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"It's all because of the song. You see, the song's what kept it alive." The ballad of Casey Jones, and there are at least 150 different versions, has made the railroad engineer as much a part of American folklore as Johnny Appleseed and Paul Bunyan.

Jackson, Jones' hometown, is going to stage a big celebration April 30 at the museum. Casey's old house, a white cottage with white picket fence at 211 W. Chester St.

Town fathers are planning to rename a street after Jones. There's talk of building a statue to Casey in the courthouse square.

The home is a national shrine for railroaders. It is filled with bits and pieces of the days of steam.

"Many visitors who come here, sometimes even railroaders, believe Casey Jones never existed, that he's a legend," said Mrs. Ervin. But it's a powerful legend.

Engineers, firemen, brakemen and conductors all over the country are named Casey. So are hundreds of men with the last name Jones.

He was born Jonathan Luther Jones in Missouri in 1863. His father was a schoolteacher but he and his four brothers became railroad engineers.

The family moved to Cayce, Ky., when Jonathan Luther was a small boy. When he was 16, he came to Jackson to get a job as a telegrapher on the old Gulf, Mobile & Ohio line.

He moved into a boarding house for railroad men run by Annie Brady. When the gangly 6-foot 4-inch youth arrived for dinner his first night, a brakeman named Bose Lashley asked him his name.

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### UCLA WINS WOODEN HIS 10TH TITLE, 92-85

UCLA defeated Kentucky, 92 to 85, in a battle of sharpshooters Monday night to win their 10th NCAA basketball championship in the last 12 years and give coach John Wooden



**HANOI TAKEOVER**—Photo from North Vietnamese news agency VNA, obtained by Associated

## Damages to Be Equal to Fault, State Court Rules

BY PHILIP HAGER  
Times Staff Writer

SAN FRANCISCO—Persons involved in accidents may recover damages even if they are partly at fault, the state Supreme Court ruled Monday. From now on, it said, damages are to be divided in proportion to fault.

In a new interpretation of a 103-year-old-law, the court abolished the doctrine of "contributory negligence" in accident cases. This was the so-called "all or nothing" principle that prohibited the recovery of damages by persons negligent to any degree—even if their negligence was of a lesser degree than that of others involved.

In its place, the court established the doctrine of "comparative negligence"—in use in 26 other states—which assesses liability in proportion to fault.

"We are... persuaded that logic, practical experience, and fundamental justice counsel against the retention of the doctrine rendering contributory negligence a complete bar to recovery..." said Justice Raymond L. Sullivan, writing for the majority in a 5-2 decision.

"It should be replaced in this state by a system under which liability for damage will be borne by those whose negligence cause it in direct proportion to the extent of their causal responsibility."

In dissent, Justice William P. Clark, said that the majority was "guilty of judicial chauvinism," and suggested that if

## LOW TURNOUT SEEN FOR CITY ELECTION TODAY

BY NARDA Z. TROUT  
and DOUG SHUTT  
Times Staff Writers

Sixteen local government offices are up for grabs in the municipal primary election today, with less than half the eligible voters expected to cast ballots.

City Clerk Rex E. Layton estimated Monday that between 35% and 40% of Los Angeles' 929,524 registered voters would cast ballots in today's election, and forecast an even lower turnout by the 345,366 persons eligible to vote in education districts outside the city.

The registration figures represent the fewest number of voters in the city since 1955. There has been a dropoff of 254,624 registered voters in the city since the 1973 municipal election.

At stake in the primary are eight  
Please Turn to Page 15, Col. 1

## Russia Exiles 2 Jews for Protest Demonstrators for First Time Tried as Criminals

BY ROBERT C. TOIH  
Times Staff Writer

MOSCOW—Two young Jews were sentenced at a remote city court here Monday to five years in exile for taking part in a public protest against Soviet refusal to allow them to emigrate.

Press, carried a caption saying it shows "North Vietnamese combatants crossing bridge into city of Hue." AP Wirephotos

## Ford Puts Part of Viet Blame on Congressmen

BY RUDY ABRAMSON  
Times Staff Writer

PALM SPRINGS—President Ford said Monday that the military crisis in South Vietnam is in part a result of weakened morale in Saigon's armed forces, caused by U.S. congressional refusal to appropriate more money for arms and ammunition.

While the President refused to speak publicly himself on the situation, his press secretary told reporters that Mr. Ford attributes the staggering South Vietnamese losses to two things: "North Vietnamese violations of the cease-fire, and the failure of Congress to put up the money which he feels affected the morale of the South Vietnamese army."

Mr. Ford has asked Congress for \$300 million in supplemental aid for South Vietnam. Final action has not been taken but Democrats in both houses have taken strong stands against further aid to the Saigon regime.

Nessen said he discussed South Vietnam with the President early Monday but he would offer no substantive White House assessment of the country's prospects.

He refused, however, to categorize South Vietnam as "lost" or "going down the drain."

The President, since ordering U.S. Navy vessels to assist in the rescue of refugees fleeing threatened coastal areas of South Vietnam, has declined to comment publicly on events.

En route to Palm Springs, from

South Vietnamese killed about 200 were Viet Cong ship, the Phoenix members resented

Terrified passengers the former American Ranh on the east of Saigon some rebel leaders the crew of the barricade themselves

Military police Ranh port and trines, but they had don and began cles to Nha Trang the north. If a car marines shot its tire

David Kennerly, House photographer tour for President Nha Trang's U.S. Moncrieff J. Spear, other mutinous troops as they flew Contender and a ship also seized by were not hit.

Please Turn

### PERIL TO A

## Saigon U.S. C

SAIGON—U.S. officials warned Washington that fear of a Communist take trigger a panic among the people of Saigon and the safety of Americans here

3 added by withdrawal.  
"insurtable" because of  
lack of aid. Forced on  
them by law.

## DOMINO THEORY

QUESTION: Mr. President, you have said the question of personalities is really not vital to a settlement in Cambodia. My question is, is the survival of a non-Communist government in Cambodia vital to the U.S. security in Southeast Asia?

THE PRESIDENT: Miss Thomas, I think it is. I cannot help but notice that since the military situation in Cambodia has become very serious, and since the North Vietnamese have apparently launched a very substantial additional military effort against South Vietnam, against the Paris peace accords, there has been, as I understand it, in Thailand -- according to the news announcements this morning -- a potential request from Thailand that we withdraw our forces from that country.

I noticed in the morning news summary before I left Washington that the President of the Philippines, Mr. Marcos, is reviewing the Philippine relationship with the United States.

I think these potential developments to some extent tend to validate the so-called domino theory, and if we have one country after another -- allies of the United States -- losing faith in our word, losing faith in our agreements with them, yes, I think the first one to go could vitally affect the national security of the United States.

QUESTION: May I ask another question I have had on my mind for a long time? Since you supported the invasion of Cambodia five years ago, would you do the same today?

THE PRESIDENT: That is a hypothetical question, Miss Thomas, because under the law I have no such authority to do so. I did support the activities then, the so-called Cambodian incursion, because the North Vietnamese were using that area in Cambodia for many military strikes against U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam.

ITEMS FOR RESPONSE TO QUERY:

1. Will the President meet with the members of **the Congressional delegation that just returned from Southeast Asia**, and does he intend to follow their suggestion that Sec. Kissinger initiate peace negotiations in Vietnam and Cambodia?

GUIDANCE: The President does intend to meet with the delegation once they have had a chance to rest and to prepare their ideas and observations for consultation. Until he hears *how* ~~their reports, conclusions, etc.~~ about any U. S. involvement in ~~peace negotiations~~ or Sec. Kissinger's possible role would ~~be premature.~~

*met with the group and evaluated their reports we would have nothing further to add.*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~250~~ 250 ~~aircraft~~ aircraft (helos  
airplane)  
including ~~25~~ 25 helos

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Flown to Thailand,  
except 7 to Singapore.

---

+ 48 flown to Midway  
helicopters (All right)  
~~As of 1/1/70~~

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VN & Cambodian pilots.

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Still counting others that  
may be on other ships

18. Why did the President select April 19 as the deadline for Congressional approval of his Indochina proposals?

Date for Completion of legislative process - As the President stated, the situation is critical. A prompt firm signal of U.S. resolve is required. Delays convey the opposite impression. Nine days is sufficient time.

7. Specifically, how will the President ask Congress to clarify immediately its restrictions on the use of U. S. military forces in Southeast Asia for the limited purposes of protecting American lives by ensuring their evacuation? Will he submit recommended draft legislation to this effect or how does he expect the Congress to proceed?

The President will submit legislation to the Congress in this regard today.



## U.S. EQUIPMENT SAVED FROM INDOCHINA

Q: A lot of Cambodian and Vietnamese aircraft and naval vessels, originally obtained from the United States, were taken to several Asian countries by fleeing South Vietnamese and Cambodians. Who owns this equipment now? What can be done with it? Did the Thai not want to keep the equipment in Thailand in order to return it to Vietnam?

A: Under the provisions of U.S. statutes, all such equipment reverts to the United States when the purposes for which it was furnished are no longer applicable. However, it would make sense for this equipment to be reallocated within the context of the overall U.S. security assistance program to countries where a need exists. We are now discussing with the Thai Government turning over some of this equipment to them in order to assist them in meeting their security requirements.

### Cardinal Mindszenty's Death

Q: Mr. President, Cardinal Mindszenty died today. I was wondering if you had any comment in view of his years in our embassy at Budapest?

A: Cardinal Mindszenty was a man of extraordinary character and determination who lived a full and courageous life. I know I speak for many, many Americans in saying that we are deeply saddened by his death.

2. Do we have any additional information or reaction on the situation in South Vietnam and Cambodia? Does the President plan to ask Congress for a supplemental to increase aid to Indochina?

*We will abide by the provisions of the law.*

*1/8/75*

Guidance: I have nothing more to give you today on the situation in Indochina. As I said yesterday, we are watching developments there closely. As you will recall, I pointed out that in his signing statement for the foreign aid bill the President noted the inadequate levels of assistance for South Vietnam and Cambodia and said that he would discuss this with the Congressional Leadership when Congress reconvenes. I have nothing specific to give you today on a supplemental request but ~~I certainly would not rule one out.~~ *The President has it under intense consideration.*

FYI: Refer any questions on the current location of the Enterprise or other ship movements to the Pentagon. End FYI.

4. ~~Do you have any comment on increased fighting in South Vietnam?~~

GUIDANCE: The Department of State issued a statement on Friday deploring the North Vietnamese violations of the peace agreements, and I refer you to that statement on behalf of the Administration.

FYI: If asked whether the Administration will ask for supplemental appropriations to aid Vietnam and Cambodia, you should say that in his signing statement for the AID Bill, the President said that adequate assistance levels for Indochina would be a matter he would discuss with the Congress when it reconvenes. I have nothing more for you on that today.

1/4/75  
Q: Do you have any comment on the new Communist offensive in South Vietnam?

A: The State Department issued a statement for the Administration yesterday deploring these attacks. The statement said:

"Coming just before the second anniversary of the Paris Agreement, this dramatically belies Hanoi's claims that it is the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam who are violating the Agreement and standing in the way of peace.

"We deplore North Viet-Nam's turning from the path of negotiations to that of war -- not only because it is a grave violation of the Agreement, but also because of the cruel price it is imposing on the civilian population of South Viet-Nam."

I have nothing to add to this statement.

TODAY (First hour devoted to Indochina -- news      March 18, 1975  
reports on the fighting and the following interviews)

Discussion of domino theory. Sen. Dewey Bartlett said he doesn't believe our national security depends on our aid to SVN and Cambodia. However, he feels there will be a problem with US credibility if we don't help these two countries. Feels we have a moral obligation to help Cambodians help themselves. It is a test of our will against the will of China and the Soviet Union who are supplying military support for aggression. I hope that our will is at least equal to their will.

Hubert Humphrey is opposed to further military assistance to Cambodia. Feels that since we have no treaty obligation to that region and since it is not vital to our national security we shouldn't give any further military assistance. It is a civil war. Feels that if the US keeps going into different places all the time we are going to lose our national security structure, which is built around NATO, Japan and the Mid East. We are always talking about "losing Cambodia" -- it is not ours to lose. I don't believe in the domino theory as regards Cambodia. However, he feels that the American people would be willing to give economic and humanitarian aid to Cambodia. HHH feels that the US is becoming the world's munitions supplier. (HHH sounds like he's running for something!)

Walters had two Asian authorities on the show -- Roger Hilsman (who doesn't believe in the domino theory) and Dr. Frank Trager (who takes an opposing view). Hilsman, who was once Asst. of State in East Asia bureau, feels that Communism has had its day in Asia. Feels that movements taking place are nationalist movements. Doesn't feel that Communists are going anywhere. Doesn't feel that our honor is involved in giving Cambodia aid. Said our greatest mistake was supporting the Lon Nol government. We invaded Cambodia and what we should give them now is peace. Said that Sihanouk has been sending to a Newsday reporter 55 page cables telling him to pass them to Ford and Mansfield. Sihanouk is saying that he feels he will not be in control but can do something to stop the killing.

Dr. Trager says that Thailand has been one of our strongest allies since 1954. The Thais now feel endangered. They feel they cannot call upon US for support. Cambodia and Laos are neighbors -- they're in danger. Thais feel we will not back them up -- words but not deeds. Feels we should hold Cambodia until rainy season. The key point is Vietnam -- the US has failed to send our one-to-one replacement that we promised the Vietnamese in the Paris Agreement and the SVN are now in trouble. Feels we should keep supporting SVN, Laos, Thais and Philippines. Sees no end unfortunately to aiding these countries because of the communist support apparatus to other countries.

Trager feels that the expected "bloodbath" that everyone is talking about is simply a propaganda argument. Feels that a small group should be evacuated if there's some kind of negotiations. Trager said that if he were President Ford he would go ~~to~~ to the American public and Congress more vigorously, more repeatedly about Cambodia and get the \$300 million that had already been authorized.

Hilsman disagreed. Said that if he were President he would work on negotiations. Said that Harriman had it going in Paris and we could have it again if our President will accept it. Nixon wouldn't and Ford won't. (Ran out of time).



Research Institute  
Report

CONFIDENTIAL TO MEMBERS

MAR 24 1975



Friday, March 21, 1975

Dear Member:

The mess in Vietnam-Cambodia is more than "necessary surgery" of overextended U.S. commitments that many assume was inevitable. It will upset the balance of power all the way from India to Japan, including Indonesia & the Philippines, with effects on the Mideast.

That's why the unfortunate domino metaphor is around again. It's not a question of the fall of one regime toppling a neighbor, but an intricate network of linkages that connect S.E. Asians, leading from one country to another to the outside world as well. Here are some repercussions of what's happening or could soon:

Thailand has many Cambodians in its eastern border provinces. And there's every reason to believe the Communists will use them. A ten-year Thailand insurgency in the Northeast, North & South has been fueled by Communist infiltration among other minorities. That explains the regime's fear, its move to oust U.S. air bases.

Or Malaysia: Until 1970, Cambodian ports passed Russian arms, supplied the 1968 Tet offensive that broke U.S. power in Vietnam. Fishing boats ferried other arms across the narrow Gulf of Siam to percolate the 25-year-old Communist guerrilla war in Malaysia. Once the Communists control Cambodia, they can rev that up again.

Food-desperate India, Bangladesh, Ceylon and even Indonesia are likely to become importers of Vietnam rice as peace returns, with the Communists in control of the world's largest export crop. The price would include a political tilt in Hanoi's direction.

For Indonesia, too, there will be new problems if Hanoi wins. Pres. Suharto fears a powerful, numerous Communist underground if aided by a united Vietnam, strongest regional military power. With half S.E. Asia's population, oil, it's been the No. 1 prize in the strategic efforts of Peking, Moscow, & the Hanoi Communists.

Even the Philippines will take it on the chin from defeat. Moslem insurgents in southern Philippines already get outside help from fanatics in Libya & Malaysia, an enormous burden for Manila. Vietnam arms would make it that much harder to blunt the threat.

And that would endanger Subic Bay, U.S. No. 2 Asian Navy base, make the role of protecting the oil tanker routes more difficult. Indonesian & Mideast crude passing S.E. Asia is Japan's lifeblood.

For Japan, linkage is clear: S.E. Asia buys 1/3 its exports. Once the Communists took over, she'd make a deal or be frozen out. Any political reorientation of the world's second largest economy would be of immediate and direct concern to the U.S. worldwide.

In the Mideast, too, there are already reports of reaction.



Talk that it has already hurt Kissinger's efforts is overdone. But if as most observers agree a deal demands Israel concessions, the Israelis are bound to think harder about American guarantees.

All of which adds up to an answer to the argument of many now: What's happening in Southeast Asia is a necessary "cauterization" of a long-standing bleeding ulcer of U.S. foreign policy decisions. The fact is, predictable and unpredictable new policy dilemmas are just down the road in S.E. Asia -- and other places as well.

Some retail price tags are actually falling -- at long last. Latest gov't figures this week confirm the general impression: Price softness is slowly but surely spreading to more markets, braking the long climb in the Consumer Index to a slower pace.

New car price cuts have gotten most of the recent publicity, with makers' rebate programs trimming what buyers pay in cash. But used car prices seem headed down now, too, after their rise.

And there have been many other important price developments, in lines of trade scattered all across the spectrum of business. Here are some cases where prices are down from recent levels -- or where they've firmed less than seasonal factors would explain.

Most meat cuts are lower, as supermarket shoppers have found. Of course, there's also the bitter question of "Down from where?" But at least the movement is in the right direction this spring, from the consumer's point of view if not the grower's & packer's.

There's been a real break in many clothing prices since Dec. Thanks to "special sales," a wide range of items from men's suits to children's dresses can be bought for less this Easter season. And market trends in textiles suggest there'll be more cuts ahead.

Gasoline pump prices seem to have halted their retreat now, but many homeowners are noticing small drops in fuel oil prices. And those who heat with coal are often getting a small break too.

What's ahead? Will retail price trends continue to level? Unfortunately, much depends on the weather, the Arabs, Congress. A hefty gasoline tax and new farm supports, for just two examples, could inject a lot of new zip into the flagging inflation rate.

But with luck, the rate of rise at retail will keep easing. And that'll mean that more prices, in more segments of business, will be headed downward -- for the next several months, at least.

This increases chances of reducing stocks of finished goods, maybe sufficiently by late spring to start a pick-up in production. The impact on employment of such a prospect is, of course, obvious,



but it may not be widespread or emphatic for many months to come. While all the attention has been focused on the inventories of finished goods, the overhang of basic materials is forgotten.

The build-up of materials in the 4th quarter was near \$3 bill., representing over-purchases by mfrs. fearing continued shortages. Sales volume fell off, production slowed, and these materials came to account for 35% of the increase in all mfrs.' inventories.

As of now, most major materials producers are at record low capacity utilization, including aluminum, cement, paper, lumber. Bringing back the people into these production lines will lag, pending the hoped-for upturn in the production of finished goods.

Will there be a confrontation between the Federal Reserve and Congress next week? The stage for exactly this has been set by a House-Senate agreement on the "sense of Congress" resolution directing the Fed to "consult" with House & Senate Banking Comms.

April 1 is the date set for the first of these consultations. The aim is to put Fed. Chmn. Burns on the carpet twice every year before each committee, resulting in quarterly briefing sessions.

The joint resolution calls for the Reserve Bd. to disclose, in detail, its monetary and credit growth targets for the year. That, says Burns, would just create a field day for speculators, and he has indicated he has no intention of complying with it.

Actually, there's furious backstage negotiating going on, to get both sides to soften their adamant stands, settle things. Washington being Washington, that's probably what will happen -- no showdown, but a face-saving exchange of statements instead.

RIA Observation: Meanwhile, the Fed is shaping a decision on whether and when to trim its bank discount rate still again. Since December, the rate has been reduced early in every month, is now 6½%. But with Treasury bills yielding less than 5½%, the Board could decide on another cut in April, to 6% or under.

The war of nerves against the U.S. dollar by oil producers: It is designed to come to a decisive climax early this summer, when producers & consumers meet to discuss long-range oil prices.

Thus far, Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have shed the dollar as the basic currency denominating the posted price for their oil. Their stated reason: The dollar is still under the inflation gun, buys less all the time and thus undercuts the value of oil exports.

Repeatedly the oil producers have put their case as follows: Our oil resources are finite and can't be expected to last forever. We have got to make ours while the making is good, in 25 years.



By then, either we have a diversified economy, or we're dead.

The implied threat to the dollar from OPEC oil producers is not only a matter of what the U.S. must pay for oil imports. With 65% of Free World trade handled in \$s, its acceptability is a question that puts the U.S. under pressure from all sides.

One special pressure that may surface by the summer meeting is the aftermath of U.S. efforts to reflate out of the recession. Another inflationary dose is not what oil producers want to see. The current Congressional prescription may not be reassuring.

The U.S. is headed pell-mell back into agricultural subsidies. That's the effect of the farm bill now going through the Congress. It's pushed by a farm income drop from \$39 to \$23 bill. in one yr.

Sec. Butz has lost his fight to keep the target prices low, to keep U.S. farmers on a market economy with maximum production. Temporary world food shortages of two years ago have now slacked.

Combined good weather and worldwide recession trimmed demand. The U.S. will export \$22 billion in agricultural products in 1975, but declining markets, lower \$ prices will halt hoped-for gains.

As the bill stands now, it would raise target prices heftily. If sale price falls below that, the U.S. government would pay out. USDA doesn't expect big differentials this year except in cotton. But it projects government subsidies as high as \$4½ bill. ahead.

The bill gives the government the old option of acreage cuts, if and when it becomes less expensive than paying "deficiencies." But that's going to be an ugly option as the world's poor nations continue to starve but can't pay for the food imports they need.

Ironically, the bill is the product of Congressional "reform." Freshmen Congressmen are expressing their constituents' complaints that despite rising costs, inflation, farm prices continue to drop.

The bill has a whopping inflationary impact as it's written. It could raise the nation's food bill by \$440 million this year, as some of the reinforcing of farm prices is passed on by dealers.

It's likely to boost pressure for some kind of food reserves, maybe along the lines of a Humphrey bill now before the Senate. But with West Europe, Japan, the Soviet Bloc eating better now, Washington is looking for a way to have them pay storage costs instead of the U.S. taxpayer who paid in the '30s and post-WWII.

# Members of Congress for Peace through Law

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February 6, 1975

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

We, the undersigned Members of Congress for Peace through Law, write to you on a matter of very great concern -- the extent and direction of the continuing U.S. involvement in Indochina.

What particularly disturbs us is the clear implication in remarks made by the Secretary of State and the Vice President and by yourself in a recent news conference that this only partly resolved issue -- one of the most divisive in the nation's history -- is being re-opened for debate. We had thought that the American military withdrawal, the Peace Agreements negotiated by the Administration and the clearly and repeatedly expressed Congressional mandate to gradually eliminate the American role in Indochina had settled the matter. Apparently, that is not the case.

We remain resolute in our conviction, supported by the legislation passed in the 93rd Congress, that continuing American military and economic involvement in Indochina will not bring that unhappy region closer to a lasting peace. While continuing high levels of American assistance may perhaps prolong the life of the incumbent South Vietnamese and Cambodian governments, we can see no humanitarian or national interest that justifies the cost of this assistance to our country. Although the phased withdrawal of American support will not in itself bring peace to the region, it is equally clear that its continuation will not do so either.

Another prolonged disagreement over events in Vietnam and our policy there may well lead to acrimonious accusations over who "lost" Indochina, reminiscent of the China debate over two decades ago. The result of that earlier experience was to freeze U.S. options in Asia for a quarter of a century. We must at all costs avoid a repetition of such a struggle which would set the Congress against the Executive.

It is especially unfortunate that the internal debate over Indochina should resume at a time when we are confronted by so many pressing domestic and international problems. These problems do not have easy solutions. They require an extraordinary degree of accord between our two branches of government and among the industrialized and developing nations.

This is not the time for another divisive debate that can only impede the development of the cooperation so necessary in dealing with the complex problems of global inflation, domestic recession, and growing shortages of necessary raw materials. Instead, we need to work together.

We believe the time is now at hand when our government must make a decision, too long postponed at a tragically high cost to both the people of Indochina and to our own citizens as to how we will extricate ourselves from the situation in Southeast Asia once and for all.

We write to ask you and your most senior advisers to accept this expression of our views in a spirit of conciliation. We should get on with the important work ahead of us. Innovative leadership both from you and the Congress will be needed more than ever.

Accordingly, we are prepared for a serious, unemotional dialogue on the immediate problem of ending our involvement in Indochina responsibly and honorably. We are not prepared for it to continue indefinitely.

Sincerely,

(List of signatories  
follows on next page)

SENATE

Dick Clark  
James Abourezk  
Alan Cranston  
Philip A. Hart  
Floyd Haskell  
William D. Hathaway

Mark O. Hatfield  
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Patricia Schroeder  
John F. Seiberling  
Fortney H. Stark, Jr.  
Gerry Studds  
James W. Symington  
Frank Thompson  
Morris K. Udall  
Charles H. Wilson  
Antonio B. Won Pat

(FORD-INDOCHINA)'''

PALM SPRINGS, CALIF. (UPI) -- PRESIDENT FORD MONDAY BLAMED THE COLLAPSE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA ON CONGRESSIONAL FAILURE TO VOTE AID FOR SOUTH VIETNAM AND NORTH VIETNAMESE VIOLATIONS OF THE PEACE TREATY.

PRESS SECRETARY RON NESSEN TOLD REPORTERS THAT FORD FEELS THE "FAILURE OF CONGRESS TO PUT UP THE MONEY AFFECTED THE MORALE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY."

HE ALSO ATTRIBUTED THE CRUMBLING SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM TO VIOLATIONS OF THE 1973 PARIS PEACE ACCORD BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

NESSEN GAVE FORDS FIRST ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME FOR THE DETERIORATING MILITARY SITUATION ABOARD AIR FORCE 1 ENROUTE BACK TO PALM SPRINGS FROM BAKERSFIELD, CALIF., WHERE FORD HAD GONE TO TOUR THE ELK HILLS NAVAL RESERVE OIL FIELDS.

CONGRESS HAS REFUSED TO APPROVE FORDS REQUEST FOR A SUPPLEMENTAL \$522 MILLION IN AID FOR SOUTH VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA.


FORD HIMSELF FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE DAYS HAS AVOIDED ALL REPORTERS QUESTIONS ON THE EVENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, APPARENTLY AWAITING HIS NEWS CONFERENCE IN SAN DIEGO THURSDAY AFTERNOON.

NESSEN SAID THE PRESIDENT FINDS THE ORDEAL OF SOUTH VIETNAM "VERY SOBERING" AND HE IS "VERY CONCERNED" ABOUT THE PEOPLE THERE.

ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GEN. FREDERICK C. WEYAND, NOW IN VIETNAM ON A FACT-FINDING MISSION FOR THE PRESIDENT, WILL RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES LATER THIS WEEK AND GO DIRECTLY TO PALM SPRINGS TO REPORT TO FORD.

SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER ALSO WILL FLY HERE THURSDAY OR FRIDAY TO SIT IN ON THE SESSION WITH WEYAND.

THE FALL OF THE MAJOR SOUTH VIETNAMESE CITIES OF HUE AND DA NANG HAS CAST AN AURA OF GLOOM OVER THE WHITE HOUSE BUT FORDS AIDES SAY ONLY THAT HE IS HELPLESS TO DO ANYTHING IN THE FACE OF CONGRESSIONAL REFUSAL TO GIVE A GREEN LIGHT ON FURTHER AID.



SECRET

is deemed to be an administrative matter  
covered per F.O. 12388, Sec. 1.1 and  
Archivist's memo of March 16, 1983

By JP NARS date 12/18/84

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FM JACK MARSH

TO DONALD RUMSFELD FOR THE PRESIDENT

ZEM

SECRET WH50624

NOTE: CORRECTED COPY. PLEASE SUBSTITUTE THIS MESSAGE FOR  
ONE SENT YOU EARLIER.

APRIL 4, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
THROUGH: DON RUMSFELD  
FROM: JACK MARSH

IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS OF  
SECTION 4A (2) OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIRING REPORTING  
TO THE SPEAKER AND THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE SHOULD BE OBSERVED.  
THEY ARE APPLICABLE FOR THE REASONS SET OUT IN THE ATTACHED  
DRAFT OF A LETTER ACCOMPANYING THIS MEMO. ATTACHED ARE THE  
APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION.

THIS REPORT MUST BE MADE BY YOU TO THESE TWO CONGRESSIONAL  
OFFICERS WITHIN 48 HOURS FROM THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT THAT  
INVOKES THE STATUE. THIS OCCURRED AT 0400 A. M., EDT, APRIL 3.  
THEREFORE, THIS REPORT MUST BE FILED BY YOU NO LATER THAN  
0400 A. M., APRIL 5. BRENT HAS SENT A SIMILAR DRAFT OF THE  
ATTACHED TO HENRY AT PALM SPRINGS. WE WILL STAND BY FOR YOUR  
RESPONSE AND SUGGESTIONS AS WELL AS ANY CHANGES WHICH YOU FEEL  
SHOULD BE MADE IN THE ATTACHED REPORT.

YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT JOHN FINNEY OF THE NEW YORK TIMES  
WAS THE STORY OF THIS INCIDENT, WHICH APPARENTLY INVOLVED  
THE USS DURHAM, AND HAS MADE INQUIRY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE. DEFENSE IS AWAITING GUIDANCE ON HOW TO RESPOND  
TO BOTH THE ACTIVITIES OF THE VESSEL AND YOUR POSSIBLE ACTION  
UNDER THE WAR POWERS WHICH WERE THE QUESTIONS FINNEY ASKED.

THE DETERMINATION OF THE APPLICATION OF THE WAR POWERS IS BASED  
ON THE OPINION OF THE COUNSEL'S OFFICE AT: THE WHITE HOUSE;  
DEFENSE; AND STATE. THE DRAFT LETTER IS THEIR JOINT EFFORT.

DRAFT LETTER:

APRIL 4, 1975

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: & (PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE)



SECRET

AS YOU KNOW, LAST SATURDAY I DIRECTED UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN AN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORT TO TRANSPORT REFUGEES FROM DANANG AND OTHER SEAPORTS TO SAFER AREAS FARTHER SOUTH IN VIETNAM. THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN JOINED IN THIS HUMANITARIAN EFFORT BY A NUMBER OF OTHER COUNTRIES WHO ARE OFFERING PEOPLE, SUPPLIES AND VESSELS TO ASSIST IN THIS EFFORT. THIS EFFORT WAS UNDERTAKEN IN RESPONSE TO URGENT APPEALS FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM BECAUSE OF THE EXTREMELY GRAVE NATURE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVING THE LIVES OF HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES. THIS SITUATION HAS BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY LARGE-SCALE VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING THE PEACE IN VIETNAM BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WHO HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING MASSIVE ATTACKS ON THE NORTHERN AND CENTRAL PROVINCES OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY DESIRE TO KEEP THE CONGRESS FULLY INFORMED ON THIS MATTER, AND TAKING NOTE OF THE PROVISION OF SECTION 4(A)(2) OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION (PUBLIC LAW 93-148), I WISH TO REPORT TO YOU CONCERNING ONE ASPECT OF UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE REFUGEE EVACUATION EFFORT. BECAUSE OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF REFUGEES AND THE OVERWHELMING DIMENSIONS OF THE TASK, I HAVE ORDERED U.S. NAVAL VESSELS TO ASSIST IN THIS EFFORT, INCLUDING AMPHIBIOUS TASK GROUP 76.8 WITH 12 EMBARKED HELICOPTERS AND APPROXIMATELY 700 MARINES. THESE NAVAL VESSELS HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED TO APPROACH THE COAST OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO PICK UP REFUGEES AND U.S. NATIONALS, AND TRANSPORT THEM TO SAFETY. MARINES ARE BEING DETAILED TO VESSELS PARTICIPATING IN THE RESCUE MISSION. THE FIRST VESSEL ENTERED SOUTH VIETNAM TERRITORIAL WATERS AT 0400 A.M. EDT ON APRIL 3, 1975.

ALTHOUGH THESE FORCES ARE EQUIPPED FOR COMBAT WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 4(A)(2) OF PUBLIC LAW 93-148, THEIR SOLE MISSION IS TO ASSIST IN THE EVACUATION INCLUDING THE MAINTENANCE OF ORDER ON BOARD THE VESSELS ENGAGED IN THAT TASK.

AS STATED ABOVE, THE PURPOSE OF THE INTRODUCTION OF UNITED STATES NAVAL VESSELS INTO VIETNAMESE WATERS IS TO ASSIST IN AN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN EFFORT INVOLVING VESSELS OF SEVERAL NATIONS, INCLUDING BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CRAFT. THE UNITED STATES' PARTICIPATION IN THIS EFFORT INCLUDES THE CHARTER OF COMMERCIAL VESSELS, THE USE OF MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND VESSELS WITH CIVILIAN CREWS, AS WELL AS UNITED STATES NAVAL VESSELS WITH MILITARY CREWS. THIS EFFORT IS BEING UNDERTAKEN PURSUANT TO THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS AND PURSUANT TO THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED, WHICH AUTHORIZES HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES, CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTIES AND OTHER PERSONS

END OF PAGE 02

SECRET

SECRET

DISADVANTAGED BY HOSTILITIES OR CONDITIONS RELATING TO HOSTILITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

YOU WILL APPRECIATE, I AM SURE, MY DIFFICULTY IN TELLING YOU PRECISELY HOW LONG UNITED STATES FORCES MAY BE NEEDED IN THIS EFFORT. OUR PRESENT ESTIMATE, HOWEVER, IS THAT THIS OPERATION MAY INVOLVE THE PRESENCE OF UNITED STATES NAVAL VESSELS IN VIETNAMESE WATERS FOR A PERIOD OF AT LEAST SEVERAL WEEKS.

PUBLIC LAW 93-~~149~~ 149

CONSULTATION

*Donald R. Ford*

*Pres signed at*

*1734 - 4/4/75*

SEC. 3. THE PRESIDENT IN EVERY POSSIBLE INSTANCE SHALL CONSULT WITH CONGRESS BEFORE INTRODUCING UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES INTO HOSTILITIES OR INTO SITUATIONS WHERE IMMINENT INVOLVEMENT IN HOSTILITIES IS CLEARLY INDICATED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND AFTER EVERY SUCH INTRODUCTION SHALL CONSULT REGULARLY WITH THE CONGRESS UNTIL UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ARE NO LONGER ENGAGED IN HOSTILITIES OR HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM SUCH SITUATIONS.

#### REPORTING

SEC. 4. (U) IN THE ABSENCE OF A DECLARATION OF WAR, IN ANY CASE IN WHICH UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ARE INTRODUCED--

(1) INTO HOSTILITIES OR INTO SITUATIONS WHERE IMMINENT INVOLVEMENT IN HOSTILITIES IS CLEARLY INDICATED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES:

(2) INTO THE TERRITORY, AIRSPACE OR WATERS OF A FOREIGN NATION, WHILE EQUIPPED FOR COMBAT, EXCEPT FOR DEPLOYMENTS WHICH RELATE SOLELY TO SUPPLY, REPLACEMENT, REPAIR, OR TRAINING OF SUCH FORCES; OR

(3) IN NUMBERS WHICH SUBSTANTIALLY ENLARGE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES EQUIPPED FOR COMBAT ALREADY LOCATED IN A FOREIGN NATION;

THE PRESIDENT SHALL SUBMIT WITHIN 48 HOURS TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND TO THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE A REPORT, IN WRITING, SETTING FORTH--

(A) THE CIRCUMSTANCES NECESSITATING THE INTRODUCTION OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES;

(B) THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY UNDER WHICH SUCH INTRODUCTION TOOK PLACE; AND,

(C) THE ESTIMATED SCOPE AND DURATION OF THE HOSTILITIES OR INVOLVEMENT.

(B) THE PRESIDENT SHALL PROVIDE SUCH OTHER INFORMATION AS

END OF PAGE 03

SECRET

SECRET

THE CONGRESS MAY REQUEST IN THE FULFILLMENT OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES WITH RESPECT TO COMMITTING THE NATION TO WAR AND TO THE USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD.

(C) WHENEVER UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ARE INTRODUCED INTO HOSTILITIES OR INTO ANY SITUATION DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION (A) OF THIS SECTION, THE PRESIDENT SHALL, SO LONG AS SUCH ARMED FORCES CONTINUE TO BE ENGAGED IN SUCH HOSTILITIES OR SITUATION, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS PERIODICALLY ON THE STATUS OF SUCH HOSTILITIES OR SITUATION AS WELL AS ON THE SCOPE AND DURATION OF SUCH HOSTILITIES OR SITUATION, BUT IN NO EVENT SHALL HE REPORT TO THE CONGRESS LESS OFTEN THAN ONCE EVERY SIX MONTHS.

1282  
1837

SECRET

NNNN

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (Public Law 93-148)

SEC. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a) (1) shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar day. Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30 percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section.

(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.

(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

April 4, 1975

As you know, last Saturday I directed United States participation in an international humanitarian relief effort to transport refugees from DaNang and other seaports to safer areas farther south in Vietnam. The United States has been joined in this humanitarian effort by a number of other countries who are offering people, supplies and vessels to assist in this effort. This effort was undertaken in response to urgent appeals from the Government of the Republic of Vietnam because of the extremely grave nature of the circumstances involving the lives of hundreds of thousands of refugees. This situation has been brought about by large-scale violations of the agreement ending the war and restoring the peace in Vietnam by the North Vietnamese who have been conducting massive attacks on the northern and central provinces of South Vietnam.

In accordance with my desire to keep the Congress fully informed on this matter, and taking note of the provision of Section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148), I wish to report to you concerning one aspect of United States participation in the refugee evacuation effort. Because of the large number of refugees and the overwhelming dimensions of the task, I have ordered U.S. Naval vessels to assist in this effort, including amphibious task group 76.8 with 12 embarked helicopters and approximately 700 Marines. These Naval vessels have been authorized to approach the coast of South Vietnam to pick up refugees and U.S. Nationals, and transport them to safety. Marines are being detailed to vessels participating in the rescue mission. The first vessel entered South Vietnam territorial waters at 0400 a.m. EDT on April 3, 1975.

Although these forces are equipped for combat within the meaning of Section 4(a)(2) of Public Law 93-148, their sole mission is to assist in the evacuation including the maintenance of order on board the vessels engaged in that task.

As stated above, the purpose of the introduction of United States Naval vessels into Vietnamese waters is to assist in an international humanitarian effort involving vessels of several nations, including both military and civilian craft. The United States' participation in this effort includes the charter of commercial vessels, the use of military sealift command vessels with civilian crews, as well as United States naval vessels with military crews. This effort is being undertaken pursuant to the President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive in the conduct of foreign relations and pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which authorizes humanitarian assistance to refugees, civilian war casualties and other persons disadvantaged by hostilities or conditions relating to hostilities in South Vietnam.

You will appreciate, I am sure, my difficulty in telling you precisely how long United States Forces may be needed in this effort. Our present estimate, however, is that this operation will involve the presence of United States Naval vessels in Vietnamese waters for a period of at least several weeks.

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You will appreciate, I am sure, my difficulty in telling you precisely how long United States Forces may be needed in this effort. Our present estimate, however, is that this operation may involve the presence of United States Naval vessels in Vietnamese waters for a period of at least several weeks.

April 8, 1975

FRENCH PEACE INITIATIVE ON INDOCHINA

Question: Is it our understanding that the French have underway an Indochina peace initiative as carried in press reports?

Answer: As Secretary Kissinger said in his news conference on April 5, we would gratefully welcome any attempt by any nation, including France, to participate in the humanitarian effort.

"Secondly, we have attempted to encourage all of the signatories of the Paris Accords to bring about their implementation and, therefore, if France is attempting to bring about an implementation of the Paris Accords, we would certainly look at their proposals with sympathy."

"The United States strongly favors the implementation of the Paris Accords which have been grossly and outrageously violated by Hanoi and it would support the efforts of any country that would attempt to bring about an implementation of these Accords."



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

April 11, 1975

Office of the White House Press Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE

TEXT OF LETTERS FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE  
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE

April 11, 1975

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

I hereby transmit draft legislation to carry out the recommendations made in my April 10, 1975 address to the Congress with respect to Indochina.

The enclosed draft bills authorize additional military, economic, and humanitarian assistance for South Vietnam, and also clarify the availability of funds for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for humanitarian evacuation in Indochina, should this become necessary.

I urge the immediate consideration and enactment of these measures.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD

# # # #

A BILL

To authorize additional military assistance for  
South Vietnam, and for other purposes.

1           Be it enacted by the Senate and the  
2           House of Representatives of the United States  
3           of America in Congress assembled, That para-  
4           graph (1) of section 401(a) and subsection  
5           (b) of Public Law 89-367, approved March 15,  
6           1966 (80 Stat. 37), as amended, are amended by  
7           striking out "\$1,000,000,000" each place it  
8           appears and inserting in lieu thereof  
9           "\$1,422,000,000".

A BILL

To authorize additional economic assistance for  
South Vietnam, and for other purposes.

1. Be it enacted by the Senate and the House  
2 of Representatives of the United States of  
3 America in Congress assembled, That, in addition  
4 to amounts otherwise authorized for such purposes,  
5 there is authorized to be appropriated to the  
6 President not to exceed \$73,000,000 to carry out  
7 the purposes of part V of the Foreign Assistance  
8 Act of 1961, as amended, for South Vietnam for  
9 the fiscal year 1975. Funds made available for  
10 economic and humanitarian assistance for Indo-  
11 china shall be available after the date of  
12 enactment of this Act for obligation without  
13 regard to the limitations contained in sections  
14 36 and 38 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974,  
15 Public Law 93-559, approved December 30, 1974 (88  
16 Stat. 1795).

A BILL

To clarify restrictions on the availability of funds for the use of United States Armed Forces in Indochina, and for other purposes.

1           Be it enacted by the Senate and the House  
2           of Representatives of the United States of  
3           America in Congress assembled, That nothing  
4           contained in section 839 of Public Law 93-437,  
5           section 741 of Public Law 93-238, section 30 of  
6           Public Law 93-189, section 806 of Public Law 93-155,  
7           section 13 of Public Law 93-126, section 108 of  
8           Public Law 93-52, section 307 of Public Law 93-50,  
9           or any other comparable provision of law shall be  
10          construed as limiting the availability of funds  
11          for the use of the Armed Forces of the United  
12          States to aid, assist, and carry out humanitarian  
13          evacuation, if ordered by the President.

ED DALY TELEGRAM 4/15/75

Q: The President of World Airways--Ed Daly--~~says he has sent~~ has released a telegram he has sent to the President, ~~the~~ Cabinet, Members of Congress and all Governors. complaining the Government has cancelled his insurance and put him out of business. Is this true? What's the reason for this punitive action?

A: The telegram from Mr . Daly was received at the White House last evening. It is now under study by the White~~n~~ House legal counsel, ~~which is~~

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT  
AND  
QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION  
TO THE  
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER  
EDITORS ANNUAL CONVENTION

THE SHOREHAM HOTEL

1:26 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: President Hays, distinguished editors and guests:

I am very, very pleased to be with you today and to have this opportunity to continue a dialogue which has been my pleasure in many parts of the country with many of you in various regional meetings during the past few months.

Those exchanges and the one which will begin shortly are exceedingly valuable to me in providing an insight into the attitudes and the concerns of the people who are your readers and my constituents.

Before answering the questions put to me by the distinguished panel, let me add, if I might, a few comments to the speech that I made to the Congress last Thursday night, and to the American people.

Let me, if I might, express in broad terms some deep beliefs that I have.

First, I firmly believe that the United States must play a very major role in world affairs in the years ahead. It is a great and difficult responsibility, but it is one, in my judgment, that our Nation must continue to have.

This has been my conviction, going back to my first political campaign in the fall of 1948. It was my conviction when I took my first oath of office on January 3, 1949. For a period of better than 25 years in the Congress--as a Member of the House, and part of that time as a leadership role in the minority party--it has been my conviction.

As long as I am President of the United States I will seek to carry on that very important responsibility of our country. I believe to be successful in this effort, this endeavor, the Congress and the President must work together.

MORE

QUESTION: On that point, you have asked for more than \$700 million worth of military aid. There is some obvious psychological and symbolic reasons for simply asking, but militarily speaking, if you could get the package through Congress and get it to South Vietnam, would it militarily do any good at this point?

THE PRESIDENT: I am absolutely convinced if Congress made available \$722 million in military assistance in a timely way by the date that I suggested, or sometime shortly thereafter, the South Vietnamese could stabilize the military situation in Vietnam today.

QUESTION: Mr. President, you keep talking about commitments and promises, and we are getting hung up on these words. In the light of this controversy, why should the Thieu-Nixon correspondence not be released?

THE PRESIDENT: It is not the usual custom for correspondence between heads of state, as I understand it, to be released. I can say from my own experience, not referring to the correspondence to which you refer, that if it is expected that such correspondence will be public, I think on some occasions, or in some instances, you would have to compromise on what you would say. I think that would be true of any correspondence that I received from any other head of state.

If you are going to have a frank, free exchange, I think it has to be between the heads of states.

Now, I have personally reviewed the correspondence to which you refer between President Nixon and President Thieu and I can assure you that there was nothing in any of those communications that was different from what was stated as our public policy.

The words are virtually identical, with some variation, of course, but the intent, the commitments are identical with that which was stated as our country's policy and our country's commitment.

QUESTION: Sir, on that question of your trip to Red China that Mr. Isaacs raised, it seems that down the road it has been speculated that the policy or the purpose of detente is to establish normal diplomatic relations with a country that you described last Thursday as having one-quarter of the population of the world.

That would assume the establishment of an Embassy in Peking, which would automatically assume the de-recognition of some kind of Taiwan. If that is in the cards, what kind of guarantees would you seek, what kind of quid pro quo would you seek from Peking to insure the continued existence of Taiwan?

MORE

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

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THE WHITE HOUSE

INTERVIEW WITH THE PRESIDENT

BY

WALTER CRONKITE

ERIC SEVAREID

AND

BOB SCHIEFFER

LIVE TELEVISION AND RADIO

THE BLUE ROOM

10:01 P.M. EDT

MR. CRONKITE: Good evening, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Good evening, Walter.

MR. CRONKITE: Thank you for this opportunity to talk to you this evening here in the Rose Room in the White House.

THE PRESIDENT: I am looking forward to it.

MR. CRONKITE: Mr. President, just this moment as we came on the air, I was surprised over this little machine here that the Associated Press and the United Press International are reporting from Honolulu that a large number of battle-equipped Marines, 800 or so, have left Hawaii by air, on chartered aircraft.

Can you tell us what their destination is and what is up?

THE PRESIDENT: That is part of a movement to strengthen, or to bring up to strength, the Marine detachment in that area of the Pacific. It is not an unusual military movement. On the other hand, we felt under the circumstances, that it was wise to bring that Marine group in that area of the world -- the South Pacific -- up to strength.

MR. CRONKITE: Can you tell us where they are going, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think I should be any more definitive than that.

MR. CRONKITE: They are not going directly to Saigon?

THE PRESIDENT: No, they are not.

MORE



THE PRESIDENT: As far as I know, Walter, there was no prenotification to any, certainly high-ranking, U.S. military or civilian official of the withdrawal decision.

MR. SEVAREID: This whole affair is going to be argued over. There will be vast books on it for years and years and years. Wouldn't it be wisest to publish the correspondence between former President Nixon and President Thieu, which is disputed now, the 1973 correspondence after the Paris accords?

THE PRESIDENT: In the first place, I have personally read the correspondence. The personal correspondence between President Nixon and President Thieu corresponds with the public record. I have personally verified that. I don't think in this atmosphere it would be wise to establish the precedent of publishing the personal correspondence between heads of state.

Maybe historically, after a period of time, it might be possible, in this instance, but if we establish a precedent for the publication of correspondence between heads of state, I don't think that that correspondence or that kind of correspondence will be effective because heads of state -- I have learned firsthand -- have to be very frank in their exchanges with one another, and to establish a precedent that such correspondence would be public, I think will downgrade what heads of state try to do in order to solve problems.

MORE



MR. SEVAREID: Of course, there is no way to keep President Thieu from publishing it?

THE PRESIDENT: No.

MR. SEVAREID: Things like this have been judiciously leaked when it served the purpose of the President or the Secretary of State. You have no such plans for that?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I have no such plans, and to be very frank about it, it seems to me that the American people today are yearning for a new start. As I said in my State of the World address to the Congress, let's start afresh.

Now, unless I am pressed, I don't say the Congress did this or did that. I have to be frank if I am asked the categorical question.

I think we ought to turn back the past and take a long look at how we can solve these problems affirmatively in the future. Vietnam has been a trauma for this country for 15 years or more. A lot of blame can be shared by a good many people -- Democrats as well as Republicans, Congress as well as Presidents.

We have some big jobs to do in other parts of the world. We have treaty commitments to keep. We have relations with adversaries or potential adversaries that we should be concerned about. It is my judgment, under these circumstances, we should look ahead and not concentrate on the problems of the past where a good bit of blame can be shared by many.

MR. CRONKITE: Mr. President, Vice President Rockefeller suggested he thinks this would be an issue in the 1976 campaign. Will you make it an issue in 1976 or will you try to keep it out of the campaign?

THE PRESIDENT: I will not make it an issue in 1976.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Will Mr. Rockefeller? I didn't quite understand what he was driving at in that recent interview when he said, you know, if 2,000 or 3,000 Americans die in this evacuation, that raises some issues.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, of course, the record -- whatever a man in public office says -- can be, in and of itself, a campaign issue. But I can speak only for myself, and I do not intend to go out and point the finger or make a speech concerning those who have differed with me who I might privately think contributed to the problem.

MORE



By 1976, I would hope we could look forward with some progress in the field of foreign policy. I think we have got some potential successes that will be very much possible as we look ahead.

So, rather than to replay the past with all the division and divisive feelings between good people in this country, I just hope we can admit we made some mistakes--not try to assess the blame--but decide how we can solve the problems that are on our doorstep.

And we have a few, but they are solvable if we stick together, if we have a high degree of American unity.

MR. CRONKITE: There is not much trouble -- leaving the Vietnam issue that the Nation has had, and leaving Vietnam here tonight, but I would like to ask just one more.

Have you talked to former President Nixon about any aspects of this Vietnam thing in the last few weeks?

THE PRESIDENT: After my State of the World speech April 10th, he called me, congratulated me on it. We discussed what I had said. It was a rather short, but a very friendly chat on the telephone.

MR. CRONKITE: Any talk about secret agreements?

THE PRESIDENT: AS I recall the conversation, he reiterated what I have said, that the public record corresponds with the private correspondence in reference to the commitments, moral or legal, or otherwise.

MORE



4/21/75

Q: Secretary Kissinger's policy in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere all seem to be failing at one time. Why do you keep Kissinger as your Secretary of State when he has been so wrong, so often?

A: You know my view of the causes of the recent setbacks in Indochina. I stated them at length in my State of the World Address to Congress April 10 and I needn't repeat them here. But the last person to criticize as responsible for the tragedy in South Vietnam is Dr. Kissinger, who has fought unceasingly for six and one-half years for a satisfactory solution to that conflict.

On the Middle East, the causes of the recent setback are very complicated. Again, no purpose would be served by going into this. But the American performance in the Middle East in the last 18 months has been an unprecedented success, as I also pointed out in my address to the Congress.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

A verbatim transcript of the testimony of  
the SECRETARY OF STATE before the Committee on Appro-  
priations in the House of Representatives, Room 2154,  
on Monday, April 21, 1975, at 3:15 p.m.

P R O C E E D I N G S

CHAIRMAN MAHON: We will resume the hearing.

General Weyand is going to stay with us. We want to move along as well as we can.

Mr. Secretary, we welcome you before the Committee. We are glad to see you, Mr. Habib.

We have been talking about what to do, if anything, by way of providing additional funds for military and economic, humanitarian aid for South Viet-Nam.

I have introduced, earlier today, a bill providing for an appropriation of \$200 million additional in military assistance, and \$165 million additional in economic and humanitarian assistance -- realizing of course that it might become impossible to deliver any of this. But thinking perhaps, under all the circumstances, consideration should be given to this approach. And of course, you know, Mr. Secretary, that the recent offensive in Southeast Asia had not been predicted, at least within the time-span, within the time-frame that the collapse of parts of South Viet-Nam have happened.

It was thought that perhaps on the regular appropriation bill for defense and the regular foreign assistance

appropriation coming from the Pass Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, these funds -- these problems could be considered at that time.

But events have changed that picture.

Now, you know the President made a request some time ago for \$972 million in additional aid, including \$742 million -- in excess of \$700 million in military assistance.

There have been no authorizations of large parts of that request. But there is existing authorization for some military assistance, and for some economic aid.

Now, what do we do at this point in history? We realize that this is a difficult time. You are very busy with the problems of Secretary of State. We realize there is much uncertainty in the equation. What can you say to us now, and have you got any recommendation to make at this moment as to anything meaningful which we might do -- however uncertain the results might be.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I appreciate this opportunity to testify before your Committee.

I have a brief formal statement which I can submit

for the record, or which I can read, whichever you prefer. And then I can answer your questions. Or should I go right to the questions?

CHAIRMAN MAHON: I think it would be good for you to make an over-all statement, without interruption, in regard to the situation.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: All right. Well, then, let me make this brief, rather general statement.

CHAIRMAN MAHON: Sure.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And then I will address your specific questions that you put to me, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, it is unnecessary for me to speak at great length this afternoon, since my views with respect to the new and difficult situation are well-known to the Congress.

I merely wish to reiterate briefly what we see as the essential issues remaining before us at this late hour in Viet-Nam.

Events have moved with great rapidity. In the ten days since the President addressed the Congress and the American people, the threat to South Viet-Nam's continued existence has become ever more grave.

Hard and bloody battles have been waged, despite



resistance by the South Vietnamese Army -- the pattern of these encounters has been one of gradual but steady Communist advance.

This has prompted some to conclude that our discussion of assistance to Viet-Nam is therefore meaningless.

In any judgment, however, the issue remains relevant. The ultimate outcome is yet to be determined, and it would serve no purpose for me to speculate on that matter at this time.

There is another equally compelling aspect of the tragedy in South Viet-Nam. The hundreds of thousands of refugees in that country, people who have abandoned their homes and their land to flee the advancing Communist armies. These people have suffered unimaginably. Indeed, in many ways, they symbolize "the blind sorrow of warfare." We have been providing food, shelter and medical care. I am confident that America will continue to respond to their plight with the generosity so characteristic of our national tradition.

In addition to requesting emergency military and humanitarian assistance for South Viet-Nam, the President also asked the Congress to clarify existing

legislation governing the use of armed forces in Indochina. Here, too, I believe the need is obvious -- so should the worst come to pass, our forces would be available to assist in any evacuation of Americans, and of Vietnamese, whose lives would be clearly in danger.

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, much of our discussion during the last two weeks has focused on United States objectives in Viet-Nam. What can we hope to achieve in this immensely difficult situation, when our range of choices obviously is extremely limited?

We have spoken of the possibility, however remote, that by giving South Viet-Nam the military aid it so desperately needs, the momentum of North Viet-Nam's advance might be blunted, and conditions thereby established which could allow South Viet-Nam to work towards a more equitable and more humane solution than one which is imposed upon it totally by force,

We have not said that this will come about. Whether a controlled solution can be achieved by any means is yet to be determined.

The transfer of power and formation of the new government following President Thieu's resignation appears to be taking place in accordance with constitutional

processes. For that government to pursue its objectives, which we assume will be announced in due time, it will need our support.

Thus, our objectives in the military or political sense are indeed limited, as they must be.

But however limited, those objectives must be pursued with urgency -- for despite the complex history fo the conflict, and our role in it, the fundamental issue we now face is quite clear. south Viet-Nam has nowhere else to turn. Without our help, it has no hope, even of moderating the pace of events which it has bravely resisted for many years.

Our long association with South Viet-Nam, in their painful and tragic endeavor, does not permit us to look away.

This is my formal statement, Mr. Chairman. If I could add perhaps some extemporaneous remarks.

Since the President has submitted his request, in all the testimony we have made before various Congressional committees, we have stated that no one under the conditions existing could guarantee a particular military outcome. But our argument has been that whatever outcome one foresaw, it was in our interests, it was in the interests of the

lives of Americans that were still involved, as well as those thousands of Vietnamese who, in reliance on us, worked with us for a decade and a half, that we achieve to the greatest extent possible a controlled situation, in which there were individuals with whom we could deal, who would be responsible for these actions. This attempt to achieve a controlled situation is as urgent, if not more urgent, today, than it was previously. And for those reasons, any action by the Congress to meet the President's request would be an enormous help to those of us who are attempting to bring about these controlled circumstances.

CHAIRMAN MAHON: What, in your opinion, will be the impact on American foreign policy world-wide if we do not take proper action with respect to South Viet-Nam at this time? And what is your rationale for your position?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, Mr. Chairman, I have stated two seemingly contradictory propositions. One is the impact of events in Indochina on our international position has been serious. And the failure of the Congress to vote any assistance would complicate that situation.

On the other hand, I have also stated that we are determined to master this situation, and even without aid, we are determined to master it. But without aid,

it will be more difficult -- if the United States projects  
the impression of abandoning people who have dealt with  
us for so long, totally -- without making any effort to  
achieve control over the situation, it would not help  
our international position.

But I do not want to contribute to an impression world-wide that however it ends, the United States is not capable of mastering events.

CHAIRMAN MAHON: Well, am I to conclude that you feel that some economic aid and some military aid would  
be in the best interests of the United States at this time,  
in your opinion?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In my opinion, yes, Mr.  
Chairman.

CHAIRMAN MAHON: Of course, you would agree that the effectiveness, and our capacity to deliver such aid, might be in question. But you would still favor some action by the Congress?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would still favor some action by the Congress, Mr. Chairman, and if events should turn out that it cannot be delivered, we will at least have done what we could in this difficult circumstance.

CHAIRMAN MAHON: It has been said that military aid is, if not desirable under the circumstances, but that humanitarian aid might be more appropriate.

I would like to know whether in your opinion there would be some way to deliver humanitarian aid in the event of the collapse of Saigon and the South Vietnamese Government? Would you then be without any opportunity to deliver the humanitarian aid? Do you think they have got to go side-by-side with respect to this matter?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, Mr. Chairman, we have many objectives in Viet-Nam. When the President spoke, he spoke of stabilizing the military situation, at least for long enough to permit a controlled outcome.

If the new government attempts a negotiation -- and I cannot speak for it, since it has not yet even technically been formed -- but if it attempts a negotiation, the conditions on the ground will have at least, to some extent, an effect on the outcome of these negotiations.

As the situation disintegrates -- or if the situation disintegrates totally, the humanitarian need will rapidly escalate. And the capacity to deal with it

will rapidly disintegrate.

In addition to this, our ability to extricate those whom we are trying to evacuate will of course progressively diminish as the situation gets out of control. And this is our principal reason for attempting to achieve the maximum control over the situation.

CHAIRMAN MAHON: I would like to say to the members of the Committee that some of the members have had no opportunity to ask any questions of the General -- of the Secretary. I would yield. I am not going to ask a number of questions myself at this time. I would yield to the gentleman on my left, Mr. Yates.


MR. YATES: Mr. Secretary, peace was achieved, or an effort to achieve peace, was made at the time that you negotiated with Le Duc Tho, and the representatives of the North Vietnamese forces. Has an effort been made to communicate with them at all? To try to establish any kind of a peace, or any kind of an agreement?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, there are various negotiating efforts going on. But it would be inappropriate for me to discuss them at this moment.

However, we are of course aware of the fact, and we have supported it, that a negotiated outcome of

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 30, 1975

TO: RON NESSEN  
FROM: JIM SHUMAN   
SUBJ: END OF WAR TV SPECIALS

Attached are summaries of the TV specials on the end of the Vietnam war, with questions raised which might come up at your news briefing.



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CBS: VIETNAM: "A War That Is Finished..."  
8:30 - 11 p. m.

A retrospective look at the war, beginning with today's final evacuation and decision-making at the White House, devoting most of its two-and-a-half hours to war scenes, and concluding with comment by a group of prominent Americans.

Following questions were raised, either directly or in the viewer's mind, which might be asked at a news briefing:

Evacuation: Could it have been more orderly? Could it have been planned earlier?

Unfinished Business: What happened to those listed as Missing in Action? Will there be attempts to learn their fate?

General: What has the war proved?

The Future: What will be our future policy, toward South (and North) Vietnam, and how do we determine it. Dean Rusk suggested a great national debate on this subject. Does the President plan to initiate such a debate? Has the outcome of the war undercut the detante? Has our credibility diminished to the point where other nations may seek their own nuclear deterrent and thus lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons? What is our agenda for the future? (Walter Cronkite closed the show by saying that the lesson of Vietnam is the need for candor in government, and the need now to "look forward to an agenda for the future.) How will humanitarian aid be dispensed? Will the U. S. begin a push to strengthen its alliances?

jbs/4/29/75

NBC Special on Indochina: 10:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.

April 29, 1975

The Chancellor-moderated report consisted of straight reporting of the series of events since the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in Jan. '73 that led the to the final U.S. evacuation.

Chancellor opened the program saying, "It looks as though all Americans are now gone" from Vietnam. (His Emphasis).

Possible Question: Are All Americans Out?

Jim Laurie reported from Saigon (voice only) that the final evacuation was "chaotic" and "did not go smoothly." Laurie reported storming and rampaging of the U.S. Embassy by angered South Vietnamese (they pummeled a portrait of Pres. Ford), while the remaining eleven (11) U.S. Marines waited on the roof-top for a chopper, but tossing tear gas grenades into the Embassy to hold the Vietnamese back.

Possible Question: Is the US Aware of Any Incidents With Angered South Vietnamese During the Evacuation?

Arthur Lord reported from Bangkok that the Viet Cong "allowed" the U.S. to complete its evacuation. (This was Lord's interpretation, not a "hard" story).

Possible Question: Was There Any US-Hanoi/VC Agreement on Allowing the U.S. to evacuate?

\* \* \* \*

jh/4-29-75

ABC

Vietnam: Lessons Learned, Prices Paid

11:30 p. m. - 1 a. m.

The main thrust of ABC's program was mainly on the war's effects at home and on some of the men who fought it and/or were injured in it.

The following questions were raised in the viewer's mind:

What plans does President Ford have for unifying the United States?

Who will pay for the resettlement in the United States of the refugees?

There were criticisms of VA hospitals and VA bureaucracy treatment of Vietnam veterans. Is anything being done to speed up the bureaucracy and/or to improve treatment in hospitals?

Do we expect a bloodbath?

jbs/4-30-75

U.S. EQUIPMENT SAVED FROM INDOCHINA

- Q: A lot of Cambodian and Vietnamese aircraft and naval vessels, originally obtained from the United States, were taken to several Asian countries by fleeing South Vietnamese and Cambodians. Who owns this equipment now? What can be done with it? Did the Thai not want to keep the equipment in Thailand in order to return it to Vietnam?
- A: Under the provisions of U.S. statutes, all such equipment reverts to the United States when the purposes for which it was furnished are no longer applicable. However, it would make sense for this equipment to be reallocated within the context of the overall U.S. security assistance program to countries where a need exists. We are now discussing with the Thai Government turning over some of this equipment to them in order to assist them in meeting their security requirements.

MC GOVERN: VIETNAM WANTS TIES WITH U. S.

Q. Senator McGovern, upon his return from a trip to Hanoi and Saigon said that Vietnamese leaders appeared eager to open peaceful relations with the U. S. and other countries. (NYT, 1/22/76). What is the Administration reaction to McGovern's assessment of the Vietnamese intentions?

A. I think the U. S. attitudes toward Vietnam are enunciated quite clearly in the President's Pacific Doctrine of December 7.

You may recall that he said at the time:

"In Indochina, the healing effects of time are required. Our policies toward the new regimes of the peninsula will be determined by their conduct toward us. We are prepared to reciprocate gestures of good will, particularly the return of remains of Americans killed or missing in action or information about them. If they exhibit restraint toward their neighbors and constructive approaches to international problems, we will look to the future rather than to the past."



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INTERVIEW WITH FORMER U.S. SENATOR J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT

ABC's AM America - 4/1/75

12:30 minutes

(Conducted by Peter Jennings with Bill Beutel and Stephanie Edwards in NY)

Jennings: Sen. Fulbright, for the first question, now I guess that Vietnam is dominating a certain and larger portion of our lives than it did, say, one year ago, is whether or not there is any action the U.S. should now take?

Fulbright: Well, I think we should be most sympathetic to these conditions which we have contributed to. We ought to be prepared to give relief, humanitarian aid. I do not think there is anything we can do to alter the inevitable political developments there because they are in accord with conditions, conditions which we influenced by intervening. We have made it much worse. We never should have intervened after the Geneva Accords.

Jennings: There has been a great deal of discussion in the last couple of weeks as the South Vietnamese and the Cambodian forces have pulled back about the disappearance of Lon Nol and whether or not the resignation or the overthrow of President Thieu would make any difference, Do you think it would?



Fulbright: I don't think so. These people have been identified as our puppets, you see. I mean a good foreign power cannot intervene in a country like this and set up a puppet and expect to succeed. The very fact that he is our puppet alienates him in the view of the local people.

This was what happened to the French. Diem was a French...he had been working for the French and he came in under a cloud, you might say. The Americans ought to understand this. When we had our revolution, we did not like the British for a long time. It took us 10 years to accept a quite substantial gift from James Smithson because we did not like the British. It is a psychological problem. People do not like the representative of a big foreign power. This is basically one of the reasons why we never could succeed in that procedure.

Jennings: One of the questions being asked, Senator, though, is whether or not we do not have still an obligation to come to the assistance of those people in South Vietnam who do resist the North? That may not be Thieu.

Fulbright: Well, we really should give them an opportunity to save their lives by coming here, anywhere we like. And we also have an obligation to give humanitarian relief to all of them that are left there that we have conditioned. My point is there is nothing we can do outside of killing them all with nuclear bombs or making them a colony.





If we had gone in as the British used to go in and taken them and governed them and so on, we could have probably sustained that for a period, but colonialism had become unpopular. We were in an ambiguous position disaffirming any desire to own it, but thinking we could create a nice, democratic system modeled on our own. That is an impossible undertaking.

Jennings: So, as of now, with the exception of humanitarian aid, the U.S. must, in your view, wipe its hands completely of....

Fulbright: Well, I don't like the word 'wipe its hands'. We created this. This is a terrible mistake; it is part of our growing up. We are a relatively, politically speaking, relatively young nation. We have to learn not to do these foolish things.

Jennings: This administration has reintroduced the phrase 'domino theory,' a phrase you heard many times.

Fulbright: It is a mistake.

Jennings: Right or wrong? Possible?

Fulbright: I think it is wrong. I don't think this means all the world losing confidence in us. Their confidence in us is in our basic traditions and purposes and our strength, our military strength, and the ability of our people which remains, very strong. <sup>As a matter of fact,</sup> We should have learned from this. We should be more mature and a wiser country from here on.

Jennings: What specifically should we learn from Vietnam?



Fulbright: Not to intervene in conditions such as we have been where you had a movement to get, throw out the foreigner, -- the French. It succeeded, and we intervened and try to reintroduce our own influence and to control the course of events there, to make it come out like we wanted, not like they wanted.

Jennings: Secretary Kissinger in one of his series of remarks the other day said that the events in Portugal, in Greece, in Turkey, and Indochina do serve to undermine American commitments abroad. You do not agree with that.

Fulbright: Well, yes, commitment abroad. We had a subcommittee of my committee -- Foreign Relations -- on this commitment abroad. We had entirely too many bases around the world. This whole concept of the policeman of the world is basically at fault. If we are to influence the world properly, it is not directly by putting military bases it is through cooperation with these countries, say something like the United Nations. Now, these so-called realists snorted this as being naive and stupid, but look at their own realistic policy of controlling the world by bases all over the world. That is realism, which is a failure, clearly proved to be a failure. I don't know whether you have a word or not; it has not been tried yet. It has not been proved to be a failure as we don't have anything to do with it to speak of.

Jennings: Will there be now a debate on who lost Indochina do you think?

Fulbright: Right. It is sure a stupid thing to have a debate on it. That is not important; what is important is where we go from here is where we go from here. What is our policy in the future? Are we going to quit intervening in the Dominican Republic or Vietnam, and I hope we won't intervene militarily in the Middle East no matter what happens. That is not our affair. We can help them; we have our preferences. We give them money. Goodness knows, we give them a lot of it, and we ought to negotiate that out of there, but not go in there with the military.



Gammings: We were talking a minute ago about the question of American influence around the world, and you perceive it as not being necessarily a tragic effect, but how do we convince people that our behavior in Indochina now and before does not have a debilitating effect on our commitments elsewhere?

Fulbright: People are already convinced that we were mistaken. They are already convinced that we are not infallible; that is quite true. Why should we be? We are still a very great and powerful country. It is a question of how we use it from here on. And this intervention by military means is not going to be accepted by the rest of the world. It is old fashioned, old hat. That is why the British moved out of the colonies and the French came. From here out, with the invention of nuclear weapons is a new era in international relations. We have to cooperate with people persuade them.

Beutel: You say what we have to worry about is what we do next, what happens in the future, but sometimes it seems that our foreign policy has a life all its own and it moves ahead willy-nilly like a snowball. Do we have any choices, important choices that we can make any more?

Fulbright: Well, a foreign policy should not have a life of its own. It should be subsidiary to the national interest and what promotes our interest. This is true. People tend to play it as a game, as if they... as if it was a basketball game like you saw last night. That is not what it is. It is supposed to be a vehicle to promote our interests and this sort of intervention does not do that. We're basically at fault and I hope we get over that illusion that we are playing a game in international relations that has no relation to the interests of the United States people. So that concept is wrong; I think our interest is in cooperating with other countries and arriving at a kind of modus vivendi as we are attempting to do with China and Russia. It is...how ridiculous it is to be fighting about a little country, what kind of a government it is, when we are making up to having what they call detente with Russia and China. This is an inconsistency that has always offended me.



Edwards: Will you change your mind, if after a couple of decades of trying it your way -- assistance with monetary aid and philosophical aid, but never military intervention -- if after a couple decades trying it your way you found the world predominantly communistic?

Fulbright: Well, of course, I would not like that. It would indicate if this happens by cooperation and non-military means, then it would shock me very much that communism has that much appeal. I don't believe it. I don't believe communism will prevail if we will give democracy, or the non-communists governments, a fair opportunity to establish themselves. Or to put it another way, a government like Tito's in Yugoslavia they call it communism. I remember George Kennan had a lot to say about this, but it is the kind of a government that certainly is not very offensive to us. We give them aid, and they have been friendly people. Praise Tito, it is an awfully bad problem of semantics here about communism. Why are we being so nice to the Chinese? They call themselves communist. There are a lot of problems about our concepts.

Beutel: One of the concepts that you made kind of a catchword was "the arrogance of power," your book by that name. Is President Ford still locked into what you would call "the attitude of the arrogance of power"?

Fulbright: Well, I regret his reviving this business of dominoes and so on, and that this is somewhere...that we have a certain position as leader of the Free World that we must maintain, quite apart from the interests of the United States there is a role that must be played. If that is one aspect of the arrogance of power, then I deplore it. I think we are another country, an important country. We ought to enter into the spirit of negotiation and settling these matters, wherever it might be, by compromise which would work out to the interests of this people and I don't think that military intervention will.

Jennings: This administration is now undergoing what it calls a reappraisal of U.S. policy in the Middle East. What do you anticipate?



Fulbright: Well, there again, I would hope they would reaffirm their original position to return to the Resolution ~~of '57 and to work out a compromise settlement by which we would get a political overall political settlement providing for the acceptance of Israel, securing its future within the borders of '57 and a real commitment from the Arabs and from Russia and ourselves to maintain the political integrity, the geographical integrity of the countries of that area. I think it can be done if we would approach it in that spirit.~~

Jennings: Can the Middle East be brought to peaceful resolution without the participation of the Russians?

Fulbright: No, not on any permanent basis. I don't think we can do it; therefore, we do have to include them.

Jennings: If negotiations are further delayed in the Middle East, who do you think stands to lose the most?

Fulbright: I think in the long run the Israelis because of their size and they're few in number; that as time goes on the Arabs' side is growing in strength in wealth, in technology, in everything... Time is against the small nation in that case.

Jennings: Do you specifically this is the time when a reappraisal or a realignment of American foreign policy regarding the Middle East is likely?

Fulbright: Well, our own Congress is so committed to the other view, I am not sure whether the Secretary can bring it about. I hope we can. I think he wants to and I think it would be in the interest of Israel if he could succeed, and in our interest.

Beutel: Yesterday on this program, Moshe Dayan said he wished the U.S. would be policeman of the world. I suspect that if President Thieu were on this program, he would say the same thing. What do you say to those people?

Fulbright: I think that is against the interests of the U.S. and of the world, and I would not agree with it. I can understand they have a very special reason for it, but I do not agree with that. We should primarily look after the interests of people of this country and use such means as the United Nations furnishes us and there are other agencies for negotiating, for cooperation. I want as a substitute the concept of cooperation and negotiation for this military intervention because with nuclear weapons, it is no longer credible.

~~Fulbright~~ You're just not going to use nuclear weapons. And  
continued] you are sort of hostage to the smaller countries.  
That is not a good way any more as it used to  
be for big countries like Great Britain.



OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

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THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT  
AND  
QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION  
TO THE  
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER  
EDITORS ANNUAL CONVENTION

THE SHOREHAM HOTEL

1:26 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: President Hays, distinguished editors and guests:

I am very, very pleased to be with you today and to have this opportunity to continue a dialogue which has been my pleasure in many parts of the country with many of you in various regional meetings during the past few months.

Those exchanges and the one which will begin shortly are exceedingly valuable to me in providing an insight into the attitudes and the concerns of the people who are your readers and my constituents.

Before answering the questions put to me by the distinguished panel, let me add, if I might, a few comments to the speech that I made to the Congress last Thursday night, and to the American people.

Let me, if I might, express in broad terms some deep beliefs that I have.

First, I firmly believe that the United States must play a very major role in world affairs in the years ahead. It is a great and difficult responsibility, but it is one, in my judgment, that our Nation must continue to have.

This has been my conviction, going back to my first political campaign in the fall of 1948. It was my conviction when I took my first oath of office on January 3, 1949. For a period of better than 25 years in the Congress--as a Member of the House, and part of that time as a leadership role in the minority party--it has been my conviction.

As long as I am President of the United States I will seek to carry on that very important responsibility of our country. I believe to be successful in this effort, this endeavor, the Congress and the President must work together.

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It is my belief that if we are to be successful in the achievement of success in the area of foreign policy, the American people, to the degree that they can, must be united.

I also believe that our foreign policy, if you look at the record -- at least during the period that I was honored to be a part of our Government in the Congress or in the Executive Branch -- that our foreign policy has been a successful one.

Of course, there has been some instances where we did not achieve all that we sought, in some cases because the circumstances were well beyond our control. In a few instances where we have not been as successful as we would have liked, I think we self-inflicted some problems that helped to bring that unfortunate result.

I also believe to maintain peace and to insure it, certainly in the future, the United States must remain strong militarily. We must have a broad, strong, well-led military establishment -- and I include in that an intelligence system that can be extremely helpful to me and to Presidents in the future.

I believe also that we must work with friend and foe alike. We have many, many friends throughout the world. We have some potential adversaries and we have some that are true adversaries. But if we are to achieve what we all want, we have to work with all.

It is my strong belief that we can achieve unity at home. I see no reason why the Congress and the President cannot work together. That doesn't mean that all 535 Members of the House and Senate will agree with me, but I can assure you that what I have said on more than one occasion, I believe, and I will try to implement and I will work with the Congress, and I know many, if not all, in the Congress will try to work with me.

If we do get this unity at home and if we do develop a closer relationship between the President and the Congress, I think we can continue a successful foreign policy in building a better world and achieving, on a more permanent basis, peace for all.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Reston?

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QUESTION: Mr. President, two points. There is a story on the ticker this morning out of Geneva that the Cambodian government has asked for a cease-fire and that this information has been passed to Prince Sihanouk in Peking. Could you tell us anything about that, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Reston, I just received a note from one of my staff members, Ron Nessen, indicating that we had gotten the information after I had left the White House to the effect that the Cambodian government **has communicated with Sihanouk indicating that the Cambodian government will work with the Khmer Rouge to try and negotiate a settlement.**

It is my recollection, from a quick look at that information that was given to me at the luncheon table, that Prince Sihanouk is in no position to really achieve or accomplish the results that we all want, namely, a negotiated settlement in that unfortunate situation.

I can only say from our point of view we will help in any way we can to further negotiations to end that conflict.

QUESTION: On that same point, could I ask you whether you have been in touch with the North Vietnamese about a cease-fire in South Vietnam or with any other government to try to bring that about?

THE PRESIDENT: Over a period of time, we have communicated with all of the signatories of the Paris accords, which were signed in January of 1973. The efforts that we have made are broad and comprehensive, and when I say we have indicated our feelings to all signatories, of course, that includes the North Vietnamese.

Mr. Funk?

QUESTION: Mr. President, is the United States in direct contact now, in a situation of negotiation, with the North Vietnamese for a cease-fire around Saigon?

THE PRESIDENT: We are not in direct negotiations in that regard.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: Mr. President, when a delegation of the American Society of Newspaper Editors was in China, the last time around there was considerable emphasis placed by the Chinese leaders, leading all the way from Premier Chou on down, that no firm relationship with the United States was possible until Taiwan, so to speak, was taken out of the picture and placed under Chinese rule.

You are going back to China. Is that on your agenda?

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THE PRESIDENT: The relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China, which was reopened several years ago, is predicated on the Shanghai communique. This relationship is continuing, I would say, on schedule.

I am going back to the People's Republic of China late this fall. I was there for about two weeks in June and July of 1972. I would say that no firm agenda for that forthcoming meeting has been established. So, I am not in a position to comment directly on the question that you ask.

QUESTION: Mr. President, you have reaffirmed your confidence in the present American foreign policy, but I wonder if you could expand on that just a little bit.

Are we committed to containing Communism around the world? Are we committed to a heavy program of economic aid? Are we committed to a heavy program of military aid? Will we get into armed intervention in desperate cases?

THE PRESIDENT: We are committed to a furtherance of a policy of detente with the Soviet Union. I think that policy is in our mutual interests. It won't solve all the problems where either we or they are involved, but it has helped to reduce tensions.

It has helped in other ways where our joint cooperation could be helpful. We do, as a country, at least while I am President, expect to continue our relationship with Western Europe, with NATO.

We hope to strengthen it. We hope to eliminate some of the current problems, such as the problem between Greece and Turkey at the present time over Cyprus. We do expect to continue working in the Middle East, which includes some economic aid, some military assistance for various countries in that area of the world.

I think we have an obligation to continue to have a presence in the Pacific, in Latin America, in Africa. It is my judgment that in each of these cases we will probably continue both economic and military assistance on a selective basis.

I am not saying this is the containment of Communism. It is a furtherance of the policy of the United States aimed at our security and the maintenance of peace on a global basis.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, in response to Mr. Kirkpatrick's question, you mentioned a policy of detente in an affirmative way. The Chinese and Russian military aid to the North Vietnamese has been placed ~~at~~ approximately \$1.5 billion.

My question is, doesn't that or does that violate the spirit of detente, and if so, of what purpose is detente?

THE PRESIDENT: I think it is worthwhile to point out that none of the signatories to the Paris accords have sought to enforce the violations\* of those accords, including, of course, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

In the agreement that was signed in Paris in January of 1973, the United States, as part of its agreement with South Vietnam, agreed to supply replacement war materiel to give economic aid.

The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, I assume, made the same commitment to North Vietnam.

It appears that they have maintained that commitment. Unfortunately, the United States did not carry out its commitment in the supplying of military hardware and economic aid to South Vietnam.

I wish we had. I think if we had, this present tragic situation in South Vietnam would not have occurred.

I don't think we can blame the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China. In this case, if we had done with our ally what we promised, I think this whole tragedy could have been eliminated.

Nevertheless, we hope to and are working through the countries that are a part or were a part of the Paris accords to try and achieve a *cease-fire, and will continue* to do so.

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\* Word should be "provisions"

QUESTION: On that point, you have asked for more than \$700 million worth of military aid. There is some obvious psychological and symbolic reasons for simply asking, but militarily speaking, if you could get the package through Congress and get it to South Vietnam, would it militarily do any good at this point?

THE PRESIDENT: I am absolutely convinced if Congress made available \$722 million in military assistance in a timely way by the date that I suggested, or sometime shortly thereafter, the South Vietnamese could stabilize the military situation in Vietnam today.

QUESTION: Mr. President, you keep talking about commitments and promises, and we are getting hung up on these words. In the light of this controversy, why should the Thieu-Nixon correspondence not be released?

THE PRESIDENT: It is not the usual custom for correspondence between heads of state, as I understand it, to be released. I can say from my own experience, not referring to the correspondence to which you refer, that if it is expected that such correspondence will be public, I think on some occasions, or in some instances, you would have to compromise on what you would say. I think that would be true of any correspondence that I received from any other head of state.

If you are going to have a frank, free exchange, I think it has to be between the heads of states.

Now, I have personally reviewed the correspondence to which you refer between President Nixon and President Thieu and I can assure you that there was nothing in any of those communications that was different from what was stated as our public policy.

The words are virtually identical, with some variation, of course, but the intent, the commitments are identical with that which was stated as our country's policy and our country's commitment.

QUESTION: Sir, on that question of your trip to Red China that Mr. Isaacs raised, it seems that down the road it has been speculated that the policy or the purpose of detente is to establish normal diplomatic relations with a country that you described last Thursday as having one-quarter of the population of the world.

That would assume the establishment of an Embassy in Peking, which would automatically assume the de-recognition of some kind of Taiwan. If that is in the cards, what kind of guarantees would you seek, what kind of quid pro quo would you seek from Peking to insure the continued existence of Taiwan?

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THE PRESIDENT: I honestly don't believe that I should discuss, under these circumstances, any of the agenda or any of the details of the continuation of our relations with the People's Republic of China.

We have excellent relations, as I am sure you know, with the Republic of China. We value that relationship. We are concerned, of course, and will continue to be concerned about the Republic of China's security and stability. And it doesn't seem to me at this time in this forum that I should discuss any negotiations that might take place between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

QUESTION: ~~It~~ is our policy for the continued existence and guarantee of the defense of Taiwan. Is that our continuing policy?

THE PRESIDENT: I said, and if I might I would more or less repeat it, we do value that relationship between the United States and the Republic of China. I think that is best indicated by the high level delegation that I sent for the funeral services of Chiang Kai-shek. I believe that having sent Vice President Rockefeller there, with the others that were included, is a clear indication that we consider our relationship, our cooperation with the Republic of China, a matter of very, very great importance to us.

QUESTION: Mr. President, you referred to the tragic situation in Vietnam. It seems to many of us that it flows in part from what is obviously a profound credibility gap between the majority of American citizens and all of the various arms of what we can call the society's establishment.

I include the press in this unease which grips the American people and certainly it is clear that this Administration is regarded by many in the society as uncertain, inconsistent and even confused.

My question, sir, is whether the reports coming to you match this picture that I described in any way?

THE PRESIDENT: If I understand the question, I can -- (Laughter)

QUESTION: I can make it clearer, perhaps.

THE PRESIDENT: Why don't you make it crystal clear? (Laughter)

QUESTION: Sir, the Administration is regarded by many in the American electorate as inconsistent, uncertain and confused.

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THE PRESIDENT: I categorically deny that we are.  
(Laughter)

I must say that if that is the perception, this is not the first Administration that has had that problem.  
(Laughter)

I don't think we are inconsistent and confused in an economic policy. I don't think we are inconsistent and confused on an energy policy. And I don't believe, under any circumstances, that we are inconsistent and confused on foreign policy.

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I would be glad to take them one by one, if you would like me to set forth in detail, but I can assure you that the policies in each of those three major areas are integrated, are fully understood and, in my judgment, are the policies that are in the best interests of the United States.

One of the reasons why I do travel around the country -- and I have been in five or six areas where we have had press conferences, met with newspaper, radio television people -- is to make sure that they get from me and from my Administration the facts, straightforward, firsthand.

If those facts are presented, as we seek to do, I can assure you that the public will be convinced that they are not inconsistent and confused. We intend to continue those policies and that program.

QUESTION: Mr. President, does Secretary Simon have a future in the Ford Administration, or is he going to leave over some policy differences in the economic sphere?

THE PRESIDENT: I have asked Secretary Simon to stay, and he has agreed to stay.

QUESTION: Mr. President, to pick up Mr. Isaac's question, are we fighting inflation or are we fighting recession, and when did we ~~make~~ this transition? (Laughter)

THE PRESIDENT: We are fighting both, and if you go back to the economic summit meetings that we had last September, I think you will find that we said we had a problem in both areas, but in September of 1974, because we were then suffering from 12 to 14 percent inflation on an annual rate, we felt a greater emphasis had to be placed in trying to lick inflation.

At the same time, we fully recognized that there were certain potential dangers with the economic situation, that there were some signals that a recession was moving in on our economy.

In January, when I gave the State of the Union Message and concentrated on the economy and on energy, the situation had changed; inflation was to be less of a problem.

At that time, the rate of inflation, if I recollect, was roughly 9 percent. There had been some improvement.

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On the other hand, we had had tremendous layoffs, a decided increase potentially in the field of unemployment, and so we had to change the emphasis.

I still believe that we have to face the problems of inflation. The rate of inflation, according to the last three reports, the CPI figures indicate were at about 7.2 percent on an annual basis. We have another figure coming out Friday.

I am optimistic it is going to be better, but even if it is better, say the rate of 5 to 6 percent, that is too high, and we are going to do something about it.

On the other hand, we have 8.7 unemployment. That is too high, and we are going to do something about that, and we are encouraged, but it is a two-pronged problem and our policies are aimed at achieving success in both instances. I don't think you can ignore one and overemphasize the other.

QUESTION: Mr. President, going back again to Isaac's question, does it ever occur to you late in the morning that maybe it is the press that is confused and inconsistent? (Laughter)

THE PRESIDENT: Scotty, I think you know me well enough to know that under no circumstances would I make that allegation. (Laughter)

QUESTION: Mr. President, I have a question relating to off-shore oil drilling. We had quite a presentation this morning on energy, and as part of your goal of energy independence for the United States by 1985, the Interior Department is planning to open the Outer Continental Shelf off Southern California to oil exploration at the end of this year and beginning of next year and to full drilling in 1979.

There are about nine to 16 billion barrels of oil out there. Nevertheless, Senators Cranston and Tunney and local officials are saying we don't want you to go this fast because you have not allowed Congress and the people in these areas enough input into these plans.

In fact, the City of Los Angeles is going to sue, I think, if you don't delay the Interior Department's hearings in May, to block those hearings.

My question is, is it still your Administration's belief that those oil reserves off Southern California must be tapped according to the present Interior Department timetable, and that delay would be harmful to the best interests of the United States as a whole?

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THE PRESIDENT: This Administration believes that we must develop the Outer Continental oil fields on all of our coasts -- in Alaska, on the Eastern Seaboard, in the Gulf and off our West Coast. Those potential oil fields are exceedingly important, all of them, to our better invulnerability to a foreign oil cartel decision.

The facts are that in 1974 our domestic production of oil was roughly ten million barrels per day and our foreign oil imports were roughly six million barrels per day. In the short span of less than six months, our domestic production has gone down to about nine million barrels per day, and our dependency on foreign oil imports has gone up to about seven million barrels per day.

The situation is going to get worse, not better, unless we find a way to develop all domestic sources of energy, including the Outer Continental Shelf.

I get very concerned when I see the dangerous trend of our growing dependence and worsening dependence on overseas shipments of oil when at the same time I see some actions that you have indicated that might be taken to preclude the Federal Government from developing Outer Continental sources of oil, when I see other actions of individuals, or groups, or units of Government trying to slow down, and in some instances, stop the installation, and the production of nuclear power plants, when I see other actions in one way or another -- and I don't challenge their motives, I challenge whether it is wise from our Nation's future strength to handicap our development of a sound energy program, which is in our national interest.

I just believe that the United States, the Federal Government, has to proceed according to law in the development of our Outer Continental oil resources on all of our shores, not just in California.

QUESTION: Then I presume that we can assume that the timetable will be adhered to as far as the Outer Continental Shelf off Southern California?

THE PRESIDENT: The timetable will be adhered to, but we will strictly abide by the laws of this country. As far as I know, there is no change in that timetable.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, there have been some conflicting news stories out of Vietnam about the possible, if it is necessary, evacuation of not only Americans but of South Vietnamese nationals from Saigon. Is there any plan or policy about such evacuation?

THE PRESIDENT: I have ordered the evacuation of all nonessential U.S. personnel in South Vietnam and we are phasing down on a daily basis such U.S. personnel who have no responsibilities, either for the Government or for whatever other purpose they are there.

The present plan is to keep those there who have a position of responsibility, a meaningful job. I am not in the position to speculate as to how many that will be, or when there might be a change in the situation.

I think it is too fluid at this moment to make any categorical comment.

QUESTION: That is speaking about Americans, and I think we understand that. But is there any policy about the potential evacuation of South Vietnamese?

THE PRESIDENT: Excuse me. In my speech last Thursday, I indicated there are a number of South Vietnamese who, over a period of almost two decades, have stood with us in various official capacities -- long-time employees of the Federal Government, our Government, who have been dedicated to the cause that not I, but a number of Presidents, have pursued.

I think we have an obligation to them. To the extent that I can, under the law, or hopefully if the law is clarified, I think we have a responsibility to them. But I don't think I ought to talk about an evacuation. I hope we are in a position where we can clarify or stabilize the situation and get a negotiated settlement that wouldn't put their lives in jeopardy.

QUESTION: Mr. President, you have talked a great deal about the moral obligation of this country to provide more military arms for South Vietnam. But what about the moral obligation to the suffering people of that country, the moral obligation to end that war?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Reston, the agreement which was signed, I think, by 12 nations in January of 1973 in Paris -- and I was there, I saw the signing -- was accomplished with the expectation that that war would end.

If the agreement had been lived up to, the war would not now be going on.

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We have continued in various ways to try and achieve a cease-fire and I can assure you that we intend to continue those efforts.

But it is tragic, in my judgment, that what everybody thought was good in January of 1973 has been violated and now we are faced with a terrible catastrophe at the present time.

QUESTION: But would we not then a year from now, or five years from now, still have the same moral obligation you speak of?

THE PRESIDENT: It is my best judgment, based on experts within the Administration, both economic and military, that if we had made available for the next three years reasonable sums of military aid and economic assistance that South Vietnam would have been viable, that it could have met any of its economic problems, could have met any military challenges.

This is another of the tragedies. For just a relatively small additional commitment in economic and military aid, relatively small compared to the \$150 billion that we spent, that at the last minute of the last quarter we don't make that special effort and now we are faced with this human tragedy. It just makes me sick every day I hear about it, read about it and see it.

QUESTION: Mr. President, a political question: You have some interest, I believe, in 1976, and there is some doubt about the wisdom of some of the primary laws that have been enacted.

I wonder, do you place your confidence in the primary laws or do you like the convention system better?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Kirkpatrick, I have always enjoyed a good election contest. I certainly would not lift my hand to try and get any State to do away with a Presidential primary election law.

I think a good contest is helpful for the public, for the candidate, and I would not, under any circumstances, try to undermine the decision of any State to continue its Presidential primary legislation.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. President.

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(AT 2:05 P.M. EDT)