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9:15 A.M. Saturday
~~oval office~~

10/24/75

In the early winter of 1956 Congressman Gerald R. Ford visited Vienna during the Hungarian Revolution. He traveled to the Border and watched the Escapes make their way to safety amidst flying bullets.

~~Later~~ Through mutual Austrian friends he was asked to assist a young Hungarian doctor and his fiancée to enter the United States where they could make their home and qualify under American standards to practice medicine. Ford helped ^(arrange for) them ^{to} come to this country and ^{helped him enroll} ~~saw them~~ ⁱⁿ through the University of Michigan medical school, ~~after which they chose Los Angeles as their home.~~ Dr. Giorgi Sandor has now successfully practiced medicine in ^{Los Angeles} ~~California~~ for 15 years.

Today the President greeted the Sandor Family in the Oval Office. The Sandors now have two children, Steven - and Victoria -. They and their parents are American citizens proud of their Hungarian heritage but fiercely devoted to their adopted country and its democratic ideals.

Viewing the ceremony on the White House lawn at the Reception Thursday for Emperor Hirohito, the Sandors watched their mentor, President Ford greet Japan's Chief of State. "I can't believe I'm here," Doctor Sandor said with deep emotion. "It's like a dream - an American dream come true. Imagine how different our lives might have been if it hadn't been for Jerry Ford."

The Sandors have spent two weeks in Washington showing their children the highlights of the Capitol. "It was a great thrill to have a chance to visit the President in the Oval Office and have an opportunity to thank him again for all he's done for us." said Mrs. Sandor - "The children wanted to thank him too."

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~

DATE 04/06/76

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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WHSR COMMENT:

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SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE

1. TO QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, MARCH 29, ABOUT REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO MR. SONNENFELDT CONCERNING U.S. POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE, THE SECRETARY SAID:

WHAT SONNENFELDT WAS TRYING TO SAY, WAS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE NOW IS UNNATURAL IN THE SENSE OF THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE SOVIET UNION. WHAT HE MEANT WAS A MORE HISTORIC RELATIONSHIP, A RELATIONSHIP IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT SO PRE-DOMINANT.

AS FAR AS THE U.S. IS CONCERNED, WE DO NOT ACCEPT A SPHERE OF INFLUENCE OF ANY COUNTRY, ANYWHERE, AND EMPHATICALLY WE REJECT A SOVIET SPHERE OF INFLUENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE.

TWO PRESIDENTS HAVE VISITED IN EASTERN EUROPE; THERE HAVE BEEN TWO VISITS TO POLAND AND ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA, BY PRESIDENTS. I HAVE MADE REPEATED VISITS TO EASTERN EUROPE, ON EVERY TRIP, AND THEREFORE TO SYMBOLIZE AND TO MAKE CLEAR TO THESE COUNTRIES THAT WE ARE INTERESTED

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~

3no. 6/27/85



*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~*****

DATE 04/06/76

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IN WORKING WITH THEM AND THAT WE DO NOT ACCEPT OR ACT UPON THE EXCLUSIVE DOMINANCE OF ANY ONE COUNTRY IN THAT AREA.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE DO NOT WANT TO GIVE ENCOURAGEMENT TO AN UPRISING THAT MIGHT LEAD TO ENORMOUS SUFFERING. BUT IN TERMS OF THE BASIC POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES, WE DO NOT ACCEPT THE DOMINANCE OF ANY ONE COUNTRY ANYWHERE.

YUGOSLAVIA WAS MENTIONED, FOR EXAMPLE. WE WOULD EMPHATICALLY CONSIDER IT A VERY GRAVE MATTER IF OUTSIDE FORCES WERE TO ATTEMPT TO INTERVENE IN THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF YUGOSLAVIA. WE WELCOME EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DEVELOPING MORE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR NATIONAL TRADITIONS, AND WE WILL COOPERATE WITH THEM. THIS IS THE POLICY OF THE U.S., AND THERE IS NO SONNENFELDT DOCTRINE. KISSINGER

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*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~*****



Sonnenfeldt *Nissen*
Eastern
*Europe*¹

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DPC 65

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS, RADIO AND TELEVISION NEWS BRIEFING
TUESDAY, APRIL 6, 1976, 12:48 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. FUNSETH: Good afternoon. One announcement. At 1:30 this afternoon we will have available in the Press Office the statement by Under Secretary Sisco before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House International Relations Committee. He is scheduled to appear at 1:30. The subject of his statement is the sale of C-130 aircraft to Egypt and the training of Egyptian officers as related to this sale.

I have asked Mr. Sonnenfeldt to come to the briefing today and answer your questions about various leaked versions of what he may have said or did not say about U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. After you have finished questioning Mr. Sonnenfeldt, I will be available to answer questions on other subjects.

But before presenting Mr. Sonnenfeldt to you, I have a few remarks to make. First, the Secretary has asked me to state at this briefing that he has full confidence in Mr. Sonnenfeldt.



Second, our policy toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is as the Secretary has stated it. In the case of Eastern Europe, I refer you to his testimony before the House International Relations Committee on March 29. In the case of the Soviet Union, I refer you to his San Francisco address on February 3.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt did not present a new policy in his classified remarks in London but rather an explanation of this policy.

Third, the classified summary which was leaked was a synopsis of Mr. Sonnenfeldt's classified comments to American Ambassadors stationed in Europe. At that time he presented a classified analysis of the situation in Europe and a classified explanation of our policy, the same policy the Secretary has explained in the two statements cited as well as in other statements.

Such a summary as was leaked was based on notes taken during the briefing and was really a shorthand version of what was said, prepared for officers who are familiar with the policy.

Now I would like to turn to our concern about a process whereby classified cables are leaked and State Department officers are then subjected to public debate

and scrutiny over views they have expressed in confidence. We believe this is a very serious matter. We are concerned about this practice of leaking classified documents for any reason, including in order to either impugn a policy or to impugn officials of this Department, or both. It is a pernicious practice which does grave damage to the policy process as well as to the foreign policy establishment. It reminds us of the early 1950's when our officers and our policies were also impugned with far-reaching damage to the national interests of this country.

As the Secretary noted in his letter to Chairman Pike on October 14, the practice of exposing the positions taken by Foreign Service Officers to ex post facto public examination and recrimination has in the past resulted in gross injustice to loyal public servants, a sapping of morale and abilities of the Foreign Service, and serious damage to the ability of the Administration to formulate and conduct the foreign affairs of this nation.

Now I present Mr. Sonnenfeldt to answer your questions.

Q Bob, I have a couple of question about your statement here. You said you oppose or deplore or object to the leaking of documents to impugn officials or foreign policy. Do you also deplore the leaking of documents to justify policy and to clear officials?

A I said the leaking of classified documents for any purpose.

Q That applies also to justify foreign policy and clear officials?

A For any reason.

Q What if the purpose is simply to further discussion of foreign policy? Do you think that is damaging to the national security?

A I don't think that we have to -- is this country and in this democracy -- base our debate of foreign policy on the leaking of classified documents.

Q If the public is only told about the final result, how can there be any debate if they are not aware of the debate by informed people within the State Department? You just want to give them the results, don't you?

A No. I think if you look back over transcripts of press conferences and testimony before the Congress you will find that State Department officials have certainly responded fully to questions and not just discussed results.

Q Before Mr. Sonnenfeldt begins, do you have any basis here -- are we going to receive the document which has now appeared in about four different forms?

A No.

Q What is your premise then on [inaudible] --

A Because we are not going to release this classified document.

Q Again, why was it classified?

A Because it contained classified information.

Q You're just answering -- you are just using -- there is something wrong with that semantically as well as logically.

A There is nothing wrong with it either semantically or logically.

Q If I ask you why something is classified and your answer is because it contains classified information, you're not quite answering the question. You may not want to. But what is the basis for making the document classified?

A Responsible officials are given the authority to determine when they speak whether that information should properly be classified as either secret or confidential or not be classified at all.

This was a presentation, as you all know, at a discussion before our Ambassadors in a very restricted session in London. And the content of those discussions, in our judgment, was properly classified.

Q Is this any different from the Pentagon Papers, for instance?

A I'm not talking about the Pentagon --

Q Is it your intrinsic right to classify any discussion within the State Department? Is that what you are saying?

A Why of course Executive officials have the right to classify.

Q I didn't know that. I don't think the courts would agree with you, but I am glad to hear you say that.

Q To get back to my original question, I did want to establish what premise you are operating on. You have not disavowed any of the versions that have been described as the official version of what Mr. Sonnenfeldt

said. Mr. Sonnenfeldt is now going to give us his views.

A He is here to answer your questions.

Q But we will not have any authenticated version, although you have not disavowed the two versions that are described as official versions. Your premise here is extremely clouded when you start out.

A That is your premise, but not ours.

Hal.

Q Do you want to take questions, or do you want to say something first?

MR. SONNENFELDT: I just want to say one thing first, that I am always happy to be with you in these surroundings.

Q Are you on the record?

MR. SONNENFELDT: Yes.

And secondly, on the question that has been raised concerning the authenticity of this particular material that appeared in the New York Times this morning, I will only say that I am prepared to accept that material as a reasonable though very compressed version of the discussion that took place in London last December in which I participated. And I will be glad to take your questions on that basis.

Q Hal, do you think the purpose of the leak is to impugn the motives of the State Department, or do you think it is a political --

MR. FUNSETH: Excuse me, I have to interrupt. NBC has said that they are going to bring a camera crew into this briefing. We have never agreed to have TV coverage or recording of these briefings. If they arrive our on-the-record noon briefing will end.

Q What? I'm sorry, I didn't understand.

Q That is high-handed, Bob.

MR. FUNSETH: No it isn't. We have never agreed that this daily briefing shall be covered by TV cameras or recorded. And if in violation of that understanding and practice someone tries to bring in a camera crew, then we will have to stop the briefing. We have never agreed. The Correspondents' Association has sent us a letter, and we have not responded, and we haven't agreed, and I am sorry.

Hal, continue.

Q This is independent of the noon briefing though, is it not?

MR. SONNENFELDT: I think I am a participant in the noon briefing.

Q Can I ask you, what do you think?

MR. SONNENFELDT: Barry, I can't really speculate about people's motives. Obviously some things have been said that have impugned, I suppose, my own or our policy's principles with respect to the issues discussed, but I am not going to speculate about motives.

Q Mr. Sonnenfeldt, the one thing in the summary that seems exceptionable is the advocacy of an organic unity between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

MR. SONNENFELDT: Where do you find that? Where do you find the word "unity"?

Q Organic -- I don't have the text in front of me unfortunately, but there was a phrase in there that seems to advocate some sort of organic oneness, unity, or relationship.

MR. SONNENFELDT: Oneness?

Q That word is not there either.

Q Relationship.

MR. SONNENFELDT: I think that in the context of the discussion, including in the summary itself, but also in the discussions that occurred in London, this word, this term, "organic relationship" was used in contrast to a relationship based totally on power and

force and repression. It was intended to convey a relationship that tolerated independence, autonomy, national identity, all the things that the peoples and countries of Eastern Europe are striving for and which we seek to encourage. The word "organic" was intended to denote a relationship of complexity and of structure and of tolerance rather than a relationship of force and repression. That was the only sense in which it was meant. It had absolutely nothing to do, does not have anything to do, with the word that was invented in one of the columns; namely, the word "unity," and which has subsequently been further modified to say "incorporation" or "integration." That is really the opposite.

Q I understand your point. But don't you think that even an organic relationship is bound to be a kind of implementation of Soviet superiority over Eastern Europe whenever you give way to a certain autonomy?

MR. SONNENFELDT: I am not going to speculate about various possible meanings. The meaning that I attach to it and the meaning that our policy attaches to it, and which we discussed in London, and which is the premise of our whole policy, is to encourage the desires already clearly visible in Eastern Europe for independence, autonomy, and the various aspects of sovereign independence

that I have outlined and that have been repeatedly reaffirmed in joint communiques and Presidential statements, and so on.

If you are referring to the fact that the Soviet Union is nearby and is very large and powerful, that is, of course, correct. There is no way in which these countries can be transplanted. That is why our policy seeks to encourage responsibly the independence of these countries and at the same time to encourage the acceptance by all concerned, including the Soviet Union, of such independence and autonomy.

Q Hal, in one of the statements to which we were referred, the Secretary, I believe, said quite emphatically that we do not accept a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. That seems to me, in spite of everything that you have said defining "organic" in terms of the context of what you are saying, that seems to be, quite radically to be, a contradiction of the thesis that you were advancing.

MR. SONNENFELDT: I think we have never accepted a sphere of influence if by that you mean an exclusive sphere of influence from which all others are excluded. We don't accept that. Our policy doesn't accept that.

That is why Presidents have gone to the region, why we have received leaders from those countries in this country, why we have, along with our allies, all of whom have done similar things, established a whole series of relationships in the political and economic and cultural realm, and so on. So I think it is clearly established that we do not accept that this is a sealed off, exclusive preserve for anyone.

On the other hand, as I say, geographically the Soviet Union is a great power nearby, and that is not something that can be changed because the country simply cannot be transplanted.

That is a problem that was discussed in the State of the World messages, in 1970 in particular, and more briefly in 1971 and 1972. But we do not accept -- the President has made this clear -- a sphere of influence that excludes others from pursuing legitimate objectives in that area.

Jerry.

(Continued on page B-1)

Q Hal, you have been reported to have gone to the Capitol to discuss this matter with some members of Congress and the report is that at a given point, it came to place where you would not give them everything that you said in London, whether the document or the words. How does that square with the Secretary's letter to the Pike Committee that in effect said that junior officers are the ones who will not go up there and be available. But you are a senior officer, and he indicated, as I recall, that senior officers are almost always available.

A Are you now talking about documents or bodies?

Q Both.

A Well, as far as my personal availability, it exists. I have talked, as you have indicated, with individual members of the Congress, both in person and on the telephone, and the question of my further availability is open; if there is some request for an appearance of some kind, we will be glad to consider it.

On the matter of documents, that is a question that has to be considered in each instance. And I am simply not in a position personally to make the judgment

whether a particular Executive Branch document is handed over to an individual Congressman. That is simply not a decision that I can make, whatever my purposes in that regard may be. It is a long established issue that has to be resolved

Q Have you refused to turn over a document based on Executive privilege?

A I have noticed that this morning. That is a term that I don't believe has ever crossed my lips in this particular matter. It couldn't cross my lips because my understanding is that you can only make such a claim if you have the authority of the President, and the issue hadn't been raised in that fashion. When the matter came up -- I don't like to go into private conversations, but as long as a version of it has appeared in the press -- when the matter came up, the position I took was the one that I have just outlined, which is that this raises broader questions that go beyond my authority, and that I would take it up with my superiors, which is what I did.

Q What was the reason for the discussion in London of this subject? In what context did you have to go back and restate American policy on this area?

A The Ambassadorial meetings occur maybe every two years or so. And it is simply an opportunity to review general trends and some underlying assumptions. The discussions are then normally broken down into regional components, or particular countries of interest, and there was on the agenda, which is perfectly normal, a discussion of Eastern Europe, and I thought it desirable to make some general introductory comments before going into the specific question of implementing our well-established policy towards Eastern Europe.

Q Yes, but had anything changed, anything been questioned, any difficulties arisen that required a restatement?

A No, not particularly. The group of Ambassadors was a somewhat different one from the one we met there two years earlier, so I felt it was a good time to discuss some underlying assumptions and thoughts and assessments, and I think everyone present entered into the spirit of that, and then the discussion gradually turned to more specific matters.

Q Mr. Sonnenfeldt --

A Who is going to arbitrate here on these hands that are up?

Q You are.

A All right. Then Ted first.

Q I wonder if you could explain, Hal, what the difference is between a sphere of influence and describing kind of a status quo relationship in which, as you say, the Soviet Union is the major power that has to be dealt with. It is nearby and that cannot be changed. What is the difference between that reality and speaking about a sphere of influence?

A Well, I think, normally, when people speak of a sphere of influence, they have in mind some kind of an exclusive sphere. And that, as I have explained, is not something that we accept. We obviously have to accept that the Soviet Union is nearby and has interests in the area, and has influence in the area.

Q Would you not exclude the description of the Soviet Union as having a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, as long as one leaves out the word "exclusive."

A Well, I think there is certainly Soviet influence there. And it is an area in which Soviet influence is well-known and well established, at least since World War II. But I resist the term only because it has been given particular connotations that our policy

simply does not accept. There used to be a time when sphere of influence had a much vaguer meaning, and was used in a much more porous context. Nowadays, when that word is used, it appears to be given this very, very special quality, and that is a quality that we have not accepted; that is to say, the exclusivity of it.

Q Mr. Sonnenfeldt, it seems there remains some dispute or controversy over the word -- use of the word "organic." And Secretary Kissinger himself has suggested that he didn't care much for the usage. I am wondering if you have changed, in the light of the discussion, or of the passing of the months, whether you have changed your view of this word, particularly, and this is the second part of my question -- if the tenor that I read in that summary is that the United States should contribute, should help, should assist the Soviet Union and its East European allies to develop a more natural, a more organic, a less military-based relationship, it would seem to defy at least some tenets of chemistry and biology, not to say politics. That is that we should -- an outside force should even be in a position to assist in the development of organic relationships.

A You mean it should be an exclusive sphere of Soviet influence?

Q No, I am not saying it should be. I am saying it defies my concept of chemistry, biology, and of politics.

A Well, as far as the word "organic" is concerned, obviously since it has acquired a meaning which is -- in this discussion -- which was clearly not mine, and was not the intended one, I regret that that has happened. I will certainly take care that this word will go to the same place where certain other words that define U.S.-Soviet relations have recently gone. [Laughter.]

Q Will you treat it with benign neglect?

A It is a word that I had on occasion used in the past to describe this process of normalization and acceptance of autonomous and independent existence.

Now, it is a process, and obviously it is not something that we are in a position to foist on countries or on an area. We respond to tendencies and impulses, and desires and pressures that already exist. And we try to encourage those as responsibly as we can, but it is obviously not something that we can implant.

So, I don't particularly accept your rendition of our being helpmates to these countries.

We are in a position, our policy is in a position, of encouraging as responsibly as we can, but also as consistently as we can, the trends that, and the tendencies and the impulses that I have described.

Q Hal, what does that word "responsibly" mean, when you use that word?

A It has something to do with what the Secretary said in his testimony. For example, if we were to be in a position of fostering uprisings, I don't think that would be responsible.

Murrey.

Q I would like to ask a question, but with this preface, with all due respect to you and the dilemma you are in here. On this basis, I find this whole procedure here bizarre. You have accepted as a premise a summation which appeared in The New York Times, and with all due respect to the New York Times, with a mass of typographical error, which is not unusual --

A Yes, I regret that.

Q -- I find it impossible here, in terms of any reasonable discourse, to ask you questions intelligently,

to which you can intelligently respond, based on a summary which I can't quite read, which is officially disavowed by the State Department, as are all classified summaries, and on that confused basis, let me attempt to ask you this question. [Laughter.]

Q The second edition is much clearer.

Q Can you wait until we go up to New York and get it?

Q Can you declassify it?

A Let Murrey ask his question, please.

Q The whole premise of the dispute, as I understand it, revolves around statements which have appeared which give the impression that you expressed regret that the Soviet Union did not have a different kind of relationship with Eastern European countries.

The impression has been given that you were saying it is unfortunate that the Soviet Union did not have a tighter, more organic hold over these countries.

I understand that is what you are disavowing. What is less clear is, what it is you are expressing such regret about in terms of the Soviet relationship, and what it is you are advocating that the United States should encourage the Soviet Union to do in its

relationship toward Eastern Europe.

A Well, the regret that I have felt and expressed has to do with the fact that the desires as expressed by the peoples of Eastern Europe have been for thirty years in many ways suppressed and repressed and that the general principles of nationhood and international relationships have not had their fruition in that part of the world.

That is cause for regret, particularly when this takes the form of the events of 1956 or '68, etc. I mean, the use of force, tanks and armies, and so on.

So that is a reason for expressing regret, for considering that tragic events have occurred in that part of the world.

We are not -- I am not -- our policy is not here to give advice. Our policy is intended to do what an outside power reasonably can to encourage the normal evolution in that part of the world. And it is obviously an issue that concerns many millions of Americans, in particular because of their origin, and it is for that reason also that I must say that I have deplored the debate that has occurred here for the last two weeks or so, because many of these fellow-countrymen of ours

have been given the impression that their government strives to insure the incorporation of these countries of their heritage and origin in the Soviet Union, when in fact the policy of this Government is to encourage independence and national sovereignty, and a normal life and normal international relationships for those countries.

Now, I do not know whether that answers your question, but, anyway, that is the purpose of our policy and all the things that we have said and done.

Q I would like to just follow that up by asking this. Can you amplify at all on why you said "This presents a greater danger than anything that could happen in the East-West context" -- namely, the danger of hostilities -- I assume you are speaking of an uprising between or in Eastern Europe -- presents a greater danger than the normal kinds of conflict the U.S. looks at in terms of Europe.

A This is one of the places where summarized versions are very compressed. I don't want now to try to go into the situation in any particular country, but there is obviously under the surface instability in this part of the world, and it has on many occasions surfaced

with tragic consequences. And, therefore, it is something that one needs to be concerned about as time goes on.

It is our general assumption that the East-West demarcation line is on the whole relatively stable because of the balance of forces that exists through NATO in Central and Western Europe. But the concern has to be that any kind of explosion in the Eastern part of Europe might have spill-over effects, and that was really the general thought that was being expressed.

Q Hal, could you just say -- has anything changed in that regard? Is there any strain in the Soviet relationship?

A Not particularly, no. And, again, I stress the discussion in London was not occasioned by any particular event, but was just a normal discussion of trends and assumptions.

Q Well, Hungary in '56 had no spill-over effect. What sort of thing are you envisaging?

A I cannot tell you precisely. There is that potential.

Q Do you have Yugoslavia specifically in mind here?

A Well, I would rather not discuss particular

instances right now. Our view with respect to Yugoslavia was stated by the Secretary the other day, also, but I really don't want to go into specific details.

Yes, Hank.

Q Hal, this sounds like a simplistic question but I am trying to comprehend the nuances here. Are you saying that the relationship between the Soviet Union and the East European countries should evolve in a way that slowly develops greater political freedom for them while satisfying Soviet perceptions of strategic interest?

A I hate for you to say what I am saying.

What I am saying is what I said --

Q I am trying to --

A -- well, I think that is one way to put it, but I wouldn't necessarily phrase it precisely that way.

I repeat again, that these issues have been discussed authoritatively in the State of the World Messages, and there is no particular change from those perceptions.

Q Hal --

A Can we cut this down to a very few more because I have to go.

Q May I pick up one of the original questions?

On the basis of what you are saying, it becomes increasingly difficult to understand what is classified.

You have been talking about your position. You are taking the questions here. You are setting forth, as you see, the American policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

I am befuddled as to what dictates classification of that speech to the Ambassadors.

A I would really rather prefer not to parçè each sentence that has appeared in the newspapers, and tell you which sentence is classified and which is not -- which word is classified and which is not.

Basically, however, Bernie, in my view at least what is involved here is that this was a private and confidential discussion among American Ambassadors and senior officials from Washington. It seems to me that is the sort of discussion that ought to be preserved in privacy. The Government has ample opportunity to lay out its policy views, both in the process of formulation in following decisions in an unclassified manner and the great variety of forums that we have for that purpose. But I really do think that without now going into a specific justification of any given word or any given sentence, this Government and this Department and its officials must be in a position to conduct their

business with a certain degree of discretion and privacy and must be able to talk about their assumptions and the policy implications with a certain degree of confidentiality. And that is my particular concern in having these discussions in this form, appear in the public domain.

I have not been shy, certainly, in talking to many of you, either in open forums or in other ways. Certainly the Government, the Secretary of State, the President -- lots of people have laid these things out. This is a particular format and a particular type of discussion that I really do believe deserves privacy, or we will totally destroy the processes of policy formulation and policymaking, and free discussion.

Q If I can just follow that up on --

A There is a gentleman there -- a person here who hasn't asked one yet.

Q Neither have I.

A Oh, go ahead, please, and then --

Q I want to go more closely to the mechanics of the problem that Mr. Funseth complained about -- leaks which came up with what he called "distorted material."

We were told that the Secretary told the Committee on the Hill that the problem was that a junior notetaker took notes, and that these were perhaps wrong -- and that another junior compiled the telegram and that this was wrong -- and then Nessen said that you drafted the telegram.

A But he corrected that.

Q But aside from that, it seems to me -- Why didn't you tape the thing, instead of having juniors taking notes -- and then if it leaks, it leaks accurately.

A I realize that I have a longstanding experience with tapes, but it is not something that I -

Q I am not insinuating any relationship.

A No, but I don't really want to go into the mechanics of how an Ambassador's meeting is run -- and I don't want to go into the details of the providence of these summaries, or cables, and so on. I am here to talk substance with you, and there isn't really much light I can shed on the particular process.

Q I'm sorry -- I wanted to ask a question somewhat similar to that -- but basically what it was was

It was first explained to us that the contents of the specific quotes from the briefing were inaccurate and distorted -- and the Secretary reiterated that -- Mr. Funseth reiterated that.

Are you saying today that substantially, the quotes, though compressed, and there have been compressions, are reasonably accurate?

A I have said that at the outset.

Q Yes.

A But I have stressed that it is a summary and that it is not verbatim and that it is compressed, and therefore words appeared that were not necessarily used in speech on the occasion. But I am prepared to accept this as a reasonable rendition -- although truncated and compressed -- of what transpired there and that is why I am taking your question on that basis.

Q Could I then ask, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, why there has been a change from "distortion and inaccuracy" to "a reasonable presentation?"

A Well, I think that distortions have appeared. I pointed out earlier that the word "unity" was

invented and inserted into one of the articles.

The word "permanent" was, likewise, invented and inserted.

There was a portion about Yugoslavia which you may look at, although I believe it is garbled in The New York Times which you may look at, which was given almost the opposite meaning of what was said.

There were subsequent paraphrases and speeches referring to slaves and incorporation into the Soviet Union, and things of that kind -- all of which I would consider misconstructions, if not distortions. So I think that is what was addressed.

Q How much of the controversy around this in the past couple of weeks is somewhat reminiscent of what went on during the European Security Conference, or just prior to the European Security Conference?

Well just in view of your --

A Do you mean the substance of it?

Q Yes, the debate.

-- in view of your statement that much of what you said at this meeting reflects statements that have been publicly stated and stated in "World Reports" and in other speeches -- to what do you attribute this

controversy that is raised over this, in the last couple of weeks?

A Don't ask me to dissect the anatomy of this controversy because I think it would be apparent to you that the manner in which these thoughts have been presented in public discourse was bound to be extraordinarily distressing to the public at large. But in particular to millions of people in this country -- not to mention the countries in Eastern Europe as well.

Q Do you think it was politically motivated?

A I am not going to go into motivations.

And I deplore that. I really do, because I think it is an injustice to these people to arouse their concerns and anxieties in this fashion.

I have tried, here, to restate the policy. I strongly urge you to reread the President's speech at Helsinki.

There should not have been such implications and I regret it -- and I repeat here if the word "organic" contributed to that, I can assure you that it will not do so in future.

Q would you say -- in a sort of summation here -- would you say that the policy followed by the

Nixon-Ford Administrations toward Eastern Europe differs and in what degree, from the previous Administrations policy toward Eastern Europe?

A I think that the principles of American policy have evolved along similar lines.

I recall in an earlier administration, a Secretary of State said that we should treat different Communists differently -- and our policies evolved along those lines.

I think that in the last seven years, our policies have become more active and more intensive to wit, including the first visits, ever, to this part of the world by Presidents of the United States in office -- as well as Secretaries of State and numerous other Cabinet Officers; and visits of leaders of those countries to this country.

So I think the policies are more intensive and more extensive.

They are also geared to particular conditions prevailing in each of the countries.

That, I think, fairly describes what has been hapening in this area.

May I leave you now, because I have to go to an official function ?

Q Thank you, thank you, very much.

A Thank you.

[Mr. Sonnenfeld withdrew from the briefing]

[Responses by Mr. Funseth.]

MR. FUNSETH: O.K.

Q A question on the mechanics before we start, please.

If this was an ON THE RECORD, why were television cameras and tape recorders not allowed?

A Because it was part of our regular briefing Dick. We have not agreed --

Q Well perhaps you not aware that the Correspondents' Association has approved, and not only approved, insisted -- that the daily briefings, the regular briefings be opened to cameras and to tape recorders.

A I am aware of that.

Q There was a lengthy grace period extended to the new Spokesman --

A We have not agreed to that

Q -- to provide official on the record -- and you should be alerted that the issue will now be forced.

A We are aware of the issue and we have not agreed to that request.

Q Bob, since the barring of cameras, I think, is an element of this story, can you also tell us --

A It is not a "barring of cameras." This is part of our --

Q It certainly is a barring of cameras.

A -- this is part of our daily briefing. We have never had TV camera coverage or recordings made of this briefing.

Q All right, the continued exclusion of cameras, I think, is an element of the story.

And to complete that element a little -- to give us a little more on that, can you tell me to whom in the Government and elsewhere, this briefing is being communicated live?

Who else is listening to this briefing? What other departments, agencies -- is the Secretary of State tuned in, or what?

A I don't believe so. There are some offices in the building, as well as mine, you know, that have speakers. And I believe the Press Room at USUN in New York and the Press Room at the National Press Club also have speakers.

Q Now will the foreign embassies be permitted to come in to read, at least transcripts of the briefing?

A They are always allowed to come in and read transcripts of the briefing. It's an ON THE RECORD briefing.

This briefing today is no different than the briefing yesterday, as far as I am concerned.

Q It certainly is.

Q May I ask, Bob, why it is that the decision then was made to have Mr. Sonnenfeldt come to this briefing rather than holding a separate news conference at which cameras would have been permitted?

A There was a great deal of interest in this question. I thought that I was being responsive in inviting him down to attend this briefing and answer your questions directly.

Q May I ask why it would not have been equally, if not more responsive, to have simply classified it as a "News Conference?"

A Because it was not a news conference. It was part of this daily briefing.

Q I am asking you on what basis it was made

a part of this briefing -- and you are telling me "to be responsive" and I am suggesting to you that it might have been even more responsive had you classified it as a news conference.

A Well, it was not a news conference. It was part of this briefing.

Q I understand. So would you explain --

A And I must say that if you are going to raise that question, then we will have to reopen the whole practice of trying to be responsive in bringing officials down to answer your questions at the briefing.

Q In that case I must say, Bob, that your suggestion is that you are doing us a favor -- and I reject that suggestion.

A No, I am not saying --

Q This is at least as useful to the Department of State as it is to those of us gathered here, and I reject the implication of your doing us a personal favor by bringing Mr. Sonnenfeldt down here.

A You are making the implication. I am not.

Q No, sir. You were making the implication. I was drawing the inference.

A I reject what you have said.

Q About what?

A I was trying to be responsive.

Q A follow up --

A If you do not accept my explanation, that is your privilege. But that was our purpose in having him down.

[Continued on Page D-1]

Q Bob, the summary that Mr. Sonnenfeldt said at the outset was a pretty reasonable summation. Were you, in your opening comments, condemning the leak of a document that obviously leaked from this building?

A Why is it obviously leaked from this building? I reject that categorically.

Q Do you deny it?

A I reject it. There is no proof from where that piece of paper leaked.

Q Who else has copies of it?

A It is a classified cable which probably was circulated on a limited basis throughout the Government, as are most classified cables. It was a circular cable to all diplomatic posts.

Q But other parts of the Government here in Washington had it?

A I would assume so, yes.

Q Do you know where it was leaked from?

A Excuse me?

Q Do you know where it was leaked from?

A No, I do not.

Q Then how do you reject categorically that it was leaked from this building?

A Because it has not been demonstrated that it has been.

Q The point is: How can you reject that it has if you don't know?

A John made a flat statement that it was leaked from this building, and I do not believe that he has any basis for making that statement.

Q But, there's a certain Alice in Wonderland-ish kind of quality about all of this. You're rejecting a flat statement that one person makes with an equally flat statement of your own, and this seems to me that you don't have any more ability to make that statement than the original one. How can you reject the statement if you don't know where the leak came from?

A All right, I will correct my statement. I will say that there is no basis for making the allegation that John did that the cable was leaked from this building. However --

Q Might you reject the fact that it was leaked from the building? Do you deny that it was leaked from

this building -- flatly?

A No, I cannot deny that --

Q Bob --

A -- but it cannot be said that it was.

Q Well, have you made any effort to find out if it was leaked from this building?

A I do not think I am in a position to comment on procedures taken in investigations of this kind.

Q There is an investigation?

Q You went through a long routine about the Atherton leak --

A Yes.

Q -- and there was a memo issued by Mr. Eagleburger afterwards.

Q Is there an investigation under way?

A Any time a classified document is leaked from this building -- or any time a classified document is leaked (laughter) -- a classified document which came, or originated in this building, is leaked, it is taken very seriously.

Q What are you investigating now? Are you investigating three leaks or four now? How many of them are

you investigating? You must have a great many people conducting these investigations.

Have you asked whether anyone from the Seventh Floor leaked the document that you say was leaked?

I don't regard it as leaked; it's so much in the public domain at this point the whole thing gets preposterous, because here we have the Counselor of the State Department giving us a press briefing on a leaked document -- by your terminology -- but if there is an investigation going on, I would like to know who is conducting it.

A It would be conducted by the Department, obviously.

Q Bob, you're talking about an investigation under way. That came up as a question. Then you're talking about it being taken very seriously. Now, why don't you help us out and just simply clear up this ambiguity so we can go on to something else?

Is there an investigation or not, beyond taking it very seriously -- can you help us on that, please?

A I will take that question.

Q We can go on to something else?

A If you would like to.

Q David McGinnes?

A I believe the Civil Service Commission has issued a statement on that, and I would refer you to the Civil Service Commission as well as to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Q Is there going to be anything in connection with that story from you -- from here at the State Department?

A No.

Q There will be nothing from here?

A No.

Q Bob, the Secretary has no comment on it?

A Correct. The Civil Service Commission has, I believe, issued a statement.

Q Well, that's going to go to the substance. Do you also have no comment on the way the event was reported in the press? Do you think it was reported fairly?

A I would just refer you to the Civil Service Commission statement.

Q Do you have it in front of you?

A No.

Q Do you have that statement available here?

A No, I do not have it.

Q Bob, do you have anything new on the situation in Lebanon -- particularly with regard to the fact that you had yesterday no hard evidence. I think the word was "hard" -- confirmed evidence --

A Concrete.

Q -- concrete evidence of Syrian intervention. Do you have any evidence now of Syrian intervention into Lebanon?

A I have nothing to add from yesterday. I have no change.

Q Bob, do you have any guidance on Soviet pilots in Cuba?

A No. I have seen those reports and I understand that the Defense Department said something about such reports, but I do not have anything beyond that.

Q Any Cubans in Mozambique?

Q Question?

Q Cubans in Mozambique -- question mark?

A There have been unconfirmed reports of arrivals of Cuban military personnel in Mozambique, but I am not aware of any confirmation of those reports.

Q How many?

A I do not have numbers.

Q Whatabout Soviet advisers in Mozambique?

A I have seen unconfirmed reports about that as well, but --

Q All right, Bob --

Q Excuse me. Are these new reports?

A No.

Q They're old reports?

A Old reports.

Q Bob, when you refer to reports, because this comes up again and again on different occasions, you're not telling us about the reports we've seen in the press. Are you telling us about the reports to the Government?

A I am not going to identify --

Q Without identifying.

A -- country by country, but, generally,

obviously, we have unconfirmed reports that are both public and private.

Q Bob, about a month ago I asked a number of questions about the possible presence of around 600 Cubans in another part of Africa, Somalia. You took the question about four times, and now a month later there have been some more published reports saying about the same thing. Do you have any further confirmation or non-confirmation?

A I checked that as recently as yesterday on Somalia, John, and I have still not received confirmed reports.

Q You have unconfirmed reports about the Somalia thing as well, is that right?

A We have jumped around. Let me just try to wrap it up. What we have been talking about are reports that have indicated within the past year that there have been Cuban military personnel in as many as a dozen countries around the world, and in quantities varying from a small number of advisers to the thousands of Cuban troops in Angola.

My understanding at the present time is that it is public knowledge that there are Cuban military personnel

in the Congo, whose capital is Brazzaville; Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau, as well as in Angola.

Now, in addition, there have been unconfirmed reports of the arrival of Cuban military personnel, in addition to Somalia and Mozambique, of which we have spoken here today, Equatorial Guinea.

Q Go back to Mozambique and Somalia.

A Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, Somalia; and also there have been reports of arrival of Cuban military personnel in South Yemen. That is the wrapup that I have. I do not have anything beyond that.

Q Some reports refer to what?

A Both public and private.

Q You mean from other diplomatic sources you are talking about.

A I mean official as well as public.

Q Official American?

A That is right.

Q You are not reading back the AP wire?

A No.

Q Or UPI?

A I don't mind. But I am including them as public reports.

Q Bob, is this the same list DOD put out a few weeks ago?

A Who did?

Q The Department of Defense.

A I do not know.

Q When you referred to Cuban military personnel, you are making no distinction here between military advisers attached to an Embassy and battalions of troops?

A I said that there were reports about both. They vary from small numbers of Cuban military advisers to the Cuban troops in Angola.

Q Right, but when you are referring to additional countries here I have no way of knowing whether you are referring to reports that Cuba sent two military advisers to Equatorial Guinea or a regiment.

A I do not have that kind of precision in the information I have received, Murrey.

Q Does the information you have tell us to what extent the Russians are entwined with these interventions, in all or some?

A No. Obviously what is known in Angola, but not beyond that.

Q In the others the Cubans could be totally self-starters?

A It could be, but I am not saying it necessarily is.

Q Were these reports in any way what motivated the Secretary to issue any of his several warnings to the Cubans about further adventures in Africa?

A I honestly do not know, but I think what he really was directly referring to was the presence of the 13,000 Cuban expeditionary force in Angola and any repetition of the Angolan adventure.

Q In the interest of comprehensiveness, perhaps we should ask you about a report which has appeared in the Post for the last two days about Cubans on the Chinese border. It appears on the same page as Jack Anderson's column.

(Laughter)

A Is this a serious question, or are you teasing? (Laughter)

Q I am just trying to cover all the countries. You seem to have run down all the other countries we can think of.

A I do not have anything on that.

Q Bob, do you have anything on U.S. reaction to the developments in China?

A No.

Q Bob, do you have anything on the replacement of -- this AP story that ran yesterday about Crimmins coming to replace William Rogers?

A I have nothing on those reports.

Q Okay, but is it true? AP ran this story saying that Ambassador Crimmins is going to Washington to replace --

A I just don't have anything on reports speculating about personnel changes.

Q Bob, I would like to make a point as to where you can help us in the future. It seems to me maddening for there to be a small gazetteer of countries listed about where Cuban military personnel might be without any relationship, as Murrey had suggested, as to numbers of Cubans. It would be helpful in the future if there is this kind of a rundown to get some indication of military strengths numerically.

A Does that mean that if I cannot that I shouldn't answer the question?

Q Perhaps in many cases you can. And if you can [inaudible] --

A I have provided you with the information that I have.

Q Bob, there has got to be more information in this building about numbers going to these countries, if you want to continue this debate. Otherwise, they are sending you out here unarmed.

Q It would be useful to know when these reports came in. Some of the countries on the list are new, particularly Equatorial Guinea and South Yemen.

A Let me check into that, try to obtain the timeframe.

Q Thank you, Bob.

[The briefing was concluded at 1:50 p.m.]

State Dept. Summary of Sonnenfeldt Remarks

WASHINGTON, April 5—Following is the official State Department summary of remarks made by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, counselor to the department, at a meeting in London last December of American ambassadors in Europe.

We are witnessing the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower on a global scale. This will be a long-term process. It is a process that is just beginning in global terms as the Soviets are just now breaking out of their continental mold. They are just now developing modalities for carrying out such a global policy.

The reason why it is possible for the United States and its Western European allies to develop the policies that will allow us to cope with this situation is that Soviet power is developing irregularly. It is subject to flaws and to requirements which in some cases only the outside world can meet.

Their thrust as an imperial power comes at a time well after the period when the last imperial power, Germany, made the plunge, and it hence comes at a time when different rules and perceptions apply. The Soviets have been inept. They have not been able to bring the attractions that past imperial powers brought to their conquests. They have not brought the ideological, legal,

cultural, architectural, organizational and other values and skills that characterized the British, French and German adventures.

Tensions in the System
In addition, there are serious underlying pressures and tensions in the Soviet system itself.

The base from which imperialism asserts itself has serious problems in the economic and social sectors. There are also internal nationalist groups which are growing. Non-Russian nationalist groups in Russia are growing at a disproportionately faster rate, which will add to these tensions in the base whence springs Soviet imperialism.

The Soviets have been particularly unskilled in building viable international structures. They have nothing approaching the European Community or the many other successful Western institutions. In Eastern Europe particularly, the single most important unifying force is the presence of sheer Soviet military power. There has been no development of a more viable, organized structure.

If anything, the last 30 years have intensified the urges in Eastern European countries for autonomy, for identity. There has been an intensification of the desire to break out of the Soviet straitjacket. This has happened in every Eastern Eu-

ropean country to one degree or another. There are almost no genuine friends of the Soviets left in Eastern Europe, except possibly Bulgaria.

Power at the Core

The Soviets' inability to acquire loyalty in Eastern Europe is an unfortunate historical failure, because Eastern Europe is within their scope and area of natural interest. It is doubly tragic that in this area of vital interest and crucial importance it has not been possible for the Soviet Union to establish roots of interest that go beyond sheer power.

It is, therefore, important to remember that the main, if not the only, instrument of Soviet imperialism has been power. The reason we can today talk and think in terms of dealing with Soviet imperialism, outside of and in addition to simple confrontation, is precisely because Soviet power is emerging in such a flawed way. This gives us the time to develop and to react. There is no way to prevent the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower. What we can do is affect the way in which that power is developed and used. Not only can we balance it in the traditional sense, but we can affect its usage—and that is what detente is all about.

It is often asked how detente is doing. The question itself evades the central issue we are trying to pose, that is, what do you do in the face of increasing Soviet power? We will be facing this increased power if our relationship with the Russians is sour. The day when the U.S. could choose its preferences from two alternatives is over. That is, turning our back on the world—usually behind the protection of another power like the British navy—or changing the world. That choice no longer exists for us. There is too much power in the world for us to ignore, not just the Soviets, but other industrial powers, raw-material producers, and even the combined political power of the dwarf states. Nor do we today have enough power to simply overwhelm these problems.

The Persistent Challenge

So the Soviets will be seen and heard on the world stage no matter what we do. Therefore, the question of whether or not detente is up or down at a particular moment is largely irrelevant. We Americans like to keep score cards, but the historic challenge of the Soviet Union will not go away and the problem of coping with the Soviet power also won't go away.

We don't have any alternative except to come to grips with the various forms of power which surround us in the world. We have to get away from seeing detente as a process which appeases or propitiates Soviet power. We have to see our task as managing or domesticating this power.

That is our central problem in the years ahead, not finding agreements to sign or atmospheres to improve, although those have some effect. Our challenge is how to live in a world with another superpower, and anticipate the arrival of a third superpower, China, in 20 years or so.

The debate in the United States on detente is illustrat-

ed by comments that Soviet trade is a one-way street. It seems that today you can't just get payment for the goods you sell your must get Jewish emigration, or arms restraint, or any number of other things.

Our European friends have extended considerable credit to the Soviets and Eastern European countries, while the U.S. does not extend lines of credit but, rather, approves financing on the basis of each project. That feature gives us some control over the direction of Soviet economic development. The Europeans have surrendered on this point. While not falling into the trade trap, we have seen trade as a set of instrumentalities to address the set of problems we face with the Soviets. We have to find a way to develop a coherent trade strategy that goes beyond the commercial views of individual firms.

The grain agreement is a good but narrow example of what I am talking about. The Soviets were forced to accept that they need substantial imports from the United States. That gives us leverage, but only if it is done within a coherent framework of policies to achieve certain objectives. M.F.N. [most-favored-nation treatment] has been considered a concession to the U.S.S.R., and in a sense it is. The Soviets don't like paying interest—they prefer to earn their way as they go.

If this is an accurate assessment, then with M.F.N. and credit policies we can get the U.S.S.R. to be competitively engaged in our U.S. markets. If done skillfully, this forced them to meet the requirements of the sophisticated U.S. market. If done skillfully, this forced them to meet the requirements of the sophisticated U.S. market. M.F.N. entry into U.S. markets can have an impact on Soviet behavior. This is not a trivial matter.

It is in our long-term interests to use these strengths to break down the autarchic nature of the U.S.S.R. There are consumer choices being made in the U.S.S.R. that, although more below the surface than those in the United States, can be exploited.

This is just one illustration. There are many assets in the West in this area and instead of looking at them as just commercial sales, we need to be using them to draw the Soviet Union into a series of dependencies and ties with the West. It is a long-term project.

When we lost the M.F.N. battle with Congress, we lost as we were able to do in the case of the grain deal. This is the real tragedy of losing that trade issue. In the long term, we have suffered a setback.

Influence on East Europe

With regard to Eastern Europe, it must be in our long term interest to influence events in this area—because of the present unnatural relationship with the Soviet Union sooner or later explode, causing World War III. This inorganic, unnatural relationship is a far greater danger to world peace than the conflict between East and West. There is one qualification to this statement. If Western Europe becomes so concerned with its economic and social problems that an imbalance develops, then perhaps

the dangers of the United States' interests will be endangered by the simple change in the balance of power.

So it must be our policy to strive for an evolution that makes the relationship between the Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one. Any excess of zeal on our part is bound to produce results that could reverse the desired process for a period of time, even though the process would remain inevitable within the next 100 years. But, of course, for us that is too long a time to wait.

So our policy must be a policy of responding to the clearly visible aspirations in Eastern Europe for a more autonomous existence within the context of a strong Soviet geopolitical influence. This has worked in Poland. The Poles have been able to overcome their romantic political inclinations which led to their disasters in the past. They have been skillful in developing a policy that is satisfying their needs for a national identity without arousing Soviet reactions. It is a long process.

A similar process is now going on in Hungary. János Kadar's performance has been remarkable in finding ways which are acceptable to the Soviet Union, which develop Hungarian roots and the natural aspirations of the people. He has conducted a number of experiments in the social and economic areas. To a large degree he has been able to do this because the Soviets have four divisions in Hungary and, therefore, have not been overly concerned. He has skillfully used their presence as a security blanket for the Soviets, in that has been advantageous to the development of his own country.

The Rumanian picture is different, as one would expect from their different history. The Rumanians have striven for autonomy, but they have been less daring and innovative in their domestic systems. They remain among the most rigid countries in the internal organization of their system.

The Yugoslavian Position

We seek to influence the emergence of the Soviet imperial power by making the base more natural and organic so that it will not remain founded in sheer power alone. But there is no alternative open to us other than that of influencing the way Soviet power is used.

Finally, on Yugoslavia, we and the Western Europeans, indeed, the Eastern Europeans as well, borders on the vital for us in continuing the independence of Yugoslavia from Soviet domination. Of the way we accost behavior will continue to be, as it has been in the past, influenced and constrained by Soviet power. But any shift back by Yugoslavia into the Soviet orbit would represent a major step concerned about what appears, and it is worrying us a good deal.


So our basic policy continues to be that which we have pursued since 1948-49, keeping Yugoslavia in a posture from the Soviet Union. Now at the same time we would like them to be less obnoxious, and we should allow them to get away with very little. We should especially disabuse them of any notion that our interest in their relative independence is greater in our own and, therefore, they have a freidre.



Speaker
Green

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 9, 1976

MEMO FOR: BUD McFARLANE
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

Attached is the documentation of the President's policy toward Eastern Europe. Following a two-page summary are tabs containing the various public statements and messages on the subject. I think this would be useful for Ron Nessen to have and I would suggest that he also give a set to the PFC for their use.

Administration Position

The President said on April 2, 1976:

"It is the policy of the United States and it has been my policy ever since I entered public life to support the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe, with whom we have such close ties of culture as well as blood, by every proper and by every peaceful means.

"My policy, America's policy, toward Eastern Europe is fully, clearly and formally documented. It is a creative and cooperative policy toward the nations of Eastern Europe. It is the policy that embraces our most important ideals as a nation.

"I have followed this policy in my visits to Eastern Europe and in my meetings with Eastern European leaders here as well as overseas. Our policy in no sense -- and I emphasize this -- in no sense accepts Soviet dominion of Eastern Europe. . . . Nor is it in any way designed to permit the consolidation of such dominion. On the contrary, the United States seeks to be responsive to and to encourage as responsibly as possible the desires of Eastern Europeans for greater autonomy, independence and more normal relations with the rest of the world.

"This is the policy that I will continue to pursue with patience, with firmness and with persistence -- a policy from which the United States will not waiver."

Presidential Documents

Vol. 12, No. 15, pp. 537-538

The United States interest in Eastern Europe is due not only to considerations of foreign policy but also to the fact that millions of Americans' ancestral homelands, relatives and friends are there. The President believes that efforts to settle political conflicts and improve relations with the countries of Eastern Europe contributes to their peaceful evolution toward more openness and to their efforts to define their own roles as sovereign nations in the affairs of Europe.

The President's policy toward Eastern Europe is fully, clearly, and formally documented.* It is a policy of positive action and a policy embracing America's most important ideals. It is a policy the President has repeated in messages to Americans of Estonian, Lithuanian and Ukrainian ancestry in



recent months. The United States strongly supports the aspirations for freedom and national independence of peoples everywhere -- including the peoples of Eastern Europe. The President is totally opposed to so-called spheres of influence by any power. He has manifested this policy in his visits to Eastern Europe and in his meetings with Eastern European leaders in the United States.

United States policy in no sense accepts Soviet "dominion" of Eastern Europe nor is it in any way designed to seek the consolidation of such "dominion." On the contrary, the United States seeks to be responsive to, and to encourage as responsibly as possible, the desires of East Europeans for greater autonomy, independence and more normal relations with the rest of the world.

Administration Actions

The Administration has capped a decade of improving relations with Romania with the negotiation of a trade agreement that will promote the continued development of mutually beneficial economic ties and thereby bring the structure of our economic relations into accord with the very satisfactory state of our political relations. These relations have been advanced further by President Ford's wide-ranging discussions with President Ceausescu in Washington and Bucharest.

President Ford's talks with Polish First Secretary Gierk in Washington in October 1974 and again in Warsaw in July 1975 have affirmed the desire we share for further improvements in relations between our two countries, and have provided for the further development of commercial, economic, cultural, scientific and technological cooperation.

The President's meetings with Yugoslav leaders have provided a welcome opportunity to assess continued progress in our bilateral relations, including the substantial growth of trade in recent years. We have reaffirmed our mutual intention to encourage cooperation, not only in bilateral matters but also for the preservation and consolidation of peace.

The President's meetings with ethnic leaders in the United States have provided welcome occasions for a discussion of U. S. policy toward Eastern Europe.

* Tab A -- Remarks of the President to the Polish-American Congress
September 24, 1976

Tab B -- President's Captive Nations Week Proclamation
July 2, 1976




Tab C -- President's Message to American Latvian Association
April 27, 1976

Tab D -- President's Remarks to Greater Milwaukee Ethnic Organizations
April 2, 1976

Tab E -- President's Message to Americans of Lithuanian Ancestry
February 26, 1976

Tab F -- Statement by the President on Policy Toward Eastern Europe
July 25, 1975



OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
TO THE
NATIONAL QUADRENNIAL CONVENTION
OF THE POLISH-AMERICAN CONGRESS

THE BENJAMIN FRANKLIN HOTEL

10:35 A.M. EDT

Your Excellence Cardinal Krol, Senator Schweicker, Congressman John Heinz, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen:

-----I feel great. How do you feel this morning?

I am greatly honored by your invitation to address the Convention of the Polish-American Congress, and I am mighty proud to be here, not just as President but as a friend of American Polonia.

It has been the policy of mine -- and the policy of my Administration -- to listen carefully to the voice of Polish America. When it comes to sacrifice and achievement, you have given more, far more, than your share in making this the greatest country in the history of mankind.

Fifty-eight years ago another Polish-American conference was addressed by the great patriot Jan Paderewski. His feats as an orator were no less stunning than his genius as a musician and as the leader of the Polish-American people.

-----His address to his audience in Polish for over two and a half hours -- I will not try to emulate that performance.

However, let me repeat a few of Paderewski's comments and observations. He said, and I quote, "The Poles in America do not need any Americanization. It is superfluous to explain to them what are the ideals of America. They know very well, for they have been theirs for 1000 years."

MORE

Another Polish American leader put the same thought this way. "I feel I am 200 percent American because I am 100 percent Pole."

Much of what America celebrates in its Bicentennial year we owe to Polish Americans. Before the Pilgrims even landed at Plymouth, Poles had already first built the first factory in America in the colony at Jamestown. Poles had already pioneered American civil liberties demanding and receiving from the Virginia colony a voice in their own government.

For more than 3-1/2 centuries, Polish Americans have been working hard to build a better life for themselves and for their children. You have been soldiers and settlers, teachers and clergymen, scientists, craftsmen and artists. You have earned a distinguished place in the new world as your ancestors did in the old.

Yet today, you are troubled. You look abroad and see friends and relatives who do not fully share your freedom in America. You look at home and see too many of your neighborhoods deteriorating. I share your deep concern and I am also troubled.

But there is much we can do, as much as we have been doing, both at home and abroad. In the first two years of this Administration, I have worked hard to build a positive and expanding relationship with the people and the Government of Poland. A powerful motivation for that policy has been the knowledge that for many, many Americans, Poland is the home of their ancestors and their relatives.

I have sought to tie our countries closer together economically and culturally. In the last two years, trade between our countries has almost doubled. For America, that means more jobs and more production. For Poland, that means a higher standard of living and greater exposure to the American way of life.

A valuable worker in this important task has been the head of the Small Business Administration, Mitch Kobelinski. Last week in Washington, I met with Mitch. He told me personally how badly he wanted to be here this weekend, but this week, he is in Poland discussing how and by what means we can expand trade between our two peoples. My own meetings with Polish officials in Washington in 1974 and in Warsaw and Krakow in 1975 have led to a better understanding between our two countries.

In 1974, we signed a Joint Statement of Principles of Polish-American relations. In that statement, I reaffirmed for the United States the importance we attach to a sovereign and independent Poland. That statement was a part of a broader policy I have advocated throughout my entire life. The United States must continue to support by every peaceful and proper means the aspirations for freedom and national independence of peoples of Eastern Europe. As I have said many times before, as I told a group of Polish-American leaders at the White House just two weeks ago, the so-called Sonnenfeldt Doctrine never did exist and does not exist. The United States is totally opposed to spheres of influence belonging to any power. That policy is fundamental to our relationship with Poland and that policy will continue as long as I am President of the United States.

MORE

In my several meetings with Polish leaders, I also stress the importance that all Americans attach to humanitarian issues. People everywhere should have the right to express themselves freely. People everywhere should have the right to emigrate and travel freely. People everywhere should have the right to be united with their families.

I will continue to see that humanitarian matters are treated with the highest priority, not only in our relationships with Poland, but with the rest of the world. If we are to keep the respect throughout the world that the United States has today and must maintain, we must keep America strong. We must make sure that America not only has strong defenses but a strong heart.

Polish Americans know what it means to be strong. Many of your families came here without material wealth. In the countryside you cleared the land and made productive farms. In the cities you built neighborhoods you could be proud of. You built and paid for your own churches. You built your own schools and financial institutions. You built orphanages for the young and hospitals for the aged. You built your own institutions, the great fraternal organizations represented here today.

We must insure that what you have done, what you have earned, what you have built, will be here for your children to enjoy -- these wonderful young people here on this podium and in this hall. We must insure that your families will have the neighborhoods they need to build a decent life of their own.

A family needs a neighborhood that is safe. A family needs a neighborhood that is stable. A family needs a neighborhood with local churches, local shops and local schools.

Some of the healthiest neighborhoods in our cities are Polish American neighborhoods, but today too many neighborhoods are threatened by urban decay. You are paying a terrible price in lost property values -- property you worked hard to buy and maintain and that you love.

In cities like Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, too many young men and women are finding it impossible to remain in the neighborhoods where they were raised. Too many parents are forced to watch helplessly as all they have worked and saved to build up is eaten away.

MORE

This does not have to happen. I will continue to do everything in my power to see to it that it does not happen.

On the first day of this year I signed into law the Mortgage Disclosure Act to prevent redlining and neighborhood decline. Last month I met with the ethnic leaders to see what more we could do. As a result of that meeting, I created the President's Committee on Urban Development and Neighborhood Revitalization. I charged that committee with developing a sound Federal policy to help preserve our neighborhoods. That policy will be based on local initiative and local control.

Revitalizing our neighborhoods will help preserve your investments in your homes, your churches and your community facilities; it will help keep families together; it will help keep America together. America itself is a wonderful family. We must keep that family close -- closer in the future than it has been in the past.

As a young boy in Grand Rapids, Michigan, I was very fortunate to have as close friends Americans from many backgrounds. In high school I was lucky. I worked as a part-time waiter and a dishwasher in a restaurant owned by a man named Bill Skouges, who was of Greek descent. That was in 1929 and 1930, when jobs and money were not easy to come by. I earned \$2 a week and my lunches, and Bill Skouges earned my admiration and affection and respect.

As a young Congressman, my first administrative assistant was my long and dear friend John Milonowski, who is incidentally running for probate judge out there, and let's get him elected. John and I worked together for many, many years, and on my recommendation he became our United States District Attorney in the Western District of Michigan. I was proud of the job he did, and it earns him the opportunity to be one of our three probate judges in the City of Grand Rapids.

But, as President of all of the people, I am determined that every voice in the American family must be heard. The voice of American Polonia will be listened to because all of us are proud of the red, white and blue. We should be proud of the great heritage of the red and white.

Thank you very, very much.

END (AT 10:50 A.M. EDT)



Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1973

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

This year we mark the beginning of our third century as an independent nation. Two hundred years ago our Declaration of Independence declared that "all men are created equal." It did not say "all Americans" but embraced all men everywhere. Throughout our history we have repeatedly demonstrated our conviction and concern that men and women throughout the world should share the full blessings of liberty.

As we celebrate our Bicentennial, it is important that we let the world know that America still cares, that the torch in the Statue of Liberty still burns brightly. The world should know that we stand for freedom and independence in 1973, just as we stood for freedom and independence in 1776.

For two centuries, the fundamental basis of American policy toward other nations has remained unchanged: the United States supports the aspirations for freedom, independence and national self-determination of all peoples. We do not accept foreign domination over any nation. We reaffirm today this principle and policy.

The Eighty-Sixth Congress, by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), authorized and requested the President to proclaim the third week in July of each year as Captive Nations Week.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 18, 1973 as Captive Nations Week.

I call upon the people of the United States to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities and I urge rededication to the aspirations of all peoples for self-determination and liberty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this second day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundredth.

GERALD R. FORD



April 27, 1976

With fond memories of my participation in your meetings five years ago in Grand Rapids, I am delighted to greet the delegates at this Twenty-Fifth Annual Convention of the American Latvian Association.

I am very much aware of your great anxiety concerning your ancestral homeland, families and friends who have been, and still are, profoundly affected by East-West political developments in Europe. Earlier this month in Milwaukee, and last summer just before departing for Helsinki, I met with a number of Americans of East European background to discuss their concerns and to reaffirm the continuing United States support by every proper peaceful means for the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the people of Eastern Europe. I assured them -- even as I want to assure you now -- that the United States has never recognized the Soviet incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and is not doing so now.

As we celebrate the two hundredth anniversary of our independence, we are more than ever mindful of the ethnic diversity that has always been such a source of national vitality and strength. Your Latvian-American activities during this Bicentennial year appropriately focus attention on the remarkable efforts of many talented and hard working individuals who have helped to build America into the great nation we know today.

I welcome this opportunity to applaud the American Latvian Association on a quarter century of important accomplishment in preserving a cherished Old World heritage and in enriching our American way of life. I wish you a most successful and memorable session.

DR. MYRON KUROPAS TO HANDCARRY TO EVENT ✓

cc: Honorable Edward J. Derwinski



OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Milwaukee, Wisconsin)

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
GREATER MILWAUKEE ETHNIC ORGANIZATIONS

MADER'S RESTAURANT

12:55 P.M. CST

THE PRESIDENT: First, let me express my appreciation for your being here, and after I make a few prepared remarks I will look forward to the opportunity to responding to any questions, whether it is on the subject matter that I am speaking on or any other subject, whether it is domestic or international matters.

I am reminded, as I see some of the faces here, of the meeting that we had, with some of you at least, in the Cabinet Room at the White House on July 25, as I recollect. At that time some 30 leaders of the Eastern European community met with me to discuss problems relating to Western Europe and related matters. I understand, however, that that was the very first time that a President of the United States met with leaders representing the interests of so many Americans concerned about Eastern Europe.

I think on our Bicentennial Anniversary it is particularly appropriate that we in Government recognize the great contributions of our citizens from Eastern Europe. Before the departure for the European Security Conference in Helsinki last July I stated my policy very categorically in reference to Eastern Europe, and at this time let me reiterate that statement. I worked on it myself, I am very proud of it and I think oftentimes it is not read in proper context.

.. It goes like this: It is the policy of the United States and it has been my policy ever since I entered public life to support the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe with whom we have such close ties of culture as well as blood by every proper and by every peaceful means.

MORE

(OVER)

I stated my hope and expectation that my visits to Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia would again demonstrate the friendship and the interest in the welfare and progress of the fine people of Eastern Europe. This remains my policy, regardless of what any Washington experts or anti-Washington experts may say or write.

On July 29, 1975, in the market square of Krakow, Poland, I told a good many thousands who were assembled there that I was standing only a very few feet from the flag marking where General Kosciusko stood and took his famous oath to fight, to regain the independence of Poland and the freedom of all Poles. I said I was very proud to be in a place so rich in Polish history and so closely associated with the Polish hero in our own struggle for independence in the United States.

During my visit to Belgrade I said that Americans particularly admired Yugoslavia's independent spirit. I said whenever independence is threatened, people everywhere look to the example of Yugoslavian people throughout their history. They take strength and they take inspiration from that example.

America's interest in Yugoslavia's continued independence, integrity and well-being, expressed often in the past, remains undiminished.

In the Joint Communique which President Ceausescu and I signed in Rumania we emphasized our support for a just and equitable international order which respects the right of each country regardless of size or political or economic or social system to choose its own destiny free from the use or threat of force.

When I returned from Europe, I told the American people that I was able to deliver in person a message of enormous significance to all Europeans. My message was very clear: America still cares. And the torch and the Statue of Liberty still burns very brightly. We stand for freedom and independence in 1976 just as we stood for freedom and independence in 1776.

I have recalled these events because they underline the fact that my policy, America's policy, toward Eastern Europe is fully, clearly and formally documented. It is a creative and cooperative policy toward the nations of Eastern Europe. It is the policy that embraces our most important ideals as a nation. It is a policy that I have repeated in messages to Americans of Estonian, Lithuanian and Ukrainian ancestry, and I add the Latvian people whom I know so well in my hometown of Grand Rapids, Michigan, know of my deep concern and devotion and friendship with them.

MORE

What it amounts to -- there is no secret Washington policy, no double standard by this Government.

The record is positive, consistent, responsive to your concerns, and I say it is indisputable. The United States strongly supports the aspirations for freedom, for national independence of peoples everywhere, including the peoples of Eastern Europe. I have followed this policy in my visits to Eastern Europe and in my meetings with Eastern European leaders here as well as overseas. Our policy is in no sense -- and I emphasize this -- in no sense accept Soviet dominion of Eastern Europe or any kind of organic origin.


Nor is it in any way designed to permit the consolidation for such dominion. On the contrary, the United States seeks to be responsive to and to encourage as responsibly as possible the desires of Eastern Europeans for greater autonomy, independence and more normal relations with the rest of the world.

This is the policy that I will continue to pursue with patience, with firmness and with persistence -- a policy from which the United States will not waiver.

Thank you very, very much.

END

(AT 1:10 P.M. CST)



February 26, 1976

TO AMERICANS OF LITHUANIAN ANCESTRY

As we celebrate the birth of freedom in America, more and more of our people are mindful of their bi-national heritage. Your Lithuanian-American activities call attention to the remarkable efforts of millions of talented and hard-working individuals from all over the world who built America into the great nation we know today.

I am keenly aware of your great anxiety concerning your homeland, families and friends who have been and are still profoundly affected by East - West political developments in Europe. Last summer, just before departing for Helsinki, and before that in February of 1975, I met with your leaders to discuss these concerns and to emphasize that the accord I would sign in Helsinki was neither a treaty nor a legally binding document.

The Helsinki agreements, I pointed out, were political and moral commitments aimed at lessening tensions and opening further the lines of communication between the peoples of East and West. I assure you again that there is no cause for the very understandable concern you raised about the effect of the Helsinki Declarations on the Baltic nations. The United States has never recognized the Soviet incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and is not doing so now. Our official policy of nonrecognition is not affected by the results of the European Security Conference.



It is the policy of the United States--and it has been my policy ever since I entered public life--to support the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe by every proper and peaceful means.

I commend you for your continued contributions to our national legacy and to our durable system of representative government. Today, I salute you for your struggle on behalf of all human freedom.

TO BE READ BY DR. MYRON KUROPAS IN CHICAGO AT LITHUANIAN AMERICAN REPUBLICAN LEAGUE BANQUET ON FEB. 28

GRF:NSC/Kuropas/Hasek:jmc
Approved by Dennis Clift, NSC

11/4/76 Kuropas
201 2/27 2:10 p.m.



EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE
AT 11:00 A. M., EDT

JULY 25, 1975

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I am glad to have this opportunity, before taking off for Europe tomorrow, to discuss with you frankly how I feel about the forthcoming European Security Conference in Helsinki.

I know there are some honest doubts and disagreements among good Americans about this meeting with the leaders of Eastern and Western European countries and Canada -- 35 nations altogether.

There are those who fear the Conference will put a seal of approval on the political division of Europe that has existed since the Soviet Union incorporated the Baltic nations and set new boundaries elsewhere in Europe by military action in World War II. These critics contend that participation by the United States in the Helsinki understandings amounts to tacit recognition of a status quo which favors the Soviet Union and perpetuates its control over countries allied with it.

On the other extreme there are critics who say the meeting is a meaningless exercise because the Helsinki declarations are merely statements of principles and good intentions which are neither legally binding nor enforceable and cannot be depended upon. They express concern, however, that the result will be to make the free governments of Western Europe and North America less wary and lead to a letting down of NATO's political guard and military defenses.

If I seriously shared these reservations I would not be going, but I certainly understand the historical reasons for them and, especially, the anxiety of Americans whose ancestral homelands, families and friends have been and still are profoundly affected by East-West political developments in Europe.

I would emphasize that the document I will sign is neither a treaty nor is it legally binding on any participating State. The Helsinki documents involve political and moral commitments aimed at lessening tensions and opening further the lines of communication between the peoples of East and West.

(MORE)

It is the policy of the United States, and it has been my policy ever since I entered public life, to support the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe--with whom we have close ties of culture and blood--by every proper and peaceful means. I believe the outcome of this European Security Conference will be a step--how long a step remains to be tested--in that direction. I hope my visits to Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia will again demonstrate our continuing friendship and interest in the welfare and progress of the fine people of Eastern Europe.

To keep the Helsinki Conference in perspective, we must remember that it is not simply another summit between the superpowers. On the contrary, it is primarily a political dialogue among the Europeans, East, West, and neutral, with primary emphasis on European relationships rather than global differences. The United States has taken part, along with Canada, to maintain the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance and because our absence would have caused a serious imbalance for the West.

We have acted in concert with our free and democratic partners to preserve our interests in Berlin and Germany, and have obtained the public commitment of the Warsaw Pact governments to the possibility of peaceful adjustment of frontiers--a major concession which runs quite contrary to the allegation that present borders are being permanently frozen.

The Warsaw Pact nations met important Western preconditions--the Berlin Agreement of 1971, the force reduction talks now underway in Vienna--before our agreement to go to Helsinki.

Specifically addressing the understandable concern about the effect of the Helsinki declarations on the Baltic nations, I can assure you as one who has long been interested in this question that the United States has never recognized the Soviet incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and is not doing so now. Our official policy of non-recognition is not affected by the results of the European Security Conference.

There is included in the declaration of principles on territorial integrity the provision that no occupation or acquisition of territory in violation of international law will be recognized as legal. This is not to raise the hope that there will be any immediate change in the map of Europe, but the United States has not abandoned and will not compromise this long-standing principle.

(MORE)

The question has been asked: What have we given up in these negotiations and what have we obtained in return from the other side? I have studied the negotiations and declarations carefully and will discuss them even more intensely with other leaders in Helsinki. In my judgment, the United States and the open countries of the West already practice what the Helsinki accords preach, and have no intention of doing what they prohibit -- such as using force or restricting freedoms. We are not committing ourselves to anything beyond what we are already committed to by our own moral and legal standards and by more formal treaty agreements such as the United Nations Charter and Declaration of Human Rights.

We are getting a public commitment by the leaders of the more closed and controlled countries to a greater measure of freedom and movement for individuals, information and ideas than has existed there in the past, and establishing a yardstick by which the world can measure how well they live up to these stated intentions. It is a step in the direction of a greater degree of European community, of expanding East West contacts, of more normal and healthier relations in an area where we have the closest historic ties. Surely this is the best interest of the United States and of peace in the world.

I think we are all agreed that our world cannot be changed for the better by war; that in the thermonuclear age our primary task is to reduce the danger of unprecedented destruction. This we are doing through continuing Strategic Arms Limitations talks with the Soviet Union and the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe. This European Security Conference in Helsinki, while it contains some military understandings such as advance notice of maneuvers, should not be confused with either the SALT or MBFR negotiations. The Helsinki summit is linked with our overall policy of working to reduce East-West tensions and pursuing peace, but it is a much more general and modest undertaking.

Its success or failure depends not alone on the United States and the Soviet Union but primarily upon its 33 European signatories, East, West and Neutral. The fact that each of them, large and small, can have their voices heard is itself a good sign. The fact that these very different governments can agree, even on paper, to such principles as greater human contacts and exchanges, improved conditions for journalists, reunification of families and international marriages, a freer flow of information and publications, and increased tourism and travel, seems to me a development well worthy of positive and public encouragement by the United States. If it all fails, Europe will be no worse off than it is now. If even a part of it succeeds, the lot of the people in Eastern Europe will be that much better, and the cause of freedom will advance at least that far.

(MORE)

I saw an editorial the other day entitled: "Jerry, Don't Go."

But I would rather read that than headlines all over Europe saying: "United States Boycotts Peace Hopes".

So I am going, and I hope your support goes with me.

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Office of the White House Press Secretary

NOTICE TO THE PRESS

COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL
STATEMENTS ON EASTERN EUROPE



EASTERN EUROPE

Administration Position

The President said on April 2, 1976:

"It is the policy of the United States and it has been my policy ever since I entered public life to support the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe, with whom we have such close ties of culture as well as blood, by every proper and by every peaceful means.

"My policy, America's policy, toward Eastern Europe is fully, clearly and formally documented. It is a creative and cooperative policy toward the nations of Eastern Europe. It is the policy that embraces our most important ideals as a nation.

"I have followed this policy in my visits to Eastern Europe and in my meetings with Eastern European leaders here as well as overseas. Our policy in no sense -- and I emphasize this -- in no sense accepts Soviet dominion of Eastern Europe Nor is it in any way designed to permit the consolidation of such dominion. On the contrary, the United States seeks to be responsive to and to encourage as responsibly as possible the desires of Eastern Europeans for greater autonomy, independence and more normal relations with the rest of the world.

"This is the policy that I will continue to pursue with patience, with firmness and with persistence -- a policy from which the United States will not waiver."

Presidential Documents

Vol. 12, no. 15, pp. 537-538

The United States interest in Eastern Europe is due not only to considerations of foreign policy but also to the fact that millions of Americans' ancestral homelands, relatives and friends are there. The President believes that efforts to settle political conflicts and improve relations with the countries of Eastern Europe contributes to their peaceful evolution toward more openness and to their efforts to define their own roles as sovereign nations in the affairs of Europe.

The President's policy toward Eastern Europe is fully, clearly, and formally documented.* It is a policy of positive action and a policy embracing America's most important ideals. It is a policy the President has repeated in messages to Americans of Estonian, Lithuanian and Ukrainian ancestry in recent months. The United States strongly supports the aspirations for freedom and national independence of peoples everywhere -- including the peoples of Eastern Europe. The President is totally opposed to so-called spheres of influence by any power. He has manifested this policy in his visits to Eastern Europe and in his meetings with Eastern European leaders in the United States.

United States policy in no sense accepts Soviet "dominion" of Eastern Europe nor is it in any way designed to seek the consolidation of such "dominion." On the contrary, the United States seeks to be responsive to, and to encourage as responsibly as possible, the desires of East Europeans for greater autonomy, independence and more normal relations with the rest of the world.

Administration Actions

The Administration has capped a decade of improving relations with Romania with the negotiation of a trade agreement that will promote the continued development of mutually beneficial economic ties and thereby bring the structure of our economic relations into accord with the very satisfactory state of our political relations. These relations have been advanced further by President Ford's wide-ranging discussions with President Ceausescu in Washington and Bucharest.

President Ford's talks with Polish First Secretary Gierak in Washington in October 1974 and again in Warsaw in July 1975 have affirmed the desire we share for further improvements in relations between our two countries, and have provided for the further development of commercial, economic, cultural, scientific and technological cooperation.

The President's meetings with Yugoslav leaders have provided a welcome opportunity to assess continued progress in our bilateral relations, including the substantial growth of trade in recent years. We have reaffirmed our mutual intention to encourage cooperation, not only in bilateral matters but also for the preservation and consolidation of peace.

The President's meetings with ethnic leaders in the United States have provided welcome occasions for a discussion of U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe.

- * Tab A -- Remarks of the President to the Polish-American Congress
September 24, 1976
- Tab B -- President's Captive Nations Week Proclamation
July 2, 1976
- Tab C -- President's Message to American Latvian Association
April 27, 1976
- Tab D -- President's Remarks to Greater Milwaukee Ethnic Organizations
April 2, 1976
- Tab E -- President's Message to Americans of Lithuanian Ancestry
February 26, 1976
- Tab F -- Statement by the President on Policy Toward Eastern Europe
July 25, 1975

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
TO THE
NATIONAL QUADRENNIAL CONVENTION
OF THE POLISH-AMERICAN CONGRESS

THE BENJAMIN FRANKLIN HOTEL

10:35 A.M. EDT

Your Excellence Cardinal Krol, Senator Schweicker, Congressman John Heinz, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen:

I feel great. How do you feel this morning?

I am greatly honored by your invitation to address the Convention of the Polish-American Congress, and I am mighty proud to be here, not just as President but as a friend of American Polonia.

It has been the policy of mine -- and the policy of my Administration -- to listen carefully to the voice of Polish America. When it comes to sacrifice and achievement, you have given more, far more, than your share in making this the greatest country in the history of mankind.

Fifty-eight years ago another Polish-American conference was addressed by the great patriot Jan Paderewski. His feats as an orator were no less stunning than his genius as a musician and as the leader of the Polish-American people.

His address to his audience in Polish for over two and a half hours -- I will not try to emulate that performance.

However, let me repeat a few of Paderewski's comments and observations. He said, and I quote, "The Poles in America do not need any Americanization. It is superfluous to explain to them what are the ideals of America. They know very well, for they have been theirs for 1000 years."

MORE

Another Polish American leader put the same thought this way. "I feel I am 200 percent American because I am 100 percent Pole."

Much of what America celebrates in its Bicentennial year we owe to Polish Americans. Before the Pilgrims even landed at Plymouth, Poles had already first built the first factory in America in the colony at Jamestown. Poles had already pioneered American civil liberties demanding and receiving from the Virginia colony a voice in their own government.

For more than 3-1/2 centuries, Polish Americans have been working hard to build a better life for themselves and for their children. You have been soldiers and settlers, teachers and clergymen, scientists, craftsmen and artists. You have earned a distinguished place in the new world as your ancestors did in the old.

Yet today, you are troubled. You look abroad and see friends and relatives who do not fully share your freedom in America. You look at home and see too many of your neighborhoods deteriorating. I share your deep concern and I am also troubled.

But there is much we can do, as much as we have been doing, both at home and abroad. In the first two years of this Administration, I have worked hard to build a positive and expanding relationship with the people and the Government of Poland. A powerful motivation for that policy has been the knowledge that for many, many Americans, Poland is the home of their ancestors and their relatives.

I have sought to tie our countries closer together economically and culturally. In the last two years, trade between our countries has almost doubled. For America, that means more jobs and more production. For Poland, that means a higher standard of living and greater exposure to the American way of life.

A valuable worker in this important task has been the head of the Small Business Administration, Mitch Kobelinski. Last week in Washington, I met with Mitch. He told me personally how badly he wanted to be here this weekend, but this week, he is in Poland discussing how and by what means we can expand trade between our two peoples. My own meetings with Polish officials in Washington in 1974 and in Warsaw and Krakow in 1975 have led to a better understanding between our two countries.

In 1974, we signed a Joint Statement of Principles of Polish-American relations. In that statement, I reaffirmed for the United States the importance we attach to a sovereign and independent Poland. That statement was a part of a broader policy I have advocated throughout my entire life. The United States must continue to support by every peaceful and proper means the aspirations for freedom and national independence of peoples of Eastern Europe. As I have said many times before, as I told a group of Polish-American leaders at the White House just two weeks ago, the so-called Sonnenfeldt Doctrine never did exist and does not exist. The United States is totally opposed to spheres of influence belonging to any power. That policy is fundamental to our relationship with Poland and that policy will continue as long as I am President of the United States.

MORE

In my several meetings with Polish leaders, I also stress the importance that all Americans attach to humanitarian issues. People everywhere should have the right to express themselves freely. People everywhere should have the right to emigrate and travel freely. People everywhere should have the right to be united with their families.

I will continue to see that humanitarian matters are treated with the highest priority, not only in our relationships with Poland, but with the rest of the world. If we are to keep the respect throughout the world that the United States has today and must maintain, we must keep America strong. We must make sure that America not only has strong defenses but a strong heart.

Polish Americans know what it means to be strong. Many of your families came here without material wealth. In the countryside you cleared the land and made productive farms. In the cities you built neighborhoods you could be proud of. You built and paid for your own churches. You built your own schools and financial institutions. You built orphanages for the young and hospitals for the aged. You built your own institutions, the great fraternal organizations represented here today.

We must insure that what you have done, what you have earned, what you have built, will be here for your children to enjoy -- these wonderful young people here on this podium and in this hall. We must insure that your families will have the neighborhoods they need to build a decent life of their own.

A family needs a neighborhood that is safe. A family needs a neighborhood that is stable. A family needs a neighborhood with local churches, local shops and local schools.

Some of the healthiest neighborhoods in our cities are Polish-American neighborhoods, but today too many neighborhoods are threatened by urban decay. You are paying a terrible price in lost property values -- property you worked hard to buy and maintain and that you love.

In cities like Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, too many young men and women are finding it impossible to remain in the neighborhoods where they were raised. Too many parents are forced to watch helplessly as all they have worked and saved to build up is eaten away.

MORE

This does not have to happen. I will continue to do everything in my power to see to it that it does not happen.

On the first day of this year I signed into law the Mortgage Disclosure Act to prevent redlining and neighborhood decline. Last month I met with the ethnic leaders to see what more we could do. As a result of that meeting, I created the President's Committee on Urban Development and Neighborhood Revitalization. I charged that committee with developing a sound Federal policy to help preserve our neighborhoods. That policy will be based on local initiative and local control.

Revitalizing our neighborhoods will help preserve your investments in your homes, your churches and your community facilities; it will help keep families together; it will help keep America together. America itself is a wonderful family. We must keep that family close -- closer in the future than it has been in the past.

As a young boy in Grand Rapids, Michigan, I was very fortunate to have as close friends Americans from many backgrounds. In high school I was lucky. I worked as a part-time waiter and a dishwasher in a restaurant owned by a man named Bill Skouges, who was of Greek descent. That was in 1929 and 1930, when jobs and money were not easy to come by. I earned \$2 a week and my lunches, and Bill Skouges earned my admiration and affection and respect.

As a young Congressman, my first administrative assistant was my long and dear friend John Milonowski, who is incidentally running for probate judge out there, and let's get him elected. John and I worked together for many, many years, and on my recommendation he became our United States District Attorney in the Western District of Michigan. I was proud of the job he did, and it earns him the opportunity to be one of our three probate judges in the City of Grand Rapids.

But, as President of all of the people, I am determined that every voice in the American family must be heard. The voice of American Polonia will be listened to because all of us are proud of the red, white and blue. We should be proud of the great heritage of the red and white.

Thank you very, very much.

END (AT 10:50 A.M. EDT)

THE WHITE HOUSE

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1975

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

This year we mark the beginning of our third century as an independent nation. Two hundred years ago our Declaration of Independence declared that "all men are created equal." It did not say "all Americans" but embraced all men everywhere. Throughout our history we have repeatedly demonstrated our conviction and concern that men and women throughout the world should share the full blessings of liberty.

As we celebrate our Bicentennial, it is important that we let the world know that America still cares, that the torch in the Statue of Liberty still burns brightly. The world should know that we stand for freedom and independence in 1975, just as we stood for freedom and independence in 1775.

For two centuries, the fundamental basis of American policy toward other nations has remained unchanged: the United States supports the aspirations for freedom, independence and national self-determination of all peoples. We do not accept foreign domination over any nation. We reaffirm today this principle and policy.

The Eighty-Sixth Congress, by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), authorized and requested the President to proclaim the third week in July of each year as Captive Nations Week.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 18, 1975 as Captive Nations Week.

I call upon the people of the United States to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities and I urge rededication to the aspirations of all peoples for self-determination and liberty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this second day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundredth.

GERALD R. FORD

April 27, 1976

With fond memories of my participation in your meetings five years ago in Grand Rapids, I am delighted to greet the delegates at this Twenty-Fifth Annual Convention of the American Latvian Association.

I am very much aware of your great anxiety concerning your ancestral homeland, families and friends who have been, and still are, profoundly affected by East-West political developments in Europe. Earlier this month in Milwaukee, and last summer just before departing for Helsinki, I met with a number of Americans of East European background to discuss their concerns and to reaffirm the continuing United States support by every proper peaceful means for the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the people of Eastern Europe. I assured them -- even as I want to assure you now -- that the United States has never recognized the Soviet incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and is not doing so now.

As we celebrate the two hundredth anniversary of our independence, we are more than ever mindful of the ethnic diversity that has always been such a source of national vitality and strength. Your Latvian-American activities during this Bicentennial year appropriately focus attention on the remarkable efforts of many talented and hard working individuals who have helped to build America into the great nation we know today.

I welcome this opportunity to applaud the American Latvian Association on a quarter century of important accomplishment in preserving a cherished Old World heritage and in enriching our American way of life. I wish you a most successful and memorable session.

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Milwaukee, Wisconsin)

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
GREATER MILWAUKEE ETHNIC ORGANIZATIONS

MADER'S RESTAURANT

12:55 P.M. CST

THE PRESIDENT: First, let me express my appreciation for your being here, and after I make a few prepared remarks I will look forward to the opportunity to responding to any questions, whether it is on the subject matter that I am speaking on or any other subject, whether it is domestic or international matters.

I am reminded, as I see some of the faces here, of the meeting that we had, with some of you at least, in the Cabinet Room at the White House on July 25, as I recollect. At that time some 30 leaders of the Eastern European community met with me to discuss problems relating to Western Europe and related matters. I understand, however, that that was the very first time that a President of the United States met with leaders representing the interests of so many Americans concerned about Eastern Europe.

I think on our Bicentennial Anniversary it is particularly appropriate that we in Government recognize the great contributions of our citizens from Eastern Europe. Before the departure for the European Security Conference in Helsinki last July I stated my policy very categorically in reference to Eastern Europe, and at this time let me reiterate that statement. I worked on it myself, I am very proud of it and I think oftentimes it is not read in proper context.

It goes like this: It is the policy of the United States and it has been my policy ever since I entered public life to support the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe with whom we have such close ties of culture as well as blood by every proper and by every peaceful means.

MORE

(OVER)

I stated my hope and expectation that my visits to Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia would again demonstrate the friendship and the interest in the welfare and progress of the fine people of Eastern Europe. This remains my policy, regardless of what any Washington experts or anti-Washington experts may say or write.

On July 29, 1975, in the market square of Krakow, Poland, I told a good many thousands who were assembled there that I was standing only a very few feet from the flag marking where General Kosciusko stood and took his famous oath to fight, to regain the independence of Poland and the freedom of all Poles. I said I was very proud to be in a place so rich in Polish history and so closely associated with the Polish hero in our own struggle for independence in the United States.

During my visit to Belgrade I said that Americans particularly admired Yugoslavia's independent spirit. I said whenever independence is threatened, people everywhere look to the example of Yugoslavian people throughout their history. They take strength and they take inspiration from that example.

America's interest in Yugoslavia's continued independence, integrity and well-being, expressed often in the past, remains undiminished.

In the Joint Communique which President Ceausescu and I signed in Rumania we emphasized our support for a just and equitable international order which respects the right of each country regardless of size or political or economic or social system to choose its own destiny free from the use or threat of force.

When I returned from Europe, I told the American people that I was able to deliver in person a message of enormous significance to all Europeans. My message was very clear: America still cares. And the torch and the Statue of Liberty still burns very brightly. We stand for freedom and independence in 1976 just as we stood for freedom and independence in 1776.

I have recalled these events because they underline the fact that my policy, America's policy, toward Eastern Europe is fully, clearly and formally documented. It is a creative and cooperative policy toward the nations of Eastern Europe. It is the policy that embraces our most important values and ideals as a nation. It is a policy that I have repeated in messages to Americans of Estonian, Lithuanian and Ukrainian ancestry, and I add the Latvian people whom I know so well in my hometown of Grand Rapids, Michigan, know of my deep concern and devotion and friendship with them.

MORE

What it amounts to -- there is no secret Washington policy, no double standard by this Government.

The record is positive, consistent, responsive to your concerns, and I say it is indisputable. The United States strongly supports the aspirations for freedom, for national independence of peoples everywhere, including the peoples of Eastern Europe. I have followed this policy in my visits to Eastern Europe and in my meetings with Eastern European leaders here as well as overseas. Our policy is in no sense -- and I emphasize this -- in no sense accept Soviet dominion of Eastern Europe or any kind of organic origin.

Nor is it in any way designed to permit the consolidation for such dominion. On the contrary, the United States seeks to be responsive to and to encourage as responsibly as possible the desires of Eastern Europeans for greater autonomy, independence and more normal relations with the rest of the world.

This is the policy that I will continue to pursue with patience, with firmness and with persistence -- a policy from which the United States will not waiver.

Thank you very, very much.

END

(AT 1:10 P.M. CST)

February 26, 1976

TO AMERICANS OF LITHUANIAN ANCESTRY

As we celebrate the birth of freedom in America, more and more of our people are mindful of their bi-national heritage. Your Lithuanian-American activities call attention to the remarkable efforts of millions of talented and hard-working individuals from all over the world who built America into the great nation we know today.

I am keenly aware of your great anxiety concerning your homeland, families and friends who have been and are still profoundly affected by East - West political developments in Europe. Last summer, just before departing for Helsinki, and before that in February of 1975, I met with your leaders to discuss these concerns and to emphasize that the accord I would sign in Helsinki was neither a treaty nor a legally binding document.

The Helsinki agreements, I pointed out, were political and moral commitments aimed at lessening tensions and opening further the lines of communication between the peoples of East and West. I assure you again that there is no cause for the very understandable concern you raised about the effect of the Helsinki Declarations on the Baltic nations. The United States has never recognized the Soviet incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and is not doing so now. Our official policy of nonrecognition is not affected by the results of the European Security Conference.

It is the policy of the United States--and it has been my policy ever since I entered public life--to support the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe by every proper and peaceful means.

I commend you for your continued contributions to our national legacy and to our durable system of representative government. Today, I salute you for your struggle on behalf of all human freedom.

JULY 25, 1975

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I am glad to have this opportunity, before taking off for Europe tomorrow, to discuss with you frankly how I feel about the forthcoming European Security Conference in Helsinki.

I know there are some honest doubts and disagreements among good Americans about this meeting with the leaders of Eastern and Western European countries and Canada -- 35 nations altogether.

There are those who fear the Conference will put a seal of approval on the political division of Europe that has existed since the Soviet Union incorporated the Baltic nations and set new boundaries elsewhere in Europe by military action in World War II. These critics contend that participation by the United States in the Helsinki understandings amounts to tacit recognition of a status quo which favors the Soviet Union and perpetuates its control over countries allied with it.

On the other extreme there are critics who say the meeting is a meaningless exercise because the Helsinki declarations are merely statements of principles and good intentions which are neither legally binding nor enforceable and cannot be depended upon. They express concern, however, that the result will be to make the free governments of Western Europe and North America less wary and lead to a letting down of NATO's political guard and military defenses.

If I seriously shared these reservations I would not be going, but I certainly understand the historical reasons for them and, especially, the anxiety of Americans whose ancestral homelands, families and friends have been and still are profoundly affected by East-West political developments in Europe.

I would emphasize that the document I will sign is neither a treaty nor is it legally binding on any participating State. The Helsinki documents involve political and moral commitments aimed at lessening tensions and opening further the lines of communication between the peoples of East and West.

(MORE)

It is the policy of the United States, and it has been my policy ever since I entered public life, to support the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe--with whom we have close ties of culture and blood--by every proper and peaceful means. I believe the outcome of this European Security Conference will be a step--how long a step remains to be tested--in that direction. I hope my visits to Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia will again demonstrate our continuing friendship and interest in the welfare and progress of the fine people of Eastern Europe.

To keep the Helsinki Conference in perspective, we must remember that it is not simply another summit between the superpowers. On the contrary, it is primarily a political dialogue among the Europeans, East, West, and neutral, with primary emphasis on European relationships rather than global differences. The United States has taken part, along with Canada, to maintain the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance and because our absence would have caused a serious imbalance for the West.

We have acted in concert with our free and democratic partners to preserve our interests in Berlin and Germany, and have obtained the public commitment of the Warsaw Pact governments to the possibility of peaceful adjustment of frontiers--a major concession which runs quite contrary to the allegation that present borders are being permanently frozen.

The Warsaw Pact nations met important Western preconditions--the Berlin Agreement of 1971, the force reduction talks now underway in Vienna--before our agreement to go to Helsinki.

Specifically addressing the understandable concern about the effect of the Helsinki declarations on the Baltic nations, I can assure you as one who has long been interested in this question that the United States has never recognized the Soviet incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and is not doing so now. Our official policy of non-recognition is not affected by the results of the European Security Conference.

There is included in the declaration of principles on territorial integrity the provision that no occupation or acquisition of territory in violation of international law will be recognized as legal. This is not to raise the hope that there will be any immediate change in the map of Europe, but the United States has not abandoned and will not compromise this long-standing principle.

(MORE)

The question has been asked: What have we given up in these negotiations and what have we obtained in return from the other side? I have studied the negotiations and declarations carefully and will discuss them even more intensely with other leaders in Helsinki. In my judgment, the United States and the open countries of the West already practice what the Helsinki accords preach, and have no intention of doing what they prohibit -- such as using force or restricting freedoms. We are not committing ourselves to anything beyond what we are already committed to by our own moral and legal standards and by more formal treaty agreements such as the United Nations Charter and Declaration of Human Rights.

We are getting a public commitment by the leaders of the more closed and controlled countries to a greater measure of freedom and movement for individuals, information and ideas than has existed there in the past, and establishing a yardstick by which the world can measure how well they live up to these stated intentions. It is a step in the direction of a greater degree of European community, of expanding East West contacts, of more normal and healthier relations in an area where we have the closest historic ties. Surely this is the best interest of the United States and of peace in the world.

I think we are all agreed that our world cannot be changed for the better by war; that in the thermonuclear age our primary task is to reduce the danger of unprecedented destruction. This we are doing through continuing Strategic Arms Limitations talks with the Soviet Union and the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe. This European Security Conference in Helsinki, while it contains some military understandings such as advance notice of maneuvers, should not be confused with either the SALT or MBFR negotiations. The Helsinki summit is linked with our overall policy of working to reduce East-West tensions and pursuing peace, but it is a much more general and modest undertaking.

Its success or failure depends not alone on the United States and the Soviet Union but primarily upon its 33 European signatories, East, West and Neutral. The fact that each of them, large and small, can have their voices heard is itself a good sign. The fact that these very different governments can agree, even on paper, to such principles as greater human contacts and exchanges, improved conditions for journalists, reunification of families and international marriages, a freer flow of information and publications, and increased tourism and travel, seems to me a development well worthy of positive and public encouragement by the United States. If it all fails, Europe will be no worse off than it is now. If even a part of it succeeds, the lot of the people in Eastern Europe will be that much better, and the cause of freedom will advance at least that far.

(MORE)

I saw an editorial the other day entitled: "Jerry, Don't Go."

But I would rather read that than headlines all over Europe saying: "United States Boycotts Peace Hopes".

So I am going, and I hope your support goes with me.

#

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
AMERICAN LEADERS OF EAST EUROPEAN ANCESTRY

10:47 A.M. EDT

MR. NESSEN: The meeting has just broken up and the leaders of the ethnic groups will be down to speak to you. They are on their way right now.

The President read to them a statement at the beginning of the meeting which we have put into writing and will hand out immediately after this meeting. There was applause at the end of the President's remarks and then the ethnic leaders made statements and asked some questions. They will describe to you further the meeting.

Q How can we ask questions if we don't know what the President said?

MR. NESSEN: Would you like to have the statement handed out first?

Q Yes.

MR. NESSEN: We can do that.

Q Were all of these people pro Ford?

MR. NESSEN: I don't think so but you can ask them yourselves.

Q You told us the President would make a statement.

MR. NESSEN: There was a misunderstanding on my part about whether the President would read the statement or distribute the statement. It was a mistake on my part. The President has four stacks of bills that he is trying to get through before he leaves, which is in less than 30 minutes, and that is where he is.

Q How long was the meeting?

MR. NESSEN: The meeting was approximately 45 minutes.

I am going to let the leaders come up and introduce themselves and begin to answer your questions and I will hand the President's statement out so you will have it with you in order to ask questions.

MR. MAZEWSKI: I am President of the Polish American Congress which is a national organization. I did attend the session this morning. I am very much satisfied with the statement that the President has spoken. As a matter of fact he has reiterated his position on the acknowledgement on the freedom and independence of Poland as well as the self-determination of these European countries. He has clarified the position more fully. Not only that, he has admitted that he made a mistake. The statement was not accurate at all, and that --

Q He acknowledged he made a mistake?

MR. MAZEWSKI: Definitely he made a mistake. It was an error. It was never his true feeling and as a matter of fact we have checked his Captive Nations Proclamation. As a matter of fact the speech that he delivered at the Polish American Congress in Philadelphia on September 24 will definitely make anyone reading that, and hearing the statements, will know it must have been an error because he couldn't have changed his position of long standing in the last 30 years. Therefore I enjoyed hearing that and I am sure that our community will accept it as stated.

There will be a determination that will be made by any member of my community but for myself I am very much satisfied.

Q Do you think he will have the Polish ethnic vote?

MR. MAZEWSKI: There is no one that can guarantee anybody's vote. We have problems in guaranteeing our wife's vote, and our wife has a problem guaranteeing a husband's vote. But I am sure that the community is knowledgeable and that they will weigh the statement the way it should be.

Q I gather from your statement about the abortion issue that was reported in the newspaper the other day that you yourself personally opposed Mr. Carter because of the abortion issue. Was that correct?

MR. MAZEWSKI: Where you received that information I don't know. My name is Mayewski and I never made a statement on the abortion issue.

Q I am sorry about that.

MR. MAZEWSKI: And it was not made.

Q Are you pro Ford?

MR. MAZEWSKI: I am pro every American and in this case I have not committed myself to either candidate. I am president of a national organization and I don't want to influence my organization either way because they have the intelligence to decide on their own after hearing the facts.

Q But you have your own personal views, don't you?

MR. MAZEWSKI: I have my personal views. I have made a decision which I will disclose in the secrecy of the booth in November.

Q Were you wearing one of those Ford buttons?

MR. MAZEWSKI: I was not, absolutely not. I don't wear anybody's button.

Q Is there such a thing as an ethnic vote? Why are we all here?

MR. MAZEWSKI: I would say that it is a misnomer. We are all Americans and we speak about Americans and we speak about Americans of different ethnic background, and I happen to be of a Polish background. I am an American of Polish heritage.

MORE



MR. NESSEN: I think some of the other leaders have brief statements they might like to make, and then we can go to questions, okay?

MR. PASZTOR: My name is Laszlo Pasztor. I am Chairman of the Board of Directors of the American Hungarian Federation. I came here not because I wasn't convinced of President Ford's stand on these very important issues as far as Eastern Europe is concerned.

I have known President Ford when he was a Congressman and I admire him for his stand on the cause of freedom and liberty for all nations. He always emphasized that he doesn't make any difference as far as freedom and basic human rights are concerned, whether they are Eastern Europeans or from other nations.

I think that I was surprised that Mr. Carter wasn't aware of President Ford's statements in this area. I was very surprised that he made an issue of it and I think in the order of the fact that the President mentioned, as Mr. Mazewski said, that he made an inaccurate statement showing what a great President we have and what a human being he is.

I think, you know, that he can still speak with public opinion as far as the ethnic Americans are concerned. I think that the President's statements and his recent statement that he gave to us today, will clarify everything with some people who don't know him as well as some of us do, and that continue to support him as they did in the past.

Q Why did it take him so long to admit his mistake?

MR. PASZTOR: In my opinion, it was a slip of the tongue, and I think, right the next day, he made, in a positive way, a restating of his position. Even if you check his speech, right after that he made that statement, that Eastern Europe is not under -- I believe he said Soviet domination -- immediately, he stated that he will never concede the domination of Eastern Europe.



That was such an obvious correction, even in his statement that I, personally knowing him, didn't even catch the mistake in the first place. I have to admit that.

Q Did he say to you today that he made a mistake? How did he express it?

MR. PASZTOR: "I did not express myself clearly." I believe those were his words, and it is in his written statement. I believe you have that and you will have it in your hands, but he had the courage to say he didn't express himself clearly. I think that he showed to us that he is not ashamed to admit it if he didn't use the right expression.

Q You are now favoring President Ford?

MR. PASZTOR: I am working for him and I am going to continue to work for him.

Q Are you wearing a button this morning?

MR. PASZTOR: No, because I am a Hungarian and that was a Romanian button.

MR. PLEER: My name is Ilmar Pleer, President of the Estonian National Council. I am very much satisfied with the President's statement this morning regarding the situation in Eastern Europe and his slip of the tongue. He rectified his statement. We are very much satisfied with it.

He, himself, again mentioned that he will never recognize the overthrow of the Baltis States and the occupation by the Soviet Union, as he has done prior to the Helsinki Conference, and afterwards in statements to the Estonian and Baltic people. I will be very confident with the statement at this point, and I believe that the Estonian people will follow him and certainly support Mr. Ford for the Presidency.

MR. NESSEN: Let me put one thing in perspective before we go on, and that is as to who you are supporting, and so forth.

One of the leaders at the meeting, and maybe he will identify himself, pointed out that last week, when there was a rash of complaining public statements about the President's remarks in the debate, that many of those, or most of them in fact, were elected Democratic officials in various areas of the country. Maybe one of the leaders will want to talk about that because it was mentioned to the President this morning.

MR. BOBELIS: I am Dr. Bobelis, National President of the Lithuanian American Council. I was very pleased with the President's statement. However, I do have some reservations about our foreign policy as conducted by Secretary Kissinger.

Q What are the reservations?

MR. BOBELIS: He has never expressed himself in behalf of Eastern European countries. He made many statements announcing human rights violations in South Africa, Rhodesia and Chile, but at no time, has he ever made any statement announcing any human rights violations, which are much more severe in Eastern European countries.

MORE



MR. KIPEL: My name is Vitaut Kipel, representing the Byelorussian American Association of the United States. We are very pleased with the statement made by the President this morning and I must tell you that we as Russian Americans never considered as serious what happened last week in the debate. We considered that it was a mistake. However, we are very much disturbed that nobody from the press picked up that Jimmy Carter did not know that there were two radio stations broadcasting in the Soviet Union when he said Voice of Radio Free Europe, and then he stopped and he didn't know that the other station was Radio Liberty.

MR. LEJINS: My name is Adolfs Lejins, President of American Latvian Association of the United States. Now, we have a bipartisan organization. However, some of our groups had worked with President Ford for some 20 years and know him very well. However his statement last week did raise some questions and I hope President Ford's statement as distributed this morning will clarify some of those issues.

The Latvians, of course, are bipartisan and at least I hope that those who supported Mr. Ford in the past will also support him now.

MR. GECYS: My name is Stanley Gecys. I am National President of the Lithuanian American Community of the United States. As far as I personally am concerned, the President did admit his mistake and the case is closed. I think we should look towards the statement with the same eyes as the press looked toward Jimmy Carter's ethnic purity statement.

In a way I think it is fortunate that Eastern Europe was able to receive all of this attention from the press. We have felt that Eastern Europe had been forgotten and that primarily our concerns were directed to Africa, South America and Asia.

I just would like to point out that the Baltic States which are enslaved by the Soviet Union are strong and the people are fighting the Soviet regime, and I also hope that one of these days the Baltic States will be free.



I realize that President Ford is our friend. His record of 30 years in public office does show him to be the friend of captive nations, and therefore there are some things that all of us should forgive as one minute error in judgment.

MR. MEYER: My name is George Meyer. I am a representative of the Congress of Russian Americans. I have to confess to you that our 400,000 Americans of Russian descent, as all other of the voters in our country here, are for a solution. We have three ways to participate and to vote -- to support Governor Carter, to support President Ford, or to abstain.

I have to confess to you the mood of this group of American citizens is that they are very much afraid of Governor Carter, just as we were afraid of Senator McGovern. The problem is, is Governor Carter conservative or liberal? He has not cleared that up, up to now.

There are several facts which show that Mr. Carter, in this house, we believe, is the incarnation of Senator McGovern. He chose as Vice President Senator Mondale and the record of the Senator shows that Senator Mondale, by his votes in the Senate, is standing to the left of Senator McGovern.

Governor Carter has chosen, during the primaries, as his speechwriter the same person who had written the speeches for McGovern during the old campaign. Governor Carter has chosen as his counsel for foreign policy Averell Harriman and Dewey Rashin, and all of the people from Middle Europe very well know what advice these advisers gave and what advice Mr. Harriman and Mr. Hawkins gave to the late President Roosevelt. We cannot forget it.

The last thing we would like to bring to your attention is a speech which Governor Carter delivered three weeks ago in Penn Station, when he started his trip to Pittsburg. Have you noticed who stood at the side of Governor Carter when he delivered his speech? It was not Mr. Moynihan, who recently was nominated by the Democratic Party of the State of New York. It was Mrs. Bella Abzug, who was beaten by Mr. Moynihan. She was smiling and showing signs of victory.

This choice of Mr. Carter shows very clearly for us toward which part of the Democratis Party he is inclined.

MR. SEFFER: I am Dr. Uros Seffer, President of the Serbian National Committee, representing 26 Serbian organizations in the United States, Canada and the free world.

We know President Ford's record since coming to Congress. We consider him a very strong leader. We are very satisfied with his explanation today. We trust him and most of us will vote for him because we believe that he deserves to be President of the United States for the next term.

MR. MEDWED: Good morning. My name is Nick Medwed and I am West Coast Representative for the Ukranian Congress Committee of America. We are the eyes and ears of President Ford in our respective heritage communities. Therefore we were asked to come here because there was a feeling of urgency, particularly because it affected partially and to a great extent the American foreign policy towards the peoples that we as citizens are representing as the various ethnic heritage communities.

We came here today and are leaving greatly satisfied with the acknowledgement by President Ford that a mistake was made, and I am sure it is in the published statements being released to you, and we are going back with other statements that will be presented in the paper from now to November 2, and we want to thank you expressly, each of you, for giving us these front page headlines, and we need it very badly. Thank you very much.

MR. ABRAHAMIAN: I am Dr. Hratch Abrahamian, I am National President of the Armenian National Committee. I am from Eastern Europe and working for President Ford, and I don't know yet how my people are going to vote, but I was quite comfortable after the meeting today when the President restated or reconfirmed his previous statements when he was a Congressman about all of the people who were deprived of independence, freedom and self determination. He clearly reaffirmed all of the statements and I am very glad for that. At this time I don't have any reason to have doubt about his sincerity.

MR. SABAN: My name is Joseph Saban, National President of the Croatian Catholic Union of the United States of America. President Ford has convinced me this morning with his statement that he is for all people that are striving for their independence in their own countries, regardless of where they might be. Thank you very much.

MR. KIJ: I am Daniel Kij from Buffalo. I am a national officer of the Polish American Congress. I, like many of the others, was neither born in Eastern Europe nor were my parents who were born in Western New York. However, I feel what the President did today was clarify the record. There was little doubt in the minds of the ethnics in Western New York, and in the area served by our organization, that he really meant what he said, or as it sounded as it came over the television screen. Today, the President wanted to set the record straight and I think he did that.

I don't believe there was any doubt in the minds of those except Democratic Party leaders. I was the one alluded to earlier and I did state to the President that in Buffalo, this past Sunday when Betty Ford was the guest of honor at our annual Pulaski Day Parade, at which she was present, and also Senator Mondale, the feeling was neither pro-Ford nor pro-Carter. Both equally received the attention of the great Polish American community in our area.

I think that the President's statement may have caused a temporary slowdown in the ethnic inroads he was making, but I feel that the record that he set straight today is going to put him back on the track and people will not stop and be turned off simply because of something that he said during the debate.

Q Before you get off the stand, Mr. Kij, you are identified here on the list put out by the White House as being with the Polish Union of America.

MR. KIJ: The Polish Union of America is a fraternal benefit society founded in 1890 in Buffalo. I am the president of that organization, and is part of the Polish American Congress, which is the umbrella organization representing approximately 12 million Americans of Polish descent.

Q Which one do you prefer to be identified with? That is all I am asking.

MR. KIJ: It is immaterial.

Q Can you tell us how the meeting was organized? Were you earlier here in the week or last week for organizational purposes?

MR. KIJ: No, I was here in September at which time the Pulaski Day Proclamation, yesterday, was designated by the President on the anniversary of the American Revolutionary War heroes' death. This was done in September and at that time a member of the Polish American Congress was presented to the President bringing up several of the items that he covered, and at that time we were very well pleased with his answers to questions about the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine which were put to rest for the last time.

This is why just a bit of confusion erupted when the President said those words during the debate. I don't think that those of us who were here from throughout the country, there were only a dozen of us, I don't think we really felt there was a change in the United States or Administration policy, but we did want to have this matter clarified, and I fully believe that everyone that was here today was satisfied with his explanation that he misspoke. And I believe the actual words that he used are right in the prepared text.


We all knew this. I was notified yesterday there might be a meeting of people from the Eastern European nations, that is representatives of groups from that area.

Q Was Mr. Osajda there from the Polish Croatian Roman Catholic Union?

MR. KIJ: Mr. Osajda was not present here today. He is from Chicago.

MR. ROBERTS: The President is about to depart from the South Ground and those who wish to photograph or witness the departure should assemble up here at this time.

MRS. FALTUS: I just want to make a short statement. I am representing the Czechoslovak National Council of America and my name is Anna Faltus. The President admitted that he made a mistake in the debate and his statement that he released today should clarify the issue, and we are all convinced that President Ford's record in Congress speaks for itself.



Q Can anyone tell us how this meeting was organized? Who called whom?

MR. MEDWED: There was a telephone call made from the White House in regards to the statement because of the numerous telegrams and letters and phone calls, and we were bombarded in our local communities, and we in turn passed on to the White House the urgency of such a meeting. It was agreed by Mr. Ford to have this meeting this morning and some of us have traveled half of the night and early morning to be here in order to be present, those who were able to be available.

Q Did you travel at your own expense?

MR. MEDWED: We traveled at our own expense, that is right.

Q When did this start?

MR. MEDWED: I would imagine sometime yesterday afternoon. I was reached at 4:00 in the afternoon and made a plane right away.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 11:15 A.M. EDT)

