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Kidnapping of Two USIA Officers in Beirut

Background: Our Embassy reports this morning that Charles D. Gallagher, Director USIA Regional Service Center, and William R. Dykes, Deputy Director Regional Service Center, were kidnapped enroute to work by as yet unidentified persons. Gallagher and Dykes were proceeding to work when they came upon a group of armed individuals in fatigue uniforms blocking the road. Two individuals entered the vehicle and drove away with the USIA officials. State Department has formed a task group to deal with the kidnapping.

Q: What can you tell us about the kidnapping of two USIA officers in Beirut today?

A: We understand that a kidnapping did in fact take place this morning in Beirut and I believe the State Department has the information on the incident if you would care to check with them.

FYI Only: We should try to low key this as much as possible, so that the White House does not seem to be too concerned or involved in the expedient resolution of the problem. To do otherwise would only encourage the kidnappers and jeopardize the lives of the hostages.

— State will reveal names + relevant info - they advise referring Q's to them —

October 28, 1975

U. S. POLICY TOWARD LEBANON

Q. Did they discuss the Lebanese situation?

A. President Ford and President Sadat touched briefly on the situation in Lebanon in reviewing the Middle East question. ^{However I do not have any other details on it.} Their primary attention, however, was on ways to maintain the momentum toward a peaceful settlement. Both leaders believe that a settlement to the Arab-Israel conflict which is just and durable will contribute significantly to a reduction of tensions in the area. This is and will be the main focus of their discussions.

Q. What is our general policy toward Lebanon?

A. Our strong friendship with the people of Lebanon and our policy of support for Lebanon's territorial integrity and independence, unity and cohesion are well known. We are naturally following events there closely and consulting with the Lebanese and other governments on what could usefully be done to help.

Blood and so forth



BEIRUT: UPDATE

In view of the continuing deterioration of the security situation in Beirut, our Embassy has begun to reduce its non-essential staff *and dependents*. It has suggested that the American community follow the same policy by evacuating dependents and personnel who are not essential to their business activities in Lebanon.

In two telephone conversations today Amb. Godley reported the following: Embassy personnel, except for the Marine Security Guards, SY and communications people, were sent home early today as fighting was now taking place near the Embassy. As regards reduction of non-essential staff, the Embassy is moving out personnel assigned to regional offices and their dependents first. The Embassy had no count of the number of non-official Americans leaving Beirut.

official americans and dependents 475 - Now 425
non-official americans re-registered at US Cons = 1200. Before
alter ad. 11
Orms = 5000

Wounded Reporter: Godley said that Chicago Tribune reporter, Phil Caputo, wounded by gunfire Sunday was in reasonably good shape and still in a local hospital where it remained impossible to reach him because of the fighting. The comptroller of the American school and an Embassy communicator are in a hotel in the same area and could not be reached. Caputo's wife and child are staying with the family of a local AP correspondent until arrangements are made to fly them out of Beirut.

Q. What can you tell us about the situation in Beirut today?

A. In view of the continuing deterioration of the situation in Beirut, our Embassy has evacuated all but essential personnel from the Embassy building. Amb. Godley has suggested that the American community follow the same policy by evacuating dependents and personnel not essential to their business activities in Beirut.



Q. Is this the start of a full-scale evacuation from Beirut?

A. No. Amb. Godley has not ordered an evacuation beyond what I just stated. We are hopeful that the situation is restored to normal as quickly as possible and that members of the American community in Beirut can return to their routine pursuits.

LEBANON: UPDATE

The security situation in Beirut has improved enough to permit the resumption of some vital services, although a few gun battles in the eastern section of the city marred the cease-fire yesterday. Army troops have been ordered to fire on truce violators.

Lebanese security forces have removed some barricades from city streets, although their task has been complicated by the efforts of warring factions to improve their positions. Christian and Muslim militiamen still occupy areas of the hotel district, where the truce is particularly tenuous.

For the first time in several days, Beirut's fuel and food supplies are being replenished. Some banks are scheduled to open today, and this would encourage citizens to respond to government calls for a return to normal business activity.

The meeting on Tuesday between Prime Minister Karami and Interior Minister Shamun is receiving wide publicity. The feuding leaders apparently agreed to cooperate in the interest of public security, although they certainly have serious differences on how security should be achieved. The uneasy reconciliation will ease the task of the cabinet in dealing with immediate problems, but the feud between Karami and Shamun will continue to impede efforts of the national dialogue committee to find a political solution.

delay in release; not yet public
At 6:00 am EST (1:00 pm Local) Prime Minister Karami reported the U. S. statement of support for the Government's effort to restore calm to Beirut.

Q. Can you tell us what is happening in Lebanon?

A. We understand that the situation in Lebanon has improved somewhat. Our embassy is still assisting American citizens there. As you may be aware, the State Dept. said Friday that we are working urgently to respond to Lebanon's relief needs (especially medical supplies) and are encouraging the Red Cross to do likewise.

FYI: Almost 23 tons of AID disaster relief medical supplies is scheduled to be carried to Beirut tonight aboard a Trans Mediterranean Airlines' cargo 747, due to depart Kennedy Airport today.

LEBANON - ARMS SALES

Q. The Washington Post today has a story about arms sales to Lebanon which implies some U. S. involvement in the transactions. Can you comment on the story about any U. S. involvement?

A. The United States government is not involved in any way in any arms sales to Lebanon ^{use factions}. As we have stated repeatedly, we are opposed to outside military intervention in Lebanon in keeping with our longstanding policy of support for Lebanon's territorial integrity and independence.

FYI: If you read the story carefully, it does not in any way allege even private transactions in the continental United States.

November 24, 1975

LEBANON - ARMS SALES

Q. The Washington Post today has a story about arms sales to Lebanon ^{which} ~~by~~ ^{factious} implies some U. S. involvement in the transactions. Can you comment on the story ^{about} any U. S. involvement?

A. The United States government is not involved in any way in any arms sales to Lebanon ^{or} ~~as~~ ^{se. factious.} As we have stated repeatedly, we are opposed to outside military intervention in Lebanon in keeping with our longstanding policy of support for Lebanon's territorial integrity and independence.

FYI: If you read the story carefully, it does not in any way allege even private transactions in the continental United States.

KARAMI RESIGNATION

In what observers characterize as a direct challenge by Lebanon's Moslem leaders to Christian President Frangie, Prime Minister Karami announced his resignation January 18. Karami said he had decided to resign because of the failure of his many attempts to end the Lebanese fighting. In fact, Karami may perceive himself to be on the fringes of the political processes in Lebanon since much of the strategy for resolving the conflict has been conducted between Frangie and Asad. (See Attached cable).

Q. Did the President have any comment on Prime Minister Karami's resignation Sunday? How does he feel about its effect on the situation in Lebanon?

A. I would have no specific comment on the Prime Minister's resignation, except to say that our position on the situation in Lebanon is well known. Our policy is one of clear support for Lebanon's independence, territorial integrity and national unity and we hope that harmonious relations can be restored among different religious and ethnic groups. Amb. Godley is following the situation closely and remains in touch with the Lebanese government.

LEBANON DEVELOPMENTS

BACKGROUND: See Attached Cable.


Q. What can you tell us about the reports of troops moving across the Syrian border into Lebanon? Is the President concerned with these new developments?

A. Naturally, the President is watching the situation closely and continues to be kept informed of developments there. *Sympathy for the people.*

ON BACKGROUND:

We have information that some Palestinian forces (PLA) have entered Lebanon from Syria, but we do not have any way to ascertain accurately the numbers involved. We do have indications that the levels reported in the press (10,000-15,000) are exaggerated. Let me say that we have no evidence of Syrian military forces entering Lebanon. END BACKGROUND.

We continue to believe that the end of the fighting in Lebanon demands that all concerned show the moderation and spirit of compromise essential to the beginning of political accommodation. We remain committed to a solution which preserves the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon, its national unity and cohesion.



We are opposed to the partition of Lebanon and we are opposed to outside interference from any quarter, a position Secretary Kissinger reiterated strongly in a news conference in Copenhagen this morning.

(Vanderheye)

March 12, 1976

GUIDANCE ON THE COUP IN LEBANON

If asked about the situation in Lebanon or the prospects for the stability of the Government there, we should respond as follows:

We are watching the situation in Lebanon closely. We are, of course, concerned as we have said on previous occasions for the independence, territorial integrity and national cohesion of Lebanon.

We should not get into any details of the coup itself. The State Department will use guidance similar to the above.

March 29, 1976

SITUATION IN LEBANON

Q. Can you bring us up to day on the situation in Lebanon.
Are we involved in any way?

A. Our position has been consistent and has been stated publicly as recently as March 22 by Secretary Kissinger in Dallas. During a press conference there he said that we have urged all parties in Lebanon and concerned with Lebanon to exercise maximum restraint. He added that we support the coexistence of the two communities, Christian and Moslem, in Lebanon, and that we are using our influence to bring about or encourage a negotiated outcome.

March 30, 1976

STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT OF MARCH 29
ON U.S. POSITION ON LEBANESE SITUATION

The situation in Lebanon has become more acute during the past week and we want to make clear the United States position concerning developments there.

We believe that a resolution of the Lebanese crisis can only come with agreement among the Lebanese on a basic political solution that gives adequate opportunity and security to all groups and communities in the country. The political compromise worked out with constructive Syrian assistance in connection with the January 22nd ceasefire appears to us to provide a fair basis for such a solution.

It appears to us, moreover, that a ceasefire and an orderly and constitutional resolution of the Presidential question are necessary if progress is to be made on the more fundamental issues.

We believe that military intervention by any outside party contains great dangers and must be avoided.

The United States is prepared to help all the parties toward a political solution on the basis of these principles.

* * * * *

Above statement reflects U.S. position, and we should not go beyond or elaborate in our public statements. You may wish to point out that State explained and amplified the Statement fully yesterday.

March 31, 1976

FUNSETH STATEMENT ON BROWN APPOINTMENT TO BEIRUT

Secretary Kissinger today asked former Ambassador L. Dean Brown to go to Beirut, Lebanon, and take charge of our Embassy there temporarily during the continuing absence of Ambassador Godley, who is recovering from recent surgery.

The Secretary considers that it is important to have in Beirut, at this critical time, a man with Ambassador Brown's seniority and long experience to further strengthen our able and heavily over-burdened Embassy staff. The Ambassador has been closely associated with the Secretary, who has the greatest personal confidence in him.

Ambassador Brown will assess the situation at first hand and will be in contact with the leaders of the various Lebanese groups. He will be available to assist them in any way they may think useful in efforts to achieve a ceasefire and work toward a political solution.

Ambassador Brown has served his government with great distinction in many responsible assignments, as Ambassador to Senegal, The Gambia, and Jordan, as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management and, most recently, as coordinator of the Interagency Task Force for Indochina Refugees. Since his retirement from the Foreign Service he has been President of the Middle East Institute, a position for which he has been well suited by virtue of his friendships, experience and attachments with the peoples of the Middle East.

SIXTH FLEET MOVEMENTS AND THE LEBANON

Q. Can you tell us why the Sixth Fleet is in the Mediterranean now? Are there any plans to move in U. S. forces in the event the military situation deteriorates?

A. The Sixth Fleet is operating routinely in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is performing normal routine maneuvers; there are no plans to involve the Sixth Fleet in the military situation in Lebanon.

The Fleet is within 24 hours steaming time of Lebanon. There are no plans to evacuate Americans and we hope an evacuation would not be necessary, but as Secretary Rumsfeld said this morning (CBS) we are, of course, prepared for any number of contingencies (relating to evacuation).

April 1, 1976

BROWN TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS ON LEBANON

Q. The Washington Post reports today that Ambassador Brown has showed himself "open toward the Palestinians." He said he would meet them only if he received instructions from Washington to do so, but the implication left by the news account was that he was more receptive to the idea for a meeting than any U. S. representative has been previously. Is there a chance that Brown will receive instructions from Washington to meet with the PLO?

A. Our position on contacts with the PLO has been made clear. That position has not changed. You will recall that the State Department announcement of Ambassador Brown's assignment specified that he was being sent to Lebanon to take charge of our Embassy there is to assess the situation at first hand and to be available to the various Lebanese groups "to assist them in any way they may think useful in efforts to achieve a ceasefire and work toward a political solution."

The matter has not arisen. Brown's instructions do not include authorization to have contact with the PLO.

April 5, 1976

SITUATION IN LEBANON

Q. Kamal Jumblatt among other has charged that Syrian regulars are occupying Lebanese ports. Can you confirm that story? Has our position on intervention changed?

A. We are following events in Lebanon very closely. But because the situation there is fluid and rather confused, I am not going to comment on each individual report. Our position has not changed, however. We remain opposed to unilateral outside intervention and feel that a cease-fire and a political resolution to the conflict is the best way for all parties to proceed.

April 15, 1976

INTERVENTION IN LEBANON:
U. S. REACTIONS AND POSSIBLE ACTIONS

Q. What is your reaction the reports that the Syrian intervention continues and Secretary Kissinger's warning that it is "getting close to the borderline" of Israeli intolerance? How do we view the Syrian intervention in view of our publicly stated opposition to unilateral intervention?

A. As you may be aware, Secretary Kissinger addressed this issue at the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee yesterday, and I understand that the State Department subsequently had a rather lengthy discussion of these issues at their briefing.

Basically, we are in a very delicate situation following the Lebanese parliament's actions Saturday, and at this time we should probably be careful in what we say. As we have indicated, we are in close touch with all the parties, and we're watching the situation carefully. We will continue to support constructive efforts by the parties to reach a political solution in Lebanon.

* * * *

Additional questions should be referred to State.

4/18/76

U. S. POSITION ON SYRIAN TROOPS INSIDE LEBANON

Q: Secretary Kissinger has admitted that Syrian regular troops are in Lebanon. If we are opposed to outside intervention, what are we going to do about it?

A: It is true that there are some Syrian military units inside Lebanon particularly in the Lebanese-Syrian border area. We have stated that we do not favor outside intervention in Lebanon; however, when one looks at the nature and the intent of what Syria has been doing in Lebanon, the Syrian role has been constructive. We continue to strongly support a political resolution of the present tragic crisis in Lebanon and to oppose intervention which could result in military confrontation or a Middle East conflict.

Q: What about Prime Minister Rabin's warning to Syria? Has the United States sent similar warnings? What is the "red line," the breaking point for Israel where Syrian military action is concerned?

A: I would not want to interpret what Prime Minister Rabin may have meant. However, it is obvious that the situation is -- as it has been for some time -- sensitive and dangerous. Thus far, both Syria and Israel have behaved with restraint and we hope that will continue. We are continuing to do our best to encourage responsible behavior by all concerned parties and to help bring about an end to the violence and a political solution for Lebanon within the framework of an independent, unified country.

19 April 1976

SYRIAN INTERVENTION IN LEBANON

Q: What is your reaction to reports that the Syrian intervention continues: How do we view the Syrian intervention in view of our publicly stated opposition to unilateral intervention?

A: The Syrians have acted responsibly in this, and their role is a constructive one. We do, however, continue to oppose outside intervention which poses the risk of military confrontation.

(FYI: It is true that there are some Syrian military units inside Lebanon, particularly in the Lebanese-Syria border area.)

Q: Is it true that the United States has been acting as the go-between for Syria and Israel, that the US has passed on to the Israelis Syrian assurances about their role in Lebanon?

A: We have been in touch almost daily with both Syria and Israel, but I don't want to discuss our diplomatic exchanges.

Outside Military Intervention in Lebanon

- Q. Do Ron Nessen's comments at the White House today represent a change in U.S. policy regarding outside military intervention in Lebanon?
- A. U.S. policy regarding outside military intervention in Lebanon remains as has been stated many times publicly. We are opposed to outside military intervention in Lebanon and have made clear our concern that it could lead to wider hostilities in the Middle East. The White House spokesman's response to questions was not intended to indicate any change in this policy.
- Q. Then you consider the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon as being part of the constructive role Syria has been playing in Lebanon?
- A. We consider that Syrian political efforts to bring about a political accommodation among the Lebanese parties have been constructive. There has been no change in our policy of opposition to outside military intervention in Lebanon.

Clearance: NEA - Mr. Atherton
W.H. - Mr. Scowcroft

NEA/P: MVanOrder:dp

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FOR SECRETARY FROM BROWN

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, PINT, EGEN, LE
SUBJECT: WHAT NEXT FOR LEBANON?

1. SUMMARY: THIS CABLE ATTEMPTS TO SET FORTH SOME OF THE PROBLEMS A NEW LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WILL CONFRONT ON WHICH IT WILL HAVE TO ACT ADDED TOGETHER, POLITICAL, SOCIAL, SECURITY AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ARE QUITE DEPRESSING. IT WILL TAKE BETTER LEADERSHIP THAN WE HAVE SEEN IN THE PAST IN LEBANON. ALL THIS IS PREDICATED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE GENERALLY AGREED TO PROCESS OF INSTALLING A NEW PRESIDENT WILL MOVE FORWARD, PERHAPS BY FITS AND STARTS, BUT THAT IT WILL SOMEHOW WORK, END SUMMARY.

2. THE CONCLUSION THAT STANDS OUT MOST VIVIDLY IS THAT AN ENORMOUS BUNDLE OF PROBLEMS WILL SUDDENLY FALL ON THE SHOULDERS OF THE UNLUCKY MAN SELECTED AS PRESIDENT, THESE WILL BE NOT ONLY PROBLEMS INHERENT IN HIS LONG-TERM TASK OF RESURRECTING LEBANON, BUT ALSO ONES DELIBERATELY POSTPONED FROM THE PRESENT PERIOD. FOR REASONS OF POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY, FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS CONSIDERED BEST TO SWEEP THE ISSUE OF POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING UNDER THE RUG WHILE THE PRESIDENTIAL "CAMPAIGN" GOES ON. THE DIFFICULTY IS THAT SUCH QUESTIONS FALLING ON TOP OF OTHERS MAY GIVE THE PRESIDENT TOO OVERWHELMING A TASK ALL AT ONCE. THE ISSUES FACING THE NEW PRESIDENT WILL FALL INTO THREE GENERAL AREAS: (A) RESTORING SECURITY AND GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY; (B) POLITICAL REFORMS; (C) RECONSTRUCTION.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NR 94-81, #31 State Hr. 11/28/94

By 10214 NARA, Date 2/21/95

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RM RESTORING SECURITY AND GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY: YOU CANNOT BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT AN EARLY RENEWAL OF LAW AND ORDER AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF AUTHORITY THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE. LEBANON TODAY IS A LAND OF "TURFS" RUN (WHEN RUN AT ALL) BY ARMED GROUPS. THESE ARE OFTEN MUTUALLY HOSTILE. CLASHES CAN ARISE AT THE DROP OF A HAT -- ESPECIALLY, BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY, ACROSS THE CHRISTIAN-MOSLEM DIVIDING LINES. THE SLIGHTEST INCIDENT CAN SPARK A BIG BLOW-UP. PROVOCATEURS OF ONE EXTREME OR THE OTHER ARE ALWAYS READY TO PROVIDE THE SPARK. EXTREMISTS OF THE LEFT AND PALESTINIAN REJECTIONISTS ARE A PARTICULAR MENACE. WHEN ONE ADDS TO THIS THE EASE WITH WHICH OUTSIDE POWERS SUCH AS LIBYA, IRAQ, AND EGYPT CAN STIMULATE INTRANSIGENCE IN VARIOUS GROUPS AND PARTIES, THE DIFFICULTY OF RESTORING EVEN A MINIMUM OF SECURITY IS APPARENT.

5. FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD, SYRIA WILL HAVE TO PROVIDE THE COVER FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S RENEWAL. ALONG WITH THIS, DE FACTO PARTITION WILL HAVE TO BE ACCEPTED, AS CHRISTIAN MILITIAS POLICE CHRISTIAN AREAS AND THE DISPARATE AND NOT ALWAYS MUTUALLY FRIENDLY MOSLEMS/LEFTIST/PALESTINIAN GROUPS POLICE THE REST. THE RESTBRED HIGHER MILITARY COMMITTEE PROVIDES THE FRAMEWORK FOR THIS SCHEME; SOMETHING LIKE IT WILL HAVE TO BE CONCOCTED AFTER THE NEW PRESIDENT IS ELECTED. THE OVER-ALL PURPOSE WILL BE TO ELIMINATE THE DE FACTO PARTITION AND THE SYRIAN COVER GRADUALLY, PUTTING IN THEIR PLACE A NEW LEBANESE AUTHORITY. SETB CKS ARE PROBABLY INEVITABLE, BUT HOPEFULLY MANAGEABLE. ANY SIGNIFICANT DOWNTURN IN SECURITY IS APT TO MAKE CHRISTIAN HARDLINERS FREEZE.

6. THE GOL NOT LONGER HAS ANY SERVICE CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY. POLICE FORCE CANNOT BE REORGANIZED AND GIVEN CAPABILITY OF SUPPRESSING INSURRECTION QUICKLY ENOUGH. POLARIZATION OF THE ARMY HAS INCREASED DURING LATEST ROUND OF FIGHTING, AND ITS RECONSTRUCTION AS A NATIONAL ARMY WOULD TAKE AT LEAST TWO YEARS. HOWEVER, A MOBILE BRIGADE MIGHT BE READY IN 6-12 MONTHS. IN THE INTERIM, AN EXTERNAL MILITARY FORCE WOULD BE REQUIRED TO RESTORE LAW AND ORDER, PENDING DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL CAPABILITY, OR IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROVISIONAL FORCE

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FROM THE VARIOUS WARRING FACTIONS,

7. A LATENT PROBLEM LIKELY TO ARISE WHEN THE BARE BONES OF AUTHORITY ARE RECREATED IS LEBANESE NATIONAL FEELING AGAINST SYRIA. THE DEFEATIST MOOD OF MOST LEBANESE TODAY PROBABLY GIVES DAMASCUS SOME TIME BEFORE THIS WILL BECOME A MAJOR PROBLEM, BUT IS IS AN EVER-PRESENT FEELING AND MUST BE EXPECTED TO EMERGE IN FORCE. BOTH RIGHTISTS AND LEFTISTS MAY VOICE IT, ALTHOUGH FOR DIFFERENT REASONS (RIGHTISTS SPEAKING OF LEBANESE "SOVERIGNTY" AND LEFTISTS CONSIDERING DAMASCUS AS A TRAITOR TO THE "PROGRESSIVE" CAUSE). THIS OF COURSE STRENGTHENS THE ARGUMENT FOR AN EARLY DEPARTURE OF SYRIAN MILITARY INFLUENCE. DAMASCUS WILL HAVE TO PLAY ITS GAME VERY CAREFULLY, STEERING CLEAR OF A DEPARTURE SO ABRUPT THAT IT LEAVES A POWER VACUUM AND ONE SO DELAYED THAT IT CREATES SUSPICION OF SYRIAN INTENTIONS IN THE MINDS OF LEBANESE. (WITH THE NEW SYRIAN-PALESTINIAN ACCORD ON LEBANON, WHERE THE PALESTINIANS ASSUME A GREATER ROLE FOR SECURITY, THIS SUSPICION COULD WELL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE LATTER.)

8. POLITICAL REFORMS. OF ALL THE PROBLEMS DUMPED ON THE NEW PRESIDENT, NONE WILL BE MORE THORNY THAN THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL REFORM. WHEN FRANGIE ANNOUNCED HIS 17- POINT PROGRAM IN FEBRUARY, THIS WAS FONDLY THOUGHT TO BE THE BASIS FOR THE "NEW LEBANON". IT CONTAINED MAINLY POLITIC. CHANGES AND INVOLVED CONCESSIONS FROM BOTH CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS. DESPITE GRUMBLINGS BY THE LEFT ABOUT SOME OF THE POINTS, LEFTISTS WERE AT FIRST UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE ACQUIESCED. NOW THIS IS ALL UP IN THE AIR. IT HAS BEEN LEFT THAT WAY BY TACIT AGREEMENT, ON THEORY THAT ELECTION OF NEW PRESIDENT SHOULD NOT BE COMPLICATED BY SUCH INTRACTABLE ISSUES.

9. THE HOPE IS THAT DEPARTURE OF FRANGIE WILL CLEAR THE AIR POLITICALLY AND ALLOW NEW MAN TO PUSH REFORMS WITH BROAD PUBLIC SUPPORT. THERE IS CERTAINLY BASIS FOR THIS HOPE. MAKING "SCAPEGOAT" OF FRANGIE WILL HELP CLEANSE SYSTEM SYMBOLICALLY OF OLD POLITICAL MENTALITY. HOWEVER, MORE IS INVOLVED THAN JUST PERSONALITIES. WRAPPED UP IN FRANGIE'S 17 POINTS ARE GUT ISSUES INVOLVING

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STRONG FEELINGS ON ALL SIDES. IT TOOK LABORIOUS NEGOTIATING TO ARRIVE AT 17 POINTS LAST FEBRUARY. ON CHRISTIAN SIDE, THEY EMBODIED "MINIMUM" GUARANTEE OF THEIR POLITICAL FUTURE WHILE GIVING LONG-BOUGHT GAINS TO MOSLEMS. ESTABLISH-

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MENT-MINDED CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS WERE BASICALLY SATISFIED WITH THE ACCORD. JUMBLATT, WHO HAS LONG CONSIDERED POLITICAL REFORM THE SPEARHEAD OF HIS PROGRAM, LATER MADE IT CLEAR HE WAS NOT SATISFIED. HE HAS BEEN A KEY FIGURE IN EROSION OF FRANGIE'S PROGRAM SINCE EARLY MARCH (ALTHOUGH HE GOT UNEXPECTED HELP FROM AHDAB'S COUP AND CANNOT FORGET HIS DEBT TO PALESTINIA MUSCLE ON BATTLEFIELD). HE WILL CONTINUE TO PUCH FOR REVISION OF THE 17 POINTS. DESPITE THEIR REVERSES IN BATTLE, CHRISTIAN RIGHTISTS WILL STRUGGLE TO PRESERVE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF "GUARANTEE" TO WHICH THEY ADHERE EMOTIONALLY. TRADITIONAL MOSLEMS, IN PART THROUGH WEAKNESS AND IN PART THROUGH SECURITY THEY FEEL THAT DEMANDS WON WILL STICK, MAY SIT ON SIDELINES EXCEPT ON ISSUE OF SECULARIZATION. ALL IN ALL, THE NEW PRESIDENT'S PATH WILL LEAD STRAIGHT THROUGH A POLITICAL MINEFIELD. YET HE CANNOT AVOID CROSSING IT IF HE HOPES TO REACH THE "NEW LEBANON" THAT EVERYBODY DEMANDS.

10. FORTUNATELY, THE MINEFIELD IS NOT UNCHARTED. THE 17 POINTS WERE THE OUTGROWTH OF AN EARLIER SET OF 5 POINTS HAMMERED OUT IN LATE 1975 THROUGH SYRIAN MEDIATION. FOUR OF THESE POINTS WERE POLITICAL: (A) EQUAL CHRISTIAN-MOSLEM REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT; (B) NAMING OF PRIME MINISTER BY THE PARLIAMENT; (C) ABOLITION OF CONFESSIONALISM IN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT; (D) ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURT. A SEPARATE POINT STATING THE PALESTINIANS WOULD ABIDE BY CARIRO AGREEMENT ALSO EMERGED LATER AS A COROLLARY TO THE 17 POINTS. THE

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LEFT'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE 5 POINTS WAS LESS AMBIGUOUS THAN IT EVER WAS FOR FRANGIE'S PROGRAM. THERE IS ALSO INDICATION THAT IT WOULD ACCEPT THE TRADITION OF A MARONITE PRESIDENT, A SUNNI PREMIER AND A SHIITE SPEAKER FOR THE TIME BEING, ALTHOUGH THIS HAS NOT BEEN MADE TOO CLEAR. BY FOCUSING ON THESE MORE FIRMLY ACCEPTED POINTS, THE NEW PRESIDENT COULD HOPE TO GET POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS REASONABLY FAR ALONG WITHOUT MISHAP.

11. HIS MAIN PROBLEMS WOULD BE THREE, AS WE SEE IT: (A) THE PARTS OF THE 17 POINTS REPRESENTING COUNTER-CONCESSIONS TO CHRISTIANS; (B) THE EXTENT OF DECONFESSIONALIZATION IN THE GOVERNMENT; (C) THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIANS. THE FIRST OF THESE ISSUES CENTERS ESPECIALLY ON A PROVISION IN FRANGIE'S PROGRAM THAT A TWO-THIRDS VOTE WILL BE NEEDED IN PARLIAMENT ON UNSPECIFIED "IMPORTANT MATTERS" AND THAT A 55-0/0 VOTE WILL BE NEEDED TO ELECT A PRESIDENT ON THE SECOND AND SUBSEQUENT BALLOTS (TWO-THIRDS ALREADY BEING REQUIRED ON THE FIRST BALLOT). THE LEFT HAS OBJECTED TO THE 55-0/0 IDEA. ITS RETENTION SYMBOLIZES FOR CHRISTIANS THEIR FUTURE POLITICAL SAFETY AND WE EXPECT THEY WILL HOTLY CONTEST ITS BEING DROPPED. ON THE DECONFESSIONALIZATION ISSUE, THE 17 POINTS MOVED SIGNIFICANTLY AWAY FROM CONFESSIONALISM BUT KEPT IT FOR POSTS OF DIRECTOR GENERAL LEVEL AND ABOVE. AS FOR THE PALESTINIANS, IT WAS A QUESTION EVEN UNDER THE 17 POINTS HOW FAR THEY WOULD AGREE TO GO BACK TO THE CAIRO AGREEMENT. THIS IS STILL A MAJOR UNKNOWN. (IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THE CAIRO AGREEMENT CAN BE OBSERVED IF THE PALESTINIANS HAVE A MAJOR POLICING ROLE, AS IS NOW THE CASE.) IN THESE STRUGGLES, MUCH WILL DEPEND ON THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN JUMBLATT AND THE EXTREMISTS IN HIS CAMP AND ON THE EVEN MORE TRICKY INTERACTIONS INVOLVING ARAFAT, SAIQA AND THE REJECTIONISTS AMONG THE PALESTINIANS. THE ATTITUDE OF THE "CHRISTIAN REJECTION FRONT" ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE FENCE MAY ALSO COMPLICATE THINGS.

12. AN IDEA THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT COULD USEFULLY PICK UP IS THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEFUNCT NATIONAL DIALOGUE

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COMMITTEE, OR SOMETHING RESEMBLING IT, HONORING IT MIGHT MOLLIFY HIM TEMPORARILY AND THEREBY GIVE THE PRESIDENT TIME TO SORT OUT THE ISSUES. THE DIALOGUE TECHNIQUE IS, IN FACT, MORE THAN JUST A GIMMICK, THE COMMITTEE THAT MET LAST AUTUMN PROVIDED A FORUM FOR AIRING SENSITIVE ISSUES, SOMETHING THAT MAY BE EVEN MORE IMPORTANT IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD. THE MAIN PITFALL IS THAT SUCH A GROUP CAN PLAUSIBLY BE SAID TO UNDERMINE PARLIAMENT'S AUTHORITY. THIS CLAIM WAS MADE ABOUT THE EARLIER COMMITTEE. BUT THIS SHOULD NOT BE AN IMPOSSIBLE OBJECTION TO OVERCOME IN THESE CRITICAL TIMES THAT REQUIRE EXTRAORDINARY METHODS.

13. RECONSTRUCTION. THE PUBLIC SECTOR WILL BE OBLIGED TO PLAY AN UNPRECEDENTED ROLE IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LEBANON, FIRST BECAUSE OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE JOB TO BE DONE, SECONDLY BECAUSE THE PRIVATE SECTOR IS NO LONGER PREPARED TO ASSUME ITS TRADITIONAL ROLE OF LEADERSHIP UNTIL CONFIDENCE IS RESTORED. COMPLICATING MATTERS IS THE FACT THAT THE PUBLIC SECTOR IS NOT IN A POSITION TO DO THE JOB. THERE ARE ONLY A HANDFUL OF COMPETENT CIVIL SERVANTS. MOST CIVIL SERVANTS ARE BADLY TRAINED AND ONE THEIR JOBS TO POLITICAL PATRONAGE.

14. ONE CAN ENVISAGE THE CREATION OF A SPECIAL OFFICE DIRECTLY UNDER THE PRESIDENT TO PLAN AND COORDINATE THE REBUILDING OF THE COUNTRY. A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF WESTERN KNOW-HOW WILL BE REQUIRED AND LARGE AMOUNTS OF LOW INTEREST, LONG-TERM CREDIT, PRESUMABLY FROM THE ARAB COUNTRIES, PERHAPS \$1-2 BILLION AS A STARTER.

15. THE CONCEPT OF WESTERN KNOW-HOW JOINED WITH ARAB CAPITAL LENDS ITSELF WELL TO THE FORMATION OF A CONSORTIUM, THE MEMBERS OF WHICH WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO BE SELECTED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF EXISTING POLITICAL REALITIES, WHICH MEANS THE INCLUSION OF SYRIA REGARDLESS OF THE LATTER'S DEARTH OF CAPITAL AND/OR WESTERN KNOW-HOW.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

42
ACTION NODS-00

MR 94-81, #33 State Hr. 11/29/94

By KAM, NARA, Date 2/21/95

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
16. THE PUBLIC SECTOR EFFORT, IT MUST BE STRESSED, WOULD SUPPLEMENT, OR REPLACE, THE PRIVATE SECTOR EFFORT. ALMOST ALL OF THE COUNTRY'S NOT INCONSIDERABLE TALENT IS FOUND IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, WHAT IS NEEDED IS AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF CREDIT UNDER FAVORABLE TERMS. ALSO NEEDED ARE GUARANTEES, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES OR INSURANCE THAT THE COST OF THE OFFICE BUILDING REBUILT OR THE INVENTORIES REPLENISHED WOULD BE COVERED IF ONCE MORE DESTROYED. GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES ARE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO INDUSTRY. NOT ONLY SHOULD LAWS BE PASSED TO GUARANTEE THE FOREIGN INVESTOR, BUT THE LEBANESE INVESTOR AS WELL.

17. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND TOURISM FOR JOINT COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO SECTORS. THIS HAS ALREADY EXISTED IN THE CASE OF TOURISM, BUT THE STATE'S ROLE IN PROVIDING THE NECESSARY INFRASTRUCTURE TO ALLOW FOR REAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, AND SEEING TO IT THAT THIS IS NOT ALL CONCENTRATED IN BEIRUT, HAS EXISTED ON PAPER ONLY.

18. WHETHER BEIRUT WILL BECOME ONCE MORE A REGIONAL FINANCIAL CENTER WILL DEPEND NOT ONLY ON SECURITY BUT ON THE CONTINUATION OF A LIBERAL STYLE ECONOMY, THE ABSENCE OF CONTROLS ON CAPITAL MOVEMENTS AND MAINTENANCE OF THE BANK SECRECY LAWS. INDEED THE WHOLE RENEWAL OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR COULD ONLY BE ASSUMED IF THE COUNTRY CONTINUES TO FUNCTION UNDER

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A FREE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM.

19. IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR ROAD CONSTRUCTION AND PORT DEVELOPMENT REQUIRE PRIORITY AS AN AID TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR, BUT THE PUBLIC SECTOR WILL ALSO HAVE PRESSING PRIORITIES OF A SOCIAL NATURE. THESE INCLUDE SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, MORE SCHOOLS, AND AN END TO TAX EVASION ON THE PART OF THE WEALTHY.

20. IN THE MIDST OF ALL THE DESTRUCTION TO THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY THE RELATIVE STABILITY OF THE LEVANESE POUND IS ONE OF THE BRIGHT SPOTS. THANKS TO A VERY CONSERVATIVE POLICY FOLLOWED SINCE THE INTRA BANK CRAS ROCKED THE COUNTRY, THE POUND HAS AN 80 PER CENT GOLD COVER AT THE OFFICIAL RATE OF \$42 PER OUNCE. MOREOVER THE LEBANESE PUBLIC DEBT IS NEGLIGIVLE. LEBANON'S ABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO HELPING ITSELF THEREFORE IS BY NO MEANS INSIGNIFICANT.

21. A MAJOR EFFORT BY THE PUBLIC SECTOR TO RESTORE THE ECONOMY, IT SHOULD BE NOTED, WOULD TEND TO STRENGTHEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND WORK AGAINST TRENDS TOWARD PARTITION.
BROWN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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July 7, 1975

ABDUCTION OF COL. MORGAN

FOR YOUR BACKGROUND USE ONLY: -- NOT FOR DISSEMINATION^E
TO THE PRESS:

Members of the Embassy staff in Beirut met this morning (9:30 Beirut time) with representatives of the Lebanese Deuxieme Bureau, the Lebanese Surete and Lebanese Internal Security Forces. Col. Boustany, Chief of the Deuxieme reported that information available to the GOL indicated Col. Morgan is well and being properly taken care of.

Col. Boustany inquired how far the U.S. government is prepared to go in meeting the terrorists' demands. He was informed that the USG would not undertake any direct action, that we would not agree to pay any ransom, either in money or goods, and that we are relying on the GOL to secure Col. Morgan's safe release. Col. Boustany responded that the GOL understood this responsibility and had already made contact with various parties. The USG is not responding directly to any kidnapers' demands.

* * * * *

The public guidance on Col. Morgan remains the same as yesterday. Specific details should be referred to the State Department.

July 7, 1975

ABDUCTION OF COL. MORGAN

BACKGROUND USE ONLY:

The "Revolutionary Socialist Action Organization" that has threatened to kill U. S. Army Colonel Ernest Morgan in Beirut apparently is the same Lebanese radical group that has carried out a series of attacks against official and private U. S. interests over the past two years. The group uses leftist rhetoric and fedayeen tactics to cover what are essentially criminal activities; by late last year, it had attempted to extort money from at least 50 businesses and diplomatic missions in Lebanon.

The group, usually known simply as the Revolutionary Socialist Organization has no regular ties with Palestinian feydayeen organizations.

In a statement released to several Beirut newspapers last night, the kidnapers said Morgan will be released if by Wednesday night the U. S. makes public the statement of the Revolutionary Socialist Organization, asks the Lebanese government to stop searching for Morgan, and delivers to inhabitants of a poor section of Beirut large quantities of food, clothing, and building materials.

The State Department Press Office is responding to queries on Morgan's abduction as follows. We are advised to follow their guidance referring to them where possible:

Q. What can you tell us about the report, confirmed by Embassy Beirut, that demands have been received from a group purportedly holding Colonel Morgan in Beirut?

A. Embassy Beirut received at about 1945 Beirut time, July 6, a communication concerning Col. Morgan from "the Rebolutionary Socialist Action Organization." The contents of this communication were immediately made known to the Lebanese Government.

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- A. Embassy Beirut received at about 1945 Beirut time, July 6, a communication concerning Col. Morgan from "the Revolutionary Socialist Action Organization." The contents of this communication were immediately made known to the Lebanese Government.

Q. What action is the U. S. government taking to secure the safe release of Col. Morgan?

A. Our Embassy in Beirut is remaining in close touch with the Lebanese Government concerning Col. Morgan. Amb. Godley has discussed the matter with Foreign Minister Taqla. A Washington Task Force in support of efforts to secure Col. Morgan's release has been established under the chairmanship of Robert A. Fearey, the State Department's terrorism coordinator.

Q. Is that all you can tell us?

A. As you can well understand, this is a very delicate situation. It would not be conducive to the safe return of Col. Morgan to comment further at this time. But I can assure you we are doing everything possible to secure his release.

Q. What is U. S. government policy in cases of abduction of U. S. government personnel abroad?

A. Our policy is well known and need not be repeated.

July 10, 1975

ABDUCTION OF COL. MORGAN

UPI reports from Beirut that the kidnapers of American Col. Ernest Morgan today granted him another 72 hour "stay of execution", but warned he would be killed if the U.S. does not meet their food and ransom demands.

Our public statements should continue to emphasize:

- (1) that we continue to be in close touch with the Lebanese government concerning Col. Morgan and that Amb. Godley has met several times with Foreign Minister Togla on the Morgan abduction.
- (2) The Lebanese government is doing everything possible to secure Morgan's release.
- (3) That securing his release presents a very delicate situation, and comments about our efforts or anyone else's efforts can only jeopardize his safe return.

April 20, 1976

SYRIAN INTERVENTION IN LEBANON

Q. Yesterday you essentially condoned Syrian intervention in Lebanon. Does this signal a change in our policy?

A. What I said yesterday indicates no change in our policy.

Our policy regarding outside military intervention in Lebanon remains as it has been stated many times publicly. We are opposed to outside military intervention in Lebanon and have made clear our concern that it could lead to wider hostilities in the Middle East.

Q. Then you consider the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon as being part of the constructive role Syria has been playing in Lebanon?

A. We consider that Syrian political efforts to bring about a political accomodation among the Lebanese parties have been constructive. There has been no change in our policy of opposition to outside military intervention in Lebanon.

April 21, 1976

MATHIAS - ARAFAT MEETING

Q: Senator Mathias reportedly met with PLO leader Yasir Arafat and discussed Lebanon and the Middle East. Did Mathias meet with Arafat at the President's request or did Mathias carry a message from the President? Do you expect Mathias to report to the President on his meeting with Arafat?

A: The President did not meet with ^{Sen} Mathias before his trip to the Middle East. Mathias did not meet with Arafat at the President's urging nor did he carry a message from the President. As to whether ~~Mathias~~ ^{the Senator} will meet with the President when he returns, that is up to the Senator. But I have nothing on that.

May 10, 1976

SYRIAN TROOP PRESENCE IN LEBANON

Q. What remains the USG position on the Syrian troops presence in Lebanon? Now that the elections have taken place, should the Syrians get out and will the U.S. encourage this?

A. We have made clear to all concerned that we do not favor outside military intervention in Lebanon. While the Syrian role has generally been constructive, we hope that the election of a new President means that the Lebanese political process will function in such a way that the Lebanese can resolve their own problems.

SARKIS ELECTION

Q. What is the U. S. reaction to the election of Sarkis as the new President of Lebanon? What will happen next? What about the continued fighting?

A. The U. S. did not take a position on any of the candidates for the Lebanese Presidency, nor did we indicate that we would do so. In general terms, we are pleased that the Lebanese constitutional process has been able to elect a new President and we hope the process will continue to function so that political reconciliation and reform can take place under the leadership of the new President.

For this to occur will require the cooperation of all factions in Lebanon, both in maintaining the ceasefire and furthering the political process. We stand ready to assist Lebanon in any suitable way within the context of Lebanese independence, territorial integrity and national unity. We hope that all interested outside governments will do the same.

Q. Will the President be sending Sarkis a congratulatory message?

A. President-designate Sarkis has not yet assumed office; such a message should await the completion of the Lebanese political processes.

May 10, 1976

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR MELOY

TO BE VOLUNTEERED:

The President met this morning at 10:15 a. m. with Ambassador Francis Meloy, Jr., our new Ambassador to Lebanon. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss current developments in the Lebanese crisis and to underscore the importance the U. S. attaches to Meloy's mission there.

- Q. Did the President give Meloy any specific instructions or ask him to relay any messages to the newly elected President Sarkis?
- A. Ambassador Meloy will continue the same policy we have been following in Lebanon. As for delivering any message to Sarkis, the newly elected President has not yet been installed in office, and any message should await the completion of the Lebanese political processes.

June 2, 1976

SYRIAN INCURSIONS INTO LEBANON

Q: Can you confirm today the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon?

A: Yes, we can confirm that there has been some troop movement, but we cannot confirm levels for you. (State will say, per their guidance yesterday, that there are between 5,000 and 6,000 troops total in Lebanon including new forces. They will not break out the figures comparing new to old troops or any movement of forces.)

Q: Do we view the Syrian role as constructive? What about our views on military intervention?

A: We have consistently maintained that the political role Syria has played in mediating the conflict has been constructive. At the same time, our position on the risks of foreign ^{military} intervention remains unchanged. We have stated consistently that foreign intervention carries with it the risk of widening the conflict.

It is important to understand that the restoration of security in Lebanon is very complex which the parties themselves are discussing. It is not for the U.S. to comment on every development in this complex situation, but in the last analysis the restoration of peace and security depends on the political accommodation among the parties in Lebanon themselves.

Q: How would you characterize the United States role throughout this crisis?

A: Our efforts have been political and humanitarian: to encourage the

parties to reach a political settlement and to provide emergency relief assistance including the President's proposal for \$20 million in rehabilitation funds for Lebanon. We have lent maximum encouragement to all political efforts.

Q: Did we give any kind of tacit approval to Syria to intervene? Did we "clear" any of these moves with Israel?

A: We did not give any tacit approval; no moves were cleared with us, nor have we "cleared" any moves with anyone else. We have urged all governments to exercise restraint.

June 8, 1976

SITUATION IN LEBANON

Q: What is your reaction to recent events concerning Lebanon? What is the scale of Syria's military intervention, including the use of aircraft? Does the United States approve of this? What does the US think of the protests of other Arab states over Syria's actions and the emergency meeting of the Arab League to discuss this?

A: We have consistently opposed outside military intervention in Lebanese affairs. ~~This would apply to Syria as well as others,~~
[e.g., the Palestinians who are intervening, the Israelis
who have not but might be tempted to do so] Reports from the field make clear that the situation is fluid and complex. We continue to support Lebanon's independence, territorial integrity and national cohesion and we very much regret the continuation of the tragic conflict and the loss of life. We are doing our best to encourage a lasting cease-fire and return to peaceful political processes in Lebanon, and we would generally support efforts by others to bring about a peaceful accommodation. It is inappropriate for us to comment on inter-Arab positions concerning Lebanon.

(Concerning any deliberations of the Arab League)



June 9, 1976

SITUATION IN LEBANON

Q: What is your reaction to recent events concerning Lebanon? What is the scale of Syria's military intervention, including the use of aircraft? Does the United States approve of this? What does the U.S. think of the protests of other Arab states over Syria's actions and the emergency meeting of the Arab League to discuss this?

A: We have consistently opposed outside military intervention in Lebanese affairs. Reports from the field make clear that the situation is fluid and complex. We continue to support Lebanon's independence, territorial integrity and national cohesion and we very much regret the continuation of the tragic conflict and loss of life. We are doing our best to encourage a lasting ceasefire and return to peaceful political processes in Lebanon. Generally, we will support any genuine efforts to bring about a peaceful accommodation. I don't think I should comment on the ~~attitudes~~ *attitudes* governments in this situation.

6/10/76

LEBANON

Q: The Arab League has agreed to establish a joining force to move into Lebanon. Does the President have any reaction to this?

A: We note recent efforts to form an Arab League force to monitor a ceasefire and ~~hope it will lead to a further~~
~~improvement of the situation there.~~ We do remain opposed to any outside intervention which could carry the risk of further escalation of the fighting. We continue to support Lebanon's independence, territorial integrity and national cohesion and would support any arrangement acceptable to all the parties concerned.

Q: Does the President then endorse the proposed intervention of the Arab League force?

A: As I said, we have been watching the developments in Lebanon and note the resolution of the Arab League. We will continue to closely monitor the situation and hope efforts by the parties can bring about an arrangement acceptable to all the parties concerned.

LEBANON

revised

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6/17/76

MELOY ASSASSINATION

Q: Can you confirm reports that the PLO have 5 individuals in custody who they claim are the culprits. Are we in direct contact with the PLO on this?

A: We have received reports that PLO and Lebanese elements have detained several individuals. We are of course in contact on a continuing basis with all parties in the area. I would not want to speculate further at this time.

Statement by the Pres

June 18, 1976


~~Evacuation of American Citizens from Lebanon~~

Due to the continuing uncertainty of the situation in Beirut, ~~the~~
~~President has~~ ^{I have} directed the United States Embassy there to assist in
the departure by overland convoy to Damascus of ~~the~~ U.S. citizens
who wish to depart Lebanon at this time.

~~The first such~~ ^{The} convoy is expected to leave Beirut Saturday, and
American citizens are being alerted both by the Embassy and by
broadcast on the Voice of America to be prepared for departure at
that time, if they so wish.

The remains of Ambassador Francis Meloy and Mr. Robert Waring
have been brought to Damascus overland. They will be picked up by a
U.S. plane and returned to the United States, arriving on Saturday.

Only those Embassy officials not essential to our continuing
operations will be leaving Lebanon. ~~[FBI - It is expected that~~
~~approximately 35 to 40 will remain. FBI - 25]~~ The American Embassy
in Beirut is to remain open to continue our efforts to help bring an end
to the strife which has brought this tragedy to Lebanon.



The purpose of this call is to give you a confidential status report on the situation involving the present plans for the evacuation of Americans in Beirut.

You are aware that as a result of discussions involving Americans as well as representatives of other interests in Beirut, it has been planned to conduct an evacuation of Americans from Beirut by a motor convoy. Following the inability of the convoy to make the trip Friday night, it was planned to make another attempt tonight.

However, we have been informed by forces controlling the convoy route that the road has been interdicted and that heavy shelling along some portions make it impossible to accomplish the planned evacuation tonight.

However, the PLO has concurred in our proposal for an evacuation by sea, using a landing type vessel which is a part of the Sixth Fleet.

This will be an administrative operation, not a combat type operation. The mother ship (LPD) will proceed from its present location in the task force to a point approximately three to five miles off the coast. It will release

a landing craft (LCU) which will proceed to a beach area at Beirut near the evacuation assembly point where it will load the evacuees. The landing craft has sufficient capacity to take all anticipated evacuees in one trip. We have been assured by the forces controlling the area where the operation will take place that security will be maintained throughout the operation. We expect the operation to take place sometime after midnight and to be concluded by 6:00 or 7:00 a.m.

We would appreciate your keeping a close hold on these details.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CONTACT LIST

<u>MEMBER</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
The Speaker	12:05	---	No answer after repeated calls. At 12:05 spoke to A. A. Ward. (J. M. contacted.)
Tip O'Neill			Unable to reach. Had police leave call request on cottage door in Mass. No return call by 12:25 a.m.
John McFall	10:45 pm	--Sheraton Boston Hotel, Boston, Mass.	---Asked what time operation would begin. Responded 11:00 pm USDST, 7:00 am Beirut time. Hopes everything goes all right.
John Rhodes	12:34	Washington home.	"Sounds like the right thing to do. Where do you take the evacuees? To the ship. Knew that the overland convoy route x is an SOB." (JM & CL)
Bob Michel	10:38 pm	--At residence in Washington, D. C.	---No Comment.
Al Cederberg	11:15 pm	--Holiday Inn, Midland, Michigan	---Surprised that evacuation not completed last night (6/18). Asked if British would participate. Believes evacuation by sea better than by overland route.
George Mahon	10:40 pm	--At residence in Washington, D. C.	---Asked why we are not resorting to overland convoy. Responded that route has been interdicted and there is heavy shelling along some portions. Hopes all goes well.
"Doc" Morgan			White House does not have Washington home phone. Press aide reached at 10:59. Wouldn't reveal Morgan's home phone but he would keep trying for us. His Pa. home number is 412-377-3144 but there is no answer.
Bill Broomfield	10:50 pm	--At Capital Hill Club, Washington, D. C.	---In complete support of operation.
Mel Price	10:39	place: Washington, D. C. home	-- "Thank you"
Bob Wilson	10:49	- Not at home - Reached A. A. Ed Terrar -	Gave overview to Ed. Wilson at Tides Inn, Irving, Va. No answer in his room or hotel page. Ed felt Wilson didn't need to be reached on this.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 19, 1976

██████████ of Senators regarding evacuation plan from Lebanon.

Senator	Time	Place	comment
Eastland	10:50pm	DC	I'm mighty glad you done it
Mansfield	10:15pm	DC	Has reservations. Like overland route better. Got others out that way.
Scott, H.	10:20pm	DC	Approves.
Griffin	10:50pm	Cap Hill Club	OK, but don't downplay military side of it.
Sparkman	10:35pm	DC	Sounds very encouraging. Was getting worried. Sound good.
Case	10:30pm	DC	Fine. Approves operation. Glad we are doing it.
McClellan	10:43	DC	Other nationalities coming out? That shouldn't be any problem. They ought to be glad let us get them out
Young	10:50	DC	OK, good luck
Thurmond	11:00	So Car	RW told AA, Beasley
Stennis	11:10	DC	RW told Ed Braswell

R. Byrd call still outstanding as of 11:30 pm

JUNE 20, 1976

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The evacuation operation in Beirut today was completed successfully without incident. The success of this operation was made possible through the combined efforts of our Armed Forces and State Department personnel both here and in the field.

I want to express my deep appreciation and pride in the outstanding performance of all the men and women who contributed to this effort. We are grateful, as well, for the assistance of other governments and individuals that facilitated the evacuation. The United States will continue to play a positive role in seeking to restore stability and bring peace to Lebanon.

I would like to express to all those who played a part in the success of this operation my heartfelt thanks.

#

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6/19/76

RON:

FYI NSC is
giving this guidance
to Ann Compton
in response to questions
she raised

JKF

Q: Real battle between U.S. Embassy - who says not to use U.S. forces and White House/State on the other -- which want to use them?

A: Untrue. The President's concern, and that of his advisors here in Washington and in the field, throughout, has been to proceed in the manner which best assures the safety of Americans.

We believe the evacuation can be carried out without force and are in touch with the parties to achieve that end.

As well, we of course, wish to continue to help wherever possible with all of the parties to achieve a political solution to the situation in Lebanon.

Q: Rumor: that Syria has warned U.S. that there will be a big movement of their forces in two or three days (implying that Americans may be in greater jeopardy than they are now). Any truth to this?

A: No. We have not been told this, and we are not aware of any such information.

July 16, 1976

LEBANON EVACUATION

Q: Mr. President, what has happened in Lebanon that has caused the need for new evacuation of Americans? Has the security situation worsened? Do you intend to use units of the Sixth Fleet as you did last month? How many people will be involved?

A: We have decided to reduce temporarily the staff of our Embassy in Beirut to a minimum level as a result of the greatly increased difficulties of operating in West Beirut, including the shortage of basic food stuffs, gasoline and water. This action would require a reduction in the services that we can provide the American community in Lebanon, and we have again urged all American citizens to leave Lebanon. The departure of Embassy staff personnel and other Americans is currently planned for Tuesday. The means for departure and the number who will go are still being determined.

Q: Why aren't you as directly involved in this evacuation as the last one?

A: The security situation the last time was more confused and we were much more apprehensive about the possibility of safely evacuating American citizens. This time there is still danger, but a number of group departures have taken place without incident in recent weeks. I am being kept fully informed of the evacuation plans as they evolve.

Q: Do you intend to contact the PLO, directly or indirectly, to arrange for the security of Americans wishing to depart the country?

A: Administrative details, including the security of departure arrangements, are still being worked out. We will make the necessary contacts just as we did the last time.

Q: Will Ambassador Seelye be among those leaving?

A: No final decision as to which Embassy personnel will leave and which will stay has been made.

Q: What does the United States think about the general situation in Lebanon?

A: We hope that efforts being made to bring about an end to the fighting and a political agreement among the Lebanese parties to the conflict will succeed. We are continuing to do our best to assist in achieving this objective, and we continue to support Lebanon's independence, territorial integrity and national unity. I do not wish to comment more specifically on the details of the extremely complex and fast-moving situation there.

July 19, 1976

BEIRUT EVACUATION POSTPONEMENT

Q: Why has the American-sponsored convoy from Beirut, due to depart Tuesday, July 20, been postponed? Has there been a threat to the convoy? When will it be rescheduled?

A: The convoy has been postponed because we were advised that the route of departure from Beirut is not totally secure. This advice was given to us by the parties with whom we have been in contact, both direct and indirect. There was no threat to the convoy, whose departure we expect to reschedule in the next few days.

Q: Did in fact the PLO inform you that the route was not secure?

A: Let me repeat, we were advised that the route was not secure by the parties with whom we have been in contact regarding the evacuation. I will not get into the details of our exchanges with them. (FYI ONLY: The PLO should not be mentioned specifically in regard to any aspect of the postponement.)

July 23, 1976

BEIRUT EVACUATION

Q: What are the facts about the Evans and Novak story on American citizens not being able to leave Beirut because they are hostages to PLO political pressures?

A: I will not comment on speculative editorial comment. Our position on the Beirut evacuation remains as stated previously: it has been postponed on grounds of the general security situation; we are in touch with various concerned parties about the situation; we are trying to work something out; and we will proceed with the evacuation when it can be safely carried out. Our planning is still for an overland convoy to Damascus.

(State is planning to add, if pressed, that there are possible sea and air options, including use of the Sixth Fleet as before, but these options are not presently under active consideration. State is also planning to add, if pressed, that we must depend upon those in control on the ground to advise us on the security situation; therefore, we are not in a position to say that the route is actually safe as Evans and Novak imply.)

26 July 1976

BEIRUT EVACUATION

Q: Why did you abandon the road convey for a sea departure?

A: On the basis of our exchanges with the parties involved in maintaining security for an evacuation, it was determined that departure by sea is the safest way to do it.

Q: By "all the parties involved" do you mean to include the PLO?

A: State discussed this issue at some length on Friday. I see no reason to go through it all again.

Q: Does this indicate a change of policy toward the PLO?

A: No.

Q: Does this mean that the President or Secretary Kissinger have been in direct contact with Arafat on the evacuation?

A: No, they have not.

Q: But private persons and convoys go to D mascus every day by road safely. Why couldn't you?

A: The security arrangements for a large number are necessarily more difficult to assure than for a single car or small convoy.

The parties responsible for security advised us that the road was not secure, and the safest way to go would be ~~x~~ by sea.

-2- Beirut Evacuation

Q: Will Amb. Seelye be coming out?

A: That has not been decided.

Q: We will not know exactly how many until the registration is complete, but the figures from the registration last week indicate that about four to five hundred are expected to depart, and of that total approximately 160 will be Americans.

Q: How many were evacuated in June?

A: A total of 279 were evacuated, and of that 116 are Americans.

[Refer to State any further questions on details of the 20 June evacuation.]

Q: Will you still reduce the Embassy staff? To what level?

A: Yes, the Embassy will be reduced to a minimal level of about ten to fifteen Americans.

Q: Things are looking better in Lebanon -- the emplacement of the Arab League force and some hopeful indications from the Syrian-Palestinian meeting -- why are we pressing for evacuation now?

A: Because of the increasingly difficult living conditions, it is necessary to reduce the size of our Embassy to absolute minimal levels. Due to the reduction of Embassy personnel and resultant decrease in Embassy services, we have urged the remaining Americans ~~to~~ in Beirut to evacuate. We contemplate no such further organized departures and are therefore urging all private Americans to take advantage of

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this opportunity to depart under US Government auspices.

Q: Does this mean you expect the situation to take a turn for the worse?

A: As I have said, our decision is based on the very difficult living conditions in Beirut and the consequent necessity to reduce our Embassy to minimum levels.

Q: You evacuated in June and now again in July; can we expect another in August?

A: No.

Q: Did the PLO approve this evacuation? Have they guaranteed safe passage?

A: We have continued to have daily exchanges with the various parties involved in order to facilitate the departure of Americans and other foreigners. We are pleased that all parties have extended their full cooperation to facilitate this departure. The situation including assurances, is similar to the June evacuation.

Q: What will you do about the remaining people in the Embassy should the security situation become acute?

A: We do not anticipate such a situation arising and I do not want to speculate on a hypothetical case.

July 27, 1976
0935

AVAILABLE FACTS--LEBANON EVACUATION

1. Number of persons evacuated: 308
2. Number of Americans and their foreign dependents evacuated: 149
of which 78 are U.S. citizens. (unconfirmed)
3. Number of USG officials evacuated: 27 included in total U.S. citizens
count of 78.
4. Number of nations whose citizens were evacuated: probably 20+ but
exact count not yet known.
5. Number of Americans remaining in Lebanon: probably 500-700, most
of whom are dual-nationals or long-time residents of Lebanon.
6. Number of USG officials remaining: 15
7. Name of present Charge in Beirut: Leamon R. (Ray) Hunt.

August 6, 1976

US HOSPITAL SHIP FOR LEBANON? --
SENATOR ABOUREZK PROPOSAL

Q. [FYI: Some UPI reporter has evidently picked up the following]

Is it true that Senator Abourezk is proposing that the US send a medical ship to Lebanon to offer humanitarian assistance? Will the President approve this?

A. The President has received a letter from Senator Abourezk suggesting that the US send a hospital ship to Lebanon. This proposal is under consideration and an appropriate reply will be made to the Senator. Therefore, I have nothing further to add at this time.

August 12, 1976

US POLICY TOWARDS THE PLO

Q: What is the US position towards the PLO now that we are having direct contacts in Lebanon with that group?

A: Our position with respect to the PLO on issues fundamental to the Arab-Israeli conflict has not changed:

-- The question of recognition and negotiations with the PLO does not arise as long as the PLO does not recognize the existence of the state of Israel and accept Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for a final settlement. This remains our policy.

-- The contacts with the PLO are only at local security level at our embassy in Beirut and have to do strictly with security matters, mainly related to the protection of our remaining embassy personnel. This is only because the PLO is a principal element in the security situation in West Beirut, where our Embassy is located.

-- However, our position with respect to the PLO on issues fundamental to the Arab-Israeli conflict has not changed and remains as I have stated above.

[The Department of State issued the following public statement clarifying direct contacts with the PLO: "Because it was apparent to us that the PLO was the principal element in the security situation in West Beirut, we authorized at the end of June our Embassy Security Officer to discuss with the PLO the personal security of our Embassy personnel in their movements

in West Beirut. These contacts by the Security Officer for that purpose continued and we expect that they will continue as needed. Prior to then, our contacts with the PLO were through intermediaries. We informed the Israeli Government of our first direct contact shortly after it took place."]

Q: Is the senior officer left in charge of our Embassy in Beirut authorized to have contacts with the PLO? If so, for any political discussions?

A: The contacts are being conducted at the level of the security officer on matters strictly related to security. There is no authorization for other level of contacts or for discussion on matters other than the security of our personnel. Our position with respect to the PLO on the fundamental issues of the Arab-Israeli dispute has not changed.

AGREEMENT ON LEBANON

Q. What do you think of the plans for a 30,000-man Arab League peacekeeping force? Don't we oppose outside military intervention?

A. Look, we have been over our position opposing outside military intervention on many occasions. The situation in Lebanon is very complex and I don't believe it is appropriate for me to comment on this new proposal which is one for the parties involved to work out and whose details are not clear. Our main hope is that the agreement brings about a peaceful settlement and thus leads to an end of outside military intervention.

AGREEMENT ON LEBANON

Q. What is the President's reaction to the agreement on Lebanon in Riyadh?

A. Although we are not fully familiar with all the details of the accord, I can assure you that the United States genuinely welcomes the efforts made in Riyadh as a significant new element of hope for resolution of the Lebanese tragedy.

The United States has consistently supported efforts to bring about an end to the fighting and to promote a peaceful negotiated settlement preserving Lebanon's independence, territorial integrity and national unity. We strongly hope that this new development will end the divisiveness and bloodshed which have plagued that country for so many months.

OPEC MEETING

Does the President have any comment on the departure of the Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Yamani from the OPEC Conference in Doha?

I do not think I am going to comment on the day-to-day developments of this conference.

MIA REPORT

Does the President have any comment on the report released yesterday by the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia?

I have nothing for you on that at this time. Copies of the report, which was only released yesterday, have been received and its conclusions and recommendations on the MIA question will be studied carefully.

[The President's policy has been that the United States is pledged to the fullest possible accounting of our MIA's]

LEBANESE ENVOY

Will anyone at the White House be meeting with the Lebanese Envoy, Ghassan Tuani, who is in the United States to discuss reconstruction aid for Lebanon.

I do not believe Mr. Tuani's schedule, which is being coordinated by the State Department, has been fully finalized so as yet I do not know whether he will be seeing anyone here. I do know, however, that he met with Under Secretary Habib and Assistant Secretary Atherton over at State yesterday and will be seeing Secretary Kissinger today.