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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

JAN 8 1976

January 8, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH
FROM: DONALD G. OGILVIE
SUBJECT: Helicopter Pilot Training

Attached is the Defense budget decision document which consolidated helicopter pilot training at Fort Rucker. Clements is apparently considering a proposal to consolidate fixed-wing aircraft training at Pensacola, but no decision has been made to date.

I have asked Jim Mitchell and Paul O'Neill to check on the forestry issue you raised and will get you a report shortly.

Attachment

saw Jim 1/20/76 - discussed

R - ALM

D - Friday

D - Deforx mth.

m



PROGRAM/BUDGET DECISION

NUMBER

317 *Adams*SUBJECT Program 8 - Consolidation of Undergraduate
Helicopter Pilot TrainingDOD COMPONENT
Navy, Army

DESCRIPTION Covers all undergraduate helicopter pilot training.

FY 1977

	Army	Navy
Alternative Estimate, TOA, \$M	+12.5	-34.3
Alternative Estimate, Military E/S	+60	-2,000
Alternative Estimate, Civilian E/S	+23	-450

Evaluation

The potential for consolidation of undergraduate helicopter pilot training (UHPT) has long been studied by different groups. While strong opposing views have been presented by the Navy, the general conclusion reached by the Interservice Training Review Organization (ITRO) task group is that significant savings could be realized from consolidation. The greatest total savings to DoD, however, would clearly be realized by having the Army conduct all DoD helicopter training at Fort Rucker. The alternative directs that all UHPT training be consolidated under Army, adds \$12.5 million to Army training estimates for this purpose and reduces Navy training estimates by \$34.3 million for a net DoD savings of \$21.8 million in FY 1977. Larger savings will be realized in the outyears.

In addition, the alternative would preclude the Navy from acquiring two additional outlying training fields near Pensacola and would provide for the reduction of at least one Navy flight training base. The effect of the alternative would be to also reduce Navy aircraft procurement requirements by \$24.0 million. Aircraft requirements will be addressed in a separate PBD.

Outyear savings indicated below include the impact of a Navy base closure and excludes aircraft procurement reductions.

Outyear Impact: Per Year FY 1978 - FY 1981

Army	Navy
+12.5 Million	-\$51.3 Million
+60 Military E/S	-2,300 Military E/S
+23 Civilian E/S	-900 Civilian E/S

Alternative. Consolidate all UHPT under Army; approve an increase of \$12.5 million, 60 military E/S and 23 civilian E/S to Army estimates and a decrease of \$34.3 million, 2,000 military E/S, and 450 civilian E/S to Navy estimates in FY 1977; and reduce Navy flight training base structure by one base.

Mtg with Sikes --

*① Clements --- DoD must start with efficiencies --- 'Hard pill time'
must do hard things*

Pensacola ---- open option with Corpus Christi (Clements does not like)

② Navy - fighting to bitter end

DECISION The Deputy Secretary approved the alternative and to
consolidate at Fort Rucker. December 15, 1975

SD FORM 1 OCT 74 428-1

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PAGE 1 OF 5

Disclosure Restricted Under FOI Act (5 USC 552) and DoD Directive 5400.7

CONTINUATION OF CONSIDERATION

DETAIL OF EVALUATIONConsolidation of Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot Training (UHPT)

For several years now, proposals have been considered to consolidate UHPT into an all helicopter program under the Army. A great deal of pressure has been exerted from the GAO and the Congress on the DoD to move forward with this consolidation. Each time this issue has been addressed, significant economies identified have prompted OSD staff support of such consolidation. However, each time a particular version was solidified, staffed and began moving through the decision process, strong objections have been raised by the Navy on the basis that the "Service peculiar" needs of the Navy cannot be met causing delay in a decision on any particular consolidation proposal. On the other hand, Air Force helicopter pilots have been trained by the Army successfully for a number of years and Army has successfully trained Marines (several hundred a year during the Vietnam era). Navy conducts a combination fixed and rotary wing UHPT program with graduates receiving some 100 hours in rotary-wing aircraft in contrast to some 200 rotary-wing hours for graduates of the Army all helo program.

At ASD(M&RA) request, the Interservice Training Review Organization (ITRO) studied the potential for this consolidation and found that significant savings would accrue from such a move. GAO concluded also in a 1974 report that helicopter training consolidation would result in savings. In short, the issue has been studied long enough and this PBD provides an alternative intended to prompt a decision to consolidate helicopter training as part of the FY 1977 budget review process.

The ITRO task group found that significant commonality existed among the Services in the UHPT basic course requirements for training a helo pilot. Navy graduates of UHPT, as they do now, would attend advanced (Readiness Squadron) training to fully prepare them for assignment to a fleet aviation unit. Service peculiar requirements can be readily provided in this intermediate follow-on program or in an expanded Service-specialized final segment of the UHPT syllabus, or both, as in the case for the Air Force. These needs are discussed in detail by the ITRO. It is generally agreed that a revision of the current UHPT syllabus to provide for such needs would be desirable if Army did all the training at Fort Rucker.

The table below displays Service budgeted helicopter training rates over the next several years, subject to adjustment in the current budget cycle.

	<u>FY 1976</u>	<u>FY 1977</u>	<u>FY 1978</u>	<u>FY 1979</u>	<u>FY 1980</u>	<u>FY 1981</u>
Army	811	158	820	820	820	820
Air Force	50	12	50	50	50	50
Navy	225	50	201	200	200	200
Marine Corps	216	45	180	260	260	260
Other*	139	63	151	95	95	95
Total	1,441	328	1,402	1,425	1,425	1,425

*Includes Coast Guard, Foreign, etc.

Army training officials have advised that the Fort Rucker capacity for training helicopter pilots is about 2,400 pilots per year; it is the only base that has the capacity to train all helicopter pilots required by DoD. As indicated, the Army's stated peak annual helo pilot training requirement FY77 through FY81 is less than

CONTINUATION OF CONSIDERATION

900 pilots. Because of Army's current pilot surplus, however, the PBD on Program VIII, Army, proposes reducing the annual training rate to at least 675 and perhaps to 500 pilots. Assuming that this proposed training rate is accepted, only a quarter of the present training capacity at Fort Rucker will be used. Furthermore, training rates for the other Services are expected to be lower than those shown pending final decision in separate PBD's currently under consideration.

The ITRO study addressed three options. The first option was to maintain the status quo and allow Navy to proceed with its Long Range Pilot Training System at a one-time cost of \$17.7M and annual recurring savings estimated at \$6.7M. Option two provided for "All Helicopter" Training by the Army and identified one-time costs of \$.2M and annual recurring savings of \$11.7M. Option three, which is essentially a compromise between the first two options, would have collocated Navy training at Fort Rucker but allowed Navy to continue its own training. One-time costs were estimated at \$12.8M with annual recurring savings of \$6.3M. The estimates did not include cost avoidance/savings associated with current Navy plans to acquire two outlying fields at Whiting near Pensacola nor did they include reduced procurement requirements of T-34C training aircraft. Base utilization adjustments which could be accomplished with consolidation were also not addressed in the ITRO study. The study was reported in March 1975 and although it remains valid, some detailed cost estimates may warrant updating.

Current estimates from the Army indicate that Army can train all Navy and Marine Corps helo pilots for an annual additional Army cost of approximately \$12.5M, an estimate consistent with the ITRO study. The Army add-on is based on budgeted Navy-conducted training rates and would be adjusted to reflect other budget adjustments in these rates. This estimate is based on the following assumptions: (1) all primary flight training (approximately the first half) will be performed by contract, as it is now in the Army program; (2) Navy will provide and fund all Instructor Pilots, Check Pilots, and Flight Commanders required beyond primary flight training; (3) training syllabus will be identical except for 25 hours of Navy-unique training; (4) all academic instructors will be provided by Army; (5) flight clothing for USN students will be provided by Navy; (6) Navy will furnish a detachment for all administrative support for USN permanent party and students; (7) investment costs for training aircraft are not included; and (8) Navy will transfer its UH-1 training aircraft to Army to augment the present UHPT trainer inventory. The latter will supplement Army UH-1 assets for the last half of the course; Army TH-55 assets from the Vietnam surge are adequate to handle all DoD training loads.

The Navy budget displays the total cost of its flight training program which includes estimated costs of training jet, propeller, and helicopter pilots for Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and foreign countries. Budget estimates are presented in aggregate for all aircraft lines. The Service estimate breaks out only aircraft operating cost for each line and does not separately identify the total costs of training jet pilots, prop pilots or helo pilots. Navy has been repeatedly requested to break out the cost for the helo pilot portion only. Navy has reported that it is having great difficulty separating these costs and to date has been unable to provide the data.

The table below displays data provided by the Navy for the FY 1976 Military Manpower Training Report (MMTR), which identifies total cost of UHPT program for FY 1976 and FY 1977, as contained in the President's Budget.

CONTINUATION OF CONSIDERATION

Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot Training

	FY 1976 (\$000)	FY 1977 (\$000)	FY 1977 (\$000)
Navy Training Rate (Navy/Marcorps)	528	106	381
<u>Appropriation</u>			
MilPers	35,884	8,877	39,245
O&M	22,260	5,879	27,681
Aircraft Procurement	11,010	3,670	34,800
Other Procurement	113	32	693
MILCON	2,672	0	0
Reimb.	0	0	0
	<u>71,939</u>	<u>18,458</u>	<u>102,419 (est.)</u>
<u>Purpose/Use</u>			
Student Pay and Allow.	4,797	1,195	5,154
Direct Spt. MilPers	22,538	5,515	22,795
Direct Spt. Other	12,332	3,369	14,531
Indirect Spt. MilPers	8,549	2,167	33,146
Indirect Spt. Other	23,723	6,212	26,793
	<u>71,939</u>	<u>18,458</u>	<u>102,419 (est.)</u>

Costs associated with conduct of UHPT in FY 1976 were stated by Navy last year to be \$71.9M, of which \$11M was for aircraft procurement and \$2.7M was for new construction. Navy has been tasked to update and extend this table for FY 1977 funding. Since Navy has not yet responded, the FY 1976/77 data above was used to factor the FY 1977 costs for pricing out the alternative in this PBD. The costs for Navy UHPT in FY 1977 have been estimated to be about \$102.4M, of which \$34.8M is programmed for aircraft procurement.

Data from the above table indicates an average cost of about \$136,000 per Navy helo pilot graduate in FY 1976 and about \$174,000 per graduate in FY 1977. Cost per graduate in FY 1977 would exceed \$260,000 when proposed aircraft procurement costs are allocated. Comparable MMTR data for the Army helo pilot program indicates an average cost per graduate of \$87,000 in FY 1976 and \$86,000 in FY 1977.

The Navy fixed-wing aircraft procurement plan, part of which supports Navy's UHPT, is well underway. Total procurement is programmed for 228 T-34C training aircraft at a total cost of \$82.9M, with funding of 109 planned for FY 1977 at a cost of \$34.8M. About one-third of the total buy could be avoided under this consolidation, or 76 aircraft at a savings of about \$24M. Aside from the large investment cost of such aircraft, they are more expensive to operate in the primary phase than the different rotary wing aircraft that could be used if the Army did this training instead. Based on the estimated Navy costs above and analysis by the OSD staff, it is estimated that no less than \$60M in FY 1977 Navy funds could be saved by having the Army train all helicopter pilots at its UHPT base at Fort Rucker.

The alternative would direct the Army to conduct undergraduate helo pilot training for all DoD needs at Fort Rucker, beginning in FY 1977. This decision would require adding 60 military E/S, 23 civilian E/S and \$12.5M to the Army budget. Navy training budget estimates could be reduced by 2,000 military, 450 civilians, and \$34.3M in FY 1977 with larger savings anticipated in the outyears. In addition, potential

CONTINUATION OF CONSIDERATION

Navy aircraft procurement savings (now estimated at \$24.0 million) will be addressed in a separate PBD.

The alternative would direct Navy to withhold action on the planned acquisition of two outlying fields at Whiting until the full impact of this decision is determined. Consolidation of UHPT together with other training consolidation actions, makes possible the reduction of the Navy flight training base structure by one base with the location to be proposed by the Navy. The reductions above assume one-time Navy phasing costs of \$17M in FY 1977.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


January 19, 1976

Memo For Jack Marsh

Attached is a revised page 10 to substitute in the report I sent you over the weekend regarding base closure justifications.



Alan Woods





OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C., 20301

JAN 17 1976

January 17, 1976

THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN O. MARSH, JR.

Attached you will find the bullet points you requested for each significant base realignment to be studied. Where there are substantive negative factors involved, they have been included.

Also attached is an additional copy of the memorandum indicating the names (in parentheses) of the Congressman in whose district the facilities are located and the names of other Members of Congress and Senators from that state who serve on committees which affect DoD. An asterisk next to the state's name shows whether or not it is a primary state.

I will remain available to discuss these with you at your convenience. I can be reached at 697-8388 (office) or 549-5919 (home).

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Alan Woods".

Alan Woods
The Special Assistant

cc: James Cavanaugh
Donald Ogilvie



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
REALIGNMENT CANDIDATES
JANUARY 1976

SIGNIFICANT CANDIDATES

ACTION

Key Committee Member

ALABAMA ●

STUDY CLOSURE OF CRAIG AIR FORCE BASE,
SELMA (Represented by Cong. Flowers-D)

Dickinson (R) HASC
Edwards (R) HAC
Nichols (D) HASC
Bevill (D) HAC

ARIZONA ●

STUDY CONSOLIDATION AND RELOCATION OF
ACTIVITIES FROM DAVIS-MONTHAN AIR FORCE
BASE, TUSCON (Represented by Cong. Udall-D)

Goldwater (R) SASC

CALIFORNIA ●

STUDY CLOSURE OF FORT MAC ARTHUR, LOS ANGELES
(Represented by Cong. Johnson-D)

CONSOLIDATE SUPPORT AND OVERHEAD OF NAVAL
ELECTRONIC LABORATORY CENTER/NAVAL UNDERSEA
CENTER, SAN DIEGO (Represented by B. Wilson-R)

Cranston (D) SBC
B. Wilson (R) HASC
Hinshaw (R) HASC
Talcott (R) HAC
Clawson (R) HBC
C. Wilson (D) HASC
Leggett (D) HASC & HBC
Lloyd (D) HASC
Burke (D) HAS
Roybal (D) HAC
McFall (D) HAC
Burgener (D) HAC
Dellums (D) HASC

FLORIDA ●

STUDY DISESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL AIR STATION,
KEY WEST (Represented by Cong. Fascall-D)

STUDY DISESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL AIR STATION,
PENSACOLA, SAUFLEY FIELD (Represented by
Cong. Sikes-D)

Chiles (D) SAC & SBC
Young (R) HAC
Bennett (D) HASC
Sikes (D) HAC
Chappell (D) HAC
Gibbons (D) HBC



ILLINOIS*

STUDY CLOSURE OF SAVANNA ARMY DEPOT, SAVANNA (Represented by Cong. Railsback-R)	O'Brien(R)	HASC
	Michel(R)	HAC
	Price(D)	HASC
	Shipley(D)	HAC
	Yates(D)	HAC

INDIANA*

STUDY CLOSURE OF JEFFERSON PROVING GROUND, MADISON (Represented by Cong. Hamilton-D)	Bayh (D)	SAC
	Hillis(R)	HASC
	Roush(D)	HAC
REDUCE OPERATIONS AT NAVAL WEAPONS SUPPORT CENTER, CRANE (Represented by Cong. Hillis-R)	Myers(R)	HAC

MAINE

STUDY REDUCTION OF BASE AT LORING AIR FORCE BASE, LIMESTONE (Represented by Cong. Cohen-R)	Muskie(D)	SBC
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MARYLAND*

STUDY CONSOLIDATION OF ORDNANCE SCHOOL, ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, ABERDEEN (Represented by Cong. R. Bauman-R)	Mathias(R)	SAC
	Beall(R)	SBC
	Holt(R)	HASC
	Long(D)	HAC
	Mitchell(D)	HBC

MASSACHUSETTS*

STUDY REDUCTION OF SEMIACTIVE STATUS OF FORT DEVENS, AYER (Represented by Cong. Drinan-D)	Brooke(R)	SAC
	Conte(R)	HAC
	Boland(D)	HAC
	Early(D)	HAC
	O'Neill(D)	HBC

MICHIGAN*

STUDY CONVERSION TO CONTRACT OPERATION OF ARMY FAMILY HOUSING AT SELFRIDGE AIR GUARD BASE, MT. CLEMENTS (Represented by Cong. O'Hara-D)	Cederberg(R)	HAC & HBC
	Nedzi(D)	HASC
	Carr(D)	HASC
	Traxler(D)	HAC
STUDY CLOSURE OF KINCHELOE AIR FORCE BASE, KINROSS (Represented by Cong. Ruppe-R)	O'Hara(D)	HBC

MISSOURI

STUDY RELOCATION OF ACTIVITIES FROM RICHARDS-GEBEUR AIR FORCE BASE, GRANDVIEW (Represented by Cong. Bolling-D)	Symington(D)	SASC
	Eagleton(D)	SAC
	Randall(D)	HASC
	Ichord(D)	HASC
	Burleson(D)	HAC

MONTANA*

INACTIVATE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND SATELLITE DETACHMENT AND DISESTABLISH AIR FORCE ACTIVITIES AT GLASGOW AIR FORCE BASE, GLASGOW (Represented by Cong. Melcher-D)	Mansfield(D)	SAC
	Baucus(D)	HAC

NEW JERSEY*

STUDY CLOSURE OF FORT DIX, WRIGHTSTOWN (Represented by Thompson-D and Forsythe-R)	Case(R)	SAC
	Patten(D)	HAC
STUDY CONVERSION TO CONTACT OPERATION AT ARMY MILITARY OCEAN TERMINAL, BAYONNE (Represented by Cong. Daniels-D)		

NEW YORK*

STUDY CLOSURE OF FORTS HAMILTON AND TOTTEN, NEW YORK CITY (Represented by Cong. Zeferetti-D; Rosenthal-D, Biaggi-D, Wolff-D)	Buckley(R)	SBC
	Mitchell(R)	HASC
	Kemp(R)	HAC
	McEwen(R)	HAC
STUDY RELOCATION OF NAVY RESALE OFFICE FROM NEW YORK CITY (Represented by Cong. Zeferetti-D)	Conable(R)	HBC
	Hastings(R)	HBC
	Stratton(D)	HASC
STUDY CONVERSION TO CONTRACT OPERATION OF ARMY FAMILY HOUSING AT STEWART AIRPORT, NEWBURGH (Represented by Cong. Gilman-R)	Holtzman(D)	HBC
	Addabbo(D)	HAC
	Koch(D)	HAC

OHIO*

STUDY CONVERSION OF CONTRACTOR OPERATED RESERVE FACILITY OF RICKENBACKER AIR FORCE BASE, COLUMBUS (Represented by Wylie-R and Devine-R)	Taft(R)	SASC
	Regula(R)	HAC
	Miller(R)	HAC
	Latta(R)	HBC
	Ashley(D)	HBC
	Stokes(D)	HAC & HBC

OKLAHOMA

STUDY CONSOLIDATION AND RELOCATION OF
ACTIVITIES FROM ALTUS AIR FORCE BASE
ALTUS (Represented by Cong. Steed-D)

Bellmon(R) SAC & SBC
Steed(D) HAC

STUDY REALIGNMENT OF AIR CONTROL SYSTEM AND
COMMUNICATIONS AT TINKER AIR FORCE BASE,
OKLAHOMA CITY (Represented by Cong. Jarman-R)

PENNSYLVANIA*

STUDY REDUCTION OF OPERATIONS AT NEW CUMBER-
LAND ARMY DEPOT, NEW CUMBERLAND (Represented
by Cong. Goodling-R)

Schulze(R) HASC
Coughlin(R) HAC
Murtha(R) HAC
McDade(R) HAC
Schneebeli(R) HBC
Flood(D) HAC

STUDY TERMINATION OF ARMY OPERATIONS AT FORT
INDIANTOWN GAP, LEBANON (Represented by
Cong. Schneebeli-R)

STUDY REDUCTION OF NAVAL HOSPITAL, PHILADELPHIA
(Represented by Cong. Barrett-D, Eilberg-D,
Green-D and Nix-D)

TENNESSEE*

STUDY CLOSURE OF NAVAL AIR STATION, MEMPHIS
(Represented by Cong. Jones-D)

Beard(R) HASC
Evins(D) HAC

TEXAS*

STUDY DISESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL AIR STATION
CORPUS CHRISTI AND REDESIGNATION AS NAVAL
AIR FACILITY (Represented by Cong. Young-D)

Tower(R) SASC
White(D) HASC
Kazen(D) HASC
Casey(D) HAC
Mahon(D) HAC
Wright(D) HBC
Burleson(D) HBC

STUDY CLOSURE OF WEBB AIR FORCE BASE, BIG
SPRING (Represented by Cong. Burleson-D)

VIRGINIA

STUDY TERMINATION OF ARMY ACTIVITIES AT
ARLINGTON HALL, ARLINGTON (Represented by
Cong. Fisher-D)

Byrd(D) SASC
Scott(R) SASC
Whitehurst(R) HASC
Robinson(R) HAC
Daniel (R) HASC
Daniel, D(D) HASC

STUDY CLOSURE OF WINT HILL FARMS STATION
WARRENTON (Represented by Cong. Robinson-R)

STUDY CLOSURE OF FORT STORY, VIRGINIA BEACH
(Represented by Cong. Whitehurst-R)

PUERTO RICO

STUDY CLOSURE OF FORT BUCHANAN

GUAM

STUDY CLOSURE OF NAVAL SHIP REPAIR FACILITY
AGANA (Represented by Cong. Won-D)

* Primary State



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JANUARY 1976

<u>ACTION</u>	<u>PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF PERSONNEL AFFECTED</u>		
	<u>MIL</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>ALABAMA</u>			
STUDY CLOSURE OF CRAIG AIR FORCE BASE, SELMA	1,500	550	2,050
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Excess Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) training base capacity . Craig lowest producer of all UPT bases . Airspace problems . Weather limits flying operation . New investment has purposely been withheld because Craig has been "soft" for some time . Large percentage of substandard facilities . No need for other AF requirements 			
<u>ARIZONA</u>			
CONSOLIDATE AND RELOCATE ACTIVITIES FROM DAVIS-MONTHAN AIR FORCE BASE, TUCSON	980	40	1,020
<p>(Transfer from SAC to TAC, inactive 100th Strat. Recon Wing; relocate 349th Strat Recon Sqd's U-2 aircraft to Beale AFB, Calif. and merge with SR-71 assets; consolidate SAC and TAC drone personnel and equipment under TAC at base; and relocate Det. 1 of the AF Fighter Weapons Center which has six A-10 aircraft and performs Operational Test & Evaluation mission for Nellis AFB, Nevada)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Collocates Strat. Recon resources . Reduces air space hazard for U-2 by relocating 			

PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED
MIL CIV TOTAL

ACTIONARIZONA (Continued)

- . Avoids U-2 construction requirements at D/M
- . Results in economies due to consolidation of Strat. Recon and drone resources

CALIFORNIA

STUDY CLOSURE OF FORT MAC ARTHUR, LOS ANGELES 90 180 270

- . Reduction of unneeded, high cost, single mission installation (DoD policy to eliminate)
- . Reduction of overhead and support costs
- . Originally proposed in 1974 but not fully implemented
- . Reserve mission can be performed as effectively at Naval Air Station, Los Alamitos


CONSOLIDATE SUPPORT AND OVERHEAD OF NAVAL ELECTRONIC LABORATORY CENTER/NAVAL UNDERSEA CENTER, SAN DIEGO 370 370

- . Economies through consolidation of overhead and support facilities
- . Situated almost across street from each other

FLORIDA

STUDY DISESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL AIR STATION, SAUFLEY FIELD, PENSACOLA 330 28 358

- . Realignment of Navy Aviation Training assets
- . Economies through consolidation
- . Property will continue to be used for Navy non-flying activities



PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED

<u>ACTION</u>	<u>MIL</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
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FLORIDA (Continued)

STUDY DISESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL AIR STATION, KEY WEST	2,600	640	3,240
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- . Cost Economies due to reduction of base Operating Support Costs
- . Reduces Navy shore establishment
- . Consolidates similar activities in Pensacola area

ILLINOIS

STUDY CLOSURE OF SAVANNA ARMY DEPOT, SAVANNA	15	415	430
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- . Continuation of Army's long range plan to reduce unneeded depot structure (Reduction affected 2-3 years ago)
- . Preliminary estimate indicates long term pay back (14 years)
- . Army analyses indicates this most feasible one at this time
- . Property will probably be retained for contingency requirements.

INDIANA

STUDY CLOSURE OF JEFFERSON PROVING GROUND, MADISON	4	420	424
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- . Continuation of Army's long range plan to reduce unnecessary installations
- . One of four locations at which ammo testing is accomplished. Proposals will reduce to three, thereby eliminating some duplication
- . Will result in better utilization of proposed mission relocation sites (Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.; Yuma, Ariz. and/or Dugway, Utah)
- . Preliminary estimate indicates long term pay back (11.4 years)

PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED

	<u>MIL</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
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ACTION

INDIANA (Continued)

REDUCE OPERATIONS AT NAVAL WEAPONS SUPPORT
CENTER, CRANE

445 445

- . RIF only (11%)
- . Need based upon Navy's projection of workload

MAINE

STUDY REDUCTION OF BASE AT LORING AIR
FORCE BASE, LIMESTONE

2,750 465 3,215

- . Scheduled reduction of older B-52 (G models) from active inventory
- . Results in part from total force strategy which transfers certain SAC tanker functions to Reserve Component responsibility (i.e., KC-135s to Reserves)
- . Will retain capability to support SAC, Air Defense Command alert and contingency requirements
- . Reduction of single mission base (DoD policy is to evolve to multi-mission base)
- . Results in sizable resource reductions (less than 3 month pay back)
- . New investment has been held to minimum in recent years
- . Coastal SAC base

MARYLAND

STUDY CONSOLIDATION OF ORDNANCE SCHOOL,
ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND (APG), ABERDEEN

1,475 720 2,195

- . Consolidation of similar training activities (Ordnance School, APG and Missile and Munitions School, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama)

PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED
MIL CIV TOTAL

ACTIONMARYLAND (Continued)

- . Very cost effective - 1.1 year pay back (but \$40 mil in new MILCON)
- . Reduces overhead and support costs
- . Would significantly reduce APG with no planned back fill.

MASSACHUSETTS

STUDY REDUCTION TO SEMIACTIVE STATUS OF FORT DEVENS, AYER	4,370	850	5,220
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- . Consolidation of Army Intelligence training activities
- . Reduces overhead and support costs
- . Cost effective - 5.6 year pay back
- . Preliminary estimates indicates \$50 mil MILCON required

MICHIGAN

STUDY CONVERSION TO CONTRACT OPERATION OF ARMY FAMILY HOUSING AT SELFRIDGE AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE, MT. CLEMENS	21	230	251
---	----	-----	-----

- . Could be very cost effective
- . Reduces DoD civilian end strength
- . Would continue to provide required family housing
- . Reserve Component activities unaffected

STUDY CLOSURE OF KINCHELOE AIR FORCE BASE, KINROSS	2,700	470	3,170
--	-------	-----	-------

- . Single mission base
- . Transfer of KC-135 forces closure
- . Clean base, allowing maximum economies to be realized

PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED

	<u>MIL</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
--	------------	------------	--------------

ACTION

MICHIGAN (Continued)

- . Very cost effective - 1.4 year pay back
- . Facilities redistribution of B-52 assets for consolidation
- . Low investment
- . No significant recent new construction

MISSOURI

STUDY RELOCATION OF ACTIVITIES FROM RICHARDS-GEBEUR AIR FORCE BASE, GRANDVIEW (INCLUDES NOVEMBER 1974 ANNOUNCED ACTION)	2,370	1,680	4,050
--	-------	-------	-------

- . Consolidate similar functions
- . Reduces headquarters
- . Relocation of Air Force Communications Service will enable management efficiencies to be realigned
- . Base retained for Air Force Reserve use
- . If Navy relocates Reserve activities from Memphis tempo of AF planned operations at this base could increase substantially
- . Very cost effective - 1.6 year pay back

MONTANA

INACTIVATE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND SATELLITE DETACHMENT AND DISESTABLISH AIR FORCE ACTIVITIES AT GLASGOW AIR FORCE BASE, GLASGOW	149	15	164
--	-----	----	-----

TERMINATE ARMY CONTRACT OPERATIONS AT GLASGOW AIR FORCE BASE, GLASGOW

- . Consolidation of SAC assets
- . Reduction in overhead and support cost (\$10 mil)
- . Action delayed for some period to assist local community in overcoming adverse economic impact of 1968 closure of base with little attraction of long term industrial tenants for use of base facilities

PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED

	<u>MIL</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
--	------------	------------	--------------

ACTIONMONTANA (Continued)

- . Base excess and will be available for State/Local ownership
- . Civilian energy projects now being considered by State for base should help mitigate being economic impact.

NEW JERSEY

STUDY CONVERSION TO CONTRACT OPERATION AT ARMY MILITARY OCEAN TERMINAL, BAYONNE	7	590	597
--	---	-----	-----

- . No need for full time DoD longshoremen
- . Trend towards containerization diminished need for Bayonne break bulk type operation
- . Accomplishment by contract allows when and as needed arrangement with resulting economies

NEW YORK

STUDY CLOSURE OF FORTS HAMILTON AND TOTTEN, NEW YORK CITY	410	604	1,014
--	-----	-----	-------

- . Eliminates small single mission, high cost installations
- . Reduces overhead and support costs
- . Very cost effective - 2.7 year pay back
- . Reserve activities remain

STUDY RELOCATION OF NAVY RESALE OFFICE FROM NEW YORK CITY	18	740	758
--	----	-----	-----

- . Consolidates DoD activities on military installation
- . Reduces Navy SLUC costs (DoD payments to GSA)
- . Reduces overhead and support costs
- . No civilian end strength reduction

PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED

	<u>MIL</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
--	------------	------------	--------------

ACTIONNEW YORK (Continued)

STUDY CONVERSION TO CONTRACT OPERATION OF ARMY FAMILY HOUSING AT STEWART AIRPORT, NEWBURGH	41	148	189
--	----	-----	-----

- . Could be very cost effective
- . Reduces DoD end strength
- . Would continue to provide required family housing
- . Reserve activities remain

OHIO

STUDY CONVERSION TO CONTRACTOR OPERATED RESERVE FACILITY OF RICKENBACKER AIR FORCE BASE, COLUMBUS	1,750	560	2,310
---	-------	-----	-------

- . Transfer of KC-135 to Reserve allows inactivation of active sqds at this base and transfer to take place at same base
- . Very cost effective - less than three months pay back
- . Avoids MILCON for Reserve KC-135 transfer by using existing KC-135 facilities on base
- . Base remains viable but for Reserves only

OKLAHOMA

CONSOLIDATE AND RELOCATE ACTIVITIES FROM ALTUS AIR FORCE BASE, ALTUS	615	52	667
---	-----	----	-----

- . Nunn Amendment - communications units deploy to Europe
- . Increases communications posture in Europe
- . Assists in modernization of National Guard Air Tactical Control System

PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED
MIL CIV TOTAL

ACTIONOKLAHOMA (Continued)

- . Combines two mobile communications units and one base for increased efficiencies

REALIGNMENT OF AIR CONTROL SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS AT TINKER AIR FORCE BASE, OKLAHOMA CITY	413	5	418
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- . Assists in modernization of Air National Guard Tactical Air Control System
- . Increase communications posture in Europe
- . Nunn Amendment - communications units deploy to Europe

PENNSYLVANIA

STUDY REDUCTION OF ARMY AVIATION MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS AT NEW CUMBERLAND ARMY DEPOT, NEW CUMBERLAND	35	1,420	1,455
--	----	-------	-------

- . Consolidates Army Aviation Maintenance activities (Corpus Christi, Texas/ New Cumberland, Md.)
- . Reduces overhead and support functions
- . Permits significant annual cost reductions
- . Improves management of Army aviation maintenance activities

STUDY TERMINATION OF ARMY OPERATIONS AT FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, LEBANON	130	820	950
--	-----	-----	-----

- . Owned primarily by State; State National Guard activities unaffected
- . ROTC training mission reassigned elsewhere several years ago
- . Operation New Life (VN Refugee Program) delayed consideration of proposal
- . Eliminates unneeded, low utility, Reserve Component base which has very marginal

PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED
MIL CIV TOTAL

ACTION

PENNSYLVANIA (Continued)

mobilization use (Reserves for main training use Drum, N.Y.; Hill, Va.; Pickett, Va. and will use Dix more)

- . Very cost effective - less than four months pay back
- . Enables civilian personnel end strength reduction

STUDY REDUCTION OF NAVAL HOSPITAL, PHILADELPHIA	590	248	838
--	-----	-----	-----

- . Regionalization of hospital assets
- . Navy regards 300 bed hospital as excess to its requirements
- . Enables civilian personnel end strength reduction

STUDY CLOSURE OF THE DEFENSE CLOTHING FACTORY, PHILADELPHIA	1,600		1,600
--	-------	--	-------

- . Enables civilian end strength reduction
- . Work would be accomplished by contract
- . In line with Government Policy
- . Problem may be that industry may not be responsive (such as has happened in past)
- . Option may be to reduce to 500 personnel level
- . Civilian employees - 85% Black; 80% women.

TENNESSEE

STUDY CLOSURE OF NAVAL AIR STATION, MEMPHIS (Relocate five Reserve Squadrons to Richards-Gebaur AFB, Mo.)	580	100	680
--	-----	-----	-----

- . Naval Air Reserve Facility (Marine/ Navy Reservists)
- . 60% of Reservists now come from Kansas City area

PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED
MIL CIV TOTAL

ACTIONTENNESSEE (Continued)

- . Increase in Reserve training effectiveness
- . Helps Reserve morale
- . Reduces costs

TEXAS

STUDY DISESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL AIR STATION, CORPUS CHRISTI AND REDESIGNATION AS NAVAL AIR FACILITY	1,549	880	2,429
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- . Consolidation of Naval Aviation training assets
- . Reduces overhead and support costs
- . Makes more effective use of a better physical plant in Pensacola
- . Retains Navy presence
- . Proposed relocation of Army Aviation Maintenance Activity from New Cumberland to this station would help offset impact
- . Navy needs to reduce its Aviation training base structure and this proposal helps do this
- . Relocates Chief of Naval Aviation Training to Pensacola, thereby placing this headquarters in a better position to manage aviation training

STUDY CLOSURE OF WEBB AIR FORCE BASE, BIG SPRING	1,860	700	2,560
---	-------	-----	-------

- . Excess Undergraduate Pilot Training base capacity
- . Serious community land encroachment problem
- . Does not have three runway systems required for effective Undergraduate Pilot Training (neither does Craig-

PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED
MIL CIV TOTAL

ACTION

TEXAS (Continued)

remaining five Undergraduate Pilot Training bases do)

- . More substandard facilities than remaining five Undergraduate Pilot Training bases.
- . Very substantial savings (\$38 mil per year) - two months pay back

VIRGINIA

STUDY TERMINATION OF ARMY FACILITIES AT ARLINGTON HALL, ARLINGTON	690	560	1,250
---	-----	-----	-------

- . Substandard facilities
- . High cost operations
- . Relocate to better facilities
- . GSA would support residual DIA activities
- . Long overdue
- . Reduces civilian personnel end strength
- . \$25 mil MILCON required
- . ten year pay back

STUDY CLOSURE OF VINT HILL FARMS STATION, WARRENTON	700	425	1,125
---	-----	-----	-------

- . Operational need diminished
- . Residual essential activities can be accommodated elsewhere
- . Very cost effective - one year pay back
- . Eliminates single mission high cost installation

PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED

	<u>MIL</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
--	------------	------------	--------------

ACTIONVIRGINIA (Continued)

STUDY CLOSURE OF FORT STORY, VIRGINIA BEACH	470	40	510
---	-----	----	-----

- . Personnel reduction only
- . Property will continue to be retained by Army for training purposes
- . Requires \$7.3 MILCON
- . Cost effective - four year pay back

PUERTO RICO

STUDY CLOSURE OF FORT BUCHANAN	170	470	640
--------------------------------	-----	-----	-----

- . Closure of single mission, high cost installation
- . Reduces civilian personnel end strength
- . Very cost effective - 6-month pay back
- . Serves as only remaining Army military installation in Puerto Rico which is a source of large recruiting base for the volunteer Army.

GUAM

STUDY CLOSURE OF NAVAL SHIP REPAIR FACILITY, AGANA	7	330	337
---	---	-----	-----

- . High cost operation (US wages vs wages in the Philippines and Japan which are competitors of the Guam operation)
- . Long ship transit times from Western Pacific - excess use of fuel, high cost
- . Significant economic impact
- . Issue will revolve around US vs Foreign bases/nationals.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 9, 1976

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH
MAX FRIEDERSDORF

FROM: RUSS ROURKE *Russ*

Bryce Harlow called to advise that he has been told that Bill Clements has been instructed to stand by for base closure announcements this week.

It is reasonable to assume that everyone at the White House having an involvement in this matter is now "on board." If that is not the case and if, indeed, Harlow's information is even correct, then it is quite another matter.

I recognize fully that we have debated to death the wisdom of the aforementioned move and the best procedures to be followed. The Harlow call is, therefore, strictly FYI.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

John Tower -

Corpus Christi -

Don Aguirre

- out of loop - DOD -

Cheney operation -

"still under review"



FEB 27 1976

February 27, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF
SUBJECT: ~~Senator Ed Brooke~~ (R-MASS)

Attached is the letter just received from Senator Brooke
pertaining to Ft. Devens.

I recommend the President phone Senator Brooke today.

bcc: Jack Marsh ✓
Dick Cheney





UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

EDWARD W. BROOKE
MASSACHUSETTS

February 27, 1976

Dear Mr. President:

May I bring to your attention a matter that is of the deepest concern to me and to which I hope you will give your personal attention.

There are very persistent and very troubling reports that the Department of Defense will recommend the closing of Fort Devens Army Base in Ayer, Massachusetts. At the present time Massachusetts suffers from a 12 percent unemployment rate which is one of the highest in the country. To close Fort Devens and to thereby deprive the state's economy of the \$100 million which this base generates annually, would be to saddle our state with an unbearable burden.

On January 29, I had occasion to discuss this matter with Army Secretary Martin Hoffmann. And I understand full well the Army's need to close or realign certain bases in order to comply with the budgetary constraints mandated by Congress and the Office of Management and Budget. But Fort Devens' brief cannot and must not be limited to one department's fiscal difficulties. It must be expanded to consider the very drastic economic impact on Massachusetts and New England. It must also consider the economic impact such action would have on other Federal programs such as unemployment compensation and job retraining. And above all, it must be wedded to and steeped in the concept of equity.

Fort Devens provides for 5,700 military personnel and 1,600 civilian jobs. It boasts an annual payroll of \$86 million, with attendant economic benefits of over \$20 million. To take these jobs and federal funds from Massachusetts would be a serious blow to her already grippled economy.



Moreover, it is my understanding from the Secretary of the Army that there is no study being done at this time to determine the impact of such an action on overall federal and state expenditures. I well remember the arguments put forth when the Boston Naval Shipyard was closed. Great savings were anticipated for the Department of Navy. But the Department of Defense never considered the tremendously increased expenditures by the Labor Department for job training programs; by the Commerce Department for EDA grants; by HEW for additional contributions to Massachusetts state programs; by the Department of Defense itself for the activities of the Office of Economic Adjustment; and by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for increased social services and unemployment benefits. In light of these kinds of costs, action such as that contemplated for Fort Devens might well prove to be uneconomic and counterproductive to the spending reductions we all seek.

The people of Massachusetts are ready, willing and able to shoulder their share of the burdens in these difficult economic times. But only if they know that their share is equal to those of other states in other regions. And in the past several years it is quite clear that these burdens have not been distributed equitably. In fact, since 1968 New England has suffered twenty-five percent of all base closings in the country. In Massachusetts alone, we have suffered the closing of the Springfield Armory, the Watertown Arsenal, the Boston Naval Shipyard, the Westover Air Force Base, and the Otis Air Force Base. To a people who already think these actions by the Federal Government were capricious and vindictive, the closing of Fort Devens would be the proverbial last straw. In serious jeopardy would be their belief that their government can and will decide problems in a fair and reasonable fashion.

I recognize your very great time restraints particularly at this moment, but I consider this matter to be of such overriding importance that I respectfully request an appointment at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'E. Brooke', written over a faint, circular stamp.

Edward W. Brooke

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.



WAR 15 1976

March 12, 1976

Dear Senator:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of March 11 to the President expressing your strong objections to **any** action being taken with respect to Glasgow Air Force Base until *an* appropriate alternative use can be found.

Please be assured the President will receive your letter without delay. I am certain **it will be fully considered.**

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

William T. Kendall
Deputy Assistant
to the President

The Honorable Mike Mansfield
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

bcc: w/incoming to Capt. Kollmorgen - for DRAFT REPLY -
Max Friedersdorf signature - ASAP
~~bcc: w/incoming to Jack Marsh - FYI~~

WTK:JEB:VO:vo



United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

March 11, 1976

Handed to WTK 3/12

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Yesterday, I was visited by Walter B. LaBerge, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, and several of his colleagues. The purpose of their visit was to advise me of proposed studies of installations and activities in Montana.

Mr. LaBerge stated that it was the intention of the Department of the Air Force to inactivate the Strategic Air Command "Satellite" units at Malmstrom and Glasgow Air Force Bases in Montana. This would entail a loss of 199 military and 11 civilian spaces at these two installations. It is my policy not to oppose reductions in force based on military requirements within the Department of Defense and feel that that matter is best left to the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, I interpose no objection to the inactivation of these SAC units.

However, I vigorously object to any action concerning Glasgow Air Force Base which may relieve the Department of Defense, and specifically the Department of the Air Force, of its responsibility for maintaining this facility as a viable installation under its jurisdiction until such time as an appropriate alternative use can be found.

Since 1966, when it was first announced that Glasgow Air Force Base, the newest in the Air Force inventory, was to be closed, I have taken the position that the people of Montana did not ask that the Base be established; the people of Montana did not object to it being closed for military reasons; and that these decisions rested entirely with the Federal government. But with this exercise of authority, there remained an attendant responsibility for the Administration to develop an alternative productive use for this outstanding facility in Northeastern Montana. It is clearly



March 11, 1976

beyond the capability of Glasgow, Valley County, or the State of Montana to support an installation of this size at that location, and it is too modern and complete to abandon.

Under two previous Presidents and four Secretaries of Defense, the Department of the Air Force has been responsible for actively pursuing a program of civilian use of facilities not required by Federal agencies, as well as possible joint civilian aviation use of the airfield facilities. In 1973, I was advised by then Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, that "Glasgow Air Force Base will be almost fully occupied by military and other Federally supported activities." Despite this, the Department of Defense and the Department of the Air Force have been ineffective in finding a use for the Base other than establishing a small satellite of SAC for a limited period of time. No significant Defense-related long-term contracts have been developed from within the entire DOD effort except one or two small Army procurements as a temporary measure. This in spite of being advised by Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements on May 23, 1974, that immediate attention would be provided to the matter of DOD contracts being placed at Glasgow to facilitate its conversion from an active military post, and to provide employment opportunities in that isolated area of the country. It is difficult for me to accept that a Department which spends approximately 30% of its entire budget of more than \$100 billion on procurement has been unable to identify a single significant long-term item or items to be fabricated, assembled, or produced at Glasgow. It is even more difficult to understand why such an outstanding air facility located in such an advantageous position for polar flights, both to Europe and the Far East, not to mention Alaska, has not been utilized in the government's vast transportation network. I can only assume that those charged with this responsibility have not aggressively sought a solution.

In order for this Base to be reported excess and disposed of under Title 10 procedures, it will require the concurrence of the Senate Armed Services Committee. I feel that I must do all in my power to prevent this from happening. Further, in my capacity as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Construction of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, this matter will be gone into thoroughly. As a matter of responsibility, the Air Force should be required to maintain an adequate contracting agency at Glasgow to administer the Base utilities, facilities, fire and police protection, tower operations, and tenant relationship so that those few on-going civilian enterprises now there can continue. This requirement should remain until an alternative use is developed. I am requesting that the Air Force, which must produce a thorough environmental impact statement, also consider and study as a viable alternative the adaptability of the Base to a state energy complex encompassing a gasification plant, a Char Oil Energy Development

March 11, 1976

Plant, and an electrical generation plant to supply both electric utilities and process steam for the total energy center. This is one of the more promising alternatives being offered for study, and if it is successfully processed will relieve the Department of Defense from all responsibility at the Base. In this regard, the cooperation of ERDA and FEA will be absolutely necessary.

Of all Air Force installations listed on the current notification for inactivation, Glasgow is probably the only one which will not be eagerly sought after by local communities and private entrepreneurs for alternative civilian use. Other states with heavy population and requirements for industrial expansion will have few problems in transforming an active military installation to a civilian industrial park. I agree that Glasgow Air Force Base is the most difficult situation to face the Office of Economic Adjustment in the Department of Defense and, therefore, should receive the highest priority in their efforts to seek nationwide civilian use of excess installations.

In the meantime, I would appreciate it if no action is taken to diminish the equipment or facilities at Glasgow until Congressional approval is obtained.

With best personal wishes, I am

Respectfully yours,

Mike Mansfield



APR 1 1976

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date April 1, 1976

TO: Jack Marsh

FROM: CHARLES LEPPERT

Please Handle _____

For Your Information _____

X

Per Our Conversation _____

Other:



(BASES-STATES)

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- HERE ARE THE BASES INCLUDED IN THE ARMY'S PLANS TO IMPOSE CUTBACKS TO SAVE \$42 MILLION A YEAR (RIF DENOTES REDUCTION IN FORCE):

BASE	ACTION	MILITARY	JOBBS	JOBBS
CIVILIAN				
CALIFORNIA:			92	684
FT. MACARTHUR	CLOSURE		92	178
FT. ORD	RIF			506
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA:			5	10
WASHINGTON RECRUIT COMMAND	RIF		5	10
IDAHO:			11	12
BOISE RECRUIT COMMAND	RIF		11	12
ILLINOIS:			15	733
ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL	MOVE TOOL SET UNIT			320
SAVANNA ARMY DEPOT	CLOSURE		15	413
INDIANA:			4	438
JEFFERSON PROVING GROUND	CLOSURE		4	438
KANSAS:			16	53
SCHILLING MANOR	CLOSURE		16	53
MARYLAND:			1,603	860
ABERDEEN PROV. GRND.	MOVE ORDINANCE SCHOOL		1,475	720
	TRANSPORTATION COURSES		103	21
	MAKE SUBINSTALLATION		25	119
FT. DETRICK			4,372	846
MASSACHUSETTS:			4,372	846
FT. DEVENS	END ACTIVE ARMY OPS		21	234
MICHIGAN:			21	234
SELFDRIDGE AFB	CHANGE HOUSING INSTLN		9	12
MONTANA:			9	12
HELENA RECRUIT COMMAND	RIF		9	12
NEW JERSEY:				280
PICATINNY ARSENAL	RIF			280
NEW YORK:			451	752
FTS. HAMILTON, TOTTEN	CLOSURE		410	604
STEWART ANNEX	CHANGE HOUSING INSTLN		41	148
NORTH DAKOTA:			14	12
FARGO RECRUIT COMMAND	CLOSURE		14	12
PENNSYLVANIA:			167	2,237
FT. INDIANTOWN GAP	END ACTIVE ARMY OPS		132	819
NEW CUMBERLAND DEPOT	MOVE AVIATION MAINT		35	1,418
PUERTO RICO:			168	466
FT. BUCHANAN	CLOSURE		168	466
RHODE ISLAND:			12	13
PROVIDENCE RECRUIT COMMAND	RIF		12	13
SOUTH DAKOTA:			13	12
SIOUX FALLS RECRUIT COMMAND	RIF		13	12
TEXAS:			115	58
AMARILLO RECRUIT COMMAND	RIF		12	9
FT. HOOD	RIF		103	49
VIRGINIA:			1,886	1,073
ARLINGTON HILL	RELOCATE		667	588
FT. STORY	RELOCATE TROOPS		468	37
VINT HILL FARMS	CLOSURE		751	448



**ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET**

9/13/76

TO: Mr. ~~Wolthuis~~

FROM: Mr. Ogilvie

To Paul O'Neill
From: Bob Wolthuis

send back to
Don Ogilvie




ARMY RESPONSE

Dear Mr. Breckinridge [Ford]:

During the past several months the President has been requested to review the Army's realignment action at the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD). This review has confirmed the original decision to phase down LBAD. In view of recent requests, I have again reviewed the case at the request of the President. I find that the decision to realign LBAD remains valid.


The decision to realign the mission at LBAD was not an easy one. After the cessation of hostilities in South East Asia, there began a significant decline in the communication-electronics maintenance and supply workload. The decline necessitated a major curtailment in the workforce. The combined capacities at the Lexington-Bluegrass, Sacramento, and Tobyhanna depots, our communication and electronic depots, exceeded the Army's requirements in the electronics maintenance functional area. Substantial management efficiencies were to be gained by consolidating into two depots. The facilities, location and other key missions assigned to the Tobyhanna, Sacramento, and Lexington-Bluegrass Depots were compared and the study



indicated a reduction at Lexington-Bluegrass. Most importantly, the Army gains the greatest total savings from realigning at LBAD.

As you know, on April 1, 1976 the Army announced a series of realignments to effectuate approximately 6,000 additional civilian space reductions which is in consonance with the FY 1977 budget submitted by the President. The Congress obtained an additional civilian manpower reduction on Defense, resulting in the loss of an additional 1814 spaces by the Army. These reductions further highlight the dollar and manpower constraints within which the Army must live. The LBAD action was an early step in the Army's worldwide program to live within the budgetary constraints of a peacetime era while fielding an effective fighting force -- a program that continues to date.

There is concern over the report that purports to rank LBAD number one among Army depots. In previous correspondence, the Army has explained that the Productivity and Effectiveness Report only rates each depot against itself and does not mean that LBAD is the best or most efficient depot in the system. The report presents data based on a 1972 start point only as a self-improvement indicator. The Army must reduce its workforce not on the basis of improvement but in a manner that results in the most effective defense force possible.



In summary, I have reviewed in detail the realignment and the Secretary of Defense concurs with my recommendation that the realignment must occur. LBAD, when reduced to a depot activity, will result in substantial savings after the realignment costs have been incurred. Delays in implementing our plan are costly to the taxpayers and threaten to jeopardize the readiness of our Army in the field. Accordingly, the Army will proceed with the phase down.

Sincerely,

Martin R. Hoffmann

DISTRICT OFFICES:
201 COLONY SQUARE BUILDING
107 EAST MAIN
LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY 40507
(606) 251-1901

13 FEDERAL BUILDING
COVINGTON, KENTUCKY 41011
(606) 431-2599

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

May 24, 1976

COMMITTEES:
TOBACCO
FAMILY FARMS AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT
DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS,
INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIC

SMALL BUSINESS
SUBCOMMITTEES:
SBA AND SBC LEGISLATION
SBA OVERSIGHT AND
MINORITY ENTERPRISE

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

This has reference to my telephone conversation earlier today with Deputy Assistant Charlie Leppert, concerning your announced review of the Army's decision to phase down Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot (LBAD), as reported on May 24, 1976 in the Lexington Herald. I am pleased that you have asked for the "specific facts" for your personal study upon returning to the White House and am writing to bring to your attention the comprehensive file which I provided nearly a year ago outlining facts which I think you will find fully justify reversing the Army's decision to phase back LBAD by 2600 even though LBAD has consistently been ranked No. 1 in the nation in efficiency and economy. I presented this material to your then Deputy Assistant Vernon Loen on July 2, 1975, aboard Air Force 1, enroute to a conference on domestic and economic affairs in Cincinnati, Ohio.

My detailed report included an analysis of some thirteen letters which I had written to the then Army Secretary "Bo" Calloway, revealing significant errors in the figures, calculations and logic which the military relied upon in Project CONCISE, which has been used as justification for the proposed 2600 job cut back at the Depot.

For your convenience I am enclosing herewith a copy of my July 2 letter and referenced correspondence with the Secretary of the Army.

In addition to this earlier material, I call to your attention and enclose for your perusal, additional data further addressing the areas of comparative costs between the three electronics depots; their overhead ratios; effectiveness and efficiency and the total installation point-of-view concept.

A. Lexington is the lowest cost depot. The following rate comparison table between the three electronics depots shows that Lexington operates at a lower cost than the other two.

Maintenance Cost Recovery Rate Per Hour

	<u>FY-75</u>	<u>Present</u>	<u>Present Rate Difference</u>
Lexington	\$11.79	\$13.22	
Sacramento	15.03	18.65	+\$5.43
Tobyhanna	12.34	14.15	+ .93

It costs \$5.43 more at Sacramento and \$.93 more at Tobyhanna for each direct manhour worked. For each million manhours worked at Lexington in lieu of Sacramento, savings in the amount of \$5,430,000 would accrue. The difference between Tobyhanna and Lexington would be \$930,000 for one million manhours. The Army projected 2,530 manyears of electronics maintenance workload for the steady state year 1978. This equates to over 4.25 million direct manhours per year.

Please note my letter of March 4, 1975, addressed to Secretary Calloway stating, among other things, that the following rates were in effect as utilized by AMC Comptroller during the first quarter, Fiscal Year 1975 (the up-date period for CONCISE) as follows:

Lexington	\$11.79
Tobyhanna	12.34
Sacramento	15.03

The Secretary's reply under date of April 18, 1975, stated basically that (1) LBAD's maintenance labor costs were lower than SAAD's but that the supply, supply support, and overhead costs must also be considered, and that at best the rates could not be used because they fluctuate.

The \$11.79 labor rate includes all overhead supply costs. The supply costs referred to made no mention of the supply rates for the same period which were \$12.44 for LBAD, \$13.60 for SAAD, and \$13.19 for TOAD. Your attention is invited to Enclosure 1, documentation prepared by the Major Item Data Agency (MIDA) which controls depot workloads. The source of the present SAAD and TOAD rates is at Enclosure 2. LBAD was not included in this package due to a misunderstanding by MIDA. The "present" LBAD rates were submitted to MIDA (Enclosure 3) and approved by MIDA (Enclosure 4).



Secretary Calloway's response (Enclosure 5) to my March 14th letter (Enclosure 6) omitted, as you will note, corresponding SAAD rates. The source of the actual first and second quarter fiscal year rates used in the Secretary's reply is unknown, but it is known that those cited for LBAD are erroneous. The actual average maintenance rate used by LBAD was \$11.79 for both the first and second quarters. Enclosure 7 contains the wage grade payroll scale for LBAD, SAAD and TOAD. When coupled with LBAD's efficiency, effectiveness, and ratio of overhead to direct cost, there is no doubt that LBAD is far more economical than SAAD.

B. Lexington has the lowest maintenance overhead cost:
The following table reflects the ratio of direct dollars to indirect dollars expended by each depot.

	<u>Ratio of Direct \$ to Overhead</u>					
	<u>Nov. -74</u>		<u>Nov. 75</u>		<u>Present</u>	
	<u>Direct</u>	<u>Overhead</u>	<u>Direct</u>	<u>Overhead</u>	<u>Direct</u>	<u>Overhead</u>
Lexington	1.00	.65	1.00	.69	1.00	.69
Sacramento	1.00	.92	1.00	.92	1.00	1.02
Tobyhanna	1.00	.77	1.00	.79	1.00	.83

Lexington has a much better ratio of direct to overhead than the other two depots.

During Fiscal Years 72, 73, and 74 LBAD was ranked No. 1 in the AMC System for its best ratio of direct to indirect labor cost. This ranking was published by the Army in the AMC-MAPS reports dated October 1974. This data, Mr. President, exemplifies the management effort at LBAD to produce the most efficient operation in the system. Needless to say morale, which has been of the highest order over the years, has not been helped by this bureaucratic lack of recognition.

C. Lexington is the most effective and efficient depot.
The effectiveness system, as used by the Army, measures how well a depot performs its mission while the efficiency system evaluates the economical application of people and money. When considered together, these provide a comprehensive evaluation system for depot management. The Army utilizes this system to relatively rank all of its eleven depots against each other. The following table reflects the ranking of the electronics maintenance depots for Fiscal Years 74 and 75.



Depot Rankings

	<u>FY-74</u>	<u>FY-75</u>
Lexington	1	1
Sacramento	10	11
Tobyhanna	3	8

It is difficult to understand a decision to phase back the Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot which is the lowest cost depot, and which ranks No. 1 in efficiency and effectiveness, other than to speculate that this decision was based on political considerations, without regard to cost efficiency and depot performance.

The depot rankings of efficiency and effectiveness have been provided to Department of the Army (see Enclosure 8). Army's response addressed only the efficiency portion of the system saying that it only measures against its own past performance (see Enclosure 9). Army does not mention effectiveness which does measure all depots against common standards. When considered together, depots are measured by how well their missions are performed and evaluates their economical application of people and money. Therefore, contrary to Army's contention, the combined ranking does measure depot against depot.

D. Installation point-of-view concept. This concept is utilized by Army to predict the savings to be realized by phasing down or closing an installation. This methodology uses two factors in arriving at average installation manyear costs. These factors are:

1. Manyears worked at an installation.
2. Total cost to operate the installation including the cost of items produced.

To obtain the average cost per manyear worked the total cost is divided by the number of manyears. These average manyear costs of the three electronics depots were compared, and the depot with the highest average manyear cost considered the most expensive to operate. This would be a valid system if each depot had identical missions and produced identical items. In the case of the electronics depots there is a substantive difference in the missions of the three depots. LBAD performs the major portion of design, fabrication and assembly known as quick reaction projects which can be categorized as research and development. Percentage breakout of this workload by depot is as follows:

Lexington	60
Sacramento	11
Tobyhanna	29



Fifty-five (55) percent of funds allocated to perform this type of work is required for material, equipment and travel expense. The result is that these expenses are reflected in the total depot expense, inflating the cost above depots not having like missions. These costs are a direct result of the mission performed and are not controllable by the depot. Because of this Quick Reaction Mission, Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot was penalized. The following reflects the average maintenance manyear cost at Lexington with and without the Quick Reaction Project influence:


<u>Average Manyear Cost Including Quick Reaction Projects*</u>			
<u>Depot</u>	<u>Salary</u>	<u>Other Costs</u>	<u>Average Cost Per Man Year</u>
Lexington	\$11,710	\$6,737 (3,031)	\$18,447 (14,741)
Sacramento	13,422	3,895	17,317
Tobyhanna	11,412	3,031	14,493

*Source - GAO

Removing the influence of the quick reaction projects reduces the Lexington costs substantially bringing the average cost per manyear in line with Tobyhanna. The quick reaction project has greatly penalized Lexington, while Sacramento with very little of this type work is by far the highest in cost.

The GAO accepted this installation point-of-view concept as one that could be used, but it clearly discriminates against an installation having that mission. The above data was furnished GAO who in turn questioned the Army. The draft GAO statement received in September 1975 stated "According to Army officials, the other two depots also have unique workloads and assigned missions which are reflected in their costs. They claim that their cost comparison tried to recognize some of these differences. However, they readily point out that they did not intend to make all options equal or identical since this simply was not feasible" (emphasis added).

It is impossible for SAAD or TOAD to have unique missions comparable to LBAD's QRP because their total workload's "Other Cost" (including their uniques) is less than the "Other Costs" for QRP alone at LBAD. Enclosure 10 breaks out the QRP "Other Costs" from that used by CONCISE (Encl. 11). QRP consumed 55% of LBAD's "Other Costs" but only 13.3% of our funded manyears of workload. The only possible way that Army could conclude LBAD is more expensive than SAAD or TOAD is to include these noncontrollable, extremely high dollar costs in our costs per funded manyear.



The Army has stated also that the QRP workload was \$12.25 million during FY-75 and would decrease to about \$6.25 million for fiscal year 1976 and a similar amount for 1977 and 1978. However, logic and common sense dictate that any future decrease has no bearing on the argument that the past QRP workload inflated LBAD's cost per funded manyear.

Army does not have to identify QRP or other unique missions at the three depots in order to perform a fair evaluation. They need only to exclude the cost elements that are not variable between the installations from the "Other Cost" rate used by CONCISE. The "Other Costs" are broken down by element at Enclosure 10. An alternative average might involve a calculation to determine the cost of completing Army's planned workload at each installation. I believe this would be a fairer system in that it would allow all options of CONCISE to be considered on an equal basis.

Mr. President, I submit for your special consideration without reference to prior argumentation, a new element, viz., that Army should rescind their action to further phase back the Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot since actions taken to date have resulted in a reduction of maintenance production personnel at the three depots to a point near the Fiscal Year 78 steady state objective. Each of the three depots could reduce their productive work force to bring into balance workload requirements and power restraints. Overhead personnel should also be reduced to maintain an efficient ratio of direct to indirect costs. The advantages of this recommendation are as follows:

1. Mobilization Base Retained. The capacity to meet war-time requirements can be expanded without resorting to three-shift, seven day operations.
2. Most Effective, Efficient and Economical Depot Retained.
3. Skill capabilities Retained. Closure of the Lexington Maintenance facility will result in the loss of peculiar skills utilized to support world wide defense missions. These skills are not available at either Sacramento or Tobyhanna. Examples of these are:
 - a. Satellite Communication Terminals
 - b. Missile Monitor Systems
 - c. Automatic Secure Voice Communication Systems
 - d. Combat Service Support Systems
 - e. Defense Communication System Contingency Stations
 - f. World Wide Primary Technical Control Centers.

As Lexington employees have no transfer of function rights, or do not prefer to leave this locality, these skills will be lost to the Army.



4. Army Steady State Workload Objective Attained. A good percentage of the savings objective has already been realized by a reduction of personnel since the CONCISE announcement. For instance, the productive personnel in the three depot maintenance activities now total 2674 people. The Army's objective was to reach a steady state workload of 2530 people in FY-78. To attain this goal only 144 people would have to be reduced in the next two years. This can be attained through attrition.

5. Community Impact Reduced. Reduction would be spread over three installations (in three states) lessening the community effect.

6. Less Contract to Industry Required. With capabilities at three depots, less work will have to be contracted to industry. Past experience has shown that contracts with industry are:

a. More expensive. The Army claims that it does not have the funds to maintain the three depot maintenance facilities but admits that contracts to industry must be let to eliminate the maintenance work back-logged. If money can be made available for these contracts it can be diverted to accomplish this backlog most economically in-house.

b. Less responsive to Army requirements.

c. Rework of equipment repaired by industry is required in many instances.

Failing the acceptance of this recommendation, the Army should phase down the depot highest in cost, and it's certainly illogical to phase down a depot which has consistently ranked No. 1 in the depot effectiveness and efficiency system and which operates at the lowest cost.

Based upon the compelling facts of the situation it is not in the best interests of either our Nation's defense or the prudent use of taxpayer's dollars, to phase back LBAD, the most cost effective, innovative, and efficient facility in our depot system.

Appreciating the great demands made on your attention, may I hear from you at your early convenience and prior to the announcement or, preferably, making of any final decision.

With best wishes, I am

Respectfully yours,

John E. Breckinridge

John E. Breckinridge



United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 9, 1976

MF
Honorable Gerald R. Ford
The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Ford:

In further reference to our recent correspondence regarding the Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot, let me begin by saying that I could not agree more that moving "toward an efficient allocation of resources" should be a goal of the Department of Defense. I write today because of my desire for this "efficient allocation" and because of your commitment to review the Army's decision to cut back at the depot.

In your July 3 letter to me, you indicated that "relevant data on the realignment of the depot" had been forwarded to you by Secretary Hoffman. Mr. President, all of us know what the Army's position is. What I, on behalf of the depot employees, am seeking to determine is what you think should be done after you have reviewed both sides of the issue.

In the interest of allowing a fair exchange of views on this most important matter, I respectfully request that opponents of the cutback be allowed to analyze the data provided you by Secretary Hoffman... ~~Since the announcement of the original~~ decision, there has not been a complete, impartial review of information other than that given by the Army itself.

Once we know the figures being used by the Army, I ask that you allow opponents of the cutback to make a detailed response. I believe then we will be in a much better position to discuss the situation. However, in the meantime, I believe you should be aware of the points listed below:

1. LEAD has the lowest labor pay scale of the electronic depots.
2. LEAD also has the lowest cost recovery rates.

Honorable Gerald R. Ford

Page 2

July 9, 1976

3. In addition to the above, LBAD has ranked Number One in the Army's own efficiency and effectiveness measurement system every quarter since July 1973, including the first half of FY 76, the most recent available information. This rating is in comparison with all Army depots. LBAD has stayed Number One even under the trying conditions the Army has placed them under.

4. The Department of the Army made an error in its method of determining the depot to phase down. LBAD can operate cheaper than it's sister depots of Tobyhanna and Sacramento. If the electronics workload (4.4 million man hours) would be divided between Tobyhanna and Lexington, the government would save \$11.9 million per year over the current plans. If it were divided between Sacramento and Lexington, we would save \$2.046 million per year. If one depot could do all the work, Lexington could complete it \$23.9 million cheaper than Sacramento and \$4.1 million cheaper than Tobyhanna. In short, every one million manhours of work taken from LBAD and given to Sacramento will cost the tax payer an additional \$5.43 million per year. Likewise, for every one million man hours of work taken from LBAD to give to Tobyhanna will cost the tax payer \$.9 million per year.

Mr. President, I respectfully request you to have the Army suspend any action until such time as you can examine both sides of this issue.

Sincerely,



Walter D. Huddleston



FOROT Says THE WOMEN

Block Depot

new Front of
her Lead
8/27

By JOHN ALEXANDER
Leader Staff Writer

Apparently the decision to eliminate 2,500 jobs at the Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot is to be enforced as soon as a court injunction is lifted. And the President is powerless to interfere.

The decision was reflected in a letter made public this morning by Sen. Wendell Ford, D-Ky., which had been forwarded to him by a constituent. It apparently had been mailed to employees of the depot.

The letter says that the President has reviewed the decision to cut back the work force at the depot and has declined to reverse it.

Therefore, the letter says, the Army will proceed with the cutback as soon as a pending court injunction is removed.

The letter is signed by Maj. Gen. Bert Dwyer, who is assistant deputy chief of staff.

Presidential Response

President Ford and Special Assistant Jerry Jones, who was handling details of the review of the cutback to the President, were both in Wash. Col. today and could not be reached for comment.

White House Report

No direct response from the President was forthcoming; however, the White House — while making it clear that the President still was supporting a court injunction which prohibited increased parties from making public comment — reported to the White House staff the cutback.

The letter says that the depot spent the White House and that it is difficult to fight at the depot level in defense of Congress.

The Congress will not approve the extra money for the defense budget which would have been needed to keep the depot at full strength, obviously leaving the cutback as necessary for economic reasons.

Political Impact

The President might be decisive, extremely," the letter says.

The military officials of the depot are in a state of confusion and are not sure what to do next.

General Comment

The White House is not sure of the impact of the cutback on the economy. It is expected that the cutback will have a significant impact on the economy.

Cutbacks

The Army plans to reduce the number of jobs at the depot.

Various court actions have been taken during the past year to delay the cutback. Sen. Rep. John Marshall Dye, D-Ky., issued a Co-

and Accounting Office report to the House to determine if the cutback was the best solution in the country.

A survey earlier this month also indicated that the cutback was not the best solution in the country.



JOHN B. BRECKINRIDGE
5TH DISTRICT, KENTUCKY

DISTRICT OFFICES:
304 COURT SQUARE BUILDING
107 CHEAPSIDE
LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY 40507
(502) 253-1301

13 FEDERAL BUILDING
COVINGTON, KENTUCKY 41011
(502) 431-2699

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

AGRICULTURE
SUBCOMMITTEES:
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DEVELOPMENT
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SMALL BUSINESS
SUBCOMMITTEES:
SBA AND SBC LEGISLATION
SBA OVERSIGHT AND
MINORITY ENTERPRISE

August 27, 1976

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

W/F
8/27/76

I am enclosing for your information a copy of a news article which appeared on the front page of the Lexington Leader this afternoon, the release of which my staff has verified with your press office. I quote it in pertinent part for your ready reference as follows:

"'He had hoped (the President) to keep the depot open,' the White House said, 'but found it difficult in light of the economic mood on defense in Congress.

'The Congress did not approve the extra money for the defense budget which would have been needed to keep the depot at full strength, obviously feeling the cutbacks are necessary for economic reasons.

'The President regrets the decision extremely,' the White House said."


Needless to say I was both surprised and disturbed to read this statement, attributed to you as the basis for your agreement with Army's decision to cut back the Lexington Bluegrass Army Depot (LEAD), not only in view of the fact that I have received only interim responses to my substantive letters of May 24, 1976 and July 20, 1976, forwarded since your announced decision of May 20 to review the matter, but more particularly because there is presently pending before the House and Senate conferees the largest defense budget in the history of the world -- some 112 odd billion dollars -- a budget larger even than those which we experienced during the years of World War II; a budget item I might add, which I continually support.

It is true that the Congress has made some reductions in the pending defense budget -- a total reduction of \$2,342,000,000 (including a postponement in B-1 procurement, which I voted against) in other areas.

where the reductions might be made without harming national defense, such as Army permanent station funds (travel funds) and the patrol hydrofoil program (which many considered somewhat large and elaborate). However, the Congress, both House and Senate, have agreed to every cent requested by the Defense Department for Fiscal Year 1977 for all depot operations. Fifty million of this \$710 million over-all depot operation budget is for communications and electronics repair/overhaul, in which LBAD is pre-eminent. This should be compared with the \$60.3 million for FY 76 and the \$33.1 million for FY 75 - the period in which we were gearing down from the Vietnam War.

Mr. President, I submit that the stated basis for agreeing with Army's announced plan under Project CONCISE to phase back the most efficient and effective depot in our 11 depot system does not ring true, and I urge you to designate someone more concerned with the facts than serving as apologist for the Army's erroneous decision, to reconsider in your behalf the position which has been announced on a basis unsupported by the facts.

Sincerely yours,



John B. Breckinridge



HERALD-LEADER

Proud Time For Depot

Employees and staff members of the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot have more reason than usual to be proud of their No. 1 ranking in the Army Materiel Command.

In view of the announced cutback and phase-down of the Lexington and Richmond facilities, workers could have, with some justification, adopted a lame-duck attitude and let performance quality go by the wayside. To their everlasting credit, they didn't and as a result the Army's own ranking system judged them the most efficient and most effective.

The local depot has, year-in and year-out, held top ratings, and we are gratified to see those rankings maintained even in the face of adversity.

An injunction against the phase

down has been dissolved by the U.S. Court of Appeals. There was hope that the new ratings might have some helpful effect on the decision. This was especially true when one considers that a facility in Sacramento, Calif., scheduled to get the local depot's maintenance mission, ranked 12th, or last. A depot at Tobyhanna, Pa., slated to receive the supply mission, ranked fifth.

Those rankings certainly should give the Kentucky congressional delegation and the Save the Depot Committee some help in their efforts to stop the phase-down.

In a system where more and more emphasis is put on efficiency and plain old getting the job done, we think the government-military establishment should look to Lexington.



DISTRICT OFFICES:
205 COURT SQUARE BUILDING
107 CHEAPSIDE
LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY 40507
(502) 253-1501
1 FEDERAL BUILDING
COWINGTON, KENTUCKY 41011
(502) 431-2599

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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SUBCOMMITTEES:
SBA AND SBIC LEGISLATION
SBA OVERSIGHT AND
MINORITY ENTERPRISE

July 20, 1976

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

MF
With further reference to my earlier correspondence concerning Army's decision to phase down the Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot (LEAD), I enclose a copy of an editorial which appeared in the Lexington Herald-Leader on Saturday morning, July 10, 1976, and a copy of Army's Productivity Trend and Effectiveness Performance Evaluation for the first half of Fiscal Year 1976. The report previously entitled "Efficiency and Effectiveness Report", has been renamed, as you may be aware.

Your particular attention is directed to pages 49 and 50 of the report, reflecting that LEAD continues to hold the No. 1 position which it initially established in Fiscal Year 1973 over all other similar Army Depots. You will further note, Mr. President, that Tobyhanna and Sacramento, which are scheduled to receive LEAD's maintenance mission and supply mission, rank 5th and 12th, respectively.

This information exemplifies, once again, the established management effort at LEAD to continue to maintain the most efficient operation in the system. Needless to say morale, which has been of the highest order over the years, has not been helped by this bureaucratic lack of recognition.

I submit once again that it is not in the best interest of either our Nation's defense, or the prudent use of taxpayer's dollars, to proceed with a phase back of LEAD, the most cost effective, innovative, and efficient facility in our depot system.




Page 2

I shall greatly appreciate your consideration of the enclosed material in connection with the review which you have been making of Army's decision based upon Project CONCISE.

May I hear from you in this matter at your early convenience.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John E. Breckinridge". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long horizontal stroke at the beginning and a large, sweeping flourish at the end.

John E. Breckinridge



United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 19, 1976

Dear Mr. President:

MF
In regard to your continuing review of the Army's decision to phase out the mission of the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, I want to call your attention to the most recent DARCOM Productivity Trend and Effectiveness Performance Evaluation. This document was prepared by the Headquarters United States Army Material Command and once again, the Lexington Depot was ranked as the most productive and effective operation in the Army as it has since FY-73 by this measurement system.


I am enclosing a copy of this evaluation for your information and specifically would invite your attention to pages 49 and 50. Please note that the Tobyhanna and Sacramento Depots, to which the Army proposes to transfer the Lexington-Blue Grass mission, are ranked fifth and last, respectively.

Quite frankly, Mr. President, it would appear to me that if the Army would go to the time and effort to prepare a detailed evaluation of this nature, serious consideration would be given to its results. Obviously, this is not the case which seems both paradoxical and contrary to the very purpose of such an evaluation.

As you complete your review, I urge you to seek an explanation as to why this and prior evaluations which ranked the Lexington-Blue Grass Depot first in both productivity and efficiency, were seemingly ignored.

In my opinion, this should have a significant bearing on your personal review of this matter, and I would hope influence you that this decision is wrong and should be reversed.

Sincerely,



The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

DISTRICT OFFICES:
108 WATTS FEDERAL BUILDING
FRANKFORT, KENTUCKY 40301
(502) 223-2335

172-C NEW FEDERAL BUILDING
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY 40202
(502) 582-6251

314 FEDERAL BUILDING
OWENSBORO, KENTUCKY 42301
(502) 685-5158

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tim Lee Carter

ma

Blue Grass

Ordnance Depot

postponed down to months

- made inquiry at

DDO

- receiving correspondence
(Jerry Jones)

Sen. Huddleston - quote

Jerry Jones

- brought - call Alan
Woods

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

= Alan Woods →

* Suggest Tim Lee
Carter get same type
letter as Huddleston
once at clear office
et al. -

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wolthing -

1) 'Jones quote'

a) why Jones

b) status -

* Jones here when call came in - * was immediately prior to Ky. primary.

* Wolthing into it - he prepared draft response; sent to Don Ogden for his check; is in holding action, pending court action

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Cheney called from airplane
reporter.....

Ogden

There was a report in
IT's desk the next day.



June 23, 1976

Dear Senator:

This will acknowledge receipt of your June 22 letter to the President concerning the Blue Grass Army Depot in Lexington. You may be assured it will be called promptly to the President's attention.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

William T. Kendall
Deputy Assistant
to the President

The Honorable Walter D. Huddleston
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

bcc: w/incoming to B&B Wolhuis for further handling and DRAFT

WTK:JEB:VO:vo



U
U.S. Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 22, 1976

1976 JUN 23 AM 10 48

HAND DELIVERED

RECEIVED SECURITY UNIT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The Honorable Gerald Ford
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Perhaps the most serious economic blow that central and eastern Kentucky has sustained in the past two years was the Defense Department's decision to cut back operations at the Blue Grass Army Depot in Lexington, with the loss of approximately 2,600 jobs.

Since that time, the people of central and eastern Kentucky and the Kentucky congressional delegation have made a major effort to forestall that decision, based on the fact that the Blue Grass depot has been rated the most efficient depot of its kind in the country. Court action has also been instituted and the case is now before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

On May 24, the day before the presidential primary in Kentucky, Mr. Jerry Jones of your staff was quoted in a page one story in the Lexington Herald as saying that you were "personally looking into the proposed cutbacks" and that you had ordered "specific facts" on the matter to be ready for your review upon your return to Washington. Earlier, in a press conference in Washington with members of the Kentucky press corps -- on May 20th -- you stated, in response to a question, "I will take a look at it."

Needless to say, those comments -- especially the banner story in the Herald -- gave great hope to the people of central and eastern Kentucky. Employees who stood to lose their jobs felt that at last they would get a fair review of the Defense Department's decision -- which, incidentally, was made after contrary assurances were given the Kentucky congressional delegation.

The Honorable Gerald Ford
June 22, 1976
Page 2


I write today to inquire as to the status of that personal review, if indeed there is to be one. My office has made two inquiries to the White House in this regard. The first reply was that the review has been done and the White House is "sticking by the original Army decision." That was last week. If true, it could not have been much of a review. And, if so, why was no public announcement made?

Another inquiry was made to the office of Mr. Jones, who promised the "personal" review by you. That resulted in a referral to the Office of Management and Budget, which stated that the only review taking place was the one already in progress by the Department of the Army in response to the congressional delegation. This inquiry also produced the startling information that results of the inquiry would not be made public until after the court action is resolved.

All of which raises the question in my mind as to whether a "personal review" by the President was ever contemplated, or whether the promise of a review was made by your staff with May 25th in mind.

In any event, I urge you to seriously undertake a genuine review of this Defense Department decision, which I believe was wrong and which I believe the facts will show to be wrong. You have raised high hopes in Kentucky with your promise; I just hope you will follow through on that promise.

Sincerely,



Walter D. Huddleston



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday
8/27/76

Bob--

Attached is a draft received today from the Military Aide's ofc. in response to Senator Ford's July 19 letter to the President on Lexington-Blue Grass. Bill Kendall would prefer if it could be sent out over someone else's signature (instead of a WTK signature).

Also, I am attaching the original of the August 26 letter to the President from Senator Ford, which we received today and which encloses an interesting letter from a Dept. of the Army official. (Note that the name of the person to whom this letter was addressed has been blocked out.) How should this letter from Senator Ford be handled?

You may be interested to know that we have in our pending file a July 20 letter to the President from Congressman Breckinridge on the same matter as the July 19 letter from Senator Ford. A draft for Breckinridge is expected next week and will probably be similar to the one furnished for Senator Ford.

Judy Berg-Hansen

Judy

Wendell Ford
Pending
Mil. Aide

8/30
Bob asked me to find out to whom the 8/10 Bert David letter was sent. Called Mil. Aide & was referred to Shupe's ofc. x4149. Found out that the letter was sent to Robt. Palmer, Jr., Rt. 5, Log Lick Rd., Winchester, Ky. 40391. Told Bob.

ie6

J. MAGNUSON, WASH., CHAIRMAN
 J. JAMES B. PEARSON, KANS.
 AICH. ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, MICH.
 ANON, NEV. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
 NG, LA. TED STEVENS, ALASKA
 SS, UTAH J. GLENN BEALL, JR., MD.
 OLLINGS, S.C. LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., CONN.
 DAN. HOUYE, HAWAII JAMES L. SUCKLEY, N.Y.
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 WENDELL H. FORD, KY.
 JOHN A. DURKIN, N.H.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

MICHAEL PORTSCHUK, CHIEF COUNSEL
 S. LYNN SUTCLIFFE, GENERAL COUNSEL
 MALCOLM M. B. STERRETT, MINORITY COUNSEL


August 26, 1976

Dear Mr. President:

MP
10/1/76
 I am writing to bring to your attention that a letter is being circulated, purportedly in your behalf, by the Department of Defense declaring that you have completed your personal review of the decision to phase out the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot and that the action will not be reversed. Quite naturally I was surprised to learn of this since I am still awaiting a response to a letter I sent you in early July concerning the progress of this review, while at the same time bringing to your attention the most recent efficiency rating for the Depot.

I am asking that you either confirm or deny the validity of the statement in the Department of the Army's letter. If it is true, I would appreciate an explanation as to why neither I nor other members of the Kentucky Congressional delegation had been advised that your review was indeed finished.

Sincerely,



Wendell H. Ford
 KENTUCKY

The President
 The White House
 Washington, D. C. 20500



Enclosure



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DALO-SMZ-E WH 12472

10 AUG 1976

1976 AUG 20 AM 11

On behalf of President Ford, I am replying to your letter of 9 June 1976 regarding Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot (LBAD). The President has had the decision reviewed. After review, the position of Department of Defense remains unchanged; when no longer enjoined, the Army will proceed with the reduction.

The decision to reduce LBAD was made only after careful and detailed study and thorough consideration of the viable alternatives, including the reduction of Sacramento Army Depot (SAAD) and the reduction of Tobyhanna Army Depot (TOAD). The newer and larger facilities at TOAD and the location and other missions assigned to SAAD dictated the decision to realign LBAD. The largest annual cost reduction, best use of facilities and most economic flexibility to meet unprogrammed requirements are offered by reducing LEAD to depot activity status.

Regarding the depot rating system, it measures a depot against its own past performance. This rating system does not compare one depot with another, except in relation to the progress each depot makes against its own past performance. Lexington is the most improved depot. The Army must, however, look to total savings to the government in deciding upon realignments. As a result, Lexington was chosen.

On 9 July 1976, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the decision of the District Court of the Eastern District of Kentucky on an injunction in furtherance of the realignment at LBAD. Additionally, on 3 August 1976, the District Court of the Eastern District of Kentucky also ruled in favor of the Army in another court challenge to the realignment.

Your interest in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely,

BERT A. DAVID
Major General, GS
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
for Logistics






OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

August 25, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. William T. Kendall
Deputy Assistant to the President

THROUGH: Mr. Warren L. Gulley
Director, White House
Military Office

Pursuant to your request, attached is a draft reply to
Senator Wendell H. Ford.


E. G. Zeller
Commander, USN
Military Assistant

Attachment



Dear Senator Ford:

This is in response to your letter of July 19, 1976 to the President concerning Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot (LBAD).

The Army's requirement in the communications-electronics commodity area has decreased. As a result, workloads in both general supply and maintenance operations have declined. Further supply reductions have occurred with the implementation of the Revised Supply Distribution Plan.

The total electronics maintenance capacity at Lexington Blue Grass, Sacramento (California) and Tobyhanna (Pennsylvania) far exceeds current and future requirements. Based upon a ~~comparison of the three depots~~ **CONSIDERATION OF ALL FACTORS**, it has been determined that the greatest savings to the Government will be achieved through the realignment of Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot.

Your referenced report, which rates each depot against itself, does not mean that LBAD is the best depot in the system -- it means only that LBAD is the most improved depot when rated against itself. The hard work and efforts put forth by the employees of LBAD is fully recognized and is indicative of the dedicated employees throughout the depot system. Despite all the efforts of our dedicated civil servants in the depot system, lack of money and emphasis on improved management dictate the ~~closure~~ **REALIGNMENT** of some of our installations and activities. LBAD is only one of many activities and installations that is being reduced.

We fully understand and share your concern over the economic and human impact of the proposed reductions at LBAD. However, it must be realized that since 1968, the defense establishment has been cut by almost 350,000 civilian personnel and 1.4 million military personnel without a corresponding reduction.



in the number of activities and installations. In addition, the Defense budget last year was cut by \$7 billion. Faced with these continued reductions and the need to streamline our military operations, we must reduce and realign our domestic base structures.

Your interest in this matter is appreciated and we hope the above information will be helpful for you.

Sincerely,

Mr. Kendall

July 22, 1976

Dear Senator:

Thank you for your July 19 letter to the President concerning the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot and enclosing the DARCOM Productivity Trend and Effectiveness Performance Evaluation.

Be assured that I will call your letter to the attention of the President and the appropriate advisers without delay. You will hear further as soon as possible.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

William T. Kendall
Deputy Assistant
to the President

The Honorable Wendell H. Ford
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

bcc: w/ inc. to Military Aide for DRAFT for Kendall signature.
bcc: w/ inc. to Bob Wolthuis fyi

WTK:JEB:j

JUL 26 1976

WH 13748

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 19, 1976

Dear Mr. President:

MF
In regard to your continuing review of the Army's decision to phase out the mission of the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, I want to call your attention to the most recent DARCOM Productivity Trend and Effectiveness Performance Evaluation. This document was prepared by the Headquarters United States Army Material Command and once again, the Lexington Depot was ranked as the most productive and effective operation in the Army as it has since FY-73 by this measurement system.


I am enclosing a copy of this evaluation for your information and specifically would invite your attention to pages 49 and 50. Please note that the Tobyhanna and Sacramento Depots, to which the Army proposes to transfer the Lexington-Blue Grass mission, are ranked fifth and last, respectively.

Quite frankly, Mr. President, it would appear to me that if the Army would go to the time and effort to prepare a detailed evaluation of this nature, serious consideration would be given to its results. Obviously, this is not the case which seems both paradoxical and contrary to the very purpose of such an evaluation.

As you complete your review, I urge you to seek an explanation as to why this and prior evaluations which ranked the Lexington-Blue Grass Depot first in both productivity and efficiency, were seemingly ignored.

In my opinion, this should have a significant bearing on your personal review of this matter, and I would hope influence you that this decision is wrong and should be reversed.

Sincerely,



The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

draft rec. 8/2
sent to
Wolthuis
w/ note

July 22, 1976

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Sincerely,

William T. Kendall
Deputy Assistant
to the President

The Honorable Wendell H. Ford
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

bcc: w/ inc. to Military Aide for DRAFT for Kendall signature.
bcc: w/ inc. to Bob Wolthuis fyi

WTK:JEB:j



United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 19, 1976

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
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Sincerely,



The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

C A M E R A
F E E D B A C K

DARCOM PRODUCTIVITY TREND
AND EFFECTIVENESS PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION, FIRST HALF FY 1976

12/76

Prepared by
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS DIVISION
COMPTROLLER HQ, USAMC

AUG 28 1976

President's Mail - August 27, 1976

House

1. Bill Archer Requests message of congratulations for Hedley V. Jackson of Houston, who will receive the highest award which Rotary International can bestow on August 31.
2. Garry Brown Urges that H.R. 15194, the Public Works Employment Appropriations Act, be signed or allowed to become law without the President's signature, if it passes the Senate in substantially the same form as it passed the House. Explains why.
3. James Collins Praises Bob Dole and Jim Baker selections. Requests 15-minute appointment with the President to present a campaign issue idea.
4. Thomas Morgan Endorses Seymore Heyison for the National Highway Safety Advisory Committee.
5. Gillis Long Sends detailed letter urging the President to take immediate action to alleviate "the severe impact that the low prices have had on sugar producers."
6. Steward McKinney Edward Biester Send detailed letter urging a veto of H.R. 12261, "in keeping with the Republican Party Platform adopted in Kansas City which for the first time calls for '. . . full home rule over those matters that are purely local.' "
7. Robert Michel Writes on behalf of Louis Neumiller, who was on the committee which chose the President as one of the 10 Outstanding Young Men in 1950, who recommends that the campaign film include a segment from this award.
8. Walter Fauntroy Sends detailed letter urging a veto of H.R. 12261. Says it "seriously undermines the District of Columbia Home Rule Act."
9. Harley Staggers Expresses deep appreciation for the ceremonial pen marking the signing of the National Swine Flu Immunization Program.
10. John Dent Richard Schulze Request that the President "take immediate action to place either an embargo or impose quotas on foreign mushroom imports." Point out that "subsequent to your decision for 'adjustment assistance' to the domestic mushroom industry, imports by Asian mushroom processors have increased by the largest volume ever experienced."
11. Pat Schroeder Writes on behalf of the Denver Committee of Concern for Soviet Jewry regarding Mikhail Mager, whose visa requests to emigrate to Israel to be reunited with his wife have been denied.



President's Mail - August 27, 1976

House

12. Bo Ginn Supports the CAB's recommendation for nonstop air service between Atlanta and London.
13. Jerome Ambro Requests that Nassau County be declared a disaster area due to damage from Hurricane Belle.
14. Bud Shuster Extends invitation to the President or a member of his family to attend the Republican Day Rally at the McClure Bean Soup Celebration on September 18.
15. Silvio Conte Extends invitation to the National Italian American Bicentennial Tribute Dinner on September 16 at the Washington Hilton Hotel.
16. 4 Members of the South Dakota Delegation and 2 Former Members
Extend invitation to a reception in honor of Congressman Jim Abdnor on August 30 at the Rotunda Restaurant.
17. James Florio Requests greetings for Mrs. Verna Kannaro on her 88th birthday September 5.
18. James Hanley Requests greetings for Mrs. Elsie Coles on her 111th birthday August 27.
19. John Murtha Requests citation honoring Dr. Harold W. Thomas to be presented at a school dedication in October.

Senate

- 1S Floyd Haskell Cites P.L. 90-498, which authorizes that the week including September 15-16 be designated National Hispanic Heritage Week. Hopes a proclamation will be issued.
- 2S Wendell Ford Writes about a letter being circulated in the President's behalf by DOD saying that the President has completed his personal review of the decision to phase out the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot and that the action will not be reversed. Asks for a confirmation or denial and, if a confirmation, requests explanation why the Kentucky Congressional delegation was not advised that the review was finished.
- 3S Pete Domenici Sends detailed letter concerning the campaign and the ethnic vote. Offers his help.
- 4S Ted Stevens On behalf of Mr. J. L. Laughlin, sends a set of post cards with pictures of each of the camps being used in the construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.
- 5S Bill Brock Endorses Kenneth M. Smith for reappointment to the National Advisory Council on the Education of Disadvantaged Children.
- 6S Hugh Scott Endorses Richard C. Frame's invitation to attend the Distinguished Republican Award Dinners in Pennsylvania this fall.
- 7S Bill Brock Writes on behalf of Miller McDonald, who wishes to be appointed to a Presidential advisory board or commission.
- 8S Milton Young Writes on behalf of the General Manager of Minn-Dak Farmers Cooperative in support of an increase in the sugar tariff.
- 9S Clifford Hansen Requests autographed photograph for Etna Johnson.

9-1-76
R - Status

