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# LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON U. S. MILITARY FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

## General Restrictions

Several legislative acts, beginning with PL 93-50, the Second Supplemental Appropriation Act for FY 1973 and PL 93-52, the Continuing Appropriations Act for FY 1974 (both of July 1, 1973) prohibit the use of funds:

"to support directly or indirectly combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam and South Vietnam by United States forces..."

A slightly different formulation appears in PL 93-126, the Department of State Appropriations Authorization Act of 1973 (October 18, 1973) which prohibits funds to finance:

"the involvement of United States military forces in hostilities in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia, unless specifically authorized hereafter by the Congress."

The legality of involving U. S. military forces in South Vietnam is also affected by restrictions on U. S. military manpower there. PL 93-559, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (December 30, 1974) limits to 2,500 the number of personnel in Vietnam at any one time who are "members of the armed forces or direct hire and contract employees of the Department of Defense." This limit is set at 1,500 by December 30, 1975.

## Specific Combat Activities Prohibited

A letter of March 20, 1974 from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Dennis Doolin to Senator Hughes specified the specific activities prohibited in Cambodia and Laos under PL 93-50 and 93-52 as perceived by the Department of Defense as follows:

"a) bombing, strafing, rocketing or other expenditure of ordnance; b) forward air control operations, c) armed reconnaissance; d) helicopter gunship operations; e) comparable hostile actions by U. S. naval and ground forces directly engaged as American units against the enemy; f) activities by individual personnel in support of indigenous forces...."

Similar prohibitions would appear to apply in South Vietnam.



The War Powers Resolution

The War Powers Resolution of November 1, 1973 provides that:

"The President shall in every possible instance consult with the Congress before introducing U. S. Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." The President must also consult with the Congress prior to substantially augmenting any U. S. combat troops already located in a foreign nation.

-- The President must report any such steps within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House and the President pro-tempore of the Senate.

-- The President's report must be in writing and must set forth the circumstances, the Constitutional and legislative authority, and the estimated scope and duration involved.

-- If, when the President's report is submitted, the Congress has adjourned, the Speaker and President pro-tempore (if they deem it advisable or if petitioned by at least 30 percent of their respective houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress to consider the report and take appropriate action.

-- The President's report is referred to the House Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committees.

The President is required to end the troops' involvement within 60 days unless the Congress has declared war or authorized the troops' role, or unless the Congress cannot meet as a result of an armed attack against the U. S.

-- Extensions of the involvement require new Presidential reports and new Congressional authorization every 30 or 60 days.

-- In the absence of a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.



Condolences

Has the President contacted directly or sent messages to the families of the 2 Marines killed yesterday?

Notification

Was the Congress informed last night of the evacuation action?  
If so, does the President consider that this was a formal notification under the War Powers Act or simply an informal report?

# # #



Policy (continued)

Beyond the statement made today, does the President plan to speak personally to the Nation about the Vietnamese denouement?

Has the President or any other senior American officials been in touch with President Minh since the final evacuation was launched?

Will there be any NSC or WSAG meetings today?

Assistance

What is now the status of the President's request to Congress for \$722 million in military assistance?

What will happen to the \$327 million for humanitarian assistance and other purposes now before the Congress?

Will the President agree that any humanitarian funds voted by the Congress be channeled through international organizations such as the United Nations? Assuming communist control over all of South Vietnam, would he consider giving any relief and rehabilitation assistance through any channel to the people of that country?

Martin

Has the President spoken personally with Ambassador Martin?

Has he now left Saigon and will he return directly to the United States to report to the President?

Does the President consider that Ambassador Martin acted properly, not only through the entire episode, but particularly in his handling of the final evacuation?



Q. Has he contacted the South Vietnamese?

A.

Q. Has he talked personally to Ambassador Martin or has  
or has Kissinger or Schlesinger contacted Martin?

A.

Q. When will Martin return to the United States?

A.

Q. Do you have any knowledge if any newsmen stayed behind?  
And if so, who?

A.

Q. Will there be briefings later on in the day by Defense or State?

A.

Q. Has the President contacted the families or sent messages  
to the families of the two marines who were killed?

A.



Q. Was anyone injured or killed in the evacuation or were the two marines the last Americans killed in the Vietnamese War?

A.

Q. Is there any meeting of the National Security Council called for this morning?

A.

Q. Will the President be meeting with Congress this morning?

A.

Q. Ron, now what is the status of the \$722 million?

A.



Q. How many Vietnamese were evacuated?

A.

Q. Will there be any more, either through negotiations with the new government or through third country intervention?

A.

Q. Where are the Vietnamese now?

A.

Q: When will the first Americans arrive back in the U.S. and where?

A.

Q: What is the status of the remaining money under the Paris accords for reparations to North Vietnam? Can this money be used for assistance to the Vietnamese who were evacuated?

A:



Q: Will America recognize the Vietnamese government; will we support their entrance into the U.N. ?

A:

Q: Has the American Government been in touch with Hanoi ?

A:

Q: Did Secretary Kissinger notify the heads, or his counterparts in any other governments around the world about the evacuation ?

A:

~~Q: Will Secretary Kissinger be available later today for a briefing?~~

A:



V.N.

Contemplating a supplemental  
for V.N. Probably 300M  
all military.

Contemplating supplemental Request  
for Cambodia = 362 - 200

Continuing resolution  
all military

Cambodia

Economic supplemental for ~~the~~  
contemplated. Maybe next  
for ~~Cambodia~~ V.N.

1976 Requests Don't reveal.



Nat. come to him for a device

~~Call Conine + ...~~

# AID TO VIET-NAM

PR #35

21<sup>5</sup>

morning the leaders of both parties in Congress have told President Ford that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to get more aid to South Viet-Nam. Where does that leave the situation?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, let us make clear what it is we have asked for. And let me express the hope that what we are asking for doesn't rekindle the entire debate on Vietnam, because that is emphatically not involved.

Last year the Administration asked for \$1.4 billion for military aid to Viet-Nam. The Congress authorized \$1 billion. It appropriated \$700 million. We are asking the Congress to appropriate the \$300 million difference between what it had already authorized and what it actually appropriated in the light of the stepped-up military operations in Viet-Nam.

This is not an issue of principle of whether or not we should be in Viet-Nam. The issue is whether any case at all can be made for giving inadequate aid to Viet-Nam. And we believe there can be no case for a deliberate decision to give less than the adequate aid, and aid that the Congress had already authorized to be given, so that it could not have been even an issue of principle for the Congress.



All that we have ever said was that the settlement would put South Viet-nam in a position where it had a chance

PR #35

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to defend itself. That chance exists. That chance depends on adequate American assistance. And that is the chance we are asking for.



## BOMBING OF PRESIDENTIAL PALACE

This morning a VNAF F-5 dropped two bombs on the President's residence in what appears to have been an isolated attempt on Thieu's life.

Q. What is the significance of the bombing effort? Why should we persist in supporting a government that is against the very leadership with which we are associating ourselves and our aid?

A. I am not going to get into a long discussion on this, but our reports indicate that most likely, the bombing was a manifestation of an individuals' frustration and dissatisfaction with the situation in Vietnam.


FYI ONLY: It is best not to characterize the situation further, lest you get trapped into doing so if and when further expressions of GVN dissatisfaction are shown. You want to avoid characterizations of what is or is not a coup attempt, etc.



We are seeing a great human tragedy as untold numbers of Vietnamese flee the North Vietnamese onslaught. The United States has been doing and will continue to do its utmost to assist these people.

I have, for example, directed all available naval ships to stand off Indochina to do whatever is necessary to assist. We have appealed to the United Nations to use its moral influence to permit these innocent people to leave, and we call on North Vietnam to permit the movement of refugees to areas of their choice.

The requirements for the care and ultimate disposition of all those who are fleeing from the war will be heavy. Because of the large numbers involved and the overwhelming need for assistance, I will soon be asking the Congress for additional funds to meet this humanitarian requirement. We will as well be working with the humanitarian agencies to do everything humanly possible to relieve the tragic plight of these refugees.





# BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES ARMY  
OFFICE, CHIEF OF INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

CURRENT AS OF: January 1974

*C/SIAI 7 Oct 74*

GENERAL FRED C. WEYAND  
CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY (*as of Oct 4, 1974*)

General Fred C. Weyand was born in Arbuckle, California, 15 September 1916. He was commissioned a second lieutenant on graduation from the University of California in 1938 and entered on active duty in December 1940. In 1944 and 1945 he was assigned to various units in China, Burma and India.

After World War II, his assignments included duty with the War Department; Headquarters, US Army, Pacific; Joint Task Force 7; and the staff of the Commander in Chief, Pacific.

During the Korean conflict, he served with the 3rd Infantry Division in Japan and Korea in 1950 and 1951.

In 1954 following duty as an instructor at the Infantry School, he was assigned to the Office of the Secretary of the Army.

From 1959 to 1960, General Weyand was assigned in West Berlin as Commanding Officer, 3rd Battle Group, 6th Infantry; as assistant to the U.S. Commander, Berlin; and in France as Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Communications Zone. He then served as Chief of Legislative Liaison at Department of the Army.

From 1964 to 1967 General Weyand commanded the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii and South Vietnam. In May 1967, he assumed command of II Field Force Vietnam. In late 1968 he became Chief, Office of Reserve Components. In 1969 and early 1970 he was Military Advisor to the Chairman, U.S. Delegation, U.S. Embassy, Paris, France.

Following brief service in mid-1970 as Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, he returned to Vietnam as Deputy Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam. In June 1972 he was appointed Commander, USMACV.

In March 1973, after withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Republic of Vietnam, he assumed command of the United States Army, Pacific. General Weyand was sworn in as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army on 1 August 1973.



*March 26, 1975*

PERSONAL DATA

Date and Place of Birth: 15 September 1916, Arbuckle, California  
 Parents: Mr. and Mrs. Fred C. Weyand  
 (Father deceased)  
 Marriage: Date: 20 September 1940  
 Wife: Arline Langhart Weyand  
 Children: Robert C.  
 Carolyn Ann  
 Nancy Diane

EDUCATION

University of California - AB Degree - 1939  
 Command and General Staff School - 1942  
 Coast Artillery School - 1943  
 Task Force Officers School - 1944  
 Advanced Infantry Officers Course - 1950  
 Armed Forces Staff College - 1953  
 National War College - 1958

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF PROMOTIONS

	<u>TEMP</u>	<u>PERM</u>
Second Lieutenant	6 Dec 40	
First Lieutenant	25 Jun 41	28 Jun 46
Captain	1 Feb 42	1 Jul 48
Major	17 Nov 42	2 Jul 53
Lieutenant Colonel	4 Mar 45	15 Sep 61
Colonel	20 Jul 55	15 Sep 66
Brigadier General	29 Jul 60	16 Aug 68
Major General	1 Nov 62	16 Aug 68
Lieutenant General	16 Aug 68	
General	31 Oct 70	

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF ASSIGNMENTS

	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
USAR Inactive	May 38	Nov 40
S1, 6th Artillery Regiment (CA)	Dec 40	Jun 42
Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas	Jul 42	Aug 42
S1, Harbor Defense Command, San Francisco, California	Sep 42	Dec 43
Office of G2, War Department General Staff, Washington, DC	Jan 44	Apr 44
Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, US Army Forces, China-Burma-India Theater	May 44	Feb 45
HQ China Theater, Chungking	Mar 45	Sep 45



CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF ASSIGNMENTS (CONT.)

	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
Military Branch, Military Intelligence Service, War Department	Oct 45	Jul 46
Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, US Army Forces, Middle Pacific	Aug 46	Aug 49
Student Training Regiment, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia	Sep 49	Jul 50
Deputy Chief of Staff, 3d Infantry Division, Korea	Aug 50	Dec 50
Battalion Commander, 7th Infantry Regiment, Korea	Jan 51	Jul 51
Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, 3d Infantry Division, Korea	Aug 51	Dec 51
Committee Chairman, Tactical and Academic Depart- ments, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia	Jan 52	Jan 53
Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia	Feb 53	Jul 53
Military Assistant, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management), Washington, D.C.	Aug 53	Jul 54
Military Assistant and Executive to Secretary of the Army	Aug 54	Jul 57
National War College, Washington, D.C.	Aug 57	May 58
Commander, 3d Battle Group, 6th Infantry, USAREUR	Jun 58	Dec 59
Office of the US Commander, Berlin	Jan 60	Jun 60
Chief of Staff, USAREUR (REAR)/COMZ	Jul 60	Apr 61
Deputy Chief of Legislative Liaison, DA	Apr 61	Aug 62
Chief of Legislative Liaison, OSA	Sep 62	Aug 64
Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii	Aug 64	Mar 66
Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, Vietnam	Mar 66	Mar 67
Deputy Commanding General, II Field Force, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam	Mar 67	May 67
Acting Commanding General, II Field Force, USMACV	May 67	Jun 67
Commanding General, II Field Force, US Army, Vietnam	Jul 67	Jul 68
Chief, Office of Reserve Components, USA, Washington, D.C.	Aug 68	Mar 69
Military Advisor to the Chairman of the US Delegation, US Embassy, Paris, France	Mar 69	Jun 70
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, US Army, Washington, D.C.	Jun 70	Aug 70
Deputy Commander, USMACV	Sep 70	Jun 72
Commander, USMACV	Jun 72	Mar 73
Commander in Chief, US Army, Pacific	Mar 73	Jul 73
Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army	Aug 73	
<i>CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY</i>	<i>5 Oct 74</i>	

LIST OF CITATIONS AND DECORATIONS

Distinguished Service Cross  
Distinguished Service Medal (2. OLC)  
Silver Star



LIST OF CITATIONS AND DECORATIONS (CONT.)

Legion of Merit (OLC)  
Bronze Star Medal with V Device (OLC)  
Air Medal (9 Awards)  
Joint Service Commendation Medal  
Army Commendation Medal (OLC)  
Gallantry Cross w/Palm (5 Palms)  
National Order of Vietnam, 1st Class  
National Order of Vietnam, 3d Class  
National Order of Vietnam, 4th Class  
National Order of Vietnam, 5th Class  
Distinguished Unit Citation  
Meritorious Unit Citation  
South Korean Presidential Citation  
Order of Military Merit, Eulji (Korea)  
Order of Sikatuna, Rank of Maginoo (Philippines)  
Order of Knight Grand Cross, First Class (Thailand)  
American Campaign Medal  
American Defense Service Medal  
Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal  
World War II Victory Medal  
Army Occupation Medal (Japan and Berlin)  
Korean Service Medal (5 Campaigns)  
National Defense Service Medal (OLC)  
United Nations Service Medal  
Vietnam Service Medal (9 Campaigns)  
Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal w/60 Device

BADGES

Combat Infantryman Badge  
General Staff Identification Badge  
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge



# DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 13, 1975

No. 12



## DIPLOMATIC NOTE ON THE VIET-NAM SITUATION

The Department of State of the United States of America presents its compliments to (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Ministry of External Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, People's Republic of China, Great Britain, France, Hungary, Poland, Indonesia, Iran, and Secretary General of the UN Kurt Waldheim) and has the honor to refer to the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam signed at Paris January 27, 1973, and to the Act of the International Conference on Viet-Nam signed at Paris March 2, 1973.

When the Agreement was concluded nearly two years ago, our hope was that it would provide a framework under which the Vietnamese people could make their own political choices and resolve their own problems in an atmosphere of peace. Unfortunately this hope, which was clearly shared by the Republic of Viet-Nam and the South Vietnamese people, has been frustrated by the persistent refusal of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to abide by the Agreement's most fundamental provisions. Specifically, in flagrant violation of the Agreement, the North Vietnamese and "Provisional Revolutionary Government" authorities have:

- built up the North Vietnamese main-force army in the South through the illegal infiltration of over 160,000 troops;
- tripled the strength of their armor in the South by sending in over 400 new vehicles, as well as greatly increased their artillery and anti-aircraft weaponry;
- improved their military logistics system running through Laos, Cambodia and the Demilitarized Zone as well as within South Viet-Nam, and expanded their armament stockpiles;
- refused to deploy the teams which under the Agreement were to oversee the cease-fire;
- refused to pay their prescribed share of the expenses of the International Commission of Control and Supervision;



For further information contact: EA/VN - 632-3221

-- failed to honor their commitment to cooperate in resolving the status of American and other personnel missing in action, even breaking off all discussions on this matter by refusing for the past seven months to meet with U.S. and Republic of Viet-Nam representatives in the Four-Party Joint Military Team;

-- broken off all negotiations with the Republic of Viet-Nam including the political negotiations in Paris and the Two Party Joint Military Commission talks in Saigon, answering the Republic of Viet-Nam's repeated calls for unconditional resumption of the negotiations with demands for the overthrow of the government as a pre-condition for any renewed talks; and

-- gradually increased their military pressure, over-running several areas, including 11 district towns, which were clearly and unequivocally held by the Republic of Viet-Nam at the time of the cease-fire. Their latest and most serious escalation of the fighting began in early December with offensives in the southern half of South Viet-Nam which have brought the level of casualties and destruction back up to what it was before the Agreement. These attacks -- which included for the first time since the massive North Vietnamese 1972 offensive the over-running of a province capital (Song Be in Phuoc Long Province) -- appear to reflect a decision by Hanoi to seek once again to impose a military solution in Viet-Nam. Coming just before the second anniversary of the Agreement, this dramatically belies Hanoi's claims that it is the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam who are violating the Agreement and standing in the way of peace.

The United States deplors the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam's turning from the path of negotiation to that of war, not only because it is a grave violation of a solemn international agreement, but also because of the cruel price it is imposing on the people of South Viet-Nam. The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam must accept the full consequences of its actions. We are deeply concerned about the threat posed to international peace and security, to the political stability of Southeast Asia, to the progress which has been made in removing Viet-Nam as a major issue of great-power contention, and to the hopes of mankind for the building of structures of peace and the strengthening of mechanisms to avert war. We therefore reiterate our strong support for the Republic of Viet-Nam's call to the Hanoi-"Provisional Revolutionary Government" side to reopen the talks in Paris and Saigon which are mandated by the Agreement. We also urge that the (Addressees) call upon the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to halt its military offensive and join the Republic of Viet-Nam in re-establishing stability and seeking a political solution.

January 11, 1975

\* \* \* \* \*



U.S. PERSONNEL IN SOUTH VIETNAM

December 1974

U.S. Government civilians	1298
U.S. Government military	130
U.S. Government-invited contractors	1430
Other non-Government US-civilians	1581
U.S. dependents	<u>1580</u>
Total about	6020



Ron:

AP has a story quoting Defense officials as saying that South Vietnam would not be threatened if Cambodia fell, which directly contradicts what Henry Kissinger has been telling the Congressional leaders at the White House breakfasts. He said, as best I recall, that two [REDACTED] North Vietnamese Divisions would be freed from Cambodian duty to be used in South Vietnam. I don't know if HAK was just trying to scare the leaders, but these Defense comments will undermine his credibility. I've got a call in to Margy to get some guidance from HAK on this. Joe Laitin recommends that you try to send questions to him. [REDACTED] If really pressed, Joe recommends saying that the source of the story was a Defense Department analyst, and analysts have different opinions.

JWH



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U.S. - Cambodia Bjt 410, 2 takes 850

By FRED S. HOFFMAN

AP Military Writer

WASHINGTON AP - Defense officials say neither South Vietnam nor Thailand would be seriously threatened if Cambodia fell to Communist insurgents.

"I don't see anybody gravely threatened," said a senior official in assessing the possible results of a Cambodian collapse.

Pentagon analysts say Cambodia's fall would have a psychological impact on South Vietnam but only a marginal military effect on its war with North Vietnamese forces.

The North Vietnamese already control Cambodian areas bordering South Vietnam and only a few thousand North Vietnamese troops serving principally a logistics function in the Cambodian war would be freed for use in South Vietnam.

U.S. officials believe the North Vietnamese already have a big enough force in South Vietnam to launch a major offensive if they wish to do so.

Meanwhile, Sen. Barry M. Goldwater, R-Ariz., said Thursday night that he thinks "Cambodia is lost."

After a speech at Great Neck, N.Y., Goldwater was asked if he favored President Ford's request for more U.S. aid to Cambodia. He replied, "It's a moral question. I don't believe honestly that the additional money is going to mean victory. I think Cambodia is lost. It's a combination of bad government there, of almost a total lack of interest in defense." He said he felt a "moral commitment" to support the aid request.

U.S. officials, in evaluating the impact of Cambodia's possible collapse, said Thailand probably would reassess its alliance with the United States and might ask U.S. forces to leave. Defense analysts say Thailand has a history of accommodation with potential enemies, such as Japan in World War II, and that the Thais might take such a course if faced with a Communist-controlled Cambodia on their eastern flank.

Defense officials indicate that Cambodia is not as important to the United States as South Vietnam, but that they feel a responsibility to help Cambodia survive.

They are concerned that a failure by the United States to continue supporting Cambodia would raise questions in Europe and Israel about U.S. steadfastness.

Surveying the military situation in Cambodia, defense officials say the Communist Khmer Rouge insurgents are in better shape this year than last dry season when they ran low on ammunition and had to break off their attacks.

More

0210aED 02-28

*Background briefing with 7 newsmen  
by Deputy Assistant Secretary prompted  
this story.*



~~Info~~  
Morgi  
File Vietnam (From Colby)  
(G has gone to Steamer)  
March 4, 1975

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Communist Military and Economic Aid to North Vietnam, 1970-1974\*

1. The Intelligence Community has been requested to estimate the amounts of Communist aid delivered to North Vietnam in the years 1970-1974, using current US dollar costs of the materiel and services provided (see Table I). It is important to recognize that the Intelligence Community's estimate on this subject is not equivalent to -- and hence not comparable with -- US appropriations for military and economic aid to South Vietnam, for the following reasons:

(a) On the matter of accuracy, our information on North Vietnam has always been incomplete, although coverage on civilian imports is substantially better than for military aid. The draw-down of the US presence in Southeast Asia has further limited intelligence collection capabilities in the area, so that current information on North Vietnam is less comprehensive than it was formerly. In particular, on the question of Communist military aid, our information base is very spotty. Hence we know we are seeing only part of the picture on military aid, and our estimates for the part we cannot see have a wide margin of error.

(b) Military aid to North Vietnam is focused on materiel required for the type of military action undertaken by the Communist forces in South Vietnam -- i.e., selected attacks from redoubt areas at times and places of their choice. US military aid to South Vietnam supports a different military mission -- i.e., defense of scattered communities, large agricultural areas, and lines of communication, plus reaction and reinforcement of local forces after Communist attack. As the total

\* This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, and concurred in by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

- 1 -

NR 93-49, #8, CIA Mr. 6/22/93

By KSH NARA, Date 10/29/93



forces for the different missions differ in size, so do their requirements for assistance. Throughout the war, South Vietnam's forces have been roughly twice the size of North Vietnam's forces in the South, primarily because the missions of South Vietnam's forces -- protecting population and holding territory -- have required a much larger and widely dispersed military structure.

(c) The GVN has therefore also required a combat air force and an ability to redeploy forces rapidly by ground and air transport. Thus, the types of equipment supplied to South Vietnam by the US have been more sophisticated and therefore more expensive than those required by Hanoi. South Vietnam also requires considerably more logistic support.

(d) In addition, shipping, overhead, and other support costs of military aid to the GVN are substantially more than support costs of Communist aid to North Vietnam because of the greater distance involved and other factors. (See Table II at annex.)

2. Several conclusions may nonetheless be drawn with respect to levels of military and economic assistance to North Vietnam from 1970 through 1974.

(a) Total Communist military and economic aid to North Vietnam in 1974 was higher (in current dollars) than in any previous year.

(b) The suspension of US air bombardment in North Vietnam at the beginning of 1973 brought about a large decrease in assistance for defense against such bombardment or to replace losses caused by it (e.g., air defense equipment, missiles, trucks, etc.).

(c) The US disengagement from combat and the reduction in the level of hostilities in South Vietnam in 1973 were reflected in a substantial decrease in the amount of ammunition and ground force equipment received by North Vietnam, compared with 1972.

(d) In 1974, the delivery of ammunition to Hanoi markedly increased over 1973 and reached a level as high as that of 1972\*, although deliveries of ground force equipment continued at relatively low levels.

\* The dollar figure shown in the table for ammunition deliveries in 1974 is considerably higher than that for 1972, but ton-nages were about the same. Inflation of ammunition prices explains the difference.



(e) Economic aid was reduced in 1972 with the closure of North Vietnamese ports, but with their reopening rose sharply in 1973 and reached a record level in 1974. The economic aid increase in 1974 was further spurred by typhoons which damaged the 1973 North Vietnamese autumn rice harvest, the inflation of dollar values in 1974, and the increased pace of reconstruction during 1974.

3. The figures leading to the above conclusions are shown in Table I. They give a rough order of magnitude of Communist military assistance to North Vietnam and a somewhat more precise indication of economic aid. Within the category of military assistance, the estimates of deliveries of equipment and materiel (\$275 million in 1974), as well as the estimate for transportation equipment (\$25 million in 1974), are fairly good. Even a more complete data base would produce estimates of the same relative magnitude. This is not true, however, for those items listed under the "other military-related support" heading, where the lack of hard data makes our estimates subject to wider margins of error.

4. It should also be noted that in the final analysis what is significant is not so much the level of military assistance but the relative balance of forces on the battlefield in South Vietnam. North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, supported by record stockpiles of military supplies, are stronger today than they have ever been. The Communists are expected to sharply increase the tempo of the fighting in the next few months. Given the present military balance in the South, the GVN's forces will not be decisively defeated during the current dry season. At currently appropriated levels of US military assistance, however, the level of combat that we anticipate in the next few months will place the Communists in a position of significant advantage over the South Vietnamese forces in subsequent fighting.



TABLE I

ESTIMATED COMMUNIST MILITARY AND ECONOMIC  
ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM

	Million Current US\$ <sup>a/</sup>				
	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974<sup>b/</sup></u>
MILITARY	<u>205</u>	<u>315</u>	<u>750</u>	<u>330</u>	<u>400</u>
Military Equipment and Materiel	140	240	565	230	275
Air Defense Equipment	20	85	310	100	55
Ground Forces Equipment	45	80	110	40	45
Ammunition	70	60	130	85	170 <sup>c/</sup>
Other	5	15	15	5	5
Military Transportation Equipment (Trucks, helicopters, transports)	20	15	30	35	25
Other Military-related Support <sup>d/</sup> (Delivery and packaging costs, Spare parts, POL for the mili- tary, Technical Assistance and Training, Medical Supplies)	45	60	155	65	100
ECONOMIC	<u>735</u>	<u>755</u>	<u>465</u>	<u>670</u>	<u>1,295</u>
Commodity Shipments <sup>e/</sup>	635	645	360	540	1,145
Food	65	60	80	170	420
Fertilizer	10	15	5	5	25
Petroleum	10	10	5	15	55
Machinery, Transport Equipment, & Metal Products	240	175	125	165	345
Other	310	385	145	185	300
Technical Assistance (Includes cost of foreign technicians in NVN and NVN trainees abroad)	100	110	105	130	150
TOTAL OF ESTIMATED COMMUNIST GOODS AND SERVICES PROVIDED TO NORTH VIETNAM	940	1,070	1,215	1,000	1,695



ESTIMATED COMMUNIST MILITARY AND ECONOMIC  
ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM  
(Continued)

	Million Current US\$				
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
TOTAL OF ESTIMATED COMMUNIST GOODS AND SERVICES PROVIDED TO NORTH VIETNAM (repeated from last page)	940	1,070	1,215	1,000	1,695
LESS - NORTH VIETNAMESE EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES <sup>f/</sup>	50	50	30	80	125
TOTAL ESTIMATED COMMUNIST AID TO NORTH VIETNAM	890	1,020	1,185	920	1,570

<sup>a/</sup> Because of rounding, individual figures do not always add to the totals in this table.

<sup>b/</sup> The data for 1974 are preliminary.

<sup>c/</sup> Although ammunition supplied to North Vietnam in 1974 constituted an estimated 40 percent of its military aid, our data regarding probable ammunition costs per ton are admittedly "soft." Therefore, if our price estimates are off by, say, 10 percent, the total value for ammunition alone could fluctuate by some US \$17 million.

<sup>d/</sup> The lack of hard information on the items included under "Other military-related support" makes these estimates subject to a wider margin of error than exists for other categories of military assistance to North Vietnam.

<sup>e/</sup> For economic goods, the cost of transportation is included in the cost of the goods as shown in the table. (For military goods, delivery and packaging costs are included under "Other military-related support.")

<sup>f/</sup> Since North Vietnamese exports in these years paid for some of North Vietnam's imports, we have subtracted them to derive our estimates of Communist aid to North Vietnam.



TABLE II

COMPARISONS OF MAJOR CATEGORIES OF SOVIET AND CHINESE  
MILITARY AID TO NORTH VIETNAM AND US AID  
TO SOUTH VIETNAM<sup>a/</sup>


In Million \$US and Percentages

	Communist Military Aid Delivered to North Vietnam CY 1974	US Military Aid Appropriate to South Vietnam FY 1975
<u>Total Military Aid</u>	<u>390</u> (100%) <sup>b/</sup>	<u>700</u> (100%)
Military Equipment and Materiel	270 (69%)	268 (38%)
Air Defense Equipment	55 (14%)	-- (negl.)
Ground Forces Equipment	45 (12%)	-- (negl.)
Ammunition	170 (43%)	268 (38%)
Military Transportation Equipment	25 (7%)	-- (negl.)
Delivery Costs	20 (5%)	74 (11%)
Other Military-Related Support (including Spare Parts, POL for the military. Technical Assistance and Training, Medical Supplies, and miscellaneous costs)	75 (20%)	358 (51%) <sup>c/</sup>

<sup>a/</sup> For reasons explained in the text, our figures on Communist aid to North Vietnam (some of which are soft estimates) are not readily comparable with US aid appropriations for South Vietnam. Also, the data we have on Communist aid is kept on a calendar year basis while US aid appropriations are keyed to a Fiscal Year cycle. The above table, however, gives a rough indication of the way the two aid packages break out in CY 1974 for Communist aid and FY 1975 for US aid.

<sup>b/</sup> Figures may not add because of rounding. This numerical total is less than that in Table I because of component rounding in Table I and because Table II does not include East European military aid deliveries to North Vietnam.

<sup>c/</sup> One reason for the wide disparity is a charge against the US aid account for administrative expenses for the DAO in South Vietnam which has no known counterpart on the Communist side. There are also other items for which no counterparts on the Communist side are available, such as off-shore maintenance servicing of military equipment, and construction.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Americans in  
Pan Me + Quot.

7 Missions  
1 Red Cross  
1 AID





Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 2003

PAGE 01 SAIGON 02564 080739Z

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ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 FUR-12 NEA-09 IO-10 ISO-00 DPW-01 CIAE-00  
DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02  
PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-15 SR-02 ORM-01 AID-05 SSO-00

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AMEMBASSY ROME  
USDEL JEC PARIS  
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
US MISSION GENEVA 1505  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
THE HAGUE 0224

UNCLAS SAIGON 2564

DEPARTMENT PASS IBS/NCA

ROME FOR ILLING

E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: PINS, PINT, MILI, VS  
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST RULE COMES TO PHUOC LONG

FOL TEL FM AMCONSUL NHA TRANG RECEIVED MAR 07, 1975  
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 02564 080739Z

UNCLAS NHA TRANG 0133

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINS PINT MILI VS

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST RULE COMES TO PHUOC LONG.

1. AS THE EMBASSY IS AWARE, REFUGEES FROM PHUOC LONG PROV. ARE STILL COMING INTO QUANG DUC, OUR PROVINCE REPRESENTATIVE THERE HAS HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO INTERVIEW SOME OF THEM NO HE HAS RECEIVED REPORTS OF THEIR DEBRIEFING FROM OTHERS. FROM THIS A PRELIMINARY PICTURE OF CONDITIONS IN PHUOC LONG UNDER COMMUNIST RULE IS BEGINNING TO EMERGE.

2. THE FIRST VC/NVA ACTION AFTER THE FIGHTING STOPPED WAS, ACCORDING TO THESE REPORTS, TO GATHER AND COUNT ALL THE POPULACE IN THE AREAS THEY HAD OCCUPIED. THEN, THEY IDENTIFIED AND ARRESTED THE GVN PERSONNEL, LOCAL POLICE AND CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LEADERS. ESCAPEES FROM BU JAI HAMLET, BO DUC DISTRICT, REPORT THAT 11 PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED IN THIS MANNER IN THEIR AREA; OF THESE 8 WERE SHOT. THEY DIRECTLY OBSERVED THE EXECUTION OF 2 PF LEADERS AND STATE THAT BOTH THE DAK SUNG I AND DAK SUNG II HAMLET CHIEFS WERE SHOT. OTHERS BELIEVED EXECUTED WERE THE DEPUTY DISTRICT CHIEF OF BO DUC, THE HAMLET CHIEF OF BU DOP AND A SPECIAL BRANCH AGENT WORKING IN BU JAI HAMLET. THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE PHUOC LONG VILLAGE COUNCIL, ANOTHER COUNCIL MEMBER AND ONE PF WERE ALSO BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN TORTURED OR KILLED.

3. THE WIFE OF A VIETNAMESE TEACHER IN LONG DIEN HAMLET, SON GIANG VILLAGE, PHUOC BINH DISTRICT REPORTED THAT HER HUSBAND WAS SHOT WHILE TRYING TO ESCAPE. SHE STATED FURTHER THAT SHE BELIEVED THAT BOTH THE VILLAGE AND THE HAMLET CHIEFS HAD BEEN EXECUTED--BY BEHEADING.

4. REFUGEES STATE THAT AFTER THE INITIAL GATHERING AND CULLING: OF THE RESIDENTS BY THE VC/NVA OCCUPYING FORCE, THEY WERE RELEASED BUT WATCHED CLOSELY; PARTICULARLY ETHNIC VIETNAMESE (THE POPULATION WAS HEAVILY MONTAGNARD) AND PERSONS WHO HAD HELD ANY POSITION OF LEADERSHIP IN THE PAST. INFORMERS WERE PLANTED AMONG THE PEOPLE (SOMETIMES AS MANY AS 4 VC CADRE TO WATCH 3 FAMILIES) AND THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES WERE ENCOURAGED

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Department of State

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INFORM ON EACH OTHER. THEY WERE ALSO FORCED TO STAGE DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL AGAINST THE GVN AND PRESIDENT THIEU. THE YOUTH WERE EITHER DRAFTED INTO MILITARY TRAINING OR WERE USED TO DIG TRENCHES AND CONSTRUCT MILITARY FORTIFICATIONS. "RETRAINING COURSES" AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION SESSIONS WERE COMMONPLACE.

5. THOSE PRISONERS WHO WERE NOT EXECUTED HAVE BEEN MOVED ACCORDING TO THE REPORTS, INTO UNDERGROUND BAMBOO PRISONS THAT HAVE THATCHED COVER ROOFING; MOST PRISONERS ARE CURRENTLY BELIEVED TO BE INCARCERATED AT THE BU GIA MOP BASE AREA (YU 345325).  
SPFAR UNQUOTE  
LEHMANN



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SUN



Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger  
Interviewed by Newsmen  
Following appearance before  
Senate Armed Services Committee  
Thursday, March 20, 1975

Q: Secretary Schlesinger, regarding the situation in South Vietnam, do you feel there's a direct relationship between the threatened cut-off of additional aid to South Vietnam and the North Vietnamese offensive?

A: Well, the prior intelligence until last weekend indicated that there was no expectation of an offensive of scale of 1972, until 1976, unless the North Vietnamese perceived an opportunity. Whether it is the situation in Washington or whether it was a decision by President Thieu with his shrunken resources to abandon certain provinces, it is plain that the North Vietnamese now perceived such an opportunity and they are proceeding to invade at a very high pace.

Q: How much of an influence do you think the attitude of Congress has been in this? Can you weigh it at all; is there a relationship in any way?

A: I think that what one must recognize is that the shrinking levels of support for South Vietnam which have resulted in a much weaker force structure of the ARVN, has undoubtedly played a large role in these calculations, that was the approximate cause of the withdrawal from the Central Highlands.

Q: Did General Thieu talk to anyone in Washington that you know of about the withdrawal from the Highlands and the other provinces.

A: No, sir.

Q: Is there such concern about the shrinking levels of support (inaudible) House members pressure on House Appropriations Committee to speed up hearings on the supplemental?

A: I think that it is advisable to proceed first with the Cambodian issue.

Q: Do you think, Mr. Schlesinger, that the level of activities there now, the fighting, is at the Tet level of '72 or '68? Where are we now?

A: It probably has not reached the intensity of '72 as yet, but the outcome is of course far more devastating than the '72 outcome because of the weakened position of the government and the withdrawal--the voluntary withdrawal--from areas that previously had been held during the '72 offensive.

Q: Up till now the Pentagon has been unwilling to say that this was a nationwide offensive. Are you now calling it a nationwide offensive by the North Vietnamese?

A: It is a major offensive. Clearly in MR-I and II, the North Vietnamese are making every effort that they can.

Q: Last week you were saying they were chipping away at the provincial capitals. Obviously, that's now changed. What do you think is the intention of both sides? The North Vietnamese on one hand and South Vietnamese from pulling back?

MORE

A: The South Vietnamese are attempting to obtain a defensible position that given their reduced resource base and reduced force structure, they can hold. The North Vietnamese intention, quite clearly, is to take advantage of these withdrawals in an attempt to achieve more than the South Vietnamese government would like.

Q: Is it because of the lack of American willingness, this is why the North Vietnamese are moving?

A: What I would say is that if the level of resources provided to the South Vietnamese had continued at the level of '72 and '73, if we had been less niggardly in our funding of South Vietnam, that the position of South Vietnam would be far better today and they would not be forced to make these withdrawals.

Q: Why focus on Cambodian aid first?

A: The situation in Cambodia is as a result of the pressure on the ammunition supply immediate; unless ammunition is provided they will not get through this fiscal year.

Q: Are you in a mood today to comment on the CIA submarine?

A: No comment.

Q: As the South Vietnamese forces withdraw, do you expect the North Vietnamese forces to try to avoid contact with the main forces of South Vietnam as you said a week ago or do you now expect them to try to tangle directly?

A: I think that as of now they will attempt to tangle directly. These withdrawals provide them with an opportunity and they will cease those opportunities now.

Q: The theory that we have heard is that they are attempting obviously to take the second military zone and then build up a base, get a lot of people and supplies there and then go after Saigon, maybe early next year. Do you read it that way?

A: I think that that is a very reasonable prognosis.

Q: Did you say that there will be an invasion of Saigon next year?

A: That they will plan to go after Saigon next year.

Q: Why are you unable to comment on the submarine incident?

A: No comment.



Q: Can I ask you about the apparent blackout of news, etc., about the submarine? Are you in favor of such news blackouts?

A: I think that as a general observation the government is going to be exceedingly careful in commenting on any actual or alleged intelligence operations.

Q: What about the survival of the South Vietnamese government there? Do you think that's in doubt in any way?

A: Not at this point, but, of course, their control of the countryside will be much shrunken. The North Vietnamese have taken advantage of what they regard as American impetus. They have heralded that and that is a major change and a major impact on their calculations. Some years ago there were those who were

MORE

worried about what they called the illusion of American omnipotence, now we are faced with a perception of American impetus. I'm not sure that that change is for the better.

Q: Is there any worry about a coup against President Thieu? He pulled back the paratroopers ostensibly to protect the palace.

A: I think that as far as we can see, the internal political situation within South Vietnam continues to be exceedingly stable. The planned withdrawals will still leave the government with control of 90 percent of the population. The movement of refugees continues to indicate that the overwhelming bulk of the South Vietnamese population, whatever their other differences, do not wish to be under the control of the Communists.

Q: When you talk about a defensible position, would that mean pulling back to the Saigon area and trying to hold the Saigon area, the III Corps and the Delta? Is that all we can expect to have left of Vietnam?

A: I would not say that. The intention clearly is to hold the coastal regions as well.

END



March 21, 1975

VIETNAM FOLLOW-UP

HOC TAP

HOC TAP, translated means "Theoretical Studies." It is an internal party journal which appears monthly for the edification of the Communist Party cadre. It attempts to define and clarify the attitudes and policies of the Party for the Party; and therefore, it should not be construed as an external propaganda instrument.

Military Personnel in South Vietnam

There are fewer than 250 military personnel in South Vietnam. They function as Defense Attaches to the Embassy, as members of the Four Party Joint Military Team, and as guards for the Embassy itself.





The successes of the southern people in countering the enemy's nibbling and "pacification" operations and the struggle movement of the people in the southern cities in recent months mark the bankruptcy of the new U. S. strategy and the new stage of development of the southern revolution.

Since early in 1974, the "offensive" position of the Southern Revolution has shifted to a new stage, gradually driving the Saigon army into a passive, defensive position and frustrating and repelling to a great extent the nibbling and "pacification" policy of Nguyen Van Thieu.

Since July, 1974, the activities of the Puppet army have been concentrated mainly on blocking the offensive of the liberation armed forces and clearing the areas that have been reoccupied by the liberation armed forces.

In 1974, the Southern Armed Forces and people destroyed or forced the surrender or abandonment of 4,500 posts -- this was the greatest number of posts destroyed in one year since 1968 and clearly equaled one-half of the total number of posts of the Puppet army in the South.

The failure of the Saigon regime in implementing its nibbling and "pacification" policy plus its multi-faceted difficulties have driven the Puppet army into a further and rapidly weakening situation.

What is noteworthy is that the total number of Puppet troops has begun to decrease and will rapidly decrease.

The intensity of firepower and the amount of mobile equipment of the puppet troops have markedly decrease. In the third quarter of 1974, the monthly number of artillery pounds fired by the Puppet troops decreased approximately by three-fourths, compared with the monthly number in 1973. The number of daily tactical sorties of the puppet Air Force only equaled approximately one-half of the daily sorties made in 1973 and equaled approximately one-fifth of those conducted in 1972. The present number of aircraft in the South, compared with the greatest number of aircraft on hand in the period of the limited war, has decreased by 70 percent. This situation indicates that the bomb and ammunition reserves of the Puppet troops have decreased and that they are encountering great difficulties in fuel and in the maintenance, repair and use of various types of aircraft, tanks, combat vessels and heavy weapons.

The liberation troops are attacking and counterattacking relentlessly and everywhere, the Puppet Army is being driven into a situation fraught with acute contradictions between concentration and dispersion and between conducting nibbling operations and defensive operations within the scope of its strategy.

The serious consequences of a prolonged war, the forced withdrawal of the U. S. armed forces as a result of their defeat, the inability of the United States to continue its military and economic aid as it did previously because of its difficulties, the continuous failure of the nibbling and "pacification" policy, and so forth, all this has driven the areas controlled by the Saigon administration into an unprecedented, tragic situation.

Nguyen Van Thieu can only rely on U. S. support and backing. However, the U. S. imperialists are encountering unprecedented, great difficulties at home and abroad; the internal ranks of the United States are seriously divided, inflation is spiraling, the economy is in a state of recession, the danger of a grave economic crisis is threatening the United States, U. S. prestige and influence in the world are declining, etc.

The fact that the U. S. Congress has reduced by one-half the military aid, requested by the Pentagon for Thieu in the 1974-1975 fiscal year, and by 24 percent in economic aid compared with the preceding fiscal year, clearly reflects the difficult, multifaceted situation now confronting the U. S. administration. In such a situation, it is certain that no matter how stubborn the U. S. imperialists have experienced many bitter setbacks in years past in Vietnam.

At a time when the Thieu regime has encountered cumulative difficulties, suffered increasingly greater setbacks and has been increasingly weakened, the forces of the Southern revolution have been comprehensively strengthened and developed ever more steadfastly. Their morale, equipment and combat tactics and technique have been improved.

The comprehensive forces of the Southern Revolution are stronger than in any previous period, the military and political position of the Southern Revolution is firmer than ever, and its international advantage is developing. All this is of a decisive significance for the development of the entire Southern in the days ahead. The whole development of this situation will lead to disturbances in the Southern cities.

The character scale and objectives of the struggle movements in the Southern cities clearly demonstrate that the Nguyen Van Thieu regime, which has been strenuously built during more than a decade by the United States as an efficient tool to carry out its neocolonialist policy, is now confronted with an unprecedentedly serious challenge.

What they want is that if they are forced to do away with Thieu, they will still be able to maintain a regime without Thieu to continue to implement U. S. neocolonialist policy.

Prompted by the urgent and earnest demands of the nation and of themselves, the South Vietnamese people have set forth objectives and slogans for their struggle, with the strength of solidarity and with large forces, they will struggle to the end and will certainly not deviate from their set objectives and slogans.

However, no matter whether Thieu is to be done away, the U. S. imperialists will be unable to solve the comprehensive crisis in South Vietnam and to avoid tragic defeat.

The question raised now for the South Vietnamese people is to quickly strengthen and resolutely protect the revolutionary forces; to unite and be vigilant against all enemy schemes of sowing dissension among and fooling the people; to accelerate the struggle to take the initiative in attacking the enemy on all fronts, only then will they win great victories. No matter how stubborn and perfidious the U. S. Thieu clique may be, it cannot check the strong development and the inevitable victory of the Southern revolution.

Although the struggle of the Southern people is still replete with difficulties, hardships and complexities, the new developments over the past 2 years, specially in 1974, have created a strong and firm basis for even stronger development in the future. Determined to maintain peace, scrupulously implement the Paris Agreement and accelerate the struggle on the military, political and diplomatic fronts, the Southern people will advance toward achieving the national democratic revolutionary cause in South Vietnam and toward peacefully reunifying the fatherland.



Christian  
Science  
Monitor

3/21/75

## What is owed Vietnam

There is something deeply troubling about the sight of the North Vietnamese Army forcefully advancing in South Vietnam and a United States Congress gripped by indecision as to whether to supply more aid to the South Vietnamese forces. ~~Is this the way America wants to write the next chapter in the history of Vietnam? A world power that grows exhausted by its responsibilities and hesitates to offer the hand of help to a people fighting for its survival — in a country where it encouraged and indeed taught the people to resist?~~

The United States was once criticized for not letting the South Vietnamese fight their own battle. Now they are. While they are at the moment abandoning strategically unimportant regions, no one is saying they are not fighting well. Saigon is far from succumbing to a Communist take-over. ~~The withdrawals are a militarily expedient effort to consolidate forces where they are needed most, given the limited availability of ammunition and equipment.~~

It is therefore ironic that at a time when the South Vietnamese have shaped up, so to speak, U.S. lawmakers are reducing military and economic aid, and even arguing it be cut off altogether.

Few think this does not enter into Hanoi's calculations. ~~The North Vietnamese are taking ad-~~

~~vantage of what they perceive to be the weakening American resolve, even at great cost to themselves.~~ According to some reports, they are throwing recruits into the fight who have had only one month's training.

The dilemma for Congress is deep. Americans are dismayed at the bloodshed and devastation wreaked on innocent people by American weapons. They are understandably sensitive to the compelling argument that Hanoi will never give up until it wins and that the U.S. can at least stop the bloodshed now by halting military aid.

But the question is whether it is morally right or wrong to sustain an army with the arms it was led to believe it would receive. The South Vietnamese are defending themselves. Hundreds of thousands of refugees are fleeing the Communist-overrun areas, and now add to the South's economic as well as military burden. Surely there should be no argument about giving humanitarian assistance.

Clearly there are limits to U.S. power — and Vietnam was a sad lesson in an overextension and misuse of that power. But there are still moral questions that affect America's standing in the world — its reliability, its sense of judgment, and its willingness not to throw in the towel when there is still a chance to forestall a total Communist victory.



# The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

3/21/75

## Congress and Vietnam

THE NEWS FROM South Vietnam, where government troops are abandoning whole regions, and hundreds of thousands of refugees are in flight, makes it necessary to ask if the question of military aid for Saigon will not shortly be mooted by President Thieu's collapse. He has lost more than territory. Colleagues and countrymen may well be raising fingers to test the wind. The latest North Vietnamese offensive, including an all-out invasion by a division across the DMZ, could spell the end. In this sense, it may have been gratuitous yesterday for Senators Mathias and Stevenson to add to President Thieu's immediate distress by asking Congress to put an outside limit of six months on further military aid.

But we suspect Americans will not be spared the need to make at least one more choice on Vietnam aid. At the least, it's premature to count on it. Mr. Thieu is not without resources. He had been contemplating a fall-back for months, to compensate for an aid cut or an enemy offensive or both. General Gavin long ago noted the military advantages to Saigon of such an "enclave" strategy. The casualties the South Vietnamese are taking, and inflicting, suggest a certain remaining will. That the refugees are streaming toward government areas can be read as one sign of how they feel about a Communist victory.

So we think the aid question remains live. Here it is useful to realize how broad *already* is the consensus that military aid should end. The argument is over when and how. The administration leans toward a final three-year burst; in principle, though not in critical details, we concur. Others cannot wait that long. Some in the Congress would halt aid at once if they could. In what, incredibly enough, is probably something of a down-the-middle compromise of the issue in terms of prevailing sentiment, Senators Stevenson and Mathias would go for three months, at maximum six. Since no one can

guarantee that things won't come out the same in the end anyway, why not go their route?

The reason is simple. Three years gives President Thieu time to be a partner in his own government's and supporters' fate. Three months or six months means that the United States alone may be widely and reasonably held responsible for flushing him down the drain. Yes, his government has had plenty of time and has used it inadequately, and has severe flaws. But the irreducible minimum the United States owes any friend or client is a reasonable opportunity to make serious plans for going it alone in the face of a flat and final timetable for terminating all aid. This is what has been missing all along because the administration has failed to enter the sort of agreement with Congress that President Thieu would have to accept as inarguable and irrevocable. Giving adequate notice is no mere diplomatic courtesy. It goes to the heart of fairness in relationships among nations as well as men. This makes the terms of the final American notice to Saigon crucial to American diplomacy and to the American domestic scene, too.

Here we address a critical difference between the Mathias and Stevenson approaches to their joint cutoff proposal. Mr. Mathias is honest about it. He concedes that things could go badly; the "other side" might take military advantage of an early end to American aid. In that event, he says, "I am prepared to accept the consequences." By contrast, Mr. Stevenson airily promises roses. The cutoff, he says, constitutes "the last chance for the United States to salvage freedom and independence for the people of South Vietnam." This is completely fatuous. It dodges responsibility and ensures recrimination. If the Congress is to take what we believe to be the extra and unwise risk of guillotining Nguyen Van Thieu, it ought to accept the responsibility for doing so.



N.Y. 3/24/73  
TIMES

## Vietnam's Crisis

North Vietnam's wide-ranging military advances—the first resumption of large-scale warfare since 1972—and Saigon's dramatic withdrawals have created a new situation in Indochina. It cannot fail to affect the politics of South Vietnam and the American debate over aid to Saigon.

The war clearly is on in earnest, not just the small-scale local attacks in disputed areas that both sides began within the first days after the January, 1973, ceasefire. Hanoi sees within its grasp the opportunity to reunify Vietnam by force; Saigon has retrenched the better to defend the most populous areas under its control.

The new war finds the military balance significantly altered. The Paris accords permit one-for-one replacement, but no increase of military equipment in South Vietnam. They prohibit not only increases but even replacement there of North Vietnamese troops, which are supposed to be slated for ultimate withdrawal. Instead, North Vietnam's combat forces in the South during 1973 alone were increased by more than one-third by infiltration to an all-time high of 190,000, plus 50,000 Vietcong.

Tanks (Soviet built) have been quadrupled in number as have heavy artillery pieces. Supplies have been enormously increased to levels sufficient for 18 to 20 months of combat at the intensity of the 1972 Easter offensive. Added supplies can be moved from North Vietnam to the Saigon area in three weeks, instead of three months, with the aid of an oil pipeline and two dual-lane, hard-surfaced highways built through Laos and Cambodia to replace the Ho Chi Minh trail.

Meanwhile, the sharply reduced level of American aid funds has prevented replacement of Saigon's equipment losses. Substantial numbers of planes, helicopters, tanks and other combat vehicles are out of service for lack of spare parts and civilian maintenance crews.

In the past three years, American military aid funds have been steadily reduced by Congress. Rationing of fuel has cut the operating hours of aircraft and ground combat vehicles to one-half their capability; ammunition use has been cut back 30 per cent. Lack of mobility and reduced air and artillery support have led to loss of outposts, an increasingly defensive posture and higher casualties.

The supply drawdown and the uncertainties of future aid evidently were key factors in President Thieu's decision to abandon vast sparsely inhabited areas in the Central Highlands and the northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. The withdrawal of Saigon forces to shorter lines and the defense primarily of agricultural, coastal and urban areas containing 80 to 90 per cent of the country's population and arable land may be a sound strategic move but its psychological impact cannot yet be assessed.

In these new circumstances, it would be unconscionable for the United States, in effect, to cut off the ammunition supply for the weapons with which Washington has armed the South Vietnamese. President Ford's proposal for a terminal three-year aid program, if adequately funded by Congress, would remove the Vietnam issue from next year's Presidential campaign and give the South Vietnamese a chance to reach a stalemate that might encourage Hanoi to turn to negotiation and domestic reconstruction. That prospect would be greatly enhanced if President Thieu were to seize the present opportunity—with his non-Communist opposition impressed with the gravity of the military situation—to broaden his regime and to set up a government of national union.



## U.S.-VIETNAM

BY FRED S. HOFFMAN

WASHINGTON (AP) -- PRESIDENT FORD'S CHIEF SPOKESMAN SAID TODAY THE UNITED STATES ASKED RECENTLY FOR A RECONVENING OF NATIONS THAT SIGNED THE PARIS ACCORDS ENDING DIRECT AMERICAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM.

WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY RON NESSEN TOLD REPORTERS THE REQUEST WAS MADE TWO OR THREE WEEKS AGO. HE SAID THE UNITED STATES HAS GOTTEN NO RESPONSE. NESSEN OFFERED NO ELABORATION.

HIS STATEMENT CAME AS U.S. INTELLIGENCE DRASTICALLY CHANGED ITS ASSESSMENT OF THE FIGHTING IN VIETNAM. INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS NOW BELIEVE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE IS HAVING A DEVASTATING EFFECT ON SOUTH VIETNAM'S MILITARY POSITION.

STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS OFFICER ROBERT FUNSETH CALLED THE OFFENSIVE EQUAL TO THE TET OFFENSIVE BY THE COMMUNISTS IN 1968 AND EQUAL TO THEIR EASTER OFFENSIVE IN 1972.

FUNSETH SAID NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS SOUTH OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE COMPRISE THE LARGEST NUMBER OF COMMUNIST TROOPS IN THE AREA SINCE THE FIGHTING BEGAN MORE THAN 20 YEARS AGO.

NESSEN, DISCUSSING PRESIDENT FORD'S CONTROVERSIAL AID REQUESTS FOR SOUTH VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA, REPORTED:

--FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE TO CONTINUE AMMUNITION SHIPMENTS FOR CAMBODIA FOR THREE WEEKS. FOOD SHIPMENTS WOULD BE CUT OFF APRIL 30 IN THE ABSENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL AID.

--A PREVIOUS \$700 MILLION AID APPROPRIATION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM WILL PERMIT SOME SHIPMENTS OF AMMUNITION AND FUEL TO THAT COUNTRY THROUGH THE END OF THE FISCAL YEAR JUNE 30, BUT SUCH SHIPMENTS WOULD REPRESENT "LESS THAN 40 PER CENT OF REQUIREMENTS."

NESSEN ACKNOWLEDGED POLLS SHOWING NEGATIVE PUBLIC REACTION TO FORD'S AID REQUEST. BUT HE SAID FORD "HOPES TO PERSUADE THE PUBLIC OF THE RIGHTNESS OF HIS COURSE."



1029

R A

AID 4-9

(PICTURE)

DAY LD

BY JOHN F. BARTON

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF FREDERICK C. WEYAND HAS TOLD CONGRESS THAT SOUTH VIETNAM WILL NOT SURVIVE WITHOUT MAJOR ADDITIONAL MILITARY AID.

WEYAND, WHO TESTIFIED FOR SEVEN HOURS IN SEPERATE MEETINGS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES TUESDAY, WAS ASKED IF SOUTH VIETNAM COULD SURVIVE WITHOUT MAJOR AMOUNTS OF AID.

"NO, THEY CANNOT," HE REPLIED.

"WEYAND TOLD US THAT IF WE HELP THEM THERE IS A CHANCE," REPORTED REP. F. EDWARD HEBERT, D-LA. "HE COULDN'T GUARANTEE ANYTHING, EXCEPT THAT THERE WOULD BE A CHANCE.. IF WE DON'T HELP THEM, THEY ARE GONE. IT'S AS SIMPLE AS THAT."

SEN. JOHN C. STENNIS, D-MISS., CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SAID, "GENERAL WEYAND TOLD US THAT SOME ADDITIONAL MILITARY AID BEYOND THAT ALREADY IN THE PIPELINE WAS NECESSARY FOR THE SURVIVAL OF VIETNAM. BUT WE DIDN'T TALK NUMBERS. WE FOUND OUT HOW MUCH OF WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN APPROPRIATED IS LEFT AND IT IS VIRTUALLY NOTHING."

WEYAND SAID HE TOLD CONGRESS THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE "ARE UNDER VERY HEAVY MILITARY PRESSURE. THEY NEED MATERIAL AND MORAL SUPPORT FROM THE U.S. THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE HAVE THEIR BACKS TO THE WALL," HE SAID.

ASKED IF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE COULD DEFEND SAIGON, WEYAND SAID "THAT ALL DEPENDS ON WHETHER OR NOT THEY GET SUPPORT FROM US."

WEYAND SAID HE DID NOT TELL THE LAWMAKERS HOW MUCH AID THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD SEEK. HE WOULD NOT CONFIRM REPORTS THAT PRESIDENT FORD WOULD ASK FOR AN IMMEDIATE \$550 MILLION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM IN HIS UPCOMING SPEECH TO CONGRESS.

"I DON'T HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THAT," HE SAID. "NO FINAL DECISION HAS BEEN MADE YET. I WON'T EVEN HAVE A CLUE ON THAT UNTIL THURSDAY NIGHT."

WEYAND WAS PART OF AN ADMINISTRATION DRIVE TO PREPARE CONGRESS FOR FORD'S ADDRESS. OTHERS TALKING TO CONGRESSIONAL TUESDAY INCLUDED AID ADMINISTRATOR DANIEL PARKER ON THE ORPHAN AIRLIFT AND PHILIP HABIB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, ON CAMBODIA AND SOUTH VIETNAM.

UPI 04-09 03:28 AED



R.N.

*If asked about Weyand's recommendation, his statement may be useful. His report was a report to the President and it isn't something that you will discuss prior to tomorrow's speech.*

*Just*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 30, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RON NESSEN *RNN*

Attached is a statement proposed by Brent Scowcroft to be put out to the press here this afternoon in a low-key way. I have also talked to Dr. Kissinger and he agrees on the desirability of putting out a statement commenting on the humanitarian aspects of the fall of DaNang.

With your approval I will issue this statement this afternoon, with any additions or modifications you indicate on this copy.



PROPOSED STATEMENT BY RON NESSEN

The President considers that the fall of DaNang is an immense human tragedy. It has cruelly trapped many hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese refugees who tried until the last moment to escape the North Vietnamese army. It should be ~~be~~ deeply disturbing ~~event~~ to all civilized mankind.



Bakersfield, California  
March 31, 1975  
10:00 a.m. (PDT)

Ron,

Jack had a call from Joe Laitin and asked me to pass on the following information to you:

Joe Laitin called at 9:00 a.m. to pass on the following information:

1. Two of the four navy transports have arrived off Nha Trang, which is 200 miles south of DaNang, to begin evacuating refugees. Joe does not know the location of the other two transports.
2. Secretary Schlesinger will be interviewed at 2:00 p.m. EDT today by Hank Trewhitt. This is a live interview by PDS and the tape will be turned over to the three networks for their use. Schlesinger also will be on FACE THE NATION this Sunday. Both interviews were agreed to several weeks ago before the Vietnam situation began deteriorating. However, Laitin says Schlesinger will try to keep the interviews on a broader perspective than Indochina.
3. Herman Staudt, Under Secretary of the Army has resigned effective May 1 and his resignation has been accepted by the President. Laitin wants to know if he can announce it. I told him to wait until we are ready to announce it here and we will coordinate with him so he can say something at the Pentagon. His replacement has been selected--Laitin says,-- but is not to be announced at this time.

GF -

1. Photo with Regan? Yes  
Patty

2. Briefing book. - Tues



Bakersfield, California

March 31, 1975

10:35 a.m.

Ron

Jack asked that the following information be added to what I gave you earlier today.

None of the four transports will be going to DaNang and the press has been told that in Washington, but the White House Press Corp should also be told.

Also.....

Ambassador Anderson called. re your conversation with McCloskey on the NBC special at 11:30 p.m. on Southeast Asia. Apparently during your earlier conversation you talked about the possibility of Phil Habib participating in this special. Anderson talked to Habib about this and Habib said he was to go on record tomorrow at 12:15 and brief. This briefing would be open for any one to cover. In view of this he doesn't feel he should talk with NBC tonight...because basically he would say the same thing tonight that he will be saying tomorrow. Anderson and McCloskey both agree with Habib.

Patty



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April 1, 1975

Statement Being Put Out Now by Defense to the Hill

and in Response to Press Queries

Concerning Alleged Drawdowns of Equipment From

from Army Reserve Units for the

Emergency ReSupply of South Vietnam

Because of the current situation in South Vietnam, shipment of certain urgently needed equipment and supplies is being expedited. The material is being provided under already approved and funded military assistance programs and, as sometimes is the case, modest quantities are being obtained from Reserve components. ~~We are not prepared to provide further details at this time.~~

Ron and Jack --

Jack Marsh suggested Lou get this statement to you because there are numerous queries from the Hill and from the press in the last several hours that we are taking large quantities of material from our Reserve units. The fact is only a <sup>relatively</sup> few items of equipment are coming from the Reserves.

c.j.

April 2, 1975

SUMMARY OF SCHESSINGER PRESS CONFERENCE

Cam Ranh Bay under government control. Continued deterioration in the highlands. Some reduction in combat activities around Saigon and Tay Ninh. Some increase in Delta, but stable. 2/3 country under Communist control.

Saigon defenses will be tested in the next 4 weeks or less. \$2 billion in equipment lost, estimated. Cannot reintroduce American troops. Referred to President's March 6 statement. Could not rule out President asking Congress to use air power but probability of that relatively low.

One for one replacement of equipment depends on what we perceive present needs to stabilize Saigon. Contingent on President's decisions after Wyand report.

Some possible defensive area around Saigon and delta which can be held with present forces. But depends on North Vietnam intentions to move uncommitted divisions south and ability of South Vietnam to pull together their troops.

Relatively little movement of North Vietnam troops in MR1, but some southward movement of NVN strategic reserve divisions in North Vietnam.

U.S. has plans to evacuate Saigon, as we have plans to evacuate Americans from any capital in the world. U.S. forces are available for emergency evacuation if requested by Ambassador through the State Department. Concer

Concerning use of Marines on ships in territorial waters, DoD position is to adhere strictly to the law, pertaining to the cutoff of all combat activity of August 15, 1973. Participation in combat not permitted. If U.S. forces were placed in a position where they could be drawn into combat, we would be in violation of that law.



WHITE HOUSE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

'75 APR 3 PM 7:46

APRIL 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS:

A USAF C-5 aircraft is departing Clark Air Base, Republic of the Philippines, at 7 p.m. EDT to deliver supplies to the Republic of Vietnam. The aircraft is scheduled to arrive at Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon at 9 p.m. EDT. This aircraft will be available to pickup refugee children if any are ready to depart and return them to Clark Air Base where they will receive medical attention if required and be processed for the remainder of the trip to the United States.

Nurses and medical support will be aboard the aircraft.

-2-



ZCZCWHC025

CO WTE14

DE WTE 1892 0950115

O 030121Z APR 75

FM THE SITUATION ROOM

TO DONALD RUMSFELD - SAN FRANCISCO

ZEN

*san* T 0950625

~~SECRET~~

APRIL 4, 1975

FOR: DONALD RUMSFELD

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FOLLOWING ARE THE DETAILS YOU REQUESTED SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT WHICH LED TO THE REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:

1. ON 1 APRIL 1975, JCS AUTHORIZED FOUR USN AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS TO APPROACH WITHIN ONE MILE OF THE RVN COAST TO CONDUCT HUMANITARIAN CIVILIAN REFUGEE EVACUATION.

2. ON 3 APRIL 1975, THE USS DURHAM (LKA-114) PENETRATED RVN TERRITORIAL WATERS IN THE VICINITY OF PHAM HANG SON, AT 030300Z, APRIL 1975. A TOTAL OF 1,404 REFUGEES WERE PICKED UP BY THE DURHAM.

3. AUTHORITY FOR PENETRATION OF RVN TERRITORIAL WATERS WAS GRANTED IN JCS 6039/010216Z, APRIL 1975 MESSAGE TO CINCPAC.

4. RADM WHITMIRE IS COMMANDER, AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE, SEVENTH FLEET (CTF 76) WHO HAS THE DURHAM UNDER HIS COMMAND.

2173  
1892

~~SECRET~~



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

NR 93-50, #9; NSC 644 11/27/95

By *lit* NARA, Date 11/16/97

Official notification went to Eastland and McFall, who is speaker pro tem. Eastland and McFall were informed by phone and the official notification went by Western Union telegram. (In addition, their Washington staffs received a copy of the communication.)

Albert were informed through the Ambassador in China. In addition, he Washington staff received a copy of the report.



April 5

Eastland (And aide)

Albert (~~to the~~) (And aide)

McFall (Copy). Action

Get from Don a summary  
of the action that occurred.  
o statute.

Durham - picked up over 1000  
references.

Deadline for notification.  
4:00am (Eastern Time).



Koppel - Tennis Club - 201

April 15, 1975

The Administration will have witnesses testifying on the Vietnam legislation (and other related matters) Tuesday before the following Congressional Committees:

SENATE

Armed Services: Secretary Schlesinger and General Weyand,  
2 p.m. OPEN

Appropriations: Secretary Kissinger, 10 a.m. OPEN

Judiciary Committee: Commissioner Leonard Chapman of  
Immigration and Naturalization Services and his  
Executive Officer, James Greene; Phillip Habib,  
Under Secretary of State, OPEN

HOUSE

Armed Services: Secretary Schlesinger and General Weyand,  
10 a.m. EXECUTIVE SESSION

House Legislative and National Security Subcommittee: Robert Miller,  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and  
Pacific Affairs; and Frank L. Kellogg, Special Assistant  
to the Secretary for Refugee and Migration, 2 p.m.  
EXECUTIVE SESSION



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DPC 64

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS, RADIO AND TELEVISION NEWS BRIEFING  
MONDAY, APRIL 21, 1975, 12:32 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

Q Did the United States put pressure on Thieu in any way to get him to resign?

A I realize that this is one of the points that came up in President Thieu's speech; and, as I said earlier, I am not going to comment on any of the details in President Thieu's speech at this time.

Q Was the United States notified in advance?

A Yes.

Q When?

A No comment.

Q Bob, is the Secretary going to Latin America on Wednesday -- as the first part of a two part question -- and, two, is the Secretary going to Paris any time in the next 48 hours?

A On the latter question, first, I am completely



unaware, as of an hour to an hour and a half ago, that the Secretary has any plans to go to Paris within the next 48 hours.

Q How many Americans are left in the Saigon area at this time?

A I would like to make it for the reasons that I have given you many times before, a general figure. It is under 3,000. But I would rather not get into the specifics, Jerry.

how many

8

of personnel in Saigon in order to carry out the duties that must be carried out by our Mission there.

Q Bob, has President Thieu asked our help in his own evacuation?

A No.

Q Is there any plan to assist him to leave Saigon?

A No, there isn't. I have nothing on that. That has not arisen.

Q Bob, when you say there are under 3,000 Americans left in South Viet-Nam, I assume we are not playing games. That means there are more than 2,000 and less than 3,000, is that right?

A Yes. It is a little under 3,000. I just don't want to get into specific numbers for the reasons that we have stated here, I think, a number of times.



Q Bob, have we got any indication that the presence of Ambassador Martin in Saigon might be a block to negotiations?

A No, we have not.

Q Bob, has the U.S. asked any other countries, including Australia, whether they will take any of the South Vietnamese who are now arriving in the Philippines without travel documents?

A I believe we are in touch with other countries. I cannot answer you specifically whether we have asked Australia. I do not know, but I will check into it. But we are in touch with other governments and international agencies with regard to moving on people that have gotten out.

Q Would President Thieu be welcome in the United States if he asked to come here?

A This question has not arisen, as I said earlier, Spence. I think obviously if such a request were made, we obviously would look upon it with sympathy. But this is a hypothetical situation.

Q Look upon it with sympathy?

A Yes.

Q Why obviously?

A Well, I think this is a man with whom we have been associated for a great number of years. I would like to just leave it there and not make any further

comment now because the question, I emphasize again, has not arisen.



4/21/75

THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER VIETNAM

Q. It now looks as though South Vietnam will be lost militarily within a matter of weeks and perhaps days. Now, where do we go from here? Will we revise our world-wide policies or will we keep them? Will we avoid other entanglement or will we want to rush into it? Why are you talking so much about the Domino Theory and about the decline in American influence -- will that not bring about precisely that decline that you fear?

A. As I said in my speech to the Congress, our national unity is a priceless asset, and one of the most tragic consequences the situation in Vietnam could have would be to use it to pit Americans against other Americans. Some Americans have believed throughout this conflict that the war and our involvement in it was a mistake. Many others lost a member of their family or a friend, or must watch a wounded veteran trying to make a new life. And countless others grieve for our frustrated attempts to help a small, brave country preserve its independence. The Vietnam war has touched too many American and Vietnamese lives for there not to be an effect on our country. The important point is what we learn from our experiences. What expectations for the future will we have and how do we envision our role in helping to shape that future?

We have a sound foreign policy structure and we must keep that in mind as we try to put an end to our self-inflicted wounds.



If we can respond to adversity with dignity and demonstrate to all that we can and do intend to continue our role as a major force for peace throughout the world, then our commitments to our allies and our warnings to potential adversaries will be heeded and will be believed. We have no choice but to play a major role in world affairs; therefore, we should resolve not to shrink from the duties of leadership on complex issues of our interdependent world.

There is so much to be done: We have allies who have relied upon our cooperation and support for more than a generation. We have adversaries with whom we have begun to lessen tensions and seek common grounds of cooperation in the interest of reducing the dangers of war. We must meet the challenges of hunger, lead the way for technological advancement while preserving the environment and help to assure that the oceans are used as a basis of peaceful cooperation rather than conflict. In sum, American leadership is needed in the creation of new institutions and practices for worldwide prosperity and progress. A new order is emerging which all nations must have a part and in which American will have a leading role as long as I am President.



4/21/75

THIEU RESIGNATION

FBIS 50 is carrying the report that Vietnamese President Thieu announced his resignation at 12:37 GMT today. Under the Constitution, Vice President Tran Van Huong succeeds to the Presidency. There is some speculation that Huong, who holds no real power or leadership, will resign shortly in favor of President of the Senate Tran Van Lam who would then call for a new Cabinet as a prelude to a "negotiated takeover", i. e. surrender without bloodshed.

Q. What is the President's reaction to the resignation of President Thieu? How will his resignation affect the U.S. position and policy in Vietnam? In light of the current situation, does the President still intend to press for military and economic assistance on the scale he requested?

*President Thieu has resigned and*

A. ~~At this point we should not and will not speculate about the implications~~

~~of President Thieu's resignation.~~ Under the Vietnamese Constitution

Vice President Tran Van Huong will succeed <sup>him</sup> ~~Thieu~~. <sup>At this</sup> Without prejudging ~~delicate procedure~~, <sup>it is too early</sup> or attempting to analyze the resignation, some members of the Congress

<sup>do make any comment or speculation.</sup> have called for Thieu to step down as a precondition to assistance for

Vietnam. The President stands by his request for military and

economic assistance and urges the Congress to provide aid swiftly

and adequately. ~~An early decision~~ by the Congress may help to stabilize

the political situation and provide an opportunity for a peaceful

~~resolution of the conflict.~~

FYI ONLY: In reports that Thieu, in his resignation speech charged the United States with the blame for the current situation in Vietnam and that we were responsible in part for Thieu's resignation, we would have no comment. END FYI.



DEPARTURE OF AMERICANS FROM VIETNAMBACKGROUND:

There are now about 3,000 American citizens in South Vietnam and an estimated 200,000 potential evacuees.

Q. Where do we stand on the evacuation of Americans, and what are our goals in terms of reduction of U.S. and Vietnamese personnel?

A. As I have stated, I don't think any useful purpose is served, nor do we intend to engage in a daily accounting of departing Americans or engage in speculation about future departures. Per the President's order, Americans whose services are no longer needed or whose functions have been terminated have been leaving.



U.S. REACTION TO THIEU'S RESIGNATION

QUESTION: Do you have any comment on President Thieu's resignation?

ANSWER: We have no comment on the announcement other than that the transfer of power and the formation of a new government appear to be taking place in accordance with constitutional processes.

QUESTION: Will Thieu's resignation promote negotiations?

ANSWER: It would be more appropriate for the new government to address that question.

QUESTION: What is the U.S. assessment now for the chances for negotiations?

ANSWER: I have no comment on that question at this time. We presume that the new government will make its positions known when it is ready to do so.

QUESTION: Do you have any comment on Thieu's reference to U.S. pressure?

ANSWER: We have no comment on any of the details of President Thieu's speech.

QUESTION: Was the U.S. Government informed in advance of resignation?

ANSWER: Yes.



QUESTION: How far in advance?

ANSWER: Shortly before it was made.

QUESTION: What are Thieu's plans?

ANSWER: I have no idea at this time.

QUESTION: Will this development affect the departure of Americans from Viet-Nam in any way?

ANSWER: The reduction in the number of the Americans will continue in accordance with the President's order.

EA-Mr. Habib

EA:RHMILLER:aoa  
4/21/75



April 22, 1975

PROSPECT OF THIEU VISIT TO THE U. S.

FYI ONLY: In response to questions about the possibility of President Thieu coming to the United States, State Department issued the following guidance yesterday:

Q. Would President Thieu be welcome in the United States if he asked to come here?

A. This questions has not arisen, as I said earlier. I think obviously if such a request were made, we would look upon it with sympathy. But this is a hypothetical situation.

Q. Look upon it with sympathy?

A. Yes.

Q. Why obviously?

A. Well, I think this is a man with whom we have been associated for a great number of years. I would like to just leave it there and not make any further comment now because the question, I emphasize again, has not arisen.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

NOTE FOR:

FROM:

RON NESSEN

*Assigned*

---

DP IMMED  
FJK584  
DE RUFNPS #5889/01 2501111  
O 061109Z SEP 76  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4705

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 25889

XDIS  
E.O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: PFOR VN US  
SUBJECT: U.S. RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM

1. DRV FIRST SECRETARY DO THANH TELEPHONED FOR AN URGENT MEETING WITH EMBOFF AT 1115 LOCAL TIME SEPTEMBER

6. DO THANH DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE WHICH WE HAVE TRANSLATED ALMOST VERBATIM: QUOTE " THE VIETNAMESE PARTY HOPES THAT THE TALKS WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE IN PARIS WILL ACHIEVE POSITIVE RESULTS IN ANSWERING THE INTERESTS OF THE TWO PARTIES. IN THIS SPIRIT THE VIETNAMESE PARTY HAS DECIDED TO COMMUNICATE TO THE AMERICAN PARTY INFORMATION ON TWELVE AMERICAN PILOTS KILLED WHEN THEIR PLANES WERE SHOT DOWN OVER VIETNAM. THIS IS RECENT INFORMATION PICKED UP BY THE VIETNAMESE SERVICES WHICH ARE HANDLING THE MIA PROBLEM. WE HOPE THAT THE AMERICAN PARTY WILL RESPOND IN A POSITIVE MANNER TO PROBLEMS INTERESTING THE VIETNAMESE PARTY. UNQUOTE. DO THANH SAID THZT THE VIETNAMESE WOULD ANNOUNCE AT NOON PARIS TIME THAT THEY HAVE TURNED OVER THE NAMES OF TWELVE PILOTS THEY ARE CONFIRMING AS KILLED. HANOI MAY ALSO BE MAKING AN ANNOUNCEMENT.

2. THE FOLLOWING IS THE LIST OF THE PILOTS. NO INFORMATION CONCERNING DATE AND PLACE OF CRASH OR ANY OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES WAS CONVEYED ON THE LIST OR ORALLY. DO THARH SAID THERE MAY BE SLIGHT DIFFERENCES IN SOME OF THE NAMES BECAUSE OF COMMUNICATION DIFFICULTIES. QUOTE.

L. CAPLING ELWYN REX, NE LE 15 JUILLET 1938, MAJOR  
US AIR FORCE

\*\*\*\*\* WHSR COMMENT \*\*\*\*\*

HYLAND, MCFARLANE, LL, ... QUINN

PSN:040543 PAGE 01 TOR:250/11:23Z DTG:061109Z SEP 76

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12355, Sec. 3.4.

MIA-4, #20, State etc. 1/25/93

By KBT NARA, Date 3/30/93

NO. MATRICULE FV 3058025

2. ROARK WILLIAM M. NE LE 23 OCTOBRE 1938, CAPITAINE,  
US NAVY  
NO. MATRICULE 641458
3. MITZ JAMES H. NE LE 12 JUIN 1931, MAJOR,  
US AIR FORCE  
NO. MATRICULE 31149A
4. KOLSTAD THOMAS C. NE LE 17 JUILLET 1935, MAJOR,  
US NAVY  
NO. MATRICULE 613094
5. KLENERT WILLIAM BLUE NE LE 17 OCTOBRE 1948,  
SOUS LIEUTENANT, US NAVY  
NO. MATRICULE 689823
6. DIAMOND STEPHEN W. NE LE 1ER JUILLET 1948, LIEU-  
TENANT US AIR FORCE  
NO. MATRICULE 3447934

BT

OP IMMED  
FJK585  
DE RUFNPS #5889/02 2501111  
O 061109Z SEP 76  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4706

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 25889

EXDIS

- 7. EATON CURTIS ABBOTNE LE 1ER JUILLET 1924, MAJOR  
US AIR FORCE  
NO. MATRICULE 2073835
- 8. WATERS SAMUEL EDWIN JR., NE LE 8 MAI 1937,  
CAPITAINE US AIR FORCE  
NO. MATRICULE 59427A
- 9. BOWLING ROY HOWARDNE LE 16 DECEMBRE 1929, MAJOR  
US NAVY  
NO. MATRICULE 575995
- 10. DRUAT BRUCE CHALMERSA, NE LE 9 JUIN 1941,  
LIEUTENANT, US AIR FORCE  
NO. FR 75625
- 11. GOLBERG LAWRENCE H., NE LE 31 DECEMBRE 1932,  
CAPITAINE, US AIR FORCE  
NO. MATRICULE A02211367
- 12. JOHNSON GUY DAVID, NE LE 26 OCTOBRE 1929, MAJOR  
US NAVY  
NO. MATRICULE 511310.

UNQUOTE

3. DO THANH MADE NO EFFORT TO CLARIFY WHAT "POSITIVE RESPONSE" HANGI WISHED TO WHAT "PROBLEMS INTERESTING THE VIETNAMESE PARTY", AND EMBOFF DID NOT PRESS. IT SEEMS CLEAR FROM THE TIMING AND THE RELEASE TO THE PRESS THAT ONE OF THE PROBLEMS IS THE VIETNAMESE APPLICATION TO ENTER THE UN.  
RUSH

\*\*\*\*\* \*MHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

HYLAND, MCFARLANE, LL

PSN:040544 PAGE 01 TOR:250/11:24Z DTG:061109Z SEP 76

4-4-20 State Dept. 2/25/73  
KSP 3/30/73

QUESTIONS FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. Did you tell Butz that you would veto the farm bill?
2. What books on Vietnam have you read?
3. Your personal feeling on Thieu's resignation?

United bell is  
 Avee, no decision  
 directly to consumer.  
 (2) Cart, & Govt  
 (3) Vet Govt had in  
 farm business.

"Street without sign"  
 "Hell in Very Small Place."  
 "Best of Best of Best"  
~~"The Last Days of Pompeii"~~

Although, I know,  
 that of meeting  
 with Butz on this  
 consistently opposed  
 bill. Butz recommended  
 veto and he will.

Horoshima (finished last night)

Palace Guard = Police  
 Making of the Pres.

~~The~~ Frank Capra. "The Voyage Above the

Jefferson.

History.

~~Ben~~ Frank Vanderbriden.



Compassionate Deceit

Tex Hart, Bud Vested, David Lee, or J.P.

April 30, 1975

PRESIDENT'S AID REQUEST

Q. What is the status of the legislation providing \$327 million in assistance to Vietnam?

A. We are now assessing the situation to determine the needs of the refugees which we understand to be between 50 and 60 thousand. The President hopes the Congress will proceed to pass the Conference Report on Humanitarian Assistance. While he recognizes that the evacuation authorities are no longer needed, the President feels that passage of the bill now before the House would be the most expeditious way to provide urgently needed funding for refugee transportation, care and resettlement.

