

The original documents are located in Box 122, folder “4/5/75 - Evacuation of Vietnamese Refugees (3)” of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Palm Springs, California)

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE



THE INTERNATIONAL HOTEL

9:20 A.M. PDT

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, I just want to bring you up to date on the discussions that have been taking place.

The President, General Weyand and I met for about an hour and one half this morning. General Weyand gave us a report about the military situation in South Vietnam, as he sees it, and some of the options which he believes should be considered.

The President invited General Weyand to return this afternoon, and on that occasion he will bring along with him two intelligence experts, as well as the Defense Department expert who has been handling military supplies.

We will then go into the question of the political situation and the long-term supply situation in detail.

The President has also ordered an NSC meeting for probably Tuesday afternoon. It could slip until Wednesday morning, to permit General Weyand and his team to report to the entire NSC.

In the meantime, he has ordered that the NSC staff, in close cooperation with the other agencies, develop for their NSC meeting a statement of the various options before us.

These are the procedures that are going to be followed. I make these points in order to indicate that we are at the very early stages of considering the report of General Weyand. No decisions will be taken while the President is in Palm Springs.

Rather, we will use this opportunity for the fullest possible briefing of the President, and then the staffs in Washington are going to analyze the reports, prepare the options and then the entire NSC will consider the matter.

I might also point out that we are considering releasing the report of General Weyand, after the President has had an opportunity to study it with just some minor deletions by the middle of the week so the public can have the general appreciation. This is where

Q Mr. Secretary, considering the enormous amount of military equipment that has been lost in South Vietnam by the deterioration of the South Vietnamese Army, do you see any conceivable way that you can justify sending additional military equipment to South Vietnam until at least the South Vietnamese Army shows it can stand and hold its own territory?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The determination that has to be made is with respect to the military capacity of the South Vietnamese Army to defend the remaining territories. We have received another detailed analysis from General Weyand as to some estimates of what would be required to effect this.

The loss of territory in the North -- I think it is important to understand what the military situation was. In flagrant violation of Article 7 of the Paris accords, the North Vietnamese have introduced almost their entire army into South Vietnam so that there are 18 North Vietnamese divisions in South Vietnam at this moment leaving only two or three divisions in North Vietnam and this is in flagrant, total violation of solemn agreements which were endorsed by the international community.

That created an unbalanced military situation in the North in which whatever the South Vietnamese did it would be wrong. If they stood, they were going to be defeated piecemeal. If they retreated, they ran the risk of disintegration of the units that were retreating which is in fact what happened.


But one of the aspects of our examination is, of course, what the military situation is and what degree of American help can be significant.

Q Mr. Secretary, can the South Vietnamese Army defend the remaining territory and what are the requirements of their army now to defend that territory?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As I pointed out, this is, of course, one of the issues that has to be looked at. There is a possibility for the South Vietnamese military forces to stabilize the situation. The next question is for what length of time and against what level of attack.

Then, there is also the moral question for the United States, whether when an ally with which it has been associated for ten years wishes to defend itself, whether it is the United States that should make the decision for it by withholding supplies, that it should no longer defend itself. These are all questions that are involved in the examination that is now going on.

MORE



Q Mr. Secretary, General Thieu seems to have adopted some of the Administration's language in explaining about why he retreated; namely, that the U.S. failed to supply him with aid. In fact, he said it would be an act of betrayal if we continued to fail to supply aid.

Now, how is that going to help your problems with the U.S. Congress?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think, Mr. Lisagor, that one of the most important things that all of us can do--the Administration, Congress, and if I may say so, the press as well-- is to recognize that we are facing a great human tragedy and that we don't try to gloat over arguments that may have been made or to try to pick on things that men, who obviously are in despair, now may be saying.

There are certain facts in the situation which may be difficult and unpleasant, but which are, nevertheless, true. It is a fact that the aid levels to Vietnam were cut by a third the first year and by another 50 percent the following year.


This coincided with a worldwide inflation, and a fourfold increase in fuel prices, so that a situation was created for a variety of reasons, in which almost all of the American military aid had to be given for ammunition and for fuel, very little for spare parts, and none for new equipment.

Even the ammunition had to be rationed, according to General Weyand, and so that individual guns could, for example, fire only two rounds a day. To what extent did such a situation contribute to the demoralization of the Army; and to what extent the certainty, as they were looking at the situation of constantly declining aid levels, produced a decision to withdraw, which in turn produced a panic, I think is fairly evident.

This is far from saying this was the intention of those who cut the aid, and I think it is safe to say that you can tell from the public statements that senior Administration officials made, that there was no expectation of a massive North Vietnamese attack this year.

So, there were a number of factors involved here, and I think there is some merit in what General Thieu is saying now. I think some of the adjectives he used are those of a desperate man who is in great anguish and I think it is also fair to say that the United States, for ten years, put in a great deal of its efforts and of its blood and of its treasure, and that, too, should weigh in the scale and that we made a very great effort through a long period of time. So, we have to evaluate it over an extended period of time.

MORE



In terms of a strategic assessment, it made a lot of sense. The trouble was that in executing it, it was not planned with sufficient care, with sufficient understanding of the logistic system of South Vietnam, and it was compounded by the fact that the South Vietnamese divisions have their dependents living with them so that when a South Vietnamese division moved, all of their dependents moved with them, which, in turn, triggered a mass exodus of refugees, immobilizing these armies and at some point along this retreat, that turned into a panic where the soldiers were trying to take care of their families.

So, the decision was triggered by a correct evaluation of his prospects, the prospects being that if he kept his units strung out, they would probably be defeated by this massive North Vietnamese invasion and to try to get to a more consolidated line, in executing what was probably a correct strategic decision, he, of course, brought about consequences with which we are familiar, which are tragic. I am just trying to explain our best understanding of what happened.

Q Mr. Secretary, the United States has spent about \$140 to \$150 billion in South Vietnam. What is it that makes the Administration think that \$300 million or even an amount somewhat larger than that would do any good? What is it that makes you think additional money is ever going to be able to make the South Vietnamese Army fight or solve the situation, when you spend \$140 to \$150 billion and you are in the situation you are in now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, as I pointed out, this whole situation is going to be reviewed by the National Security Council on Tuesday, and I do not want to prejudge all of these decisions.

There is, however, also involved a question of the obligations a country has that for ten years has fought somewhere, which has encouraged millions of people to associate themselves with the United States, and whether it should then refuse to let them defend themselves if they want to defend themselves.

This is one argument on the military side. On the humanitarian side, I think it is important and decisive that the United States has an obligation to the hundreds of thousands who were closely associated with it and must make a maximum effort on the level of refugees and otherwise.

MORE



Q I am not talking about the humanitarian side, Mr. Secretary. I am asking, in effect, whether \$140 to \$150 billion is not as much moral obligation as the United States can undertake?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is the decision that will have to be made by first the President and then the Congress.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you anticipate that the President would make these decisions in time to tell us about them in the so-called State of the World address Thursday?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have not had an opportunity to discuss with the President in great detail what he intends to say in this address. My impression is he will deal with the immediate foreign policy situation that he feels the United States is confronting, and I would think it is extremely probable that he would put before the Congress on that occasion at least some preliminary ideas of at least some immediate measures that in his judgment have to be taken.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the New York Times has a report from Paris this morning that the French government has initiated plans to implement the Paris peace accords and to reach a settlement on that basis. Also, that the French are going to be active in all of Vietnam in humanitarian and refugee work.


Do you have any comment on that? Have you been informed of this, and, what is the outlook of this taking place?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We would gratefully welcome any attempt by any nation, including France, to participate in the humanitarian effort. Secondly, we have attempted to encourage all of the signatories of the Paris accords to bring about their implementation and therefore, if France is attempting to bring about an implementation of the Paris accords, we would certainly look at their proposals with sympathy.

We have not received an official French proposal and, indeed, I was not aware of this particular report, but the United States strongly favors the implementation of the Paris accords, which have been grossly and outrageously violated by Hanoi, and it would support the efforts of any country that would attempt to bring about an implementation of those accords.

Helen?

MORE



Q Mr. Secretary, we have heard around here that this is not our war. We have also seen some pretty pessimistic reports from everywhere that the ball game is over. And also, you seem to neglect the area while you are concentrating on the Middle East. What do you have to say for that? Do you think Southeast Asia is still as viable as you thought it was two years ago?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, my trip to the Middle East to deal with the question that I was dealing with, other problems, had been scheduled for many months and when I left on the trip to the Middle East, we had a crisis in Cambodia, the nature of which was well understood and which really required a Congressional decision. It did not require decisions by the Administration.

We did not expect an imminent crisis in Vietnam, and you remember that the Secretary of Defense stated a view which, all of us shared, that the attacks this year would not be of a critical nature, so that the disintegration of the situation in the Northern half of Vietnam was quite unexpected to us in the sense that we were not told in advance of the decision to evacuate.

It really did not reach the proportions it has until after my return from the Middle East. There is no question that South Vietnam faces an extremely grave situation. There are 18 North Vietnamese divisions in South Vietnam in blatant violation of the Paris accords, and there is no agreement in history that is self-enforcing.


If the signatories of the agreement cannot enforce it, either by actions of their own or by aid to the aggrieved parties, then a difficult situation is inevitable.

Under the Paris accords, North Vietnam was not permitted to infiltrate or to add any additional forces to those it already had in South Vietnam. At that time, it had something like 80,000 to 100,000 people in South Vietnam. Today, it has closer to 400,000 in South Vietnam.

Under the Paris accords, North Vietnam was not permitted to introduce new equipment except through ICCS checkpoints and in replacement on a one-to-one basis for equipment that had been lost, damaged and destroyed.

The North Vietnamese never even permitted the establishment of these checkpoints and totally disregarded the agreement. This is what brought about the change in the military situation which was compounded by the fact that the South Vietnamese Army inventories were running down while the North Vietnamese inventories were increasing. This is the objective structure of what happened in the last two years.

MORE



Q Mr. Secretary, has the Administration any indication from the Democratic leadership of Congress that Congress will be any more receptive to providing more military aid now than they were before they went into recess?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As you know, the Congress is in recess right now and I am confident that the President is going to be in touch with the Congressional leadership.

He has not had an opportunity, to the best of my knowledge, to be in touch with the Congressional leadership, but again, let me make one point: It is unavoidable that when one analyzes the causes of a situation, that it may be taken as a criticism of this or that group.

I think, in the history of Vietnam, there is enough criticism to go around. There have been mistakes made by the Executive Branch and there have been mis-judgments made by the legislative.

I think the major requirement for the United States, recognizing that we will now have a difficult set of decision, and a difficult set of debates, is to come out of this with dignity and without adding to the bitterness and viciousness which has so drained us over the years.

We will try to do our best to contribute to this. Whether we will always succeed, I don't know.

Q Mr. Secretary, you said at your last press conference in some very strong language, that the problem was that this was now a question of what kind of people we are and whether or not we will destroy deliberately an ally.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is right.

MORE




Q The scenario that you gave us today indicates that while that \$300 million would have been needed, there was a proper, comprehensible decision to make, yet it was poorly executed, and that is why we have the problem. Your scenario does not really seem to back up the question of laying the blame.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Wait just a minute. It is not just a question of \$300 million. It is a question that since 1973, the combination of declining aid levels, inflation and rising fuel prices has led to a constant attrition of the South Vietnamese Army.

It is not just a decision of this Congress to delay \$300 million. It is a process that has been going on for a period of two years.

The statement I made in the press conference, which was under slightly different military conditions, at least as they were then perceived in Washington, was in terms of those decisions, but nevertheless, it is a very important moral question for the United States, whether when people who, with its encouragement, have fought for many years, should in their hour of extremity be told by the United States that while they want to continue fighting that the United States would no longer help them defend themselves against an enemy who has never been told by its allies that there is a limit beyond which they won't support them.

I maintain that is a question that we ought to ask ourselves as a people. Regardless of the probable outcome of the war, I think it is a serious question. It is not meant necessarily as a criticism of anybody, and I really believe that at this moment, having paid so much in our national unity on this issue, we should conduct this debate, not with an attitude of who is going to pin the blame on whom, but with an attitude that we are facing a great tragedy in which there is involved something of American credibility, something of American honor, something of how we are perceived by other people in the world, on which serious people may have different questions but in which, for God's sake, we ought to stop talking as if one side had the monopoly of wisdom, morality and insight and that serious people trying to deal with this problem are trying to run a confidence game. This is all that I am trying to suggest.



Q Mr. Secretary, if I may continue, my question really was getting toward, are you personally convinced that if we had voted that extra \$300 million that was requested for the emergency supplemental, or if we had actually appropriated the full amount requested in the beginning -- \$1.4 billion -- that we would not have faced the situation we now face, either at this time or sometime down the road?

MORE

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe, personally, that it is not just the \$300 million. It is the \$300 million coming on top of a lot of other things. I believe that if it had not been for the moralities of Executive authority resulting from Watergate, if the aid levels had been appropriate over the years and if we had been freer to conduct foreign policy than was possible under these circumstances -- partly for reasons in which the Executive shares a responsibility -- I believe that certainly the difficulties we face this year could have been avoided for a number of years.

For how long, it is hard to say, but very often, if we look over the postwar period, a period of time gain gets a possibility of things developing. But I would add, moreover, that it would have made a lot of difference to us as a people, that if it happened, if it had more clearly happened as a result of actions, not so much under our control. But I would finally add, since you asked the question, and I did not volunteer this statement, that at some point in this discussion -- we now cannot avoid the discussion -- at some point in this discussion we ought to stop this inquiry and ask ourselves where we go from here.

Q Mr. Secretary, I have two questions. One is, you keep referring to the massive violations by the North Vietnamese, and in view of their record, I wonder why you thought at the time the agreements were negotiated, or at any other time, that they were going to abide by them?

We knew very early, as you said, they did not allow us to establish checkpoints.


My other question is, do you think there would be any benefit if the United States were able to provide some military aid now, through bombing or any other measure, to stem the tide of what is going on?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The first thing I think the people ought to remember is the kind of national debate that was going on in the United States in 1971 and 1972. I think it is indisputable that there was overwhelming consensus developing that the United States should end its participation in the war.

And you may remember that before I went on my last negotiation, the Democratic caucus had already voted to set a terminal date to our participation in the war. That is January, 1973.

Let me point out this did not affect the actual terms of the negotiations which were substantially agreed to before that. So, I am simply trying to reconstruct the national mood which was that the American military participation in the war had to be ended..

MORE



The major debate that then occurred was whether the United States should deliberately overthrow the government with which it was associated, and that we refused to do.


Now, that the North Vietnamese would press against the edges of the agreement was to be expected. What was not to be expected was, that partly through legislative action and partly through our internal divisions we would find ourselves in a position where a forceful diplomacy became extremely difficult, and this certainly accelerated the violations and made them substantially free.

So, we had no illusions that we were dealing with a country other than one that had violated every other agreement that it had made, but under the conditions in which the agreement was made of a strong period in American foreign policy, we believe that we would be able to exercise sufficient influence on the situation to keep the violations to manageable proportions, and also to obtain sufficient aid to permit the South Vietnamese to handle the problem.

So, those expectations, for reasons that no one could possibly predict at that time, were not fulfilled.

Q Mr. Secretary, a look at the future rather than the past. I have two questions. One, isn't it likely that if we provided the \$300 million at this point, the likelihood would be that it would only prolong the fighting, cost more lives, and end in the same result? Two, the President and General Weyand have said they think the situation is salvageable. I wonder what evidence you have to give any hope that it is salvageable?

MORE



SECRETARY KISSINGER: The President will study all the recommendations of General Weyand, plus the judgment of all of his senior advisers over the next days, and I think it is for the President then to make the judgment and to state it in his press conference.

I would like also to point out that even if this situation should finally wind up in some negotiation, it is not a matter of indifference whether it is done in such a way that permits the maximum extraction of refugees and of those whose very lives are at stake in the present situation.

So, there are very many levels of objectives that can be set. There is a point of view, which we will be examining, that the situation can be stabilized by a combination of the shortened lines, infusion of American aid, and other measures.

That point of view, together with other points of view, will be considered over the next few days, and the President will report his conclusions to the Congress on Thursday.

My point in appearing here is to tell you primarily what the status of our discussion is at this moment and at this moment the President has really done nothing but spend about 90 percent of his time listening and asking questions to the purely military aspect of General Weyand's report.


He will get a further discussion of that this afternoon, together with the intelligence appraisal, and then this whole matter will be submitted to the National Security Council, so I do not want to pre-empt his decisions.

Q Mr. Secretary, it would seem time is of the essence, and with the events happening as quickly as they are over there, isn't time being wasted with the President being out here? Isn't this whole policy-making process being delayed because of the distances between here and Washington?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am not going to answer that question. Isn't time being wasted?

Q Isn't time being wasted in the policy-making decision with NSC being all back in Washington, you are here, General Weyand is here, the President is here. Couldn't it be done faster if everything was concentrated back there. It seems the middle of the week is awfully late for something so important.

MORE



SECRETARY KISSINGER: There are about \$175 million left in the pipeline in the current appropriations. We are expediting the shipment of that equipment to Vietnam. No matter what decision is made by the President, it could not take effect for a number of weeks.

Therefore, we believe in decisions of this importance, it is extremely crucial that there be a very careful and a very prayerful examination of all the choices before us, and there is no effective delay, no matter what decisions the President eventually decides.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you answer the other part of that question about whether bombing is still an option and whether that would be of any assistance, help to the South Vietnamese?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As you know, the introduction of American military forces in or over Vietnam is prohibited by specific legislation that was passed in July 1973, which was, I may say, another complicated factor in the enforcement of the agreement.

It is not so much a question of what we would have done. It is a question of what the other side knew we could not possibly do. Therefore, before any such action could be contemplated, the President would have to ask authority from the Congress to do that, and I do not anticipate that.

Q Mr. Secretary, one of the questions that is troubling many Americans and some people in this room, as you have already judged, is that what is happening in Vietnam today was foreseen by many people once the American troops withdrew.

My question is, why then must the Nation be asked to wear a hair shirt because of what has happened?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The problem is not whether the Nation must be made to wear a hair shirt. The President is trying, to the best of his abilities, to make clear what he takes to be the causes of that situation.

We will never know whether it would have happened if enforcement had been carried out more aggressively and aid had been given more substantially. He is simply trying to point out his analysis of what brought about the present situation. After all, the people who predicted this could have been wrong. Maybe they could have been right. We do not know now.

MORE



Q You do acknowledge that a great many people did predict it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Oh, yes, and I am saying, of course, there were many people who made that argument, and that still does not change the question of whether the United States, having made all these investments, should not have carried out at least its moral obligations more fully.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what some of the options are that are being considered? We are not going to get a chance to talk to General Weyand, so we don't know what the suggestions are.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I really cannot properly go into it. Partly this is due to the fact that this morning General Weyand concentrated, I would say, exclusively on two things: His analysis of the reasons for the development of the military situation, and secondly, his analysis of the military prospects.

We have not yet covered the humanitarian problems, the evacuation problems of refugees, the possibilities that were alluded to of which we have no formal indication of restoration of the Paris accords.

So, all of these will have to be issues that will have to be examined in developing the options, but what we are planning is to go over that this afternoon, to sketch out some of the main options as we see them.

Then, the NSC staff, together with General Weyand, the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency will pull them together into a more comprehensive option paper, which will then be put before the National Security Council on Tuesday or, at the latest, Wednesday morning.

Q Mr. Secretary, the President spoke in his press conference of solemn commitments we had made to South Vietnam. This, I am sure you are aware, has raised many questions of secret agreements or tacit understandings or that kind of thing.

First of all, what solemn commitments was the President referring to? Was he referring only to the one-for-one replacement, which, as I understand it, was not a commitment but an option, and if he was not referring to that, what was he talking about?

MORE



- 10 -

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As I have explained, I think, at a previous press conference, he was not talking of a legal commitment. He was talking of a moral commitment. I believe that the South Vietnamese had every reason to think that if they permitted American troops to withdraw and if they enabled us to retrieve our prisoners, that we would carry out what we had called the Vietnamization process in enabling them to defend themselves.

We did not give them any specific figures, and we did not give them any definite promises, except to indicate that obviously, having signed the Paris agreement, we would have an interest in its enforcement.

But, I believe that what the President was talking about was a moral obligation, not a legal commitment. He was talking about something growing out of a ten-year engagement of the United States ended by our withdrawal, not about secret clauses in particular documents.

There is no question that when we were negotiating the agreement we, ourselves, believed that the American debate had not concerned economic or military aid, and I think if you check the record, there was no debate on that subject at the time.

The American debate had concerned the question of whether enough Americans had died there and whether the South Vietnamese should not be able to defend themselves, and I believe, in all fairness, we all have to admit to ourselves, that we all believe that if the South Vietnamese would make the effort to defend themselves, there would be great receptivity in this country to help them do it as long as our prisoners could come back and Americans could stop dying there.


That was the assumption within which we were operating, and I think if you read the back files of newspapers and Congressional debates, that was the essence of our debate at the time.

Therefore, it was never put in the form of a legal commitment, and it is not that we are violating a legal commitment. It is the President's perception of the moral obligation growing out of the context of events.

I just want to say again, many of you have heard me brief on this subject now for six years, and I think none of you have ever heard me question the travail and concern of those who have opposed the war, and all we can ask is that those of you who have been critical, ought to keep in mind that there is a great human tragedy that those in the Administration are viewing, and they are trying to deal with it in the best interest of the United States and in the best interests of world peace.

Thank you.

END (AT 10:10 A.M. PDT)



1:27

WITH RON NESSEN

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

AT 11:10 A.M. PDT

APRIL 5, 1975

SATURDAY

(Palm Springs, California)

MR. NESSEN: You have been given a packet of relatively routine announcements concerning two intentions to nominate and an appointment, and two proclamations, one of Maritime Day and one of Trade Week.

The President, as the pool has reported to you, is playing golf this afternoon. He will resume his meeting with Secretary Kissinger and General Weyand somewhere around 2:30 or 3 o'clock. I cannot tell you how long the meeting will last.

The President's plans for this evening are to stay at home at the moment and to have dinner with some members of his staff.

General Weyand will be returning to Washington tomorrow, sometime early in the day. Dr. Kissinger will be staying and will go back to Washington on Monday.

Q With the President?

MR. NESSEN: Probably with the President.

Q Is he going to church tomorrow?

MR. NESSEN: There are no church plans for tomorrow. I think we possibly could have something to post at 4 o'clock, so I suggest that you check here at 4 o'clock.

Q Does that concern the orphans?

MR. NESSEN: Let's wait and see what it turns out to be.

Q Ron, 4 o'clock is getting late. Can you give us any indication of the probability of a Travis visit?

MORE

#184



MR. NESSEN: There is still a possibility.

Q That will be a posting, not a briefing?

MR. NESSEN: A posting at 4 o'clock.

Q For guidance, can you tell us whether Travis would be Sunday or Monday?

MR. NESSEN: I just say that is a possibility, John.

Q You don't know which day?

MR. NESSEN: I don't have anything further at the moment.

Q Ron, there is a plane due in Seattle tonight. Can you rule that out?

MR. NESSEN: Yes, sir.

Q Can you rule out any word any more today?

MR. NESSEN: Let's wait until we have it locked up, Jim, and then we won't have to rule out or rule in.

Q Ron, will you be able to tell us within a few minutes after this afternoon's meeting concludes?

MR. NESSEN: Yes.

Some of you may recall that last Saturday the President announced that he was directing four Navy ships to base themselves off the coast of Vietnam, in a humanitarian effort to pick up refugees.

In the course of this humanitarian effort, one of the ships; namely, a Durham --

Q What type ship is this?

MR. NESSEN: An LKA.

Q A transport?

MR. NESSEN: Navy transport ship.

Q What is an LKA?

MR. NESSEN: It is a transport ship.

In the course of the humanitarian effort, the Durham, on the 3rd of April, entered the territorial waters of South Vietnam and picked up a total of 1404 refugees in the area of Phan Rang.



2:35

2:54

- 3 -

#128-1175

In keeping with his desire to keep Congress fully informed on this humanitarian effort, and taking note of a provision of the war powers resolution, the President has sent a message to the Speaker of the House and to the President Pro Tem of the Senate, Senator Eastland, and to the acting Speaker of the House, Congressman McFall, giving a report on the activities of the Durham.

We also have a posting, as I say, or there is the possibility of a posting at 4 o'clock.

MORE



Q Ron, I came in late, but why was it necessary to inform the Congress about the activities of the Durham? Did they exceed their instructions by going into the territorial waters?

MR. NESSEN: No, they did not exceed their instructions.

Q Did they exceed the prohibition in the War Powers Act is what I am getting at. Why did he feel it necessary to inform the Congressional leaders?

MR. NESSEN: Primarily because he feels he wants to keep Congress fully informed on this humanitarian effort.

Q But we are doing a lot of things out there. Is he keeping them informed about other things or just the Durham?

MR. NESSEN: No, he is keeping them informed on other things.

Q Ron, under the War Powers Act, did they go in to get Americans or South Vietnamese? Is that the technical difference?

MR. NESSEN: No. There was a total of 1404 refugees. As far as I know, they were all Vietnamese, but you need to check with the Pentagon on that.

Q Where are they heading for?

Q Where did they take them?


MR. NESSEN: The messages I have say they were transported to safety, but I am sorry that I do not have the location where they were taken.

Q Ron, what is the provision of the War Powers Act that you say the President acted under? What does it require?

MR. NESSEN: No, wait a minute, Ralph. I said, "taking note of a provision of the War Powers Act."

Q What does that provision say?

MR. NESSEN: The government lawyers don't agree that there is any requirement to make this report. The President is doing it because he wants to keep Congress fully informed on the humanitarian effort. The provision he took note of was Section 4, which states that, "In name united states Armed Forces are introduced into" -- and then it lists a variety of situations.



The situation that the President took note of was subparagraph two. "The introduction of United States Armed Forces into the territory, air space, or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces."

Q Ron, did the President suddenly discover that he had \$175 million in the pipeline, or what?

MR. NESSEN: Let's clear up whatever other questions there may be on this matter.

Q Was this ship fired upon or something?

MR. NESSEN: No.

Q What prompts this?

MR. NESSEN: Nothing prompts it except the President's desire to keep Congress informed and the fact he is taking note of provisions of the War Powers Act.

Q Have the other three ships not succeeded in picking up any refugees?

MR. NESSEN: They have not entered Vietnamese territorial waters.

Q That is the point we are getting at.

MR. NESSEN: I am sorry, Peter. I know what you are getting at. It was felt this ship did, on one occasion, enter South Vietnam territorial waters, but prior to then, and since then, as far as I know, all four ships have remained outside of Vietnamese territorial waters.

Q Was there enemy gunfire directed against the Durham during this operation?

MR. NESSEN: There was not.

Q Was the vessel escorted by U.S. aircraft or surface vessels?

MR. NESSEN: Not that I know of, no.

Q In what you gave us here, I don't see how he had the authority to go in. Was he going in to supply?

Q Was this ship equipped for combat?

MORE

#184



MR. NEEDEN: Let me back up. This provision of the War Powers Act which the President takes note of and which government lawyers do not agree is a requirement provides that "if American Armed Forces are introduced into" -- and then it lists the variety of conditions and I have given the one that he is taking note of here.

Then, the remainder of that sentence reads, "the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President Pro Tem of the Senate, a report in writing." As I say, he is taking note of that without agreeing that it is required.

MORE



Q So, the combat thing is what bothers him?

MR. NESSEN: No. It is the entire description, "that forces equipped for combat go into an area of a foreign nation while equipped for combat." The equipment for combat -- they are equipped for combat within the legal definition of the law, but I do want to make the point that their whole purpose for being there is to assist --

Q We don't want to strain the point, Ron, but the fact is that humanitarian purposes are not included in subparagraph two.

MR. NESSEN: But that is the very point. It says "ships that go in for other reasons than those,"

Q I did not get that from you.

Q Would you read that again.

MR. NESSEN: The law reads, "In any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced," then various subsections. The one he is taking note of here is subsection two, "into the territory, air space or waters of a foreign nation while equipped for combat except for deployment relating solely to supply," except for those occasions.

Then the President shall submit a report. So, since humanitarian reasons is not one of the exceptions, he is taking note of the fact that there is a provision for reporting.

Q I asked about the \$175 million.

MR. NESSEN: No, that is no great mystery. In fact, it has come up here a number of times. As you know, \$700 million was appropriated for this fiscal year, which lasts until July 1. What was the figure Henry used, \$175 million?

That means \$525 million has been spent so far and the other \$175 million is in the process of being spent between now and July 1.

Q Has the President talked with David Kannerly since he got back?

MR. NESSEN: Yes, he has.

MORE

#184



- B -

#134-4/5

Q Did Kennerly tell him in substance what I guess he told the pool?

MR. NESSEN: I did not attend the meeting, Marty.

Q Ron, where is the President playing golf today?

MR. NESSEN: Didn't the pool report have that?

Q Is he playing golf tomorrow?

MR. NESSEN: Possibly.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Ron.

END (AT 11:25 A.M. PDT)




April 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT

This is the legal background which relates to the President's report to the Speaker and President pro tempore. This message was under the Reporting Section of the Act.

There is a question as to whether the Act applies and, therefore, the Report has been carefully drafted to keep that question open.

Jack



IMMEDIATE
PRECEDENCE

UNCLAS
CLASSIFICATION

FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY

FROM: JACK MARSH
TO: HOOPS FOR DON RUMSFELD

DEX _____
DAC 112 GPS _____
LDX _____ PAGES 1
TTY _____ CITE _____

NFO:

DTG: 051948Z

RELEASED BY: BD

TOR: 051953Z/GP

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

75 APR 5 PM 4:02
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1975 APR 5 19 48



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: DON RUMSFELD

FROM: JACK MARSH

I would appreciate your passing to the President the following report from Charlie Leppert prepared after advising the House Leadership of the President's message to the Speaker and President Pro Tempore of the Senate, concerning the War Powers matter.

| <u>Rep.</u> | <u>Place</u> | <u>Time</u> | <u>Comment</u> |
|-------------|--------------|-------------|----------------|
| Michel | Peoria, Ill. | 12:55 pm | "No Comment" |



/s/ CHARLES LEPPERT

Notes:

- (1) Tip O'Neill in Israel is being advised in care of the U.S. Ambassador there.
- (2) ~~State~~ State and Defense Advising Chairman and Ranking member their jurisdictional committees, House and Senate. Defense Advising leaders of Appropriation Committees, also
- (3) Vice President advised last night ~~at~~ ^{about} 11:45 pm by me.
MARSH

IMMEDIATE
PRECEDENCE

UNCLAS
CLASSIFICATION

FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY

FROM: JACK MARSH
TO: Hoops For Don Rumsfeld

INFO:

DEX _____

DAC 143

GPS _____

LDX _____

PAGES 1

TTY _____

CITE _____

DTG: 051949Z

RELEASED BY: BD

TOR: 051956Z/GP

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

APR 5 PM 4:02



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 5, 1975



MEMORANDUM FOR: DON RUMSFELD

FROM: JACK MARSH

I would appreciate your passing to the President the following report from Bill Kendall prepared after advising the Senate Leadership of the President's message to the Speaker and President Pro Tempore of the Senate, concerning the War Powers matter. I particularly call to your attention Senator Mansfield's request contained in his comment:

| <u>Senator</u> | <u>Place</u> | <u>Time</u> | <u>Comment</u> |
|----------------|-----------------------|-------------|--|
| Mansfield | Florida | 12: 45 | O.k. Appreciates being kept informed. Asked me to tell President he is calling Democratic Policy Committee meeting Monday morning to discuss energy, refugee and Indo-China situation. |
| Griffin | Maryland (suburbs) | 12: 50 | Has no problem with it. Asked to be informed if there is any "flak." |
| Bryd,R. | D.C. | 12: 55 | This is proper role for President. Thinks President is handling a terribly difficult situation very well. |

ALL APPRECIATED BEING KEPT INFORMED.

/s/ WILLIAM T. KENDALL

NOTE:

Senator Hugh Scott in Spain is being advised in care of the U.S. Ambassador there.

MARSH

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1975

CERTIFICATE

* Phil B. -
note on Monday
7 April

* ~~for the direction of the President~~

This is to certify that the Undersigned dispatched ~~the attached message~~ ^{document as the President's report} to The Honorable Carl Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives from the President of the United States bearing the date April 4, 1975 at 10:56 p.m., in care of the United States Ambassador in Peking, China. A duplicate copy was delivered to Michael Reed, Legislative Assistant to the Speaker, at his residence in Alexandria, Virginia at 12:05 a.m., April 5, 1975.

John O. Marsh, Jr.
John O. Marsh, Jr.
Counsellor to the President



APR 7 1974



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

April 7, 1975

Mr. John O. Marsh, Jr.
Counsellor to the President
The White House
Washington, District of Columbia

Dear Mr. Marsh:


This will acknowledge the receipt and referral of the message from the President of the United States to the President Pro Tempore of April 4, 1975, pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 (a) (2) of the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148).

The message was transmitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at 12:30 p.m. on April 7.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Spofford Canfield".

H. Spofford Canfield
Administrative Assistant to
The President of the Senate



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD

FROM:

JACK MARSH

Don, attached is a statement which Senator Mansfield gave to Bill Kendall shortly before noon today. It's our understanding that he planned to issue this to the press.

I thought the President would want to be aware of its contents and Ron Nessen in the event of press inquiry.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 7, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF
FROM: WILLIAM T. KENDALL *WTK*
SUBJECT: Telegram to Senator Mansfield

Senator Mansfield delivered the attached documents to me at 11:40 a.m. today. One is his statement to the press regarding the present situation. The other is a telegram (in French) from Prince Sihanouk, a copy of which was also given to Bob McCloskey at State at the same time.





Mr. President:

Recent months have witnessed a breakdown in U. S. foreign policy in widely separated parts of the globe. At the present time, our policy in South-east Asia is in a state of disarray and it might be said that we have no foreign policy at all, except to advocate more military and economic assistance.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, we have the situation on Cyprus involving Greece and Turkey, and in the western part of that sea, an uncertain situation developing as it affects Portugal. In Latin America, we have over the years, if not the decades, paid too little attention to that most important part of the world. At home, we have 8.7 percent unemployment, or eight million Americans out of work, inflation in the double figures, and a worsening farm situation, to mention just a few of our difficulties.

It is time that we base our foreign policy on the present rather than on the past, that we revise and review our defense arrangements all over the world and that we do so in both areas on the basis of cooperation between the Executive and the Legislative Branches of government. We have paid a high price for our participation in the Indo-China tragedy in men and money. The Cambodians, the Laotians and the Vietnamese have likewise paid a terrible price in killed, wounded, starvation, disease and an increasing number of refugees.


The results of a foreign policy inaugurated six Presidents ago and carried on down to the present are now at our doorstep. In our domestic policy, we have seen a bad economic situation become steadily more dangerous and more all-embracing as far as industry, agriculture and the work force are concerned. The President and the Congress have approved a tax bill which will add enormously to the budget deficit, and we have passed a farm bill which will increase government costs.

We have become the world's chief supplier of arms and it appears that we will sell to anyone, anywhere, anytime who wants to buy our armaments often at bargain-basement prices and, in some cases, we have even given them away. We have helped to supply our opponents in Indo-China with weapons to use against the governments in Saigon and Phnom Penh. This armament was not sold to the other side but was captured or acquired in various manners as was the case of approximately \$1 billion of military equipment left behind in the retreat to the South in Vietnam and similar situations, though to a lesser degree, have occurred in Cambodia.

The President has indicated that there will be a reassessment of our foreign policy as it affects the Middle East. I would suggest, most respectfully, that this reassessment should be conducted on a world-wide basis. The time is long past due for such a reexamination of our foreign and defense policies to take place, because many of those policies go back to the end of World War II and have long been subject to revision. We can no longer live in the past, but we must face up to the present and plan for the future. It isn't a question of our credibility but our will to make necessary changes. It is a question of our judgment and, in all too many parts of the world, that judgment has not been as sound as it should have been. Military interventions, except in the interests of our own security, should become a policy of the past and should be conducted only in proper consultation between the Executive and the Legislative Branches. The Nixon Doctrine was at least a step away from direct armed intervention and, in effect, a return to the Truman Doctrine. Developed further, it could, perhaps, provide a new and contemporaneous direction to foreign policy.



This is not the time for either the Executive or the Legislative Branch to begin pointing the finger. If there is any blame to be attached, and there is a great deal, we must all share in it. None of us is guiltless. It is time for the Congress and the President to work together in the area of foreign as well as domestic policy. The President, in his speech at San Diego last week, indicated that he was prepared to go more than half way in working with the Congress, and I believe the Congress can and should do no less. This does not mean that there will not be differences between us but it does mean that under the leadership of the President and with the cooperation of the Congress, we can and we will find a way out of the morass in which our country now finds itself. Cooperation will very likely not achieve much in the way of headlines, but those we can do without. Finger-pointing will achieve headlines, temporarily, but the nation will suffer and so will the Executive and the Legislative Branches. A few might like nothing better than to witness bitter recriminations between the Executive and the Legislative Branches; the people weighed down by the anxieties of these uncertain times would like nothing less. So, let us start afresh. Let us recognize that there is enough blame to go around and that it affects all of us. Let us do what we can, together, to bring this country out of the economic morass and out of the quagmire which we helped to create in Indo-China. The people cry for leadership and that leadership can come from the President assuming the initiative and the Congress working with him in tandem. The people expect no more; they deserve no less.



Telegram

WAB014(0524)(1-0534476097)PD 04/07/75 0518

ICS IPMIHA IISS

IISS FM WUI 07 0518

PMS WASHINGTON DC

UWE3184 PWS724 QAF189 DX25

UWVA HV CNPK 301

PEKING 975/971 7 1600 PAGE 1/50

LT

M LE SENATEUR MIKE MANSFIELD THE SENATE OF THE USA

WASHINGTON/DC

RESPECTED M LE SENATEUR PERMETTEZ MOI DE VOUS ADRESSER LE
PRESENT MESSAGE AFIN DE VOUS EXPOSER CE QUI SUIT DEUXPOINTS UN
CABLE DE UPI WASHINGTON APRIL 5 BY NICHOLAS DAMILOFF FAIT CONNAITRE
QUE CITATION CONGRESS WOULD PROBABLY SUPPORT

COL 5

DX25 M PAGE 2/50

SF-1201 (RS-69)

UWVA
WESTERN UNION


Telegram

PRESIDENT FORD IF HE
SENT MARINES TO CAMBODIA OR SOUTHVIETNAM FOR THE STRICTLY
LIMITED PURPOSE OF PROTECTING AMERICANS DURING AN EVACUATION
CONGRESSIONAL SOURCES SAID SATURDAY STOP BUT THE SUPPORT WOULD
LIKELY VANISH IMMEDIATELY ONE SOURCE SAID IF FORD TRIED
TO USE SUCH EVACUATION AS A PRETEXT TO UNLEASH A COUNTEROFFENSIVE
DX25 M PAGE 3/50

AGAINST THE COMMUNIST FORCES STOP THE UNITED STATES HAS
DISPATCHED THE CARRIER OKINAWA TO THE GULF OF SIAM WITH 1800 MARINES
HELICOPTERS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT TO ASSIST A POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF
AMERICANS FROM PHNOMPENH VIRGULE SAIGON VIRGULE AND OTHER
INDOCHINESE CITIES STOP PHNOMPENH IS THE LOCALITY MOST LIKELY TO
BECOME
COL 1800



SF-1201 (RS-69)



Telegram

DX25 M PAGE 4/50


THE SITE OF A MAJOR EVACUATION EFFORT BECAUSE OF THE UNRELENTING COMMUNIST ASSAULT ON ITS DEFENSE PERIMETER STOP IF THE CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES LOSE CONTROL OF THE AIRPORT VIRGULE THE MARINES COULD BE SUED TO SECURE A LANDING ZONE AND DEFEND IT WHILE AMERICAN CITIZENS ARE FLOWN BY HELICOPTER TO THE

DX25 M PAGE 5/50

AIRCRAFT CARRIER STOP HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS MIGHT BE CALLED IN TO SUPPRESS ENEMY FIRE STOP FINCITATION M LE SENATEUR PERMETTEZ MOI DE VOUS DIRE LOYALEMENT QUE A LHEURE ACTUELLE LES FORCES ARMEES POPULAIRES DE LIBERATION NATIONALE DU CAMBODGE ONT LA POSSIBILITE DE CONQUERIR POCHENTONG AIRPORT ET MEME PHNOMPENH MAIS QUE SI

DX25 M PAGE 6/50

SF-1201 (R5-69)



Telegram

NOUS TARDONS A LE FAIRE CEST PARCEQUE NOUS NE VOULONS PAS DONNER AU PRESIDENT GERALD FORD DES USA LE PRETEXTE TANT DESIRED POUR LANCER CONTRE NOUS LES FORCES ARMEES DES USA STOP CERTES NOS HEROIQUES COMBATTANTS NE SONT NULLEMENT EFFRAYES DAVOIR A AFFRONTER ENCORE UNE FOIS LES FORCES ARMEES DES

RETR MSG

NNN

NNNN



SF-1201 (R5-69)

Telegram

NEA002 WAC014(0524)(1-053451G097)PD 04/07/75 0519

ICS IPMIIHB IISS

IISS FM WUI 07 0519

PMS WASHINGTON DC

UWD6511 PWS725 QAF190 DX25

UWVA HV CNPK 302

PEKING 975/971 7 1600 PAGE 7/50

LT

M LE SENATEUR MIKE MANSFIELD THE SENATE OF THE USA

WASHINGTON/DC

USA SI PUISSANTES SOIENT ELLES MAIS NOUS ESTIMONS QUE NOUS
AVONS LE DEVOIR DE EVITER DES COMPLICATIONS INUTILES QUI
PROLONGERAIENT ET INTENSIFIERAIENT TROP CRUELLEMENT LA GUERRE CHEZ
NOUS ET LES SOUFFRANCES INDICIBLES DE NOTRE PEUPLE STOP NOUS FAISONS
DONC EXPRES DE LAISSER DISPONIBLE L'UNIQUE RUNWAY DE POCHENTONG
AIRPORT CECI AFIN

SF-1201 (RS-69)

WESTERN UNION

Telegram

DX25 M PAGE 8/50

DE LAISSER AUX AMERICAINS SE TROUVANT ENCORE
DANS PHNOMPENH ET A LEURS COLLABORATEURS CAMBODGIENS LE TEMPS ET
LA FACILITE DE SEN ALLER SAINS ET SAUFS DU CAMBODGE STOP MAIS
TOUT EN SACHANT PERTINEMMENT QUE LA GUERRE EST
IRREMEDIEABLEMENT PERDUE PAR LA S'IDENTIFIANT QUOTE REPUBLIQUE KHMERE
UNQUOTE FACE A NOTRE RESISTANCE

DX25 M PAGE 9/50

NATIONALE LE PRESIDENT FORD MAINTIENT EXPRES
DANS PHNOMPENH PLUSIEURS CENTAINES DE AMERICAINS DANS LESPOIR
EVIDENT QUE NOUS FINIRONS PAR NOUS IMPATIENTER ET PAR LANCER
UN ASSAUT DIRECT CONTRE POCHENTONG ET PHNOMPENH DONNANT AINSI
AUX FORCES ARMEES DES USA LA POSSIBILITE D'INTERVENIR AU CAMBODGE
COMME CE FUT LE CAS EN MAI

SF-1201 (RS-69)



Telegram

DX25 M PAGE 10/50

1970 STOP LOPERATION SODISANT DEVACUATION ET DE PROTECTION
DES VIES AMERICAINES NEST QUUN SIMPLE PRETEXTE
POUR DECLENCHER UNE NOUVELLE INVASION MILITAIRE MASSIVE DE NOTRE
PETIT PAYS STOP IL EST VRAI QUE LE CONGRES DES USA SE PRONONCERAIT
IMVANQUABLEMENT CONTRE UNE TELLE INVASION STOP MAIS QUI EST ASSEZ
NAIF POUR IMAGINER

COL 1970

DX25 M PAGE 11/50

QUE PLACED DEVANT UN FAIT ACCOMPLI LE CONGRES US PUISSE STOPPER LE
PROCESSUS DUNE INVASION EN REGLE DU CAMBODGE
PAR LES FORCES ARMEES DES USA POINTINTERROGATION LHONNEUR DES USA
ET DU DRAPEAU DES FORCES ARMEES US ETANT ENGAGED VIRGULE LE CONGRES
US SE TROUVERAIT DANS LOBLIGATION MORALE ET PATRIOTIQUE DE

SF-1201 (R5-69)

WESTERN UNION

Telegram

DX25 M PAGE 12/50

APPUYER LES EFFORTS DE GUERRE DU PRESIDENT FORD STOP
RESPECTED M LE SENATEUR VIRGULE LE CAMBODGE EST UN PAYS NONALIGNED ET
NEST PARCONSEQUENT LIE AUX USA PAR AUCUN TRAITE DALLIANCE STOP MEME
AVEC LA SODISANT QUOTE REPUBLIQUE KHMERE UNQUOTE LES
USA NE SONT NULLEMENT LIES PAR UN
ACCORD QUELCONQUE DASSISTANCE

RETR MSG

NNN

NNNN



SF-1201 (R5-69)

Telegram

DEA013 WAE019(0633)(1-000597D097-001)PD 04/07/75 0509
ICS IPMWAWA WSH
SUSPECTED DUPLICATE 1-053421G097 WAG 014 ICS IPMIHA IISS
IISS FM WUI 07 0509
PMS WASHINGTON DC

BT
UWC0160 PWS726 QAF191 DX25
UWVA HV CNPK 301
PEKING 975/971 7 1600 PAGE 13/50
LT
M LE SENATEUR MIKE MANSFIELD THE SENATE OF THE USA
WASHINGTON/DC
MILITAIRE STOP EN OUTRE LES USA
AFFIRMEMENT OFFICIELLEMENT QUE LA GUERRE AU CAMBODGE EST UNE GUERRE
CIVILE STOP DANS CES CONBITIONS NOUS CAMBODGIENS NE COMPRENONS

SF-1201 (RS-69)


WU
WESTERN UNION

Telegram

PAS POURQUOI LES USA INSISTENT SI LOURDEMENT POUR FAIRE SURVIVRE
A TOUT PRIX UN GANG DE TRAITRES CAMBODGIENS AU MOYEN
DE TOUTES SORTES DAIDES RUINEUSES
DX25 M PAGE 14/50
ET HONTEUSES POUR LE GRAND-PEUPLE AMERICAIN
STOP PUISQUE CEST UNE GUERRE CIVILE POURQUOI LES USA
MAINTIENENT ILS DANS PHNOMPENH DES CENTAINES DE DIPLOMATES DE
FONCTIONNAIRES ET DOFFICIERS ET LES EXPOSENT ILS SCIEMMENT A DES
ACCIDENTS MORTELS ALORS QUE TOUS LES PAYS ALLIES ET SATELL-
ITES DES USA ONT DEJA FERME
DX25 M PAGE 15/50
LEURS AMBASSADES A PHNOMPENH ET EVACUED TOUS LEURS DIPLOMATES LEURS
FONCTIONNAIRES LEURS TECHNICIENS ETC POINTINTERROGATION LES USA
AFFIRMEMENT QUILS SATTARDENT AUPRES DES TRAITRES PHNOMPENHOIS



SF-1201 (RS-69)



Telegram

PARCEQU'ILS VEULENT EVITER UN BAIN DE SANG STOP OR COMME VOUS LAVEZ
SI BIEN DIT VIRGULE M LE SENATEUR VIRGULE LE TRANSPORT INTENSIF
DE NOUVELLES ARMES

DX25 M PAGE 16/50

ET MUNITIONS PAR LIMMENSE AIRLIFT US DE U TAPAO THAILANDE A
PHNOMPENH DEVELOPPE ET PROLONGE INDEFINIMENT CET HORRIBLE BAIN DE
SANG STOP DAILLEURS UN TEL AIRLIFT SE JUSTIFIE DAUTANT MOINS AUJOU-
RDHUI QUE LA MAJEURE PARTIE DES NOUVELLES ARMES ET MUNITIONS
US TOMBENT REGULIEREMENT AUX MAINS DE NOTRE ARMEE

POPULAIRE DE

DX25 M PAGE 17/50

LIBERATION NATIONALE.

CE DONT ENTRE PARENTHESES NOUS REMERCIONS LE PRESIDENT FORD STOP
M LE SENATEUR VIRGULE VOUS AVEZ TOUJOURS EU UNE PROFONDE ET REELLE

SF-1201 (RS-69)



Telegram

AMITIE ET UNE SINCERE COMPASSION POUR LE PEUPLE CAMBODGIEN STOP ET
VOUS AVEZ TOUJOURS EU UNE CLAIRE ET JUSTE VISION DE LA SITUATION DU
CAMBODGE ET

DX25 M PAGE 18/50

DE CE QUE LES USA DEVRAIENT FAIRE POUR NE PAS SE DESHONORER
EN PERSISTANT A MENER CHEZ NOUS UN COMBAT IJUSTIFIABLE STOP M LE
SENATEUR PERMETTEZ MOI DAVOIR UNE FOIS ENCORE RECOURS A VOUS POUR
VOUS PRIER DE BIEN VOULOIR TRANSMETTRE AUX HONORABLES MEMBRES DU
CONGRES US MON EXPOSED CIDESSUS


RETR MSG

NNN

NNNN



SF-1201 (RS-69)



Telegram

W3001 WAD013(0523)(1-0533536097)PD 04/07/75 0506

ICS IPWIIHA IISS

IISS FM WUI 07 0506

PMS WASHINGTON DC

UWE5183 PWS728 QAF192 DX25

UWWA HV CNPK 071

PEKING 975/971 7 1600 PAGE 19/50

LT

M LE SENATEUR MIKE MANSFIELD THE SENATE OF THE USA

WASHINGTON/DC

QUE JE PRESENTE DANS LE SEUL BUT

DEVITER SI CEST POSSIBLE UNE AGGRAVATION DU CONFLIT ARCHISANGLANT
QUI DRESSE HELAS DEPUIS PLUS DE CINQ ANNEES DEJA NOS DEUX PAYS LUN
CONTRE LAUTRE STOP VEUILLEZ AGREER M LE SENATEUR LES ASSURANCES DE
MON ETERNELLE RECONNAISSANCE VIRGULE DE MA PROFONDE ADMIRATION ET
DEMA

SF-1201 (R5-69)



Telegram


DX25 M PAGE 20/21

TRES HAUTE ET RESPECTUEUSE CONSIDERATION NORODOM SIHANOUK
CHEF DETAT DU ROYAUME DU CAMBODGE ET PRESIDENT DU FRONT UNI NATIONAL
DU CAMBODGE

RETR MSG

NNN

NNNN



SF-1201 (R5-69)



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

April 7, 1975

Memorandum for Mr. Jack Marsh
Counselor to the President, The White House

I made the following calls on the President's report to the Speaker and President Pro Tempore. In each case I read paragraphs 2, 3, and the last paragraph. I offered to read the rest, but in each case they declined.

Thurmond said he approves the action and believes that the President should have sent Armed Forces to South Vietnam sooner. Clearly he was not referring merely to refugee evacuation.

McClellan said that he approves the action. Had no further comment.


Mahon had no comment, but he did ask me to provide material, on Monday, for a speech he will make on the floor, on the history of aid to Vietnam. His theme, he said, will be that we have sent many billions in military aid and economic aid, that he would have preferred the full \$1B in FY 75 military aid but he believes the withholding of \$300M would not have made a significant difference in the outcome.

Cederberg had no comment.

Senator Stennis was traveling in Mississippi, according to his AA, Mr. W.E. Cresswell. I outlined the message to Cresswell -- he said he would forward it whenever he could.

Senator Young was on the golf course. I passed the message to his AA, Mr. Sylvester.

Jack Edwards was out sailing. Chuck Hammond left the message with his secretary.



Chuck and Jim Kneale also informed Ed Braswell, Joel Bonner, Mike Hugo, Charles Murphy, Guy McConnell and Frank Slatinshek. Ralph Preston was traveling and could not be reached.



Richard Fryklund

CC:

Mr. Tom Latimer

Mr. Martin Hoffmann



Oh, I can understand a stampede. We can go into any theater and if somebody were to yell "fire," there would be a stampede. But heaven knows, I never have seen a father shove his wife aside and his children aside so that he could run to safety and leave them to die.

If that is what we have done in South Vietnam, I say that the quicker the better to bring it to an end.

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, I am appreciative that the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTORE) permits me to ask a question and make an observation.

In the early 1960's, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur said, in essence, that it would be a grave mistake for the United States to commit a massive land army on the Asian continent.

I mention this counsel from General MacArthur because the Senator from Rhode Island indicated that there were those who, from time to time, warned us of the eventual result of military involvement in Asia. The predicted tragedy contained in those warnings has come to pass. It is not my intention to look back, but I thought that the record should reflect the warnings MacArthur gave many years before we committed U.S. forces to South Vietnam.

This concern was initially expressed by MacArthur in 1951 in hearings before the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees when he talked of our inability to maintain large units of ground troops 10,000 miles away.

Mr. PASTORE. I recall that in November, 1967, I was invited to the White House by Lyndon Johnson, who was then President of the United States, and we just chatted a bit. It was about 6 o'clock in the evening. We were alone. He asked me the question at the time. I thought he was pulling my leg, if I may use the vernacular.

He said:

John, do you think I should not seek reelection and I should bring my term to an end?

Frankly, the remark flabbergasted me a little. I repeat, I thought he was pulling my leg.

The following March, in 1968, when he announced his decision on television, it brought my mind back to the statement he had made the previous November.

I said:

Mr. President, why do you say that?

He looked me straight in the eye and said:

I have been unable to unite the country.

And that is the result of Vietnam. Vietnam has divided the country. There is no unanimity that we continue.

If Lyndon Johnson, in my humble opinion, though that would not have hurt him at the next election, I think he would have run for reelection. It is my firm conviction that that might have happened. But he told me distinctly, "I have been unable to unite the country." I said:

Mr. President, has it ever occurred to you that the reason is Vietnam?

Today, I repeat, the chickens have come home to roost.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may absent myself from the Senate tomorrow and possibly part of the following day. The B-1 will make its first supersonic flight, and I want to be there to observe it.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR TALMADGE, AND SENATOR HELMS ON WEDNESDAY

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Wednesday, after the two leaders or their designees have been recognized under the standing order, the Senator from Georgia (Mr. TALMADGE) be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Wednesday, after the remarks of Mr. TALMADGE, Mr. HELMS be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR SENATE RESOLUTION 110 TO RETAIN ITS STATUS ON THE CALENDAR

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senate Resolution 110, a resolution coming over under the rule, not come over under the rule but retain its status on the calendar until April 22.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED DURING ADJOURNMENT

Under the authority of the order of March 26, 1975, a message from the President of the United States was received on March 31, 1975, transmitting the third annual report on the status of advisory committees covering the year 1974, which, with the accompanying report, was referred on April 1, 1975, to the Committee on Government Operations. The message is as follows:

To the Congress of the United States:

In accordance with the provisions of section 6(c) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the report on the status of advisory committees in 1974 is herewith forwarded.

This is the third annual report. It is organized to improve public access to information concerning specific advisory committees and the Federal agencies to whom they provide advice.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 28, 1975.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Helting, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session, the Acting President pro tempore (Mr. STONE) laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of the Senate proceedings.)

APPROVAL OF BILL

A message from the President of the United States stated that he had approved and signed the enrolled bill (S. 332) to authorize appropriations for the fiscal year 1975 for certain maritime programs of the Department of Commerce.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

On March 26, 1975, during the adjournment of the Senate and under the authority of the order of Wednesday, March 26, 1975, a message from the House of Representatives was received stating that the Speaker had signed the enrolled bill (H.R. 2166) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide for a refund of 1974 individual income taxes, to increase the low-income allowance and the percentage standard deduction, to provide a credit for personal exemptions and a credit for certain earned income, to increase the investment credit and the surtax exemption, to reduce percentage depletion for oil and gas, and for other purposes.

Under the authority of the order of Wednesday, March 26, 1975, the Acting President pro tempore (Mr. METCALF) signed the above enrolled bill on Thursday, March 27, 1975.

On March 2, 1975, during the adjournment of the Senate and under the authority of the order of March 26, 1975, a message from the House of Representatives was received stating that the House has agreed to the resolution (H. Res. 269) electing JOHN J. McFALL, a Representative from the State of California, Speaker pro tempore during any absence of the Speaker, such authority to continue not later than April 11, 1975.


REPORT OF A COMMITTEE RECEIVED DURING THE ADJOURNMENT OF THE SENATE

Under the authority of the order of Wednesday, March 26, 1975, Mr. MAGNUSON, from the Committee on Commerce, on Friday, April 4, 1975, reported with amendments the bill (S. 229) to amend the Endangered Species Act of 1973 to make it more consistent with the Marine Mammal Protective Act of 1972 (Rept. No. 94-63).

COMMUNICATIONS FROM EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, ETC.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. STONE) laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

A communication from the President of the United States concerning U.S. participa-



tion in international humanitarian relief efforts to transport refugees from South Vietnam; to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed in the Record. The communication is as follows:

[White House Situation Room]

APRIL 4, 1975.

HON. JAMES EASTLAND,
President pro tempore, U.S. Senate,
Doddsville, Miss.

As you know, last Saturday I directed United States participation in an international humanitarian relief effort to transport refugees from Danang and other seaports to safer areas farther south in Vietnam. The United States has been joined in this humanitarian effort by a number of other countries who are offering people, supplies and vessels to assist in this effort. This effort was undertaken in response to urgent appeals from the Government of the Republic of Vietnam because of the extremely grave nature of the circumstances involving the lives of hundreds of thousands of refugees. This situation has been brought about by large-scale violations of the agreement ending the war and restoring the peace in Vietnam by the North Vietnamese who have been conducting massive attacks on the northern and central provinces of South Vietnam.

In accordance with my desire to keep the Congress fully informed on this matter, and taking note of the provision of section 4(A)(2) of the war powers resolution (Public Law 93-148), I wish to report to you concerning one aspect of United States participation in the refugee evacuation effort. Because of the large number of refugees and the overwhelming dimensions of the task, I have ordered U.S. naval vessels to assist in this effort, including Amphibious Task Group 76.8 with 12 embarked helicopters and approximately 700 marines. These naval vessels have been authorized to approach the coast of South Vietnam to pick up refugees and U.S. nationals, and transport them to safety. Marines are being detailed to vessels participating in the rescue mission. The first vessel entered South Vietnam territorial waters at 0400 a.m. EDT on April 3, 1975.

Although these forces are equipped for combat within the meaning of section 4(A)(2) of Public Law 93-148, their sole mission is to assist in the evacuation including the maintenance of order on board the vessels engaged in that task.

As stated above, the purpose of the introduction of United States naval vessels into Vietnamese waters is to assist in an international humanitarian effort involving vessels of several nations, including both military and civilian craft. The United States participation in this effort includes the charter of commercial vessels, the use of military Sealift command vessels with civilian crews, as well as United States naval vessels with military crews. This effort is being undertaken pursuant to the President's constitutional authority as commander-in-chief and chief executive in the conduct of foreign relations and pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which authorizes humanitarian assistance to refugees, civilian war casualties and other persons disadvantaged by hostilities or conditions relating to hostilities in South Vietnam.

You will appreciate, I am sure, my difficulty in telling you precisely how long United States forces may be needed in this effort. Our present estimate, however, is that this operation may involve the presence of United States naval vessels in Vietnamese waters for a period at least several weeks.

GERALD R. FORD.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A letter from the Secretary of Defense transmitting a secret document entitled "Improving the Combat Proportion of U.S. Forces

in Europe"; to the Committee on Armed Services.

TRANSFER AUTHORITY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (S. Doc. No. 94-30)

A communication from the President of the United States transmitting a request for a transfer authority for the fiscal year 1975 in the amount of \$850,000 for the Department of Transportation; to the Committee on Appropriations, and ordered to be printed.

PRESENTATION OF A PETITION

Mr. PASTORE, Mr. President, I send to the desk for myself and my colleague, Senator PELL, a resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island memorializing the President of the United States and the Congress to appropriate \$30 million to the unemployment fund of the State of Rhode Island and ask that it be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD and referred to the proper committee.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. STONE). Without objection, it is so ordered.

The resolution, which was referred to the Committee on Appropriations, is as follows:

SENATE RESOLUTION MEMORIALIZING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE \$30,000,000 TO THE UNEMPLOYMENT FUND OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

"Whereas, the State of Rhode Island is burdened with an unemployment rate of 15 per centum, twice the national average; and

"Whereas, the State of Rhode Island, in order to fulfill its responsibility to more than 70,000 unemployed citizens, has depleted all available unemployment funds; and

Whereas, The only alternative would be to increase the employer's amount of contribution to the unemployment fund, an action which would only cause more businesses to close their doors: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That this Senate of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations hereby memorializes the Congress and the President of the United States to appropriate an outright grant of thirty million dollars to the state unemployment fund; and be it further

Resolved, That the secretary of state be, and he is hereby, respectfully requested to transmit a duly certified copy of this resolution to the President of the United States and the members of Congress from Rhode Island."

INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first time and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as indicated:

By Mr. WEICKER:

S. 1358. A bill for the relief of Simeon Zivkov and his wife, Paea Zivkov. Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MUSKIE (for himself, Mr. HUMPHREY, and Mr. BROCK):

S. 1359. A bill to coordinate State and local government budget-related actions with Federal Government efforts to stimulate economic recovery by establishing a system of emergency support grants to State and local governments. Referred to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. MCGEE (for himself and Mr. HUMPHREY):

S. 1360. A bill to provide additional humanitarian assistance authorizations for South Vietnam and Cambodia for the fiscal

year 1975. Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

By Mr. HANSEN (by request):

S. 1361. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to authorize a program of assistance to States for the establishment, expansion, improvement, and maintenance of veterans cemeteries, and to provide for transportation of bodies to a national cemetery. Referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. BAYH:

S. 1362. A bill to amend title 37 of the United States Code in order to provide incentives for lawyers to enter and remain in the Armed Forces. Referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. MOSS:

S. 1363. A bill to facilitate the exchange of school lands between the States of Utah and the Navajo Tribe. Referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. INOUE:

S. 1364. A bill to amend the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 to provide manpower programs for native Hawaiians. Referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. STEVENS (for himself and Mr. GRAVEL):

S. 1365. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to convey to the city of Haines, Alaska, interests of the United States in certain lands. Referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

S. 1366. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to waive recovery of certain costs for extraordinary wind and ice damage to certain facilities. Referred to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. PACKWOOD:

S. 1367. A bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to eliminate the legal custody requirement and the requirement of residence and physical presence in the United States for the naturalization of children adopted by U.S. citizens. Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 1368. A bill to confer U.S. citizenship on certain Vietnamese children and to provide for the adoption of such children by American families. Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SPARKMAN (by request):

S. 1369. A bill to limit cost-of-living adjustments of annuities under the Foreign Service Retirement System for a specified period of time, and for other purposes. Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

By Mr. SPARKMAN:

S. 1370. A bill to amend and improve 5 U.S.C., section 7342 (Public Law 90-83). Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

By Mr. BELLMON:

S. 1371. A bill to amend title 38 of the United States Code to provide for cost-of-living increases in educational benefits. Referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. MUSKIE (for himself and Mr. HUMPHREY):

S. 1359. A bill to coordinate State and local government budget-related actions with Federal Government efforts to stimulate economic recovery by establishing a system of emergency support grants to State and local governments. Referred to the Committee on Government Operations.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNTERCYCLICAL ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1975

Mr. MUSKIE, Mr. President, today I am introducing with Senator HUMPHREY legislation which I believe will provide



one significant new assumption—that Congress has earned the right to a meaningful voice in policymaking because of the Vietnam record of failures, bad judgments and deceptions. Whatever restraints the lawmakers may have had were removed by Watergate, which shredded away the last vestige of an omnipotent presidency. Hence, the legislators believe all the more that they are justified in challenging White House authority on a broad front.

CONGRESS MUST PROVIDE BALANCE

"Back in the 1950s and early 1960s the American people implicitly trusted their president," observes Republican Rep. Pierre duPont of Delaware, a member of the recently rebellious House Foreign Affairs Committee. "They believed what he did was clearly in the best interests of the country. Because of everything that has happened, this trust is gone. It's vanished. Now the people are saying to the Congress, you get involved because we'd like a balancing force on these questions."

The mandate has a notable irony. While President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger dwell on the need to preserve credibility and trust abroad, Congress is more concerned about reestablishing credibility and trust at home.

A NAVIGATOR AS WELL AS A HELMSMAN FOR THE SHIP OF STATE

There is little evidence the administration has got the message or that it will voluntarily veer from the old ways. The ship of state may indeed need only one helmsman in most matters, as Lincoln said, but Congress is determined to help chart the ship's future journey in foreign seas. Until the White House awakens to this fact, the outlook is for continued confrontation rather than cooperation and a new period of genuine bipartisanship.

(Mr. BRADEMAS asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. BRADEMAS' remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

(Mr. YATES asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. YATES' remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted as follows to:

Mr. PRESSLER (at the request of Mr. MICHEL), for the week of April 7, on account of illness.

Mr. AUCOIN (at the request of Mr. DUNCAN of Oregon), for 3 days (through April 9), on account of death in family (mother-in-law).

Mr. DERWINSKI (at the request of Mr. MICHEL), on account of official business.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. KASTEN) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous matter:)

Mr. KEMP, for 15 minutes, today.

Mr. PEYSER, for 20 minutes, today.
Mr. BROOMFIELD, for 45 minutes, on April 8.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. DUNCAN of Oregon), to revise and extend their remarks, and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. GONZALEZ, for 5 minutes, today.
Mr. BRADEMAs, for 5 minutes, today.
Mr. DRINAN, for 15 minutes, today.
Mr. EHLBERG, for 5 minutes, today.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. MADDEN and to include extraneous matter.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. KASTEN, and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. KEMP in two instances.
Mr. CRANE in five instances.
Mr. PEYSER in three instances.
Mr. ASHBROOK.
Mr. BELL.
Mr. BUCHANAN.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. DUNCAN of Oregon), and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. SISK in two instances.
Mrs. LLOYD of Tennessee in five instances.

Mr. ANNUNZIO in six instances.
Mr. ANDERSON of California in three instances.

Mr. GONZALEZ in three instances.
Mr. McCORMACK.

Mr. HARRIS in 10 instances.
Mr. McDONALD of Georgia in 10 instances.

Mr. FRASER in 10 instances.
Mr. RANGEL in 10 instances.

Mr. EHLBERG in 10 instances.
Mr. McFALL.

Ms. ABZUG in 10 instances.
Mr. DRINAN.

Mr. HARRINGTON in 10 instances.
Mr. DODD.

Mr. HOLLAND in 10 instances.
Mr. CONYERS in two instances.

Mr. MATSUNAGA.

SENATE BILL REFERRED

A bill of the Senate of the following title was taken from the Speaker's table and, under the rule, referred as follows:

S. 555. An act to amend the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act; to the Committee on Agriculture.

ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

Mr. HAYS of Ohio, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee had examined and found truly enrolled a bill of the House of the following title, which was thereupon signed by the Speaker:

H.R. 2168. An act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide for a refund of 1974 individual income taxes, to increase the low-income allowance and the percentage standard deduction, to provide a credit for personal exemptions and a credit for certain earned income, to increase the investment credit and the surtax exemption, to reduce percentage depletion for oil and gas, and for other purposes.

BILLS PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT

Mr. HAYS of Ohio, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee did on the following dates present to the President, for his approval, bills of the House of the following title:

On March 26, 1975:

H.R. 4592. An act making appropriations for foreign assistance and related programs for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, and for other purposes.

On March 27, 1975:

H.R. 2168. An act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide for a refund of 1974 individual income taxes, to increase the low-income allowance and the percentage standard deduction, to provide a credit for personal exemptions and a credit for certain earned income, to increase the investment credit and the surtax exemption, to reduce a percentage depletion for oil and gas, and for other purposes;

H.R. 2733. An act to continue the national insurance development program;

H.R. 3260. An act to rescind certain budget authority recommended in the message of the President of November 26, 1974 (H. Doc. 93-398) and as those rescissions are modified by the message of the President of January 30, 1975 (H. Doc. 94-39) and in the communication of the Comptroller General of November 6, 1974 (H. Doc. 93-391), transmitted pursuant to the Impoundment Control Act of 1974; and

H.R. 4075. An act to rescind certain budget authority recommended in the Message of the President of January 30, 1975 (H. Doc. 94-39) and in the communications of the Comptroller General of February 7, 1975 (H. Doc. 94-46) and of February 14, 1975 (H. Doc. 94-50), transmitted pursuant to the Impoundment Control Act of 1974.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. DUNCAN of Oregon. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 12 o'clock and 16 minutes p.m.) the House adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, April 8, 1975, at 12 o'clock noon.)

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

675. A letter from the President of the United States, transmitting a proposed amendment to a supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 1975 for the Department of Commerce (H. Doc. No. 94-91); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

676. A letter from the President of the United States, transmitting a report on participation of U.S. naval vessels in the evacuation of refugees in South Vietnam, pursuant to section 4(a) of the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148); to the Committee on International Relations.

677. A letter from the Acting Secretary of Agriculture, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Federal Insurance Act and for other purposes; to the Committee on Agriculture.

678. A letter from the Under Secretary of Agriculture, transmitting the annual report for calendar year 1974 on the Department's administration of the Animal Welfare Act of 1970, pursuant to section 25 of the act (7 U.S.C. 2155); to the Committee on Agriculture.

679. A letter from the Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, Executive



(Date & Time Stamp)

(Date & Time Stamp)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT

S/S #

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1975 APR 9

75 APR 9 AM 11.28

LDX MESSAGE NO. 335, CLASSIFICATION Uncl, NO. PAGES 2

DESCRIPTION OF MSG. Letter to Mr. Marsh

FROM: R. McCloskey, H, 23436, 7256
Officer Office Symbol Extension Room Number

LDX TO: W.H., DELIVER TO: Mr. Marsh, EXTENSION: 6586, ROOM NUMBER: Sit. Rom.

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS:

VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY: [Signature]
Executive Secretariat Officer

*File
War Powers file
for*





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED

April 9, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John O. Marsh
The White House

Subject: President's Message to the Speaker
of the House and President Pro Tem
of the Senate in Connection with
the War Powers Act

At the request of your office, we sought to contact the Chairman and ranking minority members of the two foreign relations committees and drew on language in the President's message, to brief them.

We reached HIRC Chairman Morgan in Pennsylvania. He listened carefully and was obviously taking notes. His only comment was "thank you very much for informing me". We next reached Ranking Republican HIRC member Broomfield. He was equally attentive and at the end said, "I am all for it; the President is taking just the right step. He can count on my support."


In spite of all-day telephone efforts on Saturday and Sunday, we were unable to reach Sparkman or Case personally. We did get through to SFRC Chief of Staff Pat Holt, however. Holt simply thanked me for the message and promised to inform Sparkman, if we were unable to reach him first. He inquired whether the "War Powers report" would also be sent to the Committee. We responded that the President's message had gone to the Speaker and President Pro Tem. He accepted this and said, "Well, we will get it via that route." Then, failing to reach Case before he left for Geneva Saturday night, we spoke with his foreign affairs staff man Steve Bryen. Bryen was most appreciative and said that he would see that the Senator was made aware of the fact that we had filled him in.




UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

No cables were sent.



Robert J. McCloskey
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

April 11, 1975

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

TEXT OF LETTERS FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE

April 11, 1975

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

I hereby transmit draft legislation to carry out the recommendations made in my April 10, 1975 address to the Congress with respect to Indochina.

The enclosed draft bills authorize additional military, economic, and humanitarian assistance for South Vietnam, and also clarify the availability of funds for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for humanitarian evacuation in Indochina, should this become necessary.

I urge the immediate consideration and enactment of these measures.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD

#

