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11- The Com cut in aid to ~~Korea~~

A- Totally CONTRADICTORY to the
Commitment we've made to
The modernization of
Korean forces. Hope to

9/25/74

see the amount restored.



9. Do you have any reaction to the call by a large number of Korean opposition leaders for the President to reconsider his trip to Korea because it would be seen as supporting the repressive regime of President Park?

Guidance: The President accepted the invitation to visit Korea because Korea is one of our long standing allies and the United States has important security interests in Korea. It was on this basis and not upon internal Korean political factors that the President made the decision that it was in our national interest for him to visit Korea and have discussions with President Park and other Korean leaders.

11/11/74

FYI: If really pushed on the matter of repression in Korea, you should say that the State Department has said in the past that we have made clear to the Korean Government our views on the question of human rights and we will continue to do so but whatever maybe our different points of view on this subject, the existence of an independent self-reliant Republic of Korea is a key element of U.S. efforts to maintain stability and security in ~~the~~ East Asia.
End FYI.

1. Do you have any reaction to the ~~Korean release of five Americans~~ ~~imprisoned there?~~ Did the United States pressure Korea for this release?

11/15/74

Guidance: We, of course, welcome this announcement which we are sure will please the men involved and their families. This was an action of the Korean Government and other details will have to come from the Koreans.

FYI: You should refer to State any questions about the Koreans detaining an American priest. State is the proper place to address such details. End FYI. Korea aware of the priest news on

Internal selection
is considered. Free
press reading it was in National Interest!
to go

Human rights. Imp allie. US Pres

7. Is the President going to send any kind of ^{congratulatory} ~~Congressional~~ letter to ~~President Park of Korea~~ on the outcome of the referendum today?

2/13/75

GUIDANCE: There is no letter planned, in as much as the referendum was an internal matter for the Republic of Korea. The customary congressional letters are usually sent when a head of state or government assumes office or wins an election to office.



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May 7, 1975

KOREA

Q. How does the President intend to strengthen ties with South Korea? Does he have a new policy or any specific new commitments planned?

A. The President's statement last night was a reaffirmation of similar statements made in his speech to the Congress and subsequently on the steadfastness of our commitments to our allies. We have a defense treaty with South Korea ratified by the Congress. The President was conveying to South Korea the firmness of our commitment, and to North Korea our intention to meet any of their attempts to raise tensions in the area with a very firm response.

May 8, 1975

MEETING WITH THE SPEAKER OF
THE SOUTH KOREAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
CHUNG IL-KWON

PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT

The President met this morning with the Speaker of the South Korean National Assembly Chung Il-Kwon. This courtesy call by the Speaker gave the President an opportunity to reassure South Korea of the solidity of our security commitment to Korea. While in Washington the Speaker has also met with the Vice President, Secretary Kissinger and members of the House and Senate leadership. Following his Washington visit Speaker Chung and 6 National Assemblymen will continue on to France, Germany, and Japan. The purpose of the South Korean trip is to review matters of mutual interest and concern to Korea and its allies on national security, economic, and political issues.

May 8, 1975

MEETING WITH THE SPEAKER OF
THE SOUTH KOREAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
CHUNG IL-KWON

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

Speaker Chung is visiting Washington, heading a delegation of six National Assemblymen, to ascertain first-hand the firmness of the U.S. security commitment to South Korea. While here, he will also see Secretary Kissinger, Speaker Albert, and Senators Hugh Scott and John Sparkman. After Washington, he is continuing on to France, Germany and Japan.

In the wake of Indochina, we have given Seoul several strong reassurances on our security commitment. The President specifically reaffirmed that commitment in his State of the World address.

Speaker Chung is one of the leading political figures in South Korea. He was Prime Minister from 1964 to 1970, Ambassador to the U.S. from 1961 to 1963 and Army Chief of Staff during the Korean War.

8, 1975

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ARTHUR GOLDBERG

PRE
PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT

To be announced or volunteered at the Thursday, May 8, 1975 press briefing:

The President will meet this afternoon at 5:00 p. m. with Arthur Goldberg, former US Ambassador to the United Nations. The meeting will provide the President with an opportunity to review the course of our Middle East negotiations with Mr. Goldberg with whom he has not met privately as President. Secretary Kissinger will also attend the meeting.

There will be a White House photo at the beginning of the meeting.

BACKGROUND

F. Y. I. As the US Ambassador to the United Nations during the 1968 war and passage of UN Security Council Resolution 242, Mr. Goldberg has followed the Middle East problem with keen interest. (At one time, he proposed to the USSR and Egypt a draft UN resolution calling for Israel to withdraw from all occupied territory in exchange for non-belligerency. It was rejected by the Arabs who were at that time unwilling to accept Israel.) He is very concerned over the present situation and has been pressing for a meeting with you to present his views. He is, naturally, in close touch with Israeli leaders and influential in the American Jewish community.

May 9, 1975

KOREA

Q. How strong is the United States' commitment to Korea?
Would the United States engage American troops if
North Korea invaded South Korea?

A. As you know, the President met yesterday with
Chung Il-Kwon and gave him strong reassurances of our
security commitment to Korea, a commitment he specifically
reaffirmed in his Message to Congress April 10.

We have a defense treaty with South Korea, ratified
by the Congress, and as the President has stated "We
want our friends to know that we will stand by them,
and we want our potential adversaries to know that we
will stand up to them." (May 6 Press Conference).

Those statements should convey to North Korea
our intention to respond firmly should they attempt to
raise tensions in the area.

May 12, 1975

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Q. What is the U.S. legal commitment to South Korea?

A. The ROK has a Mutual Defense Treaty with the U. S. which provides that an armed attack on either party "would be dangerous to. . . . (the) peace and security" of the other and that each country would "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." A Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, and a Status of Forces Agreement are also in effect.

With other countries Korea has a Treaty of June 22, 1965, which normalized the ROK's relations with Japan, i. e., established diplomatic relations.

May 13, 1975

SOUTH KOREAN NEW EMERGENCY MEASURES

BACKGROUND USE ONLY:

In South Korea on May 13 new emergency measures were proclaimed which would prohibit advocacy of constitutional reform, all student political activity, spreading of rumors, and news reporting of any of the foregoing. The penalty for disobedience is a sentence by civilian courts of a minimum of one year.

We are not sure if this applies to U.S. newsmen; however, U.S. media outlets in Korea are staffed by Korean nationals, for the most part. It is the view of the Korean government that their nationals come under their law in cases like this.

The following guidance has been approved for State Department's use at briefings today. I believe that we should stay fairly close to their language since it has been approved by the Secretary.

Q. Do you have a comment on the emergency measures?

A. We would have no comment. As in the past we were informed by the Korean Government very shortly before the promulgation of the emergency measures.

Q. Were we consulted in advance?

A. No, not in advance.

Q. What do you believe prompted the Korean action?

A. The government of the Republic of Korea feels in light of the international situation that its security is threatened.

Q. What is the U.S. government's view of the security situation in Korea?

A. We do not believe there has been a fundamental change in the security situation in Korea. As you know, we have on a number of occasions recently reaffirmed our security relationship with the Republic of Korea.

Q. What is the U.S. position on human rights? Is this new curtailment justified?

A. The U.S. position on human rights is well known.

FYI ONLY: Do not go beyond the above response.

NOTE: Where possible, it is preferable that questions be referred to State.

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May 21, 1975

SOUTH KOREAN RESOLUTION

Background Information:

The Washington Post today reports that South Korea has called on the United States to demonstrate its resolve to support Korea in the event of attack by providing adequate levels of assistance and troop presence: the Korean National Assembly declared a national resolve "to resolutely crush any provocation or invasion by North Korea." The statement said events in Indochina have had a heavy effect on the balance of power in Asia and together with North Korean statements and maneuvering created "new tension" on the Korean peninsula.

We hope the United States... will demonstrate by deeds its firm determination not to commit the same failure on the Korean peninsula as it did on the Indochinese peninsula," the resolution said. "Without such a demonstration, the United States will lose all credibility in its foreign commitments and this will lead to a debacle in world peace and order."

The Assembly's resolution was passed on the final day of a special four-day session convened for this purpose.

Q. What is the President's reaction to the South Korean National Assembly Resolution calling for a reaffirmation of U.S. support for Korea? What support do we currently provide for Korea?

A. We have read the reports of the resolution. As you know, the President has reaffirmed in recent weeks our support for Korea and our resolve to maintain all of our commitments. As recently as Monday during his interview with the New York Daily News Editors, he said:

"We have a treaty with South Korea. The South Koreans have done an outstanding job in building up their own military capability, defending their economy, and they are a loyal ally.

"I think it is important that we let them, as well as others, know that at least this Administration intends to live up to our signed obligations."

Q. Do you think Congress feels just as strongly about that, Mr. President?

A. "I would hope so. It would be, I think, a bad signal around the world if Congress indicated differently."

Additional Background Information:

As to our current support in Korea, we have approximately 38,000* troops in Korea, and have appropriated (FY '75) \$120 million in military assistance and \$95mil* in economic assistance.

*(including one infantry and three fighter squadrons).

FYI: For additional details on aid breakdowns, refer to State; for details on troop presence, refer to Department of Defense.

* We expect the F. Y. 75 mil. assistance to be close to \$145 million (the ceiling imposed by the Fraser Amend. to the Foreign Assistance Act).

Econ Aid \$ 95 mil. approximately
(\$75 mil in PL-480
range of \$20 mil development loan)

June 13, 1975

KOREA AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

BACKGROUND:

In an interview with columnist Robert Novak, President Park reportedly stated that Korea has the capability to go nuclear, but is not developing it and is honoring the NPT. However, he added "If the U.S. nuclear umbrella were to be removed, we have to start developing our nuclear capability to save ourselves."

* * * * *

The following guidance was prepared for State's June 12 press briefing:

Q. Do you have any comment on the reported statement of President Park that Korea may develop a nuclear weapon?

A. We have seen this report. I can only comment that the U.S. expects all NPT parties to observe their treaty commitments. Furthermore, the President's views on the U.S. commitments to Korea are well known.

FYI:

Korea is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which obligates a signator to use nuclear capability for peaceful purposes only. Safeguards under IAEA regulations are required, The NPT forbids all nuclear explosive devices for whatever purpose.

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 146713
 E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MCAF, KS, KN, US

SUBJECT: SECDEF PRESS CONFERENCE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

I. IF ASKED YOU MAY CONFIRM THAT INTERCHANGE BELOW TOOK PLACE DURING JUNE 20, 1975 SECDEF PRESS CONFERENCE. YOU SHOULD MAKE NO FURTHER COMMENT.

Q: WILL THE UNITED STATES USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA IF THEY INVADE SOUTH KOREA?

A: AS I INDICATED EARLIER, WE CANNOT FORECLOSE ANY OPTION. WE HAVE DEPLOYED IN KOREA THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS IS, I BELIEVE, WELL KNOWN. I THINK THAT IT WOULD DEPEND UPON THE JUDGMENT OF THE LEADERSHIP UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES BUT WE HAVE NOW GONE SINCE 1945 WITHOUT ANY NUCLEAR WEAPON BEING DETONATED IN ANGER AND WE WOULD STRONGLY HOPE THAT THAT HISTORICAL RECORD IS MAINTAINED. IF CIRCUMSTANCES WERE TO REQUIRE THE USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OF COURSE, I THINK THAT THAT WOULD BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED, BUT THE GROUND FORCES BALANCE IN THE KOREA PENINSULA IS NOT UNSATISFACTORY. SISCO
 BT

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

VANDERHYE

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June 30, 1975

KOREA AND THE UN PEACE KEEPING FORCE

Q: Why is the United States willing to see the UN Command disbanded? Doesn't this in fact destabilize the situation in Korea?

A: I would refer you to the State Department's remarks on the subject Friday -- that we are willing to see the UN High Command disbanded provided that there is a mechanism for maintaining the peace and preserving the Armistice.

FYI Only: Most of the UN troops are in fact Americans and Koreans and the disbanding of the UN Command does not signal any reduction in U.S. force or presence in Korea. The UN General Assembly Resolution 3333 which deals with specifications and jurisdictions of the UN Command is a highly complex document involving several countries. For this reason, we are advised that any further questions on the Command or the Resolution be referred to State.

June 23, 1975

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN KOREA

FYI: Attached is a cable with guidance on Schlesinger's comments on nuclear weapons in Korea.

If asked what the President's policy is, you should say that the United States maintains contingency plans for any situation that may arise, but we do not anticipate the circumstances such as were hypothesized in the Secretary's news conference on Friday.

KOREA

Q: Yesterday two Administration officials testified that we had earlier warnings that the North Koreans might try to provoke an incident over the tree in the Joint Security area. If this is so, why were we not better prepared to protect our men on August 18th?

A: I have not had an opportunity to review the testimony of the two officials yesterday and I think it would be more appropriate for you to check ~~with the State and Defense Departments~~ with the State and Defense Departments for such historic detail.

Q: Why did the Administration decide that no report had to be provided to Congress under the War Powers Act?

A: This question was studied very carefully by the lawyers at State and Defense and here at the White House and it was their conclusion that the reporting provisions of the War Powers Act were not applicable in this incident.

FYI: Regarding the entire subject of Korea, you should indicate the position that the incident is over as far as the White House is concerned and that follow-up questions of historic detail should be referred to State and Defense. Officials from each Department testified publicly on the Hill yesterday and the State Department released a legal memorandum regarding the War Powers Act.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF AGREEMENT WITH
NORTH KOREANS ON THE DMZ

Guidance:

The State Department issued a statement yesterday regarding the signature of a new agreement with the North Koreans governing the security of personnel operating within the Joint Security Area of the DMZ. The State Department noted that the new agreement "follows a North Korean expression of regret for the incident, and hopefully will prevent a recurrence of such unprovoked attacks." We have nothing to add to the statement issued yesterday.

We believe This ^{concession by North Korea} ~~agreement~~ accomplishes our objective of assuring the security of our personnel in the JSA.

Human Rights in Korea

Q: In his debate with Governor Carter, President Ford said that he had personally raised the human rights question with President Park. Can you tell us when the President has addressed this question with President Park?

Q: During his November 22, 1974 meeting with President Park in Seoul, the President raised the human rights issue with President Park. Subsequently, Ambassador Sneider, Secretary Kissinger and other Cabinet officers have discussed this subject with senior Republic of Korea officials. Most recently in ^{an} August 30 note the Secretary of State on behalf of the President and pursuant to Section 412 of the Security Assistance Act of 1976-1977 asked the South Korean Ambassador to call to the attention of the highest level of the Korean Government the concern of the U.S. Congress on the human rights situation.

U. S. POLICY ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA

A: The United States has fundamental national interests in the preservation of peace in Korea and stability in Northeast Asia. We cannot run away from our responsibility for helping maintain peace without great risk of sparking a dangerous conflict.

 Because the basic interests of the Peoples Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and our close ally, Japan, all converge in Northeast Asia, stability in Korea is the most critical aspect of maintaining equilibrium in Asia. A U. S. failure to live up to our defense commitment in Korea would have a profound effect on Japanese perceptions of its own security and of the value of the U. S. - Japan Mutual Security Treaty. The impact on Asian and world politics would be disastrous.

 Since 1953, our security treaty and the U. S. presence in the Republic of Korea have prevented the renewal of hostilities. Within the framework of our Mutual Defense Treaty, we have been the ultimate guarantor of the security of the ROK and of peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

 We will therefore maintain our support for the defense capabilities of South Korea as it moves toward self-sufficiency.

We will always carefully examine our force presence there, but at the present time, we have no plans for further significant reductions.

Future reductions would depend on a number of important considerations and involve assessments which must be made with the greatest care. The military balance is affected not only by the modernization of South Korea's forces but also by the often ignored growth in North Korea's offensive capabilities. We must also consider the intentions of North Korea. Our decisions on troop levels must also take into account the possible reactions of Japan, the Soviet Union and China and their perceptions of what future reductions may imply regarding the U. S. role in Korea and throughout Asia.

November 22, 1976

LAIRD'S STATEMENT ON TROOP WITHDRAWALS: KOREA

The Washington Post today quoted former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird as saying he favored withdrawal of U. S. ground forces from South Korea. Mr. Laird also said he would have completed this process of withdrawal during his tenure at Defense but for the opposition of Dr. Kissinger and the National Security Council.

I do not think it is appropriate to comment on positions taken by private American citizens. Nor do I think it is appropriate to comment on the individual positions taken by American officials on specific issues at various times. President Ford's policy towards Korea and our defense relationship with that country has been reiterated on numerous occasions and I do not think it is necessary to repeat this position at this time.

[We do not wish to award too much significance to Laird's statements. If pressed on current US policy on troop withdrawals from Korea, you may draw from the attached statement].

KIM SANG-KUN CASE

Q: Does the President have any comment on the two statements made by the South Koreans--one in respect to news reports of bugging of the Blue House and the other in respect to their inability to obtain access to Kim Sang-Kun?

A: As the State Department indicated yesterday, we have conveyed to the South Korean Government our view that these statements were not helpful.

Q: How did we convey that view?

A: I am just not in a position to get into that. We are in touch with the Koreans pretty steadily throughout all of this.

Q: Why haven't we given the Korean Government the opportunity to see Kim Sang-Kun and hear for themselves that he wants to stay in the U. S. ?

A: He chose freely to seek to remain in this country, and the Korean Government has been informed of that fact. And he is aware that they would like to have access to him, and he has made it clear that he does not wish them to have access to him, and we have made that clear to the Koreans.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: RON NESSEN
FROM: LES JANKA *for*
SUBJECT: Morning Press Items

1. Taiwan- Nuclear Reprocessing:

Guidance: We will not comment on leaked intelligence reports. I suggest you check with State Department on details of our Nuclear cooperation program with ROC.

F.Y.I. ONLY : The stories are not true: we have no evidence Taiwan is reprocessing Nuclear fuel. State will put story down, which is very complex, but do so in a way which constitutes a strong warning to Taiwan not to fool with fuel.

2. Uranium Price fixing?

Guidance: The matter is under investigation by the Justice Department. Refer questions to Justice.

3. Korea - human rights?

Question: Sec. 412 of the Security Assistance Bill, signed on June 30, requires the President to convey to Korea in 60 days the strong concern of Congress over human rights abuses in Korea. Did you met the Aug. 30 deadline?

Guidance: This Congressional mandate has been carried out by the Department of State, but I am not going to discuss the details of our communications with Korea on this subject.

F.Y.I. : Refer to State any questions about a follow up to the meeting Saturday of the Military Armistice Commission. It was agreed to meet at a lower level to work out details of separating UN and North Korean forces in the Joint Security Area.

*The General has cleared.
He suggests you say that you understand
State is taking expressing the views
on this today.*

US-KOREAN ALTERCATION

More than a dozen North Korean guards kicked and punched an American officer and sergeant outside a building in the truce compound of Panmunjom where the Korean Military Armistice Commission was meeting yesterday. There are records of other similar incidents prior to this one but the press coverage may provoke several questions on U. S. reaction. State will use the following guidance and we may wish to follow their line closely if not to refer questions to them.

Q: What are the views of the Department on the incident at Panmunjom yesterday in which an American officer was beaten by North Koreans?

A: We are seriously concerned by this incident and the injury to Major Henderson. We are instructing the United Nations Command to protest through appropriate Military Armistice Commission channels these unprovoked actions of the North Koreans at Panmunjom. I would refer you to the Department of Defense for details of the incidents and information on the condition of Major Henderson.

Q: Does this incident reflect any change in North Korean intentions?

A: I do not wish to speculate on this.

Kissinger's Korea Proposal

Q: Yesterday Secretary Kissinger called for four power talks between the two Koreas, the US and PRC, to discuss the Korean issue. Is this a new proposal? What would the four power talks accomplish?

A: No, the idea of a four power conference was first proposed by Secretary Kissinger at the opening of last year's UN General Assembly.

The proposal calls for new negotiations to discuss the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and to discuss a new legal basis for the existing armistice, or to replace the existing armistice with a more permanent agreement.

To sum up, our proposals are:

"first, we urge a resumption of a serious discussions between North and South Korea.

Second, if North Korea's allies are prepared to improve their relations with South Korea, then and only then, will we be prepared to take similar steps towards North Korea.

Third, we continue to support proposals that the United Nations open its doors to full membership for South and North Korea without prejudice to their eventual reunification.

Finally, we are prepared to negotiate a new basis for the armistice or to replace it with more permanent arrangements in any form acceptable to all the parties."

Q: Where would this conference take place?

A: We have proposed that the U. S. , South Korea, North Korea and the PRC meet during the September session of the UNGA in New York. But we are ready to consider some other mutually agreeable place, and are willing to begin immediate discussions on issues of procedure and place.

KOREA REPORT

Q: What can you tell us about the report sent to Congress on U.S. force levels in Korea?

A: The Security Assistance Act of 1976-1977 added a new Section 668, which required the President to transmit ^{IN 90 DAYS} to the Speaker of the House and to the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services a report which reviewed the security situation in Korea. The report reviews the progress of the ROK's Armed Forces Modernization Program and reports on the U.S. role on Mutual Security efforts in Korea, and on prospects for a phased reduction of U.S. armed forces in the ROK.

The report discusses the complex factors involved in any consideration of a reduction of our forces. It notes that there is currently a rough military balance on the Peninsula. The paper concludes that we will maintain our support for the defense capabilities of South Korea as it moves toward self-sufficiency and, in this context, we will continue to examine our force presence with a view toward further adjustments as they become appropriate.

FYI: IT IS UP TO CONGRESS
TO RELEASE THE REPORT.
IT IS NOT CLASSIFIED.

11. Do you have any comment on the Crosby Noyes column yesterday which ~~questioned the wisdom of the President making a trip to Japan and Korea at this time?~~ Can you tell us why the President feels it is useful to visit Japan and Korea at this time ?

Guidance: It is not my practice to comment on the views of individual columnists.

FYI: If pushed on why the President is going to Japan and Korea you could simply point out that the President considers our close relationship with Japan to be of vital importance to the United States. Japan is one of the most important countries in the world and one of our strongest allies and the President sees his trip as symbolizing and strengthening this close relationship and he looks forward to discussing with the Japanese leadership areas of US-Japanese cooperation on the common global problems we both face. Similarly, Korea is a long-standing ally where the United States has important security interests and the President believes that it was in our national interest to accept the invitation to visit Korea and have talks with the Korean leadership about the security situation in Asia and other problems of mutual concern to our two countries.

Russia

VIETNAM, SOUTH KOREA UN MEMBERSHIP

Q: Can you comment on the State Department announcement that we will veto UN membership applications of the two Vietnams if South Korea is not admitted?

A: We are prepared to support the membership of all three of these states. However, we will not be a party to attempts to admit one state while excluding another. To do otherwise would be in direct violation of the principle of universality upon which the U.N. was founded. Therefore, the United States will continue to support the candidacy of South Korea and will vote against any proposal that does not include them.

POLITICAL IMPACT OF VISIT TO KOREA

Q: Why did you go to Korea at this time? You gave the impression that you were supporting a dictator against the legitimate democratic aspirations of his people. Did you make clear to the Korean Government our views on human rights?

A: I went to Korea in order to reaffirm the long-standing American commitment to the defense of South Korea and to the stability of Northeast Asia. I believe that commitment is as important now as it ever was and that I should not have missed the opportunity to reaffirm it in person.

The Korean Government knows our views on human rights. We have made those views clear many times.

Press ~~REDACTED~~ GUIDANCE

Q: Were there any shots fired?

A: No.

Q: Were the U.S. people armed?

A: Yes, they carried regular weapons which are pistols.

Q: Were there any North Korean casualties?

A: There are no reports of North Koreans killed or injured.

Q: How did the fight end?

A: The work party was able to fight their way back to the vehicle and leave the area.

Q: How long did the fight last?

A: About 20 minutes.
