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NUCS

LIMITED U. S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POSTURE

Q. Can you shed any more light on the story that the Air Force has begun training for fighting a limited nuclear war? Is this a new policy? What is the President's position on this?

A. The policy of flexibility in the possible employment of U. S. strategic nuclear forces is not new. President Nixon addressed this issue in his foreign policy report to the Congress in 1972 and Secretary Schlesinger has addressed the issue repeatedly for a year and a half. For a more detailed explanation of the rationale for this policy I would refer you to the 1976 Defense Posture Statement. The strategy of limited strategic nuclear force is ^{an} ~~one~~ option ~~among others~~ for the U. S. ~~to consider~~ *which provides* ~~and a basic contingency for our armed forces~~ *an essential capability* ~~to give them~~ *for* the flexibility of response, ~~that has characterized our defense posture since the early 1960's.~~

I cannot comment on the specifics of military planning along these lines, but I would refer you to the numerous public comments made on the subject over the last several years.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION - NUCLEAR SUPPLIER'S CONFERENCE

Q. Would you comment on recent reports that the U. S. met in London last week with several nuclear suppliers to discuss export policies? Could you tell us something about the purpose of this meeting and the names of the other participants?

A. We are concerned that all exports of nuclear facilities and technology for peaceful purposes be accompanied by adequate controls and safeguards. To this end, we are currently engaged in a review of common export policies with other nuclear suppliers and are attempting to gain their agreement to new and stricter safeguards. This was the purpose of the meeting in London last week.

The participants agreed to keep the representation at the meetings and the substance of the discussions confidential because of the sensitivity of the subject matter.

June 22, 1975

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION -- BRAZILIAN AGREEMENT
WITH WEST GERMANY

Q: Are you concerned that countries such as Brazil are acquiring nuclear capabilities with a potential use for weapons development? Why did you not discuss this with President Scheel when you met with him?

A: We are, of course, concerned that all expansion of nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes be accompanied by controls and safeguards designed to prevent any diversion for any nuclear explosive purposes. This is a longstanding and continuing U. S. policy -- not focused on any one country -- and we have reaffirmed our commitment to the principles and objectives of non-proliferation at the recently concluded Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. We actively encourage all countries not already signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to become party to it.

The subject of Brazil's agreement with the West German Government did not come up in my conversations with President Scheel, but the subject was subsequently discussed by Secretary Kissinger and Vice Chancellor Genscher.

June 19, 1975

NUCLEAR EXPORTING NATIONS MEETING

(Binder, N.Y. T. 6/18/75; Berger, W.P. 6/19/75)

Q. Can you give us any more details about a meeting in London of eight major nuclear exporting nations?

A. I believe the State Department referred to the meeting yesterday, but I have nothing additional to give you.

FYI: The State Department itself did not get into the specifics of the meeting since the participants decided that they wanted to conduct the meetings without any publicity.

State Department Guidance:

All I can say is that officials from some countries met in London this week to discuss common problems concerning nuclear energy. The discussions were confidential. It was agreed that we would not name the countries that participated or reveal the contents of the conversations.

TOON ON ISRAELI BORDERS

June 26

Q. Was Ambassador Toon reflecting the President's views when he said that there will have to be rectifications in Israel's ^{final} borders to help Israel meet its legitimate security needs in any final settlement?

A. There has been no change in US policy. We are making every effort to assist the parties to reach agreement on a Middle East peace settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. We are not going to get into a discussion of the particular substantive issues involved,

~~since they will have to be worked out during the course of the negotiations. Until such time as the reassessment is~~

~~concluded and the President makes known his views, I *do not*~~

I think that

~~not going to comment on day-to-day issues of the negotiations~~

~~that may arise. *serves any useful purpose*~~

Q. Well, does the President agree or disagree with the statement of Ambassador Toon? Did he discuss this with Toon this morning? What did they discuss?

A. ~~You can draw your own conclusions, although~~ The Ambassador himself has noted that he was reflecting his personal views.

The US position is as I have stated it. On completion of the reassessment, the President has said that he would make known his views. But that point has not yet been reached and no definite date has been set.

*Press office
has*

As far as the meeting this morning, it was an opportunity for the President to review the Middle East situation prior to the Ambassador's departure and to receive his views, just as the President has done with a wide range of officials and private Americans. But I am not going to get into the specifics of what they discussed.

Q. What is the US position on final borders for Israel?

A. I have stated that the US position is that we are seeking to promote a settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338. But I am not going to get into the details of the substantive issues involved since these must be worked out in the negotiations.

*see paragraph one of President's
Q + A book Question entitled
Positions on Occupied Territories
in the Middle East. It's a
good amplification of the above
if you need it. M.V.*

POSITIONS ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Q: In view of the Israeli Labor Party statement, what is the US position on the Occupied Territories such as the Golan Heights, Gaza, West Bank, Sinai and Jerusalem? Have your talks with the parties revealed any changes in their positions on territorial issues?

A: We do not in any sense endorse that statement. We believe that all of the issues, including the status of Jerusalem and the Palestinian problem, are matters for negotiations among the parties looking toward a final peace settlement on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. In our judgment these two Security Council Resolutions provide the basis for a just, durable, and equitable peace which will take into account the legitimate interests of all peoples in the area and will assure the right to independent sovereign existence of all states in the area. This is the basis on which we are dealing with the principal parties involved.

I do not believe it would serve any useful purpose for me to get into the details of negotiating positions of particular parties. There is hope for progress toward peace if all parties exercise flexibility. It is essential that there be such flexibility, that there be no stalemate, and that none of the parties fix preconditions which would block the possibility of negotiations.

MIDDLE EAST: DES MOINES REGISTER
DRIFT TOWARD WAR: OIL EMBARGO

Q: You talked in really ominous terms about any new war being a "blood year," in your interview in the Des Moines Register. How soon do you think war will break out?

A: I was simply making the broad point -- and one which history has clearly shown -- that in the absence of progress in negotiations, the chances of war increase. This happened in the period of 1971-73, and that is why we are working so hard to give new momentum to negotiations, and to prevent stalemate.

Q: You linked concerns about a new war in the Middle East with another oil embargo (Des Moines Register interview). Is the fear of an oil embargo a main consideration in our Middle East strategy?

A: The central objective of our Middle East policy is to achieve peace, avoid war and maintain the good relations we now enjoy with the Arab states and Israel. But recent history has shown we cannot ignore the possibility of another oil embargo if the chances of war become a reality, nor can we ignore its consequences for the US and other nations.

We do not intend to have a foreign policy dictated by oil considerations; but we do not intend to have any one consideration predominate. I have been doing my best to reduce our dependence on imported oil, thereby reducing our vulnerability, and I would welcome cooperation from Congress in working to achieve this objective.

June 22, 1975

MIDDLE EAST -- POLICY REASSESSMENT

Q: Now that you have finished your talks with key officials, when will the policy reassessment be terminated? Will there be a US plan? Are you planning any other personal meetings with Mid East officials? Will Kissinger go to the Mid East?

A: We will be carrying on further discussions through normal diplomatic channels and I am not prepared at this point to give you a specific time for the conclusion of our reassessment process. In due course I will be making US positions known, but final decisions as a result of our reassessment have not yet been made. It is too soon to speculate on any particular travel or negotiating plans.

June 22, 1975

ISRAELI MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Q: Are you still withholding military supplies for Israel?

A: As I have said before, our ongoing military relationship with Israel continues, including routine deliveries. However, decisions on major, new programs or advanced weapons will be made as part of our overall reassessment. This is not yet completed.

June 22, 1975

MIDDLE EAST -- AID LEVELS

Q: What kind of aid commitments did you make to Sadat and what aid levels do you plan to send to the Hill for both Egypt and Israel, especially taking into account the Senate 76 letter urging substantial aid for Israel?

A: No final decisions on aid for the Middle East will be made until our general reassessment has been concluded. We will send our recommendations to Congress in due course.

The subject of aid has come up in my talks with Middle East leaders and I reaffirmed our interest in continuing past US support for economic development and progress in the area. We will be discussing the question of aid to Middle East countries further through diplomatic channels.

Egypt

MILITARY SALES TO EGYPT

Q. Is it true, as reported today in the Boston Globe, that the President is considering a \$100 million military equipment sale to Egypt?

A. No military sales from this government to Egypt are under consideration. I want to be clear-- the U.S. Government is not selling military equipment to Egypt. I understand that certain American companies, in straight commercial cash sales which need no licensing by the American government, have contracted to sell some trucks and jeeps to Egypt. But I repeat--these are not military transactions by the U.S. Government.

Q. What about the transport helicopters mentioned in the story?

A. No helicopters are being sold to Egypt by American companies.

Q. *Is the U.S. govt selling or giving the helicopters to Egypt?*

Q. How many trucks and jeeps are going to Egypt?

A. -NO

A. You will have to ask the company involved--AMC.

Q. Did the U.S. Government approve these transactions?

A. It is not a question of approval or disapproval, since they are straight commercial deals. We were asked whether such sales to Egypt would conflict with any U.S. policy. The answer was that we saw no problem with these sales.

Q. Well, are the trucks and jeeps going to the Egyptian army?

A. We do not know what use the Egyptians have in mind for all of these. It is my understanding that some of them are being purchased by an Egyptian Government corporation. Some of them at least will be going to the Egyptian army. But I stress--this is not a military sale, it is not a U.S. Government transaction, nor is it a commercial transaction which the U.S. Government must license, nor are any U. S. Government funds involved.

Q. Is it true that Egyptian officers are to be enrolled in U.S. service schools?

A. The Egyptians have indicated an interest in sending a small number of military officers for training at US Service Schools. The matter is being discussed. **I** There is currently one Egyptian officer enrolled at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. in the Foreign Officers Command course. **I**

Clearance: NEA - Mr. Atherton

NEA/P:GFSherman:mo

U. S. STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST DISPUTE

Q: Since our step-by-step diplomacy has been suspended, will the U. S. now turn towards efforts to build a framework for a comprehensive settlement? Can you envisage the parties developing a plan for an overall settlement which could then be worked out in stages? Or would you prefer a revival of the step-by-step approach? Is there a "new" U. S. initiative planned for reviving efforts for an interim agreement?

A: Our objective has always been an overall settlement which resolved all problems outstanding between the Arabs and Israel. Our step-by-step approach was never viewed as an end in itself but rather as a means of making progress on particular issues and building confidence to enable further steps to be taken toward an overall peace.

In our policy review, we are examining all options for achieving an overall settlement and, as I have already indicated, there are several possibilities, including (a) resuming efforts to achieve interim agreements, (b) seeking an overall settlement or, (c) seeking some sort of interim arrangements in the process of negotiations for an overall settlement. We will continue to seek the views of the parties as we conduct our own policy review. I am not going to prejudge the outcome of what might be the best negotiating strategy but the objective remains constant -- the



achievement of an overall and comprehensive settlement. We are determined that there will be no stalemate or stagnation in the progress toward peace in the Middle East. We are prepared to pursue any avenue, including Geneva, and we are prepared to assist in whatever way seems most likely to be effective.

US MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY TO THE MIDDLE EAST

Q: Is not the US fueling an arms race in the Middle East -- between Israel and the Arabs and even among Arab states themselves -- by huge military sales?

A: Our policy in the Middle East has had two thrusts:

-- We have made a major effort to advance negotiations toward a peace settlement and that effort continues;

-- We have made important moves to strengthen our bilateral relations with the key nations which have a role in building a peaceful and stable Middle East.

In pursuit of the second aim, we -- as a friendly nation -- are asked to help individual states meet their national security requirements. The US has an interest in such self-defense as a contribution to the security of those states whose policies we believe are compatible with our own and contribute to peace in the Middle East.

This naturally includes Israel but it is not inconsistent to supply arms in a responsible manner to other countries -- for instance, Jordan and Saudi Arabia -- any more than it is inconsistent for the US to seek excellent political and economic relations with both our Arab and Israeli friends.

We should also keep in mind that if we do not supply the arms some other country will.



U. S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL

Q. In his address on April 10, the President made clear that the U.S. would work toward peace in the Middle East. Why was he so reticent in his support for Israel's security last night?

A. In his speech April 10, the President pledged the United States to a major effort for peace in the Middle East, an effort supported by the American people and the Congress. U.S. support for Israel's survival and security is a vital element of the policy of this Administration just as it has been since the Israeli state came into being in 1948. There has been no change in this clear and frequently stated policy. But -- as Israel's leaders agree -- there could be no better long-term assurance of Israel's survival and well-being than a peaceful settlement with its Arab neighbors.



U. S. ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL

Q. The President, in his interview last night implied that the U.S. commitment to Israel is in doubt. In view of his remarks on the current reassessment, what are the U.S. intentions with regard to support for Israel?

A. Let us make the record clear: In October, 1973, when Israel was in need, the U.S. responded with urgent, massive assistance. Some \$3.3 billion dollars has been appropriated by Congress for Israel since then, with over \$3 billion already disbursed. Since he became President, Congress has appropriated some \$750 million and we have continued to assist Israel on a large scale in its military improvement.

The net result has been to improve considerably Israel's military capability over that which it had in October, 1973 -- at a time when the U.S. has been experiencing economic difficulties. This cannot be construed as a weak commitment.

It has been and remains our earnest hope that the U.S. commitment to Israel's survival will facilitate early, rapid progress toward peace in the Middle East.

At the present time, all aspects of our Middle East policies are being integrated into our overall reassessment. New aid levels



U.S. Assistance to Israel (Continued)

Page 2

have not yet been determined, but we will make our own decisions on aid on the basis of our national objectives and our commitment to the survival of Israel. The reassessment is not a punitive exercise against any country.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL --
SALES TO JORDAN

Q. Why has the U.S. held up certain new items for Israel as part of the Middle East policy reassessment but has gone ahead with the sale of the Hawk to Jordan? Is Israel being discriminated against?

A. We are moving on schedule to complete our economic and military assistance agreements with all countries in the Middle East for FY 75. On arms, the large special program Israel requested in late 1974 on an urgent basis has already been delivered, except in three or four cases of technical or availability problems. As for the regular military supply relationship, we are continuing to meet routine arms supply requests and deliver a large number of items in the pipeline; however, commitments for deliveries of new or advanced technology are not being made during the course of the reassessment. As our overall policy review proceeds, decisions will also be taken regarding these.

We have been discussing for over a year what help we might be able to give Jordan for its air defense. King Hussein was informed several months ago of our decision in principle to supply air defense equipment over the next several years. A survey team went to Jordan in February



and the matter was discussed further during King Hussein's visit last week during which final agreement was reached on details. A decision was made in principle before our reassessment began and, after careful consideration during the reassessment process, we have decided to go forward with it. The equipment involves purely defensive weapons and does not constitute a step to shift the balance in the area. In due course, decisions will be made with respect to other countries as well.



May 22, 1975

THE ARAB BOYCOTT

The American Jewish Congress has sent President Ford a memorandum asking him to use existing federal laws against Arab boycotts directed at American companies and citizens.

Q. What is the President's reaction to the letter? What is he doing to see that the laws are being carried out? *We have not yet seen the memorandum, but when it is received, we will give it serious consideration.*

A. As you may know, under the Export Administration Act

of 1969, U.S. firms must report to the Commerce Department any request to participate in an Arab boycott of Israel. Under this provision, the Commerce Department has charged five U.S. exporters with failing to report such a request and has issued a warning to another 44 companies that they are in violation of the reporting requirement. The five companies charged had previously been warned. They have 30 days in which to contest the charges if they wish to do so.

I think the Commerce Department actions demonstrate the Administration's active involvement in the use of existing laws against boycotts.

FYI ONLY: Under the 1969 Act, firms are required to report requests for participation in an embargo; they are not forbidden to trade with Arab nations to the exclusion of Israel.

F.Y.I.

State's letter to Buchen has come over and is being reviewed so Pres' directive (key proposal to tighten this up) is being carried out

Refer to Commerce Dept's action of yesterday

RR0273)1

RNA 813

MIDEAST - FIRMS

WASHINGTON, MAY 21, REUTER - THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT CHARGED FIVE U.S. EXPORTERS TODAY WITH FAILING TO REPORT THAT THEY HAD BEEN ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL.

THE DEPARTMENT SAID IN A STATEMENT THAT IT COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE FIRMS INVOLVED UNTIL THEIR CASES HAD BEEN SETTLED.

A SPOKESMAN COULD GIVE NO DETAILS SUCH AS WHO HAD ASKED THE FIRMS TO TAKE PART IN THE BOYCOTT.

UNDER THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1969, U.S. FIRMS MUST REPORT TO THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT ANY SUCH REQUEST.

THE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS NOT ILLEGAL FOR A U.S. FIRM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE BOYCOTT, USED BY THE ARAB NATIONS AS A WEAPON IN THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAEL.

MORE 1238

RR0273)2

RNA 814

MIDEAST - FIRMS 2 WASHINGTON

EACH OF THE FIVE FIRMS CHARGED HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY WARNED OF SIMILAR VIOLATIONS IN 1968 AND 1969. THEY NOW HAVE 30 DAYS IN WHICH TO CONTEST THE CHARGES OR AGREE TO IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS BY THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT.

UNDER THE LAW, THE COMPANIES COULD BE LIABLE FOR A CIVIL PENALTY OF UP TO 1,000 DOLLARS FOR EACH VIOLATION.

THE LAW ALSO PROVIDES FOR FINES OF UP TO 10,000 DOLLARS AND AND ONE YEAR IN PRISON FOR ANYONE WHO MIGHT BE CONVICTED SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT DECIDE TO PRESS CRIMINAL CHARGES.

THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SAID THAT ANOTHER 44 U.S. COMPANIES HAD BEEN WARNED THEY WERE VIOLATING THE REPORTING REQUIREMENT OF THE ACT AND WOULD FACE CHARGES -- LIKE THE OTHER FIVE FIRMS -- IF THE VIOLATIONS RECURRED.

MORE 1240

RR0273)L

RNA 815

MIDEAST - FIRMS 3 WASHINGTON

THE CHARGES AGAINST THE FIVE FIRMS AND THE WARNINGS TO THE OTHER COMPANIES WERE THE RESULT OF COMMERCE DEPARTMENT PROPS INTO ALLEGATIONS EARLIER THIS YEAR THAT U.S. COMPANIES WERE FAILING TO REPORT REQUESTS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ARAB BOYCOTT.

IN 1974, THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID, A TOTAL OF 23 FIRMS REPORTED A TOTAL OF 785 REQUESTS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE BOYCOTT.

IN 378 CASES, FIRMS REPORTED THEY PLANNED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUEST.

IN 407 CASES, FIRMS EXERCISED THEIR OPTION TO REFUSE TO SAY WHETHER THEY INTENDED TO GO ALONG WITH THE BOYCOTT.

REUTER 1241

ok

CSCE

Q: Mr. President, do you conclude from your talks with European leaders during the past week that it will be possible to have a summit-level meeting this summer to conclude the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe?

A: We are, of course, following the negotiations at the European Security Conference very closely. While there are still unresolved issues in several areas, the negotiations seem to be reaching a point where there is reason to be optimistic. If the Conference is concluded along the lines that are now foreseeable and if early progress is realized, then I think the time schedule for a concluding phase sometime this summer could materialize. However, we still need first to see the results of the negotiations now underway.

Q: Mr. President, there have been criticisms over the United States agreeing to legitimize the Soviet Union's World War II territorial acquisitions in this European Security Conference. Why are we taking this action?

A: First, I do not wish to prejudge the outcome of the current negotiations. Second, however, I would note that these negotiations do not involve the preparation of a peace treaty.

The European Security talks are aimed at producing declarations that should assist in the process now underway of reducing tensions and increasing contacts and cooperation between East and West. The **CSCE** documents will not alter the legal position of any participating **state** on European territorial questions. They will specifically reaffirm the principle of peaceful change.

June 22, 1975

U. S. BASES IN TURKEY

Q: Mr. President, in retaliation for the cut-off in U. S. military aid, the Turkish Government has called for negotiations to begin in 30 days on the status of U. S. bases and facilities in Turkey. In your opinion, will a reduced U. S. military presence in Turkey have an adverse impact on U. S. and NATO security interests in the eastern Mediterranean?

A: The Government of Turkey has delivered to our embassy in Ankara a note on the subject of U. S. bases there, and we will, of course, be giving careful attention to this communication. As I have stated in the past, Turkey is one of our closest friends and allies. I strongly support resumption of military assistance to Turkey to restore a proper relationship between the United States and Turkey.

June 22, 1975

PORTUGAL

Q: Mr. President, what is your reaction to the violence in Portugal in recent days and the continued seeming drift to the left there?

A: As you know, I have been following this subject closely and the Portuguese Prime Minister and I had a useful and forthright exchange of views in Brussels on developments in his country. I believe that there is a consensus among the NATO allies that the situation in Portugal should be watched with care and concern, and also with deep sympathy and friendship for the people of Portugal. We will continue our close consultations with our allies on this issue. We have stated that in our view Communist domination of Portugal is incompatible with NATO membership, but we do not believe that this point has been reached.

June 20 , 1975

SPANISH BASES NEGOTIATIONS

Yesterday the U. S. and Spanish governments issued a communique at the conclusion of the sixth round of negotiations on bases agreements (attached), and Amb. McCloskey did a background briefing at State.

Q. What are the next steps in the Spanish bases negotiations? Have the Spanish asked us to shut down any facilities or have they levied any new demands on us in exchange for keeping our bases in Spain?

A. First, a joint U. S. -Spanish communique issued yesterday on this subject states that the two delegations have agreed to set up a steering committee for the purpose of studying specific technical problems. The delegation has agreed to meet again the week of June 30. It is my understanding that there was a briefing on the bases agreement yesterday at the State Department, and you might wish to check there for details.

Q. What about Spanish demands that the U. S. bases in Spain not be used in the event of another Middle East war?

A. I have checked on that report. This question is not and has not been a negotiating issue throughout the duration of the negotiations.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 19, 1975

No. 341

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JOINT U.S.-SPANISH COMMUNIQUE

The sixth round of negotiations between the Spanish and the United States delegations took place in Washington from June 16 to June 19. The Spanish delegation was chaired by the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Juan Jose Rovira, and the American delegation was headed by Ambassador-at-Large Robert J. McCloskey.

The two delegations continued the discussion on the key aspects of the defense relationship between the two countries and noted the progress being made in defining areas of mutual agreement.

The discussions included an examination of the subject of the Spanish facilities which are used by American forces, and Spanish military defense needs.

The two delegations agreed to set up a steering committee which would establish guidelines and supervise working groups which would study specific technical problems.

As a result of their decision to accelerate the pace of work, the two delegations agreed to hold the seventh round in Madrid during the week beginning June 30th.

The Spanish Ambassador offered a dinner in honor of the two delegations, and Ambassador McCloskey reciprocated with a luncheon in the State Department in honor of Under Secretary Rovira.

* * * * *

KOREA

May 21, 1975

SOUTH KOREAN RESOLUTION

Background Information:

The Washington Post today reports that South Korea has called on the United States to demonstrate its resolve to support Korea in the event of attack by providing adequate levels of assistance and troop presence: the Korean National Assembly declared a national resolve "to resolutely crush any provocation or invasion by North Korea." The statement said events in Indochina have had a heavy effect on the balance of power in Asia and together with North Korean statements and maneuvering created "new tension" on the Korean peninsula.

We hope the United States... will demonstrate by deeds its firm determination not to commit the same failure on the Korean peninsula as it did on the Indochinese peninsula," the resolution said. "Without such a demonstration, the United States will lose all credibility in its foreign commitments and this will lead to a debacle in world peace and order."

The Assembly's resolution was passed on the final day of a special four-day session convened for this purpose.

Q. What is the President's reaction to the South Korean National Assembly Resolution calling for a reaffirmation of U.S. support for Korea? What support do we currently provide for Korea?

A. We have read the reports of the resolution. As you know, the President has reaffirmed in recent weeks our support for Korea and our resolve to maintain all of our commitments. As recently as Monday during his interview with the New York Daily News Editors, he said:

"We have a treaty with South Korea. The South Koreans have done an outstanding job in building up their own military capability, defending their economy, and they are a loyal ally.

"I think it is important that we let them, as well as others, know that at least this Administration intends to live up to our signed obligations."

Q. Do you think Congress feels just as strongly about that, Mr. President?

A. "I would hope so. It would be, I think, a bad signal around the world if Congress indicated differently."

Additional Background Information:

As to our current support in Korea, we have approximately 38,000*troops in Korea, ~~and have appropriated (FY '75) \$120 million in military assistance and \$95mil in economic assistance.~~

*(including one infantry and three fighter squadrons).

FYI: For additional details on aid breakdowns, refer to State; for details on troop presence, refer to Department of Defense..

*We expect the F. Y. 75 mil. assistance to be close to \$145 million (the ceiling imposed by the Fraser Amend. to the Foreign Assistance Act).

Econ Aid \$ 95 mil. approximately
(75 mil in PL-480
range of \$20 mil development loan)

F.Y. 75
ONLY

CHINA-KOREA

Q: What is your view of Peking's support for Kim Il-song's efforts to reunify Korea by force, as was revealed during the North Korean leader's recent visit to China?

A: From my reading of the communique released at the conclusion of the Kim visit, the Chinese support a policy of the reunification of Korea by peaceful means.

The North Koreans should understand that any attempts on their part to raise tensions in Korea, much less to use force, will be met with the most firm response. We consider stability on the Peninsula, ~~and the development of a constructive dialogue between the two Korean governments,~~ to be crucial to the security and well-being of the countries in Northeast Asia.

Q. What is your reaction to a recent North Korean broadcast charging we are behind Park's anti-~~communist~~ communism drive and the U.S. is even talking about using nuclear weapons?

A. I am not ~~going~~ going to respond to that kind of thing. Let me say generally with respect to the situation there that



June 13, 1975

KOREA AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

BACKGROUND:

In an interview with columnist Robert Novak, President Park reportedly stated that Korea has the capability to go nuclear, but is not developing it and is honoring the NPT. However, he added "If the U.S. nuclear umbrella were to be removed, we have to start developing our nuclear capability to save ourselves."

* * * * *

The following guidance was prepared for State's June 12 press briefing:

Q. Do you have any comment on the reported statement of President Park that Korea may develop a nuclear weapon?

A. We have seen this report. I can only comment that the U.S. expects all NPT parties to observe their treaty commitments. Furthermore, the President's views on the U.S. commitments to Korea are well known.

FYI:

Korea is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which obligates a signator to use nuclear capability for peaceful purposes only. Safeguards under IAEA regulations are required. The NPT forbids all nuclear explosive devices for whatever purpose.

CHINA

Q. Doesn't Peking want you to break relations with Taiwan as a price for normalization?

A. I see no useful purpose served by speculation now about this and other questions that may come up in the future.

I look forward to holding wide-ranging discussions with senior leaders in Peking later this year on a broad range of issues, but there are no preconditions for my trip to the PRC and no prior commitments about the outcome of my visit.



CHINA

Q: Where do we stand in our relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan? Has Chiang Kai-shek's death altered our commitments on Taiwan?

A: There has been no change in our relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan as a result of the passing of Chiang Kai-shek.

Q: But what about our defense treaty with Taiwan?

A: As I said, we maintain all of our commitments.



CHINA

Q: In the President's news conference of May 6, Mr. Ford talked about "reaffirming our commitments to Taiwan" in the months ahead. Does this mean there has been a change in his policy toward Peking, the People's Republic of China?

A: Absolutely not. The President continues to believe that normalization of U.S.-PRC relations is a cardinal element of the Administration's foreign policy. He remains firmly committed to the Shanghai Communique, which sets the general direction of our China policy.

Q: Why didn't he mention his trip to Peking later this year as one of the things that would lead to additional progress in foreign policy? Is there some doubt now about his making a trip to China in 1975?

A: Absolutely not. As the President mentioned in his speech to the Congress on April 10, he looks forward to visiting the PRC later this year in order to seek ways of accelerating the normalization of U.S.-PRC relations.



Q: Why didn't the President mention the development of a new relationship with Peking as one of the major foreign policy accomplishments of the Republican Administration?

A: I can assure you he does consider the opening of a political dialogue with Peking, the signing of the Shanghai Communique, and the progress that has been made to date in improving U.S.- PRC relations to be among the major accomplishments of the ^{American} ~~Administration's~~ foreign policy. He considers it a central set of developments, vital to the evolution of more secure international relationships in the Asian region, and in the world.

Q: But what is the Administration's policy toward Taiwan (Formosa), the Republic of China?

A: As the President told the American Society of Newspaper Editors last month, we value our relations with Taiwan. We remain concerned about the security and stability of the island.

Q: But what if Peking demands that you drop your relations with Taiwan as a price for U.S.-PRC normalization?

A: Again, I don't want to get off into a speculative discussion on this issue. It would serve no constructive purpose.

THAILAND

June 19, 1975

WITHDRAWAL OF U. S. FORCES FROM THAILAND

The Washington Post reports today that the U. S. will withdraw another 87 planes and 4,000 troops from Thailand by the end of June. They refer to this withdrawal as a "stepped up schedule" which, in fact, it is not. It is part of the mutually agreed upon reduction of 7,500 U. S. positions in Thailand by about the end of June.

Q. Have the Thais asked us to step up our schedule for the withdrawal of U. S. forces from Thailand?

A. No. The current reductions are part of the mutually agreed upon draw-down negotiated over a year ago. We continue to be in close consultation with the Thai on our presence in Thailand and, of course, we are keeping the situation under review.

U.S. ROLE IN LAOS

Q: What is the U.S. role going to be in this new situation in Laos? Will we continue to provide aid? Will we terminate diplomatic relations? Is Ambassador-designate Stone still going to go to Vientiane?

A: We are reviewing the situation in Laos. Until recently we had been providing military and economic aid to the Government on the understanding it was a neutral government in a neutral country.

We cannot accept harrassment of personnel. As you know, we will be terminating our AID Mission in Laos by the end of the month. We will then decide how to proceed in the future. We are watching the situation closely and will make our determination as it evolves.

Q: Should we not be evacuating Americans from Laos, especially in view of the recent anti-American demonstration in Vientiane?

A: We are at present thinning out U.S. personnel in Laos. We will have reduced total numbers from about 1100 in April to about 30 by the end of June. We do not now foresee any need for an evacuation. It depends, obviously, on how the situation evolves.

North Vietnamese-U. S. Diplomatic Relations

Q: The North Vietnamese have proposed diplomatic relations with the U. S. and called for the U. S. to provide aid to Vietnam. Do you have plans to do either of these?

A: We have no plans to establish diplomatic relations with North Vietnam or to provide any type of aid to them.

THAILAND

Q: The Thai Ambassador to the U. S. has been recalled to Bangkok for consultations and the Thai Government is reassessing its relations with the U. S. with a view toward having all U. S. troops out of Thailand in a year. Will the U. S. comply with the Thai wishes and what is the Administration reaction to the Thai reassessment?

A: The reassessment is being conducted by the Thai for their own purposes and we would of course have no comment on that. As I have said before, we are in continuous consultation with the Thai about matters of mutual interest, among them the U. S. troop presence which is in Thailand at the invitation of the government.

FYI: We are reducing our troop presence in Thailand from 27,000 to about 19,000 by June 30, 1975. As you will recall from past guidance, this reduction has been planned since 1974 and therefore predates the recent events in Indochina.

Q: Have we been requested to reduce our forces?

A: We have had one set of negotiations with the Thai resulting in a 7500-man reduction.

As we said before, we are ready and willing to negotiate further reductions with the Thai, and at present that is where the matter stands.

FYI ONLY. We have not been asked to have all our troops out by next year, but a public statement to this effect from the White House may provoke a Thai reaction.

MAY 8, 75

M. I. A. 's

Q. On May 7 the President issued a proclamation terminating the Vietnam "era" and ending special benefits for those in military service. How does this affect the status of men still listed as MIA in Indochina?

A. As the President said in his statement accompanying this proclamation, this determination in no way affects the eligibility for benefits of those who served during the Vietnam war. It has no effect on the status of any unaccounted for men nor their eligibility for military benefits. Nor does it in any way affect our continuing efforts to account for our missing men throughout Indochina. This remains a personal concern of the President, and the Administration is making continuing efforts to resolve this grave humanitarian problem. Our commitment on this problem remains as strong as ever.

FYI ONLY: We're seeking information on 2,300 men (from earlier Indochina conflict).

TOTAL NO. MILITARY MEN MISSING	870
TOTAL U. S. CIVILIANS MISSING	30
LEGALLY DEAD, BUT UNACCOUNTED FOR:	1,400



AMERICANS IN VIETNAM

Q. Are there not still Americans being held prisoner in Vietnam? What are we doing now to get them released?

A. We know that there are eight Americans who were captured at Ban Me Thuot in early March and are being held prisoner. We are continuing efforts to obtain their release. We are also aware of private efforts being carried out by missionary organizations for whom some of these people worked. A number of Congressmen have written to representatives of the other side in Paris seeking information on these people. To date, we have received no response to our approaches and we are not aware of any responses to these other efforts.

We, of course, are continuing our efforts to account for our MIA's and recovering the remains of those men we know to have died. We are checking into the possibility of other U.S. citizens who may be unaccounted for and who may be held against their will.

Q. First, do our efforts involve contacts with the PRG? Second, can you tell us exactly who is missing and under what circumstances?

A. For detailed replies to questions on who is missing, you should go to the Department of State. As to diplomatic contacts, you are

aware, of course, that these cannot be discussed, especially in this delicate situation where lives are at stake.

June 23, 1975

STARVATION IN CAMBODIA

Q. There are press reports of potential large scale starvation in Cambodia. Can you confirm this, and will the U. S. do anything to help?

A. We have no precise information on the present food situation in Cambodia. It is, therefore, difficult to say what is happening or to predict what will happen. The Cambodians have not asked us for assistance, and as you know, we do not have diplomatic relations with them.

LATIN AMERICA

June 22, 1975

CUBA POLICY

Q: Last week Castro announced Cuba would return a \$2 million hijacking ransom. Secretary Kissinger has acknowledged a change in the tone of Cuban statements and that the Cubans have taken some limited steps which the US Government regards as positive. The Secretary also indicated that the US is prepared to reciprocate Cuban moves. Do you regard these moves by the Cubans as evidence of a change in Castro's attitude. Will the US begin to take action to resolve our differences with Castro?

A: We have said repeatedly that we would be willing to consider changing our policy toward Cuba when we see evidence of a real change in Cuban attitudes and policies toward us. We welcome the return of the ransom money which was paid by Southern Airways. I would note, however, that the OAS sanctions remain in effect and we continue to respect them. It is possible that the question of the Cuban sanctions may be addressed next month at a meeting in Costa Rica that will be dealing with amendments to the Rio Treaty, including an amendment relating to the vote necessary to lift sanctions in general. Should the Cuba sanctions be modified, we would then consider our own position in terms of Cuba's actions and policies, but there would be no automatic change in US policy toward Cuba.

Q: Will the US support OAS action to lift the sanctions next month?

A: As I said, it is possible that the problem of the Cuba sanctions might be addressed at the meeting in Costa Rica next month. Until we see just how the matter is presented, it would be difficult to state what our position might be. We are hopeful that any resolution would be one that the US could support.

OAS Cuban Sanctions

- Q:** There have been reports that the U. S. has welcomed the more forthcoming position taken recently by Premier Castro of Cuba and that a resolution of the impasse over lifting OAS sanctions is in sight. Are we preparing to take action to resolve our differences with Castro? Will the U. S. support OAS action to lift the sanctions when the subject is considered next month?
- A:** During the OAS meetings which were held recently in Washington, the subject of OAS sanctions on Cuba was among those considered. The foreign ministers decided that a meeting should be called in July in San Jose, Costa Rica, for the purpose of drafting amendments to the Rio Treaty. Since one of the amendments relates to the vote necessary for lifting sanctions, the meeting is likely also to address the problem of the Cuba sanctions. The U. S. plans to support the amendment that sanctions can be lifted by majority votes. I want to make clear, however, that the action being considered by the OAS would simply terminate the obligatory nature of the sanctions and would have no effect on U. S. sanctions on bilateral trade and contact with Cuba.

DELENTE

DETENTE

Q: Mr. President, in light of recent events on the international scene, notably in Vietnam, Portugal and the Middle East, how do you see our relations with the Soviet Union developing? Are US-Soviet relations entering a cooling period?

A: From the outset of my Administration, I have stressed my commitment to working for improved relations with the Soviet Union in the interests of world peace. The effort to achieve a more constructive relationship with the USSR expresses the continuing desire of the vast majority of the American people for easing international tensions and reducing the chances of war while at the same time safeguarding our vital interests and our security. Such an improved relationship is in our real national interest.

On April 10, I observed that during this process, we have had no illusions. We know that we are dealing with a nation that reflects different principles and is our competitor in many parts of the globe. We will never permit detente to become a license to fish in troubled waters. Nor shall we overlook that Soviet arms were used in the conquest of Indochina.

Through a combination of firmness and flexibility, however, the United States has in recent years laid the basis of a more reliable relationship based on mutual interest and mutual restraint. Only last November, at Vladivostok, General Secretary Brezhnev and I

