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WHM, 12/4/85

October 31, 1975

THE CULTURAL DENOMINATOR IN US-EAST ASIAN RELATIONS*

A. Introduction

If the United States is sincere in its oft-repeated assurances that it does not intend to withdraw from Asia, any reduction of US military power and presence in East Asia should not be accompanied by a decline in American interest and activity in other forms, particularly in the educational and cultural fields. Indeed, the United States should make every effort to ensure that it will not "adjust to the new realities of Asia" with the same ignorance and lack of empathetic understanding of realities as was the case with the old realities when it "intervened" in Southeast Asia over two decades ago. The peoples of the various countries of Asia can measure the sincerity of our intentions to remain a responsible power in Asia and the Pacific on the basis of how sensitive and sustained is our effort to understand the nature, scope and direction of the political, cultural, economic and social changes in their part of the world. The crucial question facing the United States today is precisely, as Stephen Bailey suggests:

> "...Whether we will deal intelligently and humanely with the rest of the world, or whether we will bumble and stumble from crisis to crisis, perhaps, from crisis to disaster."**

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*Appendix Three.

**Stephen K. Bailey, Director International Education Project, American Council on Education," International Education: An Agenda for Interdependence," May 8, 1975.

He then recommends:

> "If Americans are to understand the impact of present and future international realities upon their own fortunes, and upon the fortunes of their fellow human beings around the world, and if America is to have both leaders and followers capable of dealing effectively with these complex matters, education for international interdependence must receive a new and sustained national priority and support."

Despite their psychological importance the communication, cultural and educational elements of our relations and purposes in Asia rarely receive the attention they deserve. The American people can avoid stumbling in their day to day contacts with the varied peoples of Asia only by expanding and deepening their knowledge and understanding of Asia.

Understanding Asia, however, is by no means an easy task for Americans. There is no other region in the world where so many different cultures and people interact than East Asia. Chinese, Indian, Burmese, Thai, Khmer, Vietnamese, Malay and Japanese cultures all possess distinct characteristics of their own and each of these appear more different from each other than is true of the cultures in Europe. The European colonial powers and the Americans have all had special impact on the political and cultural heritages of their former colonies in Asia.

The East Asian area is marked by a linguistic and religious heterogeneity unknown and unparalleled in any other region of the world. Many of the languages are "esoteric" and beyond the patience and interest of the Americans. Buddhism exists in three forms in Asia: Mahayana, Theravada and Tantric. Mahayana Buddhism, for example is dominant in Vietnam and Theravada in Thailand. Tantric Buddhism predominates in Tibet. Hinduism and Islam

are both found in India, and Islam is the dominant religion in Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia and very strong in Mindanao in the Philippines (where Muslims and Christians now fight both a religious and a sectarian war). The majority of the Filipinos are Christians. The Japanese have their own native religion, Shintoism, which has intermingled to one degree or another with Mahayana Buddhism. In China, Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism have all had a part in the development of Chinese culture. Moreover, according to some scholars Marxist-Leninist-Maoism has become China's first true religion. Every Southeast Asian state, of course, also has varying forms of animism. Finally, there are distinct racial differences and cultural variations throughout Asia and between Asians and Westerners whether Europeans or Americans.

All of these factors combine to one degree or another to make Asia and "the oriental" seem to the Westerner, particularly the American, "inscrutable." The lack of a common cultural heritage with Asia, the language and religious diversity and the racial differences all contribute, subconsciously or consciously, to the general assumption by Americans that somehow the United States doesn't or shouldn't have important political and security interests in Asia, most especially Southeast and South Asia. What we find difficult to understand we tend to block out mentally.

It is in the American interests to acquiesce in a situation in which public perceptions of Asia, among Americans, and the picture of America in the eyes of many Asians, now tend to create chasms rather than bridges?

While physical distance is being made less important, cultural and political distances tend, paradoxically,to increase through haphazard and ill-prepared contact. Bridges over the cultural chasms that separate Asia and the US demand an active and purposeful effort to expand upon current cultural and educational exchange programs with Asia and to open new ones with a different focus toward learning more about Asia as well as informing about America.

Understanding and appreciating Asian culture in order to help Asians cope with the changes transforming their societies through both public and private institutions requires greater involvement with Asians. Americans can judge the relevance or irrelevance of their own political, social and economic processes to the development needs of Asia only by studying Asian political and social cultures.

This approach runs against the grain of much of the current conventional wisdom about involvement in Asia--if the current contraction in Asian studies programs in American universities is any indication. The refrain is familiar enough: our priorities are in Europe and Latin America--and more recently, the Middle East. Asia should be left for Asians. We can't understand them anyway. Our politics and social processes are irrelevant to traditional patterns of oriental authoritarianism. Maybe communism can provide better answers for them. Such conventional wisdom is nothing less than escapism.

For better or worse the United States cannot retire or retrench from active involvement in one form or another in most areas of the world. Even as we seek a stable equilibrium in the balance of power with our adversaries we must also strive for "equilibrium" and balance in the nature of our foreign policy objectives and actions throughout the world. Moreover, we need to understand how "involvement" in varying forms in different areas of the world reinforces differing efforts and purposes in other areas. For example, emphasis on a substantial military and political presence in Europe and Northeast Asia in order to maintain the balance of power between the US-USSR and the PRC can be accompanied by increased emphasis on cultural activities in these key areas and throughout important regions of the Third World such as South and Southeast Asia. To the degree that these activities result in a creative and cooperative relationship with the nations of the Third World they will, in turn, strengthen our overall position with our major adversaries and allies.

Finally, the social development of our own society may benefit from better understanding of social and political development problems of Asia.

B. The Current Nature and Scope of US East-Asian Cultural Relations

The United States already has significant educational/cultural relations with certain states in East Asia on which it can build for the future. At the same time these relations represent considerable advantages over both the Soviets and Chinese on which we should capitalize.

Our primary advantages lie in the education field. The majority of Asians seeking advanced degrees in medicine, social sciences, education and economics come to the United States for their graduate work. There are probably more Asians studying at all levels in the United States than in all other countries combined. Many of these people return to their countries and eventually achieve positions of significant influence therein. The October 1973 student uprising in Thailand is a spectacular case in point. American trained professors and students played leading roles in preparing the political and psychological climate in which they and other Thai students, academics, small businessmen and even soldiers operated toward the overthrow of the Thai military dictatorship. They adopted as the slogan of their "revolution" the words, "of the people, by the people, and for the people."

In addition, many American universities retain direct ties with Asian universities, particularly in Japan, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand. The Asian, Ford and Rockefeller Foundations have programs throughout non-Communist Asia. The university and foundation links are, perhaps, more important today than ever. These institutions in their own small way possess, as does the Peace Corps, the creative and credible sense of purpose which so many Asians find lacking in the official

American Government policy and actions throughout the region. In this sense the university and foundation links and programs can serve as models on which to base the development of a more congenial "presence" in Asia.

The United States' strongest historical cultural and political links to Southeast Asia are with the Philippines. The "special relationship" with the Philippines is experiencing more stress and change today than ever before. To the degree that these changes result in a stronger Philippine image as a state in control of its own destiny but not hostile toward the United States, the current changes in our relationship are all to the good. The United States, however, stands to lose a great deal if these changes assume a rejection-oriented character against us that ultimately destroys our psychological and cultural links with the Philippines.

For the past twenty-five years the United States has also had a special relationship with Thailand. This relationship is also under great strain. Nevertheless, the U.S. should have a special interest in the current Thai effort to develop a constitutional, representative political process and actively seek, if the Thai so desire, to help them succeed in their efforts.

It is important for us to recognize that much of the recent increase in public anti-American sentiment in both the Philippines and Thailand arises not because these countries (or others) fear a U.S. threat to their security. For all of its mistakes in Indochina the United States is not really regarded by most serious Asian leaders and

scholars as an imperialist nation. The United States' image rather is that of a bumbling, but basically well-meaning giant. Asians criticize us because our national policies and actions seem to lack the sense of direction and purpose they expect a great power to have. Moreover, the often expedient nature of some US actions seem to run counter to the American character and cultural and political traditions which Asian students begin to understand and often draw inspiration from when they study in the United States. They attack our moral and political hypocrisy more than any perceived, intended American threat to their own country's national security. They also come to resent the essentially one-way nature of their relationship with Americans. We talk and teach and they listen to--or tolerate--the talk with little hope that we will ever be interested in their perspective on the problems they face or the long range hopes they entertain.

The long US involvement in the affairs of South Korea and the US occupation of Japan have had significant cultural impact on the peoples of both these dynamic nations. In many respects Japan has become more like a Western society than one of the East. This is particularly true in its universities in both science and engineering. Japan's ethnic homogeneity and social discipline, however, stand in sharp contrast to those of most Western countries, and tend to lessen US/Western influence on the structure of Japanese society. Paradoxically, Japan is externally now more like a Western industrialized country than any of its Asian neighbors but internally more unique because it is more impenetrable psychologically.

C. The Nature and Purpose of Future American-East Asian Cultural-Educational Relations

Many of America's recent political, military and economic/social development failures in Asia demonstrate the bankruptcy of programs not attuned to Asian values, attitudes and pattern of action and blind to the realities of Asian life. Individuals and governments of the Asian countries must recognize their own contributions to so-called "American failure." Too many of our "colleagues" in Asia chose to stand aside and let Americans make development decisions and carry out what became their pet projects even when, for example, Koreans, Thais or Indonesians knew the American decisions were inappropriate in their cultural milieu. Oftentimes these Asians deferred to the American advisors out of courtesy and because they had no alternatives themselves. Sometimes they deliberately deceived the naive "foreigner." And while accepting his material assistance for their own political or personal purposes, undermined any programs that would really alter the structure and processes of their society in ways that would make achievement of development project goals possible. It's hard to expect the elite who benefit from the system to make any basic changes in it.

These failures, however, do not suggest that Western or American knowledge and expertise, and even political, social and economic concepts are irrelevant to the real needs of Asia. These concepts and values are going to have their impact in any case and we should study this impact carefully.

Americans living in Asia should question, listen and question some more. If the beginning of any solution to a problem is an understanding of the problem at hand, then it behooves Americans and the many people of Asia to study the problems together. If the American questions more than explains and the Asian responds honestly--even to admitting that he himself may not understand the whys and wherefores of a given practice or problem, progress and mutually beneficial collaboration would be easier to attain. The specific nature and focus of the new American efforts with the people of Asia to understand their culture would include:

1. Delineation of the discontinuities that arise between old and new social, political, economic and cultural patterns--the fallout of the cultural collisions now taking place.

2. Identification of the differing directions of value change in the societies and civilizations in Asia.

3. Study and analysis of how specific traditional cultural, political, administrative values and patterns of action affect implementation of specific development projects.

4. Study of the art, literature, music and religions of Asia. These are all too little understood and appreciated in the United States--indeed, some "modern" Asians too easily deprecate their own people's work in their search for a more Western identity.

5. Study of Asian languages. Without adequate numbers of Americans with facility in Asian languages, Americans will never achieve an adequate

and helpful understanding of and empathy for the people of Asia, their hopes and their problems. Nor will Americans be able to understand the political and social realities of Asian countries without knowing their languages. Every US Mission in Asia should have a certain required number of language officers in <u>each</u> of its various sections.

In terms of 1, 2 and 3 above, Thailand currently offers Americans a particularly significant case study of cultures in collision and an attempt by a priviliged elite to cope with and respond to the demands of their own children and some elements of the general population for reform of an authoritarian structure and process.

The magnitude and rate of the cultural interaction that has led to the current state of affairs in Thailand is beginning to take on serious proportions. In attempting to explain what is happening in her country, Mrs. Amphorn Misuk, Director General of the Education Techniques Department, Ministry of Education of Thailand, highlights the importance of cultural and educational relations and of the necessity for carefully studying all aspects of their impact:

> "Because of the recent world-wide expansion of mass-communications and internationally homogeneous school and economic systems urban elite in most countries adopt, at least on the surface, western materialistic values, whilst in the rural areas traditional cultural values still hold away. This collision, caused by the dualistic or multiplistic nature of most developing societies is particularly significant in Thailand where the values of an old and well established national culture are often in conflict with those of modern democratic technological societies."

Thailand, in addition, has sent large numbers of its high school and college level students to the United States,* England and Australia to study. Many of these students are now political activists and party members pushing for even faster socio-political and economic reform. Student activism in Thailand is definitely undermining the traditional Thai hierarchical value system. Mrs. Amphorn observes,

> "There is little dialogue between those in high hierarchical positions and their social inferiors, but instead those of lower rank are expected to listen to, agree with and support those of higher rank. Increasingly this tradition is producing tension for both Western education and Western democratic ideals are spreading rapidly."

The tension and conflict transfer directly to the political sphere where the frustrations of the young and educated come face to face with the "inherent inconsistency between a hierarchical social structure, and democratic ideals." These young, articulate, educated Thai want to play an active role in developing their country. The existing system offers them little opportunity. Mrs. Amphorn concludes,

> "There is thus a tendency for many of these people to reject all that is Thai, and to place all their faith on the adoption of some external socio-political model."

Testimony to the truth of this last observation is the large number of former student activists, current student leaders and young academics who associate themselves closely to the New Force Party, the Socialist Party of Thailand or other far more radical leftist groups and refuse

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*Currently some 15-20,000 Thai are studying in the United States.

to cooperate directly in any coalition government because they refuse to associate with the remnants of a political system they rebelled against in October 1973.

The effect and modernization of other Asian countries is not dissimilar to the upheavels introduced into Thailand which Mrs. Amphorn describes so well. Consequently, Thai success or failure in the restructuring of its political system will be instructive to other developing countries. There is little or nothing Americans can or should do directly to advise the Thai or any other Asian country on how to develop their political processes, but Americans can certainly try to cooperate with the peoples of Asia in understanding the dynamics and direction of the changes now underway. It is possible that through their questioning Americans could even broaden Asian and American perspectives on what is happening and why. In this sense the foreigner helps simply by asking questions. The Asians in answering the questions then define the problems or explain in their own terms why some change is working as it is.

The Need for Two-Way Flow

Information and advice originating in the United States flows abroad in torrents. The flow of information and perspective from Asia to the United States is a mere trickle in comparison. This imbalance causes discomfort, irritation and even alarm that is not conducive to long-term Asian-American understanding and cooperation.

The United States needs more vigorous two-way relationships with Asia. Asians want our know-how and modernity. But Americans might now

profit from more emphasis on listening and learning about the cultures and experiences of Asian peoples and from practicing more reticence when it comes to talking and teaching. Asians would notice and welcome this posture as a signal of a new less presumptious American approach toward Asia.

The cultural variety of Asia might come to the United States in a number of forms including the academic, the archeological and the living arts. The Aspen Institute has developed a proposal suggesting what some of these methods might be. For example, the Peoples' Republic of China recently lent an exhibition of important archaeological finds to museums in Europe and North America. This travelling exhibition of China's extraordinary artistic tradition and its national pride in its distinctive heritage had a public effect beyond calculation. New York's Asia Society, Boston's Museum of Fine Arts, the Metropolitan Museum in New York, the Los Angeles County Museum, the Seattle Art Museum , the Nelson-Atkins Gallery in Kansas City and many other museums have borrowed visual arts collections for exhibitions over the last 13 years from China, Japan, Korea, Thailand, Afghanistan and Indonesia. In all, perhaps the Asia Society's Asia House Gallery has been most active in bringing masterpieces from Asia for exhibition in the United States, through its program of loan-exhibitions (exhibitions shared in the past with twenty-three American museums in twenty-two cities). These activities show the potential to be found in already existing institutions such as museums in the United States and abroad as instruments for broadening of knowledge and appreciation.

The Aspen Institute proposal points out, however, that there remain very rich collections of unique Asian art in Asian museums which have never been represented in exhibitions for the American public. Opportunities exist for showing of representative objects from the collections of the Prince of Wales Museum in Bombay, India; the Pala sculpture of the Dacca, Bangladesh Museum; the Mandalay royal regalia, returned by the British Museum to the National Museum in Rangoon, Burma, and representing the sumptuary objects of the monarchs of Burma; the early Buddhist sculpture from the National Museum in New Delhi, India; Japanese ceremonial textiles from various private and public collections in Japan; Cham sculpture from collections of early Vietnam art in the Da Nang Museum in South Vietnam; collections of Burmese gilt and lacquer, Theravada Buddhist religious manuscripts such as are held in the collections of the British Museum, London; traditional paintings and ceramics from the collections of the Peoples' Republic of China; sculptured jades from the Palace Museum collections in Taipei, Taiwan; recently discovered Korean excavation material from the Korean National Museum in the Duk-Soo Palace, Seoul, and others.

The study of Asia's cultures should not, obviously, be limited to the past and the "heritage," as it is manifested in the art and artifacts of Asia. We study the heritage only to understand the way in which it has affected the present Asian cultures and their values, attitudes and patterns of action.

We also need to understand the ideas and ideologies of Asia. Confucianism and Maoism, for example, are equally worthy of study. Indeed, special consideration should be given to the various "political cultures" of Asian nations and their impact on or manifestation in today's emerging political systems and processes.

Special Resources

There exist in the United States extensive resources, both human and physical, of cultural and educational value to bring to any of the foregoing media--resources which have remained greatly under-utilized in the past.

Among these are the collections of Asian art in such great repositories as Boston's Museum of Fine Arts; the Cleveland Art Museum; the Freer Gallery in Washington, D.C.; the Nelson Gallery in Kansas City, Missouri; the Los Angeles County Museum of Art and the De Young Museum's Brundage Collection in San Francisco, and the Seattle Art Museum in Seattle, Washington. Special exhibitions such as those of the Asia House Gallery in New York, the Newark (N.J.) Art Museum, and others could also provide visual materials of the highest caliber. (NBC's "TODAY" Show, for instance, has already given over major segments of its time to a variety of showings of Asian art, from Japanese screens to Indian miniature paintings, such as those borrowed for television from Asia House Gallery exhibitions.)

The Performing Arts of Asia--in music, dance and theatre--are also a rich mine of visually rewarding experiences, congenial to film, television and recording activities. Outstanding Asian troupes, such as those toured before dozens of US campus audiences by the Asia Society, periodically visit

the United States from all of Asia's major culture-systems and could, in the process, leave behind important teaching materials for virtually every level of education in this country.

Much more also needs to be done to make the living arts of America available to the discerning publics of Asia. The trip of the Philadelphia Orchestra to China in 1973 and the 1974 Martha Graham Dance Troupe visits to many countries in Asia both presented a picture of the United States of unusual beauty and creativity. Unfortunately, lack of funds make such spectacular events all too rare.

The private foundations and associations such as the Asia Society obviously make commendable contributions toward better understanding of Asia by Americans. They want to do more but are limited by lack of sufficient funds. There must be greater effort on the part of the US Government to complement the work of private institutions through grant assistance to private programs. Such grants, however, should not in any way compromise the great flexibility the private institutions now have in using their resources with sensitivity and precision.

D. Policy Recommendations

1. The U.S. Government in cooperation with the U.S. Congress should consider carefully the proposal of the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, which its President, Mr. J.E. Slater, outlined in some detail in a 2 May 1975 letter to Mr. John Richardson, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs. Congress should then:

(a) create a special fund to support the initiation and expansion of cultural, educational and humanistic studies and activities in appropriate American institutions concerned with Asia. The NDEA Title VI and Title IV programs for support of Asian area studies and languages need to be expanded not contracted, if we are in fact living in an increasingly interdependent world and need therefor to know more about the various political, cultural and social values, attitudes and patterns of action of Asia. There should be incentives for young American students and scholars who seek to prepare themselves for careers concerned with Asia; and,

(b) increase its annual support of the National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities so as to enable American artists to present their work and performances abroad.

2. The U.S. Foreign Service in cooperation with the U.S. AID mission, should initiate on its own a new program with high emphasis on the study of Asian countries' culture, history, social and political structures and processes within each U.S. Mission, and in cooperation with Asian universities. Included would be inter-regional programs to bring together Asian scholars for seminars and workshops in all the countries of the region. This program would utilize primarily seminar and workshop techniques and focus also on the impact of development programs on traditional cultural values and attitudes and vice versa. At the very least the Department of State, AID and USIA should strengthen area studies for personnel being assigned to East Asia and the Pacific area.

3. The State Department and the Department of Defense should not curtail their Asian language training programs in the wake of Vietnam. Chinese and Japanese language study programs probably do not face cutbacks but there may be a tendency toward less emphasis and support for Southeast and South Asian language study. Every effort should be made instead to expand and maintain these programs, improve their quality and develop stricter requirements for increased numbers of language officers in U.S. missions in these areas. The Executive Branch (State, HEW, NSF, DOD) should assure that the Inter-University Language Centers in Tokyo and Taipei, which are the principal source of non-government language expertise in Chinese and Japanese, are not forced to close for lack of steady, stable financial support.

4. The Cultural Affairs Bureau of the State Department already intends to provide new support for a variety of projects that will attempt to respond to the need for greater understanding of Asia in the United States, including:

--expanded placement of Asian scholars of Asian Studies on American college campuses;

--an annual summer seminar on Southeast Asia for Asian Studies teachers from smaller, less well-staffed American colleges, the seminar to include travel in Southeast Asia;

--consultation and observation trips to East Asia by small groups of distinguished American specialists (The emphasis would be on listening and learning rather than on teaching and talking.);

--expanded use of international visitors from East Asia (State Department invitees) as speakers on their country and region during their observation trips to the United States; introduction of a new "Asia Today" visiting lecturers program for carefully selected Asian leaders;

--seed money for a series of ETV programs on Southeast Asia;

--increased grants for American post-doctoral students and younger scholars to carry out research in East Asia;

--more non-degree, academic study and on-the-job experience for Asian professionals in such fields as law, urban studies, educational administration, environmental protection;

--American Journalist-in-Residence program involving non-degree area study in Japan, Singapore and Australia for mid-career American journalists specializing in foreign affairs, these grants to include study and travel in the surrounding regions.

Effective implementation of these projects requires that the State Department and OMB agree to approach Congress for funds to expand the CU program.

CONCLUSION

In sum, expansion and refocus of U.S. cultural and educational relations with the states of East Asia in the manner suggested here, if and as we diminish our military presence, will:

1. Greatly improve both American and Asian understanding of the emerging realities of Asian life and politics and the direction of value and political/economic changes therein;
2. Provide the cultural underpinning for more effective technological, economic and political discourse across the Pacific as it deepens mutual appreciation of each other's human values;
3. Identify new ways in which American experience and development assistance can be more effective and relevant to Asian needs than has been the case in the past; and,

4. As a result of all of these achieve considerable creative political impact throughout Asia. These cultural and educational activities represent some of the creative purpose our foreign policy so badly needs.

This said, however, it is imperative that the United States not attempt to develop or use its cultural relations with East Asia primarily for political purposes. Favorable spin-off in our political relations with the nations of East Asia will come in due course if the United States succeeds in achieving the educational and cultural purposes and objectives of its educational and cultural programs in the region.

A. Northeast Asia: Uncertain Equilibrium

October 31, 1975

JAPAN AND THE STRUCTURE OF PEACE IN ASIA*

I. INTRODUCTION

The success of the American effort to retrench and readjust its role and posture in Asia while protecting American security interests in the Pacific-Asian area depends very much on the US-Japan relationship. The assumption underlying our current effort to develop a dynamic regional equilibrium is that Japan is willing and able to play a positive role as one of the four powers in the area in cooperation with the United States.

Japan, however, is not and cannot be a great power in the traditional sense since its military power is minimal and likely to remain relatively limited for the foreseeable future, and its political influence derives from an extremely potent but vulnerable economic system. Nevertheless, Japan remains vital to US interests since it can tip the balance of power in Asia either for or against us.

1.3 (a)(b)

Today, Japan finds itself approaching a set of decisions that as a nation it does not appear ready or able to face up to: the Sino-Soviet dispute, the oil crises and resultant demonstrations of the nature and scope of Japanese resource vulnerability and the effect upon Japan's future policy planning of American readjustment in Asia.

To a degree extraordinary for a country of its importance, Japan since the end of World War II has conducted international relations

*Annex 1.

without a foreign policy backed by independent military and political power. Secure in their alliance with America, the Japanese have been able to finesse questions of security and power politics and to concentrate instead on a foreign policy geared in large part to enlarging overseas contacts for the purpose of maximizing economic well-being.

As a non-military economic superpower, Japan is perhaps more attuned to the necessities of international peace and trade (and even ecology) than any other nation. "Interdependence" for Japan is not a mere catchword, but inescapable reality. The Japanese cannot entertain any hope that they can somehow decrease their dependence on other countries in the way that the Iowa farmer and the election-seeking isolationist US Congressman might do. For Japan, many of the fundamental assumptions of the immediate post-war era are no longer tenable today. The country is faced with increasing pressures to contribute more positively to the well-being of its Asian neighbors and thereby to the political stability of the Pacific region. It is also under pressure to move away from the passive, reactive posture that has sustained it so far. There is, however, considerable inertia and resistance to seeking a more dynamic role. Japanese leaders realize that Japan must for its own long range interests play a more active economic and political role in Asia, but are inclined to proceed cautiously lest a drastic shift in its posture produce serious destabilizing effects both domestically and internationally.

The nature and degree of any basic change in the Japanese "role" in Asia could begin with and be profoundly influenced by the nature and scope of changes in the US-Japanese alliance. Changes that loosen this relationship or raise questions about its credibility can upset the power

equilibrium in Northeast Asia. It is important, therefore, to understand exactly what the current nature of the US-Japanese relationship is.

II. NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE US-JAPANESE ALLIANCE--THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY AND US MILITARY PRESENCE IN JAPAN AND ASIA

A. The Treaty Commitment

The formal basis for the US-Japan alliance is the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, which was drawn up and ratified by both countries in 1952 and revised in 1960 as the current Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Through this treaty Japan reentered the international and political order backed by a US security commitment to and on behalf of Japan. Under this treaty each party agreed:

> "An armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes."

Japan, under Article VI of the treaty, grants to US land, air and naval forces the use of Japanese facilities and territory, "for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East." The treaty requires prior consultation with the Government of Japan before the US may conduct military operations in areas "other than those in the defense of the territory under the administration of Japan." The treaty does not permit automatic US use of Japanese bases in the event of another Korean conflict. The facilities, nevertheless, do provide the US with the ability to maintain its commitments, at present, to both the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China.

The Sato-Nixon Communique of 1969 provided a broader interpretation of the 1960 treaty in that this was the first official Japanese Government

statement which publicly acknowledged that the security of Japan was related to the peace and security of the Far East and was directly related to the ability of the United States to carry out its obligations with regard to other countries in the Far East. President Ford and Prime Minister Miki reaffirmed these basic principles and common interests during their August 5-6, 1975 meetings in Washington. Moreover, the Miki Administration since its advent in December 1974 has sought to place the US-Japan security relationship on a more equal basis.

Prime Minister Miki just prior to his 1975 visit to the US enunciated "Four Principles of Defense Cooperation with the US." These principles are:

1. That no new rights will be obtained or assumed by the Japanese Government in its defense cooperation with the US;
2. That civilian control over defense cooperation will be strictly adhered to;
3. That the Japanese constitutional restrictions will be adhered to; and
4. That, as possible, deliberations on defense cooperation will be given a public airing. At the same time Miki's Defense Minister has been more outspoken than any of his predecessors regarding the need for more public recognition and discussion of Japan's defense posture.

B. The Military Facilities

US-operated military facilities in Japan are many and varied. They include:

1. Naval repair facilities, including the largest drydock accommodations west of Pearl Harbor under US control. These facilities enhance the operating capacity of the 7th Fleet for air and sea lane surveillance protection.

2. Air facilities on Japanese soil which support both logistical and surveillance operations throughout the region. Access to these air bases is important to the US "forward basing" strategy and are therefore linked to Japan's security.

3. Naval and army supply depots in Japan which are desired for the support of on-going and contingency operations throughout the region.

4. Communication facilities in Japan which are linked into the US global facilities for security operations.

5. Basing facilities on Okinawa for a US Marine Corps division to enhance the US capacity to project its power through their rapid deployment in the region.

III. JAPAN'S SECURITY INTERESTS

A. The Need for an Expanded Security Policy

Japanese security has three aspects:

1. Secure trade routes and access to raw materials;

2. Discouragement of conflict in the islands and peninsulas close to Japanese territory; and

3. Deterrence of strategic threats or pressure to the metropolitan territory of Japan itself.

What nation(s) threaten these interests? How? Isn't the Japanese-American alliance still a viable and credible security shield for Japan? The answer to the first two questions in terms of much current conventional wisdom in Japan and elsewhere is: Nobody really threatens Japan in any way. In fact, Japan as the first non-military superpower serves as an example for the other great powers. There is little or no likelihood of a global war. In a world of interdependence among many leading countries conventional security policies and instruments are no longer productive. In a nuclear era war is irrational in any case. With these arguments in mind, the answer to the third question would seem to be yes--and therefore, Japan does not really need to develop an expanded security posture. Detente reinforces these arguments.

Detente, which has resulted in expanded contact between the United States and the USSR and PRC, limited movements toward strategic arms limitations, and some lessening of tension, appears to have enhanced short terms prospects for peace and certainly altered former alliance systems and strategies.

Reality does not, however, seem so reassuring. Many observers argue that today's detente is a fragile situation at best, and that altering the strategies of the cold war does not imply the total elimination of force in international affairs, most especially on the part of the Soviet Union and China, although the crucial determining factor is credible potential force rather than its actual exercise. The Korean imbroglio and the Vietnamese war illustrate the complexity of the Asian situation. Middle-rank communist and non-communist states have both the military and political capacities to initiate violent conflict under circumstances that the great powers can neither fully control nor totally ignore. The outcome of the Vietnamese

war, in fact, confirms the utility of communist revolutionary war. Regional conflicts will persist, detente notwithstanding, and in view of the preeminent economic and seemingly inevitable political commitments of Japan in the Pacific Basin, aloofness from active participation for the indefinite future will improve increasingly difficult. Because of the implicit nationalist orientation of the current trend in international affairs, Japan itself will increasingly define its specific national interests and adopt policies appropriate to their attainment.

Three decades of political and military conflict between communist states and movements and non-communist states and groups in Asia have generated profound political and ideological differences that will continue as potential causes of conflict. At the same time, the Sino-Soviet split has made the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance largely an anachronism. The indeterminancy of an increasingly pluralist world, phenomenal Japanese economic growth, and the more nationalistic orientation of American policy have, in turn, affected the nature of the US-Japanese relationship.

B. Military/Political

Since the signing of the 1952 US-Japanese peace treaty, Japan has defined its security interests almost solely in terms of the defense of the territorial and political security of the Japanese home islands, and the US-Japan Treaty has served as the principle guarantor of that security. Article IX of the Japanese Constitution has been interpreted by the Japanese courts as forbidding the establishment of any kind of "offensive-oriented" military force. Public opinion, the media and most political leaders support this view. The Japanese have developed a token self-defense corps designed to withstand a conventional invasion of the homeland for a

brief period. Within this period of time, the Japanese expect the United States to reinforce Japan under the terms of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty.

Japan has, in fact, placed its national security almost entirely in the hands of the United States. More accurately put, the United States has itself assumed responsibility for the security of Japan.

1.3 (a)(5)

Having adjusted to these conditions, they have been more than willing to continue to abide by them. This willingness is reinforced by Japanese perceptions of themselves as being extremely vulnerable, not only militarily but economically as well.

Japan's strategic policy is one dimension of Japanese-American relations. Since 1945, under a virtually unbroken succession of conservative Japanese governments, Japan's security interests have been assumed to be identical with those of the United States. Close and extensive bilateral economic and political relations have reinforced this view which has persisted despite sharp internal political divisions on defense issues and the shrill anti-American campaigns of the Japanese left. The parliamentary

confrontation between the dominant pro-US conservatives and the leftist political opposition has until recently tended to narrow the foreign policy debate in Japan almost exclusively to an essentially irrelevant ideological quarrel centering on relations with the United States. Of particular concern is the provision in the security treaty that obliges Japan to furnish bases to support US commitments to maintain peace and stability, beyond Japan itself, in the Far East. On the other hand, the withdrawal of US military forces from the Southeast Asian mainland and concern that US military presence in Korea may be terminated have begun to have a sobering effect.

The Nixon Doctrine and the monetary, trade, and resource crises have devastated the international economic system in the last few years. These events have brought about significant changes in Japanese attitudes toward the US-Japanese relationship. Secure trade routes and access to raw materials have become priority considerations in Japan's foreign policy formulation. Nevertheless, Japan's security interests still relate directly to the continued viability and credibility of the alliance with the United States and the credibility of the American nuclear shield. The credibility and viability of this alliance is, in turn, affected by evidence of the capacity and willingness of the United States to stand by its commitments elsewhere in Asia--most especially in South Korea.

Japan's primary security interest in Korea is the prevention of a war which might directly involve Japan. The conservatives who have ruled post-war Japan have consistently linked Japan's security with that of South Korea. The United States in its security treaty with South Korea has committed itself to preventing or resisting military aggression against South Korea from

any source. The credibility and viability of the US security commitment to Japan therefore is heavily dependent upon the continued effectiveness of the US-South Korean alliance.

Beyond this priority security interest, Japan also has general security interests elsewhere in Asia which currently run parallel to those of the United States. The key variables in the overall nature and status of Japanese security interests in Asia and the Pacific are a function of the intentions and capacities of the other potentially hostile powers active in the region: the PRC, USSR, North Korea, and perhaps Vietnam.

1. Korea

a. Status Quo. For the immediate future Japan's security is best served by a maintenance of the peaceful status quo in Korea; i.e., a divided Korea and a situation in which, over time, the two Korean governments resume their dialogue toward a peaceful solution of the problem of reunification. This "status quo" is viable as long as the USSR, PRC and the US all agree that none of them can risk letting either Korean government resort to the use of force to unify the Korean Peninsula. Peace in Korea depends upon the belief of each major power that aggression by either Korean government will involve the allies of the other and therefore no "local civil war" is possible. In this situation the credibility of the South Korean-US alliance remains intact and so does Japanese reliance on the US for protection of its vital security needs.

Japanese interests in Korea, however, have begun to widen to include Korea as a whole. The status quo must eventually begin to break toward a peaceful resolution of the unification issue and thereby a reduction of tension in the area. The Japanese may begin to exercise more initiative in this direction by trying to persuade the two Koreas to resume their dialogue with each other. The US should cooperate with such initiatives

but let Japan lead.

b. War. If war breaks out in Korea because of overt aggression by the North against the South, the Japanese Government may decide to support the United States reaction thereto by permitting US utilization of Japanese bases to support US activities in Korea. However, it is certain to face some adverse public opinion and the powerful resistance of the combined opposition parties. This resistance would steadily increase if the defense of South Korea becomes a long, drawn-out affair. Even if the Japanese Government initially supported a US response to North Korean aggression it would not be able to sustain that support in the face of steadily increasing domestic unrest. A long, drawn-out conflict would be destabilizing even beyond Northeast Asia. What will be needed if the North does attack is a quick rebuff accompanied by sharp punishment. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, during his visit to South Korea in late August, left little doubt that such a response is precisely what the North Koreans could expect.

1.(a)(3)

c. Unified Korea. A unified Korea under communist control would be regarded by many Japanese as a security threat and would have a major impact on the Japanese economy since present trade relations will

undergo sharp readjustments. A non-communist united Korea would not pose a threat simply because, acting alone, it could not threaten Japan while the United States and Japan remain allied. Moreover, a non-communist state would probably want to maintain the present mutually-beneficial economic relationship with Japan.

While a unified communist Korea could be a threat to Japanese security, the circumstances of unification affect to some degree the seriousness of the threat. A unified communist Korea that resulted from peaceful agreement between the two governments and was willingly accepted by the overwhelming majority of the Korean people would not seem as directly affecting Japanese security, although it would most likely be detrimental to Japanese short-term economic interests in the South. Peaceful unification of Korea under a communist government though highly unlikely would not compromise the credibility of the American commitment to Japan as would be the case were the US to fail to respond to communist military aggression in Korea. Nevertheless, Japanese security could be threatened were the PRC and USSR to engage in increased competition for favor or alliance with a unified Korea. The overall power balance in Northeast Asia would be upset and the pressure for even closer US-Japanese cooperation and perhaps Japanese rearmament would increase. The United States would certainly be concerned about which way Japan would begin to lean in the face of this additional communist success on the rim of mainland Asia.

d. Withdrawal of US Military Power. A precipitious unilateral withdrawal of all US military power from South Korea prior to a peaceful settlement of the Korean War and reunification would seriously destabilize the situation in Korea and immediately raise questions of US intentions regarding its treaty commitments. There would be no way to separate the credibility

problem with Korea from that with Japan. Again, the political-military balance would be upset and Japan would face decisions regarding its security, including the feasibility of rearmament. The domestic debate over this issue would itself be seriously destabilizing for Japan. On the other hand, a gradual, phased US withdrawal which leaves South Korea with a credible defense capability of its own will, of course, be less destabilizing.

2. Taiwan. Japanese security interests in Taiwan are not nearly as pressing as those in Korea. Peaceful reunification with the mainland would pose no security problem for Japan, although it could adversely affect Japanese economic interests in the short term. The timing and manner in which the US honors or disposes of its security obligations to Taiwan could, however, if hasty and "expedient," have an adverse psychological-political impact on the Japanese sense of security and US-Japanese relations.

Peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the mainland that resulted from free and uncoerced agreement between the ROC and the PRC and which in no way occurred because the United States unilaterally withdrew its support from and abrogated its security commitments to the PRC would not have an adverse affect on Japanese security. An attack by the PRC on Taiwan after the US established diplomatic relations with the PRC and abrogated the ROC-US Security Treaty, even if this abrogation was at the time mutually agreed to by the US and the ROC, would, however, threaten Japanese security. Such an attack would raise serious questions about the nature of Chinese intentions. Japanese-Chinese relations would undergo severe strain. Some form of special effort to reaffirm the viability

of the US-Japanese Security Treaty would be necessary in order to resist pressure for Japanese rearmament.

3. The Peoples' Republic of China

a. Military/Political/Economic Threat to Japan? The PRC can threaten Japanese territory with its nuclear weapons and a modest missile delivery capacity. The PRC does not at this time, nor probably until the end of the century, pose a threat to Japan in terms of direct sea or air assault, despite its recent rapid growth in naval strength.

The PRC is a potential political threat to Japan both internally and externally. Internally, Chinese access to and frequent communication with Japanese politicians contributes to the frequent and often irrational conflict between the moderates, conservatives and the leftist forces in Japanese domestic politics. Externally, the Chinese, if they chose, could make life more difficult for Japan's economic activities in Southeast Asia. The Chinese could inflame fears of Japanese political and economic "hegemonial" tendencies in Southeast Asia.

The PRC is not an economic threat to Japan and is unlikely to become one for a long time. The Chinese might threaten Japanese economic interests in Taiwan after reunification. They might, however, follow something aking to the Hong Kong model and permit Taiwan and the PRC to benefit from foreign exchange earnings as well as Japanese technology.

b. PRC Intentions in Southeast Asia and Japan Security. PRC intentions in Southeast Asia, beyond trying to prevent any appreciable rise in Soviet influence there, remain unclear. China argues against "hegemonialism" by any great power, but one wonders whether the Chinese consider their own intentions, whatever they are, as hegemonial. In terms of keeping the Soviets out, China would seem to have an interest in keeping the Japanese involved

economically while China tries to parry Soviet thrusts in the military and diplomatic areas.

c. PRC and Korea. PRC support for a North Korean attack on South Korea would seriously threaten Japanese security by:

-- threatening to extend communist control over the entire peninsula and creating a unified Korea hostile to Japan;

-- destroying Japanese economic investments in Korea;

-- drawing Japan into the war through the US use of Japanese bases;

--increasing political tension in Japan over the issue of war and the nature of Japanese involvement therein.

Obviously, Japan's security interests benefit from Chinese restraints on Kim Il Sung's ambitions.

d. PRC and US-Japanese Security Treaty. For the immediate future the US-Japanese Security Treaty serves Chinese interests in that the American presence helps maintain a power balance in Northeast Asia. If the PRC resumes pressure on the Japanese to end their treaty relationship with the United States, this would exacerbate the Japanese domestic debate on security. The opposition parties led by the Socialists and Communists would probably expand their pressure tactics against the conservative government to break the treaty "in the interests of peace." On the other hand, such Chinese action could also stimulate demands for Japanese rearmament for self defense, since not all Japanese would be willing to yield to Chinese pressures and in effect place Japanese security in the hands of the Chinese.

The PRC would seem to have the best of both worlds. It can serve its own current interests vis-a-vis the Soviets by not pushing the Japanese to end their security relationship with the US and, if the time seems appropriate later, work to weaken the US-Japanese alliance and cause political turmoil inside Japan at the same time. The PRC would need, however, to consider the prospects for backfire of any attempt to break up the US-Japanese alliance. Japan might not choose to "capitulate" to China but rather embark on its own rearmament program and thereby become a threat to China.

4. The USSR

a. The Soviet Navy. The USSR, with its growing navy in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the South China Sea, can directly threaten Japanese security through its capacity to cut off or harass Japanese shipping and access to raw materials necessary for the Japanese economy. Dominance of the Sea of Japan by the Soviet navy could threaten at least the psychological underpinnings of Japanese security.

Japanese development assistance efforts in Siberia could conceivably enhance the strength of overall Soviet naval strength in Northeast Asia by making Vladivostok less dependent on European Russia. However, a Soviet naval threat to Japan or even harassment of Japanese shipping would be highly unlikely in a non-war situation and so long as the Japanese American alliance remains viable and Japan is capable of developing naval countermeasures for use in the waters surrounding Japan.

b. USSR Perceptions of the US-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty. If China favors the US-Japanese Security Treaty as long as it helps balance Soviet power in NEA, the Soviets also see the treaty as helping to balance potential Chinese power. Beyond balancing Chinese power, the Soviets may perceive that the US-Japan Treaty helps ensure against the rise of any form of Japanese Gaullism that could lead to rearmament.

5. The Sino-Soviet Dispute. Sino-Soviet competition offers Japan more room to maneuver than would Sino-Soviet cooperation. But Sino-Soviet competition and antagonism creates uncertainties in Asia which are detrimental to political and economic stability. The feud is not an "asset" to the Japanese as it might on occasion be to the US. The constant tension the Japanese find themselves under in trying to treat, or pretend to treat, power equally is increasingly frustrating. Neither of the two communist powers wants Japan to develop a closer relation to the other than it has itself. This situation places serious constraints on the Japanese foreign policy making process by dividing the Japanese public on policies toward both the Soviet Union and China. Frustrations arising out of this constant tension might over time contribute to a rebirth of militant nationalism with the hope that Japan could better control its own destiny.

a. The Soviet Union. The Soviet's primary concern in Asia is to contain China's influence and to do so in a way that concurrently undermines American influence. In this sense, Japan is now the most important country in Asia for the Soviets. Currently, the Soviet Union's interests in Northeast Asia seem best served by seeking to expand its influence with Japan through peaceful means. In terms of the Sino-Soviet dispute, for example, the Soviet efforts to obtain Japanese (and United States) investment in fuel resource development in Siberia in exchange for long term oil and gas deliveries serve Moscow's strategic as well as economic purposes. If successful in attracting this package investment, the Soviets could create a vested interest on the part of Japan and the United States in the stability of Soviet Siberia. Indeed, if the United States and/or Japan

have a long term, major investment in a trans-Siberian fuel pipeline which passes close to the Chinese border, it will be in their interest to dissuade or try to prevent China from causing a serious conflict along the border. At the same time, such development could marginally enhance the Soviet capacity to support its navy in the Pacific area.

b. The PRC. For the Chinese, however, a US-Soviet-Japanese consortium in Siberia may appear threatening and therefore destabilizing. Soviet development of Siberia could enhance Chinese fears of encirclement by the Soviets and might lead them to increase pressure on Japan to limit its involvement with the Russians. Development of Siberia would result in increased population in the area and thereby eliminate a Soviet vulnerability there.

The PRC, moreover, now appears to have considerable high quality oil reserves itself that are, and can continue to be, available to the Japanese.

On the other hand, Japan could offer much to the Chinese. Japanese technology and capital, for example, can aid in Chinese development and could conceivably ameliorate PRC attitudes toward US-Japanese involvement in Siberian development.

Obviously, both China and Russia can use Japanese cooperation. Neither would seem to have anything to gain by pressuring Japan too hard to take sides, favor one over the other and thereby inadvertently force the Japanese into a closer cooperation with the US or even into a more independent course of action of its own, including rearmament. On balance, the Asian order in which neither the Soviet Union nor the PRC gain hegemony is a prime requisite for Japan. Soviet "hegemony", for example, which drew Japan into the Soviet orbit would have a devastatingly destabilizing effect on global equilibrium. Thus the US-Japanese alliance

plays a role in the security policies of both countries.

C. Economic Vulnerability

Japanese economic power, despite its giant size, is fragile. Japan depends on imported crude oil for 75% of its primary energy supply and roughly 80% of its oil needs come from the Middle East. At the time of the Arab oil embargo, the Japanese government could not resist pressures to give active support to the Arab political cause or face mounting restrictions on fuel supplies. Japan was forced to identify their interests more sharply with the Arabs at the risk of offending powerful pro-Israeli sentiment in the United States, and to seek oil under short-term, exceptionally expensive contracts. Japan has since welcomed initiatives toward consumer country cooperation on energy, but its dependence on imported oil has made Japan cautious on any steps which the producers might perceive as confrontational. This dependence on Arab oil will continue through the 1970s to dictate cooperative relations by Tokyo with the oil-producing states regardless of contrary political considerations.

Even before the traumatic 1973 oil crisis, the worldwide boom in industrial activity brought with it serious shortages of critical raw materials for the first time since the Korean War. Scarce supplies and record prices in many commodities,particularly industrial raw materials, export control actions by many countries, including the US and OPEC success in curtailing supplies of oil while simultaneously raising its price fourfold, awakened serious concern over the future availability of raw materials in quantities adequate to sustain continued industrial expansion. While this concern was felt in all industrial countries, Japan's vulnerability in virtually all critical industrial raw materials--90 to 100% dependence

on imports for 9 out of 12 key minerals and metals--is greater by far than of the United States and even greater than that of the vulnerable European community.

In addition to industrial raw materials, primary commodities of all types have become a political issue of considerable importance in relations between the developed and less developed countries (LDCs). LDCs have made agreements on commodity arrangements a central element of their demands for a New International Economic Order. Japan as a leading economic power in Asia has been a primary target of pressures by Asian LDCs to enter into arrangements that would either stabilize commodity prices at higher levels or stabilize LDC export earnings, particularly since the current recession has caused a sharp decline in Japanese imports of raw materials and considerably reduced the export earnings of its Asian suppliers. While sensitive to the hardship this has caused, Tokyo has resisted pressures to enter into regional commodity preference agreements intended to stabilize Asian export earnings.

While Japan's trading relationship are preponderantly with the advanced industrial countries of North America and Western Europe, its economic ties with the developing countries of Asia are becoming increasingly significant. In 1974 Japan's trade with Free Asia, extending from Korea all the way to Pakistan and Afghanistan, accounted for over 23% pf her total exports and 20% of her imports. Japan purchases a wide variety of raw materials, particularly from the ASEAN nations; Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan supply substantial quantities of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods. Japan consumes a major part of the region's exports, while her export of capital goods, industrial materials, and chemical fertilizers and other inputs for agricultural production have been indispensable in the economic development of the area.

The developing nations of Asia occupy a similarly important position in Japan's direct overseas investment. These nations accounted for $2.4 billion of Japan's cumulative overseas investment ($10.3 billion) at the end of fiscal 1974. Japan's economic activity thus can have enormous impact on each of the nations of the region whose economic welfare is closely related to the state of Japan's economic well-being.

Japan's GNP is much larger than the combined GNP of the rest of Asia, including the PRC. Therefore, even a one percent entry into Japan's market represents a several percent increase in exports for each of her Asian neighbors. Conversely, a 10% increase in Japanese investment will greatly increase the availability of capital and technology to these states. But it might also risk renewed accusations of economic imperialism and arouse hostile political sensitivities that lie just beneath the surface.

The future security of Japan will, of necessity, focus on access to vital raw materials and markets to assure the survival and health of the national economy. No matter how successful the government may be in the short run in solving the problems of cost and availability of resources and energy, Japan will remain perhaps the most vulnerable of the advanced industrial societies to any breakdowns in the international economic system and to the machinations of Third World countries that use critical raw materials for political purposes.

Add to these problems increased competition for increasingly scarce raw materials and it soon becomes apparent that as the possibility for international cooperation becomes more remote, the pressures for competition in terms of narrow national interests increase, and political power becomes deeply and inextricably linked with economic policy. Under these circumstances, interdependence leads not away from a security policy, but rather is the likely catalyst for Japanese participation in Realpolitik.

Japan's economic security and continued growth obviously depends on a peaceful Asia and continued free access to and through the area. In this sense American action or lack of action that contributes to instability in the area has a direct impact on Japanese security.

IV. JAPANESE-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP: STRESS AND CHANGE

The nature of the US-Japanese relationship is changing and from time to time comes under considerable strain. The future of this relationship depends very much on whether short-term economic conflicts and security-related misunderstandings are allowed to prevail over and undermine long-term common interests. Avoidance of worldwide depression and the promotion of economic and political stability in the Pacific Asian area require that Japan and America cooperate with each other. Such cooperation is constantly being jeopardized by failure to reach a common perception of their mutual long-range interests.

The lack of a common perception of threats, interests and opportunities is due to shortcomings in US-Japanese intercommunication, but also in part to the absence of a clear US perception of its own interests and role in Asia. At the same time, the relative decline in America's international power and influence and the rise in Japan's economic strength has fostered a sense of greater equality and reciprocity in the US-Japan partnership which may provide the basis for a more equal and thereby effective relationship.

Japan and America share long-range common interests in democracy, freedom of the seas, relatively free trade, maintenance of a stable monetary system, mutual defense, not taking sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute, development and stability in Taiwan, Korea and Southeast Asia and diversification of sources of energy and materials. However, these common interests

are often obscured by short-term differences centering around competition for trade and raw materials, mutual investments, base functions and US credibility.

A. US Expectations Regarding Japan's Future Role in Their Partnership. The Nixon Doctrine recognized the limits on US capacity to continue to carry the major share of responsibility for economic development and political security problems in Asia. The United States has begun to turn increasingly to Japan for help in shouldering responsibility for some of the larger economic and political problems of the region so as to contribute to the balance of power in Asia. American expectations for Japan in Asia have followed three basic themes.

1. US-Japanese cooperation in the region is necessary for peace;
2. Japan should increase its economic aid to its Asian neighbors;
3. Japan should play a larger political role in the region.

There was at one time some expectation that Japan could also play a larger military role in Asia, perhaps through military assistance programs as well as considerable rearming of Japan itself. Recently, the United States has sensibly backed off from an effort to encourage large-scale Japanese rearmament, certainly with regard to any expanded military role in Southeast Asia.

A basic American assumption is that political stability in Southeast Asia depends on economic and political development, and that Japan could make a significant contribution to such stability by channeling larger amounts of its economic strength into foreign aid and regional assistance

programs. Communist-supported insurgencies and the political and economic conditions that foster them seem to be the greatest threats to stability in the region. Increased Japanese economic development assistance that supposedly reduces the obstacles to development will continue in some measure to reduce insurgency and foster peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

The US expects and hopes that somehow Japan will play an enlarged political role in the region. This role will have to be decided by the Japanese and the states of Southeast Asia, but the US in its own interest should have a clear idea of what the roles of all participants should be. US economic and political expectations seem to assume: (a) that Southeast Asian states want Japan to play an economic and political role; and (b) that Japan itself is ready, willing and able to carry out an enlarged economic and political role in Asia. However, there is little evidence of a sustained and concerted US effort, bilaterally or multilaterally, to explore this with our allies or friends in Asia and Japan: (a) exactly what roles these states want Japan to play, how and for how long; (b) whether Japan itself is willing and able to play the roles expected of it; and (c) what precisely are Japan's perceptions of the roles it must and will play in Asia.

Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger's trip to Japan in early September, however, may have helped lay the groundwork for new efforts at defining different roles and responsibilities in Asia. He clearly stated for the public record what US security policies and expectations are in Northeast Asia, and the two governments agreed to expanded defense consultations. There seems to be no reason the US and Japan could not begin a concerted effort to expand the current and intended consultations

beyond defense problems and begin to cover more specifically the roles each country can or cannot play in the political and economic spheres in Asia.

B. Japan's Capacities and Perceptions. Japan cannot and will not play the role in Asia which the United States may expect of it unless Japan shares the US perception of the threats and opportunities therein. Moreover, even if Japan were to share US perceptions, it might not share US prescriptions for action. The Japanese did not share US perceptions or prescriptions in Vietnam. They do not currently necessarily see eye to eye with the US on the security situation in Asia. There is no substantial evidence in Japanese attitudes that Japan sees any increased threat from China or the Soviet Union to Japan's future security as a result of changing superpower relationships. Few Japanese see China as a military threat, and with detente, even the Soviet Union appears genuinely less threatening to Japan. The possibility of large-scale Japanese involvement in development ventures in Siberia as well as the continuation of the US security commitment constrain any hypothetical Soviet threat.

The Japanese consensus which ultimately determined national policy and which has up to recent times generally supported the conservatives' US-oriented Japanese foreign policy is changing. While conservatives remain in power, their margin of strength is waning and a less docile and more politically radical public is less willing to follow the dictates of the older leadership. The younger generation, both conservative and leftist, is pushing for a more independent course for Japan.

However, there is reason to question, given the strong tendency of foreign policy issues to become highly controversial political issues in Japanese domestic politics and given the marked decline in conservative political strength, whether Japan has the institutional and political capacity to adopt an independent posture that will enable them to play a more significant role in relation with the US and China and the rest of Asia.*

The opposition parties in Japan still have considerable influence on foreign affairs through their ability to obstruct and prevent the consensus which is essential to Japanese decision-making at all levels. The opposition parties also enjoy substantial popular support and a sympathetic mass media. Although they find it difficult to work together in any sustained way, they are individually well organized and able to influence foreign policy making by the government both outside and within the Diet.

Because their basic political strategy is to use foreign policy issues as instruments to attack the government, the opposition and the media tend almost automatically to oppose the government's pro-US policies. It should be noted, however, that despite this apparently constant exposure to anti-American views from the political arena, the Japanese public remains in general relatively unaffected.

Thus far, Japan has survived this process and style of policy formulation because it has occurred in special "hot house" conditions. Furthermore, the issues debated did not involve long-range planning and decisive action required of a nation fully engaged in international politics, for

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*Hellman, Donald C., Japan and America: New Myths, Old Realities, draft paper prepared for Rockefeller Commission on Critical Choices for Americans. Spring 1975.

until now the United States took the lead in major strategic political and security issues in Asia. At the same time, Japanese security interests were closely aligned to and determined within the framework of the US-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty.

The Nixon Doctrine symbolized changes in the nature and parameters of Japanese-American relations and called for a pattern of cooperative action toward common goals in Asia. Current US Congressional attitudes and perspective in Asia seem to take for granted that: once the US retrenches from Asia, somehow peace or the absence of a shooting war will characterize the international scene in that region. At the very least, the assumption is that the kind of conflict that may develop will be such that countries like Japan, China, the Soviet Union and the US will not meddle. The cumulative impact of the Nixon Doctrine and the events in Asia since its inception, including the US-Chinese rapprochement, the collapse of the American efforts in Indochina, and the gradual withdrawal of US military power from Southeast Asia, has been a reevaluation in Japan of the US-Japanese security relationship.

V. JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS

It seems painfully obvious that Japan cannot develop an independent foreign policy without undergoing revolutionary change in its previous relationship with the US. The conventional wisdom persists, nevertheless, that any state as economically powerful yet at the same time as economically vulnerable as Japan must have an active foreign policy--one it defines itself. However, the consensus within Japan has tended overwhelmingly to support a passive, reactive policy. There is a growing debate as to what the content, direction or instrumentalities of Japan's future foreign

policy should be. There is also greater awareness that the "incubator environment" no longer exists or is entirely appropriate. The Japanese can see the problems they face. Finding the solutions and making the necessary policy decisions are proving far more difficult.

The Japanese seem to have at least six options, some of which could or do overlap:

A. Rearm. Become a full-fledged economic, political and military power capable of participating fully as one of the four great powers, independent of all alliances or in alliance with another power.

B. Eschew rearmament, but assume an active political and economic leadership role in Asia and help relieve the burden on the United States in that part of the world. Retain a close alliance with the United States.

C. Continue non-military, non-interventionist policies and posture of the past under the US protective shield. Develop, however, some increased self-defense capacity in cooperation with the United States that would help lighten the US burden without creating potential independent Japanese defense capabilities.

D. Strive to protect national security by obtaining "special" status as a truly neutral economic superpower--a source of development assistance and technology for all countries.

E. Adopt a low key but unmistakable pro-Peking policy (accommodate to Peking's lead in Asia).

F. Adopt a pro-Soviet stance.

The discussion that follows discusses the feasibility of each of these options.

A. Rearm. Become a full military, economic and political power acting independently, perhaps Gaullist in style, as one of the great powers in the world balance of power (US, USSR, Japan, PRC).

This option implies rearmament that would include nuclear weapons. It is generally conceded that Japan has the technological capacity and the economic resources to go nuclear. It is also conceded that Japan would rearm only under certain conditions:

1. The US guarantee to Japan is no longer reliable;

2. Japan perceives economic and political/military threats to its survival which can only be met through the acquisition of nuclear weapons and a credible military force, specifically a powerful naval force;

3. The Japanese public's aversion to nuclear rearmament disappears and is replaced by militant nationalism;

There are in addition, three types of situations in which Japan might acquire nuclear weapons;

1. The US sponsors Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons as a means of helping the US maintain a balance of power in Asia while the US reduces its own military presence;

2. Japan opts for nuclear weapons on its own in response to an increased threat from China, the USSR (or both), or a nuclear detonation by North Korea, South Korea or Taiwan. This situation also assumes that the US nuclear shield is no longer credible; and

3. Japan decides to acquire nuclear weapons not in response to clear threats from other countries, but as a means of acquiring prestige and supporting its own policy.

Nuclear rearmament may not, however, be Japan's only rearmament option. Nor does effective rearmament even have to be offensively-oriented. Some observers believe that Japan could concentrate on the development of a highly effective missile defense system that would make use of Japan's rapidly developing laser technology and make feasible the deployment of laser defenses against missiles sometime in the 1980s. Coupled with such defenses and perhaps preceding them, would be development of reconnaissance capacity over the Sea of Japan that would ensure complete intelligence on virtually all ship movements into and throughout the sea. Such reconnaissance capacity could be coupled with the means; e.g., shipborne precision-guided missiles, to close the Sea of Japan to all shipping at the Straits of Tsushima. This will not reduce, however, the vulnerability of Japan's vital sea lanes to the south to interdiction by a hostile force. There are, however, factors that weigh heavily against a decision to go nuclear.

1. Japan needs a source of enriched uranium. Were the US to provide the uranium after a Japanese decision to develop nuclear arms, it would be violating the NPT. It is doubtful that any other nations would provide uranium to Japan unless it had decided to actively support a resurgent military powerful Japan.

2. Japan needs a delivery system and a testing area. The USSR would certainly try to prevent Japanese use of the Pacific. The US would be under serious pressure to do so as well or face a confrontation situation not only with the USSR but also Australia and New Zealand.

3. Japan's geography, population density and the location of its industrial capacity combine to create a vulnerability not experienced by any of the other nuclear powers. Japan would have to be prepared to adopt a "Kamikaze syndrome" backed by a wide-ranging sea-based missile

threat that could deliver a devastating second strike even if the homeland were wiped out.

4. Japanese public opinion does not at present show any inclination to shed the nuclear allergy. Indeed, the Japanese public is opposed to any Japanese military role beyond Japan itself and might not support a Japanese effort to come to South Korea's aid if the North launched an attack. This is not to say that the nuclear allergy might not eventually be overcome.

If Japan does decide to rearm, however, it is important for Americans to realize that Japanese rearmament may not take place within a friendly, continuing pro-American context. Even if Japan begins to rearm with American support there can be no guarantee that it would remain a cooperative ally once it developed a credible military capacity and moved into the international arena as an active military power in its own right. Since it is not likely to be able to stand by itself in complete isolation, it would probably move toward another alignment.

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and even the opposition parties, are products of the postwar US-Japan alliance. Should this alliance fail, the LDP, as such, would probably collapse. The conservatives would probably coalesce into different groupings becoming more left-oriented and perhaps more inclined toward a radical nationalism. They would retain power only by forming coalitions with less conservative groups.

The strength and actions of the opposition parties would also undergo substantial change, however, as the American whipping boy would be less available. There is no guarantee that these parties' opposition to rearmament would continue once the American umbrella was removed and all parties had to face the difficult reality of taking responsibilities

for their actions. It is important to remember, in this regard, that the current ruling LDP is extremely vulnerable to attack from the left on military and nuclear issues and is unlikely to be able to implement major rearmament programs. Many socialist leaders and the Japan Communist Party, however, do not believe that Japan is a pacifist country and point out that their party is not pacifist. As William Overholt suggests in a recent Hudson Institute Study article in ORBIS,

> "Their anti-militarism combines fear of military influence in domestic politics, recognition of the utility of anti-militarism as a club to use on the LDP, anti-Americanism, specific fear of nuclear weapons, fear that armed forces expansion in the present political context would primarily support the right wing in Japanese politics, and a series of arguments about the utility of armaments for Japan. In a different international environment, and with a different ruling party, the rhetoric could change rather dramatically."*

Although Overholt concludes that only anti-American parties are likely to be able to implement dramatic rearmament, resistance to rearmament across the board could easily evaporate should Japan experience a severe enough security shock caused either by (1) the sudden dissolution of the Mutual Security Treaty because of Japanese-American friction, or by (2) some event which revealed the Treaty to be inadequate for Japanese defense. Each case represents a situation of Japanese disillusionment with the United States. And each case seems likely only if there occurs a drastically changed world political and economic situation such as large state warfare or a great worldwide depression.

Obviously, neither the USSR nor the PRC would likely sit by and watch Japan develop a credible nuclear capacity or a credible defense capacity

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*Overholt, William, "Japan's Emerging World Role," ORBIS, Summer 1975.

based on a laser system which could prove effective against limited nuclear threats. Japanese deployment of laser missile defenses would effectively end the era of the mutual assured destruction philosophy and might well terminate strategic arms limitation agreements based on that philosophy. Indeed, any serious attempt by Japan to even try to develop the laser as a defensive weapon would itself contribute to an arms race in Northeast Asia and possibly reshuffling of alliance/confrontation postures with respect to the Soviet Union and the PRC or an attempt by China to reunify Korea under a communist government. Whatever the possible reaction scenarios, it is difficult to believe they could be anything but seriously destabilizing and preludes to conflict.

In more simple and feasible terms, however, even an expanded Japanese defensive capability to not only monitor all "enemy" activity in the Sea of Japan and the Pacific coastal sea, but also block the Sea of Japan, in cooperation with the US (Option C) could also be destabilizing.

All of these arguments lead one to question whether an independent Japanese defense capability would not be destabilizing for any one or all of the great powers. These arguments, however, do suggest an alternative source of security for Japan. In view of the many possible adverse consequences of any Japanese rearmament program might it not be in Japan's interest to <u>not</u> ratify the NPT and retain the option of going nuclear as an additional hedge against threats to Japanese security? Retaining this option even if they never exercise it might enable the Japanese to pursue option D below with more success if for some reason the alliance with the US breaks down.

B. Eschew rearmament, but assist the US by assuming an active political and economic leadership role in Asia. Retain a close alliance with the US.

Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki in a recent interview with Tom Braden of the Washington Post discussed Japan's needs and future role,

> "Japan needs a qualitative rather than quantitative enhancement of its defense capabilities. But we have no intention of becoming a major military power, certainly not a superpower. Constitutionally and otherwise, we are restricted. Therefore, Japan is not in a position to contribute in military terms to the peace and security of the world.
>
> "But I take the word security as having more than a military meaning. Security also means the stabilization of people's livelihood and the elevation of their standards of life. Since Japan is not in a position to contribute militarily, Japan must and will contribute to the developing countries. Poverty and peace simply do not go hand-in-hand."

The implication here is that Japan will play a more active economic role in Asia. A military role is out of the question. It is difficult, if not impossible, to discern any intention on Japan's part to play an active political role in Asia. The Japanese still expect the United States to play an "activist" role in Asia and believe that this is what the Southeast Asian states hope for as well.

An active political role for Japan with a higher profile than that of the United States does not seem a viable option for the Japanese in any case. The Asian states themselves give no indication that they would welcome such a role. There is still profound suspicion of Japanese economic intentions. Moreover, a larger, purposefully political role would also require a clear consensus for such a role in Japan itself. There is no such consensus and none is likely for the foreseeable future--five to ten years hence. To be effective, such a role would also have to complement whatever role the Americans decide to play and take into account

the Chinese reaction to any active "political alliance" activities by the US and Japan in Asia. Finally, the United States itself has no clear definition of either its political purposes in Asia or the parameters and instrumentalities of the role these purposes would require.

"Option B" in effect, is not yet feasible. There is simply no way Japan can relieve the US burden in Asia in both economic and political terms. A larger and more flexible Japanese economic role is feasible, and in cooperation with the US, desireable. The Japanese will be able to do little in the political sphere without the US taking the lead.

C. Continue the non-military and non-interventionist policies of the past under the US protective shield. Develop, however, increased defense capabilities to fulfill the already designated mission of the Japanese self-defense forces.

This option is no longer adequate in all respects. Japan may not be able to become one of the pillars in the emerging world envisaged by many American leaders--either through military build-up or exploitation of non-military sources of power. Neither, however, can Japan continue to maintain an existence independent of the global structure in which the impact of its economic power cannot be ignored or avoided by the other major powers as well as the developing nations. The Japanese themselves recognize these realities, but find their current situation extremely frustrating. It seems, as this paper demonstrates, that Japan can hardly exercise strongly any activist options that go beyond its current level of low-key manipulative activism without antagonizing either a great power or oppositionist elements within Japan itself.

D. Strive to achieve national security by obtaining some form of special status or acceptance by all the great powers as a truly neutral

economic superpower--a source of development assistance and technology for all countries.

In a world in which the trend is toward stronger and greater economic interdependence between nations and many countries continues to attach high priority to the pursuit of economic values, Japan should be able to continue to transfer its economic capacities into political or diplomatic influence. For example, Japanese technology, research, financial and industrial capacity is of considerable potential benefit to both the Soviets and the Chinese. Japan is now seeking to trade on these advantages to secure raw materials for her own economy. Perhaps Japan can trade on them for security as well. Neither the Soviets nor the Chinese would seem to have anything to gain by military aggression against or occupation of Japan. Even political subservience to either of these powers of a type that crippled Japan's sense of national integrity and purpose and cut off its ties with the advanced world would not be conducive to the continued vitality of the Japanese economy and its technological and financial resources.

This option is appealing and may be the one Japan may have to eventually adopt.

E. Adopt a markedly pro-Peking or pro-Moscow posture.

Neither of these options is viable. The US could accept neither of these options because its primary objective in the Pacific would be totally compromised: a hostile power or combination of powers would dominate the Western Pacific. The Chinese would not accept a pro-Moscow Japan. Neither could most Japanese. The Russians could not accept a pro-Peking Japan and would be able to use their sea power to squeeze Japan.

Currently, some combination of Options B and C is feasible. The Japanese can play the largest economic role, but not a larger political role in Asia. They could also, however, help remove some of the US defense burden by expanding Japanese defense forces. Such expansion, however, is possible only if it occurs in close cooperation with the United States and is readily recognized as in no way establishing the basis for an independent Japanese defense capability at some time in the future. In this regard, the US and Japan could work toward some expansion of Japanese naval defense and surveillance forces in the Sea of Japan. The Japanese could contribute significantly to US efforts to ensure the security of the Western Pacific if they can themselves: (a) handle all surveillance requirements in and over the Sea of Japan and around Japan itself; and (b) close the Straits of Tsushima on their own in time of war. This type of increased defense capability is obviously no offensive threat to any power in Asia if Japan is acting alone. Japanese surveillance and closing of the Sea of Japan can only be effective in cooperation with the United States.

US-Japanese cooperation in developing a laser defense capability against missiles may also be possible, but does seem more likely to accelerate an arms race than would cooperation in the more conventional type defense arrangements discussed above.

VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

United States' expectations since the first enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine that the Japanese can and will take up the slack or pick up the ball and run with it entails considerable risk. As an independent nation Japan will follow its own interests, and the future stability of Japanese foreign policy and international politics in Asia will depend increasingly

on two highly uncertain political processes: the changing tides of international relations in Asia and the complex maneuverings of domestic politics in Tokyo.

The Japanese could find themselves unable to help the United States maintain the balance in Asia. On the other hand, it seems equally plausible to expect that, faced with the belief that they will soon have to "go it alone," the Japanese might well try to rise to the challenges to their political and economic integrity and become a major independent actor in the 1980s, not only in economic and political terms, but also militarily. Less dependent on the US, the Japanese might also be a less pliant and willing ally and instead try to become a more determined competitor. In this sense, successful Japanese Gaullism seems equally as probable as failure in any Japanese attempt to cope with their new, more exposed position in the world.

If Japan fails to preserve its economic and political security without rearmament it could move into closer "alliance" with the Chinese or the Soviets--or it could decide to try to rearm (as many outside observers believe the US secretly wants in any case). The Soviets and Chinese would then strengthen their military posture vis-a-vis Japan and begin expanded political offensives againsts these "emerging signs of Japanese hegemonialism." In this event, increased tension and instability will become inevitable. The basic implication of these possible scenarios: the United States cannot have peace and stability in Asia on its own terms, defined unilaterally and pursued within its own parameters for action.

There is considerable latitude, however, for the United States to influence the fundamental direction of Japanese policy in the short term. The close ties of the past, the broad, basic compatibility of Japanese and American interests, the uncertainty of the Japanese regarding new polic

goals and their limited capacities for formulating new policies combine to provide the United States with substantial opportunities to exercise constructive influence on the Japanese decision-making process. However, the success of such an endeavor requires clear formulation of American strategic aims in Asia and communication of these aims to all of the appropriate groups in Japanese politics.* In an indeterminate international situation, a policy of applying pressure to Tokyo without clear indications of our ultimate intentions may yield short-term diplomatic benefits but will be disastrous in its final effect on the foundations of Japan's foreign policy. Two factors, the hesitation of the Japanese regarding the making of major decisions and the deep internal division over the question of defense, virtually ensure that any effort to induce Japan to assume the military role of a great power will exacerbate political instability within the country and reduce our capacity for influence.

The United States must be prepared to readjust its vision of an emerging world in which Japan is supposed to play a large political and economic role, equal to that of each of the other great powers. The Japanese may not want such a role. Other Asian states may not accept such a role for Japan. The United States and Japan need to readjust their relationship to be sure, but the US security umbrella must remain totally credible to friend and foe alike. If the United States is unable or unwilling to maintain such an umbrella it will find itself in a new and hostile ball game not only in the Pacific, but throughout the world.

*Fortunately, Secretary Schlesinger during his visit to Japan and Korea in early September 1975 has gone a long way toward fulfilling this requirement, in security terms at least, for Northeast Asia.

Finally, to reiterate: it is unrealistic to expect Japan or any other Asian state to accept a larger Japanese political role in the absence of or uncomplementary to a well-defined US political purpose and role in Asia. It is simply not enough for the United States to say it can no longer carry the burden of peace, reduce its presence unilaterally and then expect a new cooperative order for East Asia to begin to appear as a matter of course.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Security/Political

1. Maintain indefinitely the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty.

2. Exert no persuasion for or opposition to Japanese rearmament, even if defensively oriented. This is an internal decision for the Japanese alone. We should be alert to the possibility that expanded Japanese defense capabilities, even if only in cooperation with the US, might destabilize the power balance in Northeast Asia. We and the Japanese should reason together but eschew arm-twisting.

3. Consider the feasibility, however, of some Japanese-American cooperation in development of advanced technology: i.e., laser defense. Perhaps the best basis for such cooperation would be US response to Japanese initiative in offering such cooperation. A major consideration would be the possibility of accelerating the arms race as a result of such collaboration.

4. Retain US forces in Japan as long as possible, but be responsive to official Japanese requests for drawdowns in the interest of Japanese domestic political stability. Such drawdowns should not, however, be permitted to compromise the integrity and viability of our defense

commitment to Japan.

5. Initiate a serious dialogue and examination with Japan of:

   a. Nature and scope of US political intentions and objectives in Asia.

   b. Necessity, desirability, feasibility and modus operandi of a more active Japanese political role in the affairs of Asia, including the nature and scope of that role and how it might complement that of the United States.

   c. Feasibility, desirability and techniques of independent exploratory consultation between Japan and the states of Southeast Asia on the nature, scope and desirability of a Japanese or US-Japanese political role in Southeast Asia and how the Southeast Asia states themselves can help define and support such a role.

6. This dialogue on a larger Japanese role in cooperation with the US notwithstanding, the United States must respect Japan's need to define a certain independence of initiative and style in its foreign policy. The Japanese, may for example, decide to take some risks in pursuits of political and economic detente with both Hanoi and Pyongyang, which the United States is not in a position to take. The US should not try to pressure Japan against such initiatives which in the long run could even serve US "watch and wait" interests very well.

B. Economic

Develop carefully throughout approaches and techniques for joint US-Japanese development assistance programs in Asia. While the trends today are toward providing more and more assistance through multilateral

organizations, there are still cases in which bilateral country to country assistance programs can be most helpful. Perhaps the US and Japan can be even more helpful through effective, informal coordination of their assistance projects to certain countries.

C. Cultural

1. The United States should actively promote more intensive joint US-Japanese university study of Japan's cultural heritage, including the impact thereon of the Americans.

2. The United States should also assure that the Inter-University Language Center in Tokyo which is the principal source of non-government language expertise in Japanese is not forced to close for lack of steady, stable financial support.