administration action to amend the Trade Act of 1972 and wants to begin actively lobbying on the Hill as soon as we have a specific proposal. Informal contacts between the Administration, Senator Ribicoff and others in the Congress have continued over the summer, but no formal Administration proposals have yet been advanced for Congressional consideration. Minister Alkhimov is scheduled to meet with Secretary Simon and with Senators Javits and Ribicoff during his stay in Washington.

List of American Businessmen Attending  
the Executive Committee Meeting of the

US-USSR Trade and Economic Council, October 7, 1975

1. Donald Kendall, Chairman, Pepsi Cola
2. Howard L. Clark, Chairman, American Express
3. A. W. Clausen, President, Bank of America
4. Samuel B. Casey, President, Pullman Inc.
5. Reginald Jones, Chairman, General Electric
6. Ben Crane, Partner, Cravath, Swain and Moore
7. Howard Boyd, Chairman, El Paso Natural Gas
8. Raymond Herzog, Chairman, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing
9. Dr. Robert Leshner, President, United States Chamber of Commerce
10. Brooks McCormack, Chairman, International Harvester
11. Thomas Murphy, Chairman, General Motors
12. David Packard, Chairman, Hewlett-Packard
13. Michel Fribourg, President, Continental Grain
14. Dr. Armand Hammer, Chairman, Occidental Petroleum
15. William Hewett, Chairman, John Deere
16. Melvin Holm, Chairman, Carrier Corporation
17. Edward Kaiser, Chairman, Kaiser Industries
18. Douglas Kenna, President, National Association of Manufacturers
19. Peter McCullough, President, Xerox Corporation

20. David Rockefeller, Chairman, Chase Manhattan Bank
21. William Miller, Chairman, Textron
22. Willard Rockwell, Chairman, Rockwell International
23. Milton Rosenthal, President, Engelhard Minerals
24. Arthur Santree, President, Combustion Engineering
25. Irving Shapiro, Chairman, DuPont
26. William Verity, Chairman, Armco Steel
27. George Schultz, President, Bechtel

List of Soviet Participants

1. V. S. Alkhimov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade
2. V. Stepanov, Assistant to Alkhimov
3. V. N. Sushkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade
4. M. N. Gribkov, Vice President, Trade and Economic Council
5. Y. F. Manakhov, President, Almazyuvilirexport
6. N. V. Zinoviev, Chief of Administration, Ministry of Foreign Trade
7. V. Bessmertny, President, Amtorg
8. S. A. Mkrtumov, USSR Trade Representative in the U. S.
9. V. Boychenko, Director, Intourist
10. A. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador in the U. S.

MOYNIHAN'S REMARKS TO AFL-CIO CONVENTION

Q. What is the Administration's reaction to Ambassador Moynihan's remarks about Amin and about the OAU?

A. We feel that the attacks by Ugandan President Amin were out of place and uncalled for. We recognize however, that all of his remarks do not reflect the views of the OAU, an institution for which we have very high regard and which we consider one of the very important regional organizations in the world.

(You may recall that Secretary Kissinger recently hosted a dinner in New York for the OAU foreign ministers and permanent representatives.

IF ASKED SPECIFICS: Read-out or toast may be obtained from the State Department).

U. S. -SOVIET GRAIN / OIL DEAL

Q. Has the U. S. worked out a deal with the Soviets on grain? And is it resisting conclusion of that deal to get better terms on oil?

Why does the U. S. want to deal with the Soviets on oil? And are we using grain exports as leverage to get it?

A. With respect to the status of the negotiations, I am informed by our negotiators that satisfactory progress is being made. The essential elements of a grain agreement have been worked out, and we are working to reach an agreement on oil.

We believe it is in the interest of the U. S. to import oil, to the extent imports are required, from diversified sources. An arrangement whereby we purchase a certain amount of Soviet oil would be consistent with the objective.

While it would be inappropriate to comment on the details and precise status of our negotiations on oil and grain, I will say we believe mutually beneficial arrangements can be worked out in both areas, and we are still hopeful that agreement can be reached.

October 9, 1975

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

ON MOYNIHAN'S REMARKS AT AFL-CIO

We feel that the attacks made by Ugandan President Idi Amin at the UN were out of place and uncalled for, and in that context I feel that Ambassador Moynihan said what needed to be said in reply. We recognize, however, that all of President Amin's remarks do not reflect the views of the OAU, and we do not want any misconceptions about our attitude toward that institution, for which we have very high regard. We consider the OAU one of the very important regional organizations in the world and one with which the United States will continue to develop and strengthen our good relations.

# # # #

October 15, 1975

BREZHNEV VISIT

Q. There are conflicting reports today on when General Secretary Brezhnev may visit the United States. Some sources indicate a December visit, some a January visit to precede the 25th Communist Party Congress in February. Can you clarify the discrepancies and give us an indication of when Brezhnev may be coming?

A. ~~We have maintained all along that General Secretary Brezhnev's visit would follow the successful conclusion of a SALT agreement.~~ (As Secretary Kissinger said Sunday on Meet the Press, two or three issues remain <sup>on SALT</sup> and the prospects for concluding an agreement "within the next months" is good." Beyond that we cannot conjecture what the possible dates might be for concluding the negotiations or for a visit by the General Secretary subsequent to that.

FYI ONLY:

The chances are fairly good that Brezhnev's visit will slip into 1976, but we shouldn't speculate on any dates -- even generally -- which might prejudice the SALT negotiations.

CHINA

China Angered on U. S. "support" of Tibetans

Q. The New York Times reports that the Chinese Foreign Ministry accused the U. S. of "undisguised interference in China's internal affairs" in permitting an office of Tibet to remain open in New York City and a Tibetan Song and Dance Ensemble to tour the United States. Would you comment, and does this endanger current plans by either Secretary Kissinger or the President to visit China?

A. First, let me say that your first question was fully addressed yesterday at the Department of State and I suggest you check with them. (Briefing Excerpt attached). Secondly, there are no changes in our plans on visits to China -- either by the Secretary or the President.

FYI ONLY:

The whole question of Tibet's relationship with China and our attitude to it is quite complex, hence the use by the Department spokesman of the double negative: "none of our policies or actions are based on the premise that Tibet is not a part of China." You should avoid getting into a discussion on this issue, but if you must comment at all, confine your arguments to the Constitutionality and legality of permitting the office and the dance troupe to remain in the U. S.

CHINA -- CHOU'S ILLNESS

Q. The Washington Star reported yesterday that some high level officials are discouraging the President from travelling to China at this time because of Chou (JOE) en-lai's illness and internal Chinese problems. Is there any truth to the story, and is the President thinking of changing his plans?

A. That story is highly speculative. There have been no changes in our plans.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DPC 174

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS, RADIO AND TELEVISION NEWS BRIEFING  
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1975, 1:00 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. FUNSETH: As you know, the Secretary will be having a news conference in Ottawa tomorrow afternoon at 3:30. We plan to have that press conference broadcast live into the briefing room, for those of you who are interested.

Because of the Secretary's news conference tomorrow, I do not plan to have a regular briefing. But I will, of course, be available to try to answer any questions you may have.

Q What time is the news conference?

A 3:30. Questions?

Q Yes, Bob. Are you able to give me anything regarding the charges by China of flagrant violation of the 1972 Sino-U.S. Agreement if the United States allows the so-called Tibetan Song and Dance Ensemble to tour the country?

A I have seen that statement, which was issued to the press in Peking yesterday. We believe that it must be based in part on a misunderstanding by the Chinese of the American political system. Previously the Chinese

had asked us to close the Office of Tibet in New York City.

We explained to them that this office is properly registered with the Department of Justice under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, and therefore we had no legal way to force it to close. We pointed out to them that any material issued by that office carries a statement that its registration with the Justice Department does not imply any approval by the U.S. Government.

Now, with respect to the Tibetan Song and Dance Ensemble, we also explained to the Chinese that it is being sponsored in the United States by a commercial organization -- that it met the visa requirements for such a tour -- and that we had no legal basis for preventing the group from coming to the United States.

Finally, I would like to note that none of our policies or actions is based on the premise that Tibet is not part of China.

Q Would you repeat that, again slowly, starting with the negative?

A Finally, I would like to note that none of our policies or actions is based on the premise that Tibet is not part of China.

Q Well, prior to recent years I thought that our attitude always was one that China had suzerainty but not sovereignty over Tibet. Has that been changed while I had my head turned?

A I don't know whether --

Q I mean it is not -- if you had just suzerainty, you don't have -- it is not part of the country, Bob.

A I understand the distinction you are making. I think at this point we would like to limit our views on the relationship of Tibet to China in the way that I just stated.

Q Well, then, that means that you are changing the policy, I think. I mean not you, but the State Department.

Q Was any of this communicated separately before your statement here to the PRC mission here?

A No. And I must say the statement issued by the Chinese was not communicated to us officially. We read about it in the press. But as I have suggested, the Chinese had discussed the two points with us, about the Office of Tibet and the tour by the dance group.

Q Bob, you said that this was based in part on a misunderstanding.

A Yes.

4

Q What is the other part?

A You would have to ask the Chinese that.

Q Well, you have a feeling, though, or you wouldn't have said that. Otherwise you would have just said it was based on a misunderstanding, I would assume.

A Maybe I should rephrase it to say that apparently it must be based on a misunderstanding.

Q Do you have any response to the charges made by the Peking government that this is a flagrant violation of the Shanghai Communique?

A No. We reject that. It is not a violation of the Shanghai Communique. We have said recently, and I think the Secretary just recently reiterated that U.S. policy remains firmly committed to the Shanghai Communique.

Q There could be, by people looking for it, read into your statement an implication. You say that because this Tibetan song and dance team is being sponsored in the U.S. by a commercial organization there is no legal basis for preventing its tour.

A Yes.

Q The implication might be that if there were a legal basis for preventing its tour, you would do so. Do you mean that?

A No. I think what we are saying is that these people, who I believe live in India, applied for a visa to visit the United States for the purpose of giving these performances. We accepted that as their reason for coming here, and on that basis we had no legal basis for not issuing the visa.

Q What passport are they carrying?

A I do not know that.

Q In that case, why were their documents recalled just before their arrival?

A I was not aware of that. I would have to check into that. Who recalled their documents?

Q The State Department, I believe, or Immigration and Naturalization Service, whoever was handling it. Just before they arrived in this country, according to their representatives, the documents were recalled, and they were then reissued to them.

A I do not know. I will have to check into that.

Q Bob, is the Secretary upset at all that this squabble occurs in the same week that he plans to depart for China?

A I do not know the answer to that.

GRAIN NEGOTIATION WITH THE  
SOVIET UNION

Q: What is the status of the negotiations on grain and oil which we are carrying out with the Soviet Union?

A: Our negotiations on a long-term grain purchase agreement with the Soviet Union are continuing\*, and I am optimistic that we will have an agreement shortly. Such an agreement would avoid the sudden fluctuations in Soviet demand for grain exports which have disrupted world grain markets. It would enable our farmers to plan with greater certainty, and it would minimize the shocks to our own markets and the impact on domestic prices of future Soviet purchases.

We are also discussing with the Soviets the prospects for US purchases of Soviet oil.

\*(Note: This may be superseded by announcement of conclusion of the grain negotiations.)

NSC/10-17-75

FORD - BREZHNEV MEETING ON SALT?

Q. Bernard Gwertzman has a story in Sunday's New York Times that there is a possibility of a Ford-Brezhnev or Kissinger-Gromyko meeting next month to break the deadlock on the few remaining issues holding up a SALT agreement. Is such a meeting planned, and if so, under what circumstances would it take place?

A. As you know, both the President the Secretary have stated that the prospects for concluding a SALT agreement are good but that we are under no artificial time constraints to do so. At this time there is no meeting planned between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev. As for Secretary Kissinger, he has stated in a recent press conference that he would be willing to meet to discuss SALT issues should the situation seem to warrant it, but I have nothing further to give you as to the likelihood of such a meeting in the near future.

FYI: November 10 Press Conference -- In response to a question, the Secretary said "a meeting between Gromyko and me when either side has something important to say we are, of course, prepared to do."

FORD - BREZHNEV MEETING ON SALT?

Q. Bernard Gwertzman has a story in Sunday's New York Times that there is a possibility of a Ford-Brezhnev or Kissinger-Gromyko meeting next month to break the deadlock on the few remaining issues holding up a SALT agreement. Is such a meeting planned, and if so, under what circumstances would it take place?

A. As you know, both the President the Secretary have stated that the prospects for concluding a SALT agreement are good but that we are under no artificial time constraints to do so. At this time there is no meeting planned between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev. As for Secretary Kissinger, he has stated in a recent press conference that he would be willing to meet to discuss SALT issues should the situation seem to warrant it, but I have nothing further to give you as to the likelihood of such a meeting in the near future.

FYI: November 10 Press Conference -- In response to a question, the Secretary said "a meeting between Gromyko and me when either side has something important to say we are, of course, prepared to do."

AVIATION WEEKLY ON SALT VIOLATIONS

Q. Aviation Weekly has recently asserted that President Ford and Secretary Kissinger are carrying out a deliberate policy of secrecy and deception in concealing Soviet SALT violations. Would you comment?

A. Regarding allegations of Soviet "violations" of the SALT agreements, let me reemphasize that we have no evidence that the Soviets are in violation of the SALT agreements. As we have indicated previously, some ambiguities have arisen which relate to the precise interpretation of several provisions of the SALT agreements. We have referred these ambiguities to the Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva, a joint US-Soviet body which was established in 1972 just for this purpose. To date we have been successful in resolving most of the ambiguities and we are continuing to seek clarification of the remaining ones.

He pressed: On the issue of administration estimates of Soviet nuclear weapons strength, we know of no effort to "distort" our estimates of Soviet strength. The intelligence community is in agreement on the present level of Soviet strategic forces. There may be some differences as to future levels of Soviet strength, but whenever there are such differing projections, the President

is presented with a range of estimates which include all differing views within the intelligence community. However, any differing views on projections of Soviet forces in no way constitute "distortions" or "double bookkeeping."

November 25, 1975

ADDENDUM

When asked about the Aviation Weekly editorial, the Secretary responded by saying that it was a disgrace when a President and a Secretary of State are accused of purposefully distorting the strength of an adversary to the public detriment. Serious people are bound to differ, he said, about levels and capabilities of Soviet strength. As far as ambiguities that have arisen, these have been referred to the SCC in Geneva for consideration. Most of the ambiguities have been resolved and we are seeking clarification on those that are not yet clear. If the Soviets <sup>build</sup> ~~built~~ an advantage by spending more than we do, that is one thing, but they will not do so on the basis of any SALT violations. It is an unworthy editorial, he concluded.

SECRETARY DEPARTS FOR MOSCOW

The Wall Street Journal has an excellent squib in its "World Wide" summary today on the upcoming U. S. -Soviet meetings on SALT. The article highlights a Pravda story that says that Russia "is resolved to do all it can" to obtain a new arms limitation agreement, while citing the implications of a negotiation failure. As Secretary Kissinger said in his press conference January 14, he would not be going to Moscow if the President were not convinced that some progress were possible. He emphasized that at best all we can achieve during this current round is an agreement in principle, after which the technicians would have to hammer out the details, a process that would take at least two to three months.

Q. What is the President's reaction to the Pravda article indicating the importance Russia apparently places on the upcoming talks on SALT?

A. The President, in sending the Secretary to Moscow, is hopeful that more progress can be made on an agreement to limit strategic arms. We have always said that a good agreement, carefully negotiated and mutually beneficial, is in our interest and in the interest of the world.

February 27, 1976

RUSSIA SAYS NUCLEAR WAR INEVITABLE ACCORDING TO CURRIE

Q. Dr. Malcolm Currie, Director of Defense Research and Engineering at the Pentagon said yesterday that Soviet leaders do not look upon nuclear war as unthinkable and are preparing to survive one because "they feel strategic war is inevitable." Is Currie expressing the Administration position on the Soviet view? What is our view on the inevitability of war?

A. Dr. Currie has stated his personal views and we are <sup>not</sup> going to comment on them. The Administration position on the issues you raise was stated by Secretary Kissinger in his comprehensive San Francisco speech February 3, and, of course, is reflected fully in the Defense Posture Statement as well. I would refer you to the speech and the posture statement for a full explanation of the U.S. position on strategic policy.

March 23, 1976

ADMINISTRATION POSITION ON DETENTE RESOLUTION

Q: What is the Administration position on the Cranston-sponsored sense of the Senate resolution endorsing the process known as "detente" with the Soviet Union?

A: While it is principally a matter for Congress to decide how to express itself on such resolutions, the resolution as drafted is consistent with the President's policies of seeking a constructive and responsible relationship with the Soviet Union.

FYI: The important attitude to convey is that this is a Congressional matter, the substance of which we endorse without commenting directly on how the Congress goes about resolving it.

Suggested Questions and Answers on TTBT/PNE - March 31, 1976

Q: Have the Soviets agreed to this 30-to-60 day extension?

A: No, although we have advised them that this statement was to be made.

Q: Isn't this, in effect, a moratorium?

A: No, it is not a moratorium. It is a unilateral declaration by the U.S. It does not involve any commitment from the other side; it simply sets forth the facts of our own near term testing plans.

Q: If we weren't able to reach agreement since the summer of 1974, why do you think another 30 days or so will achieve an acceptable agreement?

A: Considerable progress has been made and only a few issues remain. We are hopeful that we can achieve an acceptable agreement within the next few weeks.

Q: Can you tell us what the last remaining differences are?

A: No. We do not wish to discuss details that are under negotiation.

Q: Is it true that the observers question is settled:

A: As Secretary Kissinger noted in his July 3, 1974, Moscow Press Conference, the two sides have agreed that observers will be permitted under certain agreed circumstances.

Q: There was one news report to the effect that the Soviets would be allowed PNEs up to a yield of 200 kt. Is that true?

A: As we noted earlier, we want to avoid discussions of details under negotiations. Of course you know that one of the problems of these negotiations is that PNEs are substantially indistinguishable from weapons tests. Our objective from the start has been to ensure that PNE's do not provide weapons-related benefits otherwise prohibited by the TTBT. We are negotiating with this in mind and will not accept any provision that is not clearly in our national interest.

Q: You say we don't plan any high yield weapons tests for at least the 30 to 60 day extension period. What about peaceful nuclear explosions? Are we testing PNEs?

A: We also do not plan to conduct any PNEs in this time period.

Q: Are the Russians currently testing PNEs?

A: In recent years the Soviet Union has had a more active PNE program. Our last PNE test was a gas stimulation experiment in 1973, whereas the Soviets have had several PNEs since that time, and have announced plans for further projects.

Q: There has been discussion about monitoring equipment. Are we planning to use instruments primarily, or are we insisting on our people actually observing the shots?

A: As noted earlier, for certain categories of shots we will have observers present. For other categories we will rely on our National Technical means for verification.

Q: What will happen if an agreement has not been reached at the end of the 30-60 day period?

A: We are hopeful that we will complete the negotiations within this time period. We do not care to go beyond today's statement and speculate on future outcomes.

~~April 2, 1976~~

~~2:15 p.m.~~

~~NSC would like the following paragraph substituted for the last paragraph in the suggested statement on the firing into the Soviet Mission:~~

"I have instructed the Department of Justice to do everything it can in cooperation with the New York authorities to bring to justice those who have committed these vicious acts. I am confident that the New York authorities will cooperate in these efforts to the fullest degree."

#

#

#

GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

This form marks the file location of item number 104-10, 1  
as listed on the pink form (GSA form 7122, Withdrawal Sheet) at  
the front of the folder.

April 7, 1976

USSR-US

Georgy Arbatov's long article in *Pravda* last week has been touted privately by several Soviets as a very important statement. The full text of the article is now available and is noteworthy for its concern about political trends in the US. It reiterates Moscow's commitment to greater cooperation, especially in the area of arms control, while blaming Washington for current bilateral difficulties, and is specifically critical of the Ford administration.


In discussing the article with US embassy contacts, some of Arbatov's colleagues, unlike Arbatov himself, have privately acknowledged the serious damage Angola has inflicted on US-Soviet relations. These same sources have nevertheless called attention to the "positive" tone of Arbatov's article and the significance of its appearance in *Pravda*, contrasting it with the attitude of "some" in Moscow who are less sanguine about current trends than Arbatov and these sources.

Arbatov's analysis of the recent course of US-Soviet relations is familiar fare: The ideological struggle between the two nations must and will continue, but much has been done to lessen the threat of nuclear war. Arbatov credits a changing correlation of world forces with prompting favorable changes in US foreign policy. He notes signs of backsliding in Washington, however, under the pressures generated by US economic and political problems and the realities of the US presidential campaign. In undisguised criticism of President Ford, Arbatov attacks the concept of "peace through strength" as reminiscent of cold war attitudes. He warns that concessions made during a political campaign may persist beyond the elections, "sometimes creating serious difficulties."

Arbatov analyzes recent US foreign policy setbacks (he mentions Southeast Asia, Portugal, "miscalculations in the eastern Mediterranean," and Angola) as being the result of wrong-headed policies in Washington, rather than of any communist intrigues. Referring to the inevitability of occasional reverses for both superpowers, he argues that "detente" must not be made a scapegoat. He said that for its part, Moscow never expected the path to be easy, but is determined to press ahead.

Finally, Arbatov concludes his analysis by noting that current problems between the US and the USSR should not jeopardize the gains made in arms control. His message seems to be that progress can still be made despite other setbacks to the relationship. His stress on the continued need for arms control probably reflects genuine Soviet concern about strategic stability in a period of deteriorating relations and prolonged stalemate at SALT. [redacted]

Presidential Library Review of NSC & DOS Equities is Required



DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted

AUTHORITY (CAC) NLF-NP-3-2-1-2 9/29/04  
BY [signature] NARA, DATE 10/26/09

PRAVDA COMMENT ON US INTERFERENCE  
IN WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS

Q. What is your reaction to the Pravda charge that the U.S. is interfering in the internal affairs of Western European governments by warning them against allowing Communist participation.

A. I don't want to comment on A Pravda article.

\* \* \*

Q. What is the US opposition to Communist participation in Western European governments?

A. We are opposed to a Communist government or coalition government including Communists because it would cause serious problems about that country's role in NATO. Past actions and statements by European Communists demonstrate that their influence in Allied Governments would seriously hamper Western defense efforts essential to Europe's freedom and to international stability.

22 April 1976

US REPLY TO SOVIET NOTE ON SALT

Q: Where do we stand on the US reply to the latest Soviet note on SALT? Have the SALT talks broken down?

A: Meetings on this subject are continuing in the Administration.

The SALT talks have not broken down. There are still several unsolved issues on which we are exchanging views. But I will not speculate on what these issues are or when they might be resolved.

22 April 1976

US SUPPORT FOR UN MEMBERSHIP FOR VIETNAM

Q: Reagan has charged that the Ford Administration is prepared to support Vietnamese membership in the UN. What is your response to this?

A: There is no basis for such a comment. The question raised is a purely hypothetical one. As you will recall last year we did veto the admission of both North and South Vietnam into the United Nations <sup>because we insist upon the principle of true universality not selective universality</sup>. If and when the matter comes up again, we would of course study it.



NEW POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM

Q: Does the President's willingness to hold talks with Vietnam indicate a fundamental change in his policy toward that country? Is the US willing to provide aid to North Vietnam? How do you view the Paris Agreements.

A: Our policy is not changed. It remains as the President stated in the Pacific Doctrine speech -- that we are prepared to look to the future and not the past in dealing with Vietnam. But I want to emphasize that our policy will be influenced by Vietnam's actions toward us and toward its neighbors.

Regarding aid, we continue to believe that the responsibility for providing reconstruction aid lies with those countries that provided the means for the Communist takeover of South Vietnam. I frankly do not see any possibility for a U.S. contribution.

4/22/76

NIXON LETTER MENTION OF \$3.25 BILLION AID TO VIETNAM

Q: Did the Nixon letter in fact mention the figure \$3.25 billion?

A: At the time of the signing of the Paris Accords, we were discussing with the Vietnamese the possible levels of assistance we were willing to consider. At that time, we indicated that we thought that a figure in that range over the years would be adequate to meet their reconstruction needs. These discussions were, of course, subject to the consent of the Congress in accordance with our Constitutional processes, and to the compliance by the Vietnamese to the Paris Accords.

April 22, 1976

HANOI'S REPLY TO UNITED STATES OFFER OF TALKS

Q: There are news accounts that the North Vietnamese replied to the US offer to discuss normalization of relations in a harsh manner. Is this correct? How do you interpret the tone of their response? What steps will the President take next? What are the prospects for talks beginning soon? Will the talks take place in Paris?

A: We have received a reply from the North Vietnamese to our offer to discuss a range of bilateral issues and the problem of our men who are still unaccounted for in Indochina. We are studying their reply at the present time and it would not be useful for me to characterize its nature. It is much too soon to speculate about when or in what form any discussion might take place.

May 21, 1976

CONSULTATIONS WITH SOVIETS  
ON GRAIN SALES

Q: The Agriculture Department has announced that a Soviet delegation is arriving on May 24 for consultations on grain sales. How much grain will we be able to sell the Soviets next year?

A: The grain agreement which we signed last year with the Soviet Union commits them to purchase <sup>AT LEAST</sup> 6 million tons of grain a year, and allows them to purchase <sup>MORE IF THEY WISH.</sup> ~~an additional 2 million tons. Sales beyond that level would require consultations between our governments.~~

In order that we may have an idea of the Soviets' likely requirements, and so that the Soviets will be aware of our own production prospects, we have agreed to meet for consultations every six months. We will discuss our current estimates with the Soviets during these consultations, and we will expect the same from them, ~~so that we can avoid sharp price fluctuations which have in the past been caused by unexpected massive grain purchases by the Soviet Union.~~

It is still very early to make firm estimates of our production for next year, but the Agriculture Department informs me that the overall outlook is good. We expect exports to be high, and we expect to continue to enjoy the international earnings brought us by our remarkably productive agriculture sector.

May 18, 1976

U.S. -SOVIET OIL AGREEMENT

Q: Last October when the U.S. signed an agreement with the Soviet Union on grain purchases, a letter of intent was also signed contemplating the annual sale to the U.S. of 10 million tons of Soviet crude oil and refined products over a five-year period. I understand that Russian oil negotiators were here for two months but went home when talks broke down. Was the breakoff of these talks one more negative signal <sup>to</sup> the Soviets?

A: First, let me say that the talks did not "break down." U.S. and Soviet negotiators worked for two months, beginning at the end of January and recessing in mid-March. When they found themselves unable to agree on a formula for shipping rates they considered mutually beneficial to their economic interests, they agreed to recess the negotiations in order to afford their governments time to reconsider means of resolving this issue.

We expect to resume these negotiations with the aim of arriving at a mutually beneficial economic arrangement.

NEW US TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

Q: The Vice President said in his speech last Wednesday that the Administration is deeply concerned about the problem of Soviet eavesdropping on telephone conversations in the United States, and that steps are being taken to reduce the vulnerability of our telecommunications system. What is the nature of these steps that are being taken?

A: In many years the use of microwave transmissions have portended the possible interception of telephone traffic by someone having the necessary equipment. We have been aware of this potential for some time and <sup>are taking</sup> ~~have taken~~ prudent measures to deal with it.

(F.Y.I. ONLY: For obvious reasons it would be inappropriate to discuss the nature of these measures .

END FYI)

BREZHNEV SAYS U.S. ELECTION  
STALLS ARMS AGREEMENT

Q: The Post reports today that Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev accused the Ford Administration of delaying negotiations for a new nuclear arms agreement, though the Soviet Union "continues to attach great importance to improving US-Soviet relations." How does the Administration respond to Brezhnev's charges?

A: We are working to negotiate a SALT agreement that is in the best interests of the United States and offers the best hope for peace throughout the world. Such an agreement can only be concluded without regard for some arbitrary timetable or deadline, but must be reached instead through intensive negotiation abroad and consultation at home.

We are continuing our consultations in Geneva where the SALT meetings resumed June 1. We are working here in Washington as well to conclude a successful arms limitation agreement, but neither the campaign, conventions nor election are a factor in our deliberations.

August 4, 1976

CIA THREATEND SOVIET DIPLOMAT

Q: Do you have any information on the Moscow Magazine Literary Gazette claim that two CIA agents threatened to push a Soviet diplomat at the UN out a hotel window if he refused to reveal Soviet intentions on detente? What is our response to the Soviet's official protest?

A: In keeping with our policy, I would have no comment on alleged CIA activities. For any information or comment on the Soviet protest, I refer you to the Department of State.

August 5, 1976

SOVIET TEST

Q: Was this an Administration cover-up?

A: No. As I said, we are now analyzing data on the explosions, and the assessment of these data is continuing. At this point no definite conclusion has been reached as to the size of the explosions.

If our analysis results in the conclusion that the explosions had a yield in excess of the 150 t threshold, this would then be a matter for consultations with the Soviets as to the performance of the parties during the time between signing and ratification.

Q: Have we issued a formal protest to the Soviets yet?


A: No.

Q: When were the TTB/PNE treaties signed?

A: The TTB Treaty was signed in Moscow on July 3, 1974 and the PNE Treaty was signed in Washington and Moscow in May 28, 1976. Both treaties were sent up to the Hill July 29.

(President's letter of transmittal attached.)

*as we have by  
historically  
with  
other  
explosions*



Q: Were the ERDA yield announcements accurate in the past?

A: In the past, ERDA provided only an indication that the probable yield was within certain broad limits, such as announcing that a test was between 20 and 200 kt. In fact, yield measurement through remote means is a difficult technical problem which produces a band of values with ~~only~~ a statistically determined most-probable value. ~~The precise yield value simply cannot be determined with absolute precision.~~

refer to ERDA

Q: Why is ERDA no longer announcing the yield of Soviet nuclear weapons tests?

A: In the past ERDA provided rough estimates of yield since there were no treaty restriction on permissible yields. Under the TTB/PNE treaties, the yield is limited to 150 kt and thus will be the critical parameter in monitoring compliance with the treaties. Naturally, we will no longer routinely publish such estimates, since questions of compliance with the yield limits would be the subject of government to government consultations which are provided for in the treaties.

*fairly technical questions involved here, and  
I would refer you to EROA.*

TTB/PNE

Q: Evans and Novak claim that the Soviet Union conducted two underground nuclear tests in July that were above the 150 kt limit of the TTBT and PNE treaties. Is this true and is it consistent with their obligations under those treaties?

A: The US government is analyzing data which indicate the Soviet Union detonated underground nuclear explosions in the Semipalatinsk Test Area on July 4 and in the vicinity of Azgir near the Caspian Sea on July 29. With regard to the yield of these explosions, during the negotiations with the USSR, it was recognized that measuring the precise yield following a foreign nuclear explosion is a difficult technical problem. Since our knowledge of the seismic coupling and other geological characteristics of the two areas in which the July explosions took place is not exact; a band of uncertainty exists as to the yield of the explosions. The assessment of these data is continuing, and at this point no definite conclusion has been reached as to the size of the two explosions. The TTB/PNE Treaties contain data exchange provisions which should improve our yield measurement capability once these treaties go into effect. [If pressed for details about treaty obligations:]



A: Since the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty have just been sent to the Congress for advice and consent on July 29, the threshold is not yet legally binding on either party. If, however, the analysis results in the conclusion that the

explosion had a yield in excess of the 150 kt threshold, this would be a matter for consultations with the U.S.S.R. as to the performance of the parties during the time between signing and ratification.

SOVIET TESTS

Q: When will we know the results of the blast?

A: Within the next few weeks.

Q: Have we communicated on these tests with the Soviets and, if not, will we before the results are in?

A: We have not discussed these tests with the Soviets since our analysis is not yet complete.

Q: Will we protest if these blasts exceed 150 kt?

A: If the analysis results in the conclusion that the explosions had a yield above 150 kt, ~~that would certainly be~~ inconsistent with the spirit of the treaties, ~~and we would make that clear to the Soviet Union.~~ *and with the Soviets own assurance and we would make that clear to the Soviet Union.*

Q: If the blasts exceed 150 kt, will this constitute a violation?

A: Because the treaties have not been ratified by either the U.S. or the Soviets, they are not legally binding, so in this legal sense it would not be a violation. It would, however, be inconsistent with the spirit of the agreement and with the Soviets' own announcement that they would not take any actions incompatible with the provisions of the treaty.

Q: Is the range of these tests 100-200 kt, as a high Administration source indicated yesterday?

A: As I indicated yesterday, the preliminary band of values for both tests straddles the 150 kt limit. The values you mentioned are consistent with my information, but I am not going to get into further details on these estimates.



ASYLUM FOR SOVIET MIG PILOT

Q. Will the United States grant asylum to the Soviet pilot who defected with the MIG aircraft to Japan?

Guidance:

If the pilot wants to come to the United States he will be welcome here.

FYI:

If asked whether the U. S. will get the aircraft or not, you should point out that the disposition of the aircraft is a question of Japanese jurisdiction, and you should refer all further questions on this subject to the Department of State.

SOVIET DEFECTOR / MIG

Q: Can you confirm the reports from Japan that US experts are already studying the MIG aircraft?

A: I cannot confirm ~~or~~ comment on those reports. As I said yesterday, the disposition of the aircraft is a matter of Japanese jurisdiction and I am not in a position to comment further on this issue.

F.Y.I. ONLY: The reports of intelligence exploitation are not accurate.

The pilot may be flown to the United States tomorrow.

SAKHAROV OPEN LETTER

Q: What is the President's response to the open letter from Soviet dissident leader Andrei Sakharov to him and Governor Carter urging support for human rights in the Soviet Union and throughout the world?

A: The cause of human rights and the effort to assure such rights for all peoples is a cause the President has championed since entering public life. It is a cause which has, and will continue to have, priority in his Administration.

The President is deeply concerned for those everywhere who are unable to exercise fundamental human rights, including the right to emigrate. ~~In each of his meetings with Soviet leaders -- in Vladivostok, Helsinki and Washington -- he has impressed upon them the importance which the American people and Government attach to humanitarian matters, including the fundamental right of people to emigrate to the country of their choice.~~ These views <sup>have been</sup> ~~also~~ conveyed ~~frequently~~ to Soviet Government at all ~~other~~ levels of contact.

The President's administration will continue to emphasize in international forums and in our exchanges with other governments the United States's unswerving belief that all nations should feel bound by these principles.

AVIATION WEEK ARTICLE

The September 13 issue of the magazine "Aviation Week and Space Technology" carried a report that Secretary of State Kissinger directed the CIA to "slant" its intelligence estimate of the Soviet Backfire bomber's capability. The report was ascribed to White House officials.

This week's issue of Aviation Week carries the White House's response to that report, which we characterized as "a slanderous attack on the integrity of the Secretary of State and the Central Intelligence Agency." We also noted that "to allege that the study was distorted to fit policy preferences is an outrageous lie. The story is totally without foundation and Aviation Week has an obligation to set the record straight."

While Aviation Week notes our denial of its charges, the magazine states that, upon rechecking its source, the item is correct as originally published.

I want to point out again today that this report is an outrageous lie and I want to call to your attention the release today by the [CIA and] State Department of letters, from [Director Bush]\* and Secretary Kissinger to the Editor of Aviation Week refuting these charges and setting the record straight as the magazine has so clearly refused to do.

**NOT CONFIRMED YET.**

# Washington Roundup

## 'White House Denial.

Aviation Weekly  
Sep 20

John G. Carlson, a White House deputy press secretary, last week termed an AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY report that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger directed the Central Intelligence Agency to slant U. S. estimates of the Soviet Tupolev Backfire bombers range an "outrageous lie." The deputy press secretary's statement was made in response to a query by the United Press International news service following the publication of the item in AVIATION WEEK'S Washington Roundup column of Sept. 13 (p. 13). The report said Kissinger ordered that the range estimates for the Backfire be reduced to coincide with the present U. S. position in the strategic arms limitation talks now under way with the Soviet Union, according to a White House staff member.

The deputy press secretary said, "This is a slanderous attack on the integrity of the Secretary of State and the Central Intelligence Agency. To allege that the study was distorted to fit policy preferences is an outrageous lie. The story is totally without foundation, and AVIATION WEEK has an obligation to set the record straight."

The magazine asked the White House press office to provide its version of what would "set the record straight." A press spokesman declined and suggested, instead, that AVIATION WEEK recheck its sources. AVIATION WEEK has rechecked its sources, and the item is correct as originally published.

## Iranian Shopping

Iran is considering the purchase of approximately 250 land-based versions of the Northrop/McDonnell Douglas F-18 lightweight fighter beginning in the early 1980s as replacements for the McDonnell Douglas F-4D and E aircraft in the current Iranian air force inventory. The F-18 would be used primarily as an attack aircraft.

The Middle Eastern country also is contemplating increasing its purchase of USAF/General Dynamics F-16 lightweight fighters from the current total of 160 to an eventual 300. General Dynamics has quoted to Iran a price of \$2.1 billion for the purchase of 300 F-16s as opposed to \$3.8 billion for the 160. The 300 aircraft quote, however, is based on 1975 dollars rather than the early 1980 dollars used by the Defense Dept. in computing the price for 160 F-16s. The \$3.8-billion figure also includes provisions for spares, training and construction. The \$2.1-billion quotation does not. Lt. Gen. Howard M. Fish, director of the Defense Dept.'s Security Assistance Agency, said in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on multinational corporations that **no formal request for such a purchase has been made by Iran to the Defense Dept.** Iran plans to use the F-16 to supplement its force of Northrop F-5E air-superiority/close-support aircraft.

## Campaign Charge

Other testimony before the subcommittee touched off a new media debate in Japan, a country already buffeted by disclosures of alleged Lockheed Aircraft Corp. payments to high-level Japanese officials. Thomas P. Cheatham, Jr., former president of Grumman International, told the group that **an aide to then-President Richard M. Nixon suggested to him that Grumman should make a \$1-million contribution to the Nixon reelection campaign in return for White House support of Grumman efforts to sell its E-2C early-warning aircraft to Japan.**

The aide, Richard V. Allen, denied making any such suggestion in subsequent testimony. Grumman officials also testified that they had no knowledge of such a request, adding that no officers of the corporation had made contributions to the campaign effort.

## Who's to Be First

Allocation of early production units of the USAF/General Dynamics F-16 is confronting Defense Dept. with formidable problems. "The Iranian F-16 program will require special management to ensure that early production resources are properly allocated to the U. S. Air Force, the European participating governments [four-nation NATO consortium], and the Iranian air force . . . and other governments that appear down the line," Defense Deputy Secretary Robert Ellsworth told the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Iran's \$3.8-billion program, awaiting congressional clearance, includes 136 single-seat F-16As and 24 two-seat F-16Bs. Deliveries are due in 1979 on 10 trainers. The 150 operational aircraft, with deliveries starting in 1980, will be for air defense support of Grumman F-14 aircraft.

—Washington Staff

September 22, 1976

SUBJECT:

SUGAR DUTY AND  
ITC INVESTIGATION

Yesterday the President issued a proclamation raising the duty on imported sugar from .625 cents per pound ( 62.5 cents per hundred-weight) to 1.875 cents per pound immediately, as an interim action until the International Trade Commission can complete its review of possible harm to domestic sugar producers by imports of sugar. The ITC is undertaking such a review at the request of the Senate Finance Committee, and the President also sent a letter to Will Leonard, Chairman of the ITC, to request expedition of the review.

Isn't it a curious coincidence that the President decided to take this action just three days before he leaves for Louisiana?

Let me review for you the history of the President's decision, which should alleviate any questions of timing for political purposes.

Since the time of the large sugar price increases a couple of years ago, the price of sugar has progressively been decreasing, and the domestic producers have been increasingly concerned about the competition from foreign-produced sugar. (The price dropped from \$.64 cents per pound to \$.17 cents per pound between Nov. '74 and Jan. '76.)

As a result, the EPB formed a study group and determined the price market was not bad enough to require action; however, since that decision was reached the price had dropped to \$.12 per pound. Therefore, about six weeks ago, the task force was reconstituted, during which time the price dropped to \$.10 per pound.

On September 10, the task force completed its work and sent its findings to the EPB. The EPB was supposed to discuss its findings with the President during the scheduled Sept. 13 EPB meeting with the President, but the meeting was postponed until Sept. 15. The subject was discussed at that time, and the President made his decision.

Meanwhile, Carl Curtis and some other members of the Senate ~~Finance Committee~~ sent a letter to the President on Sept. 13 asking him to take "the most effective corrective action possible... immediately."

Neither the EPB nor the sugar task force knew about the Southern trip at the time this issue was raised with the President. The President's decision adopted a policy taking into account both producers and consumers, in order to provide immediate interim relief to the domestic sugar producers.

(Note: the sugar producers wanted far more restrictive standards.)

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

September 13, 1976

*Delivered via  
special messenger  
from Carl Curtis*

President Gerald R. Ford  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

We understand that you have reconstituted your Sugar Policy Study Group to recommend action to alleviate the disastrously low prices being paid to domestic sugar farmers. We urge that these efforts be expedited.

Inasmuch as the Congress has failed since the expiration of the Sugar Act in 1974 to provide any remedy for such low domestic prices to farmers, we are appealing to you for corrective action within the limited authority available to you under existing statutes.

As you know, prices paid to farmers who produce beets and cane have fallen drastically. Sugar beet growers this year will receive only \$21 a ton versus \$45 last year, and a comparable price drop has affected sugar cane growers. Present prices are far below the cost of production for both beet and cane farmers. Unless sugar farmers have assurance of a fair return, they will have no incentive to continue sugar production, and our country could lose its domestic sugar supply.

This would force the American housewife and other U. S. consumers to depend almost entirely on foreign sources for sugar, just as American consumers are over-dependent on foreign oil, coffee, and certain strategic materials. We do not want American consumers to be at the mercy of foreign sugar suppliers.

Our concern, therefore, is not only for American farmers but equally for consumers and those workers who depend on the sugar industry for jobs.

Without sugar production, sugar plants would close down, resulting in loss of jobs and economic depression in sugar-producing communities. Sugar factories are very expensive, and, once a plant closes down in an area, it seldom reopens.

In those areas where sugar farmers could switch to other crops, such a switch could cause disruption in farm prices for the alternative crops. In some areas, there is no alternative crop for sugar growers.

For the short term, we understand there are certain limited actions that could be taken by you to help alleviate the situation:

- (1) Increase the sugar import tariff from .625 cents per pound to 1.875 cents per pound, as allowed under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
- (2) Reduce the sugar import quota limit
- (3) Remove sugar from the list of commodities eligible for duty-free import under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for lesser-developed countries. We understand that such duty-free imports may amount to 20 per cent of U.S. sugar imports this year.

We urge that you use these powers to bring about the most effective corrective action possible and that action be taken immediately.

For the long-term, we urge that your advisers intensively explore proposals for Congressional action to maintain a healthy, viable, sugar industry in America, assure American consumers an ample supply of sugar at reasonable prices, afford foreign sugar producers a fair share of the U. S. sugar market, and avoid worldwide control of sugar prices and supplies by a few countries.

We would be pleased to meet with you as soon as possible to discuss this complex situation.

12

Sincerely,

2. Milton R. Young  
MILTON R. YOUNG

7. Roman Hruska  
ROMAN L. HRUSKA

10. Carl T. Curtis  
CARL T. CURTIS

8. Hiram L. Fong  
HIRAM L. FONG

3. John Tower  
JOHN TOWER

9. James B. Pearson  
JAMES B. PEARSON

4. Paul J. Fannin  
PAUL J. FANNIN

10. Robert P. Griffin  
ROBERT P. GRIFFIN

5. Clifford P. Hansen  
CLIFFORD P. HANSEN

11. Robert Dole  
ROBERT DOLE

6. Pete V. Domenici  
PETE V. DOMENICI

12. James A. McClure  
JAMES A. McCLURE

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS

Q. Who asked for these meetings? Did the President invite the Foreign Minister's to come to Washington?

A. As you know, many Foreign Ministers plan to attend the UN General Assembly Session and they customarily request meetings with the President and Secretary of State during their stay in the United States. And while the President usually agrees to such meetings with key Foreign Ministers and expects to do so at this time of the year, it would be appropriate to say that the Foreign Ministers asked for these meetings with the President.

FYI:

A list of the President's meetings in 1975 is attached.

PRESIDENT'S UNGA RELATED MEETINGS  
1974-1975

September 9, 1974	Kurt Waldheim	UNGA-Sec General
September 18, 1974	Kurt Waldheim	UNGA-Sec General
September 19, 1974	Swaran Singh	Indian FM
September 20, 1974	Andrey Gromyko	USSR FM
September 21, 1974	Alberto Vignes	Argentina FM
September 24, 1974	James Callaghan	British, Foreign Secretary
September 25, 1974	Adam Malik	Indonesian FM
September 26, 1974	Hans Genscher	FRG FM
September 28, 1974	John San Vagnargues	French FM
September 29, 1974	Antonio Silvera	Brazil FM
October 1, 1974	Sheikh Rahman	Bangladesh PM
October 4, 1974	Gough Whitlam	Australian PM
October 5, 1974	Ismail Fahmy	Egyptian FM
October 17, 1974	Ahmed Aziz	Pakistan Minister of State
October 18, 1974	Francis Costa-Gomes	Portugal President
September 18, 1975	Saud Faisal	Saudi FM
September 18, 1975	Andrey Gromyko	USSR FM
September 23, 1975	Mariano Rumor	Italy, FM
September 27, 1975	Jean San Vagnargues	French FM
September 30, 1975	Seewoosag Ramgoolong	Mauritius PM
October 6, 1975	Y. B. Chavan	India FM
October 9, 1975	Ahmed Azia	Pakistan FM
October 10, 1975	Melo Antunes	Portugal FM

ANNOUNCEMENT OF PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH  
FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER

(Announcement to be made at September 27 press  
briefing, or to be used in confirming meeting if  
earlier announcement made from Bonn)

---

The President will meet with Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany on September 28, 1976 at 2:00 p.m. Minister Genscher will be coming to Washington from New York where he is attending the current session of the U.N. General Assembly.

You may recall that the President and the Foreign Minister had a similar meeting in 1974. They are looking forward to reviewing issues of current interest to the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

\* \* \* \* \*

Q: Can you be more specific on the agenda?

A: As in past meetings, there is no set agenda. I would anticipate that they will discuss such matters as US-European and NATO developments, any bilateral developments of note, East-West issues and other international developments such as the evolving situation in Africa.

Q: What is Genscher's political position in addition to his Foreign Minister's role?

A: He is Chairman of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) which forms the current coalition with Chancellor Schmidt's Social Democratic Party (SPD).

Q: When is the German election?

A: October 3, 1976.

Q: When did they last meet?

A: On the occasion of Chancellor Schmidt's visit in July 1976.

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER

Tuesday, September 28, 1976

White House Press Guidance

-----

The President met this afternoon with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany. Minister Genscher was accompanied by Mr. Heinz Weber of the FRG Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Berndt von Staden. **SECRETARY KISSINGER AND** Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, also participated in the meeting.

Today's meeting, following on the President's meeting with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in July 1976, permitted a very cordial and far-ranging exchange of views on a number of issues of importance to the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Minister Genscher is in the United States for the current session of the UN General Assembly, and the President welcomed Minister Genscher's proposal -- given in his speech to the General Assembly today -- for a Convention Concerning International Measures Against the Taking of Hostages. The President stated that the United States would give the proposed convention our strong support.

The President and the Foreign Minister discussed developments in Southern Africa. They welcomed the diplomatic progress of the past week and agreed that the way is now open for an African solution to an African problem, free of outside intervention.

The President and the Foreign Minister also devoted time today to reviewing US-FRG and NATO Alliance issues of current interest. They agreed that US-FRG relations are excellent.

\* \* \* \*

Q: Both are running for re-election; did they discuss domestic politics?

A: Today's meeting focussed on the topics I have just mentioned.

Q: What about the US-FRG tank competition; did Genscher have anything to say about Congressional opposition to Secretary Rumsfeld's present course of action?

A: The President and the Foreign Minister discussed and welcomed progress being realized in the field of NATO standardization; they agreed on the importance of this program; and they also agreed that the matter of interoperability and commonality of components -- for example, in the case of the next generation of NATO battle tanks -- is of importance.

Q: Did Genscher raise the Lockheed scandal in the FRG?

A: There was no mention of Lockheed in today's meeting.

Q: When are the German elections, and did the President tell Genscher he has his support?

A: The FRG elections/on October 3. These elections, of course, are an internal matter for the people of the Federal Republic of Germany.

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO

Friday, October 1, 1976

White House Press Guidance

-----

The President met this afternoon with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who is in the United States for the United Nations General Assembly session. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, Secretary of State Kissinger and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft participated in today's talks.

As you may recall, Foreign Minister Gromyko met with the President in Washington in 1974 and 1975 on the occasion of his visits to the United States for UN General Assembly sessions. Today's meeting provided the opportunity for a very useful and far-ranging review of the major topics of current bilateral interest as well as international issues of interest to the United States and the Soviet Union.

The President and the Foreign Minister reviewed the current status and prospects for the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) Talks aimed at further limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both agreed on the importance attached by the United States and the Soviet Union to reaching an agreement that will fully implement the understanding reached in Vladivostok in November, 1974. The President and the Foreign Minister also noted with satisfaction the conclusion of the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions signed in May 1976.

In addition to the bilateral subjects, this afternoon's meeting also involved a review of international issues including developments in southern Africa, the Middle East and Lebanon, the current General Assembly session and East-West issues including the force reductions talks in Vienna and the implementation by all parties of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

\* \* \* \*

Q: Can you give us more specifics on any of this?

A: I really can't go beyond the readout I've just given you. The President found the meeting very useful and helpful for its review of the many priority issues presently the subject of attention between the U.S. and USSR.

Q: Did the President and Gromyko make any progress on SALT?

A: As I said, I just cannot go beyond the statement I have just given you.

Q: When was the President's most recent meeting with one of the Soviet leaders?

A: Foreign Minister Gromyko's call at the White House in September, 1975 was the President's last meeting with a Soviet leader. He last met with General Secretary Brezhnev in late-July-early August, 1975 in Helsinki at the time of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DE GUIRINGAUD  
Friday, October 1, 1976

White House Press Guidance

-----

The President met this morning with French Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringaud. Minister de Guiringaud was accompanied by Ambassador Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft also participated in the meeting. Minister de Guiringaud is in the United States for the current session of the UN General Assembly.

The President welcomed Minister de Guiringaud as the first representative of the newly formed government under Prime Minister Barre. The President noted his satisfaction with the improvement in US-French relations as a result of his frequent consultations with President Giscard d'Estaing in recent years, and the President and Foreign Minister reaffirmed the intention of the U.S. and French Governments to build on this constructive trend through continued close consultations and cooperation.

Current international issues of mutual interest were discussed, with particular attention to recent developments in southern Africa and negotiations to arrange a peaceful settlement there. The President and Minister de Guiringaud reviewed political, security and international economic matters of current importance to the United States and France as Allies. They also discussed East-West relations.

\* \* \* \*

Q: Who is de Guiringaud? Has the President met with him before?

A: Minister de Guiringaud was appointed Foreign Minister in August, when Raymond Barre (Bar) was named Prime Minister following the resignation of Jacques Chirac. This is the President's first meeting with the new Foreign Minister. In fact, I don't believe they had met before today.

Q: What is the need for this meeting in view of Giscard's visit only a few months ago? Isn't there a political motive behind this?

A: This meeting, which was at the request of the French Minister, was very much in keeping with the President's policy over the past two years of frequent, high-level consultations with our allies. Not only have there been significant developments on the international scene in recent months,-- such as in Africa, these meetings permit the President to review with the Foreign Minister progress on other issues of continuing importance, such as economic recovery, relations between the developed and developing nations, Alliance issues and East-West relations, to mention only a few. The President met with the French Foreign Minister at the time of the 1975 General Assembly.

Q: Can you be more specific on their talks? Did they discuss French nuclear sales to Pakistan? Did the President ask the French to support the U.S. effort in southern Africa?

A: I did not participate in the meeting, so I can't respond in detail. I believe there was a general discussion of non-proliferation issues

and I am fairly certain that the President reviewed in some detail recent developments in southern Africa. Beyond that, I simply do not know.

ECONOMICS

GRAIN DEAL; OIL TIE IN?

Q. Yesterday the President made some fairly definite remarks on an imminent grain deal with the Soviets. He also mentioned a possible oil deal. Will we soon be closing a grain deal with the Soviets and will it incorporate trade on oil as well?

A. As you know, Under Secretary Robinson is now in Moscow negotiating a grain agreement with the Soviet Union. Beyond the President's statement on an announcement -- "I think it will be reasonably soon." -- I have nothing more specific to give you at this time.

Discussions on a possible oil deal are going forward, but they would not be part of a grain agreement. What we are talking about are two distinct separate agreements which together would reflect the best interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

ECONOMIC SUMMIT

Q. Anything new to report on a possible economic summit later this fall?

A. Not at this time. The results of the exploratory discussions in New York are now under review.

Q. Would the President attend?

A. The President has made clear his view that he favors consultation at the highest levels of international economic matters which impinge on the domestic economies of countries concerned, but at this time, I have nothing further to give you.

SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTS

Q: When were the "preliminary evaluations" made public on the August 28 and September 29 tests?

A: The August 28 and September 29 tests were announced promptly, within a few hours of their detection.

Q: Our scientists have given preliminary evaluations of the August and September tests while we are still waiting for the same evaluations of the July 4 and July 29 tests. How can you explain this?

A: Preliminary evaluations were also provided for the July 4 and 29 tests.

Q: You have stated in the preliminary evaluations, that the two most recent tests "were consistent with the limits" of the treaty. Why have you not applied this description of the two July tests?

A: Although there is a wide range of uncertainty in our yield estimates, our preliminary assessment is that the August 28 and September 29 tests were consistent with the treaty limits. There was somewhat more uncertainty associated with our yield estimates for the July tests and as you know these were the subject of consultations with the Soviets. In their response, the Soviets assured us that they had not violated the treaty limits. We are continuing to evaluate these tests.

Q: Were the most recent test below the 150 kt line, and by what margin?

A: As I have stated earlier, we will no longer provide yield data for Soviet nuclear tests. (Draw on detailed, October 13 Q & A on public announcement policy, if necessary.)

Q: How long does it take to evaluate underground blasts before a preliminary evaluation can be arrived at? (FYI: Said in the context of Fred Brown's statement of "several weeks," in early August.)

A: Preliminary yield assessments are normally available within a few hours to a few days of the event (depending on the time of day and week). However, these assessments are continuously refined over a period of several weeks to several months as data is received from remote seismic stations and integrated with other intelligence information.

Q: Who makes these preliminary evaluations and when were they made in the cases of the August 28 and September 30 explosions?

A: These yield evaluations are prepared by an interdepartmental working group under the Verification Panel, which consists of representatives from State, ACDA, OSD, JCS, ERDA, and CIA. Their reports are subsequently provided to Principals of these agencies for their review.

Q: Who chairs the interdepartmental group on this matter?

A: The Verification Panel Working Group is chaired by a member of the NSC Staff (John Marcum, if pressed) and the Verification Panel is chaired by the Secretary of State in his capacity as a member of the National Security Council.

Q: Was the preliminary estimate on the two earlier tests that they were outside the 150 kt limit?

A: There was no single value for the July tests; instead, there was a range of possible values both above and below the threshold that was sufficiently broad that it led to consultations with the Soviets.

SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTS

Q: Can you comment on reports that two recent Soviet nuclear blasts may have violated the 150 KT threshold of the TTB and PNE Agreements?

A: The Soviets conducted underground nuclear tests on August 28 and September 29. These tests were promptly announced by ERDA and an interdepartmental group is analyzing data concerning their yield. The Soviets stated on August 10 that they would abide by the 150 KT threshold pending ratification of the TTB/PNE Treaties and our preliminary assessment indicates that their August and September shots were consistent with this limit. However, there is considerable uncertainty, and it is this margin of uncertainty which is being studied interdepartmentally.

I would like to point out that our estimates of Soviet yields are based on data obtained at U.S. test sites. Since our knowledge of geological and other factors at Soviet test sites is not exact, a wide range of uncertainty exists in our yield estimates for these tests which spans the 150 KT threshold. These treaties contain provisions for the exchange of data which will improve our ability to estimate these yields once the treaties take effect. Considerable uncertainty will remain, however, and our yield assessment will always contain some margin for error as a result.

Q: Can you explain why information about the size of Soviet nuclear explosions is being withheld from the public?

A: In the past, the United States announced most, but not all, Soviet tests, giving very broad yield ranges based on preliminary data; these ranges often spanned tens to thousands of kilotons. However, under the terms of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, the yield of an explosion has become the critical parameter in verification of compliance. Thus, publication of preliminary yield data, even in broad ranges, could create a misleading impression that the treaties had been violated, even though final analysis determines otherwise. Publication of a very precise yield would also be misleading, since our preliminary data are not adequate to provide more than a very wide range.

We are reviewing this public announcement policy to insure that, consistent with the framework of the two treaties and the uncertainties inherent in our verification system, the American people are kept adequately informed in this area. In all cases, of course, the Congress will be kept fully informed.

SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTS

**Guidance:** This issue was dealt with extensively at the State Department on Wednesday: You have nothing to add to what was said there, i. e. preliminary estimates indicate the two tests were consistent with the 150 KT Limit.

**F. Y. I.:** Detailed guidance attached for background use.

Panel to Double-Check Estimates of Soviet Threat

Q An article in yesterday's Evening Star by Bill Beecher infers that the White House -- or at least the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) -- has lost confidence in the Intelligence Community's ability to analyze and estimate the Soviet threat and has brought in outside experts to do the job. Is this really true?

A There is absolutely no question of a loss of confidence by the White House, or specifically the PFIAB, in the Intelligence Community's ability to adequately estimate the Soviet threat. What in fact the Beecher article is referring to is an experimental exercise in so-called "competitive analysis". That is, two groups of experts -- one composed of government analysts and another made up of outside experts -- are independently evaluating the same facts to see if they reach the same conclusions. Contrary to what the Beecher article indicates, the independent analysis by outside experts was not ordered by the PFIAB nor is it under the Advisory Board's control. I do understand, however, that the PFIAB recommended to CIA Director Bush the benefits of "competitive analysis" as an experiment in this year's national intelligence estimate. They initiated the exercise.

PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO BREZHNEV

Q: Did the President send a letter to Brezhnev on trade?

A: Yes, the President did send a letter to the General Secretary relating to the meeting of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council. In keeping with normal practice, I do not have the contents of the letter for you.

Q: Who delivered the letter -- Secretary Simon?

A: I believe the letter was carried to Moscow by Mr. Donald Kendall who is the U. S. Co-Chairman of the Council.

BREZHNEV'S COMMENTS ON SALT

Q: What is the President's reaction to Brezhnev's appeal to President-Elect Carter for an early conclusion of the SALT II negotiations with the Soviet Union? Does the President have any comment on Brezhnev's statement that Washington placed a "freeze on this question" [SALT] almost a year ago?

A: As I have stated a number of times before, we have continued to work toward conclusion of a new SALT agreement during the past year, always being guided by what serves U. S. interests, and without regard to pace, politics, or press predictions. Progress on several issues was made in the exchanges of views which took place. The President has always supported conclusion of a SALT II agreement which serves the best interests of the United States.

December 13, 1976

Q: According to Reuter, Izvestia today carries an announcement by Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny that the Soviet Union is declaring a 200-mile fishery protective zone. What is the US position on this Soviet declaration?

A: We do not yet have anything official on the Soviet fishery declaration to which you have referred.

In connection with this report, however, I would note that several countries -- including the US -- have recently declared interim 200-mile fishery protective zones that are generally consistent with the consensus that has emerged in the UN Law of the Sea Conference. The United States continues to believe that fishery and other ocean jurisdiction issues must ultimately be settled in the UN Law of the Sea Conference, which reconvenes in New York next May. For further details, I would refer you to the State Department.

November 23, 1976

SOVIET ACTION AGAINST U. S. SATELLITES

Q Can you comment on reports that the Soviet Union has used laser beams to destroy one United States space satellite and damage another?

A We have no information whatever to support the allegations we have seen in news reports.

Refer any additional questions to the Defense Department.