


The original documents are located in Box 26, folder “State Department - Kissinger Speeches and Statements (1)” of the Ron Nessen Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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The Secretary of State



Statement

October 7, 1975
Washington, D. C.

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services

EGYPT-ISRAEL AGREEMENT

The following is a statement by Secretary Kissinger before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 7, 1975.

I welcome this opportunity to appear before your committee to testify on the recent agreement between Israel and Egypt. That agreement—if carried out in good faith by both parties—may well mark a historic turning point away from the cycle of war and stalemate that has for so long afflicted Israelis and Arabs and the world at large. I am here to urge prompt and positive congressional action to help further the prospects for peace in the Middle East.

For more than 30 years the issues in dispute in that troubled region have been recognized by successive American Administrations as having profound consequences for America's own interests. The U.S. diplomatic role in the Middle East is a matter of vital national importance:

- We have a historic and moral commitment to the survival and security of Israel.
- We have important interests in the Arab world with its 150 million people and the world's largest oil reserves.
- We know that the world's hopes, and our own, for economic recovery and progress could be dashed by another upheaval in the Middle East.
- We must avoid the severe strains on our relations with our allies in Europe and Japan that perpetual crisis in the Middle East would almost certainly entail.
- We face the dangers of a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation, with its attendant nuclear risk, if tension in the Middle East should increase.

The October war of 1973 brought home to every American, in concrete and dramatic ways,

the price we pay for continued Arab-Israeli conflict. The oil embargo triggered by that war cost us 500,000 jobs, more than \$10 billion in national production, and a rampant inflation. The 1973 crisis put our alliances with Western Europe and Japan under the most serious strain they had ever known. And it brought us to the verge of a confrontation with the Soviet Union, requiring us to place our military forces on a global alert.

Thus for the most basic reasons of national policy we owe it to the American people to do all we can to insure that the Middle East moves toward peace and away from conflict.

If the past two years of vigorous diplomatic endeavor have promoted the prospects of peace—as I believe they have—the United States has made the difference. We have maintained our special relationship with Israel, while at the same time dramatically improving our relations with the Arab world. It is the United States alone among the world's nations that both Israel and its Arab neighbors have been prepared to trust. This link of confidence must be maintained. Without it the Middle East will have lost the key element of its stability. Without it the period ahead—difficult at best—may well grow unmanageable.

It is our strong conviction that the Sinai agreement is indispensable to the process of peace. Were I here today to report that we had failed to obtain a Sinai agreement, I would have to tell you as well that the prospects of still another Arab-Israeli war were infinitely and eminently greater. Instead, I can state that the prospects for peace in the Middle East have been significantly advanced and that good chances exist for even further progress—if we have the wisdom and the national will to seize the opportunity before us.

Hailed by both Prime Minister Rabin and President Sadat as a possible turning point, the Sinai agreement represents the most far-reaching, practical test of peace—political, military, and psychological—in the long and tragic history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the first time in more than two decades, Israel and an Arab state have agreed not just to disentangle their forces in the aftermath of war but to commit themselves to the peaceful resolution of the differences that for so long have made them mortal enemies.

Thus, what we are proposing to the Congress—as we seek approval for the stationing of no more than 200 technicians in the Sinai—is an investment in peace. But we must never forget that the most precarious part of the road toward a just and lasting peace still lies ahead. We will require national unity and a sympathetic understanding for the delicacy of the process if we are to continue the journey. With these considerations in mind, Mr. Chairman, I urge this committee and the Congress to respond promptly and sympathetically to the President's request for approval of the stationing of up to 200 Americans in the Sinai—a request that has now been before the Congress for more than four weeks.

The proposed American presence is a limited but crucial American responsibility. It is not a role we sought; it is a role we accepted reluctantly, at the request of both sides—and only when it was clear that there would be no agreement without it. The American personnel will be volunteers, and they will be civilian. Their function is to assist in an early-warning system in the small area of the Sinai passes in the U.N. buffer zone. They are not combat personnel or advisers for one side; they will serve both sides, at their request. They will complement the U.N. military contingents already there from such countries as Canada, Sweden, Austria, and Finland whose responsibility it is to protect the buffer zone. Nor is our own presence in the area new—36 Americans are serving there at this moment with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; Americans have been serving in this capacity for over 25 years.

The proposal we ask you to approve provides that the President may withdraw these volunteer technicians if we believe them to be in jeopardy or no longer necessary. We are prepared as well to accept the congressional proposal to make withdrawal mandatory in the event of hostilities.

Mr. Chairman, I am well aware of, and re-

spect, this committee's desire to be certain that it has before it all undertakings relevant to its consideration and approval of the proposal for U.S. participation in the Sinai early-warning system.

We have made an unprecedented effort to meet the committee's concerns. Within days of my return from the Middle East we voluntarily supplied to the committees of Congress, on a classified basis, highly sensitive material relevant to the negotiation of the Sinai accord. Included in this material was information from the record of the negotiations of the very category which President Washington declined to furnish to the House of Representatives in 1794 and which no Administration has supplied since.

Four weeks ago, we provided four sets of documents to the appropriate congressional committees. They are:

- First, the U.S. proposal for stationing technicians in the Sinai.
- Second, the unclassified agreement between Israel and Egypt, and its military annex.
- Third, the classified documents which the Administration has certified include all of the assurances, undertakings, and commitments which we consider to be legally binding upon the United States. These documents also contain many provisions which are not considered legally binding; they were submitted because they were contained in documents which include binding clauses and which were initialed or signed by the United States and one of the parties.
- Fourth, extracts from other classified documents in the negotiating record which the Administration believes are legally binding assurances, undertakings, or commitments. We have included in this category certain provisions which, although not regarded by the Administration as binding, might be so regarded by others.

Finally, the Legal Adviser of the State Department submitted yesterday to this committee on a classified basis a memorandum which provides his assessment of the legal character of all the documents previously given to the Congress.

We presented these classified documents on the assumption that they would be treated as if they had been transmitted under the Case Act which provides for submission of executive agreements to the Congress, but with "an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the President."

Mr. Chairman, the executive branch has complied with both the letter and spirit of the committee's resolution requesting the President to inform the committee "of all the assurances and undertakings by the United States on which Israel and Egypt are relying in entering into the Sinai Agreement. . ." I am authorized on behalf of the President to state that there are *no other* assurances or undertakings, beyond those already submitted to the Congress, which are binding upon the United States. We will make no contrary claim in the future; nor can any other government.

Mr. Chairman, if there has been a disagreement between this committee and the executive branch over the past several weeks, it has concerned not disclosure to the Congress—which has been complete—but the *form* of disclosure to the public.

We had hoped that a summary could be worked out with the committee which could have been certified as containing all commitments so that the full Senate would feel free to vote unreservedly on the U.S. technicians. This procedure was intended as a means of satisfying the needs of the Congress and the rights of the American people to know, while at the same time maintaining the integrity and confidentiality of the diplomatic process. We believed that we were following the precedents set in previous negotiations in the Middle East, when classified documents were submitted to the Congress but not made public. Our purpose was to avoid a situation in which other governments would feel compelled to take a public position and to protect our ability to act as a mediator in the future.

This plan became problematical when the confidential documents were leaked. This created a new and very difficult situation. The Administration disagrees with the decision of the committee to publish these documents and maintains that it in no way sets a precedent. We consider that the provisions of the Case Act regarding classification remain valid; they should be respected in the future.

We recognize that the committee faced an unusual problem to which no good answer existed. We are prepared to work with this committee to develop procedures for future negotiations which will permit ground rules to be clearly established in advance so that all parties will know what to expect.

With regard to the U.S. undertakings, the Ad-

ministration is particularly concerned about two points:

- First, that congressional approval of the proposal on the technicians not link the Sinai agreement to the U.S. undertakings—which are distinct and separate; and
- Second, that U.S. statements of intention not be given a legally binding character which was never intended and is not inherent in them.

The Administration is convinced that congressional approval of the proposal to station technicians in the Sinai does not import or imply approval of anything more.

The United States is not a party to the Sinai agreement. That agreement is between Israel and Egypt; they are the only signatories and the only states bound by it. The agreement repeatedly speaks of the obligations of "the parties"; it is beyond dispute that "the parties" are Egypt and Israel, and *not* the United States.

The agreement provides, in an annex, that in the buffer zone between Egypt and Israel—in which the United Nations Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions—there will be established an early-warning system entrusted to U.S. civilian personnel. The proposal of the United States, for which approval of the Congress is being sought, provides details of that early-warning system. That proposal is described as a *part* of the agreement between Egypt and Israel, but that does not imply that the United States is party to this agreement. By the same token the U.S. assurances and undertakings before this committee, while given on the occasion of, and concordant with, the conclusion of the Sinai agreement between Egypt and Israel, are not in any sense part of the Sinai agreement.

Thus, even if the United States were unable to fulfill all of the intentions we have expressed, the parties—Egypt and Israel—would nonetheless remain bound by the Sinai agreement. The obligations of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement are clear, direct, and unqualified; they stand on their own.

A vote in favor of the specific, limited U.S. role in the early-warning system will not thereby commit the Congress to a position on any other issue—whether it be the question of undertakings and assurances to the parties involved, our continuing relations with various countries of the area, a given level of budget support, or our policies and

programs in the Middle East. Those are separate issues which you will want to consider carefully at the appropriate time. Many will come up in the normal authorization and appropriation process; they are not an integral part of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement.

Let me turn now to the question of the nature of American assurances and undertakings to Israel and Egypt.

The special position of trust enjoyed by the United States inevitably means that both sides attach great significance to our views. Statements of our intentions, therefore, served as a lubricant in this most recent negotiation just as they have in every previous mediation effort. But they must be seen in perspective and in the light of historical practice. It is extremely important, therefore, that in approving the sending of U.S. technicians the Congress should take care not inadvertently to create commitments that were never intended.

We have submitted all documents containing U.S. commitments. Not all provisions in these documents amount to binding undertakings. They include:

- First, assurances by the United States of our political intentions. These are often statements typical of diplomatic exchange; in some instances they are merely formal reaffirmations of existing American policy. Other provisions refer to contingencies which may never arise and are related—sometimes explicitly—to present circumstances subject to rapid change.

- Second, undertakings or assurances by the United States which are conditional on existing or prior authorization and appropriation by the Congress or which fall within the constitutional authority of the President to conduct the foreign relations of the United States.

Thus to speak of memoranda of agreement as executive agreements is by no means to say that each of their individual provisions is binding upon the United States. That depends entirely upon the content of the specific provisions in question. Moreover, nothing in these particular documents

constrains congressional action in any issue involving the future legislative process.

The fact that many provisions are not by any standard international commitments does not mean, of course, that the United States is morally or politically free to act as if they did not exist. On the contrary, they are important statements of diplomatic policy and engage the good faith of the United States so long as the circumstances that gave rise to them continue. But they are not binding commitments of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to conclude with this thought: the Sinai accord could prove to be a historic milestone. It is not a peace agreement, but it can be an important step in that direction.

The United States remains committed to helping bring a just, durable, and comprehensive peace to the Middle East. We do not consider the Sinai agreement as permitting stagnation in the process of negotiation; its purpose is to give impetus to that process. We are prepared to work with *all* the parties toward a solution of *all* the issues yet remaining—including the issue of the future of the Palestinians.

Whether the Sinai agreement fulfills its promise depends crucially on the confidence and trust America inspires. Yet we cannot gain—nor retain—confidence abroad if we lack it at home. Whether there will be peace or war in the Middle East depends importantly on whether America is at peace with itself, whether America is united in its purpose.

The challenge now is to build on the progress that has been made. So let us get on with the job, for there will be no Sinai accord unless the Congress of the United States takes positive action to approve the proposal to place up to 200 technicians in the Sinai. And if there is no accord, then all that America has worked for, and all that the Middle East has hoped for, may well be lost.

So, Mr. Chairman, I respectfully ask that this committee act now to approve the resolution before it so that Israel and Egypt can get on with the business of implementing the Sinai accord and so that the march toward peace can be resumed in the Middle East.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: TOASTS AT BANQUET FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER
DEPARTMENT PASS NCSE FOR SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN

1. FOLLOWING ARE TEXTS OF TOASTS AT OCTOBER 19 BANQUET
GIVEN BY FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA IN HONOR OF
SECRETARY KISSINGER.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF TOAST BY FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO:
MR. SECRETARY AND MRS. KISSINGER, MR. BUSH, CHIEF OF
U.S.L.O, AND MRS. BUSH, AMERICAN GUESTS, COMRADES,
I WISH TO EXPRESS, IN THE NAME OF MY CHINESE COLLEAGUES
PRESENT, OUR WELCOME TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE DR. KISSINGER
AND HIS PARTY, WHO HAVE COME AGAIN TO PEKING, TO PREPARE FOR
PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO CHINA LATER THIS YEAR.
THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS CHARACTERIZED BY
GREAT DISORDER UNDER HEAVEN, AND THE SITUATION IS
EXCELLENT. THE BASIC CONTRADICTIONS IN THE WORLD ARE
SHARPENING. THE FACTORS FOR BOTH REVOLUTION AND WAR ARE
INCREASING. THE STARK REALITY IS NOT THAT DETENTE HAS
DEVELOPED TO A NEW STAGE, BUT THAT THE DANGER OF A NEW
WORLD WAR IS MOUNTING. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THERE IS ANY
LASTING PEACE. THINGS DEVELOP ACCORDING TO OBJECTIVE
LAWS INDEPENDENTLY OF MAN'S WILL. THE ONLY WAY TO DEAL
WITH HEGEMONISM IS TO WAGE A TIT-FOR-TAT STRUGGLE AGAINST IT.
TO BASE ONESELF ON ILLUSIONS, TO MISTAKE HOPES OR
WISHES FOR REALITY AND ACT ACCORDINGLY WILL ONLY ABET THE
AMBITIONS OF EXPANSIONISM AND LEAD TO GRAVE CONSEQUENCES.
IN THIS REGARD, THE HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR
PROVIDES A USEFUL LESSON. IN THE FACE OF THE GROWING
DANGER OF WAR, CHINA'S FUNDAMENTAL POLICY IS TO "DIG
TUNNELS DEEP, SOTRE GRAIN EVERYWHERE AND NEVER SEEK

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, LL, VANDERHYE FOR NESSEN

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HEGEMONY," TO PERSIST IN INDEPENDENCE AND SELF RELIANCE AND MAKE ALL NECESSARY PREPARATIONS. WE ARE DEEPLY CONVINCED THAT, WHATEVER ZIGZAGS AND REVERSES THERE MAY BE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF HISTORY, THE GENERAL TREND OF THE WORLD IS TOWARDS LIGHT AND NOT DARKNESS. A NEW PAGE WAS TURNED IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES WITH PRESIDENT NIXON'S VISIT TO CHINA AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE BY OUR TWO SIDES IN 1972. ON THE WHOLE, SINO-U.S. RELATIONS HAVE MOVED FORWARD IN THE LAST FEW YEARS. CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND THERE ARE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEIR POLICIES. HOWEVER, IN THE CURRENT TURBULENT WORLD SITUATION, OUR TWO SIDES HAVE COMMON POINTS AS WELL. THIS HAS BEEN SET FORTH CLEARLY IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. SO LONG AS OUR TWO SIDES EARNESTLY OBSERVE IN ACTUAL PRACTICE THE PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT SINO-U.S. RELATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO MOVE AHEAD. THIS IS THE COMMON DESIRE OF THE CHINESE AND AMERICAN PEOPLES. ON THE CHINESE SIDE, WE WILL DO OUR PART TO PROMOTE SINO-U.S. RELATIONS IN THE SPIRIT OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, AS WE HAVE DONE ALL ALONG. NOW I PROPOSE A TOAST TO THE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND AMERICAN PEOPLES, TO THE HEALTH OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND MRS. KISSINGER, TO THE HEALTH OF MR. BUSH, CHIEF OF U.S.L.O., AND MRS. BUSH, TO THE HEALTH OF ALL AMERICAN GUESTS, AND TO THE HEALTH OF THE CHINESE COMRADES PRESENT HERE!
END TEXT.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF TOAST BY SECRETARY KISSINGER:
MR. VICE PREMIER, MR. FOREIGN MINISTER, CHIEF OF THE LIAISON OFFICE IN WASHINGTON,
ON THIS MY EIGHTH TRIP TO CHINA, I HAVE FINALLY FOUND THE COURAGE TO SAY SOMETHING IN CHINESE. I ASK YOUR INDULGENCE TO LISTEN CAREFULLY WHILE I SAY IT: PAN CHIU JUNG YI, CH'ING K'IO NAN WHICH FOR THOSE OF YOU WHO THINK I SPOKE CANTONESE MEANS:

IT IS EASY TO PREPARE A BANQUET, BUT IT IS HARD TO BE A GOOD HOST.
ON EACH OF MY VISITS THE TABLE IS ALWAYS MAGNIFICANTLY SET. BUT IT IS THE WARMTH OF THE WELCOME THAT HAS MADE ALL OF THESE EVENINGS MEMORABLE.
I UNDERSTAND THAT TODAY IS THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF THE LONG MARCH. THIS OCCASION THEREFORE HAS PROFOUND MEANING FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THOSE HERE TONIGHT -- INCLUDING THE VICE PREMIER AND AMBASSADOR HUANG -- WHO MADE THAT EPIC MARCH. THAT EVENT WAS TESTIMONY TO THE WORLD AS WELL OF THE COURAGE AND THE VISION OF THOSE WHO SET OUT ON A PATH WHOSE LENGTH AND CONTOURS THEY COULD NOT KNOW. THEIR SUCCESS WAS A TRIUMPH OF SPIRIT AS MUCH AS EXERTION. AND IT DEMONSTRATES THAT FAITH IS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT THAN MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN ACHIEVING GREAT

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THINGS.

AS I SAID IN MY SPEECH TO THE UNITED NATIONS, THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES ASSIGNS GREATER SIGNIFICANCE THAN ITS TIES WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US ARE APPARENT. OUR TASK IS NOT TO INTENSIFY THOSE DIFFERENCES. OUR TASK IS TO ADVANCE OUR RELATIONSHIP ON THE BASIS OF OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS. SUCH A RELATIONSHIP WOULD STRENGTHEN EACH OF US. IT WOULD THREATEN NO ONE AND IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE WELL-BEING OF ALL PEOPLES. IT IS A RELATIONSHIP WHICH WE INTEND TO BE A DURABLE FEATURE OF THE WORLD SCENE. EACH COUNTRY MUST PURSUE A POLICY SUITABLE TO ITS OWN CIRCUMSTANCES. THE UNITED STATES WILL RESIST HEGEMONY AS WE HAVE ALREADY STATED IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. BUT THE UNITED STATES WILL ALSO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO AVOID NEEDLESS CONFRONTATIONS WHEN IT CAN DO SO WITHOUT THREATENING THE SECURITY OF THIRD COUNTRIES. IN THIS POLICY WE WILL BE GUIDED BY ACTIONS AND REALITIES AND NOT RHETORIC. PRESIDENT FORD WILL SOON BE COMING TO CHINA. HE HAS VISITED YOU BEFORE, BUT NOW HE COMES AS PRESIDENT WITH THE INTENTION OF STRENGTHENING OUR RELATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE AND TO GIVE EXPRESSION TO THE AMERICAN INTEREST IN A CHINA THAT IS MAKING PROGRESS IN A PEACEFUL AND SECURE WORLD. DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS WE WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON A WIDE RANGE OF MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST. THESE REGULAR CONSULTATIONS HAVE BECOME A VALUABLE FEATURE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. ONCE AGAIN, I LOOK FORWARD TO MY MEETINGS WITH THE VICE PREMIER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER.

AND NOW, MAY I PROPOSE A TOAST.

...TO THE HEALTH OF CHAIRMAN MAO AND PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI TO WHOM WE WISH A RAPID RECOVERY

...TO THE HEALTH OF THE VICE PREMIER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER

...TO THE HEALTH OF THE CHIEF OF THE LIAISON OFFICE IN WASHINGTON

...TO THE HEALTH OF ALL OUR FRIENDS HERE TODAY; AND

...TO THE FRIENDSHIP OF THE AMERICAN AND CHINESE PEOPLES. GANBEI.

END TEXT.

KISSINGER

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Nessen

The Secretary of State



Speech

November 24, 1975
Detroit, Michigan

Office of Media Services
Bureau of Public Affairs

BUILDING AN ENDURING FOREIGN POLICY

Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Economic Club of Detroit.

I come before you tonight to talk about what is right with America's foreign policy.

This nation, no matter how much some may cast doubt on it, is still seen as the land of hope by all the millions around the world who cherish freedom, the dignity of man, and peace. Without us there can be no security. Without us there can be no hope for progress. America has been true to its responsibility. And I am here to say that it will remain so.

Out of the ashes of World War II, we and our allies built a new world. We had learned from bitter experience that America's safety and world peace, America's prosperity and the world economy, were inextricably linked. In this spirit the United States promoted the economic and political recovery of Western Europe and Japan. We strengthened our defense and forged our first peacetime alliances; they have preserved the global balance of power for a generation. We pioneered in arms control, so that the specter of global cataclysm might never become a reality. We and our partners built a cooperative global economic system so that growth, prosperity, and development could be the common heritage of mankind. We have mediated conflicts and helped settle problems from the Middle East to Berlin.

The technological and managerial genius of this country has been the driving force of global change; our science and communications have circled the planet and stretched to the moon and beyond. The American people have reached out with generosity to their fellow men afflicted by

disease, hunger, deprivation, natural disaster, war, and oppression. More than any other nation, we have taken in immigrants and refugees, fed the starving, and educated the youth of other lands. We owe the world no apology for what we have done. We have much to be proud of.

And a generation after World War II, with conditions radically altered and the postwar period of international relations at an end—partially as a result of the success of previous policies—the United States successfully adapted its foreign policy to a new era. At the beginning of this decade we faced a number of urgent tasks:

- The military balance was being altered by the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the acceleration of weapons technology.
- We were bogged down in a war that we would not win and seemingly could not end.
- For 20 years we had isolated ourselves from China—in other words, from one quarter of the human race.
- Our relations with the Soviet Union were characterized by constant tension and confrontation on the access routes to Berlin, in the Middle East, and in the Caribbean.
- Diplomatic relations with most Arab states were broken and progress toward peace in the Middle East was stalemated.
- The new strength and vitality of Europe and Japan required major adjustments in the practices and responsibilities of the previous two decades.

We have come a long way in the first half of this decade. American foreign policy has been transformed. We brought peace to our nation for

the first time in over a decade and a half.

We have ended our isolation from China and opened a growing relationship with the world's most populous nation. U.S.-Soviet relations have entered a new period. In place of continual crises there are continuing negotiations—in arms control, economic relations, and international issues—which give both sides a stake in peace and have lessened the chances that great-power confrontation will lead to nuclear Armageddon.

In the Middle East we have restored diplomatic relations with all of the key countries of the Arab world. We have helped to move the area from stagnation to hope. Three major agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors have opened the path to peace—a path on which we are determined to persevere.

Our relations with Europe and Japan have been given new balance and impetus. As the recent economic summit demonstrated, they have never been better.

Above all, not only our country, but the world, is at peace. For the first time since the end of World War II, no nation anywhere is engaged in military conflict with another.

This is the true record of our foreign policy—not the debates, the innuendos, and political wrangling that so often form the headlines of the day. It is the end result of the trips, the meetings, the summits, the agreements, the setbacks, and the achievements of the everyday conduct of foreign affairs. These are the building blocks of a dream all Americans share—the vision of a peaceful, just, humane, and progressive world.

We have had our disappointments, and we have made our mistakes. After the bitter experience of Viet-Nam, America has learned that it does not possess the power to right every wrong or to solve every problem. We know that our influence is finite, though the demands upon it and the injustices of the world often seem infinite. And we understand that America, like all human institutions, is fallible.

But the vast majority of Americans remain convinced—as your Government is—that if we do not resist aggression, if we do not work for a better world economy, if we do not promote liberty and justice, no nation will do it for us—at least no nation that shares our values.

I want to speak tonight about the broader vision of a lasting peace, and how America is needed to turn that vision into a reality.

America and Global Peace

The allied statesmen who built the postwar international order would not recognize the international landscape we see today. The evolution that has taken place over 30 years has transformed the environment in which America lives. The world of the last quarter of the 20th century will be vastly different from that to which we have grown accustomed—but it is a world that we must help to shape.

These are the broad tasks of our foreign policy:

In an age of continuing peril and exploding technology, we must maintain and improve our national defense. In the aftermath of Viet-Nam, we have strengthened and modernized our military forces. This process will continue. We know that **peace requires an equilibrium of power—and this Government will maintain it.** No nation can remain great if it leaves its safety to the mercy or the good will of others. Any realistic hope of better relations with the Communist powers—and there is such hope—depends on a strong America which leaves other countries no realistic course except restraint and cooperation. So long as potential adversaries continue to expand and improve their forces, we will maintain a modern defense that cannot be challenged.

We will place our priority on our alliances with the great industrial democracies of the Atlantic community and Japan. In the new era, the industrial democracies have found that security involves more than common defense. We joined together out of fear; but we can stay united only if we find deeper and more positive common purposes. The moral unity of the democracies—in an era when their values are a minority in the world and buffeted by difficulties at home—is one of our greatest resources. A sense of solidarity in a turbulent world can help all of our peoples recover the confidence that their societies are vital, that they are the masters of their destinies, that they are not subject to blind forces beyond their control.

This is why the United States attaches so much importance to the economic summit just concluded in France. The agreement to cooperate in economic policy, energy, and development, the major progress made on monetary questions, could usher in a new era of unity and confidence among the industrial democracies. We will never forget that our most important relationships are with those nations which share our principles, our way

of life, and our future.

We strongly support the words of the Declaration of Rambouillet signed by President Ford together with the leaders of Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and Germany: "We came together because of shared beliefs and shared responsibilities. We are each responsible for the government of an open, democratic society, dedicated to individual liberty and social advancement. Our success will strengthen, indeed is essential to democratic societies everywhere."

We will strive to transform the relationship with the major Communist powers. Foreign policy must be based on reality, not rhetoric. And today's reality is that we live in a world of nuclear equality. This has been imposed by technology. It could not have been prevented; it cannot be ignored or reversed by unilateral decision. It means that we must manage a fundamental conflict of values in the shadow of nuclear holocaust. We are striving to preserve peace while defending our essential principles and interest.

At the same time, the Communist monolith of a generation ago has fragmented into bitter rivalries, and many Communist countries have turned to the West for more constructive bilateral relationships. This provides the opportunity for a careful policy of relaxation of tensions. Future generations would not understand it if partisan controversy caused us to forget that in the nuclear age the relaxation of tensions is a moral imperative as well as a practical necessity. We will spare no effort in building habits of restraint and moderation among the superpowers.

But the easing of tensions cannot endure if we relax our vigilance. We must understand the need for both defense and relaxation of tension; both firm action in crises and willingness to resolve problems on a realistic and fair basis. We must be prepared for either course; the choice rests with our adversaries.

We cannot ignore, for example, the substantial Soviet buildup of weapons in Angola which has introduced great-power rivalry into Africa for the first time in 15 years. This Soviet involvement is resented by African nations most of all. But the United States cannot be indifferent while an outside power embarks upon an interventionist policy—so distant from its homeland and so removed from traditional Russian interests. The Soviet Union still has an opportunity for a policy of restraint which permits Angolans to resolve their

own differences without outside interventions. We would be glad to cooperate in such a course. But time is running out; continuation of an interventionist policy must inevitably threaten other relationships.

Nor can we ignore the thousands of Cubans sent into an African conflict. In recent months the United States has demonstrated, by deed as well as word, its readiness to improve relations with Cuba. **We have cooperated with steps to ease the inter-American boycott against Cuba and to restore a more normal relationship between the nations of the Americas and Cuba.** But let there be no illusions: A policy of conciliation will not survive Cuban meddling in Puerto Rico or Cuban armed intervention in the affairs of other nations struggling to decide their own fate.

To Cuba, as to other nations with whom our relations have been strained, I say this: The United States has no higher goal than to ease the conflicts that have torn the globe for nearly a generation. We will be flexible and cooperative in settling conflicts. But we will never permit detente to turn into a subterfuge for unilateral advantage. The policy of relaxation of tensions is designed to promote peace, not surrender. We will be flexible, but we shall insist on reciprocity and restraint.

We shall work to shape a prosperous and equitable economy. The productivity and economic strength of this country is one of our greatest assets. We have used it to help consolidate the vitality of the industrial democracies, to stabilize political relations with potential adversaries, and to fashion new ties with the developing countries.

The division of the planet between North and South—industrial and developing—is now becoming as pressing an issue as the division between East and West. Yet our economies are interdependent, and neither North nor South can long accept growing division without paying a costly and unnecessary price. International order and a thriving world economy can only be built on the basis of cooperation. Economic warfare will mean decline for everyone, but most of all for the developing world. Therefore at the U.N. General Assembly special session in September the United States put forward a practical program of collaborative endeavor on energy, food, trade, raw materials, and the needs of the poorest. We will continue our efforts on all these fronts.

Cooperative solutions are our objective, but we will not accept the proposition that any group

of nations, no matter what its temporary economic power, can exercise its strength arbitrarily to the detriment of the world economic system. The economies of the industrialized nations have been severely shaken by the rapid and exorbitant rise in energy prices. The balance of payments and development programs of the poorer countries have been undermined to a point that no conceivable aid program could compensate.

International peace and stability now clearly require an international economic system that embraces the aspirations and needs of all nations. The United States will come to next month's Conference on International Economic Cooperation—the consumer-producer conference—with every intention to help find cooperative arrangements just to all. But we cannot accept indefinitely placing our economy at the mercy of decisions made far away or being asked to redress hardships and meet deficits caused by the actions of others.

The Asian Dimension

Let me now discuss in some detail one part of the world of particular interest to all Americans: the continent of Asia.

Next week President Ford will travel to Asia to reaffirm our stake in that vast region's future and to strengthen important bilateral ties.

The United States is a Pacific power. Our history has been inextricably linked to Asia. No region is of greater importance to us. None is more dynamic. None merits more America's enduring interest and purpose.

The security interests of all the great world powers intersect in Asia. Japan, China, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and the United States have important stakes in the region. All would be affected by any major conflict there. It is an area vast in population, rich in culture, and abundant in resources. The United States has been involved in three long and costly Asian wars in the past generation. We have learned, at painful cost, that equilibrium in Asia is essential to our own peace and safety, and that no stable order in that region can be maintained without our active participation.

Through much of the postwar period, America engaged itself deeply in Asia to build up friendly nations and to contain Communist expansion. American policy achieved major and lasting successes—the emergence of a prosperous and democratic Japan in close alliance with us; the defeat of aggression in Korea; the continued independence and growing dynamism of the many

small friendly nations in the region.

But by the late 1960's our policies needed to adjust to new realities. We were too directly committed militarily. At times America acted as if its stake in its allies' security was greater than their own.

Thus, throughout the first half of this decade we have sought to fashion a new Asian policy—a policy that gradually reduced our military presence and aimed, instead, at augmenting the strength and vitality of our allies. We sought to stabilize the region by fashioning a balance among the major powers, bringing our commitments into line with our interests.

American policy has had several basic objectives:

- To preserve the sovereignty and independence of our friends in Asia;
- To consolidate our alliance with Japan, by giving our most important Asian ally a greater role and equal partnership;
- To open the door to constructive ties with the People's Republic of China;
- To reduce tensions and promote political solutions to Asian regional conflicts; and
- To encourage self-help and regional cooperation among smaller allies.

On all these fronts much progress has been made in the last few years. Our relations with both adversaries and friends have markedly improved. We have extended the range of our diplomacy without renegeing on our commitments to our allies. We have adjusted our military posture to maintain a balance in Asia in the face of changing strategic requirements and political trends. We have expanded our economic relations in many countries.

Most importantly, the structure of Asian peace policy has proven strong enough to withstand the tragedy in Indochina. There was widespread initial apprehension that it might signal—or precipitate—a general American retreat from Asia and even from global responsibilities. Our policy since then has greatly eased those fears.

It is as clear as ever that no serious effort to resolve major problems in Asia can succeed without America's participation. The future of Japan and our other allies, the easing of tensions with potential adversaries, the problem of peace in Korea, the continuing independence of the nations of Southeast Asia all depend significantly on a strong and responsible American policy.

This is why President Ford visited Japan and Korea a year ago on his first overseas trip. This is why he will leave for Asia again at the end of this week to visit the People's Republic of China, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

For the future we have set ourselves the following tasks:

We will maintain a continuing strong role in Asia. We know that military power alone will not guarantee security. National cohesion and social justice are essential for effective resistance against subversion or external attack. We know, too, that nationalism and self-reliance are the dominant trends in the region. But foreign policy begins with security, and a military balance remains fundamental to peace and the easing of tension. Given Asia's importance to our security and well-being, we owe it to ourselves and to those whose future depends on us to preserve a firm and balanced military posture in the Pacific.

We will continue to strengthen our partnership with Japan. Japan is our principal Asian ally and largest overseas trading partner. Japan's participation is essential to international efforts to promote economic recovery. Our hopes for a peaceful and prosperous Asia depend in large part on Japan's creative collaboration on many international issues. Japan's experiment in political leadership without the attributes of military power is anchored in turn upon our security treaty—which threatens no one and is widely recognized as a pillar of regional stability. In short we regard Japan not as an occasional or temporary ally, but as a permanent friend.

In the early 1970's, in response to Japan's growing economic strength and some bilateral strains, we went through a period of adjustment in our relations. There were frictions—some avoidable by more thoughtful U.S. actions. But these tensions have been overcome by devoted effort on both sides. Today our relations are the best they have been in 30 years. We face no serious bilateral problems. We are collaborating on a vast agenda:

- To advance the prosperity of the industrial democracies;
- To ease tensions with the Communist countries;
- To extend the new era of cooperation to the members of the less developed world.

Our bilateral relationship—which depends so much upon intangibles of conduct and

understanding—has acquired a deeper quality. There have been important cultural exchanges, which have enhanced our sensitivity to each other's national style and values. The first visit by an American President to Japan last fall and the historic visit of the Emperor and the Empress to the United States—and the warm reception that each people extended to the other's leader—demonstrated the extraordinary depth and strength of this friendship.

We do not propose to rest on the accomplishments of the past.

- We will preserve the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security while continuing to adapt its practical arrangements to the changing military and political environment.
- We will strengthen our political consultation, in the full realization that we will not always pursue identical policies, but that we have it in our power to assure compatible approaches and full understanding of occasional disagreements.
- We will harmonize even more closely our national policies to combat recession and promote economic expansion.
- We will continue to deepen the cultural dimension of our ties, which strengthens the bonds between our peoples.

In all our dealings we intend to honor a higher standard of concern and consultation than normally obtains even between allies—one that reflects the profound quality of our partnership.

We shall continue to advance our relationship with the People's Republic of China. For a generation our two great countries were separated by a gulf of suspicion and hostility. The reestablishment of ties in recent years has had a significance far beyond its impact on our two countries: It has transformed the international landscape.

There have long existed attachments of sentiment and high regard between the Chinese and American peoples, which we have never ceased to value. But the United States and the People's Republic of China came together again after two decades because of necessity. It was mutual interests that impelled us both—without illusions—to launch a new beginning. These mutual interests continue. They can be the foundation of a durable, growing relationship.

We and the People's Republic of China have parallel concerns that the world be free from domination by military force or intimidation—what our

many joint communiques have termed "hegemony." We have affirmed that neither of our two countries should seek hegemony, and that each would oppose the attempts of others to do so. Our commitment to this policy will not change. The United States will continue to resist expansionism as we have throughout the entire postwar period. But we will also avoid needless confrontations. We will not be swayed from our effort to improve relations with potential adversaries and to build a more stable international environment.

The United States and China have also agreed to pursue the normalization of our relations. The United States remains dedicated to the principles of the Shanghai communique. We do not challenge the principle of one China—a principle that is maintained by Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. While time may yet be required to resolve our remaining differences on this issue, the direction of our policy is clear.

Since we lack the full range of diplomatic links with the People's Republic of China, and since so much depends on our mutual perceptions of the world scene, exchanges of views on the international scene between the President and the leaders of China are essential and assume special significance.

President Ford's visit to China next week will be the first contact between a U.S. President and Chinese leaders in nearly 4 years. We can expect the talks to be marked by the scope and the directness which have marked our previous encounters and which best serve leaders whose societies are different but whose policies are rooted in realism.

Disagreements in ideology and national interests exist; there will be no attempt to hide them. It is inevitable, therefore, that each side will determine its own policies according to its own situation and perception of its national interest. These are not subject to the instruction of the other. Both of us are self-reliant; both of us understand the difference between rhetoric and action, between tactics and basic strategy.

This spirit of candor and mutual respect has infused our new relationship with the People's Republic of China from its beginnings over 4 years ago. On this basis we are prepared to make our relationship an enduring and constructive feature of the world scene.

We shall continue to strive to reduce tensions and promote more durable arrangements for peace on the Korean peninsula. An atmosphere of confrontation regrettably persists on the Korean peninsula. The United States has a major stake in

maintaining the peace and security of the Republic of Korea. American forces are still stationed there in keeping with our Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea. Our commitment to South Korea rests not only in our historic relationship with the Korean people—a bond forged by common sacrifice in war. It derives as well from the recognition that the security of Japan—our closest ally in the Pacific—is directly linked to the security of Korea. We will continue to work with our friends to preserve the balance. We will resist with determination any unilateral attempt to change or upset the equilibrium on the peninsula.

At the same time we and the Republic of Korea are prepared to move to a more permanent solution. We have proposed a conference among North and South Korea, the United States, and the People's Republic of China to discuss the dissolution of the United Nations Command while preserving the Korean armistice agreement. And in that context we are willing to consider other measures to reduce tensions, including a wider conference to negotiate more fundamental arrangements for peace in Korea. We will not acquiesce in any proposals which would exclude the Republic of Korea from discussions about its future. And we will not allow our military presence, which derives from bilateral agreements, to be dictated by third parties. But we are prepared now to transform the armistice arrangements to a permanent peace. And we are ready to talk to any interested country, including North Korea, about the future of Korea—provided only that South Korea is present.

We shall seek a new structure of stability in Southeast Asia. This Administration inherited the conflict in Indochina and brought our involvement to an end. That chapter in our history, which occasioned so much anguish, is now closed. As for our relations with the new governments in that region, these will not be determined by the past; we are prepared to look to a more hopeful future. The United States will respond to gestures of good will. If those governments show understanding of our concerns and those of their neighbors, they will find us ready to reciprocate. This will be especially the case if they deal constructively with the anguish of thousands of Americans who ask only an accounting for their loved ones missing in action and the return of the bodies of Americans who died in Indochina. We have no interest to continue the Indochina war on the diplomatic front; we envisage the eventual normalization of relations. In the interim we are prepared to consider practical arrangements of mutual benefit in such

fields as travel and trade.

One of the basic purposes of our original commitment in Indochina was to provide a buffer of security and time for the many nations of Southeast Asia to enable them to develop their own strength and cohesion. In this regard our efforts proved successful. These nations have preserved their independence; they are assuming increasing importance. We have a substantial stake in the well-being of the Philippines and Indonesia, which President Ford will visit next week. We have important links with Thailand and strong ties of friendship with Singapore and Malaysia. And we have a longstanding association with our ANZUS partners — Australia and New Zealand.

These nations are preserving their independence through economic development, a serious effort to relax tensions, and institutions of regional cooperation. All of them are examples of self-reliance and national resilience. All of them also seek to maintain and broaden their association with us—and all of them wish the United States to remain actively engaged in Asia.

In short the new Asia is an important pillar of the structure of global peace. It is a central element in the design of our foreign policy.

America's Responsibility

Thirty years ago, when we were first summoned to leadership, we were the only country to have survived World War II with its institutions and economy intact. In that era we were overwhelmingly predominant in nuclear weapons and in every measure of military and economic strength. The American people, with pride in their victory and fresh memory of the folly of isolationism, confidently assumed the responsibilities of world leadership.

Inevitably, with time other nations— allies and adversaries—recovered and developed their strength. It was natural that decolonization and an expanding economy would produce new centers of economic power and political influence. And it was understandable that the American people would tire of the burdens of leadership and ask for another balancing of America's interests and commitments.

But history gives us no respite. To build peace, other nations must do more—but we must do our share. Today's foreign policy and today's international environment pose for us a novel psychological challenge. We can no longer overwhelm our problems with resources; we must learn

foresight, tactical skill, and constancy. We can no longer expect our moral preferences to hold sway simply because of our power; we must possess patience and understanding. We cannot shape a new world by ourselves; we must elicit from others, friend and foe alike, a contribution to the arduous process of building a stable international order. America's challenge today is to demonstrate a new kind of leadership—guiding by our vision, our example, and our energy, not by our predominance.

Only rarely in history does a people have the chance to shape the international environment in which it lives. That opportunity is America's today. But we can meet the opportunity only as a united and confident nation.

In a world of thermonuclear weapons, shrunken distances, and widely dispersed power, we cannot afford disunity, disarray, or disruption in the conduct of our foreign affairs. Foreign policy requires authority. Our ability to maintain peace fundamentally involves the belief of other nations that our word counts, that we have a coherent policy, that we possess steadiness and resolve.

It is time, therefore, to end the self-flagellation that has done so much harm to this nation's capacity to conduct foreign policy. It is time that we outgrew some of the illusions that characterized the long-past period of our isolationism—the idea that we are always being taken in by foreigners; the fear that military assistance to allies leads to involvement rather than substitutes for it; the pretense that defense spending is wasteful and generates conflict; the delusion that American intelligence activities are immoral; the suspicion that the confidentiality of diplomacy is a plot to deceive the public; or the illusion that tranquillity can be achieved by an abstract purity of motive for which history offers no example. In the nation with the highest standard of living and one of the richest cultures of the world, in the nation which has come closest of all to the ideals of civil liberty and democracy, it is long past time to put a stop to self-doubt about our example and role in the world.

We have already gone through a traumatic period—with assassinations, resignations from our two highest offices, and a political climate still poisoned by the residue of the war and domestic turbulence of the previous decade. And we are now one year before our Presidential election.

But this country cannot have a moratorium on a responsible foreign policy. Let us never forget that there are many in the world who do not wish

us well; that there are crises and challenges which will not wait for our elections. We must keep in mind that in a world where totalitarian government can manipulate friendly political parties, there is a grey area between foreign policy and overt intervention which we deny ourselves only at grave risk to our national security.

The bitterness that has marked so much of our national discourse for a decade no longer has reason or place. A great responsibility rests upon both the Congress and the Executive. Our foreign policy has been most effective when it reflected broad bipartisan support. This spirit of cooperation has never been more essential than today. Our free debate once again must find its ultimate restraint in the recognition that we are engaged in a common enterprise.

The decade-long debate over executive pre-dominance in foreign policy is now a thing of the past; Congress' reassertion of its role and prerogative is now a dominant and important fact in our political life. In recent years congressional investigations have served the country well in correcting many abuses. We must discover the excesses of the past, overcome the abuses that are uncovered and insure that they will never be repeated. This is the deepest strength of a free society. But it should be possible to cleanse our institutions without disrupting the conduct of our Nation's business abroad and buffeting all the instruments of our policy. When the most confidential documents are spread on the public record as a matter of routine there is a danger that rather than cleanse our government we will produce timidity and obfuscation in our bureaucracy and loss of confidence abroad.

We must resist the myth that government is a gigantic conspiracy. The truth is that the vast majority of public servants are serious, dedicated, and compassionate men and women who seek no other reward than the consciousness of having served their country well.

We need nothing so much as a restoration of confidence in ourselves. President Ford, a man of Congress, has conducted his Administration with

an unprecedented commitment to cooperation and conciliation with his colleagues of the House and Senate. But he has some fundamental obligations to the national interest.

- We cannot allow the intelligence services of this country to be dismantled.
- We must preserve our ability to maintain the confidentiality of other governments' dealings with us and our dealings with them.
- We must maintain our defenses and a prudent program of economic and military assistance to other countries with whom we have productive political relations.
- We must achieve a rational division of labor between Congress' defining of broad national commitments and the Executive's constitutional responsibility for tactics, the execution of policy, and the conduct of negotiations.

Ladies and gentlemen: It is the responsibility of Americans—of all political persuasions, in both branches of government, in the public and the press—to help shape a national policy in a positive and cooperative spirit. It is the responsibility of this Nation to exercise creative leadership in a moment of uncertainty, in a world that cries out for inspiration.

America is the only country whose destiny always seemed open, whose future always appeared more compelling than its past. We have been the hope of mankind, not only because we stood for freedom and offered a haven to the oppressed, but because we have demonstrated time and again the resiliency and indestructible spirit of free men. We have not lost our understanding of our true interests or our humane concern for the fate of our fellow men.

This country's foreign policy is not a burden; it is a success and a promise. We have done great things. There are great things yet to do. If the American people stand together, we will leave as our legacy a more secure, prosperous, and just world than the one that we inherited.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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FOR S/PRS; PASS NSC AND WHITE HOUSE FOR SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN
E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: TEXT OF TOAST TO BE OFFERED BY SECRETARY KISSINGER, LUNCH-
EDN, JAN 21

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF TOAST (EMBARGO UNTIL DELIVERY) TO BE OFFERED BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AT LUNCHEON HOSTED IN HIS HONOR BY FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO TODAY AT 2 P.M.
BEGIN TEXT: MR. FOREIGN MINISTER, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:
I HAVE NOT COUNTED IT PRECISELY, BUT THERE MUST NOW HAVE BEEN MORE THAN 15 OCCASIONS, DURING LESS THAN 4 YEARS, WHEN WE HAVE VISITED EACH OTHER IN OUR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES OR MET IN THIRD COUNTRIES TO DISCUSS THE SERIDUS ISSUES OF OUR TIMES, AS IN THE PAST, MY ASSOCIATES AND I APPRECIATE YOUR HOSPITALITY AND THE THOUGHTFUL ARRANGEMENTS YOU HAVE MADE FOR OUR STAY HERE. OUR MEETINGS, THOUGH NOT WITHOUT THEIR RELAXING MOMENTS, HAVE ALWAYS CONCENTRATED ON THE HARD TASKS WE FACE TOGETHER. THE DISCUSSIONS I AM HAVING ON THIS OCCASION WITH YOUR GENERAL SECRETARY, YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES ARE NO EXCEPTION.
SINCE THE BEGINNING OF OUR NEW RELATIONSHIP, OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE RECOGNIZED THE ENORMOUS AND FATEFUL SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY RESTING UPON US, AS THE MOST POWERFUL NATIONS OF THE WORLD, TO MANAGE OUR AFFAIRS SO THA A SECURE PEACE CAN BE BUILT. THREE YEARS AGO, AT THE SUMMIT MEETING OF 1972, WE CONCLUDED SIGNIFICANT FIRST AGREEMENTS TO LIMIT DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS; WE ENUNCIATED PRINCIPLES TO GOVERN OUR RELATIONS SO THAT NOT ONLY WE OURSELVES WOULD BENEFIT FROM THEM BUT THAT SECURITY AND PEACE EVERYWHERE WOULD BE STRENGTHENED; WE SIGNED SEVERAL BILATERAL COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS. SINCE THEN, PRESIDENT FORD HAS CARRIED OUR RELATIONSHIP FORWARD, BUILDING ON THOSE FIRST ACCOMPLISHMENTS; OUR FREQUENT CONTACTS AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS ARE A PART OF THAT PROCESS.
TODAY, WE ARE FACED WITH THE CHALLENGE OF GIVING FRESH MOMENTUM



*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, LL

PSN:028504 PAGE 01 TOR:021/13:16Z DTG:211145Z JAN 76

TO OUR DIALOGUE, ON ISSUES THAT ARE MUCH MORE COMPLEX, FOR WE HAVE LEARNED ALREADY THAT THE EVOLUTION WE HAVE MAPPED OUT IS NOT AUTOMATIC; IT REQUIRES PERSEVERING EFFORT, IMAGINATION AND COURAGE, AND ABOVE ALL, THAT SCRUPULOUS RESPECT FOR THE INTERESTS OF ALL CONCERNED TO WHICH WE HAVE SO OFTEN REFERRED IN OUR JOINT DOCUMENTS AND IN OUR MEETINGS.

OUR DISCUSSIONS HERE ON THIS OCCASION ARE FOCUSED ONCE AGAIN ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS, WE MUST GIVE SUBSTANCE AND BINDING FORCE TO THE ACCORDS AGREED UPON BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY IN VLADIVOSTOK 14 MONTHS AGO, ON THE SUCCESS OF THIS EFFORT DEPENDS THE FULFILLMENT OF THE COMMITMENT WE HAVE BOTH MADE BEFORE THE WHOLE WORLD THAT WE WILL ACHIEVE NOT ONLY THE LIMITATION BUT THE ACTUAL REDUCTION OF THE LEVELS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, EACH OF US, MR. FOREIGN MINISTER, MUST, IF WE FAIL, ANSWER TO HIS OWN PEOPLE, TO THE WORLD AT LARGE AND TO HISTORY THE QUESTION: DID THIS OR THAT SPECIFIC, POSSIBLY QUITE TECHNICAL ISSUE, JUSTIFY THE FAILURE OR PRO-

LONGED DELAY OF THE TOTAL EFFORT? DID WE DO EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER TO SPARE MANKIND THE BURDENS AND RISKS OF A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE? I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THIS QUESTION HAS BEEN ASKED MANY TIMES IN THE DELIBERATIONS OF MY GOVERNMENT, AND IN ANSWERING IT TO OURSELVES, HONESTLY AND WITH THE FULL RESPONSIBILITY INHERENT IN OUR POSITIONS, WE HAVE STRENGTHENED OUR RESOLVE TO SEEK AN EQUITABLE AND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME, WE BELIEVE WE HAVE A RIGHT TO ASK A SIMILAR APPROACH FROM YOU, OUR TASK IS A COMMON ONE, JUST AS SUCCESS IN ITS ACCOMPLISHMENT WILL BE TO OUR COMMON ADVANTAGE AND FAILURE WILL LEAVE US BOTH LOSERS.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION IS PERHAPS THE MOST CONCRETE TASK WE FACE TOGETHER, BUT IT IS FAR FROM THE ONLY ONE. IN RECENT WEEKS WE HAVE FOUND OURSELVES WITH DIFFERING OR OPPOSING VIEWS ON IMPORTANT ISSUES BEARING ON INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, WE BELIEVE THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF RESTRAINT, AND RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER'S INTERESTS, AND THE UNDERSTANDINGS CONCERNING THE AVOIDANCE OF CRISIS SITUATIONS AND THE ACQUISITION OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, REMAIN AT THE CORE OF THE SEARCH FOR A STABLE WORLD ORDER, THESE PRINCIPLES ARE PART OF OUR SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY, THEY MUST BE APPLIED TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS, WHEREVER THEY ARISE, FOR THEY MUST BE THE NORM OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT IF PEACE IS TO BE SECURE AND LASTING, WE KNOW FROM HISTORY THAT GREAT POWERS WILL NOT LONG ACCEPT A DIMINUTION OF THEIR SECURITY OR INROADS INTO THEIR INTERESTS AND THAT SOONER OR LATER THEY WILL SEEK WHO FIND -- COMPENSATION IN SOME OTHER PLACE OR MANNER, BUT IT IS PRECISELY THIS CHAIN OF ACTION AND REACTION THAT HAS LED TO CATASTROPHE IN THE PAST AND WHICH MUST BE BROKEN IF THE DISASTERS OF HISTORY ARE NOT TO BE REPEATED, WE HAVE SAID TO EACH OTHER AND THE WORLD THAT WE UNDERSTAND THESE



STARK REALITIES, SO, WE MUST ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEM.
IF WE DO SO, THE VISTAS BEFORE US AND MANKIND ARE FILLED WITH
THE MOST PROMISING PROSPECTS. THE CHOICE, MR. MINISTER, IS OURS.
WE HAVE THE CAPACITY TO TRANSLATE OUR WORDS AND OUR EXPRESSED
SENTIMENTS INTO DEEDS AND LIVING, LONG-TERM POLICIES. THAT IS
THE HISTORIC CHALLENGE BEFORE US AND THAT IS HOW WE SEE THESE
MEETINGS THIS WEEK.

SO IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT -- OF ACCOMPLISHMENT BUT OF GREATER
TASKS YET TO BE ACCOMPLISHED, OF DETERMINATION TO FULFILL THE
OBLIGATIONS PLACED BEFORE US BY HISTORY TO CONTRIBUTE TO A JUST
AND SECURE PEACE -- THAT I ASK YOU TO JOIN ME IN RAISING YOUR
GLASSES, TO YOUR HEALTH, MR. MINISTER AND THAT OF YOUR COLLEAGUES;
THE WISDOM AND STATESMANSHIP THAT WE OWE IT TO OURSELVES AND
FUTURE GENERATIONS TO DISPLAY. END TEXT.

KISSINGER
BT



February 4, 1976

KISSINGER'S SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

The purpose of the Secretary's address was to reinforce the Administration's policy of detente, refuting those who characterize it as a "sell-out" to the Soviets and secondly, to explain the rationale for a new SALT agreement in the hopes of building support for it.

In the speech delivered to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, Kissinger spelled out the consequences of failure to reach a new SALT agreement: an accelerated strategic arms build-up over the next five years could cost as much as an additional \$20 billion dollars, and be "a tragically missed opportunity."

He said the President's policy would be:

-- We will never stand for the violation of a solemn treaty or agreement and we will remain alert.

-- We never tolerate a shift in the strategic balance against us; by violations of agreements, by unsatisfactory agreements or by neglect of our own programs; we will spend what is necessary to maintain strategic sufficiency.

-- The President is determined to pursue the effort to negotiate a saner strategic balance on equitable terms -- because it is in our interest, and because we have an obligation to our own people and to world peace.

On Angola, Kissinger outlined the history and philosophy behind our involvement there, adding that Angola represents the first time that the Soviets have moved militarily, at long distance, to impose a regime of their choice; it is the first time the U. S. has failed to respond to Soviet military moves outside the Soviet orbit, and it is the first time that Congress has halted national action in the middle of a crisis. He concluded by saying that our Government has a duty to make clear in the Soviet Union and Cuba that Angola sets no precedent, that this type of action will not be tolerated again.

Q. Secretary Kissinger has stated that Angola sets no precedent and that this type of action "will not be tolerated" again. But what does the Administration intend to do in that eventuality -- what can it do, given the mood in Congress today.

A. As we have said before, the continuation of Soviet and Cuban policies and action in an area where they have no legitimate interests cannot help but affect our bilateral relationship with the Soviets in the long run. While I wouldn't want to expand on the Secretary's remarks or hypothesize on what the President may or may not do in a given circumstance, I think our policy is quite clear on this and needs no further elaboration at this time. We will not, and cannot, be indifferent to such Soviet actions ~~and the President hopes that Congress will come to share his views on the implications and importance of our American policy on these~~ questions.

SADAT ON U. S. PLEDGES TO RECOGNIZE PLO

Q. Yesterday you were asked for a reaction to a statement supposedly made by President Sadat to the effect that he obtained a U. S. commitment "far beyond" a promise to recognize the PLO. Can you give us anything on that today?

A] All I can tell you is that our position on the Palestinians remains the same: we believe that any final settlement must take into account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people. This position was elaborated most recently in the State Department's statement on the U. S. veto of the recent UN resolution on the Middle East, and I commend it to you.

February 4, 1976

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

1. Algeria/Morocco
2. Lebanon

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE

MARCH 29, 1976

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I am happy to have the opportunity to testify on the Administration's request for security assistance authorization for fiscal year 1977. The request follows closely on the heels of that for the current year, about which I testified before this Committee last November.

Security Assistance and Foreign Policy

Security assistance is an essential element of our overall foreign policy. That policy is designed to help build a more peaceful, stable, and prosperous world order in which America's own security, prosperity, and values will be furthered.

The basic elements of our foreign policy -- which we believe will guide any Congress and Administration, whether

Republican or Democrat -- include these:

-- to maintain our own strength and purpose as a nation;

-- to maintain and continually revitalize our relations

with allies and friendly countries with which we share

values and interests;

-- to reduce the risk of war with our potential adversaries

and move toward more rational and normal relationships

despite continuing differences;

-- to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons capability,

and otherwise to help to resolve regional conflicts that

threaten world peace;

-- to resolve international economic issues in a way which

enhances economic and political stability, prosperity,

and justice.

This is the context for designing and deciding upon our security assistance policy. These are the purposes it must -- and does -- serve.

The foundation of our foreign policy is security. Our own military strength, our alliances, and the security assistance programs which support them have been the bedrock of our security since World War II, and they remain so today. In an era of devastating nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, the conventional strength of our alliances is essential to maintain global stability and to leave our potential adversaries no rational alternative to restraint and cooperation.

The persistence of regional conflicts continues to pose risks to global stability. The carefully considered transfer of

defense equipment may be essential in creating and stabilizing regional balances of power, as a pre-condition to the attack on the root causes of disputes.

Finally, every nation has the paramount concern and sovereign responsibility to maintain its own security and to define its needs. The United States cannot expect to retain influence with nations whose perceived defense needs we disregard. Conversely, defense supply links to these countries can enhance our influence and cooperation with them on other international issues of importance to us.

Thus, we believe it is important that arms transfers continue to be approached in the context of our overall national interests and objectives. These include foreign policy as well as our defense readiness and our economy. We fully recognize

the vital role of Congressional support and oversight for the security assistance program.

An Overview of the Authorization Requests

Our specific authorization requests for Fiscal Year 1977 reflect cost-conscious attention by the Executive Branch.

-- The proposed Foreign Military Sales credit program and our resultant request for New Obligational Authority are both approximately \$200 million less than for 1976.

The New Obligational Authority request is for \$840 million; down from \$1,065 million last year. This will fund a total program of over \$2 billion, of which approximately half is for essential assistance to Israel.

-- Security Supporting Assistance programs have been reduced from last year by over \$100 million to \$1.8

billion. Nearly 95% of this amount is requested for the Middle East. The programs supported by these funds are a vital component of our Middle East peace effort.

-- The International Narcotics Control Program is reduced from last year to \$34 million. We reduced it in the expectation that major equipment items for the opium poppy eradication efforts in Mexico and Burma will already have been provided. Turkish control of its opium poppy production, the vigorous eradication efforts now being undertaken in Mexico and the beginnings of excellent results in Burma offer hope that this international security assistance program, which means so much to the health of our own people, is achieving its objectives.

-- Foreign Military Training is programmed at \$30.2 million. This program is highly cost-effective in improving the efficiency of allied and friendly military forces. Foreign governments are to an increasing extent paying for the training they receive from the United States. This modest grant program provides long-range benefits in terms of mutual defense and military cooperation.

Regional Programs

I. Middle East

In Fiscal Year 1977 our security assistance program for the Middle East absorbs almost 70 percent of our total program.

Our request has been designed to protect and further interests of vital importance to the United States and is a central

part of our efforts to help achieve progress towards peace in the Middle East.

Every American Government since 1947 has demonstrated a moral commitment to the survival and security of the State of Israel and we are certain that all future governments will continue to honor that commitment. We also have important interests and friendships in the Arab world. There is, therefore, an urgent need to avoid perpetual crises between Israel and the Arabs. These crises strain our relations with allies, jeopardize our hopes for world economic recovery and risk a direct US-Soviet confrontation.

The ability of Israel to persevere in its own defense is one of the essential constants of our Middle Eastern policy.

Although Israel has recently imposed even more stringent

domestic austerity measures, its assured survival depends upon substantial economic and military assistance, which can come only from the United States. Our program for Israel represents our best judgment of the appropriate assistance required from us to maintain the defensive strength and economic health which Israel requires for its security and survival.

Our request for Egypt -- which is entirely for non-military supporting assistance -- also rests on basic requirements and considerations of US national interests. Egypt holds a historic position of leadership in the Arab world and has courageously committed itself to pursuing peace. Egypt has demonstrated its good faith and sincerity by ending its long-time close dependence on the Soviet Union and by moving toward closer relations with the

West. It is clearly in our interest to demonstrate that countries which pursue such policies can obtain the support of the United States. Our security assistance to and our growing friendship with Egypt are aimed at achieving this objective. In this connection we have advised the Congress of our intention to provide Egypt with six C-130 transport aircraft. We are pleased that this Committee has set aside a separate time in the near future when we may discuss this transfer in some detail.

Jordan, which is of strategic importance in the Arab-Israeli dispute, has long been recognized as a force of moderation in the Middle East. Jordan is a strong friend of the United States and is working to overcome its serious problems of economic underdevelopment. Our security assistance contributes to Jordan's development and helps Jordan to maintain its politically moderate course.

Syria will play an integral part in any peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Our non-military supporting assistance program with Syria is essential to maintaining the close working relationship we need as we continue our peace efforts.

We stress that our security assistance to, and improved relations with, Arab nations do not undermine in any sense our traditional friendship with Israel. The policy of encouraging constructive and moderate forces in the Arab world is the best way we can help all the parties to attain a durable peace that will assure the survival and security of Israel.

During the past year, the Middle East Special Requirements Fund permitted us to respond promptly to special needs arising from our Middle East peace efforts. We will continue to need

this capability to move rapidly to support activities contributing to peace in the area and to maintain our Support Mission in the Sinai.

Much remains to be done to achieve peace in the Middle East. Our efforts to generate further movement in the Middle East peace negotiations are entering another difficult and critical period. We are determined to maintain the momentum toward peace. We are currently engaged in intensive consultations with all the governments directly concerned to try to reach agreement on how to proceed. Our security assistance program, and our close, cooperative relations with countries of the region, will be as important to our efforts in the future as they were to helping us to achieve the Interim Sinai Agreement in 1975. We will continue to need the sustained, strong support of the Congress

and the American people for these efforts.

II. Other Regional Programs

Aside from the Middle East program request for \$2.9 billion, the breakdown of our fiscal year 1977 requests is as follows:

		<u>% of Total Program</u>
Europe	\$448 million	11%
East Asia	\$496 million	12%
Latin America	\$208 million	5%
Africa	\$ 59 million	1%
Near East	\$ 47 million	1%

Europe

In Europe, Greece and Turkey continue to be the focal points of our program. We must continue to give substance to our concern for their security and stability and for the friendship

that has so long characterized our relations with these nations. The MAP, FMS, and training funds requested should help to return our mutual defense relationships to a more normal footing, and allow both Greece and Turkey to play more effective roles within NATO.

As you know, the Turkish Foreign Minister and I signed a new defense cooperation agreement between the U. S. and Turkey on March 26 which will be submitted to Congress in the near future under a joint resolution. This agreement will replace the U. S. -Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement of 1969 and will, when approved by the Congress, provide for the resumption of our use of important intelligence facilities and installations in Turkey. The agreement establishes the level of U. S. assistance to Turkey during a four-year period at \$250 million per year,

one-fifth of which will be in grant assistance, the remainder in credit and guarantees. The implementation of this agreement will restore the traditional U. S. -Turkish relationship within the NATO Alliance, contribute to the settlement of problems in the Eastern Mediterranean, and strengthen the conditions for peace and stability in that area.

We also have key strategic interests at the western end of the Mediterranean, on the Iberian Peninsula.

The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain is currently before the Senate for its advice and consent. We engaged in extensive consultations with the Congress during the negotiations with the Spanish Government, and decided to submit it as a treaty largely because of the advice which we received.

This treaty is a unique agreement which encompasses both a

closer relationship with Spain and an agreement for the use of facilities in Spain in exchange for a five-year program of assistance. We consider this a particularly significant agreement which serves U.S. interests in the Atlantic area and supports Spain at a time when it is moving into a new era in its domestic and international activities. We have suggested to the Senate that a Joint Resolution for authorization might be appropriate. We request that the Congress take whatever measures are necessary to authorize the funds in the treaty.

In regard to Portugal, the supporting assistance funds which we are requesting will contribute to its ability to deal with massive economic dislocations left in the wake of last year's political turmoil and will help to support its emerging democratic process.

East Asia

In East Asia, we are continuing our security relationship with the Republic of Korea. As a result of Korea's continuing economic progress, we are terminating our grant material assistance program after FY 76 and are now requesting only those MAP grant funds needed to deliver material previously funded under MAP. If we receive the FMS funding levels requested in our FY 77 program, we will complete the joint US-ROK modernization plan begun in 1970. For its part, the Republic of Korea is now undertaking a further five-year Force Improvement Plan on its own initiative and with its own resources. At the same time, we for our part expect to continue to request significant levels of FMS guaranteed loans in support of our mutual security objectives in Korea.

We know the Committee's concerns on human rights matters. The Korean human rights situation is an important element in our policy considerations. We have strongly made known our views to the Korean Government and there should be no doubt about the concern of the US on the human rights issue.

At the same time we cannot lose sight of our basic concerns over the security situation on the Korean peninsula and its importance to the peace and security of the area. Our request is based on our own assessment of the need to maintain the military balance in Korea and is in support of our security objectives in Korea, Japan, and East Asia generally.

For Thailand we have requested continuing grant MAP and FMS credit in funds. We believe the essential objectives of

our support for Thai self-sufficiency remain valid.

Latin America

In Latin America, the common program denominator continues to be training. We believe that training provides, at minimal cost, significant benefits in terms of working level contacts between American officers and their Latin American counterparts, some of whom may be expected to rise to positions of leadership in their respective governments.

Proposed FMS credits are modest in relation to both the purchasers' means and modernization requirements, and entirely consistent with the tendency of Latin American governments to hold defense expenditures to a low level in favor of development spending.

Africa

Recent events in Africa have shown that our unilateral restraint cannot prevent the introduction of arms and great power interests into this continent. We support self determination for the peoples of Africa, and wish to contribute to the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts. As you are aware, I am planning to visit several African countries in the near future, which will provide opportunities to discuss with various national leaders our perceptions and evolving policies with respect to conflict areas. Our security assistance program consists of modest FMS credits for Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, and Zaire. MAP is limited to Ethiopia. Low-key training efforts in these countries, plus Ghana and Senegal, would enhance our present bilateral cooperation while minimizing our military involvement.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, I have addressed my remarks to the essentiality of our security assistance program, its place in our overall foreign policy design, and the basic criteria under which it is employed. I have focused on the area of greatest present urgency, the Middle East, and have reviewed our proposals for other regions. I am now ready to respond to your questions on these or other matters pertaining to our security assistance program as planned for fiscal year 1977.

KUCHEL ROLAND
76 SECTO 11193

[ca 4/3/76]

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AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THIS CONTINENT. WE WILL NOT BE DEFLECTED BY ATTEMPTS TO INTERFERE WITH WHAT IS BEING ACHIEVED. THE PROMISE OF THIS EFFORT IS TOO IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES AND TO AFRICA.

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THE CHALLENGES AHEAD OF US ARE ARDUOUS AND LONG. THEY WILL REQUIRE A MUTUAL EFFORT OF UNDERSTANDING TO OVERCOME THE LEGACIES OF THE PAST. WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE THIS EFFORT TO BRING INTO BEING TOGETHER WITH YOU, THE DREAMS OF OUR NATIONS FOR A BETTER AND MORE SECURE LIFE.

AMERICA'S OWN MORAL VALUES SUMMON US TO THIS POLICY. TWO HUNDRED YEARS AGO THE UNITED STATES WON ITS INDEPENDENCE.

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HAVING THROWN OFF THE BURDENS OF COLONIALISM, AMERICANS DETERMINED NEVER TO FALL UNDER THE YOKE OF DESPOTISM AGAIN. IN THAT WE HAVE SUCCEEDED. MORE RECENTLY WE HAVE RESOLVED TO BUILD FOR PEACE, EQUALITY AND PROGRESS IN THE WORLD.

IT IS FITTING THAT I SPEAK OF THESE VALUES AND CONCERNS HERE IN THIS CITY NAMED FOR PRESIDENT JAMES MONROE, WHO CONSOLIDATED AMERICA'S INDEPENDENCE, AND HERE IN LIBERIA WHOSE PEOPLE PROUDLY PROCLAIM, "THE LOVE OF LIBERTY BROUGHT US HERE." THOUGH SEPARATED BY AN OCEAN, THE TIDES OF HISTORY AGAIN DRAW US TOGETHER. AMERICAN AND LIBERIANS REMAIN WHAT OUR ANCESTORS WERE— PROUD AND FREE PEOPLES.

FOR ALMOST A CENTURY AND A HALF SINCE COMMODORE PERRY'S SHIP BROUGHT THE FIRST PIONEERS OF FREEDOM TO THESE SHORES THE

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AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE ENJOYED A RELATIONSHIP WITH LIBERIANS UNIQUE IN OUR ASSOCIATION WITH AFRICA. THOSE WHO LEFT AMERICA TO FOUND LIBERIA DID SO TO IMPLEMENT A PRINCIPLE VITAL TO OUR NATIONS TODAY, THE LOVE OF LIBERTY.

THE UNITED STATES FOR DECADES HAS BEEN PROUD TO COOPERATE IN THE NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LIBERIA. WE ARE COMMITTED TO CONTINUE TO DO SO.

THUS OUR NATIONS ARE BOUND BY HISTORY, BY SHARED VALUES, AND

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BY A COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT TWO NATIONS CAN WORK TOGETHER CLOSELY WITH MUTUAL RESPECT FOR THE IMPERATIVES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND NATIONAL DIGNITY.

THESE PRINCIPLES HAVE IMPELLED THE UNITED STATES TO PLAY A VIGOROUS AND POSSIBLY DECISIVE ROLE IN PROMOTING THE PROCESS OF DECOLONIZATION. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY DEFENDED THE BASIC MORAL IMPERATIVES OF RACIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS. WE LAUNCHED THE GREAT INTERNATIONAL EFFORT OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR NEW NATIONS; WE TOOK THE LEAD IN BUILDING THE MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS OF COOPERATION THAT HOLD SO MUCH PROMISE FOR SUPPORTING AFRICAN EFFORTS. WE HAVE DONE SO IN MANY INTERNATIONAL FORUMS AND WILL CONTINUE THIS EFFORT IN THE UNITED NATIONS

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CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT IN A FEW DAYS TIME.

TODAY, THESE SAME ISSUES DEMAND OUR ATTENTION. WE HAVE TO DEAL BOTH WITH IMMEDIATE CHALLENGES AND LONG-RANGE NEEDS. IT IS TIME FOR THE NATIONS OF AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO ADVANCING OUR COMMON GOALS: SELF-DETERMINATION, RACIAL JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS. APART, OR IN CONTENTION, WE WILL DISSIPATE OUR EFFORTS. TOGETHER WE CAN BE TRUE TO OUR

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VALUES AND THE ASPIRATIONS OF OUR PEOPLES.
AFRICA'S GREATNESS AND AMERICA'S POLICY

THE STRENGTHENING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
AFRICA WILL HENCE FORTH BE A KEY ELEMENT OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. A
STABLE, JUST AND PROSPEROUS INTERNATIONAL ORDER CAN BE CONSTRUCTED
ONLY THROUGH THE COOPERATION OF THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL NATION
AND THE NATIONS OF THE GREAT AFRICAN CONTINENT.

THE VISITOR TO AFRICA IS AWED BY ITS IMMENSITY; BY THE
SWEEP OF ITS GREAT PLAINS; BY THE MAGNIFICENCE OF ITS GREAT RIVERS;
AND BY THE KNOWLEDGE THAT HERE IS WHERE MAN HAD HIS ORIGINS. THE
COLONIAL STEREOTYPE OF BLACK AFRICA IS A PLACE DEVOID OF HISTORY IS
DISPELLED BY AN AWARENESS THAT MODERN AFRICA IS BUILDING ON
THE RICH TRADITIONS OF ANCIENT AFRICAN STATES: OF GHANA, MALI,

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KANEM-BORNU, SONGHAY, BENIN, THE ZIMBABWE CULTURE, ETHIOPIA
AND OTHERS. BEFORE AND DURING THE COLONIAL ERA, MOST OF THE REST
OF THE WORLD WAS UNAWARE OF THE TRUE NATURE OF AFRICA, WHICH TO
OUTSIDERS REMAINED A LAND OF MYSTERY WELL INTO THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY. BUT AS WAS SO DRAMATICALLY MADE CLEAR WITHIN FIFTEEN
YEARS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, AFRICA'S COLONIAL PERIOD WAS ONLY
A BRIEF EPISODE IN THE ONWARD MOVEMENT OF THE PEOPLES OF THIS
CONTINENT.

IN 1882, THE EMINENT LIBERIAN EDUCATOR EDWARD BLYDEN
SAID: "AFRICA IS NO VAST ISLAND SEPARATED BY AN IMMENSE OCEAN
FROM OTHER PORTIONS OF THE GLOBE, AND CUT OFF
THROUGHOUT THE AGES FROM THE MEN WHO HAVE MADE AND INFLUENCED
THE DESTINIES OF MANKIND. SHE HAS BEEN CLOSELY CONNECTED,
BOTH AS SOURCE AND NOURISHER, WITH SOME OF THE MOST POTENT IN-
FLUENCES WHICH HAVE AFFECTED FOR GOOD THE HISTORY OF THE
WORLD."

BLYDEN'S PERCEPTIVE OBSERVATION APPLIES TODAY EVEN MORE THAN IT
DID A CENTURY AGO. AT NO TIME IN HISTORY HAVE WE BEEN MORE AWARE
OF THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF ALL NATIONS. AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES
ARE LINKED BY REAL INTERESTS AND COMMON CONCERNS.

POLITICALLY, WE SHARE A DEDICATION TO PEACE, NATIONAL DIGNITY

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AND RACIAL JUSTICE.

AMERICA'S HISTORIC IDENTIFICATION WITH AFRICAN ASPIRATIONS IS
DEEPLY ROOTED IN THE CULTURAL HERITAGE OF TWENTY-THREE MILLION
BLACK AMERICANS--AND IN THE MORAL SYMPATHY OF 200 MILLION AMERICANS.

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THE ASSERTION OF BLACK NATIONALISM IN AFRICA HAS COINCIDED WITH A NEW AFFIRMATION OF EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND RACIAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES. THESE DEVELOPMENTS HAVE REINFORCED EACH OTHER AND HAVE ADDED A PROFOUND MORAL STRENGTH TO THE BONDS BETWEEN US.

ECONOMICALLY, WE EACH HAVE A STAKE IN EACH OTHER'S SUCCESS AND DEVELOPMENT, FOR OUR INTERDEPENDENCE CAN BE A VEHICLE FOR COMMON PROGRESS. OUR MUTUAL TRADE IS GROWING RAPIDLY; YOUR EXPORTS ARE REACHING THE AMERICAN MARKET AT A RATE APPROACHING SOME SIX BILLION DOLLARS ANNUALLY. AFRICA'S IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES AS A PRODUCER OF ENERGY AND COMMODITIES IS OBVIOUS. AND AMERICAN INVE-

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STATEMENT IN BLACK AFRICA SINCE ITS NEW ERA OF INDEPENDENCE HAS MORE THAN QUADRUPLED, TO OVER ONE AND A HALF BILLION DOLLARS. WE ARE BOTH AWARE THAT THE PROSPERITY OF OUR PEOPLES CANNOT BE

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SUSTAINED UNLESS THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IS EQUITABLE, EFFICIENT AND EXPANDING.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND OF COMMON INTERESTS, LET ME TAKE UP WITH YOU NOW SOME OF THE PRINCIPLES OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD AFRICA.

FIRST, THE UNITED STATES UNAMBIGUOUSLY SUPPORTS AFRICA'S STRUGGLE TO PERFECT ITS INDEPENDENCE. AFRICA DID NOT FIGHT ITS LONG BATTLE FOR LIBERATION FROM COLONIAL RULE ONLY TO SURRENDER IT AGAIN TO EXTERNAL DOMINATION THAT MAY TAKE DECADES MORE TO OVERCOME. THE UNITED STATES SEEKS NO BLOC TO FOLLOW OUR LEAD, NOR PARAMOUNT INFLUENCE IN THIS CONTINENT. WE BELIEVE THAT NO OTHER COUNTRY SHOULD DO SO. AFRICANS MUST DETERMINE THEIR OWN DESTINY. THE NEW AFRICA MUST BE FREE OF GREAT POWER RIVALRY.

AFRICAN UNITY IS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL. THOSE WHO WOULD DIVIDE AFRICA--EITHER BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS OR BETWEEN FACTIONS--WOULD DIMINISH ITS PROMISE, DISSIPATE ITS ENERGIES IN CONTENTION, AND OPEN THE WAY FOR THE RETURN OF EXTERNAL INTERVENTION. THE END RESULT IS BOUND TO BE DOMINATED BY ONE OUTSIDE POWER OR DIVISION OF THE CONTINENT INTO COMPETING BLOCs. IT IS DEEPLY IN OUR COMMON INTEREST THAT NEITHER TAKE PLACE. THE UNITED STATES CALLS ON ALL

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NATIONS TO AFFIRM THE PRINCIPLE OF AFRICAN UNITY. IT WILL NOT

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IMPORT GREAT POWER CONFLICT INTO AFRICA. IT WILL OPPOSE THOSE WHO
SEEK TO DO SO.

SECOND, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED FOR FRIENDLY RELATIONS
WITH ALL INDEPENDENT AFRICAN NATIONS. WE, AS ANY COUNTRY, HAVE
OUR PREFERENCES AMONG POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS.
BUT WE ARE PREPARED FOR COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH ANY GOVERNMENT
OF AFRICA WHICH REPRESENTS AFRICAN PRINCIPLES AND ASPIRATIONS.
OUR CONCERN ARISES ONLY WHEN AN AFRICAN MOVEMENT IS EXPLOITED

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BY OUTSIDE POWERS FOR THEIR OWN ENDS.

IN THIS CONTEXT, LET ME MENTION ANGOLA. THE UNITED STATES HOLDS
NO ENMITY TOWARD ANY AFRICAN FACTION OR GOVERNMENT. THEIR
IDEOLOGY OR SOCIAL SYSTEM IS NOT PARAMOUNT CONCERN TO US; IT
IS FOR EACH COUNTRY TO CHOOSE FOR ITSELF. WE DID NOT OPPOSE THE

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COMING TO POWER OF FRELIMO, A MARXIST MOVEMENT, IN MOZAMBIQUE
BECAUSE WE CONSIDERED IT AN ESSENTIALLY INDIGENOUS EVOLUTION.
WE RECOGNIZED THE GOVERNMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE IMMEDIATELY UPON
INDEPENDENCE, AND WE BRING NO SENSE OF ACUMONY TO OUR BILATERAL
DEALINGS.

IN THE CASE OF ANGOLA, THE UNITED STATES ACCEPTED ALL THREE
ANGOLAN NATIONALIST GROUPS AS LEGITIMATE AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVE-
MENTS. WE REGRET THAT THEY WERE UNABLE TO RESOLVE THEIR DIFF-
FERENCES PEACEFULLY AND WITHOUT OUTSIDE MILITARY INTERVENTION.
WE COULD WORK WITH THE MPLA IN ANGOLA IN THE SAME SPIRIT AS WITH
FRELIMO IN MOZAMBIQUE. WHAT CONCERNS US IS THE PRESENCE IN ANGOLA
OF LARGE FOREIGN FORCES FROM OUTSIDE THE CONTINENT. THIS IS BOUND
TO RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT THAT GOVERNMENT'S ACCEPTANCE OF NON-
ALIGNMENT AND THE PRINCIPLE OF AFRICAN SELF-DETERMINATION.
WHAT CAN BE THE PURPOSE OF 15,000 TROOPS OF AN EXTERNAL EXPEDI-
TIONARY FORCE NOW THAT ALL OTHER FOREIGN FORCES HAVE WITHDRAWN
FROM ANGOLA? HOW CAN A GOVERNMENT BE CONSIDERED AFRICAN IF
IT HAS STATIONED ON ITS SOIL A LARGE FORCE FROM CUBA.

THE UNITED STATES HAS NO INTEREST IN SEEING ANGOLA REMAIN A
FOCUS OF CONTENTION. WE HAVE NO QUARREL WITH THAT COUNTRY. WE CAN

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DEAL WITH IT IN A COOPERATIVE SPIRIT. WE ARE WILLING IN PRINCIPLE
TO OPEN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ANGOLAN AUTHORITIES WITH A VIEW
TOWARD NORMALIZING OUR RELATIONS AND SEEKING MEANS OF COOPERATING --
INCLUDING ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. WE WISH ANGOLA WELL AS A UNIFIED
AND INDEPENDENT STATE. BUT BEFORE WE CAN GO FAR DOWN THAT ROAD,
WE WANT TO KNOW ANGOLA'S INTENTION WITH RESPECT TO THE
PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES ON ITS SOIL.

THIRD, THE UNITED STATES PLEDGES ITSELF UNAMBIGUOUSLY ON THE
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SIDE OF MAJORITY RULE, RACIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. A FEW DAYS AGO, IN LUSAKA, ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT FORD, I ANNOUNCED A NEW AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO THESE GOALS. AS PART OF AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT, I PUT FORWARD A CONCRETE TEN-POINT PROGRAM. IN CARRYING OUT THIS PROGRAM, WE SHALL WORK CLOSELY WITH THE PRESIDENTS OF BOTSWANA, MOZAMBIQUE, TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA-- AND WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. WE HAVE ALSO CALLED ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO DEMONSTRATE ITS COMMITMENT TO AFRICAN PURPOSES BY WORKING WITH US IN BRINGING MAJORITY RULE TO RHODESIA.

FOURTH, THE UNITED STATES WILL HELP AFRICAN NATIONS DEVELOP AND STRENGTHEN THEIR ECONOMIES. AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT GOALS ARE WIDENING OPPORTUNITY, SOCIAL PROGRESS, SELF-RELIANCE. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE ALWAYS VIEWED THESE GOALS WITH THE GREATEST SYMPATHY.

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WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED OUR SUPPORT IN BILATERAL PROGRAMS AND IN OUR EFFORTS TO BUILD A NEW ERA OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS.

LET ME DISCUSS IN FURTHER DETAIL OUR APPROACH TO THE CRUCIAL ECONOMIC CHALLENGE -- A CHALLENGE WHICH WILL REMAIN WITH US FOR THE LONG TERM.

THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

AFRICA HAS BROKEN THE SHACKLES OF THE PAST AND IS DETERMINED TO REMAIN FREE. AFRICA IS DEEPLY ENGAGED IN THE STRUGGLE TO ACHIEVE RACIAL JUSTICE. BUT THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE PAST MUST BE CONSOLIDATED BY THE BUILDING OF A PROSPEROUS TOMORROW WHICH RAISES THE STANDARD OF LIVING AND THE HORIZONS OF LIFE FOR ALL THE CONTINENT'S PEOPLES.

THE TASK AHEAD IS FORMIDABLE -- IN SOME PARTS OF AFRICA, STAGGERING. BUT AFRICA BRINGS TO THE TASK GREAT RESOURCES, VAST POTENTIAL AND THE PROSPECT THAT IN THE FUTURE AFRICAN ENERGIES WILL BE FREER TO CONCENTRATE ON POSITIVE GOALS.

OUR POLICY TOWARD AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IS GUIDED BY THESE PRINCIPLES:

-- FIRST, AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT MUST REST ON A FOUNDATION OF

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ECONOMIC SECURITY. NO NATION CAN PLAN ITS FUTURE EFFECTIVELY OR MOBILIZE ITS EFFORT IF ITS INCOME IS BUFFETED CONTINUALLY BY EXTERNAL ECONOMIC FORCES OVER WHICH IT HAS LITTLE OR NO INFLUENCE. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN AFRICA, WHERE THE EXPORT EARNINGS OF MANY NATIONAL ECONOMIES DEPEND UPON GLOBAL MARKET CONDITIONS FOR A SINGLE COMMODITY AND WHERE HIGHER ENERGY PRICES OR INFLATION ABROAD CAN RAISE THE PRICE OF IMPORTS TO PROHIBITIVE LEVELS.

-- SECOND, AFRICA MUST HAVE AN EQUITABLE VOICE AND ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND IN THE NEGOTIATIONS

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THAT SHAPE THE GLOBAL ECONOMY. ALL NATIONS MUST HAVE A STAKE IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM IF THEY ARE TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR ITS ORDERLY EVOLUTION. THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY BELIEVES
THAT THE WORLD ECONOMY CANNOT BE THE EXCLUSIVE PRESERVE OF THE
RICHER NATIONS. AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD DEMANDS A NEW ERA OF ECONOMIC
COOPERATION.

— THIRD, THE WORLD COMMUNITY MUST DEVOTE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO
THE PLIGHT OF THE WORLD'S POOREST NATIONS --MANY OF WHICH ARE
IN AFRICA. IN MANY COUNTRIES THE ECONOMIC ISSUE IS SIMPLE
HUMAN SURVIVAL. AND IT IS THOSE VERY COUNTRIES THAT HAVE BEEN MOST
DEVASTATED BY THE MASSIVE AND ABRUPT RISE IN OIL PRICES. THIS
HAS MADE IT DIFFICULT, EVEN IMPOSSIBLE, TO OBTAIN MODERN FERTILIZERS
FOR EXPANDING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, AND TO AFFORD SUFFICIENT

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FUEL FOR MECHANIZATION. SPECIAL ACCOUNT MUST BE TAKEN OF THE NEEDS
OF THE POOREST.

LAST SEPTEMBER AT THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE UNITED STATES
PRESENTED A COMPREHENSIVE SERIES OF PROPOSALS FOR THE WORLD COMM-
UNITY TO RESPOND TO THE NEEDS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ON A COOPER-
ATIVE BASIS. MANY OF THESE PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED AND
OTHERS ARE MOVING AHEAD. THESE MEASURES WILL HAVE A DIRECT IMPACT
ON AFRICA. SPECIFICALLY:

FIRST, TO ENSURE ECONOMIC SECURITY, AFRICA CAN LOOK FORWARD
TO MORE STABLE EXPORT EARNINGS AS A RESULT OF OUR PROPOSAL
TO ENLARGE THE COMPENSATORY FINANCE FACILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, TO WHICH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WILL NOW HAVE
GREATER ACCESS. TO STABILIZE MARKET CONDITIONS FOR KEY RAW
MATERIALS, THE UNITED STATES HAS SIGNED AND SUBMITTED FOR CONGRE-
SSIONAL APPROVAL INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS ON TIN AND
COFFEE. WE STAND READY TO DISCUSS
OTHERS. AND WE HAVE PROPOSED PRODUCER-CONSUMER FORUMS TO
DISCUSS MEASURES TO IMPROVE CONDITIONS FOR ALL KEY COMMODITIES.

SECOND, TO ENHANCE AFRICA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC

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SYSTEM, WE HAVE REDUCED THE BARRIERS TO AFRICAN EXPORTS INTO THE
UNITED STATES MARKET BY INSTITUTING A GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF TARIFF

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PREFERENCES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. WE HAVE TABLED OFFERS TO
REDUCE TARIFFS FOR TROPICAL PRODUCTS WHICH ARE OF SPECIAL
INTEREST TO AFRICA AND WE ARE PREPARED TO PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO
THE INTERESTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS NOW UNDERWAY IN GENEVA. TO FOSTER INDUSTRIALI-
ZATION, WE INTEND TO MAKE AN INITIAL CONTRIBUTION OF \$15 MILLION
TO THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND; AND WE WILL BE WORKING WITH
OTHERS TO SET UP AN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY INSTITUTE TO HELP
DEVELOPING NATIONS DEVISE EFFECTIVE ENERGY PROGRAMS OF THEIR
OWN.

THIRD, TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC JUSTICE, AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS EMPHASIZE THE POOREST COUNTRIES AND THE

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RURAL POOR. WE PLAN TO CONTRIBUTE \$200 MILLION TO THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT. WE WILL PROVIDE 60 PERCENT OF THE 10 MILLION TON FOOD AID TARGET ESTABLISHED BY THE WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE. IN ADDITION, THE IMF HAS APPROVED OUR PROPOSAL FOR A TRUST FUND FOR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ASSISTANCE FOR POOR COUNTRIES.

THE RECORD IS PROMISING. BUT THE NEEDS OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD ARE ENORMOUS, AND MUCH WORK REMAINS BEFORE US:

-- WE NEED TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF THE CRUSHING INTERNATIONAL DEBT BURDEN WHICH MANY AFRICAN COUNTRIES SUFFER AS A RESULT OF HIGH OIL PRICES AND DRASTIC SWINGS IN GLOBAL COMMODITY MARKETS.

-- WE NEED SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS TO FOSTER THE INVESTMENT NECESSARY FOR AFRICA'S GROWTH -- ARRANGEMENTS THAT BOTH RESPECT

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NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND ASSURE PREDICTABILITY AND FAIR TREATMENT

FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS.

-- WE MUST STIMULATE THE FLOW OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY TO AFRICA,

TO PROMOTE GROWTH AND DIVERSIFY NATIONAL ECONOMIES.

-- WE NEED TO MITIGATE THE DESTRUCTIVE EFFECTS OF FLUCTUATING PRICES FOR THE KEY RAW MATERIALS ON WHICH SO MANY AFRICAN ECONOMIES RELY.

-- WE MUST ENHANCE THE WORLD COMMUNITY'S CAPACITY TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY TO NATURAL DISASTERS, LIKE THE SAHEL DROUGHT, WHICH CAN WREAK VAST TRAGEDY ON A SCALE OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE.

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-- AND, WE NEED TO CONTINUE EFFECTIVE FOLLOW-UP TO THE WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE, ESPECIALLY TO REALIZE AFRICA'S GREAT POTENTIAL FOR EXPANDED FOOD PRODUCTION.

IN A FEW DAYS, AT THE UNCTAD CONFERENCE IN NAIROBI, I WILL PRESENT A PACKAGE OF AMERICAN PROPOSALS WHICH WILL ADDRESS MANY OF THESE ISSUES. WE ARE DEDICATED TO CONTINUING THE COOPERATIVE SPIRIT WHICH WAS FORGED AT THE SEVENTH SPECIAL SESSION. WE EXPECT OTHERS TO MEET US IN THIS SAME SPIRIT -- WITHOUT CONFRONTATION OR UNREALISTIC DEMANDS. IN THIS WAY THE MOMENTUM THAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN RECENT MONTHS CAN BE MAINTAINED AND ACCELERATED.

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I HAVE SET FORTH, ON THE SOIL OF AFRICA, CONCRETE POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE RANGE OF ASPIRATIONS THAT AFRICA AND WE SHARE -- POLITICAL, MORAL AND ECONOMIC. I SHALL ADVANCE OTHERS BEFORE I RETURN TO AMERICA.

OUR COOPERATION IS OFFERED FREELY IN OUR COMMON INTEREST. ON MY TRIP, I HAVE HEARD THE VOICES OF AFRICA, FORCEFULLY AND ELOQUENTLY EXPRESSED. THE UNITED STATES RESPECTS THOSE VOICES AND WILL RESPOND IN THE SPIRIT OF THE RESPONSIBLE AND POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP THAT WE SEEK. AFRICA'S PRIMARY CONCERN IS FOR NATIONAL DIGNITY AND DEVELOPMENT. THE UNITED STATES SHARES THESE GOALS BUT BEYOND THEM HAS AN OVERRIDING CONCERN FOR A JUST PEACE AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN THE WORLD. IF WE ARE TO WORK TOGETHER, WE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT OUR AIMS ARE CONGRUENT, AND ENCOURAGE EACH OTHER THROUGH MUTUAL RESPECT AND UNDERSTANDING. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL RESPOND TO THE ASPIRATIONS OF FRIENDS; BUT THEY WILL RESIST PRESSURE OR CONTINUAL RHETORICAL ATTACKS.

IF AFRICAN NATIONS DESCRIBE AMERICA AS INHERENTLY HOSTILE; IF THE DIGNITY AND RESPECT WHICH SHOULD MARK THE DEALINGS BETWEEN MATURE PEOPLES IS LACKING; IF NON-ALIGNMENT COMES TO BE DEFINED AS AUTOMATICALLY OPPOSING ALL U.S. POLICIES, THERE CANNOT BE THE

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NECESSARY STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT IN AMERICA FOR A NEW AND MUTUALLY
BENEFICIAL ERA OF RELATIONS.

THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA WILL
ALWAYS AGREE. THERE WILL ALWAYS BE DIFFERENCES, EVEN AMONG THE
BEST OF FRIENDS. BUT WHEN WE DISAGREE, LET US DO SO WITHOUT RANCOR.
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AND WITH AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING OUR
FRIENDSHIP. LET US ALWAYS CONSULT EARLY ON ISSUES WHICH COULD
DIVIDE US, TO ENSURE OUR MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND TO REFLECT OUR
MUTUAL RESPECT. LET US MAKE OUR COMMON AIMS THE BASIS FOR
PRACTICAL ACHIEVEMENT.

MY COUNTRY'S RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN THE GLOBAL BALANCE OF
STABILITY IS CONSISTENT WITH, AND REINFORCES, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF
AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE

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CE AND AFRICAN UNITY; THE EXTERNAL INTERVENTION,
WHICH IS OUR CONCERN, CAN ONLY DIMINISH AFRICAN SELF-DETERMINATION
AND UNDERMINE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CONTINENT. SIMILARLY, AFRICA'S
DRIVE FOR DEVELOPMENT ACCORDS WITH OUR OWN INTEREST IN A NEW ERA
OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION; WE SEEK IN OUR OWN INTEREST TO
PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF ALL NATIONS -- PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS,
DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPING, LARGE AND SMALL.

AND SO, I WILL RETURN TO AMERICA TO CONVEY MY FRESH AND DEEP
IMPRESSIONS OF THIS CONTINENT'S NEEDS AND THIS CONTINENT'S
POTENTIAL AND WITH A HEIGHTENED SENSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF
STRENGTHENED TIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA.

WITH RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER'S IDEALS AND MOTIVES, WITH
DETERMINATION TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF OUR TIME, WE CAN MAKE
AFRICAN-AMERICAN COOPERATION A MODEL FOR COOPERATION AND PROGRESS
IN THE WORLD.

IN THE DECADES TO COME, A GREAT DRAMA WILL PLAY ITSELF OUT
ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT. THE NEW AFRICA WILL TAKE ITS DESTINY
FIRMLY INTO ITS WON HANDS, AND WILL MAKE ITS FUNDAMENTAL
CONTRIBUTION TO THE WORLD COMMUNITY.

THE UNITED STATES IS READY TO JOIN
WITH YOU AS THIS HISTORICAL

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PROCESS UNFOLDS. THE STAKES ARE HIGH, THE TASK IS IMMENSE, BUT
SUCCESS WILL COME IF WE SEEK IT TOGETHER IN THE SERVICE OF
HUMANITY.

AS WE CONTEMPLATE OUR FUTURE ENDEAVORS WE CAN LOOK TO OUR
RELATIONS WITH LIBERIA AS AN OUTSTANDING EXAMPLE OF COOPERATION.
MY COUNTRY IS ESPECIALLY PLEASED TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH PRESIDENT
TOLBERT -- A STATESMAN AND THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE MODERNIZA-
TION AND INTEGRATION OF LIBERIAN SOCIETY.

TODAY IT HAS BEEN MY PRIVILEGE TO CONVEY TO PRESIDENT TOLBERT
PRESIDENT FORD'S PERSONAL INVITATION TO MAKE A STATE VISIT DURING
THIS BICENTENNIAL YEAR. HIS VISIT WILL FURTHER UNDERLINE THE
IMPORTANCE OF OUR RELATIONS WHICH HAVE SPECIAL HISTORIC MEANING
FOR AMERICANS.

BUT THE TRUEST MEANING OF OUR BICENTENNIAL IS TO CELEBRATE NOT
MERELY OUR PAST BUT OUR FUTURE. THE HIGHEST AIM OF FOREIGN POLICY
MUST BE TO SHAPE THE COURSE OF HISTORY ACCORDING TO OUR HOPES
AND MORAL ENDS. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND

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AFRICA CAN NOW ENTER ONE OF ITS MOST FRUITFUL AND SUCCESSFUL PERIODS. IT IS UP TO US, THE PEOPLES OF AFRICA AND AMERICA. THERE IS SO MUCH TO BE ACHIEVED.

IN THIS SPIRIT OF HOPE, I RAISE MY GLASS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,
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AND OFFER A TOAST:

-- TO THE HEALTH OF PRESIDENT TOLBERT,

-- TO THE HISTORIC FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES

AND LIBERIA,

-- AND TO THE TRIUMPHS THAT LIE AHEAD OF US IN THE GREAT COLLABORATION BETWEEN AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES.

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