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**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1a Map	1 <u>Russ to Jack. 8/13/75</u> The Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Lines (1 p.)	Undated	A
2a	2 <u>Janka to Friedersdorf. 9/5/75</u>		
<del>2a</del>	<del>Background re U.S. undertakings to guarantee Israel energy supplies (1 p.)</del> <i>opened 4/19/76 KBH</i>	Undated	A

## FILE LOCATION

Marsh Files  
 General Subject File  
 Middle East - Sinai Agreement

Box 22

## RESTRICTION CODES

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WHM. 1/22/86

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

M


September 10, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*  
SUBJECT: Summary of UN Experience in  
the Middle East

In reply to your request of September 4, I am attaching an unclassified Summary of the UN experience in the Middle East since the Arab-Israeli War of 1973.

While the report is unclassified, I would recommend that it be furnished on a selective basis to Members of Congress in order to avoid erroneous conclusions as to the number of fatal incidents the UN forces have experienced. As the report shows (page 6), the casualties have been few and relatively minor, and the UN experience, on the whole, has been a positive one.

Attachment



UNCLASSIFIED

Summary of UN Experience in the Middle East

The United Nations has been integrally involved in maintaining the various steps toward peace in the Middle East since the October war of 1973. The following summary explains how that role has evolved through UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization), UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force) and UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force).

UNTSO

The UN Truce Supervision Organization was established by the Security Council in 1948 as the staff of the UN Mediator in Palestine. Its job was to report to the Security Council through the UN Secretary-General on the observance of the ceasefire, and subsequently when the four Armistice Agreements were concluded by Israel with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, to assist the parties in the supervision of those agreements. After the June 1967 war, UNTSO observers were stationed on both sides of the Israeli-Egyptian and Israeli-Syrian lines, and on the Lebanese side of the Israeli-Lebanon armistice line. Jordan has not participated in UNTSO since the 1967 war lest the presence of the UN observers appear to confer recognition on the 1967 line as a permanent border.

UNEF

The creation of the present United Nations Emergency Force in late October 1973 was a direct result of the difficulty of implementing the ceasefire which followed the October 6 attack by Syria and Egypt on Israel and Israel's counterattack across the Suez Canal. On October 25, by a vote of 14-0 with China not participating, the Security Council adopted a resolution that demanded that an immediate and complete ceasefire be observed and decided to establish a United Nations emergency force on the basis of plans to be drawn up by the Secretary General.

In a resolution passed on October 27, the Security Council unanimously approved the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force for an initial period of six months. The mandate for UNEF was to supervise



UNCLASSIFIED

-2-

the implementation of the ceasefire and the return to positions occupied by the two sides on October 22. It was also to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting and to cooperate with the International Red Cross in its humanitarian efforts in the area. UNTSO was instructed to cooperate with UNEF in the fulfillment of these tasks. It was to operate with complete impartiality, avoiding any actions that would prejudice the rights, claims, or positions of the parties.

The UNEF was initially to have a force of approximately 7,000 troops (although this number was never achieved) and was to be composed of national contingents selected in consultation with the Security Council and the parties concerned, bearing in mind the principle of equitable geographic representation. It was to be provided with defensive weapons only and was not to use force except in self defense. The costs were to be borne by UN members as apportioned by the General Assembly under Article 17 of the UN Charter. By October 28, the first contingents for UNEF were in place.

The mandate of UNEF was renewed twice for six months, but in April, 1975 Egypt would only agree to a three month renewal. UNEF was again renewed for three months on July 24, 1975 and its mandate expires October 24, 1975.

UNDOF

The creation of UNDOF was part of the May 30, 1974 disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria. Following the announcement of the agreement, the Security Council on May 31, 1974 adopted a resolution, cosponsored by the United States and the USSR, welcoming the disengagement agreement and deciding to set up immediately under its authority a UN Disengagement Observer Force for an initial period of six months. The Secretary General informed the Council that UNDOF would be organized on the basis of the same general principles as UNEF and that its personnel would be drawn from UN military personnel already in the area. UNEF's Austrian and Peruvian contingents, as well as elements of the Canadian and Polish logistical contingents, were designated for UNDOF. Contingents began

UNCLASSIFIED

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to move to the Golan sector on June 3, 1974 supplementing the small group of UNTSO observers who had monitored the maintenance and the cease-fire on the Golan Heights since October 1973.

UNDOF's mandate was most recently renewed by the Security Council on May 28, 1975 for a further period ending November 30, 1975.

Composition and Deployment of the Forces

In all of the forces, the principle of equitable geographical distribution has been maintained to the extent possible compatible with the effectiveness of the operations. UNTSO (total strength: 366) differs from UNEF and UNDOF in that it is composed of only unarmed officers and functions in small observer teams made up of various nationalities. Seventeen countries have supplied personnel in numbers ranging from four to thirty-six. The US and USSR have each supplied 36 officers who serve in UNTSO units both in the Sinai and on the Golan Heights. UNEF (total strength: 3919) is composed of five units of battalion size which are deployed and operate under their own officers. These units are supplied by Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Senegal, and Sweden. Canada and Poland supply logistics units for the Force. Austria and Iran have contributed units ranging up to battalion size to UNDOF (total strength: 1198). In some sectors these units share base facilities and patrols. As in UNEF, Canada and Poland provide the logistic support.

Command and Control

The present arrangement for command and control of all three forces was approved by the Security Council on August 15, 1975 when the Secretary General proposed certain revisions in the previous structure. Under these arrangements, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo (Finland) is the Chief Coordinator of the operations of UNTSO, UNEF and UNDOF in the Middle East. Major General Bengt Liljestranal (Sweden) is Commander of UNEF and Major General Hannes Philipp (Austria) is

UNCLASSIFIED

Commander of UNDOF. UNTSO is commanded by a subordinate officer under the guidance of General Siilasvuo whose headquarters utilize UNTSO offices and facilities in Jerusalem. In addition to his coordinating the three forces, General Siilasvuo participates on behalf of the UN in the Military Working Group of the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva.

General Siilasvuo reports directly to Secretary General Waldheim. The Secretary General's staff responsible for the three forces is the Office of Special Political Affairs headed by Under-Secretaries General Roberto Guyer and Brian Urquhart. The Secretary General's authority derives from the relevant Security Council resolutions and his powers under the UN Charter.

The Security Council decides, normally on the recommendation of the Secretary General, on the size, the composition, the mandate and the command of the peacekeeping forces, as well as on all major political problems these forces face. All day-to-day decisions within this framework are made by the force commander, who normally secures the approval of the Secretary General and his staff for them. The Secretary General reports regularly to the Security Council on the functioning of these forces, and the members of the Security Council then consider these reports to see if any new decisions are required. Despite some differences of opinion among the members or between members and the Secretary General, these differences have not to date impeded the operation of the peacekeeping forces.

In the field, the peacekeeping forces commanders have likewise had a large amount of success. They have continued to lend their assistance and good offices when one of the parties raises questions concerning the observance of the agreed limitations on armaments and forces. They have also continued the practice of separate meetings with military representatives of Egypt and Israel concerning the implementation of the terms of reference of the forces and the weekly inspections of the limited forces areas and in the zones of separation. Close contact and liaison have also been maintained with the military liaison staffs of Egypt and Israel.

The forces control entry to the zones of separation through a network of manned observation posts and mobile patrols. Their authority is seldom challenged. When the zones of separation manned by UNEF or UNDOF are entered by forces of either side, these forces are escorted out. UNDOF and UNEF are authorized to resist as a last resort, however, if in their judgment, there is no other means of effecting withdrawal. On the rare occasions when the authority of the inspection patrols is challenged in the fulfillment of their mission in areas of limited forces and armaments controlled by either side, their main recourse is to protest violations of the existing disengagement agreements.

### The Roles and Experience

UNTSO's function has always been to observe, report, and mediate. UNDOF's mandate calls for it to use its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire and supervise the agreement, to man the zone of separation, and to carry out inspections under the agreement and report to the parties and the UN Secretary General. UNEF mans, patrols and controls the zone of disengagement, and is responsible for the weekly inspections of the Israeli and Egyptian areas of limited armaments and forces, as well as of other areas agreed by the parties.

Both in the Sinai and on the Golan Heights, UNTSO military observers detailed to UNEF and UNDOF carry out periodic inspections of the limited arms and missile-free zones. UNEF and UNDOF battalions police the two buffer zones, provide the show of military presence, and run the logistics. In the Golan, UNTSO maintains certain observation posts.

All three forces have had the usual logistical difficulties of operating in rugged terrain and UNEF and UNDOF have had to go through the expected shaking-down period of all newly-formed military forces. Thanks to the skill of their senior officers and to the special training for international peacekeeping which many of the national units have had, the coordination and cooperation between units from many different countries have been remarkably smooth and effective.

The UN forces have had to deal with the different parties under conditions of mutual suspicion and tension. Under these circumstances, the cooperation which the UN forces have had from the parties has varied, particularly in conducting on-site inspection and acting to mediate local military and related problems.

One problem for all three forces has been "freedom of movement" as Israel has refused to accept on her territory members of contingents of countries which do not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. Soviet UNTSO observers cannot function on Israeli territory and contingents from Poland in UNDOF and Senegal in UNEF, for example, have had restrictions placed on their movements with the forces. The Secretary General has been attempting to deal with this problem and some progress was made on the Golan for the Polish UNDOF supply contingent.

In general, the UN forces have enjoyed relative security in the period since the 1973 war. There have been occasional misunderstandings with local commanders that have temporarily impeded the UN forces' movement. There has never been, however, a deliberate attack by local forces on UN troops or installations.

#### Incidents

The experience of the UN forces in the Middle East has been a very positive one. Casualties from incidents or accidents have been few and relatively minor. The most serious incident was the destruction of a Canadian aircraft carrying nine members of the Canadian forces by a Syrian anti-aircraft battery which was not deliberately or wittingly firing on a recognized UN aircraft. All other casualties have been the result of operational accidents or the accidental detonation of land mines, but were not the result of deliberate action against the UN forces by any of the contending parties. According to the casualty figures contained in the Secretary General's reports to the Security Council, a total of 36 fatalities have occurred over the past two years out of a total force of approximately 5500 men.



UNCLASSIFIED

-7-

On several occasions the force commanders have protested the interference with patrols in the performance of their duties. These protests have normally been accepted and the situation remedied. On other occasions, there has been firing in the vicinity of UN posts. While it was not established that this firing was directed at UN forces, protests were filed and appropriate measures taken to assure that the incidents would not be repeated. However, both the UNEF and UNDOF zones of separation have in general been quiet and peaceful.

The record of the UN forces is remarkable. Since 1973, its units have stood between the contenders in a bitter dispute, have avoided major incidents and, by timely action, have managed to avert and control a number of violations of the agreements that could have had serious effects on the fragile peace.

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Sept. 9

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Jack --

Les Janka advises he has just received a voluminous report from State on the U.N. forces matter. He indicated that he would like to boil that matter down to a single six or seven page memo rather than the mass of material he now has. I assured him that that would be your recommendation. He promises me he will have the finished product to us by noon Wednesday.

Russ

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 9, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: JACK MARSH

FROM: RUSS ROURKE *R*

Les advises State input "cob" today. Further indicates that NSC should have their paper prepared ~~by~~ *by* ~~cob~~ tomorrow.

FYI - Les tells me that NSC doesn't think this is a very good idea in the first place... UN has lost about 25 men in Middle East... etc. I indicated that this paper will particularly be helpful for your purposes.

In any event, paper will be completed and expedited to us.



THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

September 8, 1975


MEMORANDUM FOR: RUSS ROURKE

FROM:

JACK MARSH



Check with Les Janka on the status of the background paper on the U. N. forces in the Middle East.



Middle East

September 4, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT  
FROM: JACK MARSH  
SUBJECT: Summary of U. N. Experience  
in the Middle East

As I mentioned to you yesterday, the President is most interested in having available a summary of the U. N. experience in the Middle East since the Arab-Israel War of 1973. I am of the view that he would like to make this available to Members of Congress.

Referring to our conversation yesterday and my earlier phone conversation with Bud McFarlane on Sunday, I believe your people are in the process of pulling this together.

My thoughts as to what the history or overview should contain would be the following:

- Background on the introduction of U. N. troops.
- The role and mission of the U. N. troops.
- The numbers in the U. N. contingent.
- The place where they were stationed.
- The command and control apparatus.
- A synopsis of their experience in the performance of their mission.





*Middle East*

-- A summary of incidents to include casualties.

Would it be helpful to you if we were to use Les Janka as a contact point on this question for the preparation of this.

cc: Bud McFarlane

JOM/dl



pre notice Sinai

Spahn / Case  
Morgan / Brownfield

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 (b)

White House Guide Lines, Feb. 24, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By AMP NARA, Date 1/14/16

TALKING POINTS FOR WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING OF CONGRESS CONCERNING PARTICIPATION OF U.S. PERSONNEL IN SINAI SURVEILLANCE ARRANGEMENTS

-- In the course of our current negotiations for an Egyptian-Israeli Interim Agreement in Sinai, Israel has taken the position that it cannot agree to withdraw from the strategic Sinai passes unless the U.S. agrees to man warning sites in the passes. In our judgment, Israeli withdrawal from the passes is essential if an agreement is to be reached, and an agreement is essential if a breakdown of the negotiating process and the risk of renewed hostilities are to be avoided.

-- The details of a U.S. presence are still under negotiation with the Israelis and Egyptians, but we have established certain principles upon which any such arrangement will be based.

-- First, the U.S. presence will be an extension on the ground of the role we undertook in the January 1974 disengagement agreement to provide aerial surveillance of the two sides' compliance with that agreement.

-- Second, it will be entirely within the United Nations buffer zone between the forces of the two sides and therefore supportive of though independent from the UN peacekeeping role.

-- Third, the American personnel involved will be civilians who will only have personal weapons for self-defense and who will be as limited as possible in numbers.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

2

-- Fourth, these U.S. personnel will be assigned to perform two kinds of functions: one group will perform a non-technical management and supervisory function at two electronic warning stations, one Israeli and one Egyptian, which will be manned by Israeli and Egyptian technical personnel, respectively; the other group will man exclusively American posts in each of the two passes whose purpose will be to provide surveillance with simple radar and sensory devices over the Eastern and Western approaches to the passes. The number of such posts has yet to be agreed.

CONFIDENTIAL



① ENG

Synopsis in  
in detail  
decision  
Friday

Check of  
Zarb

② Dunlop  
ILA/Hall  
Keep II posted  
by phone or cable

1. Whose  
employees?  
a. private (K)  
b. U.S.

\*2 Cederberg  
arrives

Tel Avi - 29 <sup>th</sup>  
30 <sup>th</sup>  
31 <sup>st</sup>

Call him

3. Can't let it  
break down.

4. Stay out front  
on heat, gas.

\*\* Send warning msg

Costs. / JTR

Can be sold  
must be  
flushed +  
p/o overall  
plan

JTR - name of  
3 on Int.


Train  
Evans  
Ray





**Sinai Peninsula  
Disengagement Agreement  
September 1975**

X → ← X The common road along the Gulf of Suez





THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: JACK MARSH

In reference to the Sinai Surveillance matter, set out below are short summaries of Members of the House and Senate who were contacted as to their views on Congressional reaction:

Congressman Thomas Morgan: He had no objection to non-military personnel being used, but felt there would be some opposition. He felt most House members would go along with it.

Senator Robert P. Griffin: He raised the question as to why not have the U.N. do it, but said if it was the only way to get an agreement, then it would be worth a try.

Congressman William Broomfield: He felt he could probably go along with a small number of civilian personnel, if it was part of an overall settlement package.

Senator Bob Byrd: He indicated concern about the proposal, and pointed out this is the way we got involved in Vietnam. His first response was "it concerns me".

Congressman John Rhodes: He had a cautious attitude, and is of the opinion that it can be sold if properly presented and must be certain of an overall plan. Rhodes also asked a question about cost.

Congressman Elford Cederberg: He says we cannot let the situation there break down inasmuch as the alternative is not acceptable, and was of the view that the Congress would go along. He asked the question as to whether they would be U. S. employees of a private outfit.

Congressman George Mahon: He had a very cautious attitude. Cited the Vietnam experience, but said we have got to do something. Felt this would not sound too bad, and he wants to be with the President, and was not shocked by such a proposal. He feels it must be part of a total settlement.



See attachments for Senators John McClellan, Clifford Case, Milton Young and Congressman Wayne Hays.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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See attachments for Senators John McClellan, Clifford Case, Milton Young and Congressman Wayne Hays.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

M

August 13, 1975

JACK,

Les, after delivering the attached item, asked that you provide him with a brief memo at the end of the day, indicating the feedback which you, Bill and Charlie might have gotten during the day on your various Hill contacts. HAK has asked for this sometime this evening. ✕

Please note...the attached map is classified.

R  
RUSS

\* Sent  
8/13  
M





THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Aug 13

Mr. Marsh:

Attached is the map I promised you on the Sinai disengagement concept. In general the idea would be to move the UN buffer zone eastward to overlap the two principal passes -- but these are the details now under negotiation.

The UN emergency force occupying the UN zone numbers about 4000 international troops. A UN truce supervisory organization of some 300 men includes 36 Americans.

Les Janka



A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Les Janka', written over the typed name.



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This form marks the file location of item number 1a  
listed on the pink Withdrawal Sheet found at the front of this folder.

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CLASSIFICATION

FROM: JACK MARSH  
TO: DON RUMSFELD

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PAGES 6

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SITUATION ROOM

TOR: 141307Z

RELEASED BY:

*[Handwritten signature]*

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

OOB



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By SD NARA, Date 3/17/14

~~SECRET~~

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Cancelled per E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.3 and  
Archivist's memo of March 16, 1983

THE WHITE HOUSE By AWO NARA date 1/4/86

WASHINGTON

August 14, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: DON RUMSFELD

FROM: JACK MARSH *Jack*

Attached is a copy of a memo to Secretary of State Kissinger summarizing the responses to Members to the Sinai Surveillance question.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: JACK MARSH

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See attachments for Senators John McClellan, Clifford Case, Milton Young and Congressman Wayne Hays.

All calls made during the day on Wednesday, August 13.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 13, 1975

ADDENDUM REPORT FROM W. T. KENDALL TO J. MARSH RE SINAI PASSES

Senator Milton Young was contacted at 6:00 p.m. Washington time:  
The Senator has no objection to this arrangement. He feels that the plan has merit but thinks there will be some criticism. He asked this question: "Would the information obtained by U.S. personnel be available to the United Nations?" He feels this would be essential to avoid the charge that we might be favoring Israel in a dispute.



RED TAG

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JACK MARSH

FROM:

CHARLES LEPPERT, JR. *cdg.*

SUBJECT:

Report on Conversation with Rep. Wayne Hays (D-Ohio)

Talked by telephone to Rep. Wayne Hays on the Egyptian - Israeli Agreement on the Sinai. The report is as follows:

Date of Contact:

August 13, 1975

Time:

4:40 p.m.

Place:

St. Clairsville, Ohio

Comment:

It's O.K. with me but I can't say what ~~some~~ <sup>Some</sup> ~~up~~ there will say. I don't think there will be a bad reaction to the use of civilian personnel. If there is any criticism it will be muted on the Hill because of the Israeli involvement. You will not get the same kind of reaction that you got on the Greek-Turkey on Turkish aid situation.



August 14, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

JACK MARSH

I had an opportunity to see Lee Hamilton on the HMI today, and I brought up the Sinai Surveillance matter to him as to his views, and how he thought the Congress would react.

Lee was very cautious in his response, and indicated reluctant approval. He recognizes the need for an interim agreement. He feels that if this is the linchpin necessary to pull it together, he could probably support it. He has reservations about the introduction of any American personnel onto the ground in this volatile situation.

My own assessment of his attitude is that he will not be an advocate, but neither will he encourage opposition, and probably would vote to support the effort.

cc: BMcFarlane  
LJanka  
JOM:cb



REACTION TO MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT

7  
[Sept 1975?]

House Leadership

Speaker Albert -- Non-committal but leaning positive.

Majority Leader O'Neill -- Generally positive but has many questions and indicated he would reserve judgment until more fully briefed. Said he has already been contacted by the Jewish lobby which seemed ok on the technician question but expressed concern about how the City of Jerusalem was to be protected.

McFall -- No contact yet.

John Rhodes -- Receptive but non-committal.

Bob Michel -- No contact yet.

Phil Burton -- Wants to help but non-committal until he receives fuller briefing.

John Anderson -- Expects trouble on the technician question.

David Satterfield -- OK

Joe Waggoner -- OK but interested in the cost of the technician project.

George Mahon -- OK

Broomfield -- No problems with the technicians but greatly concerned about the monetary costs.

Senate Leadership

Eastland -- OK

Mansfield -- Serious problems with the technician feature.

Scott -- Non-committal and nervous about the technician feature.

Moss -- OK

### Senate Leadership Continued

Stennis -- Scowcroft contacted and Stennis receptive but adamant on military personnel not being used as technicians.

McClellan -- OK

Sparkman -- Will do all he can to be helpful and feels the administration must emphasize the clearly technical nature of the civilians.

### Other Contacts

Percy -- Very supportive, concerned about the monetary costs.

Pell -- Believes any questions can be worked out within the Committee.

Buchanan -- Very happy. Will do all he can to support the agreement.

Bingham -- Very supportive.

Fraser -- Thought the agreement was an excellent one.

Church -- His only concern is what will happen to the technicians if war broke out.

Javits -- Very supportive.

Zablocki -- Given the alternatives, he thinks the agreement is ok and will make no comment until he is fully briefed.

Rosenthal -- Unhappy about the technicians, but will support the agreement.

Findley -- In total support of the agreement, but is concerned that the Israelies will feel no need to make further progress toward peace.

Hays -- Fully supportive, said agreement was a brilliant achievement.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Josh —

Here is what I  
sent out in your  
Name.

Les —



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1161

PAGE 01 STATE 207709

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ORIGIN SS-15

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DRAFTED BY TEXT AS RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE  
APPROVED BY S/S-O: DAVID MACK

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 207709

F.O. 11652IGDS

TAGS: IS, EG, PFOR

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR CONGRESSMAN ELFORD CEDERBERG

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO REPRESENTATIVE  
CEDERBERG FROM JACK MARSH, COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT:

BEGIN TEXT:

THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED TODAY THAT AN INTERIM AGREEMENT  
HAS BEEN REACHED BY ISRAEL AND WILL BE INITIALED LATER  
TODAY.

THE EMBASSY CAN PROVIDE YOU THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT  
ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT TODAY.

THE PRESIDENT WILL BE SENDING TO THE CONGRESS THE TEXTS  
OF THE VARIOUS DOCUMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE AGREEMENT.  
IN THE MEANTIME, HE ASKED ME TO INFORM YOU OF THE FOLLOWING  
POINTS:

1. THIS IS AN HISTORIC FIRST: THE FIRST TIME THERE HAS  
BEEN A MIDDLE EAST PEACE AGREEMENT THAT DID NOT FOLLOW ON  
THE HEELS OF WAR. THIS AGREEMENT ACHIEVED ALMOST TWO

YEARS AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR IN 1973 WE BELIEVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DPO, 1/14/82



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DEMONSTRATES THAT BOTH SIDES WANT TO BUILD A LASTING PEACE.

(2) THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AGREEMENT IN FORESTALLING ANOTHER MAJOR CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AN ACCOMPANYING OIL EMBARGO CANNOT BE OVERESTIMATED.

(3) IF IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE THIS STEP AND GENERATE BOTH NEW HOPE AND TANGIBLE MOVEMENT TOWARD PEACE, OUR JUDGMENT WAS THAT THE ALTERNATIVE OF MOVING DIRECTLY TO TACKLE ALL THE ISSUES OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT IN GENEVA WOULD HAVE LED TO STALEMATE, A CERTAIN DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION, AND PROBABLY A NEW WAR AND ANOTHER OIL BOYCOTT.

(4) IT BECAME CLEAR SEVERAL MONTHS AGO THAT THERE WOULD BE NO AGREEMENT WITHOUT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM IN THE GIDDI AND MITLA PASSES WITH PROVISION FOR BOTH PARTIES TO MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE STATIONS IN ORDER TO INCREASE THEIR SENSE OF SECURITY AGAINST ATTACK.

(5) AFTER TRYING ALL FORMULAS, THE ONLY ONE WHICH BOTH PARTIES COULD ACCEPT WAS FOR THE US TO PLAY A ROLE IN OVERSEEING THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM. IT WAS WITH RELUCTANCE THAT WE AGREED TO THE PARTIES' REQUEST THAT WE TRY TO FIND AN APPROPRIATE, ACCEPTABLE PROPOSAL.

(6) WE REJECTED ANY IDEA OF ACTUALLY OPERATING STATIONS FOR EGYPT OR ISRAEL, OR FOR THERE TO BE ANY US MILITARY PERSONNEL INVOLVED OR FOR OUR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL TO HAVE ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENFORCING OR SUPERVISING THE AGREEMENT ITSELF. THE US ROLE, AS SPELLED OUT IN THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSAL, IS A VERY LIMITED TECHNICAL FUNCTION PLUS VERIFICATION OF THE NUMBERS AND FUNCTIONS AT THE ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN STATIONS. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF US CIVILIANS WILL NOT EXCEED 200 SO THERE WILL, IN EFFECT, BE NO MORE THAN 100 PERSONS PRESENT IN THE EARLY WARNING AREA AT ANY ONE TIME.

(7) THE PRESIDENT HAS CONSISTENTLY TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THE US PROPOSAL MUST BE APPROVED BY CONGRESS BEFORE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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IT COULD BECOME OPERATIONAL.

(8) THERE WAS VERY GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT HAD THIS AGREEMENT NOT BEEN CONCLUDED, ANOTHER CONFLICT WOULD HAVE ENSUED BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. THE COST TO THE US, AS WELL AS TO THE COMBATANTS, WOULD HAVE BEEN

INCALCULABLE HAD THIS OCCURRED. THAT IS WHY THE PRESIDENT WAS WILLING TO RECOMMEND A LIMITED US CIVILIAN ROLE.

(9) AS IT IS, THE CONDITIONS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN CREATED FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD DURING WHICH ISRAEL WILL BE SAFE FROM ATTACK, THE US AND WESTERN EUROPE WILL BE SAFE FROM THE FALL-OUT OF A WAR AND CAN LIVE TO BUILD MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES. THE INFLUENCE OF THE USSR IN THE AREA WILL NOT INCREASE, AND THERE IS A SERIOUS POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVEMENT IN ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS.

(10) THE US INTENDS TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO HELP KEEP THE FRAGILE MOMENTUM FOR PEACE ALIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND WILL ALSO WORK TO STRENGTHEN ITS BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH ISRAEL AND THE KEY ARAB STATES. THE AREA IS TOO IMPORTANT TO OUR VITAL NATIONAL INTEREST NOT TO REMAIN ACTIVELY INVOLVED. WE WILL BE SUBMITTING RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CONGRESS LATER THIS MONTH FOR FY 76 ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR ISRAEL, EGYPT, JORDAN AND SYRIA.

(11) IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED, IT WILL REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT. SECRETARY KISSINGER WILL BE TESTIFYING BEFORE BOTH HOUSES ABOUT THE US PROPOSAL, AS WELL AS OUR GENERAL STRATEGY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST NOW THAT THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED. OUR REASSESSMENT HAS PREPARED THE WAY FOR A NEW APPROACH WHICH WE HOPE CAN BE A COOPERATIVE EFFORT BY BOTH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE CONGRESS.

END TEXT

NOTE FOR EMBASSY:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





*Department of State*

**TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PLEASE DELIVER THE CODEL THE WIRELESS FILE TEXT OF  
THE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT NOTED IN SECOND PARAGRAPH  
OF ABOVE MESSAGE.

INGERSOLL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORAN

SEP 3 1975

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

M

September 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH  
MAX FRIEDERSDORF

FROM: JIM CONNOR

The President has asked that I send you both a copy of Max Fisher's letter to him on the Egyptian/Israeli agreement.

encl.

By Phone from  
Detroit  
9/3/75

Dear Mr. President:

My congratulations again on the agreement. I have already obtained indications of complete support from many organizations. The most important of these are: Ed Sanders, President of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Lewis Cole, Chairman of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg, who is both Acting Chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations and President of the American Jewish Congress, and David Blumberg, President of B'nai B'rith. Copies of telegrams from these individuals are attached for your information. I have received assurances from all of them that their Washington offices will immediately begin working with the Congressional people to support your proposal. Senator Jackson is already backing away from the position he initially took, and I believe we will see more of this.

You may be sure that the American Jewish Community will do all it can to ensure Congressional acceptance of your plan, and the leaders are looking forward to an early meeting with you and Secretary Kissinger to demonstrate their backing for your proposals.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

  
Max M. Fisher

encls.

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

cc: General Scowcroft

The White House  
Washington

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S PRESIDENT GERALD R FORD

TE HOUSE DC

PAI ACCORD REPRESENTS HISTORIC STEP TOWARDS WORLD PEACE AND  
AMERICAN SECURITY. ALL AMERICANS CAN TAKE PRIDE IN THIS  
ORDINARY ACHIEVEMENT OF YOUR ADMINISTRATION. WILL DO ALL I CAN  
SUPPORT AND HELP IMPLEMENT THIS GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL  
KIND. RESPECTFULLY.

EDWARD SANDERS, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
COMMITTEE 1800 AVE OF THE STARS LOS ANGELES CA 90067

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White House  
Washington

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8 PMS PRESIDENT GERALD R FORD  
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10 WHITE HOUSE DC

11 WE WELCOME THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT INITIALED  
12 YESTERDAY BY BOTH SIDES AS A PROMISING STEP ON THE ROAD TO PEACE IN  
13 THAT TROUBLED AREA. WE COMMEND YOU AND SECRETARY KISSINGER ON YOUR  
14 INITIATIVE IN HELPING TO ACHIEVE THE AGREEMENT. WE HOPE THAT IT WILL  
15 PROVE TO HAVE LAID THE GROUND WORK FOR PROGRESS TOWARD THE STABLE  
16 AND JUST PEACE WITH SECURITY THAT HAS BEEN THE GOAL SHARED  
17 CONTINUALLY BY ISRAEL AND UNITED STATES.  
18  
19  
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22 LEWIS D COLE CHAIRMAN NATIONAL JEWISH COMMUNITY RELATION ADVISORY  
23 COUNCIL

24 NNNN  
25  
26

FORM 0805 PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, U. S. A

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TELEGRAM

9/2/75

Dear Mr. President:

We wholeheartedly support your call for the use of American civilians to monitor the new Sinai agreement. A U.S. presence there is essential for progress towards peace in the Middle East and for reducing world tensions.

The fact that small numbers of American civilian technicians will be stationed on both sides--and will be there at the request of both parties--should eliminate any serious apprehension that Americans will be drawn into some future conflict.

American citizens will not be there in any partisan capacity and will not be identified with the cause of either side. Any analogy to America's past involvement or to conflicts in any other part of the world is wholly misleading.

We trust that Congress--recognizing the crucial nature of the American commitments to monitor the agreement, to providing substantial military and economic aid to Israel and to assuring her oil supplies--will take appropriate action to ratify those commitments.

We are grateful for the contributions of our government in bringing about the agreement which carries with it the potential of an historic event for Israel and the Jewish people. If the parties faithfully and honestly carry out their promises and responsibilities the agreement can become the first affirmative step toward bringing genuine peace to the Middle East.

We commend you, Mr. President, and Secretary of State Kissinger for your remarkable and successful diplomatic effort.

Respectfully,

Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg  
President  
American Jewish Congress

The President of  
the United States  
White House



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PMS PRESIDENT GERALD FORD, DLR

WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

CONGRATULATIONS ON THE COMPLETION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE  
SINAI. IN ADOPTING THE COURSE FOR PEACE THAT OUR GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN  
URGING, ISRAEL HAS HAD TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL STRATEGIC CONCESSIONS. IT  
IS ONLY FITTING THAT ISRAEL SHOULD HAVE THE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY  
AID AND CIVILIAN MONITORS TO POLICE THE AGREEMENT. IT WOULD BE  
UNTHINKABLE IF THE HARD-WON SECOND STEP TOWARDS A MIDDLE EAST PEACE

SHOULD FAIL BECAUSE OF CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL

DAVID M BLUMBERG PRESIDENT B'NAI BRITH INTERNATIONAL

NNNN



SEPTEMBER 1, 1975

Office of the White House Press Secretary

M

THE WHITE HOUSE

## PROPOSAL

In connection with the early warning system referred to in Article IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date and as an integral part of that Agreement, (hereafter referred to as the Basic Agreement), the United States proposes the following:

1. The early warning system to be established in accordance with Article IV in the area shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement will be entrusted to the United States. It shall have the following elements:
  - A. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel. (Their locations are shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement.) Each station shall be manned by not more than 250 technical and administrative personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only within their stations.
  - B. In support of these stations, to provide tactical early warning and to verify access to them, three watch stations shall be established by the United States in the Mitla and Giddi Passes as will be shown on the map attached to the agreement. These stations shall be operated by United States civilian personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be established three unmanned electronic sensor fields at both ends of each Pass and in the general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and from those stations.
2. The United States civilian personnel shall perform the following duties in connection with the operation and maintenance of these stations.

(MORE)





- A. At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph 1A, above, United States personnel will verify the nature of the operations of the stations and all movement into and out of each station and will immediately report any detected divergency from its authorized role of visual and electronic surveillance to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations emergency force.
  - B. At each watch station described in paragraph 1B, above, the United States personnel will immediately report to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations emergency force and movement of armed forces, other than the United Nations emergency force, into either Pass and any observed preparations for such movement.
  - C. The total number of United States civilian personnel assigned to functions under this proposal shall not exceed 200. Only civilian personnel shall be assigned to functions under this proposal.
3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities covered by this proposal, except for small arms required for their protection.
  4. The United States personnel serving the early warning system shall be allowed to move freely within the area of the system.
  5. The United States and its personnel shall be entitled to have such support facilities as are reasonably necessary to perform their functions.
  6. The United States personnel shall be immune from local criminal, civil, tax and customs jurisdiction and may be accorded any other specific privileges and immunities provided for in the United Nations emergency force agreement of February 13, 1957.
  7. The United States affirms that it will continue to perform the functions described above for the duration of the Basic Agreement.
  8. Notwithstanding any other provision of this proposal, the United States may withdraw its personnel only if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. In the latter case the Parties to the Basic Agreement will be informed in advance in order to give them the opportunity to make alternative arrangements. If both Parties to the Basic Agreement request the United States to conclude its role under this proposal, the United States will consider such requests conclusive.

(MORE)

9. Technical problems including the location of the watch stations will be worked out through consultation with the United States.

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Office of the White House Press Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE

## ANNEX TO EGYPT-ISRAEL AGREEMENT

Within five days after the signature of the Egypt-Israeli Agreement, representatives of the two Parties shall meet in the military working group of the Middle East peace conference at Geneva to begin preparation of a detailed protocol for the implementation of the Agreement. The working group will complete the protocol within two weeks. In order to facilitate preparation of the protocol and implementation of the Agreement, and to assist in maintaining the scrupulous observance of the ceasefire and the elements of the Agreement, the two Parties have agreed on the following principles, which are an integral part of the Agreement, as guidelines for the working group.

## 1. Definitions of the lines and areas.

The deployment lines, areas of limited forces and armaments, buffer zones, the area south from line E and west from line M, other designated areas, road sections for common use and other features referred to in Article IV of the Agreement shall be as indicated on the attached map.

## 2. Buffer zones.

(a) Access to the buffer zones will be controlled by the United Nations emergency force, according to procedures to be worked out by the working group and the United Nations emergency force.

(B) Aircraft of either party will be permitted to fly freely up to the forward line of that party. Reconnaissance aircraft of either party may fly up to the middle line of the buffer zone between E and J on an agreed schedule.

(C) In the buffer zone, between line E and J there will be established under Article IV of the Agreement an early warning system entrusted to United States civilian personnel as detailed in a separate proposal, which is a part of this Agreement.

(D) Authorized personnel shall have access to the buffer zone for transit to and from the early warning system; the manner in which this is carried out shall be worked out by the working group and the United Nations emergency force.

(MORE)



3. Area south of line E and west of line M.

(A) In this area, the United Nations emergency force will assure that there are no military or para-military forces of any kind, military fortifications and military installations; it will establish checkpoints and have the freedom of movement necessary to perform this function.

(B) Egyptian civilians and third country civilian oil field personnel shall have the right to enter, exit from, work, and live in the above indicated area, except for buffer zones 2A, and 2B and the United Nations posts. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area to perform normal civil police functions among the civilian population in such numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall be provided for in the protocol.

(C) Entry to and exit from the area, by land, by air or by sea, shall be only through United Nations emergency force checkpoints. The United Nations emergency force shall also establish checkpoints along the road, the dividing line and at other points, with the precise locations and number to be included in the protocol.

(D) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area as agreed by the working group.

(E) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian installations and infrastructures.

(F) Procedures for use of the common sections of the coastal road along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the working group and detailed in the protocol.

4. Aerial surveillance.

There shall be a continuation of aerial reconnaissance missions by the United States over the areas covered by the agreement (the area between lines F and K), following the same procedures already in practice. The missions will ordinarily be carried out at a frequency of one mission every 7 to 10 days, with either party or the United Nations emergency force empowered to request an earlier mission. The United States Government will make the mission results available expeditiously to Israel, Egypt and the chief coordinator of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Middle East.

5. Limitation of Forces and Armaments

(A) Within the areas of limited forces and armaments (the areas between lines J and K and line E and F) the major limitations shall be as follows:

- (1) Eight (8) standard infantry battalions
- (2) Seventy-five (75) tanks
- (3) Seventy-two (72) artillery pieces, including heavy mortars (E. E. with caliber larger than 120 MM), whose range shall not exceed twelve (12) KM.
- (4) The total number of personnel shall not exceed eight thousand (8,000).
- (5) Both Parties agree not to station or locate in the area weapons which can reach the line of the other side.
- (6) Both Parties agree that in the areas between lines J and K, and between line A (Of the Disengagement Agreement of January 18, 1974) and line E, they will construct no new fortifications or installations for forces of a size greater than that agreed herein.

(B) The major limitations beyond the areas of limited forces and armament will be:

- (1) Neither side will station nor locate any weapon in areas from which they can reach the other line.
- (2) The Parties will not place anti-aircraft missiles within an area of ten(10)kilometres east of line K and west of line F, respectively.

(C) The United Nations Emergency Force will conduct inspections in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within these areas.

6. Process of Implementation

The detailed implementation and timing of the redeployment of forces, turnover of oil fields, and other arrangements called for by the Agreement, Annex and Protocol shall be determined by the Working Group, which will agree on the stages of this process, including the phased movement of Egyptian troops to line E and Israeli troops to line J. The first phase will be the transfer of the oil fields and installations to Egypt. This process will begin within two weeks from the signature of the Protocol with the introduction of the necessary technicians, and it will be completed no later than eight weeks after it begins. The details of the phasing will be worked out in the Military Working Group.

Implementation of the redeployment shall be completed within 5 months after signature of the Protocol.

\_\_\_\_\_  
For the Government  
of the Arab Egyptian Republic

\_\_\_\_\_  
For the Government of Israel

\_\_\_\_\_  
Witness

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SEPTEMBER 1, 1975

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

## STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The interim agreement being initialed by Egypt and Israel this evening reduces the risk of war in the Middle East and provides fresh opportunities for further progress toward peace for a troubled area whose turmoil has affected the lives and prosperity of peoples of all nations.

Under the agreement Israel will withdraw its forces from the Sinai Passes and oil fields, both parties agree not to resort to force, and to continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace settlement. I have consistently worked for this outcome. I am deeply gratified by it and proud of the contribution America has made. By reducing the dangers of military and economic warfare this agreement is of great significance for the well-being of every American.

The Parties have taken an important and indispensable step on the long and hard road to peace. The countries concerned made clear that they wanted America's effort to continue. Following my meetings with President Sadat in Salzburg and with Prime Minister Rabin in Washington, the United States intensified its active mediation.

The agreement is fair and balanced, and we hope that as a further practical test of peace on the ground it will contribute to building the confidence between the two sides which is required if ultimate peace is to be achieved.

The United States does not consider this agreement an end in itself, and it is strongly committed to continue to help make progress on all aspects of the problem.

I will be speaking personally with Prime Minister Rabin of Israel and President Sadat of Egypt to congratulate them on their leadership and statesmanship which in large measure made the agreement possible. I commend Secretary Kissinger for his tireless efforts in bringing about a successful conclusion to the negotiations.

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POOL REPORT - CAMP DAVID - September 1, 1975

Since the telephone conversations and a brief press conference afterwards were piped into the Press Room, this pool report will just concern the other matters.

The President was wearing a brown sportcoat with an open shirt collar and sat in an easy chair beside a fireplace. The fire could be described as a crackling fire. A white telephone was located on a stand by the President's chair.

During parts of his conversation with Prime Minister Rabin and then with President Sadat, the President read from a paper. The calls in order were to Secretary Kissinger, Prime Minister Rabin and President Sadat. The President told the pool he swam here at Camp David about 1/2 mile yesterday and another 1/2 mile today. He said that's about all of the exercise he is getting here. He also said Liberty is expected to have pups in about two weeks.

He said he will meet Kissinger when he arrives at Andrews Air Force Base Wednesday night. The arrival time is expected to be in the area of 9:30 or 10:00 p.m.

Thursday morning at 8:00 the President will meet with bi-partisan Congressional leaders. He expects to leave for Seattle Thursday morning at about 10:00.

The weather here at Camp David is foggy and drizzly and the President says they are thinking of driving down to Thurmount airport to take the helicopter from there back to the White House later today. The weather prohibits a helicopter take off from Camp David.

Forrest Boyd - Mutual  
Bob Schieffer - CBS

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JACK MARSH

SUBJECT: Your Meeting Today With  
Senator Hugh Scott and  
Congressman John Rhodes

In reference to your meeting today with Senator Hugh Scott and Congressman John Rhodes, I would add the following background information by way of talking points to any that you may already have:

1. Point out to Senator Scott that he was not contacted when the surveillance proposal was first suggested, back in mid-August, because at the time he was moving from place-to-place in Hawaii. All contacts were made by phone. The decision was made because of the high sensitivity at that time not to phone persons where there was a substantial risk of interception. We did not contact Senator Mansfield in Portugal nor Carl Albert and Michel in the Soviet Union. We did call both Case and McClellan in Alaska, but felt that the line was secure enough there for that purpose.
2. It is my view that we should view several major pieces of legislation including the Sinai surveillance teams as a part of an overall package. Under this approach it is envisioned that adoption of one part of the package could lead, by the momentum, to the adoption of other major proposals. The steps that I would suggest, and you may wish to change the order, are the following:

- a. Push very hard for the resolution on the Mid-East peace proposal and try to get it through the Congress first.
  - b. Second phase -- and you may wish to do this first rather than second -- press for the adoption of the energy compromise.
  - c. The third step would be House consideration of the Turkish matter which is already passed the Senate. It is my view that if we can get the approval of the Mid-East resolution, this will help us on the Turkey matter.
  - d. Finally, I believe that it would be useful for you to point out to the leaders at the meeting today and the ones tomorrow the grave concern that you have about the New York City situation and the lesson that it holds for all of us. It is my thought that emphasis should be placed on the plight of New York to serve as an example of absolute necessity of financial responsibility and restraint in Federal spending. Recalling Governor Carey's remarks to you on New York being in dire straights because of legislation for which he had voted are words that every person should heed. With appropriations bills being the major legislative items in the next 60 days, the story of New York is a grim warning to the big spenders on the Hill.
3. In reference to items a, b and c above in the order that should be considered, this may be a question you would wish to put to Scott and Rhodes for their inputs. Since we will be relying on their help to move these on the Hill, it might be well to get them to suggest a sequence in which they be considered by the Congress, or at least propounded to the Joint Leadership Meeting tomorrow.
  4. You might wish to make brief reference to the forth coming veto on the HEW appropriations bill.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 4, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: MAX FRIEDERSDORF

FROM: JACK MARSH 

You will recall in the Republican Leadership meeting in John Rhodes' office yesterday, Congressman Devine raised a question about the oil guarantee provisions of the Sinai agreement. This was an area that Brent indicated he was not prepared to respond to. Now that the State Department team, who negotiated this agreement, are back, I believe we will be in a position to get a response to Sam's question. I would suggest that you have Les Janka work on this and get an answer framed that can be transmitted as promptly as possible to Sam.

In a similar vein, Barber Conable inquired whether or not the \$2.1 billion aid request included therein the oil guarantee matter. The consensus of the meeting was this was separate and apart inasmuch as the oil guarantee related to barrels of oil rather than purchase of oil -- it was thought it would not be in the \$2.1 billion.

Here again is a question that maybe Les can address and get the information for Barber Conable.

*Middle East*

September 4, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JACK MARSH

You might want to get Les Janka to pull together some information that would be helpful to inquiries Senator Strom Thurmond is receiving on the Sinai matter. I suspect others will be asked the same questions.

A question he is having trouble answering is one relating to the money requirements. Why are we advancing this amount of money? I pointed out that over a period of years there had been economic and military assistance to Israel and Egypt. I think we should show what these amounts have been, particularly additional amounts advanced in the 1973 war.

In all events, I think it would be most helpful if NSC could pull together a tight paper that addresses the funding situation, both for Egypt and Israel, for military and economic assistance. One of Max's people will get this to the Hill as soon as it is ready.

cc: Max Friedersdorf

JOM/dI



MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED  
SECRET ATTACHMENT

September 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: MAX FRIEDERSDORF

FROM: LES JANKA *for*

SUBJECT: Devine and Conable Inquiries on  
Oil Guarantees to Israel

Attached is a classified explanation of the U. S. undertakings to guarantee Israel energy supplies following the Sinai Agreement which is responsive to the questions raised by Representatives Devine and Conable in Wednesday's Republican leadership meeting.

This information may be given to the two Congressmen with the understanding that it is classified and sensitive in that it is drawn from the US-Israeli Memorandum of Agreement which, while provided to the Congressional committees, will not be made public. Preferably, the information should be transmitted orally and no paper be left with the Congressmen.

cc: Jack Marsh ✓

SECRET

There are two separate issues involved in the U. S. undertaking to supply Israel's energy needs following implementation of the Sinai Agreement. The first relates to normal circumstances during which the United States has agreed to take into account in its yearly economic assistance requests to the Congress, for a minimum period of five years, the loss to Israel of the Abu Rudeis oil (approximately 4.5 million tons per year). This agreement may be terminated by either side upon one year notification.

The second issue is that of a U. S. guarantee to ensure the availability of oil to Israel for normal consumption requirements in the event that Israel cannot, by its own methods, obtain it--i. e., in the event of an emergency. If the United States cannot obtain such oil for Israel from third countries, then the United States undertakes to provide it from its own production. Should the United States itself be embargoed, oil would be provided sufficient to cover Israel's needs at reduced consumption levels in accordance with International Energy Agency conservation formulas. Under this provision, oil would be made available for Israeli purchase and would not be an outright grant.

**NOTE:** The above information must be considered privileged and sensitive in that it is drawn from the U. S. -Israeli Memorandum of Agreement the precise provisions of which both parties have agreed will not be made public.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.3

SECRET

MR 99-64, #35 NSC ctr 3/11/96  
By KAT NARA, Date 4/1/96

Middle East

September 8, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:           MAX FRIEDERSDORF  
FROM:                        JACK MARSH

If I have not seen you, it is very important that I speak with you concerning the Les Janka memo on the oil agreement involving Israel. I think we should discuss this prior to the time that any of this information is used on the Hill. There are some potential problems with this.

JOM/dl





gandey to Les Jants  
9/9 11:00  
al

SEP 5 1975

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

JACK -

HERE IS THE DRAFT  
RES. STATE HAS GIVEN  
TO ALBERT, HOLT &  
CZARNECKI FOR COMMENT.  
ANY REACTIONS?

ok!  
Jm  
Les

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas the threat of another major outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East poses a threat to world peace and to the security and economy of the United States; and

Whereas an agreement signed on September 4, 1975 by the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel will, when it enters into force, constitute a significant step towards a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, thereby reducing the threat to the peace and to the security and economy of the United States; and

Whereas the President of the United States on September 1, 1975 transmitted to the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and to the Government of Israel identical proposals for United States participation in an Early Warning System, the text of which is incorporated herein, providing for the assignment of no more than two hundred United States civilian personnel to carry out certain specified functions and setting forth the terms and conditions thereof; and

Whereas that proposal would permit the Government of the United States to withdraw such personnel if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary; and

Whereas entry into force of the proposal is contingent upon its approval by the Congress of the United States;

Therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that it is the sense of Congress that it supports and approves the identical proposals the text of which follows; and that the President is accordingly encouraged to take such action as may be necessary to fulfill their purposes, including the use of any statutory authority of any agency of the Government of the United States:

Middle East

September 8, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:           RUSS ROURKE

FROM:                        JACK MARSH

Check with Les Janka on the status of the background paper  
on the U. N. forces in the Middle East.

JOM/dl



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# Kissinger's New 'Mideast' Shuttle: From State to the Hill

By Jeremiah O'Leary

Washington Star Staff Writer

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger is walking a curious tightrope with Congress on how much will be made public of America's commitments to Israel and Egypt in the interim Mideast peace agreement.

There is no longer any doubt that Congress is going to approve deployment of 200 American civilians to act as monitors in the zone between the two armies. It is also certain that Congress, at a later date, will approve a huge aid package for Israel and a substantial one for Egypt.

one legislator said: "Then their idea is to prepare a precis of the American commitments on which we and the State Department can agree. Presumably it will be this summary that will be made available to the whole Congress and released for public scrutiny."

Privately, members of Congress say that Kissinger is reluctant to fully publicize the commitments because some of them were made by Egypt and Israel to the United States since neither country can politically afford to make them

day, Chairman John Stennis, D-Miss., called it "useful but incomplete." Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., called for access to all agreement documents.

"The reason for all this caution is obviously that the U.S. commitment is sensitive," a veteran congressman who usually supports Kissinger said. "But this very caution makes us uneasy." Kissinger himself, in brief exchanges with the press, talks about full disclosure of everything in one

breath and about restricted disclosure to Congress in the next.

The chances are, well placed sources say, that some aspects of the agreement will never be disclosed. This was the case with the first disengagement in the Sinai and the Golan Heights disengagement. But the equation is different this time because Kissinger has undertaken to put 200 unarmed Americans between the Arab and Israeli armies. The big

question is whether the details that are being kept

(HIDEHST)

(BY NICHOLAS DANILOFF)

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- DESPITE OBJECTIONS BY SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER, THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE TODAY VOTED 12-2 TO PUBLISH FOUR SECRET DOCUMENTS ON U.S. COMMITMENTS TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT.

SEN. FRANK CHURCH, D-IDAHO, ANNOUNCED THE DECISION AFTER MEETING WITH KISSINGER IN CLOSED SESSION FOR TWO HOURS. ASKED IF THE DECISION WAS MADE OVER KISSINGER'S OBJECTIONS, CHURCH REPLIED: "YES, THE ACTION IS BEING TAKEN ON THE COMMITTEE'S RESPONSIBILITY."

EARLIER, THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE UNANIMOUSLY VOTED TO SEND 200 AMERICAN OBSERVERS TO THE SINAI DESERT TO MONITOR THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. THE RESOLUTION WILL GO TO THE FULL HOUSE FOR A VOTE NEXT WEEK.

KISSINGER LEFT THE SENATE COMMITTEE MEETING BEFORE THE VOTE WAS TAKEN.

"WE ARE NOT IN FAVOR OF DECLASSIFYING DOCUMENTS WHICH WERE SUBMITTED ON A CLASSIFIED BASIS," HE TOLD REPORTERS.

BUT HE ADDED, "WE HAD A VERY FRUITFUL DISCUSSION AND ARE MOVING TOWARDS A RESOLUTION OF OUR PROBLEM. REALLY, THE ONLY ISSUE IS WHAT FORM TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT OF ALL RELEVANT UNDERSTANDINGS AND COMMITMENTS."

SEN. CHARLES PERCY, R-ILL., SAID THE FOUR DOCUMENTS CONTAINED NO HIDDEN SURPRISES. HE SAID SINCE THEY HAD BEEN LEAKED TO THE NEWS MEDIA, "THEY HAVE ALREADY ESSENTIALLY BEEN PUBLISHED."

UPI 10-03 01:02 PED



UP-070

(SCHOOLS)

BOSTON (UPI) -- POLICE ON MOTORCYCLES BROKE UP A CROWD OF DEMONSTRATORS PRAYING NEAR A SOUTH BOSTON SCHOOL FRIDAY FOR A HALT TO COURT ORDERED DESEGREGATION. FIVE WOMEN AND ONE MAN WERE ARRESTED. THE ARRESTS WERE MADE AFTER A CROWD OF MORE THAN 40 PERSONS, MOSTLY WOMEN, REFUSED ORDERS TO DISPERSE WHILE CHANTING THE "HAIL MARY" AND "OUR FATHER" PRAYERS AT THE SMALL ST. MARY VERONICA PARK.

THE PARK IS ABOUT 40 YARDS FROM THE PATRICK GAVIN MIDDLE SCHOOL. U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE W. ARTHUR GARRITY HAS PROHIBITED THE GATHERING OF CROWDS WITHIN 100 YARDS OF ANY SCHOOL BUILDING. ALL OF THOSE ARRESTED WERE CHARGED WITH DISORDERLY CONDUCT.

ABOUT 18 PER CENT OF THE STUDENTS SCHOOL OFFICIALS EXPECTED THIS YEAR HAD NOT REPORTED TO CLASS AS OF LAST FRIDAY, SUPT. MARION FAHEY SAID THURSDAY.

UPI 10-03 01:04 PED

ROLL NO. 685

DEMOCRATIC

\*\*OTHER\*\*

REPUBLICAN

AMA			
DEVILL	NO	BUCHANAN	YES
FLOWERS	YES	DICKINSON	YES
JONES (AL)	YES	EDWARDS (AL)	YES
NICHOLS	NO		
		YOUNG (AK)	NO
ONE			
ORALL	YES	COPLAN	YES
		FRIDIS	YES
		STEEGER (AZ)	YES
ORIG			
ALEXANDER	NO	HAMMERSCHMIDT	YES
WILLS	YES		
THORNTON	YES		
ORONIA			
ANDERSON (CA)	YES	BELL	YES
BROWN (CA)	YES	BURGNER	YES
BURKE (CA)	YES	CLAUSEN, DON H.	YES
BURTON, JOHN	YES	CLAWSON, DEL	YES
BURTON, PHILLIP	YES	GOLDWATER	YES
CORMAN	YES	HINSHAW	NO
DANIELSON	YES	KETCHUM	NO
DELLORS	YES	LACOMASSINO	YES
EDWARDS (CA)	YES	MC CLOSKEY	YES
HANFORD	YES	MOOPHEAD (CA)	YES
HANKINS	YES	PETTIS	YES
JOHNSON (CA)	YES	ROUSSELOT	YES
KRIBS	YES	TALCOTT	YES
LESCOTT	YES	WIGGINS	NO
LEWIS (CA)	YES	WILSON, BOB	NO
MC FALL	YES		
MILLER (CA)	YES		
MINTA	YES		
MOSE	YES		
PATTERSON (CA)	YES		
REES	YES		
ROYAL	NO		
RYAN	NO		
SHAW	NO		
SHAW	YES		
SMITH, BEALIN	YES		
SMITH	NO		
WILSON, C. H.	NO		
WYDE			
WYDE (CO)	YES	ARMSTRONG	YES
WYDE (CO)	YES	JOHNSON (CO)	NO
WYDE	YES		











ROLL NO. 685

DEMOCRATIC

\*\*OTHER\*\*

REPUBLICAN

DEBRI			
DELLING	YES		
DELLISON (ND)	NOY	TAYLOR (ND)	NOY
DELY	YES		
DEMBAGE	NOY		
DEMOND	NOY		
DEMON	YES		
DEMBELL	YES		
DELLINGER	NOY		
DEWINGTON	YES		
DEB			
DEBORG	NOY		
DELOVER	NOY		
DEB			
		DE COLLISTER	YES
		DE SMITH (ND)	YES
		DE THONE	YES
DE			
DEBENTINI	YES		
DEBESHIRE			
DEBANDERS	YES	CLEVELAND	YES
DEBSEY			
DEBRIELS (NJ)	YES	FENWICK	YES
DEBORG	YES	FORGYTHE	YES
DEBLOOM	YES	RINALDO	YES
DEBARI	YES		
DEBORG	YES		
DEBQUIRE	YES		
DEBNER	YES		
DEBISH	YES		
DEBATTEN (NJ)	YES		
DEBONO	YES		
DEB	YES		
DEBROCK	YES		
DEBICO			
DEBUNELS	NOY	DEBURN	NOY



ROLL NO. 685

DEMOCRATIC

\*\*OTHER\*\*

REPUBLICAN

DEMOCRATIC	**OTHER**	REPUBLICAN	
YORK			
ABRUG	YES	CONABLE	YES
ADRIANO	YES	FISH	YES
AMBRO	YES	GILMAN	YES
BARILLO	YES	HASTINGS	NO
BAGGI	YES	HORTON	YES
BINGHAM	YES	KEMP	YES
BINGHAM	YES	LENT	YES
BINGHAM	YES	MC EHEN	YES
BONNY (NY)	YES	MITCHELL (NY)	NO
BONNY	YES	PEYGER	YES
BOLTON	YES	VALON	YES
BOCH	YES	WYLLER	YES
BRAFALDE	YES		
BROOK	YES		
BURPHY (NY)	YES		
BURKH	YES		
BUTLER	YES		
BUTTS (NY)	YES		
BYRNE	YES		
BYRNE	YES		
RICHMOND	YES		
ROSENTHAL	YES		
SCHUBER	YES		
SOLARI	YES		
STRATTON	YES		
WOLFE	YES		
ZEPERETTI	YES		
NC CAROLINA			
ANDREWS (NC)	YES	BROYHILL	YES
FOUNTAIN	YES	MARTIN	YES
FERRE	NO		
FERRISON	NO		
JONES (NC)	NO		
KEAL	YES		
PREYER	YES		
ROSE	YES		
TAYLOR (NC)	YES		
ND DAKOTA			
		ANDREWS (ND)	NO





ROLL NO. 689

DEMOCRATIC

\*\*OTHER\*\*

REPUBLICAN

1 CAROLINA

DAVIS YES  
 CERRICK YES  
 HOLLAND YES  
 CHERETTE MAY  
 BROWN YES

SPENCE YES

2 DELAWARE

ABDOR YES  
 PRESSLER MAY

ESCHER  
 FINE (TN) MAY  
 FORD (TN) YES  
 GONER (TN) MAY  
 LLOYD (TN) YES

BEARD (TN) YES  
 LUNCAN (TN) YES  
 GUILLEN YES

BROOKS YES  
 BRUNSON (TX) YES  
 CASEY YES  
 DE LA GARZA YES  
 ECHOLS YES  
 GONZALEZ PRES  
 NIGHTOWER YES  
 JORDAN YES  
 KAZEN YES  
 KUEBER NY  
 KAHON NY  
 MILFORD YES  
 PATMAN (TX) NY  
 FLORE YES  
 FORBES YES  
 ROBERTS YES  
 TEAGUE NY  
 WHITE YES  
 WILSON (TX) YES  
 WRIGHT YES  
 YOUNG (TX) YES

ARCHER YES  
 COLLINS (TX) YES  
 STEELMAN YES

LOBE YES  
 MC KAY YES

ONT

JEFFERSON YES

INIA  
 DANIEL DAN YES  
 BOWLING (VA) YES  
 FISHER YES  
 HARRIS YES  
 SATTERFIELD YES

BUTLER YES  
 DANIEL R. D. YES  
 ROBINSON YES  
 SAMPLER YES  
 WHITEHURST YES





ROLL NO. 605

DEMOCRATIC

\*\*OTHER\*\*

REPUBLICAN

INGTON			
DANE	YEA		
DOHNEY	YEA		
OLEY	YEA		
HIGHE	NAY		
CO CORNACK	YEA		
SEED	YEA		
VIRGINIA			
ECHLER (MV)	YEA		
DOLLOHAN	YEA		
BLACK	YEA		
STAGGERS	YEA		
CASIN			
STIN	YEA		
COLUOS	YEA		
CORNELL	NAY		
ROTHENBERG	NAY		
SEBY	YEA		
SEUSE	YEA		
EBLOUNT	NAY		
AG			
ONCALIO	YEA		

FRITCHARD YEA

KASTEN YEA

STEIGER (WI) YEA

\* \* \* \* \* END OF REPORT \* \* \* \* \*

REPUBLICAN CLERK'S  
REFERENCE COPY

JOE BARTLETT  
H-220, U. S. CAPITOL





OCT 9 1975

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 9, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MAX FRIEDERSDORF *MF*

SUBJECT: Sinai

On the vote in the House approving the placement of American technicians in the Sinai which passed by 341 to 69, we received 227 Democratic votes and 114 Republican votes.

The 22 Republicans who voted against the measure included Young of Alaska, Ketchum, Hansen, Symms, Grassley, Sebelius, Skubitz, Carter, Snyder, Emery, Hutchinson, Lott, Taylor, Lujan, Hastings, Andrews, Miller, Goodling, Shuster, Pressler, Collins and Johnson of Colorado.

An amendment by Findley to limit the duration of the authority for the technicians to two years was soundly defeated by a vote of 122 to 287.

Only two amendments to the bill were agreed to. One of them was a meaningless restatement of the War Powers Act offered by Eckhardt and another amendment that the President report on the participation of the U.S. technicians in the peace keeping forces.

Attached is a print out of the vote by states.

bcc: ✓ Jack Marsh  
Donald Rumsfeld

