

**The original documents are located in Box 19, folder “Kintner, William R.” of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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**NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE**  
**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	Ambassador Kintner to John Marsh re cahnge of ambassadors in Thailand (1 p.) <i>Sanitized 1/30/07</i>	2/12/75	A
2a. Cable	2. <u>Cable, 2/14/75</u> Ambassador Kintner to John Marsh (1 p.) <i>Sanitized 1/30/07</i>	2/14/75	A
2b. Notes	<del>notes re the cable (1 p.)</del> <i>SyS - WHM 11/28/00</i>	Undated	C(A)
3. Cable	Ambassador Kintner to John Marsh (1 p.) <i>Sanitized 1/30/07</i>	2/15/75	A
4. Cable	Ambassador Kintner to John Marsh (1 p.) <i>Sanitized 4/12/07 12/7/04</i>	2/20/75	A
5. Cable	Ambassador Kintner to John Marsh (3 pp.) <i>Sanitized 1/30/07</i>	3/3/75	A
6a. Cable	6. <u>Marsh to Situation Room, 3/14/75</u> Ambassador Kintner to John Marsh (5 pp.) <i>Sanitized 4/12/07 12/7/04</i>	3/12/75	A
6b. Cable	AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO SECSTATE WASHDC re farewell call on the King of Thailand (6 pp.)	3/12/75	A

## FILE LOCATION

Marsh Files  
 General Subject File  
 Kintner, William

Box 19

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

*WHM, 1/22/86*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Connie --

The telegram is Secret and is in the safe if Russ would like to look at it.

Thanks.

donna

R -  
Speak with  
me - see his  
cable -  
touchy!  
M /

FEB 12 1975



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
BANGKOK THAILAND.

OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR  
February 3, 1975

Dear *John* —

Enclosed are copies of letters I have written to Senators Jackson and Sparkman which may be of some help. Failure to get the supplemental through Congress would be disastrous to our position here.

If there is anything I can do to help please let me know.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

*W.R. Kinner*  
William R. Kinner

The Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr.  
Counselor to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
BANGKOK THAILAND.

OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR

January 31, 1975


Dear Scoop:

As a person who has known you for many years and admired your political courage, your grasp of security issues and the realism of your position on the major foreign problems confronting our country, I was totally surprised to read that you were going to vote against President Ford's request for a supplemental military and economic aid bill for South Vietnam and Cambodia. Your negative vote might sound the death knell for the majority of the peoples of those two countries who do not wish to live under communist control, as well as have very serious consequences for their immediate neighbors and implications for our foreign policy worldwide.

I was never an avid enthusiast of our deep involvement in Indochina. In 1954 I participated in the study which General Ridgeway sent to President Eisenhower recommending against military intervention there. In 1968 I wrote the enclosed piece, "Debacle Road," arguing we should either win the war or get out. My main concern then was that our annual expenditures of some \$30 billion per year would lead us to short-change our strategic arms programs to the net political benefit of the Soviet Union. This has happened, leading to the difficult dilemmas posed by SALT II negotiations.

Yet the manner of our disengagement from Southeast Asia has become more important today than it might have been in 1968 -- when our overall position was much stronger.

Honorable Henry M. Jackson  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C.



The theatres of the global confrontation are now more sensitively linked today than they were then. The Soviet Union still fuels the aggressive war waged by Hanoi against the people of South Vietnam just as it undergirds the Arab efforts to render Israel impotent, and sustains the OPEC oil cartel price war against the non-communist industrial and developing nations.

The Soviet Union wants a North Vietnamese victory and is willing to pay the price. In absolute terms they are still supporting Hanoi at 1968 levels or higher while our aid is less than 1/40th of the cost of the effort we were then making. In 1968 we were doing most of the fighting. In 1975 the ARVN forces can more than hold their own against the North Vietnamese army whenever they have the means. When troops fight to the last man, as they did at Phuc Binh, it is not "an endless commitment," but one that can be ended honorably once Hanoi becomes convinced that it cannot win the war in the US Congress. If Hanoi wins a negative vote in Congress, the repercussions will be felt not only in Southeast Asia, and especially in Thailand, but in the Middle East and Europe as well. It will simply mean that the United States in 1975 showed that it lacked the will and staying power to cope with the protracted conflict waged by the Soviet Union over the past thirty years.

If the United States is willing to make billions available to insure the right of the Israeli people to exist -- as I believe it should -- it has an equivalent obligation to those people in Vietnam and Cambodia who have demonstrated their willingness to die in defense of liberty.

Arguments aside, if you would line up with Senator Kennedy on the supplemental issue the disturbing signals broadcast by your action would undercut my efforts here to convince the Thais that the United States is a dependable ally.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

William R. Kintner

Enclosure





EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
BANGKOK THAILAND.

OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR  
February 3, 1975

Dear Senator Sparkman:

I read in the Bangkok Post on Friday, January 31, a statement attributed to you that the outlook for survival of the South Vietnam Government "is not encouraging." The statement attributed to you continued:

"Even with vast amounts of aid at their disposal, they have steadily lost the confidence of their people and proved unable to cope with their adversaries."

From the perspective of my present position I beg to differ with that estimate. The continued determination of the vast majority of the people of both countries to resist the massive communist effort to crush them is one of the most inspiring and heroic performances of our time.

Unfortunately this story has not been well presented to the American people. There are Americans in and out of Congress who would like to see a communist take-over occur in order to be able to prove that our efforts in Indochina were as futile as they always claimed it to be.

The Soviet Union wants a North Vietnamese victory and is willing to pay the price. In absolute terms they are still supporting Hanoi at 1968 levels or higher while our aid is less than 1/40th of the cost of the effort we were then making. In 1968 we were doing most of the fighting. In 1975 the ARVN forces can more than hold their own against the North Vietnamese army whenever they have the means. When troops fight to the last man, as they did at Phuc Binh, it is not "an endless commitment," but one that can be ended honorably once Hanoi becomes convinced that it cannot win the war in the US Congress. If Hanoi wins a negative vote in Congress, the repercussions will be felt not only in Southeast Asia, and especially in Thailand, but in the Middle East and Europe as well. It will simply mean that the United States in 1975 showed that it lacked the will and staying power to cope with the protracted

Honorable John Sparkman  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C.



conflict waged by the Soviet Union over the past thirty years.

I know that the distinguished Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will want to make certain that the manner of our disengagement from Southeast Asia will not condemn millions of people to cruel servitude to communist tyranny nor mock the sacrifices of tens of thousands of Americans who gave their lives in the defense of human liberty.

Sincerely,

*William R. Kintner*  
William R. Kintner





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listed on the pink Withdrawal Sheet found at the front of this folder.

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\*\*\*\*\* COPY

OP: IMMED

FEB 12 1975

#0021 0431155

O 121120Z FEB 75 ZFF-L ZYM  
FM BANGKOK

25X1

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 121123Z FEB 75

FM AMBASSADOR KINTNER, BANGKOK 921  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR JOHN MARSH, COUNSELOR TO THE PRESIDENT,  
LT. GEN BRENT SCONCROFT, NSC  
"DEAR JACK"

I JUST RECEIVED A "DEAR JOHN" LETTER, PRESUMABLY WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE PRESIDENT, THAT I WOULD BE REPLACED AND THAT I WOULD BE SOON ASKED TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT FOR A NEW APPOINTMENT FROM THE THAI GOVERNMENT. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I WAS A BIT SHOCKED AT RECEIVING THIS MESSAGE IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO ADVANCE NOTICE THAT I WASN'T PERFORMING EFFECTIVELY. I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD TELL ME HOW THIS CAME ABOUT.

MORE IMPORTANTLY, IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF U.S. THAI RELATIONS AS WELL AS MY OWN FUTURE THAT SOMETHING BE DONE TO PUT THIS MOVE IN THE BEST POSSIBLE LIGHT. FOR EXAMPLE, I COULD BE RECALLED TO BE PLACED IN CHARGE OF A HIGH-LEVEL IMPORTANT TASK FORCE AND ASKED TO REVIEW AN IMPORTANT ISSUE THAT FALLS WITHIN MY AREAS OF COMPETENCE. WHATEVER IS DONE SHOULD BE DONE IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THIS LEAKS AND BEFORE I HAVE TO REQUEST AN AGREEMENT FROM THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT.

AS YOU KNOW, I DEDICATED MY OWN PERSONAL LIFE CONSIDERABLY IN ORDER TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SERVE MY COUNTRY AGAIN. I WAS ASKED TO COME INTO THIS JUNGLE, BUT DID NOT EXPECT THAT I WOULD BE ASKED TO LEAVE IN MID-STREAM SO INCEREMONIOUSLY.

PLEASE REPLY TO THIS SOONEST.

BT

DECLASSIFIED w/portions exempted

AUTHORITY ADCNV-3m F-2-3-1-2

BY WA ns/stalegrind/m  
NARA, DATE 10/23/09

\*\*\*\*\* WHBR COMMENT \*\*\*\*\*

MARSH, SCONCROFT

0431155

PAGE 01

OF 01

TOR 043115504Z

DTG 121120Z FEB 75

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~~SECRET~~

\*\*\*\*\* COPY

PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY REVIEW OF  
DOS and NSC EQUITIES IS



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OP IMPED

00033 0450921

O 140852Z FEB 75 ZYH ZFF-1  
FM BANGKOK

25X1

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 140852Z FEB 75

FM AMBASSADOR KINTNER, BANGKOK 053  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR JOHN MARSH, COUNSELOR TO THE PRESIDENT.  
REF: RMBTEL BANGKOK 2020 14 FEB FROM AMB. KINTNER

"DEAR JACK:

1. I TRIED TO TELEPHONE YOU VIA SEVERAL ROUTES WITHOUT SUCCESS SINCE I SENT YOU A MESSAGE ON 12 FEB. I WILL TRY AGAIN AROUND 0930 HOURS YOUR TIME ON FEB. 14.

2. REPTTEL PRESENTS IN MORE DETAIL THE PROBLEM. I HOPE THAT A WAY CAN BE FOUND TO PRESENT THIS MATTER IN THE BEST POSSIBLE LIGHT BEFORE THE INEVITABLE LEAK CHANGES US-THAI RELATIONS AND MY PERSONNEL TRACK RECORD. I AM CONFIDENT THAT I HAVE DONE A GOOD JOB.

3. ON FURTHER REFLECTION, MY HEADING A REVIEW PANEL ON WHAT FUTURE US POLICY ON SEA SHOULD BE COULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL TO THE ADMINISTRATION. PRESIDENT FORD HAS ASKED FOR THREE MORE YEARS FOR S. VIETNAM BEYOND THE SUPPLEMENTAL FOR FY 75. THE PANEL FINDINGS WOULD BE READY BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. ON FEB 3 I FORWARDED A COPY OF A LETTER WRITTEN TO SENATOR JACKSON WHICH CLEARLY INDICATES THAT I WAS NOT A VIETNAMESE HANK. THIS FACT COULD ADD WEIGHT TO WHAT EVER RECOMMENDATIONS A PANEL HEADED BY MYSELF MIGHT MAKE. I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU WOULD CONCERT ON AN EARLY REPLY WITH BRENT SCOWCROFT AND BOB INGERSOLL.

0933

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AUTHORITY R0C NLF-Jm.F-2-3-2-1 1/30/07

BY 4th <sup>NSC/State guidelines</sup> NARA, DATE 10/23/09



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PAGE 01

OF 01

TOR:045/00130Z

DTG:140852Z FEB 75

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~~SECRET~~

\*\*\*\*\* COPY

PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY REVIEW OF  
DOSnd NSC EQUITIES IS REQUIRED

KINTNER

26

1. Discourage & caution him re phone  
conversations (intercept by Russians)  
Don't discuss him  
a. aware of it - has spoken of  
Brent - hopeful to work something  
out for him -

Undersecretary - must speak w/  
him -

1. Would like a message  
out there re their plans  
for his future -

2c

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

J -

KINTNER will  
BE CALLING YOU  
APPROX. 9<sup>30</sup> this  
MORNING -

R.



— attach to 4

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

M

Jack-

all taken care of -  
to Kintner's satisfaction.

I will say so for you.

Brent



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\*\*\*\*\*8 COPY

OP IMMED

#0937 0460710

O 150311Z FEB 79 ZYH ZFF#4  
FM BANGKOK

25X1

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 150311Z FEB 79

FM: AMBASSADOR KINTENER, BANGKOK 937  
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT  
MANY THANKS FOR WH 51078. NEEDLESS TO SAY THE  
SOONER THE BETTER. WARM REGARDS TO YOU AND JACK.

DECLASSIFIED w/portions exempted

AUTHORITY RDC nlf-jm f-2-3-3-0 1/30/07

BY ldn nsc/state/ginkwms NARA, DATE 10/23/09

\*\*\*\*\* WHSR COMMENT \*\*\*\*\*

SCOWCROFT, MCPARLANE

BN1047861

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OF 01

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\*\*\*\*\*8 COPY

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FM BANGKOK

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

(K1)  
~~SECRET~~ 200740Z FEB 75

FM: AMBASSADOR KINTNER, BANGKOK 002  
TO: EYES ONLY FOR COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT JOHN D. MARSH, JR.

1. I HAVE JUST RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT ASKING ME TO REQUEST RTG AGREEMENT FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF MY SUCCESSOR. I HAVE NOT RECEIVED THE DEPARTMENT'S APPROVAL TO INFORM THE RTG AND PUBLICLY ANNOUNCE THE FACT THAT I AM BEING RECALLED TO UNDERTAKE A SPECIAL STUDY OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THIS AREA. AS I HAVE REPORTED IN EARLIER MESSAGES, I BELIEVE MOST STRONGLY THAT THESE TWO MUST GO AHEAD TOGETHER. OTHERWISE WE RISK SERIOUS DAMAGE TO U.S.-THAI RELATIONS AND TO MY OWN PERSONAL SITUATION.

2. I AM TODAY SENDING A TELEGRAM TO ACTING SECRETARY INGERBOLL REITERATING THIS POSITION (BANGKOK 2004) AND ASKING FOR IMMEDIATE APPROVAL FOR MY PROPOSED PRESS STATEMENT (BANGKOK 2712) BEFORE I DISCUSS THE DESIGNATION OF MY SUCCESSOR WITH THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT.

3. I WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR HELP IN PUSHING THIS THROUGH. TIME IS IMPORTANT SINCE THERE IS REAL DANGER OF A LEAK TO THE PRESS EITHER HERE OR IN WASHINGTON. FOR THIS REASON, I HAVE ASKED ACTING SECRETARY INGERBOLL FOR A REPLY IF AT ALL POSSIBLE BY FEBRUARY 21 BANGKOK TIME. PLEASE REPLY NIACT IMMEDIATE.  
KINTNER,  
.0002

DECLASSIFIED w/portions exempted

AUTHORITY RDC NLF-5m-F-2-3-4-9 12/1/04  
NSC/State guidelines  
BY WJ NARA, DATE 10/23/09



ISN: 053733 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR: 001/00:00Z DTG: 200740Z FEB 75

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Presidential Library Review of NSC and DOS Equities is Required

OP IMMED  
 ESA528MTA094  
 DE RUMTBK #3188 0570850  
 O 260816Z FEB 75  
 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1056

INFO DOD/OSD IMMEDIATE  
 CINCPAC IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BANGKOK 3188

EXDIS  
 E.O. 11652 GDS  
 TAGS: HARR RP  
 SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON ALTERNATIVE COMMAND STRUCTURES AND POLITICAL-  
 MILITARY MATTERS  
 REF: STATE 038574 (NOTAL)

1. I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH AMBASSADORS SULLIVAN AND MARTIN AND WITH MG MANOR, CO 13TH AF, THE DESIRABILITY OF OUR EXPLORING FUTURE MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURES AND POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS IN THIS AREA. ALL AGREE THAT SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE FRUITFUL AND HELP EACH OF US IN MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS ON THESE SUBJECTS TO WASHINGTON.

2. PENDING ARRANGEMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, WE HAVE DISCUSSED CONDUCTING OUR TALKS ON MARCH 6, 7 AND 8. I WILL TRAVEL TO CLARK AFB, MANILA AND SAIGON TO MEET WITH AMBASSADORS SULLIVAN AND MARTIN AND MG MANOR. GENERAL MANOR TELLS ME THAT AIR SUPPORT CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER MILITARY MISSIONS BEING PERFORMED IN THE AREA. HE CANNOT, HOWEVER, AUTHORIZE MY TRAVEL AND THAT OF MEMBERS OF MY STAFF WITHOUT FURTHER CLEARANCE.

3. I WOULD BE VERY APPRECIATIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT'S HELP IN THIS MATTER IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT MORE INFORMED AND BETTER EXAMINED ALTERNATIVES WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE COMMAND STRUCTURE AND OUR VERY IMPORTANT POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONS.

4. ACTION REQUESTED: A) AUTHORIZE MY TRAVEL TO THE PHILIPPINES AND SOUTH VIETNAM FOR THE TALKS, AND B) ASK



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 PAGE 01

TOR:057/18:41Z DTG:260816Z FEB 75

\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\* COPY  
 DRO, 1/15/82

~~\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\*~~ COPY

OSD TO FORWARD APPROVAL THROUGH USAF CHANNELS FOR PROVISION  
OF AIRLIFT SUPPORT BY 13TH AF TO AMBASSADOR KINTNER AND HIS  
STAFF, IN ACCORDANCE WITH DOD REG. 4515.13-R.  
KINTNER  
BT



RECALLED

PSN:004085

PAGE 02

OF 02

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DTG:200816Z FEB 75

~~\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\*~~ COPY

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ROUTINE  
ESA575MTA275  
DEI RUMYBK #3329 0581225  
R 271151Z FEB 75  
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1114

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BANGKOK 3329

EXDIS  
E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: TH  
SUBJECT: STUDY OF U.S. POLICY INTERESTS IN THE PACIFIC AREA  
AND ASSOCIATED TRAVEL PLANS  
REF: A) STATE 42887; B) BANGKOK 3188; AND C) STATE 044054

1. THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME CONFUSION IN COMMUNICATIONS REGARDING MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON TO CONDUCT REFERENCED STUDY AND MY PROPOSAL TO VISIT THE PHILIPPINES AND SAIGON TO DISCUSS MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURES AND POLITICAL/MILITARY MATTERS.

2. IN BANGKOK 2712 I INDICATED I WOULD BE LEAVING THAILAND IN THE MIDDLE OF MARCH. THIS WAS APPROVED IN STATE 038496. A TIGHT DEPARTURE SCHEDULE HAS BEEN ARRANGED ON THAT BASIS.

3. REPTTEL B PROPOSED TRAVEL TO THE PHILIPPINES AND SOUTH VIETNAM ON MARCH 6, 7 AND 8 TO DISCUSS FUTURE MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURES AND POLITICAL/MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS IN THIS AREA. AS INDICATED IN REPTTEL, AIR SUPPORT COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER MILITARY MISSIONS BEING PERFORMED IN THE AREA, AND THEREFORE A TRIP BY MYSELF AND TWO STAFF MEMBERS WOULD BE OF NO ADDITIONAL COST TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THIS TRIP, WHICH HAS BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION FOR SOME TIME, WOULD ASSIST US IN MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS REQUESTED IN STATE'S 038574, AS WELL AS BE OF USE TO THE STUDY.

4. I WAS AWAITING APPROVAL OF BANGKOK 3188 BEFORE SUBMITTING FOR YOUR APPROVAL MY TRAVEL PLANS FOR RETURNING TO WASHINGTON.

\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

HAK, SCOHROFT, LL

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5. I AM QUITE FAMILIAR WITH THE NORTHERN PACIFIC AREA, HAVING SERVED IN THE KOREAN WAR IN 1953 AND HAVE VISITED MOST OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE PACIFIC NORTH OF THE EQUATOR A NUMBER OF TIMES. HOWEVER, I HAVE NEVER VISITED THE SOUTH PACIFIC. CONSEQUENTLY, IN ORDER TO BETTER PREPARE MYSELF FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE PROPOSED STUDY, I WOULD LIKE TO, ON MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON, VISIT JAKARTA, PORT MORESBY, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON AND CINCPAC IN HONOLULU. I HAVE NOT YET WORKED OUT A SPECIFIC SCHEDULE, BUT I ASSUME I WILL BE BACK IN MAINLAND USA AROUND THE 31ST OF MARCH. I PLAN TO THEN TAKE A WEEK'S LEAVE AND WILL REPORT IN TO YOU ON THE 7TH OR 8TH OF APRIL.

6. IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE MY TIME EN ROUTE TO THE STATES AND IMPOSE AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE ON MISSIONS I WISH TO VISIT FOR TALKS WITH THE AMBASSADORS, I INTEND TO SEND MRS. KINTNER BACK THROUGH EUROPE SO SHE WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT OUR DAUGHTER IN BRUSSELS EN ROUTE.

7. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I LOOK FORWARD TO THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSED STUDY WHEN I RETURN TO WASHINGTON AND TO MEETING WITH OTHER EA AMBASSADORS AS THEY RETURN TO WASHINGTON IN THE SPRING.

8. I REGRET THAT I WILL BE UNABLE TO SEE AMBASSADOR MARTIN, BUT HE HAS INFORMED ME IN SAIGON 1973 THAT HIS DCM AND STAFF WILL VERY MUCH WELCOME OUR VISIT.

9. I TRUST THAT THIS MESSAGE CLARIFIES OUR SEVERAL COMMUNICATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT AND REQUEST APPROVAL OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING TRAVEL TO THE PHILIPPINES AND SOUTH VIETNAM.

KINTNER  
BT

PSN:005927 RECALLED PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:059/04:26Z DTG:271151Z FEB 75



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OP. IMMED

#0113 0621132

O 030938Z MAR 75 ZFF-1 ZYH  
FM BANGKOK

MAR 3 1975

25X1

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 030938Z MAR 75

FM AMBASSADOR KINTNER, BANGKOK 113

TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY JOHN O. MARSH, JR.  
COUNSELOR TO THE PRESIDENT, WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D. C.

THIS MESSAGE SUMMARIZES THE COMMUNICATIONS WHICH PROMPTED ME TO PHONE. I'M WELL AWARE THAT YOU CANNOT BECOME INVOLVED IN DETAILS. I CALLED YOU SATURDAY MORNING, MARCH 1ST, BECAUSE A PATTERN IS BEGINNING TO EMERGE WHICH MAY VITIATE THE SOLUTION FOR MY DEPARTURE WHICH YOU HELPED BRING ABOUT.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE STUDY WAS DESIGNED TO GIVE A PUBLIC RATIONALE FOR MY RECALL. IT SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN GOOD FAITH IF RATIONALE IS TO HOLD UP. THE ORIGINAL STATE RELEASE COULD HAVE BEEN MUCH TIGHTER.

I'M CONVINCED THAT BOB IS A DECENT, HONORABLE MAN, BUT I CAN'T UNDERSTAND A STRING OF MESSAGES I'VE RECEIVED.

AFTER RECEIVING OKAY ON A MID-MARCH DEPARTURE, I WAS SUBSEQUENTLY ASKED TO COME BACK DIRECTLY WEEK BEGINNING 3 MARCH SO AS TO MEET AMB. MARTIN IN WASHINGTON. WHEN I PROPOSED A VERY SHORT STATEMENT OF SCOPE OF STUDY, I WAS TOLD THAT DEFINITION OF STUDY WOULD HAVE TO AWAIT DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON. I AM BEING CONSTANTLY ASKED WHAT I AM GOING TO BE DOING, AND NEEDLESS TO SAY, WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO GIVE AN AUTHORIZED RESPONSE.

I FINALLY RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO RETURN WITH STOP-OVERS IN MANILA AND CINPAC FOR CONSULTATIONS. I THEN REQUESTED AUTHORIZATION TO PROCEED BY WAY OF DJAKARTA, PORT MORESBY, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON AND CINPAC. I HAVE NEVER BEEN TO THE SOUTH PACIFIC AND BELIEVED THAT BRIEF ORIENTATION VISITS WOULD BE USEFUL IN LATER DEVELOPMENT OF THE STUDY.

THIS REQUEST WAS TURNED DOWN (STATE 045859) AND I WAS TOLD "RETURN DIRECTLY TO THE DEPARTMENT VIA CINPAC ONLY". AMONG THE REASONS GIVEN WAS THAT ODD HAD ASKED QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE STUDY WHICH WERE AWKWARD TO FIELD. IT IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHY THIS SHOULD BE.

PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF THIS LAST CABLE, I HAD SENT TO BOB THE

\*\*\*\*\* WHSR COMMENT \*\*\*\*\*

EYES ONLY MR. MARSH

PSN1000419

PAGE 01

TOR:002/11:58Z

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~~SECRET~~

\*\*\*\*\* COPY

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PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY REVIEW OF  
DOS and NSC EQUITIES IS

AUTHORITY RAC nlf-sm-f-2-3-5-8 11/30/07

BY W nsc/state grm/ltms  
NARA, DATE 10/23/09



FOLLOWING FEBRUARY 28TH LETTER BY FAST POUCH.  
THE ATTACHMENTS REFERRED TO IN THE TEXT WERE LAUDATORY  
ACCOUNTS OF MY SERVICE HERE.

QUOTE: DEAR BOB.  
"TWELVE THOUSAND MILES FROM WASHINGTON I FEEL AS IF  
I AM BEING PULLED IN MANY DIRECTIONS BY THE VARIOUS CABLES  
DEALING WITH WHAT HAPPENS TO MY LIFE. I HAVE TRIED TO BE  
H  
COOPERATIVE WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S ESTIMES IN EVERY WAY  
FOR THE SAKE OF U. S. THAI RELATIONS.

ENCLOSED IS A COPY OF A LETTER I JUST RECEIVED FROM  
THE PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS WHICH YOU SHOULD SEE.

I DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE SUGGESTION IN STATE'S  
44054 THAT I RETURN TO WASHINGTON IN TIME TO SEE AMBASSADOR  
MARTIN WHO WILL BE THERE NEXT WEEK, UNLESS HE INTENDS TO  
REMAIN A WHILE. MY PLANS CONTINUE TO BE TO DEPART HERE  
MARCH 16, VISIT A COUPLE OF MISSIONS ENROUTE, TAKE A WEEK'S  
LEAVE AND REPORT TO WASHINGTON. MY PURPOSE IN VISITING  
EMBASSIES ENROUTE WOULD BE ONLY TO FAMILIARIZE MYSELF WITH  
THE PROBLEMS OF THOSE COUNTRIES AND GET THEIR VIEWS OF THE  
U. S. ROLE IN THIS AREA. I WILL NOT DISCUSS THE STUDY PER  
SE, OF COURSE, UNTIL I HAVE GONE OVER ITS SCOPE AND INTENDED  
USE IN WASHINGTON.

DEPARTURE FUNCTIONS HAVE BEEN ARRANGED WHICH I SHOULD  
HONOR (SEE ENCLOSED CLIPPING FROM THE BANGKOK WORLD). ON  
MONDAY NIGHT, MARCH 3, FOR EXAMPLE, PRIME MINISTER SENI AND  
FOREIGN MINISTER PICHAI WILL BE GUESTS AT MY RESIDENCE FOR  
A FORMAL DINNER.

UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, I TRUST THAT YOU WILL  
PERMIT ME TO DISENGAGE FROM HERE AS GRACIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE.  
I HOPE YOU WILL ALSO AUTHORIZE THE TRIP TO MANILA WHICH  
BILL SULLIVAN AND I HAVE WORKED OUT (AND WHICH, INCIDENTALLY,  
CAN BE DONE AT LITTLE COST TO THE DEPARTMENT THROUGH THE  
USE OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT -- BANGKOK 3188). I MOST SINCERELY  
HOPE I WILL ALSO HAVE YOUR SUPPORT IN MAKING THE STOPS  
ENROUTE BACK TO WASHINGTON PROPOSED IN BANGKOK 3329. HERE  
AGAIN, THE COST WOULD BE SMALL IN COMPARISON WITH THE  
BENEFITS.

I AM SENDING THIS TO YOU VIA BANGKOK'S WEEKEND "FAST  
POUCH", SO YOU WILL HOPEFULLY HAVE IT ON YOUR DESK MONDAY.  
IF TELEGRAPHIC APPROVAL FOR MY TRAVEL PLANS HAS BEEN FOR-  
WARDED IN THE MEANTIME, PLEASE DISREGARD THIS REQUEST.

WITH HIGHEST PERSONAL REGARDS,  
'END QUOTE'

MEANWHILE I RECEIVED STATE 045855 ON MARCH 1ST. I  
DO NOT PLAN TO ASK FOR A RECLAMA ON STATE 045855. BUT, PERHAPS  
AFTER YOU READ THIS MESSAGE YOU MIGHT BE WILLING TO CALL  
JOB REGARDING THE STATUS OF MY STUDY IN WHICH THE SUBJECT OF

'SN1009419 PAGE 02 TOR1002/11150Z DTG:000030Z MAR 70'

\*\*\*\*\* ~~SECRET~~ \*\*\*\*\* COPY





*Confidential  
when w/  
Attachments*

March 8, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT  
FROM: JACK MARSH

Please note the attached. How are we coming with Kintner? In order to facilitate his transition, can we work out something in reference to his travel plans?

Additionally, I have some other information for you concerning this situation which I think will be helpful.



MAR 6 1975



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
BANGKOK THAILAND.

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR

Determined to be Administrative Marking

Date 1/15/75 By SAO/NAC

February 26, 1975

Dear Jack:

On Monday I telegraphed the Department and asked that you be informed for approval of a most general statement of my proposed study, to wit:

- A. Title. Future U.S. Policy Interests in the Pacific Area.
- B. Director of Study. Ambassador William R. Kintner.
- C. Time Frame. Beginning date early April 1975, completion date 31 August 1975.
- D. Administrative and Research Support. Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
- E. Authorized Liaison. All elements of U.S. Government having interests or programs directly related to the Pacific area.
- F. Scope. Examine mid and long-term policy interests of the U.S. in the Pacific area (EA) on both a regional and worldwide basis and identify nature and relative importance of these interests to provide basis for long-term policy recommendations.

Today I received the following reply from the Deputy Secretary: "Your proposal is most interesting. However, before settling on even the general outlines, I would prefer to have an opportunity (together with other interested officers) to discuss the project with you directly. Let's plan on getting together when you return to Washington, at which time we can decide on the parameters as well as any further public disclosure."

The Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr.  
Counsellor to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.



John O. Marsh, Jr.  
Page Two

February 26, 1975

I frankly do not know what is going on, and I would appreciate it very much if you could let me know by letter what the story might be before I leave here on the 15th of March.


For your information, I requested the Department's permission to travel back by way of Jakarta, Australia and New Zealand -- countries which I have not seen before, and then checking through Honolulu and CINCPAC. I presume that this will be authorized.

I am planning to take a week's leave prior to reporting into the Department on the 7th or 8th of April. I would, however, like to think my course of action through, and therefore would appreciate any advance information you can give me.

You have been a good Samaritan.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

  
William R. Kirtner



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Jack

6 March

R. Dan McMichael (Pittsburgh)  
called today concerning  
Kintner — he said "some of  
Kintner's friends are working  
on his future" and plan to  
meet w/ him upon his  
return — Hahn, Pfaltzgraff  
& al — they have been in  
touch w/ State on this —  
— once they lay out  
their "program of assistance"  
they would like to call  
to run it by you —  
I told them you  
would await further  
word from them — R.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Office of the Ambassador  
U.S. Embassy Bangkok  
A.P.O. S. F. 96346

The Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr.  
Counsellor to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

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REGISTRY NUMBER

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Nº 2267400

*AMB*

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MAR 6 1975



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
BANGKOK THAILAND.

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR

Determined to be Administrative Marking

Date 1/15/87 By BAO-NARA

February 26, 1975

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- B. Director of Study. Ambassador William R. Kintner.
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John O. Marsh, Jr.  
Page Two

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You have been a good Samaritan.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

  
William R. Kintner



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 14, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: JACK MARSH

Would you please send the following message to  
Ambassador Kintner of Thailand:

Have received your detailed  
communications concerning  
current military and political  
situation in your area. Have  
discussed with NSC at White  
House. Appreciate the update  
and helpful guidance.

Best Regards,

Thank you.

*JAM*

note: talked w/ Scowcroft  
first before dispatching



**GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY**

This form marks the file location of item number 6a  
listed on the pink Withdrawal Sheet found at the front of this folder.

6a

MAR 12 1975

OP: IMMED

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FM BANGKOK

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 121146Z MAR 75 [REDACTED]

FM AMBASSADOR KINTNER, BANGKOK 205 SECTION 1 OP 2  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR JOHN MARSH, JR.  
COUNSELOR TO THE PRESIDENT

1. IN A SEPARATE TELEGRAM (BANGKOK 4118) I AM REPORTING THE IMPORTANT POINTS COVERED DURING MY MARCH 11 FAREWELL CALL ON THE KING OF THAILAND, INCLUDING HIS VIEWS ON PRC AND SOVIET INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, AS NOTED IN THAT TELEGRAM, THE KING WAS HIGHLY CONCERNED BY THE PROSPECT OF A TOTAL COLLAPSE IN CAMBODIA. HE STRONGLY ADVOCATED THE RETURN OF SIHANOUK TO POWER AS THE LEAST UNDESIRABLE OF SEVERAL ALTERNATIVES. I BELIEVE THE KING'S VIEWS ARE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT AND HELPFUL AND URGE THAT YOU BRING THESE TO THE PERSONAL ATTENTION OF THE PRESIDENT IN WHATEVER WAY YOU BELIEVE WOULD BE MOST APPROPRIATE.

2. AFTER SETTING FORTH IN SOME DETAIL HIS STRONG PERSONAL CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA, THE KING MADE A PERSONAL APPEAL TO ME, SAYING: "I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK TO YOU NOW NOT AS AN AMBASSADOR BY AS MY FRIEND MR. KINTNER, YOU ARE SUPPOSED TO BE A KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSON WHO KNOWS HIS WAY AROUND AND ONE WHO CAN GET THINGS DONE. YOU ALSO KNOW MANY IMPORTANT PEOPLE IN YOUR GOVERNMENT. IS IT NOT POSSIBLE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ABLE TO SEE THE WISDOM OF BRINGING ABOUT THIS PARTICULAR TYPE OF SOLUTION?" THE KING MAINTAINED THAT WE DID THINGS DIFFERENTLY; THAT WE DID THINGS MORE OPENLY AND DIRECTLY. HE ILLUSTRATED HIS POINT BY THE WATERGATE AFFAIR. WATERGATE TYPE ACTIONS TRANSPIRE IN EVERY COUNTRY--ONLY WE MAKE A PETISH OF EXPOSING THEM. HE THEN SAID EVEN YOUR JESUS CHRIST SAID "LET HE WHO IS WITHOUT SIN CAST THE FIRST STONE"--OBSVIOUSLY IMPLYING THAT NO ONE IS PERFECT--AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT OPPOSE SIHANOUK BECAUSE OF OUR PAST DIFFERENCES.

3. I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT THE RETURN OF SIHANOUK TO POWER:

Presidential Library Review of NSC and DOS Equities is Required



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PAGE 21

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AUTHORITY RDC NLF-JM\_F-2-3-6-7 12/7/01

BY lh NARA, DATE 10/23/09



U.S. AND ALLIED PERSONNEL BY HELICOPTER AT BEST WILL BE DIFFICULT. IF THE PULLOUT OF U.S. PERSONNEL REQUIRES THAT WE USE FORCE THE U.S. IMAGE IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD COULD BE SERIOUSLY TARNISHED. FURTHER, THE FACT THAT THE PLANES EMPLOYING SUPPRESSIVE FIRE FLEW FROM RTAF BASES IN THAILAND WILL MOST INEVITABLY EXACERBATE U.S.-THAI RELATIONS.

D. ONCE THE U.S. EVACUATION IS COMPLETED THE KHMER ROUGE WILL BE IN FULL CONTROL OF THE CITY AND WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ROUND UP AND EXTERMINATE ALL THOSE WHO HAVE HELD RESPONSIBLE POSITIONS IN THE LON NOL REGIME. THEIR PATTERN OF DELIBERATE TERRORISTIC EXECUTIONS OF INNOCENT PEOPLE IN MANY OF THE PRINCIPAL CAPITALS THEY HAVE CAPTURED SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND. JUST MONDAY (MARCH 10) WIVES OF GKR OFFICIALS AND A CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES REPRESENTATIVE WHO CAME OUT OF PHNOM PENH FOR TWO HOURS TO RECEIVE A CHECK IN BANGKOK FOR CHARITY WORK WITH WIDOWS AND WOUNDED CHILDREN, EXPRESSED THEIR CONVICTION THAT SHOULD THE KC CAPTURE PHNOM PENH THAT MANY ARE TAGGED FOR EXECUTION. THE PRETTY YOUNG KHMER WOMAN WHO HAS BEEN THE PRIMARY WORKER AND LEADER IN THE LARGE CHARITY WORK THERE HAS BEEN TOLD SHE IS ON THE KC LIST FOR EXECUTION. HER ONLY COMMENT WAS, "I ACCEPT". SHE THEN BOARDED THE PLANE TO RETURN TO PHNOM PENH TO CONTINUE HER WORK, REGARDLESS OF WHAT FATE HAS IN STORE.

5. AS OF NOW THE ONLY FEASIBLE WAY OF PREVENTING THE TRAGIC SCENARIO JUST DESCRIBED IS TO BRING SIHANOUK BACK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AGAINST THIS CONTENTION IS THE ASSERTION THAT HE HAS NO REAL INFLUENCE OVER THE KHMER ROUGE. THE EXTENT OF HIS INFLUENCE IS ADMITTEDLY UNKNOWN. HIS OLD KHMER ROUGE OPPONENT, KHIEU SAMPHAN, MAY OR MAY NOT BE DEAD AS SOME ALLEGE, BUT IF SO, SOMEONE IS MASCARADING UNDER THAT NAME. THERE ARE GOOD REASONS, HOWEVER, THAT SIHANOUK COULD PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN RESTORING SOME KIND OF PEACE IN CAMBODIA. THESE REASONS INCLUDE:

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PAGE 03

OF 03

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FM BANGKOK

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 121146Z MAR 75 [REDACTED]

FM AMBASSADOR KINTNER, BANGKOK; 205 PENAL SECTION OF 2  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR JOHN MARSH, JR.  
COUNSELOR TO THE PRESIDENT

A. THE RESIDUE OF GOOD FEELING WHICH MANY OF THE  
KHMER PEOPLE HOLD TOWARD HIM AS WELL AS THEIR MEMORIES OF  
MUCH BETTER TIMES WHEN HE WAS THEIR RULER.

B. HIS REPUTATION AS A DEDICATED ANTI-U.S. KHMER  
NATIONALIST.

C. HIS GENERAL INDEPENDENCE OF HANOI WHICH WOULD  
PERMIT HIM TO EXPLOIT THE ANIMOSITY WHICH MOST KHMERS FEEL  
TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE.

D. HIS SUPPORT BY THE PRC AND STANDING AS THE ONLY  
CAMBODIAN FIGURE WITH A WORLD REPUTATION.

6. A. THAILAND COULD, IF WE BELIEVE DESIRABLE, PLAY A KEY  
ROLE IN BRINGING SIHANOUK BACK TO POWER. IN THE KING'S  
VIEW, SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE IN THAILAND'S INTEREST. THE  
PROSPECTS OF CAMBODIA BECOMING A PEKING-ORIENTED BUFFER  
STATE BETWEEN THAILAND AND NORTH VIETNAM IS FAR MORE  
ATTRACTIVE TO THE PRC THAN A HANOI-DOMINATED, HARD-CORE  
100 PERCENT KHMER ROUGE REGIME.

B. IF THE U.S. IS WILLING TO SWALLOW ITS PRIDE AND  
ACQUIESCE IN THE RETURN OF SIHANOUK TO POWER, THE THAI  
MIGHT POSSIBLY BE USED TO CARRY THE MESSAGE TO SIHANOUK,  
THEY WOULD NEED, HOWEVER, FIRM ASSURANCE THAT THE UNITED  
STATES WOULD PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE CAMBODIAN  
PEOPLE AND HELP PUT THEM BACK ON THEIR FEET.

7. THIS SOLUTION WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL TO THE U.S.--

A. IT WOULD END AN EXECUTIVE-CONGRESSIONAL IMPASSE  
OVER MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CAMBODIA.

B. IT WOULD DELINEATE THE QUITE DISTINCT SITUATIONS  
THAT WE FIND IN CAMBODIA AND SOUTH VIETNAM.

C. IT WOULD ERASE THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES THAT HAVE  
BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH OUR CAMBODIAN INTERVENTION EVER SINCE.

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PAGE 01

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D. IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE TO THE WORLD THE PRESIDENT'S  
ROLE AS A PEACEMAKER AND A MASTER OF CREATIVE DIPLOMACY.

8. AFTER CONSIDERING THE CONTENT OF THIS MESSAGE, SHOULD IT  
BE DEEMED DESIRABLE I COULD RETURN TO THE KING TO PURSUE THE  
POSSIBILITY OF THE THAI PLAYING A ROLE IN THE RETURN OF  
SIHANDUK. THE KING IS NOT AN ACTIVE POLITICAL LEADER BUT  
HE HAS GREAT INFLUENCE BEHIND THE SCENES, AND OVER KUKRIT  
PRAMOT WHO IS MOST LIKELY TO BE SELECTED WITHIN THE NEXT  
WEEK AS THE NEW THAI PRIME MINISTER.

9. YOU WILL NOTE THAT BANGKOK (4118) SETS FORTH ONE KING'S  
SUGGESTION IN A GENERAL WAY. I DEEM IT BEST TO SEND HIS MORE  
PERSONAL REQUEST UPON ME AND MY OWN RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING  
IT TO YOU TO PASS ON TO THE PRESIDENT IN ANY WAY YOU DEEM FIT.  
IF YOU WISH I CAN SEND THE ESSENCE OF THIS MESSAGE TO THE  
SECRETARY. MEANWHILE, I AWAIT YOUR RESPONSE, WITH WARM REGARDS.

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RECALLED

PAGE 02

OF 02

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This form marks the file location of item number ~~65~~ 66  
as listed on the pink form (GSA Form 7122, Withdrawal Sheet)  
at the front of the folder.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 24, 1976

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM TO: JACK MARSH

FROM: RUSS ROURKE *Rum*

Jack, I returned your call from Bill Kintner. Kintner indicated his message was "super confidential". He states that HAK is an albatross around the President's neck. In his travels around the country over the past several months, he has been advised time after time that the President should get rid of HAK. "I have nothing against Henry personally, mind you. I am only interested in doing what I can to see to it that the President is elected."

Most prominently mentioned as possible successors, Kintner says, are Connally and Richardson.

*R*  
*Next step by [signature]*

RECEIVED  
AUG 25 1976

*[Handwritten mark]*