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FEB 14 1974

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February 14, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: DONALD RUMSFELD  
FROM: MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF  
SUBJECT: Viet Nam Trip

Senator Humphrey indicated this afternoon that he does not believe it would be appropriate for him to participate in the Congressional Viet Nam trip for two reasons: 1. He is loaded up with hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, and 2. Because of his role in the Johnson Administration he is considered by many key Senators to be a part of the pro Viet Nam coalition and, therefore, believes his objectivity would be questioned.

Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey pulled out of the trip this afternoon apparently because publicity and adverse editorials in New Jersey.

Senator Humphrey is going to speak to Senator Sparkman and urge him to appoint a Senatorial delegation to go to Viet Nam.

cc: General Scowcroft  
Jack Marsh



FEB 13 1974

February 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF  
SUBJECT: Viet Nam Trip

You phoned Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia last Monday in Parkersburg to ask if the leadership would sponsor a trip by Members of Congress to Viet Nam.

Senator Byrd called today in response to your call. He stated that he had spoken with Senator Mansfield about this and they indicated as the Senate Democratic leadership they will not sponsor such a trip. Senator Byrd commented that they believe they have enough facts regarding the situation and their support in a Viet Nam trip would be inadvisable.

Senator Byrd also said that if Senator Sparkman in his capacity as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wished to participate, the Senate Democratic leadership has no objection.

Senator Hugh Scott has also been uncooperative and indicated his desire not to participate in the selection of the Senators invited for the trip.

On the House side John Rhodes has been critical of the trip and has avoided any participation.

The Speaker also has not been receptive and indicated a lack of interest.

Meanwhile the State Department has been active and invited a number of Senators and Congressmen who have accepted, including the following:

Senate

Dewey Bartlett  
Bill Brock  
Clifford Case  
Dick Clark  
Jake Garn  
Paul Laxalt

House

William Brocnfield  
Paul McCloskey  
Elford Cederberg  
Bill Chappell  
Donald Fraser  
Jack Kemp  
Dante Fascell



The date of departure, as we discussed this morning, is becoming a factor because of impending Senate vote on the oil deferral bill and the possibility of veto votes after that.

Stan Kimmitt, with Senator Mansfield's office, advised us this morning that the Senate Majority Leader is concerned about Democrat Senators being absent with these important votes pending.

MLF:jg

bcc: ~~Jack Marsh~~  
Donald Rumsfeld



February 18, 1975

**MEMORANDUM FOR:       ROBERT INGERSOLL  
                              ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE**

**FROM:                    JACK MARSH  
                              COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT**

Background:

There seems to be confusion among members of the House and Senate concerning the proposed Congressional trip to South Vietnam. This concern was expressed by Congressman Cederberg to the President and members of his staff this morning at the GOP Leadership Breakfast.

This concern seems to focus on the following areas:

1. What Members are to participate.
2. The itinerary.
3. Departure and return dates.
4. Who is in charge of planning.

In order to clarify the situation, the following course of action is suggested.

1. A private meeting by a senior official of the State Department with Congressman Cederberg to obtain his guidance in reference to the above questions.
2. A meeting on a bi-partisan basis with senior members from both bodies to clarify questions about the trip and to facilitate plans and execution.
3. Develop an itinerary that reflects Congressional desires and requests.



4. Maintain coordination on planning through your Congressional L. A., Max Friedersdorf and the NSC.
5. Report back any problems and difficulties encountered as a result of the above meetings with Members.

The dates of the trip are critical and it is essential that planning take into consideration the requirements of the presence of Members for voting on key legislative matters before the Congress. The energy program is slated for key votes in the House and Senate within the next two weeks.

Congressman Cederberg also mentioned a change in the itinerary to enable the Congressional group to meet with Sihanouk. This raises questions not only with him and other Members, but also with others in the Executive Branch. I suspect this has already been brought to your attention and early clarification of this would be extremely helpful.



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**THE WHITE HOUSE**  
**WASHINGTON**

2/20/75 - Russ spoke at  
great length to Mr. Cosdick  
of Sen. Helms' Office.



FEB 21 1975

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 20, 1975

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Jack Marsh  
Counsellor to the President

FROM: Robert S. Ingersoll *RSI*

SUBJECT: Congressional Delegation to Vietnam

I wish to follow up our telephone conversation on February 19 concerning your memorandum to me of February 18 about the Congressional delegation to visit Vietnam.

We have taken action on all points mentioned in your memorandum, specifically:

1. Phil Habib (our Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs) called on Cong. Cederberg on February 18, and talked to him again by telephone twice in the same day, to provide information and solicit his views.
2. Habib and Bob McCloskey met with the potential delegation members at 4:00 p.m. on February 18 to discuss all aspects of the itinerary, logistics, etc. (Cederberg was not at this meeting.)
3. Our Congressional Relations staff are in continual touch with Max Friedersdorf and his people about plans for the delegation. However, I should add that Max' staff has been almost totally preoccupied with legislative action on the Energy Program, and therefore have not had much time for the Vietnam project.

We fully understand that the idea of a delegation to Vietnam was a Congressional initiative, and that our role is to lend advice and support rather than to take the lead. We also understand that the need for critical votes in support of the President's Energy Program may force a postponement of the trip (and in fact that has already happened). However, for the moment we will proceed with plans so that all arrangements will be complete when the delegation is finally prepared to depart.





February 18, 1975

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5. Report back any problems and difficulties encountered as a result of the above meetings with Members.

The dates of the trip are critical and it is essential that planning take into consideration the requirements of the presence of Members for voting on key legislative matters before the Congress. The energy program is slated for key votes in the House and Senate within the next two weeks.

The genesis of **this** program helps keep in perspective the White House and Executive Departments roles. The trip was mentioned by the President at a Leadership Breakfast after he had earlier received a suggestion from the Hill that such a bi-partisan **trip** would be helpful. The original plan was **this** would be a Congressionally sponsored **visit** with support from the Executive Branch so Congress could have its own independent fact-finding mission. This Congressional emphasis should be kept in mind.

Your help and assistance on **this** would be greatly appreciated.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF

FROM: BOB WOLTHUIS

SUBJECT: Viet Nam/Cambodia Congressional Trip

Part I

The trip on balance appears to be a plus. Upon arrival in Saigon on Thursday the delegation held its first meeting with Ambassador Martin at 2 P.M. I think the Ambassador did an excellent job in conveying the Embassy's position to the delegation. At 4 P.M. the entire delegation was received by President Thieu for nearly a two hour session. This was highlighted by a question answer period which I feel was very frank and I think the performance of President Thieu made a positive impression on most of the Members.

On Friday the delegation broke into subgroups and I accompanied Congressmen Chappel and Murtha to Military Region 1 and it was evident as a result of that visit that they will be very helpful to the President.

In this memo I shall not describe the activities of the entire delegation for the entire trip because that report has been assembled by the Embassy and should be available for your use and the President's sometime late today or tomorrow.

The visit to Cambodia was very helpful and impressed the delegation with the seriousness of the situation there. Upon arrival we met with Ambassador Dean who, with the military attache, explained the encircling seige of the city. The delegation then went to visit with Lon Nol and this meeting was not nearly as impressive or as helpful as the Thieu meeting in Saigon. Lon Nol does not speak English but did make a strong appeal for assistance. It was in this meeting that he offered to do anything that would result in a solution to the Cambodian war. Most people in attendance including myself understood this to mean that Lon Nol offered to resign if necessary. The press has also given his remarks that interpretation. At this point I joined Senator Bartlett and Congressman McCloskey and Eric Von Marbod of Defense joined Congressmen Chappel and Murtha for visits to the front lines. Just prior to our departure for Saigon the airport in Phnom Penh was shelled with three rounds of artillery fire.



Upon returning to Saigon that evening President Thieu again entertained the delegation at a State Dinner. He gave a brief address which I found to be very courageous and this too is on its way to me. The essence of his speech was that the South Vietnamese people had their back to the wall, they have relied on the American commitment and he strongly urged the delegation to have the Congress honor that commitment.


On Sunday the delegation spent most of its time visiting with various representatives of opposition groups as well as the Viet Cong and the North Vietnam representatives in Saigon. I was not permitted to go to that meeting since the administration representatives were all excluded.

The big story that I think will come out of the trip will deal with political oppression. None the less I expect at least five of the eight Members and possible six to recommend in their report Congressional approval of the Supplemental for South Viet Nam. The Cambodian aid request may not fair as well. I am sure Congressmen Chappel and Murtha will support it and I assume Senator Bartlett will also. Congressman McCloskey probably leaning in that direction but I have some doubt that Mrs. Fenwick will support the military aid. There is no question that Mrs. Abzug will oppose military assistance to Cambodia but will probably endorse continued humanitarian assistance.

## Part II

Based on my conversations with the Members of the delegation as well as the key people who have been talking with them throughout the trip I would like to give our collective impressions as to where they may stand in the committee report.

1. Chairman Flynt -- He began making good sounds on the way over and it is my understanding that he will endorse the Supplemental for Viet Nam although maybe not at the full \$300 million level. I also expect him to endorse some form of military assistance for Cambodia although he did not make the trip to Phnom Penh.
2. Senator Bartlett -- He made extensive notes over every visit and interview and was in country three days longer than the House Members except Congressman McCloskey. I expect Senator Bartlett to be a strong supporter but will probably also recommend that President Thieu broaden his political base in South Viet Nam.





3. Congressman Chappel -- He will be a strong supporter for both Cambodia and Viet Nam and I expect him to take a strong lead in the Passman subcommittee and in the full Appropriations Committee as well as on the floor. He went over on our side and came back strongly reinforced.
4. Congressman McCloskey -- Without question the toughest mind on the trip. He posed the hardest questions to the American Embassy people and on balance I think he has moved quite a way in our direction. He will continue to take a public position against political oppression but I expect him to support most of the Supplemental for South Viet Nam. He may not be so strong on the Cambodian aid request. His position I consider to be the most critical of the whole delegation. On Sunday afternoon prior to our departure for Washington he requested and received a private audience with President Thieu. I do not know yet what transpired in that meeting.
5. Congressman Murtha -- As you may know he served in Viet Nam with the U.S. Marine Corps in 1965-66. He hates the communists and our trip to Military Region 1 was his idea so he could retrace some of his activities in the Danang area. He will be very strong for both Viet Nam and Cambodian military assistance and is prepared to work very closely with us in the floor fights in the House. I consider him to be a very valuable ally.
6. Congressman Don Fraser -- The most difficult of all the delegation to read. He did travel outside of Saigon on one occasion but he did not make the trip to Phnom Penh. He spent considerable time with opposition leaders and groups and I am sure he will take a strong position against political oppression. If we get any help from him on military assistance for either country I will consider it an unexpected plus.
7. Mrs. Abzug -- I believe she went there with a closed mind and came home with a closed mind although it may have shaken her a little bit. She will definitely oppose military assistance to Cambodia because she is convinced that a blood bath is inevitable whichever way the war goes. She will probably endorse humanitarian assistance to Cambodia. I expect her to make a good deal of noise about political prisoners, especially 19 newspaper people who are confined in South Viet Nam. I expect her to oppose military assistance for Saigon.
8. Mrs. Fenwick -- I believe of all the people on the delegation she has wrestled harder with the problem than anyone else. She read everything she could get her hands on and while she spent a great deal of time with Fraser and Abzug, she looked at both sides very carefully. I think a Presidential nudge may be helpful in her case based on the fact that she told one member of our party that when she was a little girl she learned that if a person made a commitment, that commitment should be kept.

Prior to leaving for Saigon, the delegation was furnished a very long memorandum from the IndoChina Resources Center here in Washington. This group is anti-Thieu and basically represents the far out opposition groups in Saigon. The delegation had all of this material and most of them read it en route to Viet Nam.

Part III

In keeping with the schedule which you have recommended I will call each member of the delegation and invite them to a meeting with the President on Wednesday at 11:00 A.M. However, I do recommend that the President personally call Congress Flynt and make the invitation since Flynt has indicated to me that he could not meet before Thursday.

The Republicans headed by Senator Bartlett have also asked for a separate meeting with President Ford. I recommend that this be done especially since it may solidify Mrs. Fenwick. I do not believe it should occur before the Wednesday meeting with the whole delegation. I recommend the following participants in the Wednesday meeting besides the President:

Congressional delegation

Chairman Flynt  
Senator Bartlett  
Congressman McCloskey  
Congressman Chappel  
Congressman Murtha  
Congressman Fraser  
Mrs. Abzug  
Mrs. Fenwick

Defense Department

Secretary Schlesinger  
Eric Von Marbod

White House

Brent Scowcroft  
Max Friedersdorf  
Vern Loen  
Bill Kendall  
Bob Wolthuis

State Department

Secretary Kissinger  
Assistant Secretary Phil Habib  
Ambassador Martin



P.S. I have made the invitations and all members of the Congressional delegation have accepted for Wednesday at 11 A.M.