

The original documents are located in Box 9, folder “Indochina Refugees - General (3)” of the Theodore C. Marrs Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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Refugee
Chron file

Dated today
June 4, 1975

Dr Marris
Belatedly! Attached
are two drafts of
the telegram. Please
let me know what
you finally decide.

Thanks
Julia Fayt



DRAFT

Dear Governor _____:

Recently, I was very happy to sign into law legislation to assist the resettlement of Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees who fled their homelands and are seeking a new life in the United States. I am deeply grateful to the Congress for its speed in passing this legislation and the American people for opening their arms to welcome these refugees to our shores.

Resettlement of these newcomers ^{is proceeding at the rate of 800/day} ~~has begun~~, but to ^{be} successful will require the widest possible support.

For this resettlement to be fully

TR The primary responsibility for the resettlement lies with the accredited voluntary agencies which since World War II have successfully resettled almost 1.5 million people. They know what is necessary to bring a refugee into a community and support him as he is integrated into American life and society. ^{and consistent with their individual desires.} In resettling the Indochinese refugees, ^{that} I am assured [^] the voluntary agencies will avoid resettlement in economically hard-hit areas and will not concentrate the refugees in specific localities. I hope that you will direct your State agencies to provide the fullest measure of support for the work of these voluntary agencies.

TR ^{In addition to the primary role of the volunteer agencies,} We have received many offers of help for ~~the~~ refugees from State and community leaders. Coordination of the local efforts and offers of assistance may become a problem in the coming months. I urge you to give consideration to the



creation of a state-~~side~~^{level} committee which will bring together ~~all of the heads~~ of the local resettlement organizations, the involved state officials, and interested citizens groups to consider refugee issues. The Committee would permit you to set state goals and standards and monitor ~~progress~~^{within your state.} With your backing, ~~it might~~^{the committee could} also be used to mobilize support in local communities, identify sponsorship, develop job opportunities, and explore solutions to problems ranging ~~all the way~~ from the certification of professionals to obtaining driver's licenses.

In some cases, state or local units of government may want to become involved more directly in the sponsorship of refugee families -- as the State of Washington has recently done. Such sponsorship entails the mobilization of resources from individuals, civic organizations and the business and labor community to assist in feeding, clothing, placing children in schools, and providing shelter for a refugee family until the head of household can find employment and a degree of self-sufficiency. Sponsorship is not a legal obligation; ^{but} it is a moral one. Sponsorship ~~It~~ entails an obligation ~~for~~ beyond initial financial support; ^{and} ~~it~~ requires a continuing concern for the effective integration of the refugee into American society.

The Federal Government through the Inter Agency Task Force on Refugees is prepared to reimburse ^{certain} costs incurred by a _h

state or local unit of government up to \$500 per person as soon as resettlement is completed.

State and local community involvement with sponsorship activities should not interfere or compete with the voluntary agency resettlement programs, but rather ~~should~~ supplement these efforts by drawing upon individuals and groups who are not ~~already~~ connected with existing refugee programs.

A Sponsorship ~~program~~ should be ~~designed to~~ provide a full range of services to each refugee in an effort to reduce their likelihood of becoming welfare recipients.

However, as a protection to the States, ~~the~~ legislation ^{currently provided} ~~provides DHEW~~ with authority to reimburse up to 100% of costs for health, income maintenance, and social service funds to needy refugees who are unable to become self-sufficient in spite of sponsorship efforts.

~~Members of~~ The Inter-Agency Task Force on Refugees will be contacting you in the next few days with more specific information about these programs ^{and with a name point of contact}

We have made a good beginning in the resettlement of these newest refugees to our country. I ^{know} ~~hope~~ that during the coming months I can count on your support in the integration of these refugees into American life. What you will

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designate
person
your staff
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The Department of Health, Education & Welfare ^{provides} ~~provides DHEW~~ with authority to reimburse up to 100% of costs for health, income maintenance, and social service funds to needy refugees who are unable to become self-sufficient in spite of sponsorship efforts.

^{is}
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and the values ~~to which we are committed~~ in which we all believe
Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

Draft 2

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Resettlement of these newcomers has begun, but to be successful will require the widest possible support. The primary responsibility for the resettlement lies with the accredited voluntary agencies which since World War II have successfully resettled almost 1.5 million people. They know what is necessary to bring a refugee into a community and support him as he is integrated into American life and society. In resettling the Indochinese refugees, I am assured the voluntary agencies will avoid resettlement in economically hard-hit areas and will not concentrate the refugees in specific localities. I hope that you will direct your State agencies to provide the fullest measure of support for the work of these voluntary agencies.

We have received many offers of help for the refugees from State and community leaders. Coordination of the local efforts and offers of assistance may become a problem in the coming months. I urge you to give consideration to the

creation of a state-wide committee which will bring together all of the heads of the local resettlement organizations, the involved state officials, and interested citizens groups to consider refugee issues. The Committee would permit you to set state goals and standards and monitor progress. With your backing, it might also be used to mobilize support in local communities, identify sponsorship, develop job opportunities, and explore solutions to problems ranging all the way from the certification of professionals to obtaining driver's licenses.

The Director of the Inter-Agency Task Force will be in touch with you in the next few days with more specific information on state reimbursement procedures and suggested opportunities for State involvement.

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June 5, 1975
Bangkok, Thailand

President Gerald Ford
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C.



Dear Mr. President,

I am one of several hundred Americans recently evacuated from Laos. I have worked for the United States Agency for International Development for over six years and dedicated myself to the Agency's goals and objectives.

I am writing this letter on behalf of myself and many other Americans who feel there is an inconsistent and partial implementation of the policy of accepting Indochinese refugees. It is the understanding of myself and other United States Government American employees of Laos that Indochina also pertains to Laos and is not strictly interpreted to mean Vietnam and Cambodia. From our recent experience with U.S. personnel in the U.S. Embassies in Vientiane, Laos and Bangkok, Thailand, we are advised that there is no blanket authorization for Lao nationals to be accepted under the Indochina Refugee Aid Bill.

I wish to point out that inspite of the fact that there was no violent overthrow of the Lao Coalition Government, Americans were still evacuated on the basis of harassment and detention by unfriendly elements including the Pathet Lao. It was because of these harassing measures that USAID and some Embassy personnel were evacuated from Laos to Bangkok, Thailand.

With our departure numerous Lao, including U.S.G. employees, and non U.S.G. employees and close associates sought asylum for political reasons; some in Thailand and some in the United States. They are seeking asylum, desiring to immigrate to the U.S. as Indochina Refugees because of their close identification and association with Americans and the American presence. At the present time they are being rejected because according to Embassy personnel a blanket authorization for their acceptance is not incorporated into the Indochina Refugee Aid Bill. Since the passage of this Bill, the Lao Coalition Government has been dominated by the Communist Pathet Lao in a swift and non-violent means.


Because of your compassion for the peoples of Indochina and because you are the principle sponsor of the Indochina Refugee Aid Bill, I am pleading that the Lao also be included and be made eligible for acceptance as Indochina Refugees in justifiable cases. If they are not accepted, some will lose their lives for their previous association, some will be returned to Laos from Thailand as is anticipated and others will be unable to seek asylum and will be required to live in a compromising situation for the remainder of their lives.

I am not the only American to find himself in this frame of mind. Other Americans have and are trying to justify individual Lao cases but are being rejected. If one were to canvass the American USAID personnel, one would find many who feel the same as I do. Many of us feel that if Americans can justify a case for accepting Lao refugees or/and will sponsor the Lao individual or family, they should be accepted as Indochina refugees. It is very safe to say that the number of Lao families who would apply under this set of guidelines is very small; perhaps not more than 300 families.

Whatever act of authority is required to incorporate the Lao into this authorization seems only fitting and consistent with your humanitarian and compassionate empathy for all Indochina refugees. Many Americans who have worked in Laos, would be deeply appreciative and welcome a revision of the current policy of rejecting the Lao. Whatever attention, Mr. President, you can give to what I perceive to be an urgent matter, will certainly be appreciated by myself as well as those Lao seeking asylum in the United States.

In closing, I wish to express my sincerest regards for your humanitarian and empathetic efforts for the people of Indochina, and wish to express my continued and undivided support for those efforts.

Very Sincerely,



William W. Sage

USAID/LAOS

APO 96352

Americans in Laos Tried to Stay With People

"We wanted to demonstrate to the Lao people there that we were with them," AID Area Coordinator Jack Huxtable said after he and 18 other Americans stationed in Laos were evacuated December 30 from rebel-held Ban Houei Sai.

The U.S. Embassy earlier reported the Americans were under house arrest since the rebels took over six days earlier. Mr. Huxtable explained the stay was voluntary and that only "total breakdown in law and order"

forced their departure. "We didn't want to leave all our Laotian friends but it became evident . . . that we could not stay."

Leaving with Mr. Huxtable were his wife, Margaret, their two children as well as AID employees or dependents William W. Sage; Wayne and Thavy Johnson; Gary E. Alex; James R. Bowman; Raymond Bonne; Andie Linn and her two daughters. Non-AID Americans who also left were Karen Smith; Rev. and Mrs. Jerry Torgerson and their three children.

The provincial capital on the

Mekong River in Northwest Laos, near the Burma/Thailand border, was seized by about 100 Laotian Army soldiers early December 24 and was later occupied by Pathet Lao troops who had crossed the ceasefire line to back up the rebels.

Mr. Huxtable reported that despite the growing lawlessness, he and his staff made a final effort on their last day in the province to reopen the AID office "but it was hopeless."

"Rebel soldiers were stealing AID fuel, the students had taken over our radio transmitter and had

torn up all our papers. There was no security, no law or order so I went to see the governor and told him I was very sorry but we could not stay in a situation where students were coming into my house with M-16s and pointing guns at me and demanding the keys to my office."

The Americans left with a promise to return "if the governor and the Lao government can demonstrate they have control of the situation." Mr. Huxtable said he was optimistic about very productive AID programs in the

area, including the building schools, roads and wells.

Mr. Huxtable reported the rebels took over the town because of alleged corruption by city officials.

Lao Information Minister S. Vongsak and Interior Minister Pheng Phongsavanh headed a five-man delegation that held talks with the rebel troops.

This is the third time Mr. Huxtable has found himself caught in an armed clash during his 15 years in Laos. Twice in the 1960s he was forced to flee, once fleeing North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops in central Laos.

ANG PAO MUST LEAVE, CABINET DECIDES

The Foreign and Interior ministries were instructed by Cabinet yesterday to urgently push right-wing Gen Vang Pao out of the country to prevent about 50,000 Meo hilltribesmen from Laos following him into this country.

A Government spokesman said yesterday there are 8,000 Meos in Thailand now, 6,000 of them children. They fled from Laos to Thailand when the right-wing politicians in that country were forced to resign.

According to the spokesman, Thailand has contacted the US Government to take care of the Meos, but the request was turned down as the US Government said it could take only 200, believed to be Gen Vang Pao's troops.

Cabinet also decided that Thailand will not welcome those who seek political asylum from Laos.

At the same time Cabinet also decided on a six-point plan to deal with refugees who fled into this country from Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. The plan aims at pushing them back into their countries or third countries as soon as possible.

It was decided that aid to refugees will be limited to the humanitarian level, meaning that they will be

provided only subsistence aid to discourage them from staying too long.

Well-to-do refugees will not be given any aid, but will be confined to certain areas and the Government will tax them in case they sell their belongings.

Refugees must live only in the refugee camps and they will not be allowed to work outside these camps. The governor of each province is authorized to allow relatives of Cambodian refugees to take them out of the camp, but they will be kept within the province and must provide guarantee deposits.

Refugees living in places other than bordering provinces must be put in refugee camps to be set up by the Interior Ministry.

Cabinet also decided to give special assistance to about 1,700 Thai Dam who moved out of Laos since the trouble began there. The Interior Ministry will come up with a definite plan to get them jobs.

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
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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 5, 1975

*Ted -
Sounds as
though this
group could
be helpful
Juni*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jim Cannon
FROM: Kathleen Ryan *KR.*
SUBJECT: Vietnamese Refugees

I don't know if this falls under the orbit of the Domestic Council. But, the American Anthropological Association has offered their members' assistance in helping resettle the Vietnamese refugees in the United States.

Because of their unique knowledge gathered from years of studying cultures, anthropologists can assist in reducing the problems of transition for the Vietnamese refugees. There are many American anthropologists that have dealt with the mass relocation of peoples, and there are many others that are Asian cultural specialists.

The Association has written Ambassador L. Dean Brown, and received no reply to date. On the President's Advisory Committee on Refugees there are no social scientists. *||*

Why not have the White House take the initiative in using the skills of these people to lessen the cultural shock of the refugees and the Americans who will be dealing with them. *||*



cc: Dick Dunham

*Note to Juni
to Juni
copy to King*

JUN 5 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PAUL H. O'NEILL *PHO*
SUBJECT: Refugee Resettlement Program

Attached is a status report on the refugee resettlement program. As soon as we have a report from the site survey teams, I will give you a management plan indicating steps to be taken to overcome problems identified.

Attachment



cc: DO Records - Official File
Director
Director's chron
Deputy Director ✓
Jim Jura
Chron
PHO'NEILL:hh 6/5/75

MANAGEMENT STATUS
OF THE VIETNAM REFUGEE PROGRAM

Present Status*

At this point, U.S. authorities have received approximately 130,000 Indochinese refugees for processing. As of June 4, 1975, 24,940 had been resettled in the U.S. and 1,969 had been released to third countries. The remainder (roughly 102,000) are divided about equally between camps in the Pacific and reception centers in the continental U.S. Refugees in the Pacific are being flown to U.S. reception centers as soon as space is available for them.

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Indiantown	7,760

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

5 June 1975



FOR: TCM

FROM: JLB 1

Sponsorship

Call (1) A Mr. Glaussen: Sponsorship entails a moral responsibility to provide a place to stay, food, clothing and helping with employment. No written guidelines available.

Comment: His remarks were very general.

Call (2) An unknown person was much more specific and identified the necessity to provide food, clothing, medical care, shelter and employment support until the refugee is self-sufficient. The person was willing to take the name over the phone to put on a sponsor list.

632-9800

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 6, 1975



MEMORANDUM FOR DR. MARRS:

I called 632-9800 with my questions on sponsoring a refugee. The person who answered the telephone told me that they are only taking names and telephone numbers and that a Voluntary Agency would call me within 2 to 8 weeks. I said, but I am interested in sponsoring a refugee whom I know to be at Camp Pendleton. She said that I should give her my name and telephone number and she will have a Voluntary Agency call me - that she didn't know which VA would pick it up, but someone would be in touch with me. I thanked her.

I called again and said that my group wanted to donate some money for the refugee resettlement. The woman who answered the telephone asked if I wanted it to go to a specific person on a monthly basis. I told her that we had intended to give a lump sum. She said to write a check to the American Red Cross and indicate that it is for the Refugee Program. However, if I wanted it to go to a specific refugee I should give her my name and telephone number and in 2 to 3 months someone will call me and arrange for the monthly payments.

Velma

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 6, 1975



MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. TED MARRS

FROM: ROGER D. SEMERAD 

SUBJECT: MEETING JUNE 4, 1975, ATTENDED
BY ROGER SEMERAD, JIM FALK,
DR. TED MARRS, FRANK DANIEL
BRIEFING MATERIALS
REQUIRED INFORMATION

Dr. Marrs opened and asked that a draft of 5 or 6 talking points be provided and when finalized sent to Governor Evans and Mayor Alioto, "Governor's Conference, New Orleans, La., June 9th - 11th, and Democrat Mayors Caucus, Boston, Mass. June 9, 1975." (And members of the Advisory Committee and Interagency Task Force.) Also he would like positive answers on how Refugees are resettled? How the \$500.00 grant can be used and will travel expense be provided? He also asked that appropriate mailing material be developed.

The trip to Indiantown Gap was cancelled.

Jim Falk recommended any letter asking for state support be held until after the Governor's Conference.

Dr. Marrs asked that necessary briefing materials and required information be requested from Julia Taft, (Interagency Task Force) Noel Koch and Frank Daniel will follow through on these matters.

cc: Koch
Daniel

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 6, 1975



June 6, 1975

THE HILL 9:00 AM (Senator McGovern)

Lunch - Hogates - 1:30 PM

Baltimore Orioles 7:30 PM

June 7

Kennedy Center Matinee - Present Laughter (Begins at 2:00 PM)

Kennedy Center Evening - D.C. Youth Orchestra (Begins at 8:30 PM)

June 8

Morning Free (Zoo ??)

Cook out at Dr. Marrs' Home 4:00 PM

June 9

Morning Free

Dr. Emery Johnson - 2:00 PM (Will be picked up by Dr. Johnson's driver)
(Call 443-1083)

Senator Abourezk 4:00 PM

Grace Thorpe 4:30 PM

June 10 - 11

Norfolk

June 12

TOUR OF THE WHITE HOUSE - 8:00 AM

Mr. Buchen's Office - 9:30 AM

Mr. Bill Youpee (National Tribal Chairman's Council) (2:00 PM)
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Room 207 Wash., D.C. 20006

Mr. Barney Old Coyote and Dr. Ben Reifle 3:30 PM
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Room 310 Wash., D.C. 20006

June 13

Depart for Mission, South Dakota

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COSMOPOLITAN INTERNATIONAL

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Mr. Warren Schram
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Mrs. Pauline Ellison

LIONS INTERNATIONAL

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Mrs. Rosalie McGuire

NATIONAL EXCHANGE CLUB

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Mr. U. L. Lee

SERTOMA INTERNATIONAL

Mr. Thomas Bruckman

SOROPTIMIST FEDERATION OF THE AMERICAS, INC.

Mrs. Ruth Klotz

THE UNITED JAYCEES

Mr. David Hale
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Ms. Eleanor Jammel

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U. S. Area Treasurer

Gerald L. Heyl, Secretary General-U.S.
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Mrs. Martha K. Baumberger, Exec. Dir.
59 E. Van Buren St.
Chicago, Ill. 60605

DRAFT



Refugee Issues
Monday, June 9, 1975
Room 248, Executive Office Building

- I. Presidential Reports to the Congress
 - Responsibilities
 - Timing

- II. Presidential Status Reports on Refugees
 - Schedule
 - Content

- III. Interagency Problems - Ms. Taft

- IV. Other Problems - Ms. Taft

DRAFT



Bill Fisher

O'Neill to Julia

- o Action plan for milestones
- o We want to support you — push over anyone who needs pushing

Julia

- o If we keep current rate "we will be out by October"
- o Guam out in 90 days (i.e. by end of July)
- o SSA going to undertake financial management & accounting as a neutral body:

- (1) HEW — 100,000,000
- (2) State pay & DOD money 305.0M
- (3) AID — 90M has been spent.

Current costs average 1.6M/day but this includes set up costs.

DOL & HEW to look into long term activity

DOL — job follow up

HEW — SRS regs —

Last force has to be truly integrated
o strong state involvement —

— 49 registration ~~books~~
(should go to state?)

* (Frank is Julia's deputy)
Frank Wiener

There were 80,000 in Pacific when K
1 people
43,000 now

57,000 now in camps
30,000 have moved on
(3,000 to 3rd countries)

~~for~~
in no Security clearance, we had no
early crossing —
— injured by judiciary committee

Biggest problem:

• Volags

• State

• military

\$30,000

5

650,000


• Red Cross

• Bus. group

•

Pres Report

Huddleston Amendment
requirements to be
included



Draft on 19th from Task Force

Pres Report

People on Guam -

Provide daily tip sheet on
Guam plan down plan -

JUN 5 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PAUL H. O'NEILL *PHO'Neill*
SUBJECT: Refugee Resettlement Program

Attached is a status report on the refugee resettlement program. As soon as we have a report from the site survey teams, I will give you a management plan indicating steps to be taken to overcome problems identified.

Attachment



cc: DO Records - Official File
Director
Director's chron
Deputy Director ✓
Jim Jura
Chron
PHO'NEILL:hh 6/5/75

MANAGEMENT STATUS
OF THE VIETNAM REFUGEE PROGRAM



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INDOCHINA EVACUATION AND REFUGEE PROBLEMS

A STUDY MISSION REPORT
prepared for the use of the

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS
CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES

of the

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

Ninety-Fourth Congress

First Session

June 9, 1975

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INTRODUCTION

The Subcommittee has closely followed humanitarian problems in Indochina since 1965 -- a decade of concern over our Nation's efforts to help alleviate the problems of refugees and other war victims throughout the area. Since the early days of this year, the Subcommittee's concern necessarily focused on the escalating humanitarian needs among the people of Cambodia and South Vietnam, and the issues and problems raised by the President's plan to evacuate "tens of thousands" of Cambodian and Vietnamese nationals prior to the collapse of the Lon Nol regime in Phnom Penh and the Thieu regime in Saigon.

From the first days of this year's crisis in these countries, the Chairman expressed deep concern over the plight of the people and the course of American policy in South East Asia. Among other things, staff consultations were held with appropriate officials of international organizations and others in Geneva, Switzerland and elsewhere. On March 21, the Chairman made a private appeal to the President, urging his "personal consideration of new initiatives for the better protection and care of refugees and war victims in all areas" of Cambodia and South Vietnam. The Chairman's suggestion involved the resources and good offices of the United Nations and other international bodies to help bring peace and relief to the

people of the area. The appeal was never answered or pursued.

On March 26, the Chairman introduced emergency legislation to provide humanitarian aid, under international auspices, to war victims in Cambodia and South Vietnam. A United Nations' appeal for this purpose was issued on March 30. And in the days that followed the Chairman consulted with United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim and his colleagues in New York, and with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and others.

Regrettably, and despite the urgings from many quarters, there was little give in the Administration's policy toward South East Asia, and the familiar and bankrupt patterns of the past continued to govern our actions in Cambodia and South Vietnam. Moreover, throughout March and April, our national leadership stood virtually paralyzed, as events rapidly overtook whatever small decisions were being made to meet the growing crisis of people and the impending collapse of the American sponsored regimes in Phnom Penh and Saigon.

Public and executive session hearings on "Humanitarian and Evacuation Problems in Indochina" were held before the Subcommittee or the full Judiciary Committee on April 8, 15, 25 and 30, and on May 13. Additionally, the full Judiciary Committee frequently met in executive session to consider evacuation problems and the movement of evacuees and refugees

from Cambodia and South Vietnam to the United States.

As problems mounted in the movement and processing of evacuees and refugees from Cambodia and South Vietnam, the Chairman dispatched a Study Mission to assess conditions in the field. From May 3 to May 12, Mr. Dale S. deHaan, Staff Director to the Subcommittee, and Mr. Jerry M. Tinker, Staff Consultant, visited refugee staging and reception areas at Subic Bay in the Philippines, Guam, and Camp Pendleton, in California. The report that follows reflects the Study Mission's preliminary findings and recommendations based on the hearings, observations in the field, and other inquiry.

Additional travel was undertaken by Mrs. Dorothy Parker, Minority Counsel to the Subcommittee, who is filing a separate report.

The Study Mission wishes to acknowledge its deep appreciation for the cooperation and assistance provided by American officials in the field, including Congressman Antonio Borja Won Pat of Guam; the Governor of Guam, Ricardo Bordallo; Ambassador William H. Sullivan in Manila; Rear Admiral Doniphan B. Shelton, Commander of the Naval Base, Subic Bay; Rear Admiral George S. Morrison, Commander of Naval Operations in the Marianas, his colleagues on Guam; and Brig. General Paul Graham, Commanding General, Camp Pendleton, California.

The Study Mission moved freely in the refugee areas of the Philippines, Guam, and Camp Pendleton; talked with scores of new arrivals and other refugees in the camps; and met with a broad range of officials involved in the program. In addition, extensive conversations have been held with members of the President's Inter-agency Task Force on refugees, with representatives of the voluntary agencies involved in the resettlement of the refugees, with representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and others. Additional conversations have been held with members of the President's National Advisory Committee on Refugees and members of the White House Staff.

On April 21, the Chairman also requested the assistance of the General Accounting Office (GAO) "in monitoring, reviewing, and compiling on an urgent basis all relevant budgetary, legal, policy and related information" concerning the evacuation and movement of Vietnamese nationals from South Vietnam. When such information is made available to the Chairman, it will be printed in a separate report.

I. EVACUATION FROM SAIGON

From the beginning, the President's plan to evacuate "tens of thousands of South Vietnamese," seems to have been less of a plan, than it was a vague intention, barely stated. As events have shown, whatever plan existed was implemented badly, plagued with disorganization, and undertaken with little command control in the field. Moreover, again and again, events in the field rapidly overtook whatever decisions our national leadership was making.

According to the Congressional testimony of Department of State officials, the Embassy in Saigon was requested in late March to provide weekly status reports on the total numbers and welfare of Americans and "others for whom the United States had emergency evacuation responsibility." Subsequent cables from the Department to the field were aimed at gathering from the Embassy in Saigon information relating to the categories of Vietnamese whom, according to Department officials, "the United States had a moral obligation to evacuate and who would be most endangered under a communist regime."

The first public indication by the President of his plan to evacuate Vietnamese came in his address on April 10th to a joint session of Congress:

I must, of course, as I think each of you would, consider the safety of nearly 6,000 Americans who remain in South Vietnam, and tens of thousands of South Vietnamese employees of the United States Government, of news agencies, of contractors and businesses for many years whose lives, with their dependents, are in very grave peril. There are tens of thousands of other South Vietnamese intellectuals, professors, teachers, editors and opinion-leaders who have supported the South Vietnamese cause and the alliance with the United States, to whom we have a profound moral obligation.

...I ask the Congress to clarify immediately its restrictions on the use of U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia for the limited purposes of protecting American lives by ensuring their evacuation if this should be necessary, and I also ask prompt revision of the law to cover those Vietnamese to whom we have a very special obligation, and whose lives may be in danger, should the worst come to pass.

On April 17, Secretary of State Kissinger commented on the President's statement in answer to questions raised before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, D. C.. The Secretary indicated that:

If the worst should come to pass and if it were not possible to stabilize the situation, we feel we have a moral obligation to help in the evacuation of many of those whose association with us now endangers their lives. How to bring this about and by what steps and at what period is an extraordinarily delicate question. And it is one that I really cannot answer in an open press conference.

Evacuation was indeed a "delicate question". For the Administration, many important issues were involved, including the viability of holding Saigon and keeping an enclave in South Vietnam. But most indicators suggest that the delicacy had more to do with inter-agency squabbling and a tug of war over the substance and control of evacuation policy and other matters between Washington and the Embassy in Saigon, than anything else.

Evacuation began in March with "Operation Babylift". The orphans and other children moving to the U.S. were often accompanied by American personnel and dependents, as well as certain Vietnamese nationals. Given developments in South Vietnam, this movement of evacuees and refugees escalated considerably in the weeks that followed, on both military and commercial air craft, and, in the final hours before the transfer of power in Saigon, on helicopters from U.S. naval vessels off-shore. Many thousands more were picked up from boats at sea.

As of April 28, the following categories of Vietnamese had been targeted for evacuation from South Vietnam and "parole" into the United States. The number entailed some 130,000 people.

- 1) up to 4,000 orphans --
- 2) some 10,000 to 75,000 relatives of American citizens or permanent resident aliens --

- 3) up to 50,000 "high risk" Vietnamese, including past and present U.S. government employees; officials whose cooperation was necessary for the evacuation of American citizens; individuals with knowledge of sensitive U.S. government intelligence operations; vulnerable political or intellectual figures; communist defectors; employees of U.S. firms operating in Vietnam; employees of voluntary agencies; certain labor officials; and participants of U.S. government sponsored programs.

The record is clear that there has been little relationship between the categories of Vietnamese targeted for evacuation and parole into the United States, and the refugees now under U.S. control. In fact, the whole process of defining categories, ceilings, and the like, was little more than a charade, and a very misleading ingredient in the President's plan to evacuate and resettle refugees from South Vietnam.

As High officials on Guam estimated to the Study Mission, "half the Vietnamese we intended to get out did not get out -- and half who did get out, should not have." This theme was heard by the Study Mission again and again in the field, and is best illustrated by visiting and talking with the refugees on Guam and elsewhere. It is further illustrated by the Administration's inability to supply a meaningful numerical

breakdown of the refugees by the April 28 parole categories, and by the simple fact that on May 6, General Leonard F. Chapman, Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) found it necessary to inform the Judiciary Committee of the need to create a new parole category, covering "approximately 69,000 Vietnamese" under American control who did not meet the qualifications of the previously established categories. In the field at Camp Pendleton, this new parole category was labeled the "other" or "catch-all" category. And General Chapman's projected number in this category represents at least half of the refugees under U.S. control.

Included in the "catch-all" category are farmers, fishermen, students, street vendors, small shop keepers, local policemen, common soldiers and many others who do not fit the prescribed evacuation and parole guidelines stated to Congress in late April. Clearly, it was to be expected that some farmers and fishermen and others outside the established parole categories might become involved in the U.S. evacuation effort. But when half or more of the refugees fall into categories outside those targeted for evacuation, muchless parole into the U.S., serious and troubling questions arise over the planning and command control of the President's plan. And these questions were readily known to high officials in our government from the first days of the airlift from

Saigon. But in the rush of events, cover-up was the answer of those in control.

A good illustration of this in the early days was the handling of some of the earliest arrivals on U.S. military aircraft at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. Among these first arrivals were hundreds of Vietnamese who were undocumented or clearly outside the categories of people targeted for evacuation and eventual parole into the U.S., including unattached women and children, maids and others. The situation was such, that in mid-April the U.S. Embassy in Manila cabled an urgent alarm to Saigon and requested that the flow of such aliens cease. The flow of such aliens apparently ended, or at least slowed down. But the problem of what to do with those at Clark remained. One of the solutions was to "document maximum number of conceivably entitled aliens as immigrants". As a result, within a few days in April hundreds of Vietnamese, mainly unattached women and children, were simply issued regular immigrant visas to the United States. And others were simply paroled under false pretenses. At one point, on April 18, the Department of State even suggested to questions from Congress that many of these Vietnamese causing a problem were "confidential" and fell into "high risk" categories targeted for evacuation.

But this was never accepted as fact, and it is vigorously denied by Embassy officials in Manila.



II. REFUGEE MOVEMENT

So far, some 131,000 refugees have come under U.S. control. Additional thousands are present in other countries. At least 40,000 of those under U.S. control were rescued at sea or escorted from Vietnamese coastal waters to Subic Bay or Guam. The rest left Saigon by air.

As always, the flow of these refugees was dictated by circumstances. And the number under U.S. control is double the number initially anticipated by Administration officials.

1. Profile of the Refugees

The first wave of refugees, involving some 10,000 to 15,000 people, began to move a week to ten days before the collapse of the Saigon government and the final evacuation effort on April 29th-30th. The Vietnamese who left during this period were essentially those who were able, somehow, to establish an American connection, who claimed to be dependents of Americans, or were in the company of an American and therefore processed as dependents. Countless others simply found their way through the gates of Tan Son Nhut airport, and boarded commercial, or, more likely, U.S. military aircraft.

And all evidence from the field suggests that very little control was effectively maintained by the U.S. Defense Attache's Office in restricting access to U.S. military flights to those

Table 1: REFUGEE FLOW (as of June 5)

<u>1. Overseas Bases</u>	<u>Total Capacity</u>	<u>On Hand at Last Report</u>
Thailand	1,600	366
Clark	856	450
Subic Bay	10,000	5,921
Wake	8,000	6,814
Guam	50,000	37,956
Hickam	130	67
		<hr/> 51,574
 <u>2. Continental U.S.</u>		
Ft. Chaffee	24,000	23,453
Pendleton	18,000	15,259
Eglin	5,028	4,268
Indiantown Gap	15,000	7,760
		<hr/> 50,740
	Total in camps	102,314
 3. Total Released from system		25,583
 4. Total Released to Third Countries		2,093
 5. Repatriation requests		1,322
	 Grand total	<hr/> 131,312

legitimately authorized for evacuation. With a little persistence and luck, and perhaps some forgery, almost any Vietnamese with an apparent American connection could get on board. And this occurred even as the Embassy's Consular Section dragged its feet in processing Vietnamese relatives of American citizens who were targeted for evacuation and parole, and refused all calls for help. As suggested earlier, the irregular flow of refugees quickly became evident to the U.S. Embassy in Manila and military authorities at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines.

A second wave of refugees came during the last days of April and the helicopter evacuation just prior to the transfer of power in Saigon. An estimated 86,000 Vietnamese and Americans were evacuated during this short period, including U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin, the entire staff of the U.S. Mission, most other Americans in Saigon, several high ranking Saigon civilian and military officials, a number of Vietnamese employees of the U.S. Mission, and others deemed "high risk", or lucky enough to be at the right spot at the right time. However, thousands of others, targeted and eligible for evacuation, were left behind.

The bulk of this second wave of refugees was composed of people targeted for evacuation and parole into the United States. But the fact remains that this second wave of

refugees -- the targeted, high priority group -- represents only slightly more than half of the total number of Vietnamese who were evacuated, and, in the main, under United States control.

A third wave of refugees, involving at least 40,000 Vietnamese, left in small boats or other vessels, and commandeered aircraft. The arrival of this third group during the first two weeks of May -- at Subic Bay in the Philippines and Guam -- significantly altered the character of the Vietnamese refugee population. Increasingly, the refugee profile was of farmers, fishermen, local tradesmen and vendors, students, and common soldiers. Few speak English, and fewer still fully comprehend the implication of their plight as refugees.

While the Study Mission was on Guam, it observed this change first-hand, as the U.S. Navy Military Sealift Command vessel, the "Pioneer Commander," docked at 6 a.m. on May 7th. Watching the more than 6,000 refugees disembark, observing them during the initial processing stage, and interviewing many of them, it was clear that most were from local villages along the coast. They were farmers, soldiers and, in one case, an entire fishing village.

Many gave the impression of not understanding where they were, or why they were there. Some had simply fled in panic

from conflict and violence -- as Vietnamese have fled for years -- and had joined a flotilla of small vessels along the coast awaiting to see developments unfold. Instructed to "rescue" Vietnamese on boats deemed not seaworthy, elements of the U.S. 7th Fleet hovered for several days along the coast, scooping-up Vietnamese from their boats. Once in the military pipeline, their destination was the United States. Exactly how many never intended to travel to the Philippines or Guam, muchless to continental United States, will never be fully known. But the Study Mission's observations and interviews in the field, suggest that the number is substantial.

It is important to note this divergence in the refugee profile, and the different characteristics of the first two waves of refugees as compared to the last, in order to recognize some potential resettlement problems. The early arrivals on Guam were considered by most officials engaged in the processing to be generally well educated, skilled and professional people who should have few major problems in resettling and adjusting in the United States. In fact, some INS officials believe that the early groups are probably better prepared for life in the United States than either the Hungarian or Cuban refugees.

Although there is still no systematic data on the refugees -- only 20,000 have been screened to date as to education,

skills, or resources -- it is apparent that the first group came from upper income and education groups in South Vietnam, while the later arrivals were generally poorer and less educated. The full resettlement implications of this contrast in the characteristics of the refugee population will not be known until officials finally complete a thorough census -- already delayed too long to be as helpful as it could in resettlement planning.

2. Refugee Processing in the Pacific.

Perhaps the only regrettable move by the military services in their refugee effort is the code name given their task -- "Operation New Life" -- which has an uncomfortable ring with the old "New Life Hamlets" or "strategic hamlets" of the Diem regime many years ago. Despite the ill-chosen name, however, the fact that the military services could and did respond compassionately and effectively to a human tide of refugees -- to move, feed, shelter and care for some 130,000 men, women and children -- is an outstanding tribute to the leadership, capability, organization and tireless work of the American military services. At all points visited by the Study Mission, without exception, the services have performed exceptionally well in meeting emergency humanitarian needs, and they deserve the high tribute and commendation of Congress and the American people.

3. Role of the Military Services.

The military services have been charged with the movement and the initial care and maintenance of all refugees under U.S. control. Military installations and personnel have been marshalled all along the line in support of this task, from the Pacific fleet, the U.S. Army in Korea, to bases in the continental United States. Guam was selected as the Pacific staging area and a program was established to offer temporary shelter while necessary processing arrangements were undertaken for onward movement to continental U.S. Subic Bay, Clark Air Force Base, and Utapao in Thailand, were seen as transit points, and Wake Island became an overflow point from Guam.

Confronted with belated orders and few guidelines, the commanding officers at bases in the Pacific and in this country have nonetheless moved effectively in receiving the refugees and in providing them with the essentials of life.

Conditions on Guam.

The military services clearly understood, and have planned for, what the civilian side of the Task Force did not: that "wasted days" -- even one or two days -- in a logistic/support operation of this magnitude, can spell disaster. Once a backlog begins, once the system falls behind, it is difficult

to catch up, and a temporary situation can become a longer term disaster. There is no clearer evidence of this today than the shambles which the refugee processing and resettlement program has become -- with a back-log of refugees, which threatens the humane resettlement of people in the shortest possible period of time.

Guam, as well as Wake Island, are supposed to be short term staging or holding areas before refugees are sent to Camp Pendleton or other centers for complete processing and resettlement in the U.S. But the short stay on Guam is now turning into weeks and months for some 40,000 refugees who remain on the island. The bottleneck, aside from jeopardizing the expeditious resettlement of the refugees, also jeopardizes the health and well-being of thousands of men, women and children held twenty or more to a tent. With the passage of each day, the best plans and efforts of the military services are overtaken more and more by a log-jam out of their control.

As temporary facilities, the installations on Guam are excellent, and the military services organized in a remarkably short period, tent cities, field kitchens, sanitary facilities, extensive medical and public health facilities, and a range of other services for the refugee population. However, with the growing delay in the onward movement of refugees, serious

problems have arisen, particularly at the Orote Point camp where the bulk of the refugees live.

Temporary tents, erected on a sandy, coral base, are now beginning to weather. The approach of the rainy season, with heavy rains at times, makes tent life miserable, at best. Because of the coral base, rain is not readily absorbed, resulting in water running through some tents and around others. Obvious health and sanitation problems are developing, as water contains bacteria from shower and latrine run-off, which even on dry days poses significant odor and health problems. In addition, the rainy season brings with it an increased threat of mosquito-borne diseases -- particularly malaria and dengue fever, which are endemic to Vietnam -- and which may pose a danger to both the refugees as well as the local population of Guam.

The military services have taken a series of actions to alleviate the health and sanitation problems, but these have necessarily been temporary, stop-gap efforts. As the days drag on, however, further and more costly steps will be required, even as temporary measures, to keep up with increasing health hazards.

According to recent reports, for example, plans are now being made to relocate tents as the ground around them becomes contaminated. The up-grading of sanitation facilities alone

will cost another \$5.7 million. Temporary sewer lines will be installed in some areas. Wood toilet structures will be replaced on a 10 to 15 day cycle. Shower and washing facilities will be up-graded. Coral roads are being built. All of these steps and more, however, are only temporary -- to up-grade facilities that could easily be undone by tropical weather patterns, particularly the increasing danger of tropical storms and typhoons.

Typhoon Danger. The dangers of tropical storms and typhoons are very real, and authorities on Guam have rightly taken this threat seriously. The tents at Orote Point can only withstand wind up to 30 knots. And the chance of wind and weather conditions going beyond that, increases dramatically from now to the end of November. The probability of a severe tropical storm near Guam jumps from 13% in April-May, to 26% in July-August, to 39% to 48% in the fall. Similarly, the probability of a typhoon jumps from 13% today, to 24% in the later summer months. Although the military has attempted to draw up a storm and typhoon plan, there are facilities on the island to house only some 15,000 refugees in typhoon "resistant" shelters -- not typhoon proof shelters. Clearly, much hardship and the danger of deaths must be seriously anticipated, unless the current refugee population on Guam can be significantly reduced.

Health Problems. Health procedures and care have been generally adequate to date, and remarkably few health problems have been reported. First aid stations greet refugees as they disembark on Guam, and emergency cases -- only a few so far -- are taken by ambulance to base hospitals. Medical personnel on board the ships and air craft arriving at Guam, have usually identified the seriously ill, who have disembarked first.

Medical screening on Guam consists primarily in asking refugees if they have had any serious medical problems, in quarantining suspected patients with communicable diseases, and in giving extensive immunizations to children. In-camp medical treatment has, in the main, been provided by several Army field hospital teams, and to date they have been extraordinarily successful in avoiding public health problems and maintaining fine medical care.

The overall medical condition of the refugees has been found to be good. Although there were cases of dengue fever and malaria, the overall medical situation is reported as excellent. However, all medical officers agree that if the refugees are required to stay on Guam for the periods of time now seen, health and sanitation standards at the camps must be improved substantially in order to avert a potentially serious medical situation.

Overall, physical conditions on Guam remain tolerable, in large part because of the constant vigilance of the military services. But all officials agree that the temporary situation on Guam can only get worse with each passing day. There are growing morale problems among the refugees, too much idle time, emerging law and order problems and increased incidents of criminal acts. There is only the faint beginnings of any educational program -- of English classes or other training programs -- and they are limited by the availability of teachers, supplies, and facilities. Recreation facilities are almost non-existent.

Obviously, the immediate solution to the health, safety, sanitary, as well as the financial and humanitarian aspects of the refugee situation on Guam, is to move the refugees on -- as rapidly as possible -- to better "safe havens" and resettlement opportunities. This should involve a matter of days, not weeks and months; because the welfare of people and lives are at stake.

4. Role of the Task Force: The Bottlenecks.

The civilian side of the evacuation and resettlement effort has regrettably fallen far behind the accomplishments of the military services. From the start, the Task Force has been characterized by a failure of leadership, poor organization, inadequate planning, and belated decision making. Unlike the

military services, the civilian side allowed too many "wasted days" to pass -- permitting events to overtake plans, and actions to fall behind requirements.

The onward movement of refugees -- from Guam to processing centers in continental United States, and to resettlement opportunities in local communities -- was allowed to come to a virtual standstill for over a month. It is not for the lack of the military service's ability to physically move the refugees, but rather to the lack of civilian planning for expeditious processing and resettlement.

Regrettably, the Task Force and its predecessor were behind events from the very beginning. The President's announced intention April 10 to evacuate "tens of thousands" of Vietnamese was followed by weeks of administrative paralysis and indecision. Whereas the military services began immediate planning for the movement and care and maintenance of the refugees, when alerted to the possibility of the evacuation and reception of refugees, on the civilian side little or no effort was made to plan ahead and mobilize resources in government and the private sector for refugee processing and resettlement.

After the President's initial indication of a plan to evacuate Vietnamese civilians, it was more than a week before

he appointed Ambassador L. Dean Brown to provide high-level, inter-agency coordination for the movement and reception of refugees. Over two weeks elapsed before the voluntary agencies were approached, much less consulted, about resettlement processing and planning -- and then only after a public hearing before the Subcommittee on Refugees and the Chairman's initiative in arranging an appointment between Ambassador Brown and the agencies. And, despite the availability of funds, weeks passed before resettlement contracts were pursued with the agencies and some funds began to flow into their efforts and work. And even today, not all contracts have been finalized and signed, nor have all agencies received needed funds.

In the main, a sloppy, laissez-faire approach characterizes the President's refugee program, and the question of who's in charge arises in the minds of many Americans concerned over our special obligation to the refugees and their welfare and resettlement in the U.S.

III. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AND VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION

As is true in most refugee problems, following a period of care and maintenance and custodial assistance, the options usually available to refugees are resettlement in the initial receiving country, resettlement in other countries, or voluntary repatriation to their native lands. In the case of the Vietnamese refugees under U.S. control, all three options are being pursued. But the large bulk of the refugees will be resettling in the U.S.

During April and most of May, the President's program was little more than a logistical pipeline, run very well by the military services, but coming rapidly to a dead-end. For once a refugee was airlifted out of Vietnam, or scooped-up out of the sea, or received at base areas, he was expeditiously moved and housed and cared for by the military services. But the fundamental question of where he went from there, and what he did -- all the issues involved in resettlement -- were not catching-up with the pipeline.

It is a tragic mark on the President's refugee program and the record of the Task Force, that the fundamental issue of the refugees' future has only recently been addressed in any serious, systematic and thoughtful way -- and this is many weeks after the first arrivals on our shores. And

even today a great deal remains to be done in terms of policy, planning, and program -- let alone implementation -- before the refugee bottleneck is broken and meaningful resettlement is truly underway. For all intents and purposes, the resettlement program has not really begun. Most of those who have been resettled, have merely joined family members in this country. The real refugee still remains in camps.

1. Resettlement Planning.

Not until the middle of May did the Task Force formulate, at least on paper, a resettlement plan for the President's refugee program. The plan is premised on four basic principles:

1. Maximum internationalization of the problem;
2. Maximum dependence on international and domestic voluntary agencies and private resources;
3. Minimum impact on areas in the United States currently suffering high rates of unemployment; and
4. Maximum coordination among the many federal, state and local government and community organizations together with the voluntary agencies, that will be involved in refugee resettlement.

However, in the weeks since these principles were submitted to the Subcommittee, the public record indicates that they have, in the main, remained on paper. And there is a continuing gap between what is said and what is done.

2. Internationalization of Refugee Resettlement.

For too many weeks, the refugee program was little more than a logistical effort of moving people from one place to

another, and ultimately to camps in the United States.

Nowhere along the way was there a clear-cut opportunity for the refugees to really sort out their future, and consider whether they wanted to resettle in the United States, some other country, or, equally important, to opt for repatriation to his homeland.

Although representatives of the international community arrived in Guam by early May -- the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as well as immigration officials from a number of countries -- there was no systematic fashion in which they were brought into the refugee screening or interviewing process. As the INS officers on Guam, and later at Camp Pendleton, told the Study Mission, even the Third Country option, muchless repatriation, was not posed to the refugees. As one officer stated, "if it comes up by chance during the immigration interview, we send him to the Department of State officer."

Although the Administration indicated from the outset that they sought Third Country resettlement opportunities for Vietnamese refugees -- and the Department of State ordered on April 27th every American diplomatic mission abroad to make a demarche to this effect -- here at home too little was being done to facilitate this process. For example, the role

of ICEM was met with some confusion in the field. And it was only a few days ago that authorities at Camp Pendleton finally allowed ICEM representatives to have access to the base.

Thus, even as the Department of State was complaining by cable to the world that "the response of the world community to this tragedy so far has been minimal...the reaction of most has been either indifferent or even negative," and that the U.S. had decided "to launch a vigorous diplomatic campaign to bring our concern to the world community" about the Vietnam refugee crisis -- here at home officials were slow to tap the resources of international agencies such as ICEM. More time was spent in needlessly criticizing the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, who was also appealing for resettlement opportunities, than in developing constructive and realistic proposals for action. Once again, precious time was lost, and even today too little progress has been registered in facilitating refugee resettlement in other countries.

The current statistics (as of June 5, 1975) on Third Country resettlement totals 2,093, and breakdowns as follows:

Canada	1,396	Switzerland	1
Britain	3	South Korea	3
Australia	82	New Zealand	6
Philippines	182	Guam	100
France	98	Thailand	5
Okinawa (Japan)	65	others	65
		repatriation to Cambodia	88

Table 2: PROVISIONAL REPORT ON MOVEMENTS ASSISTED BY THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION UNDER THE SPECIAL PROGRAMME FOR RESETTLEMENT FROM INDO-CHINA

25 April - 26 May 1975

Countries of Resettlement	Total	Countries of First Asylum				
		Guam	Hong Kong	Singapore	Thailand	Others
<u>Australia</u>	<u>71</u>	<u>71</u>				
Transportation assistance	2	2				
Processing assistance	69	69				
<u>Canada</u>	<u>1,237</u>	<u>1,231</u>				6
Transportation assistance	8	2				6
Processing assistance	1,229	1,229				-
France	90	10	40			40
Italy	1					1
Korea	1	1				
New Zealand	4	3			1	
Singapore	2	2				
Switzerland	1	1				
United Kingdom	4	4				
<u>U.S.A.</u>	<u>1,731</u>		<u>205</u>	<u>222</u>	<u>1,278</u>	<u>26</u>
Direct	1,401		-	97	1,278	26
via Guam	330		205	125	-	-
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>3,142</u>	<u>1,323</u>	<u>245</u>	<u>222</u>	<u>1,279</u>	<u>73</u>

Country resettlement totals 2,092, and breakdown as follows:

1	Switzerland	1,398	Canada
3	South Korea	3	Britain
6	New Zealand	62	Australia
100	Guam	182	Philippines
2	Thailand	98	France
62	Others	62	Belarus (Japan)
88	Registration to Cambodia		

Table 3: INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION

Caseload of Refugees in processing for departure under the Special Programme for Resettlement from Indo-China as at 20 May 1975

<u>Preferred country of resettlement</u>	<u>Refugees located in:</u>				
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Guam</u>	<u>Hong Kong</u>	<u>Singapore</u>	<u>Thailand</u>
Australia	635	378	238	15	4
Austria	9	-	9	-	-
Belgium	170	107	62	-	1
Brazil	1	-	1	-	-
Canada	765	-	765	-	-
Fed Rep. of Germany	77	6	71	-	-
France	1,856	1,186	642	15	13
Gabon	4	4	-	-	-
Greece	3	3	-	-	-
Hong Kong	179	28	144	7	-
Indonesia	1	-	1	-	-
Iran	12	10	2	-	-
Italy	30	2	28	-	-
Ivory Coast	21	21	-	-	-
Japan	50	11	39	-	-
Korea	1	1	-	-	-
Laos	20	-	20	-	-
Morocco	3	-	3	-	-
Netherlands	8	8	-	-	-
New Caledonia	2	2	-	-	-
New Guinea	3	-	3	-	-
New Zealand	6	2	4	-	-
Norway	73	-	-	-	73
Pakistan	17	-	17	-	-
Philippines	19	13	6	-	-
Singapore	35	9	6	20	-
Sweden	14	-	14	-	-
Switzerland	27	9	18	-	-
Taiwan	110	52	50	3	-
Thailand	63	9	54	-	-
Tunisia	3	-	3	-	-
United Kingdom	53	4	49	-	-
United States of America	2,730	-	1,694	205	831
Zaire	4	4	-	-	-
Total	7,004	1,369	3,943	270	922

Voluntary Repatriation. During its field visit in early May, the Study Mission sensed that for personal reasons significant numbers of refugees -- in the hundreds or thousands -- would probably opt for voluntary repatriation to their native land. Small numbers, in fact, had already petitioned American officials for the opportunity to return. In testimony before the Subcommittee on May 13, Ambassador Brown confirmed this development, and indicated that the UNHCR was working on the problem.

Today the UNHCR has representatives in refugee areas in the U.S. After consultations with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, the UNHCR has prepared a questionnaire/application form by which Vietnamese may apply for repatriation. These forms are now available at all refugee camps, and Red Cross offices throughout the United States will have the forms available should a Vietnamese refugee, at some future date, wish to apply for repatriation even after resettlement in a local community.

Although diplomatic contacts have been made by the UNHCR's representatives in Saigon, and agreement in principle has been reached with the PRG that it will accept Vietnamese repatriates, there remains uncertainty over the time involved in processing repatriation applications, and the circumstances

surrounding the possible travel and return to their homes. Best estimates, however, indicate that it will involve several weeks, perhaps some months, before all those refugees who want to go home will be able to actually return to South Vietnam. Until then, they will remain the responsibility of the United States, and they must be treated and cared for in a humane manner. So far, close to 2,000 refugees under U.S. control are pursuing voluntary repatriation. The number will probably increase in the weeks and months ahead.

3. Dependence upon the Voluntary Agencies. Private voluntary agencies have traditionally played a crucial role in the effective resettlement of refugees, and they are committed to doing what they can in providing resettlement services to the new arrivals on our shores. In the end, the private sector -- mainly the voluntary agencies and their local constituencies -- will provide the human, one-to-one basis on which people are resettled and integrated into communities to become self-supporting and productive members of our society.

On paper, this has been recognized by the Task Force. Even before the Administration had the vaguest idea of an operational plan for refugee resettlement, high officials were readily invoking the names of the voluntary agencies, saying they were central to the program. Regrettably,

however, these same officials had neglected to even contact the agencies.

For example, on April 24th, the Department of State, in responding to an inquiry from Senator Kennedy, indicated that the Department "has been in close communication with the American Council of Voluntary Agencies...as a result of which the following seven agencies have agreed to undertake their traditional role in resettlement efforts." In fact, the seven agencies listed had not all been contacted. Moreover, they had not met with the Task Force, let alone made any agreements to undertake the resettlement of refugees.

Indeed, the record shows that it was not until after a Subcommittee hearing on April 25th, subsequent to the Department of State letter, that a meeting finally took place between the voluntary agencies and Ambassador Brown and the Task Force. At that meeting, as one participant phrased it, "the Task Force began to rediscover the wheel," and recognize the essential role of the voluntary agencies in any resettlement program. Even so, the unfortunate fact remains that for over a month, from April 26th until the first week of June, the role and function of the agencies was neglected, muddled, and little or no funds granted to support their work.

Despite the repeatedly stated plan of the Administration

to "depend" upon the voluntary agencies. There has been a basic failure to consult, involve, and support their activities. Below is a partial listing of some of the problem areas that have been encountered, and which, in many cases, still hamper the functioning of the agencies in resettling refugees.

1.) Failure to genuinely consult and coordinate with the voluntary agencies: At the outset, few on the Task Force apparently appreciated or understood the role of the voluntary agencies in refugee resettlement -- despite the constant reference to them by Task Force members. It was clear from the early meetings between representatives of the agencies and members of the Task Force that the involvement of the agencies was almost an after-thought. The agency representatives were subjected to patronizing lectures and patted on the hands, but never genuinely consulted or involved in the decision-making process. They were "informed" of decisions, and "notified" of developments -- often days later -- even though those decisions directly affected their work in refugee resettlement.

For example, the agencies were notified after the sites had been chosen for the reception camps, and after the refugees started to arrive, although the agencies were expected to have staff on hand to assist in the reception of the refugees.

Decisions as to processing procedures, forms to be used, and other basic questions involved in the sorting and helping of people, have frequently been made without any involvement of the voluntary agencies. Procedures have been changed, guidelines altered, and instructions reversed, without the notification, muchless any consultation, with the agencies.

The list of such instances is long -- too long -- and this neglect of the role, expertis , and function of the voluntary agencies has contributed significantly to the shambles in which the entire refugee program has been stuck for well over a month. Worse still, countless thousands of refugees have not been resettled as a result.

2.) Failure to give priority to the support requirements of the voluntary agencies: The Task Force, and particularly some of its senior civilian coordinators in the field, failed at the outset to take seriously the role and importance of the agencies in the field. In the case of Camp Pendleton, military authorities who were naturally unfamiliar with the agencies, positioned them in small tents far removed from the processing center, where they should and must be located. Not informed of the error by the civilian coordinator who had never bothered to visit the agencies, the camp commander learned of the mistake only indirectly. When informed, he ordered the error to be corrected immediately.

For the agencies to do the job they are expected to do by the Task Force -- and to contribute, as they want to, to the expeditious resettlement of refugees in as short a period of time as possible -- the Task Force should have given early and high priority to supporting and facilitating the work of the voluntary agencies. Regrettably, the provision of office facilities -- telephones, desks, typewriters, etc. -- in sufficient number and in sufficient time, has not been a priority with the Task Force, and it has resulted in many wasted days for the agencies as well as for the refugees. Even in recent days, after the Task Force had pledged to do better in the opening of the camp at Indiantown Gap, no typewriters were available.

These are small, nitty-gritty items, but it should have been in the interest of the Task Force to provide such basic support in order to avoid delays. The voluntary agencies are crucial, and they want to help, but they simply do not have the resources nor manpower to do what the government can and should do in providing basic support. If the military services can fly tens of thousands of refugees around the globe in a matter of days, and provide food and shelter and health care for 130,000 people in two weeks time, surely the Task Force could mobilize sufficient typewriters and telephones and paper clips to help the voluntary agencies do their job.

3.) Failure to provide funds expeditiously to the voluntary agencies: The record of the past month and a half is one of unfulfilled promises to provide urgently needed funds to the voluntary agencies. Over and over again, during hearings of the Subcommittee, in personal inquiries by the Subcommittee Chairman, and in communications and meetings with the Task Force, the issue of contracts with the voluntary agencies was mentioned, only to be given false and misleading information. It adds up to a month of false promises and sheer incompetence.

During the Subcommittee hearing on April 25th, and again on April 30th, the issue of federal funding of the resettlement efforts of the voluntary agencies was reviewed. The frustrations of the agencies was made clear during the April 25th hearing, and as a result the Chairman asked Task Force representatives on April 30th the simple question: "Have you signed any contracts with voluntary agencies now?" The answer, from Philip Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and James Wilson, Director of the Emergency Humanitarian Relief Committee of the Task Force, was as follows:

Mr. Wilson. As I said earlier, we have signed contracts with the voluntary agencies only for the Cambodian refugees. We are negotiating now adjustments in their contracts for the Vietnamese refugees.

Mr. Habib. I presume in a week or so we will have those completed.

Senator Kennedy. You will have what completed?

Mr. Wilson. The contract renegotiations. It will be done in a matter of just a few days now.

There then follows this exchange with Senator Fong:

Senator Fong: Will that include the cost of resettlement in the contract? The voluntary agencies will get these people into various communities?

Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir, The normal procedure is to establish an amount, an estimated amount per refugee who is resettled, and this will appear in the contract, subject of course to adjustment, depending on how the actual situation develops.

Senator Fong. Most of the expenses that will be incurred by the voluntary agencies will be paid through this fund that we are talking about?

Mr. Wilson. The voluntary agencies, of course, operate on the basis of the contributions that their own organizations in many cases provide and on the basis of the funds that come to them through the government contracts.

Senator Fong. In this case there is no special provision in there. There is not a special fund for this, for the voluntary agencies.

Mr. Wilson. The voluntary agencies have already begun solicitations so far as their own funding goes. We are the ones who will pick up the government contract.

Senator Fong. Do you anticipate that most of the expenditures by the voluntary agencies will be paid by the Federal Government?

Mr. Wilson. It varies from agency to agency, Senator Fong. In many cases the funds that the government provides are almost entirely matched by the private contributions that come through those agencies.

Despite this unequivocal testimony -- as well as repeated assurances to the Subcommittee throughout May, including

testimony on May 13th from Ambassador Brown that "we will sign them as fast as possible" -- the fact remains that not much was done. As of the first week of June, not all the contracts have been signed, and few funds have yet reached the voluntary agencies to assist in the resettlement of the refugees.

This has been an unconscionable and disgraceful failure. Worse still, those contracts originally proposed to the agencies were filled, contrary to Habib's and Wilson's testimony, with irrelevant and burdensome requirements, that questioned the integrity and long record of performance and efficiency of the church groups and voluntary agencies. Nothing symbolizes more the floundering of the White House and the Task Force than its inexcusable delay in making and implementing high priority decisions essential to the resettlement of the refugees, whom the government itself evacuated, than the muddle and delay and confusion which has surrounded the need for the government to provide urgent funds to the voluntary agencies.

As the weeks dragged on without contracts signed and no funds reaching the agencies, officials at the Task Force had blame for everyone but themselves. At first it was the agencies' responsibility for not making their plans and intentions clear. Then it was Congress for not providing funds, although some funds were available under transfer authority. Yet, in more than two weeks since funds were

authorized and appropriated by Congress, not all the contracts had been signed, there was until this past week serious confusion over the terms of the contracts.

4. Resettlement Problems: Minimizing the Impact on Areas in the United States.

All previous experience in resettling refugees provides the clear lesson that the refugee problem does not end with the initial resettlement. Despite the invaluable and crucial role of the voluntary agencies in providing institutional support to sponsors to help them when resettlement breakdowns, many aspects of resettlement still depend upon governmental support and action. The Indochina refugee evacuation was a decision made by the President and by the federal government, and the successful resettlement of the refugees remains an obligation, first of all, of the government.

The Executive Branch has clearly recognized and stated this obligation -- again, on paper. Spokesmen for the President have said that all state and local programs can and should be utilized to assist in refugee resettlement, and that the Federal Government would provide 100% reimbursement for all costs incurred. Regrettably, this assurance, if it is truly the Administration's policy, has not been clearly communicated to all levels of state and local government. Reports to the Subcommittee confirm that aside from a May 3 cable from the Task Force to all Governors, and some messages

from HEW to state social welfare agencies, no follow-up information has been provided to elaborate the government's proposal.

This has left many state capitals with a feeling of uncertainty as to precisely what services are reimburseable, and which are not. For example, the office of a New England Governor has received only the May 3 cable from the Task Force. Because the state is now facing a 12.3% unemployment rate, there is considerable anxiety over the potential impact of Vietnamese refugees on state services and the employment picture. Yet the Governor, despite his offices inquiries, has no information or guidance on the state's responsibilities in receiving refugees and on the issue of federal payments for any state services provided the refugees.

Even where HEW has informed state welfare agencies of the proposal to reimburse all costs incurred, official notification down the line has been slow or nonexistent. For example, the Administrator of the nation's largest social welfare program, has yet to receive any official notification on any aspect of the resettlement program.

After refugees have been provided resettlement opportunities, a number of follow-on programs are required. Some refugees will need additional counselling and orientation to American life. Others will need special language training and other

programs to assist them in becoming productive and self-sufficient members of American society.

To assist in the process, the Task Force has been forced to propose that a number of governmental programs be made available to the refugees -- programs, in some instances, that the Administration has cut-back or eliminated for Americans.

The following programs have been listed by the Task Force, in a statement submitted to the Subcommittee, as being planned to augment the efforts of the voluntary agencies, individual sponsors, and local community services and resources:

1. establishment of a Job Bank to determine employment opportunities in relation to the refugee's location, his skills or his potential.
2. establishment of an Educational Services Program, including:
 - a. assessment of the English language proficiency (written and oral), and equivalency of previous education to the U.S. educational system.
 - b. assessment of vocational skills and counselling on vocational training and opportunities.
 - c. identification or development of appropriate educational materials.
 - d. establishment of English language training programs.
 - e. establishment of vocational education programs with an English language component.
 - f. provision for training necessary for re-accreditation for professionals wishing to practice their previous skills in this country (e.g., doctors, lawyers, and teachers).

- g. identification of educational institutions with previous experience in teaching foreign nationals, especially Vietnamese and Cambodian.
 - h. establishment of a central dissemination and referral service to assist refugees and sponsor agencies in obtaining appropriate educational materials, e.g., phrase books for families who have sponsored refugees with limited English capacity.
 - i. assistance under presently organized Department of Health, Education, and Welfare programs once the refugee's permanent resident status is established -- e.g., student financial assistance programs for higher education and programs for limited English speaking students (under the Emergency School Assistance Act).
3. establishment of a Social Services Program. Social services through public agencies would be limited in the same manner as they apply to other residents of the states and communities in which the refugees are located. Assistance will be provided to refugees who have a high risk of becoming dependent on assistance unless they receive help with pressing problems. The major purpose of this assistance is to help individuals and families achieve self-support and remain self-supporting. The services expected to be most needed are:
- a. counselling related to obtaining and retaining employment.
 - b. referral to community resources -- such as vocational rehabilitation for persons who have disabilities which constitute barriers to self-support.
 - c. arranging for needed medical services.
 - d. homemaker service where a parent has to be hospitalized for an illness and there is no one available to take care of the children.
 - e. arranging for day care for children, if necessary, when a parent is in vocational rehabilitation.

All of the above services and programs are important. But, again, there is little evidence than many, if any, are really off-the-ground. For example, the simple provision of training necessary for re-accreditation of professionals wishing to practice their previous skills, such as doctors and dentists, has not begun. There is absolutely no reason that this program should not be functioning. Proposals have come from several universities fully capable of beginning such a program now -- such as the University of Oklahoma or the University of Miami (which assisted during the Cuban program). Yet decisions to support such programs have not been made, although funds are immediately available.

Until the Task Force moves to implement the wise and essential programs it has listed on paper, little progress can be expected in truly resettling refugees as productive members of the community.

5. Processing Problems.

What should have been an orderly, expeditious and relatively straight forward procedure for processing Indochina refugees has turned into a nightmare for officials and refugees alike. Once again, it is a problem of implementation, rather than a lack of guidance.

The elements of the process are clear enough: reception of the refugees; screening (by INS); issuance of social security

cards and HEW counselling and screening; voluntary agency counselling for sponsorships; verification of resettlement sponsors; final INS processing (Security Check verification); and final outprocessing and travel arrangements. Regrettably, this process came to a virtual standstill throughout the month of May, and is still stuck in a mire of clearances.

Statistics on the number of refugees actually processed out of camps to date speak for themselves. According to the Task Force, as of the first week of June -- well over a month after the process began -- 102,314 refugees, out of the 131,000 refugees who have come under United States control, remain to be out-processed. In short, 80% of all the refugees are still in camps awaiting resettlement. And of this total to be processed, half are still on overseas bases awaiting transfer to the reception camps where meaningful screening for resettlement begins.

For many weeks during May there simply was no movement of refugees out of camps in the United States. By the first week of June, some slight progress was reported by the Task Force, indicating that an average of 600 to 650 refugees were moving out of camps each day. Assuming that this increased rate will continue under current processing procedures -- which is not likely -- it will still take six months at a minimum to empty the camps.

More likely, significant numbers of refugees will be remaining in camps for a longer period of time -- in fact, some officials involved in the processing estimate that the time frame may be up to a year or more.

One totally unnecessary bottleneck in the screening process to date has been the INS security check. The law provides for a security check, and it was proper that it be applied. However, as it has been implemented, the security clearance process has become an inexcusable delay in the refugee process, and no adequate explanations have been offered as to why the clearance process was allowed to become quite so muddled, or so lengthy.

According to the Task Force, as of June 5th, of the 70,687 refugees who have arrived in camps in the U.S., 67,932 have been processed by INS, of which 23,284 have been cleared by INS for departure, and 18,418 have actually departed camps. Only 1,210 refugees have sponsors but are stuck in camps because they do not yet have clearances.

Presumably this clearance bottleneck can be broken in the weeks ahead. In the meantime, an effort has recently been made to close the gap between those refugees who have sponsorships but not yet security clearances, by instructing camps to cable Washington all names of refugees who have sponsors and clearing them first.

Table 4 : Refugee Resettlement Projections
(through the Voluntary Agencies)

<u>Agency</u>	<u>No. of Refugees Near-Term Projection</u>
U.S. Catholic Conference	20,000+ refugees
Church World Service	10,000
Lutheran Immigration	11,700
United HAIS Service	10,000
International Rescue Committee	5,000
American Council for Nationalities Service/Traveler's Aid	5,000
Tolstoy Foundation	2,000
Czechoslovak Refugees Fund	2,000
	<hr/>
Total	65,700 refugees

There is also a growing backlog of refugees in need of sponsorships, in part because the work of the voluntary agencies has been hampered by the lack of funds and support, and also because data on the refugees is not available for resettlement planning. The voluntary agencies have indicated that in the next few months they can, together, resettle at least 65,700 refugees. Table 4 outlines the number of refugees each agency projects that it can resettle over the short-term.

Obviously, this projection leaves almost half the refugees unsettled, and there are growing pressures within the Task Force to go around the agencies and seek resettlement sponsorships through various service organizations or state or local governments. Already the State of Washington has won approval to be a sponsor of refugees. The danger involved in taking this route, is that only the voluntary agencies have a proven record of following up refugee resettlement. A local service club may become a sponsor of a refugee family with the best of motives and the highest of spirits. But when or if the resettlement situation breaks down, no one is there to provide assistance or the experience necessary to help.

IV. CAMBODIAN REFUGEES

Although the Indochina war came last to Cambodia, it was first to be evacuated, and the first to have refugees airlifted to the United States.

On April 11, U.S. military forces, including 350 ground combat Marines, 36 helicopters, and supporting tactical air and command/control units were deployed to Phnom Penh. Thus, "Operation Eagle Pull" began, and in little less than four hours 82 American citizens, 35 Third Country nationals, and 159 Cambodians, mostly Khmer employees of the U.S. Embassy, were evacuated.

This constituted the "first wave" of Cambodian refugees, and was the group for whom parole authority was first requested. But, as in the Vietnamese situation, there was a second and third wave of Cambodian refugee movement, although far less in magnitude, yet involving similar problems.

On April 21, ten days after the evacuation of Phnom Penh, the Department of State revised its estimate of the number of Cambodians who might come to the United States. Considering the number of Cambodian diplomats and others outside of the country at the time of the collapse of the government, the fact that some 1,200 were evacuated in the weeks preceding the

evacuation, and the reports of refugees crossing the border into Thailand, the Department indicated that the maximum number of Cambodians who might seek admission to the United States would be approximately 6,000.

The total number of Cambodian refugees who have fled since the collapse of Phnom Penh has now nearly doubled that figure. However, only some 3,000 are currently estimated as eligible, under the parole authority, for admission into the United States. There are currently under United States control some 2,600 Cambodians, including some 900 at Camp Pendleton, 500 at Indiantown Gap, and 1,200 at Utapao Air Base in Thailand. Less than 100 Cambodians have yet to be processed out, principally from Camp Pendleton, and the 500 at Indiantown Gap arrived from Utapao only during the first week of June.

Reports from the field indicate that some Cambodian refugees are still moving across the border into Thailand, creating a serious diplomatic and humanitarian problem for the Thai government. Best estimates are that some 5,000 to 8,000 Cambodian refugees are in Thailand, and efforts are being made to facilitate their identification and resettlement. Of this group, the Task Force estimates that several hundred might be eligible, on a case by case basis, to come to the United States.

In addition, there are 250 Cambodian diplomats and

dependents remaining in eight countries around the globe.

The United States has indicated that they will be considered for admission to the U.S. only if the host countries expell them and if international agencies have been unable to provide assistance. Already two countries have expelled Cambodian diplomats -- India and Indonesia -- and the U.S. has tentatively agreed to assist.

The Cambodians now in camps have been housed and processed separately from the Vietnamese, and there has been a wise attempt to keep them together as much as possible. Separate arrangements have been made with the voluntary agencies for resettling the Cambodians.