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## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1a. Analysis	1. <u>Q.&amp;A. re OAU - Summit, 1/12/76</u> "OAU-Angola" (3 pp.) <i>Sanitized 5/29/97 KBH</i>	1/12/76	A
<del>2a. Cable</del>	2. <u>Nessen to Connie G., ca. 1/13/76</u> <del>AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA to SECSTATE WASHDC (2 pp.)</del> <i>declassified 10/17/97</i>	<del>1/13/76</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>3a. Cable</del>	3. <u>Nessen to Connie G., ca. 6/24/76</u> <del>SECSTATE WASHDC to ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE (4 pp.)</del> <i>Declassified 12/4/96</i>	<del>6/24/76</del>	<del>A</del>

## FILE LOCATION

Ron Nessen Papers  
General Subject File  
Box 1 - Angola

## RESTRICTION CODES

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WHM, 10/23/84



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explain the issue. It is one of these technical issues. There is no dispute that the radar in Kamchatka faces the Soviet Union and not the United States. And therefore we are dealing with a test radar. The ABM treaty requires that ABM testing could take place only at agreed test ranges, and we listed ours. The Soviet Union didn't list theirs.

*Q: You listed one for them.*

A: We unilaterally listed one for them, and the Soviet Union gave an ambiguous reply to that, saying what their test ranges were was generally known, but they would not confirm or deny the one we gave for them; and I think we claimed two for ourselves.

If the Soviet Union had claimed the Kamchatka range for itself at that time, there would be no problem. If the Soviet Union told us today that the Kamchatka range is an ABM test range then, supposing we were satisfied about the characteristics of the radar, there would be no significant problem.

So here we are dealing with a technical issue of what an agreed test range is—since there is no disagreement that the radar in Kamchatka faces into the Soviet Union and therefore must be used for some sort of internal tracking.

*Q: Mr. Secretary, isn't it true that you wouldn't have made these very important announcements here today and this report on intelligence and evaluation and how it all works if it hadn't been for the investigations on Capitol Hill?*

A: I didn't say anything about the investigations on Capitol Hill.

*Q: Yes, I know you didn't—but I mean this obviously is a reply to them, right?*

A: I did not criticize the investigations.

*Q: No, I didn't say you did. But I say, isn't it a good thing that we have had all this come out today, and isn't it true that it wouldn't have come out had it not been for the investigations up there?*

A: Well then the question is whether it could have come out without some of the wild charges that were made. But be that as it may, I am not criticizing the effort of the Congress to get clarity about how the intelligence process operates. And to the extent that my briefing today was elicited by the Congress, I have no objection if you give some credit to them.

*Q: Do you think this will take care of the subpoena now? You say you think this will be. . .*

A: No, no, on the subpoena—the subpoena

has nothing to do with this. The subpoena concerns covert operations and recommendations of Secretaries of State when I was not in office. It has nothing to do with any recommendations I made—recommendations of a previous decade to previous Presidents.

The President has exercised executive privilege with respect to that. I am under instructions from the President with respect to it. The resolution of this issue is between the White House and the committee. It is not an issue that concerns any actions while I have been Secretary of State, and it has nothing to do with the SALT issue. It has to do with the subject of covert operations, and the reason the President has exercised executive privilege is because he believed that recommendations of Cabinet members to the President should be protected. But I am not expressing a personal opinion on that subject.

*Q: Mr. Secretary, can we turn to another subject?*

A: Can we wind this up fairly soon? I have some luncheon guests upstairs who are getting restless.

*Q: All right. Mr. Kissinger, on the subject of Angola, you and the President have made some accusations. A protest has been made to the Soviet Union about alleged intervention. There's comments about Cuban intervention there. Isn't it about time that you told us roughly what the United States has done in the way of helping forces in Angola, and since when?*

A: I have said that the United States has tried to be helpful to some neighboring countries. Whatever we have done has started long after massive Soviet involvement became evident. So this is not a case that really lends itself to great dispute on that subject, because the Soviet Union has been active there in this manner since March. But I would rather not go any further until we see what can be done in the present diplomatic effort.


*Q: What can be done, Mr. Secretary?*

A: Well that's what we are trying. . .

*Q: What are the available opportunities open to the United States. . .*

A: That's what we are trying to find out. We have stated repeatedly that outside powers should stay out of Angola, and especially, extra-continental powers should stay out of Angola.

*Q: What do you mean, Mr. Secretary, when you say whatever we have done started long after*



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*the massive—what has the United States done?*

A: I have said that we try to give some assistance to neighboring countries—not South Africa—but I don't want to go any further.

Q: *Mr. Secretary, before we say "thank you," some of my colleagues seem about to bury Mr. Brezhnev. Can you give us your latest estimate of the state of his health?*

A: I have received no communication from the Soviet Government about the health of Mr. Brezhnev, as has been alleged. My visit to the Soviet Union has absolutely nothing to do with any comments regarding his state of health. Our impression is that he is in active charge and that he will continue beyond the Party Congress.

*THE PRESS: Thank you, sir.*





But we have no evidence whatever for that.

*Q: Mr. Secretary, when you say you consider the Soviet actions in Angola incompatible with detente, what does that mean? What is the "or else," and how incompatible?*

*A: Let us make a few observations here about detente. And let us separate two things: The relationship with the Soviet Union that is inherent in the relation of two superpowers; and, secondly, those relations that are subject to decisions and that we can regulate in terms of Soviet behavior.*

The basic problem in our relations with the Soviet Union is the emergence of the Soviet Union into true superpower status. That fact has become evident only in the 1970's. As late as the Cuban missile crisis, the disparity in strategic power between the United States and the Soviet Union was overwhelming in our favor. In the 1970's and 1980's the Soviet Union will have achieved, and is on the road to achieving, effective strategic equality, which means that, whoever may be ahead in the damage they can inflict on the other, the damage to the other in a general nuclear war will be of a catastrophic nature.

This being the case, in the past the emergence of a country into superpower status—such as, for example, imperial Germany vis-a-vis Great Britain—has generally led to war. Under the conditions of the nuclear age, it must not lead to war. That is a fact of the period that any administration, and any opponent of the administration, would have to face if they had to assume responsibility. How to manage the emergence of Soviet power without sacrificing vital interests is the pre-eminent problem of our period. That part of the Soviet-American relationship cannot be abolished. That is inherent in the relationship.

The second problem we have is whether we can accelerate this process of moderating this potential conflict by conscious acts of policy. This has been called detente. In this respect, it requires conscious restraint by both sides. If one side does not practice restraint, then the situation becomes inherently tense. We do not confuse the relaxation of tensions with permitting the Soviet Union to expand its sphere by military means. And that is the issue, for example, in Angola. The danger to detente that we face now is that our domestic disputes are depriving us of both the ability to provide incentives for moderation, such as in the

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restrictions on the trade act, as well as of the ability to resist military moves by the Soviet Union, as in Angola.

If the Soviet Union continues action such as Angola, we will, without any question, resist. And failure to resist can only lead other countries to conclude that their situation is becoming increasingly precarious—because in Angola we are not talking about American participation; we are talking about giving military and financial assistance to people who are doing the fighting, to local people who are doing the fighting.


To return to your question, unless the Soviet Union shows restraint in its foreign policy actions, the situation in our relationship is bound to become more tense; and there is no question that the United States will not accept Soviet military expansion of any kind.

*Q: Mr. Secretary, in a democracy when there is this kind of conflict between the executive branch and the legislative branch and the legislative branch is not moving and is not responding to your requests and to your entreaties, how is that eventually resolved? I mean, you can't act without Congress.*

*A: It will become resolved when the consequences of these actions become apparent. The danger is that they usually become apparent too late. We warned and warned about the implications of the amendments with respect to Soviet trade. The end result was that the trade act could not be implemented, or the trade agreement could not be implemented, and the people who were supposed to be helped were hurt in the sense that Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union fell from 38,000 to 10,000.*

We warned and warned about the implications of the Turkish aid cutoff, and it is now perfectly evident that our relations with Turkey have been damaged beyond any immediate hope of recovery, though we have made some progress. And we are warning now that what is happening in Angola has nothing to do with the local situation in Angola.

We were prepared to accept any outcome in Angola, before massive arms shipments by the Soviet Union and the introduction of Cuban forces occurred. We are not opposed to the MPLA as such. We make a distinction between the factions in Angola and the outside intervention. We can live with any of the factions in Angola, and we would



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never have given assistance to any of the other factions, if other great powers had stayed out of it.

*Q: Mr. Secretary, if their congressional restraints on action in Angola by us, or for Angola, are not removed—and there isn't any sign that they are going to be—how can you make your statement stick that the United States will not accept Soviet military expansion of any kind? It ties your hands, does it not?*

*A: It ties our hands, but it is my conviction that if one does not discharge one's responsibilities in one place, one will be forced to do so elsewhere under more difficult circumstances. The problem will not go away. The situation will become more difficult.*

*Q: Mr. Secretary, to follow that up, if I could ask a complicated question on that: I thought that one of the lessons of Viet-Nam was that the United States is no longer going to be the policeman for the world. There are no vital U.S. interests at all in Angola. You said that publicly. The Russians have a long history of failures in Africa. Why is it necessary every time the Russians get involved anywhere in the world, even in places where American interests are not affected, that you feel that you are compelled to go confront them?*

*And in connection with that, if you consider it so important, why do it in a clandestine way? Why don't you take it to the Congress and say, "This is important; we need money for it," and have it debated at the beginning, instead of having it blow up in your face?*

*A: May I separate out some of the strands of this exposition?*

First, the phrase that the United States cannot be the world's policeman is one of those generalities that needs some refinement. The fact of the matter is that security and progress in most parts of the world depend on some American commitment.

Now with respect to Angola, the issue, I repeat, is not whether a pro-Soviet faction is becoming dominant in Angola. The U.S. policy until well into the summer was to stay out of Angola, to let the various factions work out their own arrangements between themselves. We accepted in Mozambique, without any difficulty, a pro-Marxist faction that came to power by indigenous means, or perhaps with some minimum outside support, in the Frelimo [Mozambique

Liberation Front]. What happened between March and the middle of the summer was a massive introduction of Soviet military equipment, which was then followed by Soviet advisers and large numbers of Cuban troops—large at least in relation to what it takes in Angola to affect the situation.

Therefore, the issue is not whether the country of Angola represents a vital interest to the United States. The issue is whether the Soviet Union, backed by a Cuban expeditionary force, can impose on two-thirds of the population its own brand of government. And the issue is not whether the United States should resist it with its own military forces. Nobody ever suggested the introduction of American military forces. The President has made it clear that under no circumstances will we introduce American military forces. The issue is whether the United States will disqualify itself from giving a minimal amount of economic and military assistance to the two-thirds of the population that is resisting an expeditionary force from outside the hemisphere and a massive introduction of Soviet military equipment.

If the United States adopts as a national policy that we cannot give even military and economic assistance to people who are trying to defend themselves without American military forces, then we are practically inviting outside forces to participate in every situation in which there is a possibility for foreign intervention. And we are, therefore, undermining any hope of political and international order.

Now as far as the Congress is concerned, let us keep in mind we are talking about trivial sums. We are talking about tens of millions of dollars. And there is something wrong if one says that, if one approves tens of millions of dollars, the next thing you know is you will have spent \$150 billion and have 500,000 troops there. A country must know how to make distinctions. We are talking about tens of millions of dollars in a situation in which our whole strategy was to produce a negotiated solution, of which the first step was going to be the speech I made in Detroit at the end of November.

We did it in a clandestine way because we did not want to have a public confrontation if we could avoid it. Nor is it correct to say that the Congress did not know about it. Congressional committees were briefed on 25 separate occasions about what we were doing in Angola. Every stage



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We had hoped that on the relatively small scale that the operation was conducted—and with the very extensive congressional briefing that was going on—that to escalate the problem too much would complicate its solution.

It is perfectly clear now that, if we go back to the Congress for additional support, we will have to put the facts in all their details before the Congress. But I would also point out that there is an area in which confidential diplomacy must have an opportunity to operate or every problem becomes that much more difficult.

*Q: Mr. Secretary, isn't it a fact that a year ago the primary outside forces engaged in Angola; that is, the supplies and advisers, were China and the Soviet Union and that the Chinese withdrew sometime in the summer and that the United States more or less filled the gap left by the Chinese?*

A: That is, with all respect, a rather superficial way of putting it. Our involvement—and again, I must repeat—our involvement is relatively small financial support to African countries that have asked us to help other Africans. It is not a commitment of American forces in Angola. Ours occurred when a very substantial influx of Soviet forces, extending over many months, beyond any capacity of the Chinese to match, seemed to create a situation where an outside power imposed its solution on the country. It was not coordinated with the Chinese. It was not discussed with the Chinese. It was done for our own reasons.

*Q: Mr. Secretary, why do you consistently minimize any reference to South Africa's involvement in your statements on Angola? Are you less concerned about South African involvement than Soviet involvement? And what diplomatic pressures, if any, are you taking to get South Africa to withdraw?*

A: I believe that the removal of South African forces is a relatively simpler matter than the removal of Cuban and Soviet forces. And the United

States, I have stated publicly, and I have repeated it today, is in favor of the removal of both Cuban and South African forces and of all outside intervention.

*Q: Mr. Secretary, do you have any realistic hope or expectation of getting money from Congress to continue your efforts in Angola? And two, if you do not, these dangers that you warn of, what practical consequences might there be?*

A: Well, we are going to make a major effort, both diplomatically and on the ground, to make do with what we have, to generate as much support from other countries as we can. And we have had very positive responses from many African countries over the last few days. And we will also make our views known to those countries that will attend the OAU summit meeting on January 10 and 12. So we are not operating on the assumption that it must necessarily fail.


*Q: Mr. Secretary, you can have a diplomatic dialogue with the Soviet Union by hinting that detente or SALT or other initiatives are threatened, but what pressure points do you have with the Cubans who have 5,000 or 6,000 expeditionary troops there?*

A: First of all, let us keep in mind one thing: That SALT, and what I described as detente, is in our common interest. It is not a favor we grant to the Soviet Union. It is an inherent necessity of the present period. Avoiding nuclear war is not a favor we do anybody. Avoiding nuclear war without giving up any interests is the problem that we face now.

As far as Cuba is concerned, we have no particular additional pressure points. And on the other hand, we do not believe that Cuba would do what it is doing except under Soviet advice.

*THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.*

THE SECRETARY: May I say Merry Christmas to you all.





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QUESTION: Mr. President, yesterday you issued a statement about your sentiments on what the Senate has done on Angola.

THE PRESIDENT: I said it fairly strongly.

QUESTION: You sure did. After you did it, Dr. Kissinger said something a little more even stronger over at the State Department around five o'clock. He said the responsibility of the conduct of foreign policy is not altered or affected simply because Congress has taken an action. I don't know quite how to read that but I can read that once you spend the money that is in the pipeline there is not any more. What is the United States policy toward Angola going to be given the fact that you are going to run out of money in about two months?

THE PRESIDENT: Our fundamental purpose in Angola was to make sure that the people of Angola decide their own fate, establish their own government and proceed as an independent nation. We think it is fundamentally very unwise, very harmful for any foreign power such as the Soviet Union is obviously doing and as Cuba is doing to try to dominate any government in that country. All we want is for the majority of the people in Angola to decide for themselves what they want.

Now unfortunately because the Soviet Union has spent literally millions and millions of dollars and unfortunately because Cuba has anywhere from 4,000 to 6,000 combat troops in Angola, we think this is a setback for the people in Angola.

Now I take this problem very seriously.


QUESTION: Well, what is to be done with your hands tied, so to speak?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Congress unfortunately has tied our hands and I think it is a serious mistake. I feel very strongly that a great country like the United States should have flexibility to help those people in any one country to decide their own fate and the action of the Congress is crucial in that it has deprived us of helping a majority of the people in Angola to make their own decisions. The problem that I foresee on a broader basis is a good many countries throughout the world consider the United States friendly and helpful and we have over a period of time helped to maintain free governments around the world. Those countries that have depended on us, and there are many, can't help but have some misgivings because the Congress has refused any opportunity for us in Angola to help a majority of the people and they can't help but feel that the same fate might occur as far as they are concerned in the future.

I hope the House of Representatives will have a different view and we are certainly going to try and get the House of Representatives to reverse the Senate action.

MORE

US motives



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QUESTION: If not, are we through there?

THE PRESIDENT: I never say we are through but the action of the Senate has seriously handicapped any effort that we could make to achieve a negotiated settlement so that the people of Angola could have a free and independent government.

QUESTION: Mr. President, on that subject why did we not start earlier in making public our opposition to what the Soviet Union was doing there and telling this country how much money and what effort we were making there, and can you tell us how much money we spent there?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think it is wise for me to discuss in any detail what we have done or contemplated doing. It was a legitimate covert operation where not one American military personnel was involved in the operation and we had no intention whatsoever of ever sending any U. S. military personnel there, but to discuss any further details than that I think in this case as in any other covert action case the President just should not discuss it publicly.

QUESTION: Mr. President, now that the Soviet Union is persisting despite what the Congress did on our side in pouring equipment and material into Angola, do you see now the possibility that this might seriously harm any chance for a completion of SALT 2?

THE PRESIDENT: The persistence of the Soviet Union in Angola with a hundred million dollars or more worth of military aid certainly does not help the continuation of detente. Now I will add another comment. As I said earlier, there are between 4,000 and 6,000 Cuban combat military personnel in Angola. The action of the Cuban government in sending combat forces to Angola destroys any opportunity for improvement in relations with the United States. They have made a choice in effect and I mean very literally has precluded any improvement in relations with Cuba.

QUESTION: Mr. President, do you see any possibility that this matter could be taken to the United Nations or worked on from the diplomatic standpoint now?

THE PRESIDENT: We certainly intended to try to get diplomatic efforts underway and to help in the diplomatic area but I think our influence in trying to get a diplomatic solution is severely undercut by the action of the United States Senate.

Now there is a meeting in early January of the Organization of African Union, the foreign ministers of that organization. They are meeting the first week or so in Africa. We hope that they will take some action to let the Angolans themselves decide this. In addition, there is a meeting later in January of the heads of government of the OAU. That body, of course, is the one that could do the most and I know that there are a number of African states who have apprehension about a foreign power dominating a country as rich and potentially strong as Angola and so I



THE PRESIDENT: Both Secretary Kissinger and I have spoken out very strongly against the Soviet activities in Angola, and I reaffirm it today. I think what is being done in Angola by the Soviet Union and in conjunction with the Cubans is not constructive from the point of view of detente.

We couldn't be any firmer publicly than we have been in that regard. But, I think we have an obligation to continue to work within the framework of detente because there are some other benefits that have accrued. I think SALT I was a step forward, and if SALT II can be negotiated on a mutual basis, it will be constructive within the framework of detente.

But, I reaffirm Angola is an example of where I think detente has not worked the way it should work, and we strongly object to it.

QUESTION: Is it possible, sir, that detente may simply end up being agreements on nuclear weapons and nothing else?

THE PRESIDENT: I hope not. I think it ought to have a far broader implication. I think detente can be helpful, just as an example, in the long run solution in the Middle East, and there are some good signs that it is helping to moderate certain influences in the Middle East.

QUESTION: Mr. President, your predecessor sat in this office in May of 1970 and warned against the United States of America becoming a pitiful, helpless giant. In a sense, our speaking out on Angola is about all we can do.

The United States, seemingly operating in the framework of detente, seems to be powerless to do anything other than speak out in offering statements by the Presidents and by the Secretary of State.

Have we, therefore, in effect, reached a kind of a status in the world where we are a pitiful, helpless giant in the continent of Africa?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we are a pitiful, helpless giant. In Africa, we have a great many countries that look to us and work with us, and I think are sympathetic to what we are trying to do in conjunction with them.

There are some African States who obviously don't look toward us, but look toward the Soviet Union. I think we would have been in a stronger position to find a compromise in Angola if the Senate had not taken the action that it took.

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Nevertheless, despite that setback, we are maximizing the utilization of funds that are available, small as they are, and we are moving as strongly as possible in the area of diplomatic initiatives with the OAU, on a bilateral basis with African States, with other countries throughout the world that have an interest in Africa.

I certainly think, despite the handicap of the Senate action, we are going to do everything we possibly can, and we certainly are not a pitiful giant in this process.

QUESTION: Mr. President, can I follow that one up?

THE PRESIDENT: Surely.

QUESTION: You said you would do everything you possibly can. Would this include the use of rethinking of the sale of grain as a political weapon or diplomatic tool?

THE PRESIDENT: I think the grain sale with the Soviet Union, the five-year agreement, is a very constructive part of the policy of detente. It certainly is constructive from the point of view of American agriculture. We have a guarantee of six million tons a year with a top limit of some eight million tons.

It, I think, over the long haul, will be looked upon as a very successful negotiation. I see no reason at this time, certainly, under the circumstances existing today, for any revision of that negotiated agreement.

QUESTION: Mr. President, why is it necessary for you to rule out any improvements in our relations with Cuba when what they are doing in Angola is essentially no different than what the Soviet Union is doing, or South Africa is doing, but especially what the Cubans have done?

THE PRESIDENT: It is pretty hard for me to see what legitimate interest Cuba has in sending some 6,000 well-equipped, well-trained military personnel to Angola. I just don't see what their interest is, and it certainly doesn't help our relations with Cuba when they know we think it is in the best interests of the three parties in that country to settle their differences themselves.

QUESTION: You say it is not the understanding of the way of detente with the Soviet Union, it has not broken off our relations with South Africa and what they are doing there. Why is Cuba singled out for apparently more strict treatment?

MORE



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AF:WESchaufele, Jr. 1/8

The United States regrets the decision of the Government of Nigeria to publish a personal communication from the President of the United States to the Head of State of Nigeria. The attack which accompanied the release is completely unwarranted.

The United States has been conducting discussions on Angola with Nigerian representatives over a period of some weeks. These discussions have been marked by the mutual respect, friendship and candor which have characterized our relations with Nigeria. In fact, although our two governments have not been in complete accord on this subject, we consider that there has been a large area of common agreement.

We reject the unjustified accusations directed toward the United States. But we are particularly disturbed by the gratuitous impugning, in highly intemperate language, of United States motivations and objectives which has never been mentioned by Nigerian representatives in private conversations between the representatives of our two countries.



Whatever disagreements we may have on this question the United States has sought, in its approach to the Angolan question, to support the principles - non-intervention and self-determination - which are universally accepted in Africa and elsewhere, and the recommendations of the OAU Conciliation Commission. President Ford's letter was simply a restatement of the U.S. position which was well-known to the Nigerian Government.





January 12, 1976

OAU - SUMMIT

Q. Did the President have any reaction to, or comment on, the OAU debate and the apparent split over Angola? Are we taking any new diplomatic initiatives, in view of the OAU divisiveness?

A. I have nothing new to report diplomatically, but as for the OAU Summit, our position remains that we hope the Summit facilitates an early end to the fighting in Angola and a resolution to what should be essentially an African problem there.

FYI ONLY: See attached analysis of the Summit.



January 12, 1976

OAU-ANGOLA

The badly divided summit meeting on Angola of the Organization of African Unity, which opened Saturday in Addis Ababa, enters its third and possibly decisive session today. After the brief opening session adjourned on Saturday, most representatives held private discussions and strategy sessions. The meeting yesterday, held in closed session, was stormy at times and apparently ended in deadlock.

Seventeen of the OAU's 46 heads of state were on hand when the summit opened under the chairmanship of Uganda's President Amin. At Amin's request, Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi, the leaders of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, were seated as observers at the opening session. Neither was allowed to attend the closed session.

Agostinho Neto, head of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, declined to attend. He is represented by the "foreign minister" of his Luanda-based regime. A high-level Cuban delegation is also present and is lobbying in support of the Popular Movement.

Saturday's opening session quickly pointed up the sharp division among the delegates, who are apparently split almost evenly between those who seek OAU recognition of the Popular Movement as the sole legitimate government of Angola and those who are opposed to recognition of either rival Angolan regime and want to resolve the conflict by gaining agreement for a government of national unity.

The first speaker, Mozambique's President Machel, denounced South Africa's intervention in Angola. He charged that the National Front and National Union no longer deserve OAU support because of their collaboration with Pretoria and called for OAU endorsement of the Popular Movement in its struggle against South Africa.

In a strong rejoinder, Senegalese President Senghor declared that, to be honest, those who condemn South Africa should also condemn the USSR and Cuba for their involvement in Angola. Senghor appealed for a compromise solution that would allow the Angolan people to decide for themselves on a government rather than having one imposed on them in violation of the OAU charter.

The key issue at yesterday's closed session was the question of whether to abandon the OAU's present neutral stance toward the three warring Angolan nationalist groups and officially back the Popular Movement as Angola's government. The Popular Movement submitted a formal request to the OAU secretariat to recognize the Neto regime and to admit Angola as an OAU member.

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By KBH, NARA, Date 5/28/97

January 12, 1976

In an effort to block action on this proposal, the National Front and National Union made a similar request, seeking recognition of their own side. They acted on the advice of the Zairian ambassador to Ethiopia, who claims that, under the OAU charter, when two requests for the admission of a single territory are made by opposing groups, both must be rejected out of hand. The Popular Movement's supporters, under a different interpretation of the OAU charter, apparently are seeking to have the matter of admission considered as a procedural question that can be decided by a simple majority vote, rather than a substantive question requiring a two-thirds vote.


████████████████████ 22 OAU members in favor of a government of national unity yesterday proposed a compromise draft resolution designed to postpone entirely the volatile question of recognition. The proposal reportedly would:

- Condemn South African intervention in Angola.
- Condemn all other foreign involvement in Angola without mentioning by name Cuba or the USSR.
- Demand the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Angola.
- Call for the rival Angolan factions to cease fighting on a date to be agreed on by the OAU summit and remain in place when a cease-fire goes into effect.
- Urge the Angolan nationalist leaders to reach an agreement, under OAU supervision and in an African city of their choice, to create the conditions for national reconciliation and to establish a government of national unity.
- Call for the formation of a temporary committee of OAU heads of state to implement the resolution with the aid of the OAU defense commission.

████████████████████ the Popular Movement's backers—led by Nigeria, Algeria, and Burundi—as uncompromising and determined to press for OAU recognition of the Neto regime by tying the issue to a resolution condemning South Africa. According to Radio Luanda, the Popular Movement will reject any cease-fire proposal by the OAU in the absence of prior recognition of the Popular Movement.

A resolution favoring the Popular Movement has been sponsored by Nigeria and is backed by 22 OAU states. It reportedly calls for:

- Recognition of the Popular Movement and its concurrent admission to membership in the OAU.



Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

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January 12, 1976

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--Condemnation of South African involvement in Angola.

--Language committing the Popular Movement to discuss a coalition government for Angola, providing it is recognized and admitted to the OAU.

Zairian Foreign Minister Bula is said to believe that the anti-Movement group is solid enough to block this proposal. ~~SECRET~~

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

NOTE FOR:

*Connie G,*

FROM

: RON NESSEN

*Contains*

*classified*

*cable.*

*RAN*



ANGOLA - OAU  
ADJOURNS WITHOUT RESOLUTION

Q. The OAU Summit adjourned last night without agreement or compromise on the Angolan situation. Is the President disappointed by this development, and does it, in fact, dim the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Angolan conflict?

A. I can say that the President intends to pursue diplomatic initiatives to help bring about a ceasefire and negotiations for a coalition government. He will continue to call for an end to all foreign intervention and to assist those countries who share our goals for Angola.

*will draw all foreigners, cease fire, no govt.*

*No recognized govt  
Not possible to get recog for MPLA.  
1/2 of Africans want national unit govt.*

ON BACKGROUND:

You may say that the President, of course, had hoped that the Summit might facilitate an end to the fighting -- or at least call for an end to foreign intervention, but the fact that the Summit adjourned without a rush by the majority to recognize the MPLA is in itself a hopeful sign.

NOTE:

See attached cable analyzing OAU conclusion.





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AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2784  
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 651  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ADDIS ABABA 0417

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR OAU AO  
SUBJECT: OAU ANGOLAN SL MIT: ADJOURNS AS HEAD-ON CONFRONTATION  
BRINGS NO SOLUTION  
REF: ADDIS ABABA 0398 AND PREVIOUS

1. AT 05:30 LOCAL TIME, JANUARY 13, OAU SPOKESMAN TOLD NEWSMEN AND OTHER OAU WATCHERS THAT THE SUMMIT HAD BEEN ADJOURNED. HE SAID THAT AFTER SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING THE ANGOLAN PROBLEM JANUARY 10 TO 12, THE ASSEMBLY OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE OAU HAD DECIDED TO ADJOURN THE SUMMIT AND TO REQUEST THE BUREAU (FOR ANGOLA) OF THE 12TH SUMMIT (IN KAMPALA) TO FOLLOW THE QUESTION CLOSELY.

2. ALTHOUGH MANY ATTEMPTS AT COMPROMISE WERE MADE BY MEMBERS OF THE ASSEMBLY AND AS MANY AS 5 DRAFT PROPOSALS WERE REPORTEDLY DISCUSSED JANUARY 12, HARDLINERS, FROM BOTH PRO-MPLA AND ANTI-MPLA FACTIONS, REFUSED TO COM- PROMISE, WHILE ALL CONFEREES COULD AGREE TO CONDEMN SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION AND THE MODERATE PROPOSAL FOR A GOVERNMENT OF RECONCILIATION WAS DISCARDED MIDWAY DURING THE DAY, REPORTEDLY NO AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS.

3. ACCORDING TO ONE RELIABLE SOURCE, THE ASSEMBLY AP-

\*\*\*\*\*WHHR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

SCONCROFT, HYLAND, LL

RECALLED  
PAGE 01

PSN:020143

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DTG:130820Z JAN 76

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8

UA 97-4, #2 State Hr. 6/24/97

By KBH NARA, Date 10/17/97



POINTED A 5-NATION NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE FROM EACH SIDE TO TRY TO HAMMER OUT A COMPROMISE FOR THE GOOD OF AFRICA. ACCORDING TO THIS SOURCE, AFTER THIS GROUP HAD ENGAGED IN CONSIDERABLE DEBATE, OAU CHAIRMAN IDIDAMIN IMPATIENTLY INTERRUPTED IT AND HUMOROUSLY URGED THE GROUP TO FIND A SOLUTION WHICH WOULD SAVE HIS CHAIRMANSHIP FROM ILL REPUTE. THIS REPORTEDLY ANGERED THE CONFEREES WHO TOLD AMIN TO WITHDRAW. AMIN WITHDREW AND APPARENTLY PRECIPITOUSLY ADJOURNED THE SUMMIT.

4. ALTHOUGH APPARENTLY ACTIVE AWAY FROM OAU PREMISES, THE CUBAN DELEGATION DID NOT ADDRESS THE SUMMIT AS PREDICTED POSSIBLE IN ADDIS ABABA 0313.

5. COMMENT: THROUGHOUT THE DAY AND NIGHT OF JANUARY 12, AND THE EARLY MORNING OF JANUARY 13, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THERE WAS LITTLE GIVE ON THE BOTH SIDES FOR A COMPROMISE. MORE EXPERIENCED HEADS OF STATE SUCH AS NYERERE OF TANZANIA AND SIAD OF SOMALIA ON THE PRO-MPLA SIDE AND KUANDA FROM ZAMBIA ON THE ANTI-MPLA SIDE REPORTEDLY SHOWED CONSIDERABLE WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE. MORE RADICAL MPLA SUPPORTERS AND THE MPLA ITSELF, WHOSE BACK WAS STIFFERED BY THE CUBAN DELEGATION CURRENTLY IN ADDIS, REFUSED ANY SIGNIFICANT COMPROMISE. WHILE NOTE "THE DEATH KNEEL OF THE OAU" AS WARNED BY GHANAIAN FOREIGN MINISTER FELLI (C.F. PARA 4 ADDIS 0284), THE FAILURE OF THE SUMMIT TO ARRIVE AT AT LEAST AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE, HOWEVER WATERED DOWN, IS A SEVERE SETBACK TO OAU PRESTIGE, HEIGHTENS INTRA-AFRICAN TENSIONS AND OPENS THE WAY FOR EVEN GREATER DISARRAY IN ANGOLA.

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PAGE 02

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RI

PEACE TALKS

*Seoweroff, Hyland, LL*

LUSAKA, ZAMBIA (AP) -- SECRET TALKS ARE UNDERWAY AMONG SEVERAL AFRICAN STATES SEEKING A PEACEFUL COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE WARRING SOVIET-BACKED FACTION IN ANGOLA AND ONE OF THE WESTERN-BACKED GROUPS, RELIABLE SOURCES SAID TODAY.

THE MOVE IS A DIPLOMATIC EFFORT BY THE STATES WHICH OPPOSE RECOGNITION OF THE MARXIST MOVEMENT IN ANGOLA AS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT OF THE FORMER PORTUGUESE TERRITORY.

ZAMBIAN SOURCES SAID THE PLAN IS TO CREATE A UNIFIED GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD MEET THE DEMANDS OF AFRICA'S MORE MILITANT STATES WHICH HAVE ALREADY EXTENDED DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION TO THE SOVIET-BACKED POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (MPLA).

THE SOURCES SAID A CUBAN DELEGATION WHICH RECENTLY VISITED ZAMBIA DISCUSSED THE LIKELIHOOD OF A MERGER OF THE MPLA AND THE WESTERN-BACKED UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA (UNITA).

THE PLAN, HOWEVER, WOULD TOTALLY EXCLUDE UNITA'S WESTERN-BACKED ALLY, THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (FNLA), WHICH HAS SUFFERED SERIOUS MILITARY DEFEATS IN NORTHERN ANGOLA IN RECENT DAYS.

THE MPLA IS SUPPORTED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND BACKED BY AN ESTIMATED 9,000 CUBAN TROOPS, WHILE UNITA DRAWS SUPPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA.

01-19-76 09:37EST



[6/24/76]

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

NOTE FOR: *Connie G.*  
FROM : RON NESSEN

*Classified.*

*RWN*





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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 166289

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UN, AO, US

SUBJECT: EXPLANATION OF US VETO OF ANGOLA'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE UN

1. WE VETED ANGOLA'S APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE UN AT THE JUNE 23 MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE VOTE WAS 13 IN FAVOR, THE US AGAINST, WITH CHINA NOT PARTICIPATING.

2. FOLLOWING IS SUBSTANTIVE TEXT OF STATEMENT MADE BY

\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

SCOW, HY, LL

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\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\* COPY

KBH 11/22/96



AMBASSADOR SHERER AT UN SECURITY COUNCIL AFTER THE VOTE.

BEGIN TEXT. THE U.S. REMAINS CONVINCED THAT ANGOLA DOES NOT YET MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR MEMBERSHIP SET FORTH IN ARTICLE 4 OF THE CHARTER. THE CONTINUING PRESENCE AND APPARENT INFLUENCE OF CUBAN TROOPS, MASSIVE IN NUMBER IN THE ANGOLAN CONTEXT, IS THE BASIS FOR OUR VIEW. THERE IS NOW NO JUSTIFICATION FOR SUCH A LARGE AND ARMED FOREIGN PRESENCE IN A TRULY INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATE:

-- MAJOR HOSTILITIES HAVE BEEN TERMINATED;

-- SOUTH AFRICA HAS WITHDRAWN HER TROOPS;

-- NEIGHBORING AFRICAN STATES HAVE BEGUN NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA.

WE REGRET THAT THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT HAS SEEN FIT, IN AN APPARENT SPIRIT OF CONFRONTATION, TO PRESS ITS APPLICATION NOW, BEFORE TIME AND DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGOLA MIGHT HAVE PERMITTED A RESOLUTION OF OUR CONCERNS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY REGRETTABLE SINCE THE APPLICATION CANNOT BE ACTED UPON BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN ANY EVENT FOR ANOTHER THREE MONTHS. END TEXT.

3. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD SEEK AN EARLY MEETING WITH HOST GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN MINISTER OR MOST SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL AVAILABLE TO MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- WE APPRECIATE GREATLY THE SUPPORT GIVEN BY THE AFRICAN DELEGATIONS TO THE UN IN ENCOURAGING THE MPLA AUTHORITIES TO POSTPONE THEIR REQUEST FOR AN IMMEDIATE VOTE ON THEIR MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION. FYI: SUPPORT AMONG AFRICANS FOR DELAY WAS GENERAL BUT TANZANIA, MOZAMBIQUE AND LIBYA WERE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL. END FYI.

-- IF THE ANGOLANS HAD HEEDED THE ADVICE FROM THEIR FRIENDS OUR VETO ON JUNE 23 COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED.

-- OUR POSITION HAS BEEN CLEAR. THE SECRETARY STATED IN DAKAR ON MAY 1 THAT WE ARE READY TO OPEN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ANGOLAN AUTHORITIES REGARDING NORMALIZING RELATIONS BUT WE MUST FIRST DETERMINE THE INTENTIONS OF THE ANGOLAN AUTHORITIES TOWARD THE MASSIVE PRESENCE OF CUBAN FORCES.

-- DESPITE CASTRO'S STATEMENTS AND OTHER ASSURANCES WE HAVE RECEIVED THAT SUCH A WITHDRAWAL IS TAKING PLACE, WE HAVE SEEN NO RELIABLE EVIDENCE THAT A SIGNIFICANT NET WITH-





DRAWAL IS UNDERWAY.

-- SINCE ANGOLA CAN ONLY BE ADMITTED TO THE UN BY A VOTE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AFTER IT OPENS AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER, IT SEEMED REASONABLE TO US AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL THAT SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF ANGOLA'S MEMBERSHIP SHOULD BE POSTPONED TO ALLOW EVIDENCE OF THE WITHDRAWAL TO ACCUMULATE, IF INDEED SUCH A WITHDRAWAL WERE TAKING PLACE AS CLAIMED.

CONFIDENTIAL

-- THE DECISION TO IGNORE THE ADVICE OF THE AFRICAN GROUP AND OF OTHER UN MEMBER STATES AND TO PRESS FOR

SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF ANGOLA'S APPLICATION AT THIS TIME HAS REINFORCED OUR BELIEF THAT THERE IS A PERVERSIVE NON=AFRICAN INFLUENCE ON CERTAIN SECTORS OF THE LUANDA REGIME.

-- WHILE THOSE WHO PRESSED THE ANGOLANS TO PROCEED IN THIS MANNER MAY WISH TO DEPICT THE U.S. AS UNFRIENDLY TO ANGOLA OR THE MPLA, OUR QUARREL IS NOT WITH THE MPLA NOR ITS IDEOLOGY. WE RECOGNIZE THAT, IN THE WAKE OF A LONG PERIOD OF COLONIAL RULE, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BROADLY BASED GOVERNMENT IN ANGOLA IS NOT AN EASY TASK. NEVERTHELESS WE HAVE FELT, AND CONTINUE TO FEEL IT VITAL THAT THE FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE BE WITHDRAWN. IT SEEMS TO US THE NEED FOR THE CUBAN TROOPS TO ASSURE MPLA'S AUTHORITY IN LARGE PARTS OF ANGOLA COULD BE ELIMINATED BY A POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION WITH THE OTHER IMPORTANT FACTIONS IN THAT COUNTRY. THIS WOULD BE A TRULY AFRICAN SOLUTION.

4. SUGGESTED PRESS GUIDANCE FOLLOWS:

Q. WHY DID THE U.S. VETO THE ANGOLAN APPLICATION FOR UN MEMBERSHIP?

A. RECALLING THE TRADITION OF INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN AFRICA, SECRETARY KISSINGER IN DAKAR, MAY 1, SAID "WE ARE READY TO OPEN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ANGOLAN AUTHORITIES REGARDING NORMALIZING RELATIONS, INCLUDING EVENTUAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION, BUT OUR COMMITMENT TO AFRICAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND UNITY COMPELS US FIRST TO DETERMINE THE INTENTIONS OF THE ANGOLAN AUTHORITIES TOWARD THE MASSIVE PRESENCE OF NON=AFRICAN TROOPS ON THEIR SOIL LONG AFTER ALL OTHER NON=ANGOLAN FORCES HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN."



IT IS NOW NEARLY TWO MONTHS SINCE SECRETARY KISSINGER MADE THESE REMARKS IN DAKAR. DESPITE VARIOUS INDICATIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED THAT THE CUBAN TROOPS INTENDED OR WERE BEGINNING TO WITHDRAW FROM ANGOLA, WE HAVE SEEN NO RELIABLE EVIDENCE THAT A SIGNIFICANT NET WITHDRAWAL IS UNDER WAY. SINCE ANGOLA CAN ENTER THE UN ONLY BY A VOTE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AFTER IT OPENS AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER, IT SEEMED REASONABLE TO US AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL THAT SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE OF MEMBERSHIP BE POSTPONED TO ALLOW EVIDENCE OF WITHDRAWAL TO

ACCUMULATE IF SUCH WITHDRAWAL IS INDEED TAKING PLACE AS CLAIMED. THE DECISION OF THE ANGOLAN AUTHORITIES TO PRESS FOR CONSIDERATION NOW RATHER THAN WAIT A FEW WEEKS SUGGESTS EITHER THAT WITHDRAWAL IS NOT OCCURRING OR THAT THOSE WHO PREFER CONFRONTATION TO DIALOGUE ARE IN THE ASCENDANCY IN LUANDA AND WISH A FORM OF SECURITY COUNCIL APPROBATION OF THE STATUS QUO. EITHER INTERPRETATION POINTS TO PERVASIVE NON-AFRICAN INFLUENCE.

B. HAS YOUR DECISION BEEN TAKEN BECAUSE OF DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS?

A. OUR DECISION IN THIS MATTER HAS BEEN TAKEN ON THE BASIS OF THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH I HAVE JUST OUTLINED FOR YOU.

Q. WOULD THE U.S. FAVORABLY CONSIDER A NEW ANGOLAN APPLICATION IF THERE WERE EVIDENCE OF CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWALS ?

A. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY SAID THAT IF THERE WERE SIGNS OF SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM ANGOLA, THIS WOULD SHOW THAT THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT WAS ASSUMING MORE OF THE ASPECTS OF A TRULY INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT. ROBINSON  
BT





## CIA in Portugal, Angola

# U.S. Funneling Aid, Ignoring Pledges

By Leslie H. Gelb

New York Times News Service

Millions of dollars are being poured covertly into Portugal and Angola by East and West, according to four official sources in Washington. The funneling of the funds is part of the continuing struggle for control of the Mediterranean and for influence and raw materials in Central Africa.

U.S. money for the Portuguese Socialist party and other parties is being funneled by the CIA through West European Socialist parties and labor unions, the sources said. The CIA involvement, the sources said, amounted to several million dollars a month over the last several months.

It is also reliably reported that the Soviet Union and its East European allies have poured \$50 million to \$100 million into Portugal since April 1974, and hundreds of tons of military equipment into Angola since March alone.

THE SOURCES also said that about 200 Chinese military advisers are operating from bases in Zaire to help at least one of the two liberation fronts being supported by Washington.

Until the spring, most of the Western aid to anti-Communist forces in Portugal was being given secretly by the West German Social Democratic party and the Belgian Socialist party without any American involvement.

The sources said that the funds earmarked for two anti-Soviet liberation fronts in Angola had been dispersed mainly through President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire.

In order to maintain good relations with Mobutu, the State Department has been seeking to arrange a refinancing of hundreds of millions of dollars in Zaire's

Leonid I. Brezhnev, were signing a pledge in Helsinki, Finland, last month not to interfere in the internal affairs of other European nations.

And Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, speaking to representatives of African countries Tuesday night, said: "We are most alarmed at the interference of extracontinental powers who do not wish Africa well, and whose involvement is inconsistent with the promise of true independence."

TWO OF THE sources stressed that all odds now favored victory by the Soviet-backed Popular Movement, unless the United States and China rushed huge transfusions of aid, which is considered highly unlikely.

The main purpose for the covert American effort in Angola reportedly is to underline the administration's support for Mobutu, the man on whom Kissinger is banking to oppose Moscow's interests in Africa and to further Washington's interests in various international forums.

The funds going to Portugal from the United States and Western Europe were said to be aimed at keeping non-Communist parties intact, in the streets, and in the business of competing with the Communists for the support of military leaders and soldiers.

One source said: "The President almost blew the whole Portugal thing last week in his interview with The Chicago Sun-Times. But nobody picked him up." This was a reference to Ford's reply to a question about the absence of CIA involvement in Portugal. He noted "our strong stand" along with NATO allies against a Communist government in Lisbon, then said: "I don't think the situation required us to

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The sources said that the funds earmarked for two anti-Soviet liberation fronts in Angola had been dispersed mainly through President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire.

In order to maintain good relations with Mobutu, the State Department has been seeking to arrange a refinancing of hundreds of millions of dollars in Zaire's short-term debts and to increase American aid to Zaire from about \$20 million to about \$60 million this year.

In Angola and Portugal, the sources estimated, Soviet aid is far more than American aid and, at least in the case of Angola, has included several direct shipments of arms.

**IT IS RELIABLY** reported that the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, East Germany and others have transferred the bulk of the funds going to the Portuguese Communist party through a bank in Lisbon and a bank in Zurich.

CIA operations in Portugal and Angola have been approved by President Ford and are being carried out, as prescribed by law, with the knowledge of six congressional subcommittees.

Both sides, first Moscow then Washington, were filling the coffers of their supporters in Portugal at the very time when Ford and the Soviet party leader,

favored victory by the Soviet-backed Popular Movement, unless the United States and China rushed huge transfusions of aid, which is considered highly unlikely.

The main purpose for the covert American effort in Angola reportedly is to underline the administration's support for Mobutu, the man on whom Kissinger is banking to oppose Moscow's interests in Africa and to further Washington's interests in various international forums.

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One source said: "The President almost blew the whole Portugal thing last week in his interview with The Chicago Sun-Times. But nobody picked him up." This was a reference to Ford's reply to a question about the absence of CIA involvement in Portugal. He noted "our strong stand" along with NATO allies against a Communist government in Lisbon, then said: "I don't think the situation required us to have a major CIA involvement, which we have not had." The source was pointing to the fact that Ford was not denying that the CIA had an involvement.

**THE SOURCES** either did not know or would not state when the covert operations began. But one of the sources said that Ford and Kissinger made the decision some time after they went to Brussels for a NATO meeting in late May.

It was after consultations with heads of state there, the source continued, that they saw how strongly the West European leaders felt about maintaining a non-Communist Portugal.

The source then explained: "We wanted to show them that we would stand with them on this one, and also more money was needed." Another source said that the West Europeans were already "giving plenty" and would have given more, but "it's just that we can't keep our hands out of anything."

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