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10/1/74

6. Do you have any comment on Senator Aiken's statement that he expects. President Ford to resume relations with Cuba after the November election?

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<u>Guidance</u>: I have nothing to add to what the President said in his August 28 Press Conference. As you also know, a resolution has been approved by the OAS calling for consideration of the Cuba sanctions question. There will be a meeting of the OAS Foreign Ministers in Quito in November to discuss the issue. During this OAS process, we will continue to consult with other governments in the Hemisphere regarding their views. 7. Yesterday one of the participants in the President's meeting with the Spanish-Speaking Americans said the President opposes an OAS lifting of the embargo against Cuba. Will the U.S. vote against the lifting of the embargo at the OAS meeting in Ecuador?

10/18/74

Guidance: First, let me suggest that you look carefully at the transcript of Messrs. Casanova's and De Baca's remarks here yesterday. With regard to the U.S. position in the OAS meeting in Quito, I can tell you that we have not yet decided here to vote at the consultations we are now holding with the OAS members, the nature of the resolution converted at the Ouite meeting and the 2. Can you confirm reports that Cuba has offered the exchange of an alleged CIA Officer for a Puerto Rican nationalist now in prison in the United States?

GUIDANCE: I have no comment on those reports.

1/23/15

FYI ONLY: We are aware of the offer and it is under study within the Administration.

Did the President approve the State Department's changing the travel 2. restrictions of the Cuban UN Delegation? Does this signal a change of U.S. policy toward Cuba?

118/75

Guidance: The administrative action taken by the Department of State with regard to travel restrictions on the Cuban UN delegation represents no change in U.S. policy toward Cuba. The President was aware of these actions which were taken by the Department of State and I would refer you to the Department for any additional questions.

FYI: State will say that these actions were taken merely to bring the Cuban Delegation's restrictions into line with most other Communist delegations. <u>END FYI.</u>

4. Don't Sec. Kissinger's remarks on Cuba Saturday indicate a change in U.S. position from the President's speech in Miami the previous Wednesday?

3/3/75 <u>GUIDANCE</u>: Both the President and Sec. Kissinger have been very clear on the point that fundamental change is going to depend essentially on Cuba's demonstration of a readiness to assume a mutuality of obligations. We have indicated in various ways that we are serious in our intent to review our policy depending upon Cuba's actions and upon the decisions of the OAS by whose sanctions we feel bound by international law.

CUBA

Castro offered to enter into discussions with the U.S. if it will lift its ban on selling foodstuffs and medicines to Cuba. What is the **President's** reaction to this offer?

We have seen the reports of Prime Minister Castro's news conference and notehis recognition of the mutuality of obligation which any change in the status of our relations would involve. Of course, from our side the OAS sanctions remain in effect unless or until that organization takes formal action to lift them. As we have stated before, we see no virtue in perpetual antagonism between the U.S. and Cuba, but there are significant areas of difference between us which remain.

With regard to the operation of the embargo relating to medicines and footstuffs, I refer you to the State Department.

Do you consider this to be a signal?

Q:

A:

Q:

A:

I do not want to characterize it one way or another, the tone of it appears to be a serious one and that is a good thing.

U.S. POLICY TOWARDS OAS CUBA SANCTIONS

- Q. In his interview with L'Express the President said that whatever the decision of the OAS on sanctions atainst Cuba our attitude is that "we will continue the boycott by the U.S. until there is some change in policy by Cuba toward the United States." Premier Fidel Castro has indicated a willingness to seek improvement of relations with the U.S.; therefore what changes would the President like to see in Cuba's policy and attitude?
- A. U.S. policy has been and continues to be that any change in U.S. -Cuban relations depends upon the willingness of the Cuban government to demonstrate by concrete policy changes of its own that it seeks an improvement in relations with the United States. To date, we see no indications of such constrained.

CUBA

Can you comment on Premier Castro's move to release a 2 million ran som paid by Southern Airways for the return of a plane highjacked in 1972? How would you characterize this move by Castro? Does it indicate a change or improvement in relations between Cuba and the United States?

We welcome this move by Cuba: we have been trying to recover this ransom fee for several years this ugh the Swiss Embassy in Havana. It is difficult to assess or to characterize a gesture such as this. We do feel that such moves should be negotiated through governments, rather than simply announced or made through communications with individual Senators. To understand the basic attitudes and policies of the Cuban government we need direct contact and evidence of their willingness to improve relations with the United States.

Α.

Q.

CUBA

Q. How do you reconcile the President's statements to Pierre Salinger which see no change in Cuban attitude, with the Secretary's comments on Monday that we have noted that Castro has moderated his tone and taken some steps?

A.

I can assure you there is no difference between the Secretary and the President on this issue. They have discussed it together often and understand each other fully. They are both saying that our policies and actions will depend on those of the Cuban Government. Beyond that, the President was talking about basic policies and attitudes, while the Secretary was referring to Cuban statements and to specific gestures. Of course, the OAS sanctions still remain in effect. Should those sanctions be lifted, we would have to consider our own position in terms of Cuba's actions.

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Costa lica

IF ASKED Title: Noon Briefing Paper BUREAU: ARA July 14, 1975

Subject: OAS Meeting in San Jose

- Q: Who is heading the U.S. delegation to the San Jose meeting and what do you expect to happen there?
- A: Ambassador William S. Mailliard, U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS, will head the U.S. Delegation to the OAS Conference scheduled to meet in San Jose, Costa Rica, July 16-28. (Delegation list attached). The purpose of the meeting is to consider and approve proposed amenements. to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, better known as the Bin Treaty. The San Jose meeting arose out of 2 years of work by a special OAS committee which studied reforms of the Inter-American system including an effort to strengthen and give greater flexibility to the hemispheric security treaty.

Among the principal proposed amendments to be considered at San Jose are:

1. making it possible to lift sanctions by simple majority rather than by 2/3 vote as now required; (2) requiring prior approval from a state before measures may be taken on its behalf; (3) providing for the possibility of nonbinding sanctions and conciliatory steps as well as the existing obligatory sanctions.

Do we expect the sanctions on Cuba to be lifted in San Jose?

Once the proposed amendments to the Rio Treaty have been dealt with, there is a good possibility of an effort to deal with the Cuba sanctions question." Our attitude is to concerate in reaching a generally acceptable solution.
While we are not taking the lead in this matter, we have been engaged in consultations with other OAS members on how to handle this issue. I cannot anticipate the final outcome at this point.

ARA/PAF:KLMarshall:jz

Q:

A:

Clearances: USOAS - Mr. Moon ARA - Ambassador Ryan MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE washing 1798

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August 21, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RON NESSEN

FROM;

MARGI VANDERHYE

SUBJECT:

State Department Announcement on Third Country Sanctions Imposed by U.S. Against Gountries Trading with Cuba

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Attached is a copy of the planned statement to be issued today by the State Department spokesmen at their regular noon briefing. Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, Bill Rogers, will be on hand to answer additional and specific questions.

I have included for your use general Qs and As on the implications of lifting the sanctions against countries that trade with Cuba, as well as a brief background paper for your use.

From Vail you should respond to questions only on an if asked basis and refer all detailed or specific question to State.

STATEMENT BY DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN

The Organ of Consultation of the OAS, acting under the Rio Treaty, adopted a resolution on July 29 which allows cach member state to determine for itself the nature of its economic and diplomatic relations with the Government of Cuba. That action grew out of an earlier decision by the members of the OAS, on July 25, to adopt a Protocol of Amendment to the Rio Treaty which, once ratified, will lift sanctions by a simple majority vote.

In keeping with this action by the OAS, the U.S. is modifying the aspects of our Cuban denial policy which affects other countries. Effective today, August 21, 1975, it will be U.S. policy to grant licenses permitting transactions between U.S. subsidiaries and Cuba for trade in foreign-made goods when those subsidiaries are operating in countries where local law or policy favors trade with Cuba. Specific licenses will continue to be required in each case and they will remain subject to regulations concerning U.S. origin parts, components, strategic goods and technology.

In order to conform further with the OAS action, we are taking appropriate steps so that effective immediately countries which allow their ships or aircraft to carry goods to and from Cuba are not penalized by loss of U.S. bilateral assistance. We are initiating steps to modify regulations

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which deny bunkering in the United States to third country ships engaged in the Cuba trade. We will also seek legislation to climinate similar restrictions on Title I, PL 480 food sales to third countries.

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August 21, 1975

LIFTING OF THIRE COUNTRY RESTRICTIONS

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The State Department has announced the lifting of "third country 0: sanctions," or sanctions which the U.S. imposes against other countries that trade with Cuba. Did the President authorize this change?

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A:

- The President discussed this matter with Secretary Kissinger. As you are aware, the OAS member countries approved the the last month in San Jose a resolution to end mandatory sanctions against Cuba, freeing each government to determine whether to maintain relations with Cuba in accordance with its own particular national interests. Consistent with the OAS action at San Jose, we are modifying those aspects of our Cuban denial policy which penalize other countries that trade with Cuba. The lifting of these restrictions, however, does not affect our bilateral policy and prohibition against bilateral trade with Cuba.
- Is the lifting of sanctions intended, at least in part, as a sign to the Cubans of our desire to improve relations?

The decision should be seen within the context of the Inter-American system. The OAS recently resolved that each OAS member is free to determine whether to maintain relations with Cuba in accordance with its own particular national interests We supported the resolution. It would be inconsistent with the San Jose resolution to retain restrictions that penalize other countries exercising their freedom of choice.

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A:

Q:

A:

Q: Then this action should not be seen as a sign of U.S. readiness to begin negotiations with Cuba almed at normalizing relations?

This is not a U.S.-Cuban bilateral matter. It relates rather to U.S. relations with other countries of the world.

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<u>Does the President foresee a process of normalization of relations</u>, with Cuba beginning now that sanctions are no longer required and some aspects of the U.S. sanctions (i.e., those relating to third countries) are being modified?

We have said that we see no advantage to permanent antagonism between ourselves and Cuba, but that change in our bilateral policies toward Cuba will depend on Cuba's attitude and policies toward us. There are a number of outstanding and complex issues between us, and I wouldn't want to speculate on when or whether it might prove possible to begin to work out these issues.

RES'IRICTIONS ON TRADE WITH CUBA

Trade with Cuba has been governed by the Export Administration Regulations (Commerce) issued pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1969 and its predecessor act, the Export Control Act of 1949, and by the Foreign Assets Control Regulations (Treasury) issued pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act. Section 620 (a) (1) of the Foreign Assistance Act authorizes the President to maintain a total embargo upon all trade with Cuba.

The Commerce and Treasury regulations prohibit all unlicensed transactions between U.S. firms here and abroad with Cuba. Our general policy has been not to issue licenses for any transaction except for humanitarian reasons. We have made occasional exceptions in the past for U.S. subsidiaries abroad and for shipments to foreign embassies. In addition, our third-country restrictions prohibit the bunkering of foreign-flag ships in the Cuban trade and suspend aid or PL-480, Title I sales to countries that allow their ships to carry goods to and from Cuba. Other restrictions affect foreign companies using U.S.-origin parts and components and deny to ships calling at Cuban ports the right to carry U.S. Government-financed goods out of U.S. ports (NSAM 220).

Several countries have urged us to lift our restrictions on U.S. subsidiaries trading with Cuba (particularly Canada, Argentina, Mexico, Spain and Belgium). The prohibition of aid for countries that let their ships trade with Cuba also has been raised with us on a number of occasions, and the major shipping nations, in particular, are intermeted in a strange institution possibly from the second state of a second state of a

The licensing of American banks located abroad, whether incorporated outside the U.S. or a branch office of a bank incorporated in the U.S., will remain more restrictive than the licensing of non-banking firms. U.S. bank credits come within the Foreign Assets Control regulations and will be prohibited in the same manner as direct trade between U.S. companies within the U.S. and Cuba. Banking, by its nature, involves somewhat different issues, e.g., transfer of U.S. funds.

Background on the prohibition of shipments of food and medicine

It is our policy to prohibit all bilateral commercial transactions with Cuba. We have made some exceptions in instances when food or medicines are not available outside the U.S. For example, in 1974 we approved licenses for anti-cancer drugs since they could not be purchased from non-U.S. sources. We also permit gift parcels to be sent to Cuba. These normally contain food, medicine and clothing.

Implementation of the changes

With the exception of the restriction relating to PL-480, Title I assistance, the third-country sanctions can be modified by executive action. The Secretary of State has authority to waive the suspension

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of assistance (Foreign Assistance Act). The other changes can be effected by modifying current Executive regulations (Treasury and Commerce). State will be submitting new legislation to eliminate the prohibition against PL 480 Title I to countries whose ships and aircraft engage in the Cuba trade.

Bilateral sanctions remain in effect

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The modification of third-country sanctions will not affect direct U.S.-Cuba trade, which continues to be prohibited... That is a separate issue which would have to be considered, along with other issues, in the context of overall U.S.-Cuban relations.

CUBA: U.S. POLICIES, CONSTRAINTS, LIMITATIONS

- Q. Yesterday you were asked what the geographical limits of Cuban adventurism are according to U.S. policy. Can you expand on that?
- A. The President and Secretary Kissinger have both said flatly that we cannot accept any <u>further</u> Cuban military adventures; that means anywhere in the world.
- Q. Does that categorical statement also apply to the Soviet Union? What do we think about Soviet adventurism?
- A. What we're dealing with now -- the realities of the situation -is the Cuban export of intervention militarily in the internal affairs of other countries. We will take other situations as they arise, but I am not going to speculate on what they might involve or what we might do when we don't know what the circumstances yet are.
- Q. Is your statement about not trying to be the policemen of the world a new element in our foreign policy?

Α.

I wouldn't characterize it as such. We have long said that we will not, nor could we, inject ourselves in unlimited fashion in various situations throughout the world. On the other hand, we do not expect, nor will we sit idly by while other nations attempt to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries to their own perceived advantage.

- Q. Was there a WSAG meeting yesterday on Cuba and were contingencies for retaliation against Cuba discussed?
- A. I can tell you that there was a WSAG meeting yesterday,

but I cannot divulge anything further about it.

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CUBAN INTERVENTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Q: You and Secretary Kissinger have both said that we will not permit further Cuban intervention in situations such as Angola and that possible U.S. actions are under consideration. What measures are you prepared to take to prevent such interventions from occurring and what would you do if there should be further interventions?

As I have said before, Cuban military intervention in the internal affairs of other countries is simply unacceptable. Our response to any such situations would be determined by the specific circumstances. 1 do not believe it would be wise to speculate on the specific character our actions might take other than to reiterate

that we would respond.

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Q: Are you considering a military response?

A: I do not intend to speculate on the specific character of what

actions we might take in hypothetical situations.

Is the U.S. considering going to the Organization of American States to request reimposition of multilateral economic and political sanctions against Cuba in light of Cuban involvement in Angola?

I have already said that it simply is not useful to speculate on

hypothetical situations.

CUBA: EXTENT AND LIMITS OF U.S. POLICY CONTINGENCIES

- Q. Can you clarify the U.S. position on possible contingencies in the event of Cuban military adventurism? How do you respond to Senator Mansfield's charges that the Administration's threats to Cuba are no more than "empty rhetoric?"
- A. As Secretaries Rumsfeld, and Kissinger have stated, the United States has under study a number of various political, economic and military options in the event of further Cuban military adventurism. The emphasis on military contingencies has been made by the press, not by the Administration, as Secretary Rumsfeld pointed out yesterday on <u>Issues and Answers</u>. As to what kind of support the Administration may expect from the Congress and the American public on this issue, the recent events in Angola must be viewed in the context of their current and future effects on other areas. Should events indicate a growing involvement or further adventurism by the Cubans in other areas, the President expects that the American people and the Congress will support his decisions on how to respond.
- <u>FYI:</u> Secretary Kissinger said in Dallas in response to a question on Congressional support:

"The first duty of people in responsible positions is to put forward their best judgment of what the situation requires before a crisis occurs. We were accused in the case of Angola of not having made the issues clear. We are now

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making the issues clear; and we think that if we persist in this, we will have the support of Congress. But there is no concrete decision that we are asking the Congress to take at this moment."

March 29, 1976

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US POLICY TOWARD CUBA

Q: What is the current US policy toward Cuba?

A: The Cuban involvement in the domestic affairs of other attempt to interfere in the US relations hip nations, such as their encouragement of the independence with movement in Puerto Rico, and, in particular, their massive involvement in the Angolan conflict, is unacceptable. The President has said that, under the present circumstances he would rule out the possibility of any improvement in relations between the U.S. and Cuba.

SOVIET PILOTS IN CUBA $^{\setminus}$

Q. What about reports that the Soviets have pilots in Cuba and that this is in response to U.S. "threats" of direct action against Cuba if it intervenes further in Africa?

A. We are aware that there are Soviet pilots in Cuba. That, in itself, is not unprecedented. We are evaluating the situation to determine what, if any, significance their presence may have.

CASTRO CANCELS HIJACKING AGREEMENT

I have just read the news reports which state that Premier Castro has called off the 1973 Anti-Hijacking Agreement with the U.S.

State Dest. statement 10/15/26

We would regret and deplore this unilateral and unwarranted action by the Cuban Government. I wish to state that if Cuba does call off this agreement, Cuba will be held strictly accountable for the encouragement of any hijacking or any actions which may result from any future hijackings.

I wish to recall that at the time of the crash of the Cuban airplane, we said if it had been caused by sabotage, we reconfirmed that the U.S. unalterably opposes and strongly condemns any and all acts of international hijacking -- be they hijacking or sabotage -carried out by any group, foreign or domestic, and regardless of the political or social cause that the act is supposed to support.

As for Castro's charges of USG complicity, I wish to categorically deny that the USG was involved in any way in such a reprehensible act.

CUBA HIJACKING AGREEMENT AND RELATED MATTERS

- Q: When was the agreement made with Cuba?
- A: February 15, 1973 (by exchange of notes) with the Czeek-Embassy).

Q: What did it cover?

A:

A: The hijacking of aircraft or vessels and other offenses.

Q: What were the salient features?

A: Hijackers were to be returned or they were to be tried by the country holding them.

- Q: Did this, indeed, inhibit hijacking?
- A: We believe so, for both parties, along with intensified security measures; for example, for the US, since 1973, there have been no commercial aircraft hijackings to Cuba. There have been only one light plane and one boat hijacked to Cuba. Before 1973, a total of 86 US-registered planes had been hijacked.

Q: Have people been tried and jailed under the agreement?

In June 1974, two Americans, Patricia and Clifford McRay, commandeered a small boat to Cuba. In 1976 they were sentenced by the Cuban authorities to 1 and 3 years, respectively, for illegal entry into Cuba. Q: Do we have any information on the possible involvement of any US groups in the sabotage of the Cubana airliner?

A:

A:

Well, in the first place, sabotage has not been proven although it certainly seems highly likely. As to who may have been involved if it was sabotage, we have no information at this time which would implicate any individual or group within the jurisdiction of the United States. Certainly, should such information develop, we will investigate it rigorously and take all steps necessary to bring to justice anyone within the jurisdiction of the United States who might have engaged in such activities. This government is committed both morally and by international law to the eradication of terrorism, and we take that commitment very seriously.

Q: Is Castro using this incident to divert the attention of his own people from conditions in Cuba?

I cannot really speculate on what Castro's motives might be. He did, though, as you know, make a speech last week to the Cuban people in which he told them that the economic situation was bad and announced, in effect, some further belt tightening.

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- Q: Castro said that the agreement will expire in six months. Why the time lag?
- A: As Castro pointed out, the agreement requires a six-month advance notice in writing by either party wishing to terminate.
- Q: So the agreement is still in effect?
- A: That is correct.

A:

- Q: The Government of Venezuela has announced the arrest of Orlando Bosch and five Venezuelan citizens or residents in connection with the sabotage of the Cubana flight of October 6. Do you have any further information on that?
 - No. As far as we know, the five are either Venezuelans or Cubans resident in Venezuela. None is known to have any connection with the United States. Orlando Bosch, of course, was imprisoned in the United States for his participation in acts of terrorism. He was sentenced to ten years and paroled after serving four years. He is wanted in this country for violation of parole.
- Q: What was the parole violation?
- A: Failure to report to his parole officer and changing residence without notification. That's technical. In fact, he went underground.

CUBA POLICY

- Q: Cuban leaders have recently indicated willingness to normalize relations with us and Secretary Kissinger said the other day that you were reviewing policy towards Cuba. Do you see any possibility of movement toward re-establishing relations with Cuba?
- A: In Quito last November, the Rio Treaty organization addressed the problem of OAS Cuba sanctions, including diplomatic relations. There was not sufficient support to lift the prohibition against trade and diplomatic relations. Therefore, the situation remains unchanged and the prohibitions remain in effect. We continue to respect these OAS obligations.

We have said before that we would be willing to take a new look at our Cuba policy if there is an indication of change from the Cuban side, and this remains the case. We have these matters under constant examination and review. But we have not yet seen a demonstration that the Cubans have made any significant changes in their policies.

[FYI: In view of your forthcoming visit to Miami, we think it would be a mistake to go beyond this.]

1. Can you provide any details on reports that Secretary Krssinger is willing to consider changes in the OAS voting procedure which would permit a simple majority vote of the OAS to lift the sanctions against Cuba? Does this report hint that Secretary Kissinger will adopt the Lenowitz Commission recommendation of a new Cuban policy?

GUIDANCE: Secretary Kissinger met yesterday with

Mr. Linowitz and both of them spoke to the press following their meeting. I would, therefore, suggest you check with the State Department for any clarification or details on this report.

FYI: If pushed about our position on Cuban policy you should simply say that there has been no change in our policy toward Cuba, as has been enunciated by the President. 3. Can you confirm reports from Quito that the U.S. may abstain on the OAS vote to lift sanctions from Cuba? Can you tell us what kind of instructions the President gave the U.S. delegation regarding that vote?

> <u>Guidance</u>: While the U.S. delegation, of course, has instructions approved by the President, I am not going to discuss what instructions the President gave the U.S. diplomatic delegation. As you know, Deputy Secretary of State Ingersoll is leading the U.S. delegation to the Quito meeting and the United States is consulting closely with the other members of the OAS regarding this important matter. Any further comment on this subject will come from Secretary Ingersoll or the Department of State.

FYI: It is our understanding that the session has been suspended pending consideration of alternatives. End FYI

L. <u>Q:</u>

Can you tell us how the United States will vote at the Quito meeting-of-Foreign Ministers on the issue of lifting sanctions against Cuba?

<u>Guidance:</u> As you know, Deputy Secretary of State Ingersoll will head the U.S. delegation to the Quito meeting and he will be leaving tonight for Quito. We have been and are continuing to be in close consultations with the other members of the OAS on this matter. I would suggest you check with the Department of State for a status report on these consultations and any other information on the Quito meeting.

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7. What is the Administration's reaction to the release of four prisoners by Cuba? Do you see this as a signal for better Cuban relations?

<u>Guidance</u>: We are of course pleased with the release of four American citizens from imprisonment but I would have no comment or characterization to make beyond that. (If pushed on the significance of this act in relation to US policy toward Cuba you should simply say that we do not read anything more into it than what it is and that we will consider this release as we consider all elements in our relations with Cuba.)

U.S. CUBA RELATIONS

Q: Is the United States ready to end a 14-year state of hostility with Cuba and resume relations?

Background: Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs testified on the Hill yesterday and said the U.S. was willing to improve relations with Cuba on a basis of reciprocity.

A: As Assistant Secretary of State Rogers said yesterday, "We are prepared to improve our relations with Cuba. ... We are willing to enter a dialogue with Cuba. But the dialogue must be on a basis of reciprocity . . . The resolution of the problems between us will not be furthered by calculated offense to the other party."

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Will the U.S. support an effort to lift sanctions on Cuba if it is raised at the OAS General Assembly meeting this week?

Q:

A:

It is my understanding that this subject is not on the agenda and it is not clear that it will be raised in a formal sense at the meeting. Our own basic policy towards Cuba has not changed. We have indicated before we would be prepared to consider changing our policy toward Cuba, but only if there is a change in Cuba's policy toward us.

OAS GUBAN SANCTIONS

Q: There have been reports that the U.S. has welcomed the more forthcoming position announced last week by Premier Castro of Cuba and that a resolution of the impasses over lifting OAS sanctions is in sight. Are we preparing to take action to resolve our differences with Castro? Does this mean that the U.S. will support an OAS resolution to lift the sanctions?

A:

During the recently completed OAS meeting in Washington,

Secretary Kissinger had many useful conversations with the Foreign Ministers of the Latin American states. During these conversations the subject of OAS sanctions on Cuba was discussed. You will recall that an effort by some countries at the Quito Conference last year to lift these sanctions failed. A consensus seems to be emerging within the OAS on how to resolve the problem, but the details are still being worked out. Until we see what kind of resolution is being considered, it would be difficult to state what the U.S. position might be.

As you may know, the action being considered by the OAS relates to the obligatory nature of the sanctions and would have no effect on the bilateral sanctions the U.S. presently imposes. Following any OAS action we could consider the question in terms of our interests and Cuban policy towards us.

CUBA/USSR: SUBMARINE BASE UNDERSTANDING

- Q. There have been press reports and, more recently, testimony to Congress that the Soviets have been encroaching on the vague 1970 understanding banning Soviet submarine activities in Cuba and that the U.S. has made no move to prevent it. Is this true? Did you raise this in Vladivostok?
- A. I am familiar with this matter and I can assure you that the understanding is being observed. The Soviet Union is fully aware of the importance of this matter and has not challenged the understanding since the initial period.
- Q. Can you tell us what the understanding is?
- A. I do not want to add to what is already on the public record on this matter.I do not want to discuss the details of our exchanges with the Soviet Union.
- [FYI: The 1970 understanding prohibits the servicing in or around Cuba of any nuclear submarine or any submarine or ship carrying offensive weapons. The understanding is more extensive and detailed than what is on the public record. The Soviets have probed around the edges of it occasionally, but have not seriously challenged it.]

CUBA -- CASTRO SPEECH

- Q: In a speech on April 19, Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro charged that a recent attack on Cuban fishing vessels by exiles resident in the U.S. constitutes a violation of the U.S. -Cuban anti-hijacking agreement and threatened that unless the perpetrators are severely punished Cuba will no longer consider that the agreement continues in force. Would you comment on this and what is the U.S. doing about the attack?
- A: Clearly the United States Government condemns illegal acts of violence upon innocent persons. With regard to the incident to which the Cubans refer, the United States Government on April 16 informed the Cuban Government through the Swiss Embassy in Havana that we are conducting an investigation of the incident and that appropriate actions will be taken if it is determined that persons subject to our jurisdiction have committed acts which appear to violate U.S. Federal law. The United States continues to honor the terms of the 1973 agreement on hijacking and the actions which we have taken and are taking are in accordance with the provisions of that agreement. The Cuban Government is well aware of our position on this, and we expect the Cuban Government also to honor the terms of the agreement.
- Q: Are you saying the Cuban Government, prior to this Castro speech, was aware that U.S. officials are taking appropriate action regarding this incident?

A: Yes, the Cuban Government had been assured that an investigation is underway.

- Q: What about Castro's reference to President Ford as a "vulgar liar" with respect to the Cuban involvement in Angola?
- A:

That is clearly a ridiculous statement -- for internal political

purposes.

Ron - GI Jun MEMO

👾 TO: Jim Shuman

From : Melanie Berney

Ron Nessen called last night to find out whether the Miami papers had given coverage to the story on the Cuban ballerina who was given permission by the US and Cuban governments to perform in Los Angeles. $\Sigma_{12} = 0$

The Miami papers did not cover the story either yesterday or Sunday which I told him. The story was not given coverage in today's papers either. However, last night's Ft. Lauderdale news had a picture and short cut line on the story.

The picutre showed the ballerina being congratulated by another dancer.

Caption read: "No Longer a Secret" - Ballet dancer Igor Youskevitch congratulates prima ballerina Alicia Alonso after her performance at the Los Angeles Music Center Saturday. Her appearance was top secret and was not announced until she appeard on stage. She received special permission from the governments of Cuba nad the US. -- UPI telephoto (appeared on page 2) *In view of Russian use of Cuban troops in Angola and elsewhere, where do you draw the line to limit Russian use of Cuban forces?

*Why does the United States continue to foot the bill for the United Nations General Assembly and the Third World countries when they are so hostile to the U.S.?

*Why do you think Gov. Reagan and all the Democratic hopefuls are ganging up on Henry Kissinger and your foreign policy?

*How, in plain language, do you answer George Meany's charge that you don't care about the unemployed?

*Both Ronald Reagan and George Wallace have been attacking the so-called Washington Buddy System. Do you feel there is any merit to their charges? Do you see any merits to this "buddy system"? Do you feel you are a part of it?

Cuba

Cuban Premier Castro announced today that his government has abrogated the 1973 anti-hijacking agreement with the United. States.

I condemn in strongest terms this unilateral action of the Cuban Premier. The irresponsible discarding of this agreement can only serve to encourage terrorism and to promote disorder in international relations. Since the effective date of this agreement, hijackings to Cuba have all but stopped. The US Government expresses its deep concern at the implication of Castro's arbitrary act on the safety of international travelers.

The Cuban Premier also alleged US complicity in the possible terrorist action which resulted in the crash of a Cubana Airlines plane off Barbados on October 6. Those allegations are false. We have denied categorically any US Government involvement in that tragic event.

We have expressed publicly and to the governments of the Caribbean our profound shock at the loss of life, and we have expressed our condemnation of all acts of terrorism, whatever the motives. We have also pledged our full collaboration in the rigorous investigation of the crash and the bringing to justice of the perpetrators -- if, as appears possible, sabotage was involved. We cannot comprehend why the Cuban Government would take such serious action without prior discussion. We are awaiting the full text of the Cuban Premier's statement and the official communication from the Cuban Government prior to determining what further decisions the US Government should take.