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## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1a. Background re Angola (1 p.)	1. <u>Q&amp;A, 12/21/76</u>	Undated	A

## FILE LOCATION

Nessen Papers  
 General Subject File  
 Strategic Arms Limitations Talks

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NOVEMBER 24, 1974

Office of the White House Press Secretary  
(Vladivostok, U. S. S. R.)

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JOINT U. S. - SOVIET STATEMENT

During their working meeting in the area of Vladivostok on November 23-24, 1974, the President of the USA Gerald R. Ford and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L. I. Brezhnev discussed in detail the question of further limitations of strategic offensive arms.

They reaffirmed the great significance that both the United States and the USSR attach to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. They are convinced that a long-term agreement on this question would be a significant contribution to improving relations between the US and the USSR, to reducing the danger of war and to enhancing world peace. Having noted the value of previous agreements on this question, including the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, they reaffirm the intention to conclude a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, to last through 1985.

As a result of the exchange of views on the substance of such a new agreement, the President of the United States of America and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU concluded that favorable prospects exist for completing the work on this agreement in 1975.

Agreement was reached that further negotiations will be based on the following provisions.

1. The new agreement will incorporate the relevant provisions of the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, which will remain in force until October 1977.
2. The new agreement will cover the period from October 1977 through December 31, 1985.
3. Based on the principle of equality and equal security, the new agreement will include the following limitations:
  - a. Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles;
  - b. Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVs).
4. The new agreement will include a provision for further negotiations beginning no later than 1980-1981 on the question of further limitations and possible reductions of strategic arms in the period after 1985.
5. Negotiations between the delegations of the U. S. and USSR to work out the new agreement incorporating the foregoing points will resume in Geneva in January 1975.

November 24, 1974

# # #

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE  
UNTIL 7:00 PM LOCAL TIME  
(4:00 AM EST NOVEMBER 24, 1974)

NOVEMBER 24, 1974

Office of the White House Press Secretary  
(Vladivostok, USSR)

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### JOINT US-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE

In accordance with the previously announced agreement, a working meeting between the President of the United States of America Gerald R. Ford and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union L. I. Brezhnev took place in the area of Vladivostok on November 23 and 24, 1974. Taking part in the talks were the Secretary of State of the United States of America and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger and Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A. A. Gromyko.

They discussed a broad range of questions dealing with American-Soviet relations and the current international situation.

Also taking part in the talks were:

On the American side Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador of the USA to the USSR; Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State; Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and William Hyland, official of the Department of State.

On the Soviet side A. F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR to the USA; A. M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU; and G. M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

### I

The United States of America and the Soviet Union reaffirmed their determination to develop further their relations in the direction defined by the fundamental joint decisions and basic treaties and agreements concluded between the two States in recent years.

They are convinced that the course of American-Soviet relations, directed towards strengthening world peace, deepening the relaxation of international tensions and expanding mutually beneficial cooperation of states with different social systems meets the vital interests of the peoples of both States and other peoples.

Both Sides consider that based on the agreements reached between them important results have been achieved in fundamentally reshaping American-Soviet relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence and equal security. These results are a solid foundation for progress in reshaping Soviet-American relations.

(MORE)

Accordingly they intend to continue, without a loss in momentum, to expand the scale and intensity of their cooperative efforts in all spheres as set forth in the agreements they have signed so that the process of improving relations between the US and the USSR will continue without interruption and will become irreversible.

Mutual determination was expressed to carry out strictly and fully the mutual obligations undertaken by the US and the USSR in accordance with the treaties and agreements concluded between them.

## II

Special consideration was given in the course of the talks to a pivotal aspect of Soviet-American relations: measures to eliminate the threat of war and to halt the arms race.

Both sides reaffirm that the Agreements reached between the US and the USSR on the prevention of nuclear war and the limitation of strategic arms are a good beginning in the process of creating guarantees against the outbreak of nuclear conflict and war in general. They expressed their deep belief in the necessity of promoting this process and expressed their hope that other states would contribute to it as well. For their part the US and the USSR will continue to exert vigorous efforts to achieve this historic task.

A joint statement on the question of limiting strategic offensive arms is being released separately.

Both sides stressed once again the importance and necessity of a serious effort aimed at preventing the dangers connected with the spread of nuclear weapons in the world. In this connection they stressed the importance of increasing the effectiveness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

It was noted that, in accordance with previous agreements, initial contacts were established between representatives of the US and of the USSR on questions related to underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, to measures to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes, as well as measures dealing with the most dangerous lethal means of chemical warfare. It was agreed to continue an active search for mutually acceptable solutions of these questions.

## III

In the course of the meeting an exchange of views was held on a number of international issues: special attention was given to negotiations already in progress in which the two Sides are participants and which are designed to remove existing sources of tension and to bring about the strengthening of international security and world peace.

(MORE)

Having reviewed the situation at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, both Sides concluded that there is a possibility for its early successful conclusion. They proceed from the assumption that the results achieved in the course of the Conference will permit its conclusion at the highest level and thus be commensurate with its importance in ensuring the peaceful future of Europe.

The USA and the USSR also attach high importance to the negotiations on mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe. They agree to contribute actively to the search for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of principle of undiminished security for any of the parties and the prevention of unilateral military advantages.

Having discussed the situation existing in the Eastern Mediterranean, both Sides state their firm support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and will make every effort in this direction. They consider that a just settlement of the Cyprus question must be based on the strict implementation of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations regarding Cyprus.

In the course of the exchange of views on the Middle East both Sides expressed their concern with regard to the dangerous situation in that region. They reaffirmed their intention to make every effort to promote a solution of the key issues of a just and lasting peace in that area on the basis of the United Nations resolution 338, *taking into account the legitimate interests of all the peoples of the area, including the Palestinian people, and respect for the right to independence*  
The Sides believe that the Geneva Conference should play an important part in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and should resume its work as soon as possible.

*existence of all states in the area.*

IV

The state of relations was reviewed in the field of commercial, economic, scientific and technical ties between the USA and the USSR. Both Sides confirmed the great importance which further progress in these fields would have for Soviet - American relations, and expressed their firm intention to continue the broadening and deepening of mutually advantageous cooperation.

The two Sides emphasized the special importance accorded by them to the development on a long term basis of commercial and economic cooperation, including mutually beneficial large-scale projects. They believe that such commercial and economic cooperation will serve the cause of increasing the stability of Soviet-American relations.

Both Sides noted with satisfaction the progress in the implementation of agreements and in the development of ties and cooperation between the US and the USSR in the fields of science, technology and culture. They are convinced that the continued expansion of such cooperation will benefit the peoples of both countries and will be an important contribution to the solution of world-wide scientific and technical problems.

The talks were held in an atmosphere of frankness and mutual understanding, reflecting the constructive desire of both Sides to strengthen and develop further the peaceful cooperative relationship between the USA and the USSR, and to ensure progress in the solution of outstanding international problems in the interests of preserving and strengthening peace.

The results of the talks provided a convincing demonstration of the practical value of Soviet-American summit meetings and their exceptional importance in the shaping of a new relationship between the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

President Ford reaffirmed the invitation to L. I. Brezhnev to pay an official visit to the United States in 1975. The exact date of the visit will be agreed upon later.

For the  
United States of America

For the  
Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics

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Gerald R. Ford  
President of the  
United States of America

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L. I. Brezhnev  
General Secretary of the  
Central Committee of the CPSU

November 24, 1974

# # #



TUESDAY MORNING, 9 MARCH 1976

WASHINGTON STAR 8 MARCH 1976, Pg 10

# Time Running Out for '76 SALT

## Accord

By Henry S. Bradsher  
Washington Star Staff Writer

The latest American and  
Soviet counterproposals for

slowing negotiations.

The best that senior U. S. officials are now hoping for is some agreement during the spring. When and if agreement on principles is reached, it will take another

LOS ANGELES TIMES 7 MARCH 76, Pg 7 (9)

### Many in U.S. Think Too Little Is Spent for Defense, Poll Finds

Special to The Times

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# *High MIRV Levels May Reduce Spy Satellites' Verification Role*

W. St. J. 12/2/74

A'st

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# REVIEW & OUTLOOK

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**Whose Triumph?**

KISSINGER IN MOSCOW

SALT FOR ANGOLA?

Q. Can you tell us about the progress the Secretary is making in Moscow? Is the President encouraged or does the recent sharp exchange between Brezhnev and Kissinger indicate a deadlock?

A. Naturally, the Secretary is keeping the President informed of the progress of his trip. The President is committed to the conclusion of a good balanced agreement that is in our interest and in the best interest of all other countries as well. The continuation of unrestrained competition in strategic arms could seriously undermine world stability. Therefore, we are not undertaking these negotiations with the Soviet Union as a concession to them, but rather to try to secure a more stable and orderly nuclear relationship from which all will benefit.

As to your specific question on linking SALT to Angola, I would refer you to the Secretary's own words in his press conference of January 14: (See Attached page.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am saying two things: I am saying that Soviet actions in Angola, if continued, are bound to affect the general relationship with the United States; that a substantial deterioration of that relationship can also over time affect the strategic arms talks.

At this point, however, I would also maintain that the limitation of strategic arms is not a concession we make to the Soviet Union, but it is an objective that is in our interest, and it is in the world interest, and it is in the interest of world peace. So we will pursue the negotiations in the present framework.


KISSINGER IN MOSCOW FOR SALT NEGOTIATIONS

Q. Is the President being kept informed of the Secretary's meetings in Moscow and does he have any indications as yet as to the likelihood of an agreement in principle by the conclusion of the trip?

A. The Secretary is, of course, keeping the President informed of the progress of his trip. As you know, the general objective of this trip is to try to secure a more stable and orderly nuclear relationship. The President feels that a continuation of unrestrained competition in strategic arms could seriously undermine world stability. For this reason, he is committed to the conclusion of a good balanced agreement that is in our interest and in the best interest of all other countries as well.

IF PRESSED on his expectations for a successful conclusion:

All I can say is that the Secretary has stated that he would not be going to Moscow if the President did not feel that some progress were possible.



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file

ZZ  
RNR 247  
ARMS

BY ROLAND DALLAS

WASHINGTON, DEC 5, REUTER - THE FORD ADMINISTRATION TODAY DEFENDED THE STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA, SAYING THE U.S. WOULD KEEP ITS LEAD IN THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN ITS ARSENALS.

"THE UNITED STATES, FOR THIS AGREEMENT UP TO 1985, BELIEVES IT WILL STILL MAINTAIN A LEAD IN WARHEADS," WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY RON NESSEN SAID.

ANSWERING CRITICISM THAT THE CEILINGS OF 2,400 MISSILES OR LONG-RANGE BOMBERS AND 1,320 MULTIPLE WARHEADS WOULD PERMIT THE SOVIET UNION TO BUILD HUGE ROCKETS, MR. NESSEN SAID MISSILE SILOS COULD ONLY BE INCREASED BY 15 PER CENT IN SIZE.

"THAT ANSWERS SOME OF THE QUESTIONS ABOUT UNLIMITED DEVELOPMENT OF BIGGER AND BIGGER WEAPONS," HE DECLARED.

MORE 1406

ZZ  
RNR 248  
ARMS 2 WASHINGTON

"THERE IS ALSO A PROHIBITION OF NEW SILOS," HE ADDED.

DEALING WITH FEARS ABOUT THE GREATER CARRYING CAPACITY, OR "THROW WEIGHT," OF RUSSIAN MISSILES, HE SAID: "THE TESTING OF RUSSIAN WEAPONS THAT WE ARE AWARE OF DOESN'T INDICATE USE OF 25, OR 50 OR 100 WARHEADS."

ANSWERING CRITICISM THAT THE AGREED CEILING OF 2,400 WAS TOO HIGH, HE SAID: "IT DOESN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE WHETHER YOU HAVE 2,400, 2,200 OR 1,700 DELIVERY SYSTEMS. AT THESE LEVELS, BOTH SIDES CAN WIPE OUT EACH OTHER. THE ARGUMENT IS IRRELEVANT."

MR. NESSEN ADDED THAT RUSSIA WAS CONCENTRATING ON VULNERABLE LAND-BASED MISSILES WHILE THE UNITED STATES WAS RELYING MORE ON AIRBORNE OR SEABORNE WEAPONS.

"THE DIFFERENCE IS QUITE STRIKING BETWEEN THE VULNERABILITY OF THEIR FORCE AND OURS," HE SAID.

MORE 1408

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RNR 249  
ARMS 3 WASHINGTON

THE PRESS SECRETARY ADDED THAT RUSSIA, WHICH HAS NOT YET DEPLOYED MISSILES WITH SEVERAL WARHEADS CAPABLE OF HITTING SEPARATE TARGETS (KNOWN AS MIRV'S), COULD NOT DO SO QUICKLY BECAUSE OF THE SCOPE OF THE WORK INVOLVED.

AMERICA HAS ALREADY DEPLOYED MORE THAN 520 MIRV'S IN LAND AND SUBMARINE BASED MISSILES.

MR. NESSEN NOTED THAT THE TENTATIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PRESIDENT FORD AND SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY CHIEF LEONID BREZHNEV IN VLADIVOSTOK INCLUDED MORE TALKS FOR POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES BEFORE 1980/81.

"THE UNITED STATES IS QUITE HOPEFUL THAT NEGOTIATIONS WILL TAKE PLACE EARLIER THAN THE 1980/81 PERIOD," HE SAID.

ONCE STABILITY IS ACHIEVED, HE ADDED, "THE UNITED STATES WOULD THEN ACTIVELY PURSUE THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS."

REUTER 1409



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RNR 250

ARMS 4 WASHINGTON

MR. NESSEN ALSO SPELLED OUT THE WAY IN WHICH BOTH SIDES WILL DECIDE WHETHER THE OTHER IS DEPLOYING MIRVED MISSILES, WHICH LOOK SIMILAR TO MISSILES WITH ONLY ONE WARHEAD.

IF ANY MISSILE SILO IS ENLARGED, HE SAID, IT WILL BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE A MIRV.

ANY DEPLOYMENT OF A MISSILE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN TESTED WITH A MIRV WILL BE REGARDED AS A MIRVED MISSILE.

"THIS IS THE OVERALL VERIFICATION SYSTEM," HE ADDED.

REUTER 1410

MR. McCLOSKEY: This will be FOR BACKGROUND, the usual ground rules. Anything used will be in paraphrase, may be attributed to State Department sources.

MR. MARDER: In view of the magnitude of this subject, Mr. Secretary, and in view of the controversy about an issue of this consequence, I would like to strongly urge you to reconsider putting it ON THE RECORD because the charges, as you well know, are coming and published and the defense is coming on an anonymous basis.

MR. McCLOSKEY: Murrey, the Secretary will have a press conference at some point -- hopefully, soon -- and there it will be ON THE RECORD.

It was my impression, and that of others, that a BACKGROUND briefing would be welcome on this subject.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I just wanted to remind you I will try to have a press conference on Monday. I will be prepared to say some of these things ON THE RECORD. This gives us an opportunity to have a smaller group, and perhaps

to speak more freely. I will, however, at an early opportunity be glad to say ON THE RECORD that I think throw-weight is a phony issue. (Laughter.)

Q "Throw" what?

Q Throw-weight.

Q Oh, throw-weight.

Q Could you say that ON THE RECORD, Mr. Secretary?

A (Secretary Kissinger) No. I will say it on an occasion in which I can explain it.

But could I, perhaps -- I don't know how you want to conduct this. I thought perhaps I would start with a few minutes of what I believe to be the significance of this agreement and then take questions on it. This would be the most effective way of proceeding.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you start, perhaps, by telling us what's in the agreement? Have we gotten everything that's in the agreement?

A It's a secret agreement. (Laughter.) It's not going to come out in Senator Jackson's hearings.

Well, let me sum up what can be said about the agreement.

The President stated yesterday that the ceiling

on strategic delivery vehicles is 2400; the ceiling on MIRVs is 1320. The number of land-based silos will remain constant, though they are subject to the same modifications that are permitted in the interim agreement -- which is to say that their dimensions can be increased by 15 percent and that airborne missiles of a range of more than 600 miles will be counted as individual missiles, though not as MIRVs.

I think these are the essential elements of the agreement -- which means that each side is free to compose these 2400 in any way it wishes, except that it cannot add land-based silos. It can add land-based mobiles; it can move land-based missiles to sea.

The numerical limitations of the interim agreement with respect to submarines, as well as to the total numbers of submarine-based missiles, will not be in effect. The only number of the interim agreement that will remain in effect is that of the land-based silos; and those are, of course, the most vulnerable part of the strategic forces.

Those are the essential elements of the agreement.

Q What would be the limitation?

A 600 kilometers --

Q What?

A 600 kilometers -- For, roughly, four hundred miles.

Q What does that refer to?

A I said airborne missiles of a range of more than 600 kilometers, not 600 miles.

Q Mr. Secretary, do the silos remain so that they're limited to 15 percent in size, even though there's not anything specifically said?

A Well, that does not happen to be exactly true because the United States, either because of great foresight -- as the Russians believe -- or for other reasons -- as some others believe -- designed its silos in such a way that they can take a considerably larger missile than is presently in it, so that it's within our capability, even without increasing the size of the silo substantially, to reduce Soviet throw-weight advantage, and, if we increase the silos by 15 percent, to come close to eliminating Soviet throw-weight advantage -- if that's the decision that we want to take.

But -- I repeat -- I believe that the throw-weight issue has been vastly overstated and the decision of whether

we will attempt to close the throw-weight will be taken by us for our reasons and not simply because the Soviet Union has heavier missiles than we do.

Q Mr. Secretary, since the Soviet Union has not deployed any MIRV missiles and since the United States does not plan as many as 1320 MIRV missiles, why couldn't you get a lower MIRV figure?

A We could have probably gotten a slightly lower MIRV figure. 1320 is slightly above the American MIRV plan and, therefore, gives us some degree of flexibility. We could have gotten a slightly lower MIRV figure; it wouldn't have made any real difference.

Q Where did you get the 1320? How did you arrive at that figure?

A We arrived at the figure of 1320 by taking some of the planned programs and, in effect, adding to it the TRIDENT force -- which is 28 missiles.

Q Mr. Secretary, will the F-111 and the Soviet BACKFIRE be included as launchers?

A I would not expect them to.

Q Neither of them?

A Neither of them.

Q Mr. Secretary, the President talked yesterday

about some ambiguities in the Soviet Union in connection with verification. Could you go into that?

A Before I get into all these technical questions, let me make a general statement of what the significance of this agreement is before we get lost in a lot of technicalities.

First, in terms of the negotiating history of this agreement, there were the following items throughout the negotiations:

- One, total aggregates.
- Second, limitations on MIRVs -- for which the code name was "qualitative restraint."
- Third, there was the issue of forward-bases.
- Fourth, there was the issue of the British and French nuclear forces.
- Fifth, there was the fact that the Soviet Union claimed compensation for a more vulnerable geographic position -- the fact that some of its potential enemies were geographically closer to it than they were to us -- or, to put it into less complicated language, that China would have nuclear weapons aimed at the Soviet Union.

Therefore, these were the parameters of the negotiations as they had been going on for several years until this summer.

What we attempted to do is approve immediately a comprehensive agreement that would take care of all of the issues simultaneously. Therefore, until this summer, we attempted to bring about an extension of the Interim Agreement, in which the Soviet Union had a differential in missiles and for which we wanted to compensate by obtaining a differential in MIRV vehicles. Even though we were prepared to give them a differential in total missiles until the end of 1979, the differential in missiles for which we asked was not to be negotiable during the time of the Summit.

Secondly, as we analyzed the problem at the time of the Summit, it became clear that this was really a very precarious agreement -- that you extended the Interim Agreement for a number of years at a time when the production program of both sides of MIRVs would reach a certain peak -- that, therefore, the breakout potential was very substantial -- and where the Soviet Union, or we, simply by deferring the deployment of one year's production, would have a massive breakout potential at the precise moment



that the agreement ended.

Therefore, it was decided at the Summit meeting -- as I pointed out to this group before -- that we would, in July, aim for a 10-year agreement, in which it would be more easy to catch several cycles of the program and to attempt to bring about a negotiation in this manner.

As far as the United States is concerned, we had a number of preparatory Verification Panel meetings, out of which emerged five to eight options which were presented to the President and to the NSC meeting which took place in October.

I was just trying to give you a history of how this evolved; and then I will talk briefly about the significance, as I see it, and then we can answer your questions.

These options range from some that were extraordinarily simple to others of great esoteric complexity. Out of these options, the President chose not one of the options but a combination of two of the simpler ones and asked me to present those in Moscow when I was there in October.

We had two days of very difficult and very

inconclusive meetings, which then led to a meeting of the Politburo on the last day that I was in Moscow -- it doesn't matter what it was; it was Saturday -- at which, apparently, some fundamental decisions were taken by the Soviet Union, because that evening they made a proposition to us, which I made clear afterwards brought the issue within negotiating range.

Now, what brought it within negotiating range was the Soviet Union accepted then the principle of equal aggregate at some stage of the 10-year problem. They, nevertheless, still insisted on compensation for the British and French nuclear forces and some compensation for forward-based missiles.

The reason why equal aggregates become more important in a 10-year agreement than a 5-year agreement was that if we gave up on the principle of equal aggregates in a 10-year agreement following a 5-year agreement, it would mean that from the period of 1972<sup>5?</sup> through 1985 the United States would have accepted a position of numerical inferiority in strategic delivery vehicles, which whatever it actually invites strategically -- which I never thought was much -- nevertheless symbolically, could have had some political impact on the potential of other countries.

This was the situation when I left the Soviet Union at the end of October.

On the basis of the proposal that the Soviet Union made to us in October -- which they also put in writing to us -- we formulated a counter-proposal, in which equal aggregates were to be achieved earlier, sometime during the 1975 to 1985 period, and in the interval before the United States achieved total equal aggregate, there would be a MIRV differential in our favor.

I don't see that there's any point being served in going through all this back-and-forth of negotiations. This, more or less, was the situation in Vladivostok. I brought it out only to make clear that there was not a pre-cooked agreement that was simply ratified in Vladivostok. The negotiations were, roughly, as I had described it to you upon our arrival in Vladivostok.

Saturday evening, we had an extended negotiation on what differentials in total numbers and what differentials in MIRV numbers for what period of time might be acceptable; and this is where it stood about midnight, when we adjourned.

It was the next morning that General Secretary Brezhnev made his proposal on moving to equal aggregates

immediately -- not asking for compensation for the British and French nuclear forces. And out of this developed a more extended discussion having to do with bomber armament and the position of heavy missiles -- the limitation of heavy missiles, the agreement which we have discussed.

Now, I have since read -- I have since discussed -- with mounting amazement, I must say. For example, let me deal with some of the arguments that I have heard.

I have heard it said that the United States gave to the Soviet Union rather large figures. Now, I think the fact of the matter is quite the contrary. The overall total is below the figures which the Soviet Union has today -- so that the only way that the Soviet Union can -- we hope that the Soviet Union will be forced to reduce numbers to achieve the agreed level by 1977.

Secondly, before we went to Vladivostok -- and not necessarily connected with Vladivostok -- we asked the intelligence community to give us three projections of Soviet development, both in the MIRV field and in the missile field -- and in the total strategic delivery field. These estimates were made by people who had no idea of the figures that we were debating.

The intelligence estimates were made in three estimates -- a low estimate, a medium estimate, and a high estimate.

All three estimates -- well, the lowest estimate, was considerably above the lowest estimate of what the Soviet Union would do without an agreement -- was considerably above the figures of both the MIRVs and the delivery systems. The medium estimate was substantially above, and the high estimate was out of range.

In our experience, our medium estimate is the one that is the most probable Soviet course.

So with all due respect, it is total nonsense to say that the United States "gave the Soviet Union figures that were granted to them by us."

The United States agreed with the Soviet Union on figures below their present figures in total numbers of missiles, and well below our estimate of where they would be -- well below their lowest estimate of where they would be without an agreement -- and substantially below our estimate, our most likely estimate of where they would be without an agreement.

And all of this was done without counting the



British and French nuclear forces, without counting the forward based systems, and without any of the other frills that used to be associated.

The second argument, as well, "all we are doing is continuing the race." That, too, is not true.

If the Soviet Union had built to the level that was what our intelligence estimate predicted -- and I repeat that our intelligence estimate projected without any knowledge of the figures we were discussing with the Soviet Union -- if the Soviet Union had built up to those figures, we would have been faced with the following problem:

We would have been faced with the problem of whether we wanted to match all those, or exceed all those figures or whether we were going to permit, as a result of an arms race -- a gap to exist -- which many in our countries considered intolerable, though it was ratified as part of a SALT Agreement.

In other words, the gap which we had permitted to arise without an agreement, before 1972 -- which we had frozen as a result of the interim agreement -- would have grown against us as of 1977.

Therefore, the only way the United States could



have responded, is either to let the gap grow or to make a massive effort in order to close it.

So that our expenditures on the strategic forces would have had to go up rapidly, and would have had to go up now.

Now if we had permitted the gap to grow -- in other words, if we had kept our strategic expenditures down -- our capability of bringing the arms race under control would have declined substantially, because what arguments could we have used against the Soviet Union in order to induce them to accept figures -- even roughly comparable to the ones we have accepted. If we had gone into an arms race of our own, the consequences would have been quite unpredictable.

We had constantly felt that one of the primary objectives of these negotiations would be, not to bring about a level in which the destruction of human life was not possible -- that is beyond our ability -- but rather, to get the perceptions of both sides into a framework in which they are not a series of self-fulfilling prophecies -- a fuel wasting arms race which can be sustained only by the argument of "an imminent surprise attack" which



in turn, then makes political accommodations more and more difficult.

Now whether the level of forces is 2400, 2200 or 2,000 has some financial difference. But in terms of the capacity to destroy human life, it is almost irrelevant.

Therefore, the arguments that the levels below us are not uninteresting, but they do not go to the center of the issues -- to reduce the strategic forces to a level where they cannot destroy human life -- the reductions would have had to be to the level that are inconceivable today.

Now I would like you all to remember that in 1962 at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the United States was at something like 1,500 warheads -- maybe 2,000 -- fifteen hundred or two thousand warheads. The Soviet Union possessed something like 70 ICBM warheads.

But in the records of the deliberations at that time, the policy makers at that time had the perception to see that the delivery of even a fraction of those Soviet warheads on the United States would present quite unmanageable problems for the United States.

We are now in a period where, with MIRVs and with





the proliferation of strategic nuclear weapons, the level at which human life could be substantially -- or at least civilized life as we now know it, -- could be substantially reduced, is not affected by whether the total ceiling is 2400, 2200, 2,000, or any of the ceilings that anyone has talked about.

In fact, if you want to make a sophisticated argument, you can make the argument that at certain levels of MIRV, the fewer the aimpoints, the more precarious the situation becomes. because if one of the risks of the contemporary situation is disparity between warheads and aiming points so that a first strike again becomes a possibility , then the fewer the number of aimpoints and the larger the number of warheads , the greater the disparity between the number of warheads and the aimpoints.

And therefore, from the point of view of either the destructiveness or the destruction of human life, I see no significant difference between the figure of 2,400 or any of the other figures that have been talked about -- even though we would have preferred lower figures.

The significance of this agreement is that a ceiling

has been put on the total number for a ten-year period, so that the argument can no longer be made that the other side is racing into newer and newer fields.

In this respect, incidentally, the argument that "this isn't saving any money" is also incorrect, because if the Soviet Union had built to our expectations of its program, and our reactions would have had to be in terms of our expectations of their program -- if indeed we were going to make a reaction -- we would have had to expend a substantial additional sum to that which we now face.

Now let me come to the throw-weight.

Q Dr. Kissinger.

A Yes.

Q Were these intelligence estimates based on intentional capability?

A These intelligence estimates were based on the best judgment -- well, on a combination of both, really.

We have some indications -- we know, for example, that they have recently converted a certain number of their SS-11 missiles to a newer type. We are, therefore, subtracting those and we are assuming that they wouldn't go through



is not an important part of the issue, because throw-weight is not an entity in itself. Throw-weight is a means to an end. Throw-weight is significant if it is translated into numbers of warheads and accuracy -- and that, in turn, matters if you have specific targets against which to use them.

As I pointed out earlier , to the extent that the United States considers throw-weight significant, there is nothing in the Agreement to prevent us from building things a bit larger.

On the other hand, there is no point in building up a larger throw-weight just for a theoretical quality.

The danger that is seen by us in the Soviet throw-weight, is that it will enable them to multiply numbers of warheads on their missiles, and thereby threaten our land bases.

This danger is not very probable in the existing generation of MIRVs which we are now testing, because the numbers of warheads they have on theirs is not significantly larger than the number of warheads we have on ours; and in some categories, it is smaller than the numbers we have now.

However, if you try to analyze throw-weight, you also



have to analyze the vulnerability of the target.

The Soviet Union has 85 percent of its throw-weight in the most vulnerable target, that is to say in its land-based missile.

The United States has only about 25 percent of its throw-weight in its most vulnerable targets -- i.e. our land-based missiles.

In the 1980s the greater flexibility of our force, and the greater vulnerability of their force, is very likely to bring about a situation in which the threat to their forces is likely to be much greater than the threat to our total force -- regardless of what the weight of the individual warhead is.

So we believe that this agreement has, for the first time in the nuclear age, established a ceiling -- for the first time in the nuclear age, enabled both sides to plan without the fear of an escalating numerical arms race in both the overall numbers and in the numbers of those vehicles which have multiple warheads.

For the first time, it gives us the base from which to negotiate for our reduction and it has eliminated from the negotiations those items that were



most divisive within the Alliance.

So if we are worried about the arms race, not only about the numbers, but about the self-fulfilling properties about the perceptions by each side of the other -- and about the arguments that will have to be used to continue this -- then I believe that the achievements of this ceiling will turn out to have been of considerable historical importance.

Now this is particularly true if you look at the alternative:

The alternative to making this Agreement was for the United States to begin a substantial additional building program of its own.

Certainly, the Soviet Union was not likely to reduce its numbers, if the United States, perceiving its beginning of its MIRV program and its escalation of its own numbers, would do nothing more than maintain its presence. Therefore the realistic choice for the United States was either a substantial buildup now, beginning now, after which, perhaps, somewhat lower levels might have been possible -- or to settle for what was achieved.

Our judgment was that the risk



of this escalating to an arms race -- not to speak of the probability of obtaining it from the Congress -- all combine to argue for making this preliminary settlement now.

So let me stop here.

Q Mr. Secretary, how did it come to pass that the Soviets became unconcerned about the matter of compensation for the British and French and the Chinese missile sites?

A Because -- recognize that somebody had to come to the conclusion that some level of destructive power...


Q Was that a throw-weight point with them, in the first place, or were they really --

A Well, I can only tell you that Alex Johnson used to say to us that there are two points on which the Soviet Union would never give ground:

One is equal aggregate .

And the other was forward based systems.

So I must say that we had all expended an enormous amount of ingenuity, trying to figure out ways of bending these issues, and we were unprepared for the position of the Soviets.



Q They just made it -- huh?

A they just made it.

We had no advance warning and in Moscow, the last word I heard from the Soviet Union was that they were giving us theoretical equality, but they wanted us to deduct from that the British and the French and --

Q Is it thinkable that Brezhnev would have gone to Vladivostok to agree to something that had not been pre-approved by the Politiburo?

A No.

Q Then how could it be anything but "ratified" in Vladivostock on the Soviet part?

A Well on the Soviet side, I can only tell you visually what happened.

AND THIS I WOULD LIKE ON DEEP BACKGROUND This is just to give you a little feel for the situation:

The meeting started with two generals sitting behind Brezhnev -- and whenever we started getting concrete they started slipping little pieces of paper to him, or butting into the conversation one way or the other.

So, at the first break, Dobrynin came to me and asked whether we couldn't confine the meeting to

three people on each side -- which got rid of the two generals.

So after that, whenever numbers came up, we would explore the numbers, and then he would take about a forty-five minutes break, either to consult the two generals and, on at least two occasions, to consult Moscow.

So my estimate is that he had some basic guidelines to start with, which were within the framework of the total negotiations, and then during the night, they came up with the simplifying proposals, which was probably ratified, again, in Moscow -- at least by the Inner Group which could have included Podgorney, Kosygin and Grechko.

Q So that is to say that the Agreement was not fully negotiated in tough bargaining in Vladivostok?

A That is to say it was negotiated in tough bargaining in Vladivostok?

Q If he checked back for Politburo approval after the fact it -- I thought you said.

A I would have thought that he obeyed the guidelines before before he came to Vladivostok -- and then the evolution of the negotiations in Vladivostok was, in my



judgment checked back in Moscow overnight -- and the new proposal he made on Sunday morning, almost certainly resulted -- at least from a Politburo decision.

Q Mr. Secretary, when you speak of the 25 percent of the U.S. throw-weight being land-based, are you speaking of the present configuration or future configuration?

A That is the present configuration.. That is likely to be less.

Q Well, we have 1,054 land-based missiles --

A This includes our bombers.

Q This includes the bombers?

A Yes.

Q So if you take the 450 bombers, plus the 600 odd submarine missiles -- that amounts to 75 percent of our throw-weight?

A Give or take a few percent, yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, the President seemed to hint last night that the forward based systems that you mentioned a few moments ago might be entered into the MBFR talks. Is that likely to --

A Well, this depends on the evolution of the MBFR talks. They have received no such proposal up to now.

Q Mr. Secretary, are you defining as "bombers" in the agreement? Are "backfires" counted, or not counted?

A A lot of this is to be negotiated.

From the legislative record of these negotiations one would exclude the Backfires and the F-111 but would include the B-52 and B-1 and (inaudible).

Q From the legislative record of your negotiations -- are you referring to the Vladivostok negotiations?

A Well, October negotiations -- Vladivostok negotiations, and what has been discussed at Geneva.

Q That would exclude the Backfires?

A It would exclude the Backfires and the F-111 because the Backfires would be in a completely different category.

Q Mr. Kissinger, you indicated in Vladivostok that you felt that the Agreement would meet the approval of Senator Jackson. Had you had some previous discussion with him?

A I may have been a little bit hasty, because it seemed to me that since he criticized the previous Agreement for setting levels too low, that I was not quite

prepared for having disagreement attached for setting the levels too high.

And secondly, since Senator Jackson had always insisted that the major fault of the previous agreement was the absence of equality -- and since this Agreement achieved an equality in all of the categories and excluded all of the items that he had always said should be excluded -- I got carried away by the heady atmosphere of Vladivostok. It must have been the heat. [Laughter.]

Q You were dazzled.

Q Mr. Secretary, could I -- I am having a little difficulty with your discussion about whether or not there are permitted additional weapons and that sort of thing.

And also, the whole thing of the intelligence estimate, that you are suggesting that they may be going ahead with future programs that we hadn't heard of yet.

A Just a minute, now just a minute, that just isn't true.

In every NSC briefing, for a period of over a year and a half, we have been presented intelligence estimates of what the Soviets would be likely to do in the MIRV field

and what they were likely to do in the field of total numbers. So that this is nothing new. These numbers were substantially accepted by the whole intelligence community but they were refined in the period before -- but they didn't change much of the intelligence estimates that had been basically accepted and never challenged.

Q Well all right --

A The fact that you may have not heard of them before --

Q If I have the content of this straight, if I understand it correctly, on the basis of generally understood publications --

A Yes.

Q We have had about 800 deployed MIRVs.

We have had publicly announced plans for something in the neighborhood of a thousand.

And this Agreement sets a level of 1,320.

The Soviets, at this point, as far as we know, don't have any MIRVs.

A That is right.

Q So the Agreement in 10 years would permit them to build up to this 1320. And each one of those

missiles would have a certain number of warheads.

Now the thing that I'm having difficulty with here is, obviously, it would cost billions of dollars for them to build up to the level where we are now, and it would take a great period of time to do it, too.

A Yes.

Q And this is a catch-up for them, as far as the MIRVs are concerned.

A Yes.

Q And what you are saying is that we have set this number "high" if I understand correctly -- or the number has been set high -- or we have been satisfied with the number set this high -- because of our fears that they might have wanted to go way beyond where we are now.

Is that right?

A Way beyond --

Q 1320?

A Way beyond the 1320, that is right.

Q So we actually believe that they not only were prepared to spend the billions of dollars to catch up with us, but to go way beyond?

A That we believe that this might well be the case,

yes.

Q How long have you had that conception?

About a year and a half?

A I think any of you who have heard me speak about this problem, have heard me speak with a great sense of urgency, that if the MIRV development were not brought under control, that it would drive both sides in a direction which would become unmanageable.

And it was based on these intelligence estimates plus the fact that if the Soviet Union had decided, after the expiration of the Interim Agreement to put its MIRVs into new holes, rather than into the old holes -- then if you assumed that they were aiming to give any number -- 1,500 missiles -- 1,500 MIRVs -- we might have faced a missile force of 4,000 rather than 2,500 -- if that had been their decision. I am not saying it would have been their decision, but it was certainly their option.

Now, it is not true that our program was only a thousand. Our program was well above a thousand.

Q Our program is publicly announced.

A Well our program is publicly announced, whatever it is -- we have set the level at roughly our program.

Q It speaks -- the intention of our program was "about 1320."

A Give or take --

Q And publicly announced -- we have about a thousand.

A I haven't followed what the publicly announced program is -- I think they have announced it for five years but I haven't seen what the publicly announced program is.

Q It was projected for 1286.

That is based on what -- on the TRIDENT?

A You had the TRIDENTS and the Poseidon the Minute men -- and you will come to the figure that Murrey said.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the same question that he raised, how does one logically reconcile the fact that the Soviet Union, which you say was going to be far beyond any of these projections last October and previously, or last June, was talking with us about a figure half the size of the 1320? What is the logical rationale there?

A First of all, the Soviet Union did not accept the figure--which was a little higher than half -- for a five-year period. Here we are talking about a ten-year period. Since the Soviet Union did not accept the figure, which was somewhat larger than half of what we settled for for a five-year period, which was the beginning of their MIRV program, you have a rather good estimate that for the second five-year period they would have done at least as much again, and, therefore, in a ten-year period you would have been well above 1320.

Q Who wanted the 1320? Is that the Russian figure or the American figure?

A It's substantially our figure. I'm not saying we couldn't have had a hundred less.

Q Mr. Secretary, we could have had three or four hundred less would you say?

A I doubt it.





Q Mr. Secretary, that raises a basic question -- and this is the last one I want to ask -- but essentially --

A We were told, incidentally, by the Defense Department that once you got above 700 MIRVs we might just as well [inaudible] our program.

Q Why is that, because the cost gets phenomenal?

Q The MIRV deployment began since you became advisor to President Nixon.

A That is right, but the development didn't begin.

Q Not the development; the deployment.

A Yes.

Q Now, very seriously, as you look back at it now are you sorry you went ahead with the MIRV?

A Well, that's a good question. And I think this is the same question that people faced when the hydrogen bomb was developed. And it raises the issue whether your development of MIRVs or of a weapon produces the development on the other side, or whether by not going ahead you then simply give an advantage to the other side.

I would say in retrospect that I wish I had thought through the implications of a MIRVed world more

thoughtfully in 1969 and 1970 than I did. What conclusion I would then have come to I don't know. But I would like for you gentlemen to remember this, megalomaniac as I am, I do not claim that I made the basic weapons decision in 1969 and '70. But I still wish I had thought through the implications of the MIRVed world more fully in 1969 and 1970. But this was not the problem we faced from '72 on.

Q Mr. Secretary, it seems to me there is a basic conflict here I would like to get squared away. If I understand correctly --

A My relation to the various bureaus is that of the Queen of England and her Cabinet, each bureau gets two hours of my time. Go ahead.

Q I wanted to ask about what appears to be a conflict between what you and the President are saying about putting a cap on the growth of weapons development and what this agreement actually provides to the extent that I understand it.

A It puts a ceiling on the numbers of weapons, in certain categories.

Q Right. And you have always said, if I understood correctly, that warheads are in many respects a key figure simply because one is killed by warheads and

not by vehicles.

A That is true.

Q Now, since numbers of warheads are not limited and throw-weight is not limited -- indeed, we have said that we maintain the option to build up our throw-weight -- isn't it misleading to say that a ceiling has been put on the numbers of weapons?

A In the sense that you argue that the number of warheads can be increased.

Q Yes.

A Well, we have a good estimate -- in fact, we have a certain estimate -- of the number of warheads that the Soviet Union had deployed on their present missiles because we have some idea of their testing program. And they are not likely to deploy a warhead that they hadn't tested. That's axiomatic. So to all practical purposes we have an estimate of the total number of warheads that are going to be deployed at that period. And they have a rather good estimate of the total number of warheads that we are likely to deploy in that period.


Now, it is, of course, possible that the two sides, within the total limit of 1320, could develop warheads which

have larger numbers -- could develop MIRVs which have larger number of total warheads on them than the MIRVs that are presently designed. The question will soon have to be raised. In fact, it is a question that will have to be raised now: What is the advantage in multiplying the number of warheads beyond a certain point? As all of you know, I have never taken the view of numerical equality as seriously as some other people.

First of all, our estimate is that in the number of warheads, we will remain ahead in this ten-year period, for a variety of reasons, including the greater sophistication of our MIRVs. But in any event, we will reach a total number in which whether you build more warheads or not it seems extremely unlikely to give you a decisive, or even significant, superiority. You have that theoretical capability within the 1320 limit.

And, moreover, I would like to point out that we intend as soon as this agreement is ratified and begins to operate to begin negotiations on the reduction.

Q Mr. Secretary, two questions about the reduction. One you have just answered. One, does this agreement as it now stands commit both sides to enter into



negotiation for reduction at some point, and, if so, at what point?

A It permits both sides to enter into negotiations for reduction no later than 1980.

Q Mr. Secretary, can I follow that up, please, if I may? As I read it, you are not committing yourself to begin the negotiations before December of 1981.

A 1980 or 1981.

Q Right, but it could begin as late as December 1980 as I read the agreement. The question really is, realistically do you have any expectation that such arms reduction talks will begin seriously long before that?

A That will be our effort. And I think that once proposals on both sides have stabilized -- you see, the Soviet Union will have to reduce their forces to get to the level of 2400. If they deploy some of their new forces, some of the land-based mobiles that people are talking about, they will have to reduce even more forces. I think once the equal aggregates have been reached -- or put it another way, once the Soviets have gone down to the level that is required, I think we will certainly urge the beginning of talks on reduction. And I have great hopes

that we will succeed.

Q Well, at what point -- how long will it take them to MIRV up to a point where they will be willing to enter into arms reduction talks?

A Well, supposing the arms reduction brings about a reduction in the number of MIRVs and they haven't yet reached that level. So what? Then they would just not build up to the presently permitted and only build up to the newly permitted levels. I think it will be easier to have reduction talks once you are not in an open-ended arms race in which both sides are watching production programs of the other, whose scope they cannot assess.

Q Mr. Secretary, you described here, if I get it correctly, a process over these last months in which the Soviet Union point by point gave in to us while we resolutely held our ground. I guess I have two questions. What did we give up to them? And if you did not yield at some point in the last month anything to them, what's your reasoning on why this came about?

A I believe that one of the difficulties of the previous negotiations was the uncertainty of our domestic situation. Conversely, I think that they confronted a new President as an individual with whom they might have

to deal for a six-year period. Secondly, they dealt with a President unencumbered by past history, who, therefore, if he failed to get an agreement could go back to his original defense orientation and really pick up the arms race. Thirdly, I believe that they probably attempted to vindicate the significance of detente by getting off on the right foot with a new President or with a new Administration.

I think it was a combination of all, plus fourthly, they probably analyzed what I believe any thoughtful analyst of the strategic situation would have to do--that the field of strategic forces superiority is an illusive concept. And I think it was a combination of all of these factors that produced rather significant movement between July and December -- and I must tell you quite candidly, rather unexpectedly.

Q How many warheads do you foresee on each side in 1985?

A A very substantial number.

Q Well, we can multiply out and figure about what we would have. And do you anticipate the Russians about the same number.



A Well, I would expect us to have somewhat above 10,000, and I would expect the Soviets to have less.

Q Do your figures work out to about 11,000, Mr. Secretary?

A That sounds reasonable to me. I haven't multiplied it out. I expect the Soviets to be below that.

Q Somewhat less?

A Maybe 9,000. It depends how many warheads. . .

Q Mr. Secretary, you say the Soviets would have to reduce their force level --

A Could we put all the figures ON DEEP BACKGROUND. All the figures I give I would like to put on DEEP BACKGROUND so that you multiply it out.

Q You mentioned the Soviets would have to reduce their forces. You mean the forces they actually have deployed?

A The Soviet Union under SALT I are permitted, and would reach, something like 950 plus 1401. 2350.

Q But they are not at that level now?

A Well, it depends. If you count the SS-7, they are at that level now because what they are doing now is to trade in SS-7s and 8s for submarine-launched missiles.



So if you count the 210 SS-7s and 8s, they are in the area between 2300 and 2400. And if you add the 150 bombers that they have, they are about at a total level of 2500 right now. So they will have to give up probably their bomber force.

Q Mr. Secretary, what's your estimate of the Chinese nuclear capacity five years from now at a time when the reduction talks are supposed to start between here and Moscow?

A Insignificant.

Q Still insignificant?

A Well, if you talk about strategic nuclear forces, I believe it will be insignificant.

Q Dr. Kissinger, just on the subject of throw-weight again, you conceded here this afternoon that, at least theoretically, the Soviets have the potential of increasing the number of warheads that a given missile could deliver given their greater throw-weight, theoretically.

A So do we. We could increase the number of warheads on our missiles at least as fast as the Soviet Union could, because you have to assume that the Soviet Union is going to deploy the warheads which they have recently tested. You cannot assume that they are going to deploy a larger number of warheads than those they have

tested. Therefore, you have to assume that this generation of Soviet MIRVs is going to use the number of warheads that they have tested. That number is comparable to the number of warheads that we carry on smaller missiles because of our superior technology.

If either side considers it more important, we could, if we wanted to, put more warheads even on our existing missiles. We have the additional option if we wanted, to to design a larger missile to put into the existing holes which could carry many more warheads. So if you are asking about who could expand the number of his warheads more rapidly, the Soviet Union or we, I would say that over the period of the agreement I would bet on us.

Q What I was really asking is what is to prevent there being, in effect, another arms race in that given area?

A The fact that it doesn't make a great deal of sense to increase the number.

Q Yes, but you have frequently told us that what is important is the perception that each side has of the other. And I can easily see this becoming a political football in this country.



A The capacity of this country to develop political footballs seems to me to be unlimited. (Laughter) But I'll tell you what my recommendation to the President would be. It would be that we would not go into wild multiplication until we see the Soviets actually testing something.

Q On this question of policing the MIRVs, Mr. Secretary, would you dwell briefly on that? Isn't that an area we are going to have to go into now, and isn't it tough and intricate, a major issue?

A The major issue in the negotiations now is going to be the verification issue. And it is because of an accident of Soviet design, luckily not as difficult as it might easily be. Let me explain.

The Soviets have developed missiles to carry their MIRVs which do not fit into the existing silos; in other words, which require extensive modifications of the existing silos. Therefore, we will assume that any silo that is being substantially modified will be carrying a MIRV missile. Therefore, we will be able to count the number of their missiles by the number of silo modifications of that type, with which we are very familiar and which are undisputed.



Or to put it in another way, any missile that has been tested in a MIRV mode successfully will be counted by us as being MIRVed. In other words, we will not permit the Soviet Union to claim that they are deploying an SS-17 or 19 with the argument that it will only have a single warhead since we believe that the testing program on the SS-17 and 19 has been substantially successfully concluded. Any silo that we see modified to take an SS-17 or 19 we would count as being MIRVed.

This is one of the issues that will have to be discussed in the verification. Otherwise, there is almost no other way of verifying because you could not accept the unsupported statement of the Soviet Union that certain silos have only single warheads.

Q How can they find out about ours, Mr. Secretary?

A Because they read Aviation Weekly.

Q But, Mr. Secretary, to get back to this question. Might it not come down to the need for on-site inspection.

A Dobrynin told me the other day about a weapon I didn't know we possessed, and his description of it was perfect. I checked in the Pentagon. It was exactly the right the characteristics. It won't come along until 1980. He

had read it in a technical journal. It didn't help us in the negotiations.

Q Can I ask this? Might we not have to go to on-site inspection to make certain that they are obeying the limit?

A No. There may have to be certain collateral restraints, into which I do not want to go now. But I believe that it is quite possible -- we have gone over this in the Verification Panel on innumerable occasions -- that if we can obtain the position that any silo that accepts a 17 or 19 missile -- and we have already told the Soviets that this is going to be our definition -- and after the 18 program is completed, which it is not yet, any silo that accepts SS-18 missiles will be treated as MIRVed, I think we have a largely fool-proof method of inspection, with a few collateral restraints.

On submarines, the problem is going to be somewhat more complicated because we have not yet seen any tests of their submarine-based missiles. Therefore, we don't know what the characteristics will be. But on the whole we would have to again assume that any submarine capable of carrying a MIRVed missile, once the missile has



been tested, likely will have to be counted as MIRVed, just as all of our submarines will have to be counted as MIRVed.

Q Well, could they have 17s and 19s in silos that haven't been modified?

A No.

Q All those that have the new missiles have been modified?

A That's right. And on that we have no question. And they have never --

Q You said they had never what?

A This is the argument that we have put to them. They have never rejected it. They've also never accepted it. But it's the only possible -- if that is rejected, I see no other basis for inspection. When you talk, Peter, of on-site inspection, we went through that drill in '69 and '70 when we didn't understand the MIRV problem well enough and thought you could simply screw a MIRV warhead on an existing missile. And actually, on-site inspection wouldn't help you very much because you would have to have a random inspection, you couldn't inspect every missile every day. With the time delays that would be involved until you get to the site, they could easily take

off the MIRV warhead and put on a single warhead, have a MIRV storage, and when you leave put the MIRV back on the missile.

Q Just like used car dealers? (Laughter)

A Really I would not know how you would run on-site inspection.

Q Would it be fair to say that if they rejected the verification formula there is no deal?

A If they reject the verification formula, unless there is enormous ingenuity in which we come up with another one, I really wouldn't know where to begin. I think if they reject verification it will be very hard to conceive how there can be a deal.

Q What is your feeling? Do you think they will accept it?

A I think they will accept it. I cannot conceive that they have gone this far in order to blow up the agreement now when verification is used, when it was very easy to blow it up on numbers.

Q Unless they are buying time.

A What time are they buying? Maybe one cycle of the defense budget. If we find out by next April that they are stalling on verification, and if they are worried

about us going into a bigger defense program, I think we would have a much better chance with Congress having in good faith accepted these numbers and then finding that the numbers evaporate because they won't agree to really the only reasonable inspection system that can be designed. And there is no alternative to this inspection.

Q What is your aide memoire? How detailed is that?

A It is about what I have described.

Q Is it a very lengthy agreement?

A It's about a page. It has the numbers. I gave you the numbers.

Q Mr. Secretary, given the psychology of the arms race up to now, why do you think that pressures won't develop to keep improving the weapons that are agreed on?

A Well, but to say that you haven't got anything because you haven't got everything is a very dangerous course.

Q I'm saying for the future, spending for example.

A Well, whether you are improving weapons within an accepted ceiling or whether you are driving



the ceiling while you are improving the weapons seems to me two different problems. It's quite possible that some improvements within the existing weapons would be possible. Again you have to distinguish two categories. The improvement in the Soviet force after they reach their ceiling will be composed of 1320 MIRVs and 1080 unMIRVed vehicles. My guess is that most of them will be ICBMs. The improvements that you can make in single-warhead weapons in relation to the strategic utility are relatively marginal. So you are asking -- we have greater flexibility making improvements because our force is going to be composed of bombers and other elements. Now, the area of improvement is likely to be, therefore, in MIRVs. Now, you can improve accuracy, and you can improve yield. Then you have to ask yourself again, why?

The strategically unsettling effect of improvement in accuracy and yield is not as large when it is constricted within fixed numerical limits as it is when it is also driven by larger numbers. I find it conceptually very hard to see how you could get a decisive advantage by technological innovations that are now foreseeable in the offensive forces over the period of this agreement. I may be wrong, but I

think that by limiting the numbers of both the qualitatively worrisome and the overall figures you have put some very significant constrictions on the arms race.

Q But the Pentagon will surely want to try in the technological area to see if they can do this?

A Probably. But at some point I think the futility of this -- it's one thing when you say the other side is building at this curve and if you don't match them they are going to get strategic superiority. That's one argument. Another argument is when you say you have relatively stable forces and they are going to get marginal improvement in accuracy and marginal improvements in yield against fixed forces where you cannot define how you would use it. I think that's a more difficult problem.

Q Mr. Secretary, is it fair to say at this stage that the agreement in Vladivostok rules out the possibility that either side could achieve in the next ten years a first-strike capability?

A I would say that yes. With the limitation you can say that there is a first-strike capability against certain categories of weapons. I would think that the land-based missiles on both sides are going to become increasingly vulnerable. And that is in any case going to

happen, with or without this agreement. Then it is up to each side to compose its forces so that the land-based forces are not the most significant element in its force. And this I must say is a bigger problem for the Soviets than for us because over that ten-year period our land-based force is not going to be the most significant element in our force.

Q How are we going to verify that there is not an increase in their land-based mobiles?

A The factor of confidence we have with respect to land-based mobiles is, of course, much less than it is with respect to land-based fixed. Land-based fixed we have almost a hundred percent confidence. Land-based mobile we could be off by some 25 percent.

You have to remember now that any land-based mobile of any quantity will have to come out of either the submarines or the land-based fixed. So if you talk of a few hundred, we might be off by -- you know, it depends -- 25 to 30 percent of the total number of land-based mobiles. And we believe that our accuracy of verification -- we know that our accuracy of that will improve over ten years.

Q So we are depending on their good faith to take off of something what they add on to the land-based mobiles?

A We are not at all counting on their good faith. In our judgment, we will catch two-third to three-quarters of their land-based mobiles. They could hide the percentage which we think -- the percentage of inaccuracy. But since they don't know the percentage of our inaccuracy, it would be running a risk. But that margin exists.

Q Mr. Secretary, I got the impression from you in Moscow that the breakthrough on FBS was made in Moscow on your last trip there rather than Vladivostok.

A The breakthrough on FBS was substantially made in Moscow, but the breakthrough on the British and French nuclear forces was made at Vladivostok.

Q How can you say, Mr. Secretary, that the Joint Chiefs agreed to this proposal when you say it was not completed until Vladivostok?

A First of all, there are two separate issues. The main lines of our proposals were completed before Vladivostok. And the fact that we were willing to concede somewhat lower numbers in return for larger MIRVs than the

Soviets were willing. We were in touch with Secretary Schlesinger on several occasions on Saturday. But I think one can always assume that if the Soviet Union gives you slightly larger numbers than you were prepared to accept that this would not be vetoed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We were reasonably confident that the Joint Chiefs would approve, and we were not disappointed.

Q No, that part is clear. What about the other side of it though? You were saying by implication if you had tried to go down two or three hundred you would have had a battle on your hands from the Joint Chiefs.

A Not only with the Joint Chiefs. It depends in what category the going down would have taken place.

Q Mr. Secretary, can I go back to the reduction thing just once because of the importance that Senator Jackson, amongst others, at least professes to attach? From what level, at what point, do we hope again to negotiate reductions?

A From the level agreed in these numbers.

Q Before they are attained?

A We are perfectly prepared to discuss this before they are attained.

I must say, to say that this agreement is inadequate because it doesn't reduce defense spending, and that what we should have done is to get lower numbers when the only way we could have even talked about lower numbers is to drastically increase defense spending and to hold the increase for a large number of years long enough to convince the Soviets that we were going to drive the race through the ceiling with them, at which point we would have got vested interests in this country to accept even the figures that we were going to talk about, seems to me an argument that I find very difficult to deal with. And when at this particular point in terms of the threat to civilization, the strategic stability or any other criteria you can think of, it does not make a great deal of difference whether you have 2400 or 2200, as long as you have a ceiling against which both sides can plan for a ten-year period, something that has never happened in the entire nuclear age when both sides were constantly driven by their fears of what the other side might do. Then I believe that we had an obligation to try to settle for this and not haggle about -- well, there was no possibility for haggling except by driving the arms race.

If we had gone back to Geneva when obviously the

Soviets attach great symbolic importance to the first meeting between Brezhnev and President Ford in light of all the pressures that had existed against detente -- and I must say one other thing, that if this agreement in which the Soviet Union made very major concessions should suffer the fate of some other negotiations, then we must ask ourselves whether on the other side the whole process of detente may not be drawn into the most serious question. Because here they met every point that all the critics of detente had consistently made, actually quite unexpectedly, in which equality is achieved in all significant categories, in which the arms race in terms of numbers is at least limited, and even qualitative improvements will have to be affected by the fact that they cannot be translated into quantity, I believe that really as a country we should not denigrate this thing.

Q For comparison purposes, could you give us the figures that the intelligence community came up with about Soviet intentions or capabilities?

A Well, it's not as simple as Soviet intentions. There are some pretty sophisticated analyses that go into it. If you look at it, analyze the number of Soviet submarines, for example, that are capable of taking the missile large

enough to be a plausible candidate for a MIRV. They look at the number of SS-11 silos that have been recently modified. You know, we could easily claim that every SS-11 silo could take a 17 or a 19. And it probably could, and it probably will over a ten-year period. If the Soviet Union had converted every silo it has and every submarine it has, it could have gone well over 2,000 MIRV missiles. We tried to make it a more realistic assessment on the basis of those silos that had recently been modernized to take another type of warhead which is not MIRVed but more similar to our Polaris warhead, deducted those from the total number of SS-11s, made some analysis of what a rational allocation would be between SS-9s and SS-18s, looked at the submarines to see the likely candidates for MIRVing, and came to the conclusion that the number of MIRVs would be substantially above the figure of 1320. And the lowest intelligence projection was substantially above 1320. And I might add that at no time in the last ten years have the Soviets operated at our lowest intelligence projection. The median intelligence projection is more reasonably regarded as significant both in total numbers and in MIRVs.



Q Mr. Secretary, why do you assume that all the SS-11s are eventually going to be replaced by the bigger throw-weight missiles when your own point is that the greater throw-weight really is a phony issue?

A I'm not saying that all the SS-11s are being replaced. I just got through saying that not all the SS-11s would be replaced by the bigger throw-weight. It isn't a question of bigger throw-weight. The SS-11 is unMIRVed. The bigger throw-weight missile is MIRVed. Therefore, the Soviets have the capability, just as we have the capability of transforming every Minuteman into a MIRV missile, to transform every SS-11 silo into an SS-17 or SS-19.

Q But you don't think they'll do it?

A Under this constraint they can't do it -- under this 1320 constraint. Well, they can do it only -- they now have choices to make. Under the 1320 constraint it is impossible for them to convert all the SS-11s and also have a significant submarine program and also convert the SS-9s. So if you assume that they will do a mix, then we have certain estimates of how they are going to go about it. And even there, in our judgment, they are going to be a little bit strapped.

Q Mr. Secretary, when and how do you foresee this coming before the Senate?

A Well, I don't know whether the Senate is going to start, whether the Senate is going to be seized with this in the form of hearing. Our expectation is that we can conclude the negotiation of this agreement, the most important elements of which have after all been negotiated. Principally the verification issue is remaining. We hope that we can finish it in time for a signature in May or June when General Secretary Brezhnev comes here. It would then go to the Congress. We haven't decided yet whether to put it before the Congress like SALT I or in the form of a treaty. More likely in the form of SALT I showing action by both houses. I would think July or August.

Q Would you think that hearings could be held now, however, or with the new Congress?

A I have heard that hearings are very likely. And I just hope that restraint will be exercised in not turning this into a political issue. I mean there may be serious differences of opinion, and those should be fully aired.

Q Mr. Secretary, can a rational argument be

made now on dropping the Trident?

A Well, not in my view.

Q How do you justify the Trident now? What do you need it for in this kind of agreement?

A Well, the question about the Trident is the same now as it was before. The fact that you now have a ceiling on MIRVs does not affect the composition of your forces by which you reach that ceiling. And I think that is an issue into which I will be delighted to go .

Unfortunately, I have to see Senator Byrd.

Can we agree that any figure I gave of an intelligence nature, composition of Soviet forces, etc., the figures I gave you about the agreement you can put ON BACKGROUND. Any other figures please use ON DEEP BACKGROUND.

Q Thank you, sir.

(The briefing was terminated at 5:40 p.m.)