

The original documents are located in Box 7, folder “China, People's Republic of” of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

MAR 4 1975

MAR 1975

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

M f

March 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary Kissinger
Brent Scowcroft

FROM: Max L. Friedersdorf M.L.F.

My discussions with the Speaker and Minority Leader Rhodes indicate that they desire a total party of 15 people for their Easter recess to the PRC.

The group would include the Speaker and Mrs. Albert, and five staff members including Charles Ward, Helen Newman, Lois Butler, Kathy Kwock and Iris Adams.

Minority Leader Rhodes and Mrs. Rhodes and three persons including J. Smith, Press Secretary, Mr. and Mrs. Charles Posey (Mrs. Posey is the Congressman's personal secretary and office manager in his Capitol office).

Two support personnel and one doctor.

Both the Speaker and Rhodes mentioned Peking and Shanghai as cities they would like to visit and prefer to leave the rest of the itinerary to the State Department and the Chinese.

The dates involved are from March 26 thru April 8.

Rhodes has made one additional request that the aircraft refuel in Arizona rather than California on the trip out in order that Mrs. Rhodes can be picked up in Arizona.

I am aware of the Humphrey trip to NATO, the O'Neill trip to the Middle East and the Sparkman trip to the Soviet Union, all scheduled about the same time. However, because of the distance involved and the rank of Albert and Rhodes I believe they should be given preference over the others regarding use of a 707.

Addendum

Since this memorandum was dictated Congressman Rhodes has requested that a three man television crew also be included on this trip.

bcc: Jack Marsh, Dick Solomon, Les Janka, Bob McCloskey



S U M M A R Y
UNITED STATES/CHINA POLICY
PRIVATE CONFERENCE
Plaza Hotel, New York City
June 6, 1975

The Sino-American Shanghai Communique of February 27, 1972 concluded President Richard Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC). Its format allowed for the separate presentation of views by each party and an expression of several areas of agreement. These included a desire for "normalization of relations," reduction of the danger of international military conflict, avoidance of, and opposition to, hegemonial ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region, etc. The further development of the issues raised in the 1972 Shanghai Communique will most probably be discussed during President Ford's proposed visit to the People's Republic of China during the latter part of this year. In light of these developments, certain questions should be asked:

- What is or should be the meaning of "normalization"?
- How will such meaning affect the status of our recognition of the Republic of China and the Mutual Defense Treaty with that country?
- How will it affect our relations with other allies and friendly powers in the Western Pacific and Asia?

Reflecting current opinions and trends in Washington, it

appears that President Ford is being armed with but two alternative policies: either (1) maintain the status quo of diplomatic recognition of the GRC and a liaison office in Peking, while offering some trade and cultural concessions to the latter; or (2) derecognize the GRC and extend full diplomatic relations with the PRC, while offering some anomalous words of friendship and trade, if not protection, to the people on the islands of Taiwan. The conferees in our discussion generally felt that the either/or of recognition vs. derecognition was unacceptable diplomatic baggage for President Ford's visit. Equally convincing was the fact that derecognition of the GRC could not be "papered over" with promises of aid and trade. Furthermore, derecognition of Taipei would critically intensify the Asian/Pacific bandwagon psychology toward Peking while adding to the political-military consternation of our mutual security Asian allies.

A third policy option, however, does exist. This was called the "Willy Brandt" alternative. The participants at the Conference agreed that the Brandt solution to a divided Germany could be equally well adapted to the PRC and GRC. That is,

- There is one Chinese nation.
- Two Chinese Governments respectively rule in two geographically separate parts of this nation, each according to its own system.
- It is hoped that some day the Chinese nation may be peacefully reunited.



The Conference group recognized certain existing assets and liabilities in such a solution, but deemed the former far outweighed the latter. If this solution were to be adopted it would mean that the U.S. and any other state/government could, as in the German case, appropriately recognize both governments, i.e., exchange instruments of recognition and set up mutually accepted embassies both with the PRC and the GRC. Such a solution to the problem of PRC/GRC recognition could and should be among the options held by President Ford when he visits Peking.


OCT 6 1975

PCR

NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTER, INC.

111 EAST 58TH STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10022
—
AREA CODE 212 838-2912

October 2, 1975



OFFICERS

- FRANK R. BARNETT*
President
- DR. FRANK N. TRAGER
Director of Studies
(Professor of International Affairs
New York University)
- ROBERT G. BURKE*
Secretary, Treasurer
and General Counsel
(Chapman and Burke)
- PAUL E. FEFFER*
International Vice President
(President
Feffer and Simons)
- JOHN G. MCKAY, JR.*
Vice President
(Bradford, Williams,
McKay, Kimbrell,
Hamann and Jennings)
- DOROTHY E. NICOLOSI
Assistant Secretary and
Assistant Treasurer

Ms. Donna Larsen
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Donna:

The three-page document entitled, "Summary: United States/China Policy Private Conference, Plaza Hotel, New York City, June 6, 1975" is the one which Frank Barnett gave to Jack Marsh when last they met.

Appended to it is the larger document on the same subject from which the summary was made.

With best wishes,

Cordially,

Dorothy E. Nicolosi
Executive Administrator

DEN:n
Encs. (2)

DIRECTORS

- RICHARD C. HAM
Attorney at Law
- GEN. HAROLD K. JOHNSON, USA (Ret.)
Vice Chairman of the Board
Financial General Bankshares, Inc.
- MORRIS I. LEIBMAN
Sidley and Austin
(Civilian Aide at Large to the
Secretary of the Army)
- RADM WILLIAM C. MOTT, USN (Ret.)
Executive Vice President
U.S. Independent Telephone Association
- COL. JOHN C. NEFF, USAR (Ret.)
Former Chief of Staff
77th Infantry Division, USAR
- ROBERT H. PARSLEY
Butler, Binion, Rice,
Cook and Knapp
- MAJ. GENERAL RICHARD A. YUDKIN, USAF (Ret.)
Vice President, Corporate Affairs
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation

ADVISORY COUNCIL

- KARL R. BENDETSSEN
Chairman, Executive Committee
Champion International
- D. TENNANT BRYAN
Chairman of the Board
Media General, Inc.
- JOSEPH COORS
Executive Vice President
Adolph Coors Company
- HON. HENRY H. FOWLER
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
- JOHN W. HANES, JR.
Wertheim & Co.
- DILLARD MUNFORD
President
Munford, Inc.
- HON. ADOLPH W. SCHMIDT
former Ambassador to Canada
- DR. FREDERICK SEITZ
President
Rockefeller University
- HON. FRANK SHAKESPEARE
Executive Vice President
Westinghouse Electric Corp.
- JAMES G. SHIELDS, JR.
Executive Vice President
Crocker National Corp.
- JOHN A. SUTRO
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro
- JAMES L. WINOKUR
Chairman of the Board
Air Tool Parts and Service Company

WASHINGTON ASSOCIATE

- Dr. Roy Godson
Director
International Labor Program
Georgetown University

*Also Directors



S U M M A R Y
UNITED STATES/CHINA POLICY
PRIVATE CONFERENCE
Plaza Hotel, New York City
June 6, 1975

The Sino-American Shanghai Communique of February 27, 1972 concluded President Richard Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC). Its format allowed for the separate presentation of views by each party and an expression of several areas of agreement. These included a desire for "normalization of relations," reduction of the danger of international military conflict, avoidance of, and opposition to, hegemonial ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region, etc. The further development of the issues raised in the 1972 Shanghai Communique will most probably be discussed during President Ford's proposed visit to the People's Republic of China during the latter part of this year. In light of these developments, certain questions should be asked:

- What is or should be the meaning of "normalization"?
- How will such meaning affect the status of our recognition of the Republic of China and the Mutual Defense Treaty with that country?
- How will it affect our relations with other allies and friendly powers in the Western Pacific and Asia?



Reflecting current opinions and trends in Washington, it

appears that President Ford is being armed with but two alternative policies: either (1) maintain the status quo of diplomatic recognition of the GRC and a liaison office in Peking, while offering some trade and cultural concessions to the latter; or (2) derecognize the GRC and extend full diplomatic relations with the PRC, while offering some anomalous words of friendship and trade, if not protection, to the people on the islands of Taiwan. The conferees in our discussion generally felt that the either/or of recognition vs. derecognition was unacceptable diplomatic baggage for President Ford's visit. Equally convincing was the fact that derecognition of the GRC could not be "papered over" with promises of aid and trade. Furthermore, derecognition of Taipei would critically intensify the Asian/Pacific bandwagon psychology toward Peking while adding to the political-military consternation of our mutual security Asian allies.


A third policy option, however, does exist. This was called the "Willy Brandt" alternative. The participants at the Conference agreed that the Brandt solution to a divided Germany could be equally well adapted to the PRC and GRC. That is,

- There is one Chinese nation.
- Two Chinese Governments respectively rule in two geographically separate parts of this nation, each according to its own system.
- It is hoped that some day the Chinese nation may be peacefully reunited.



The Conference group recognized certain existing assets and liabilities in such a solution, but deemed the former far outweighed the latter. If this solution were to be adopted it would mean that the U.S. and any other state/government could, as in the German case, appropriately recognize both governments, i.e., exchange instruments of recognition and set up mutually accepted embassies both with the PRC and the GRC. Such a solution to the problem of PRC/GRC recognition could and should be among the options held by President Ford when he visits Peking.





Determined to be an
Administrative Marking

By SD INBA Date 1/22/14

STRICTLY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NOT FOR QUOTATION,
PUBLICATION OR REPRINT

UNITED STATES/CHINA POLICY

PRIVATE CONFERENCE

Plaza Hotel, New York City
June 6, 1975

Sponsored by

National Security Program/New York University
American Asian Educational Exchange

Present:

Mr. Frank R. Barnett
Dr. Ray Cline
Dr. Raymon Myers
Dr. Franz Michael
Dr. Lucian Pye
Dr. Gaston Sigur
Dr. Richard L. Walker
Amb. William Kintner
Amb. Walter McConaughy (Ret.)
Dr. Frank N. Trager, Chairman
William L. Scully, Rapporteur

Absent with regrets:

Dr. Robert Scalapino
Dr. Donald Treadgold
Mr. Sven Kraemer
Mr. A. Doak Barnett



The Agenda for this meeting was in part predicated upon the proposed visit of President Ford to the People's Republic of China, at which time the further development of the issues raised in the 1972 Shanghai Communique will most probably be discussed.

INTRODUCTION

The Sino-American Shanghai Communique of February 27, 1972 concluded President Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC). Its format allowed for the separate presentation of views by each party and an expression of several areas of agreement. These included a desire for "normalization of relations," reduction of the danger of international military conflict, avoidance of, and opposition to hegemonial ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region, etc. The subject of Taiwan, said the Chinese, "is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations" between the two countries. Its "liberation" is China's "internal affair." The U.S. failed in the Communique (though Secretary Kissinger later offered a correcting statement) to refer to its Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China. It merely affirmed the policy (held by both Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek) that "there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." It also asserted "that the Taiwan question should be decided by the Chinese themselves"; and that the U.S. "ultimate objective" is to withdraw all U.S. forces and military installations from the Republic of China.

- What should be the meaning of "normalization"?
- How will such meaning affect the status of our recognition of the Republic of China and the Mutual Defense Treaty with that country?
- How will it affect our relations with other allies and friendly powers in the Western Pacific and Asia?

This report is divided into three parts: a summary of major issues; a summary of policy recommendations; and concluding remarks regarding operational materials and further meetings.



I. SUMMARY OF MAJOR ISSUES

The meeting began with the suggestion that each participant briefly report or comment on what he feels to be the most pertinent issues which this conference should discuss. The following, in no rank order, is a listing of such issues:

- (1) China policy in the wake of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, particularly with respect to the possibility of more "normalization" between the U.S. and the PRC and the mounting pressure in Congress for a "liaison" office in Taipei. How do we counter the appearance or reality of U.S. weakness and credibility in Asia?
- (2) The viability of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) in light of possible diplomatic recognition of the PRC.
- (3) The consequences of nos. 1 and 2 above on U.S. relations with our Asian allies and other friendly Asian states. How do we articulate and carry out the commitments of our bilateral, trilateral and multilateral defense treaties in Asia?
- (4) The recognition and implications of the fact that the Soviet Union is America's major adversary. How do we then address ourselves to ("exploit") the Sino-Soviet confrontation?
- (5) What will be the effect of U.S./China policy, especially on Japan and South Korea?
- (6) What are the current U.S. interests in Southern and Eastern Asia and in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the areas of economic, military and political issues? How do these interests relate to political stability; expanding/contracting trade, investment and development; and military capability?
- (7) In view of the political, economic and military penetration by the Soviet Union in Asia, the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf areas, are we (U.S.) too mesmerized by the nuclear threat and especially the European theater to attend to the economic and political penetration of the areas concerned?



- (8) Have we, as it is sometimes alleged, successfully taken advantage of the weaknesses inherent in the Sino-Soviet dispute? What perceptible gains have been accomplished?
- (9) Estimates of public opinion in the U.S. re China policy perceived as either "confusion/ignorance" or pressure from the articulate U.S.-based pro-PRC Chinese-American Friendship associations.
- (10) Estimates of Congressional and Executive (limited or implied) thrusts on what "normalization" should mean now or in the near future. These vary from
 - a) Recognize Peking now- "get it over with" -associated with both neo-isolationist as well as anti-Soviet Senatorial expressions.
 - b) Recognize Peking but not immediately because it might be interpreted as "weakness" ("paper tiger") in light of Vietnam, etc.
 - c) What "quid pro quo" should be expected from the PRC on "more" normalization?
- (11) Estimates of the effects of further normalization with or without recognition on Southeast Asia, Australasia, Korea, Japan and, above all, the GRC. What happens to the U.S./GRC Mutual Security Treaty if "recognition" were to take place?
- (12) What of the Republic of China (GRC) if it becomes further isolated from the main streams of international intercourse? The "Willy Brandt" solution (see below).



II. SUMMARY OF POLICY FORMULATION

The following is a brief summation of the discussion on the foregoing agenda items. Needless to say there was not enough time adequately to address all items. However most were touched upon and will be reflected below. Several participants have also sent in brief notes which have been added as an appendix.

A. On Issues Generally Related to Current U.S. Policy Formulation

- (1) It was agreed that America's chief adversary is the U.S.S.R. and that, therefore, policy with respect to all Asian and Pacific areas must include this fact. However, the threat is not exclusively nuclear, another fact that has tended to inhibit U.S. policy-makers in making more effective use of the Sino-Soviet conflict when treating each of the disputants in that still serious conflict.

- (2) It was agreed that prevailing opinion in high Executive and Congressional circles tended towards pushing "normalization" further at the time of President Ford's visit. Pushing normalization further seems to mean "recognition" of Peking; derecognition of Taipei. The differences among these circles, despite their varying motivations, seems to be a matter of "timing." "Do it now," say some, "get it over with because it will be done sooner or later." They say also disregard the appearance of weakness after Vietnam. The sooner the issue is settled, the worry and uncertainty about the future will disappear even in Asian capitals. "Don't do it now," say others, "because it will appear as a weakness after Vietnam. . . but make moves toward its fulfillment." In sum, it would appear as if the President was being given two options: (1) Recognition now or at a somewhat later date; and (2) derecognition of Taipei now with some kind of "sop" liaison or trade or "consular" office or the same at a later date. As one leading Senator is supposed to have remarked: "merely switch the 'Plates' on the outside of the two buildings: 'U.S. Embassy from Taipei to Peking'; 'U.S. Liaison office from Peking to Taipei.'"



- (3) It was agreed that the language of the Shanghai communique could be diplomatically translated so as not to represent "normalization" as "recognition"; not to represent "ultimate" pull-out of American Forces from Taiwan as "pull-out now," etc. However such a diplomatist translation of the Shanghai communique probably could not serve as a sufficient basis for President Ford's forthcoming trip though it could be used in debate.

- (4) The overall sentiment of the group held that the current formulation for U.S./China policy incident to the Ford visit was being held "too tightly" by the Secretary of State and his very immediate staff. This has tended to stifle discussion on the Hill, in the White House, and among the people. The Vietnam debacle among other liabilities on Asian policy formulation has added to the general confusion and uncertainty on Asian policies. If "recognition" and "derecognition" take place what of U.S. commitments to its Defense Treaty with the GRC? And what gains, if any, would accrue to the U.S. if "recognition" was indeed forthcoming? The group felt that the treaty issue would present a genuine hurdle not surmountable in this present "two-option" approach. The group also expressed skepticism as to any substantial advantages to the U.S. from the presumed policy of "recognition" and "derecognition."

B. The Soviet Union, the Chief Adversary

Without much discussion, there was immediate awareness and almost immediate agreement that any U.S. policy in Asia had to "crank in" the non-nuclear political, economic and military penetration of the Soviet Union in Asia. There were, for example, the unfinished but still active business of the 1969 Brezhnev proposal for an Asian Security Conference; the various moves, mostly naval, that the U.S.S.R. has made in Somalia, South Yemen (including Socotra) and India; the general and special support given by the U.S.S.R. to various Asian "national" groups conducting "wars of national liberation"; the various major economic proposals bidding for Japanese (and U.S.) investment in Siberia without, however, moving toward a final "territorial" solution over the Japanese claims to islands taken by the U.S.S.R. during World War II; and



above all its military capability on the Sino-Soviet border that parallels its retained political-military aid interest in what is now communist Indochina. There was some feeling that Soviet strategy is currently turning to Asia in a most significant sense since its Western flank in Europe has seemingly achieved its objectives in that theater along with some unexpected new dividends in Europe's southern flank and in the Middle East-Mediterranean areas.

No "China" policy could be formulated without taking into account this other - there are only two super powers!

C. People's Republic of China (PRC)

Although there was some disagreement as to whether full diplomatic relations with the U.S. was the immediate "top priority" of the PRC, all agreed that Peking wants the "American connection," and it wants this on its own terms: Taiwan as a province of China and the removal, as much as possible, of American power from Asia. Cognizant that a major priority of the PRC is its confrontation with the Soviet Union, it was generally agreed that Peking desires that some U.S. nuclear power (Seventh Fleet?) remain in Asia as a counterbalance to Soviet initiatives in the area, particularly of a naval nature. On the other hand, the group clearly indicated its awareness of Peking's priority of countering Soviet moves both "peacefully" and by support for wars of national liberation in Asia and other parts of the world as seen in Europe, Africa, Malta, Cyprus, etc. It was agreed that the PRC had put itself forward in the UN and elsewhere as the model and leader of the "Third World." In this connection it pursued with all political and economic means to press - (1) its attempt to oust Taiwan from various international agencies; (2) its preoccupation in attempting to curtail through international contacts Taiwan's superior economic position, 50% greater than its own; and (3) its hardline attitude towards the British in 1970 and 1971 over the question of withdrawal of their consulate on Taiwan. There was no doubt in the group that the issue of Taiwan was of very high priority in PRC policy formulation. There was, however, some disagreement as to the time sequence which may or may not be followed in the implementation of PRC policy towards Taiwan. Chou En-lai has spoken of Chinese "patience" in the matter but PRC's actions do not seem to be imbued with that characteristic.



D. President Ford, the GRC, the PRC & Other Asian Powers

The group had no disagreement in quickly summarizing a number of factors that had to enter into the calculations of policy-formulation and execution. Among these are:

- (1) The recognition of Taiwan and the GRC as part of the Northeast Asian religio-cultural pattern; the strategic location of Taiwan as the southern flank of Japan corresponding in effect to South Korea as the northern flank; the role of Taiwan as a major trading partner of Japan and the U.S.; and Taiwan as the major custodian of traditional Chinese culture.
- (2) The impact on all remaining U.S. Asian Defense Treaty allies-Korea, Japan, the Republic of China, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Iran, Australia and New Zealand- of (1) what the Japanese well called the "shocks" of the so-called Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine with respect to the PRC, following the Kissinger 1971 "secret" visit to Peking and the Nixon 1972 (Shanghai communique) visit; (2) the tragic debacle of policy (Laos Accords, Paris Vietnam Agreements, etc.) in the "Indochinese" states; and (3) the fears and anxieties caused by the American military withdrawal and "pulldown" in Asia.
- (3) The related, if not quite similar, impact of these policy events and consequences on friendly Southeast Asian states - Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia.

Central to these three above factors are the issues of the U.S. as

- a credible ally and friend
- a sustaining global power
- an Asian-Pacific power

It is, in this context, "after Vladivostok" and now "after Vietnam," that President Ford's visit to the PRC in late 1975 will be closely scrutinized and analyzed by all Asians - friends and foes alike - for clues to future U.S. policy, particularly our Asian policy.



Such questions as these will be among those considered by Asians when Ford meets with Mao/Chou:

- How much, if anything, does the U.S. have to concede re Taiwan in order to continue its special relationship with Peking?
- What is the U.S.-Peking tie really worth? To the U.S.? To Peking?
- Are any geopolitical plans re the "triangle" (U.S.-U.S.S.R.-PRC) valid without bringing in Japan and Japan's shields, Korea and Taiwan?
- If the U.S. eventually plans to derecognize Taiwan, will she postpone such action until her Allies "forget" Vietnam?
- If the U.S. sticks with Taiwan, does this mean that Peking is no longer worried about the 50 Soviet divisions on the border?
- If the U.S. too readily make concessions to Peking, will she seem such a "Paper Tiger" that even Peking may doubt the worth of her support vis-a-vis the Soviet Union?
- Is the "Liaison Office" in Peking just as effective as an "Embassy" in terms of expanding trade, exchanging visits, safeguarding U.S. nationals? etc., etc., etc.

The ostensible purpose of President Ford's visit to the PRC is to carry forward the terms and the implications of the Shanghai communique of 1972, that is to determine how "normalization" shall proceed. The Conference participants discussed at length the various policy options which would be open to the President, especially regarding the sensitive issue of GRC - PRC relations. Reflecting current opinions and trends in Washington, it appeared to the participants, as suggested above, that the President was being armed with but two alternative policies: either (1) maintain the status quo of diplomatic recognition of the GRC and a liaison office in Peking,



while offering some trade and cultural concessions to the latter; or (2) derecognize the GRC and extend full diplomatic relations with the PRC, while offering some anomalous words of friendship and trade, if not protection, to the people on the islands of Taiwan whose "human rights" we will help preserve.

(Parenthetically one could posit a third possibility for the President - a kind of "let's get acquainted visit," at least until after the 1976 elections.) The Conference participants, however, felt that the either/or of recognition vs. derecognition was unacceptable diplomatic baggage for President Ford's visit to Peking, however much "recognition" would gratify Peking. They were equally convinced that derecognition of our increasingly isolated ally, the GRC, could not be "papered over" with promises of aid and trade. What is more, they added, derecognition of Taipei would critically intensify the Asian/ Pacific bandwagon psychology toward Peking while adding to the political-military consternation of our mutual security Asian allies. A third policy option for President Ford was proposed and generally agreed upon. It was called the "Willy Brandt" alternative.

E. The "Willy Brandt" Proposal for China

It will be recalled that not until Brandt became Prime Minister of the German Republic (West Germany) had any progress been made on the dangerously divisive post World War II issue of "Germany." Communist arms had been successful in creating and maintaining the Democratic Republic of Germany (East Germany). Several times during the past three decades the opposing Western and Soviet powers, occupying zones in Berlin, found themselves on the brink of war over the divided Germany. Willy Brandt, the then Prime Minister of West Germany, provided a solution to the issue of the divided Germany, acceptable to Moscow and therefore acceptable to the East German Communist regime. Essentially it consisted of three parts: a philosophical affirmation; a political decision and; an aspiration about the future.

- (1) There is only one German nation.
- (2) This German nation is geographically divided in two territories, each holding sovereignty (power to rule) over its own territorial state & each having its own type of government.



- (3) An expression of hope that one day the two states of German people will be united peacefully.

The participants agreed that this German solution could be equally well adapted to the PRC and GRC:

- There is one Chinese nation.
- Two Chinese Governments respectively rule in two geographically separate parts of this nation, each according to its own system.
- It is hoped that some day the Chinese nation may be peacefully reunited.

The Conference group recognized certain existing assets and liabilities in such a solution but deemed the former far outweighed the latter. Clearly, the late President of the GRC as well as Mao Tse-tung are on record against what has been loosely called the "two China" solution. But they are also on record registering their affirmation of one Chinese nation. Traditional Chinese law (exceptions with respect to treaties between Peking-Jakarta and Peking-Kuala Lumpur) have held that Chinese are always Chinese as the "right of blood," a view of nationality and citizenship contrary to Western law that has adopted the idea of citizenship as a "right of birth." Thus traditional Chinese law supports the idea that one Chinese people inhabit the China mainland and the Islands of Taiwan.

Further the Conference agreed that post World War II political life has, in fact, created and accepted, i.e. recognized the fact that one Korean nation inhabits Korea whose territory is divided at the 38th Parallel, each part, a state, in contemporary terms, ruled by separate governments, and both expressing current desire for future peaceful reunification. So too was the case for the Vietnamese from July 1954 at least until May 1975. That is there is one Viet people who inhabited two recognized states and governments in different parts of what had been at one time the territory of an independent, pre-colonial Viet Nam.

In short, historical and political precedents - and there are others not mentioned above - exist to support the



"Willy Brandt" solution for the PRC and GRC. If this solution were to be adopted it would mean that the U.S. and any other state/government could appropriately recognize both governments, i.e. exchange instruments of recognition and set up mutually accepted embassies both with the PRC and the GRC.

It was also clearly expressed by the conferees that in the present political climate neither the PRC nor the GRC could initiate, as Willy Brandt did, such a proposal. However, such a solution to the problem of the PRC/GRC recognition could and should be among the options held by President Ford when he visits Peking. It is an option to be carefully and quietly proposed at an appropriate time as the alternative to recognition/derecognition, neither of which is in the U.S. interest, nor in the interests of our allies and friends in Asia.

CONCLUDING REMARKS REGARDING OPERATIONAL MATERIALS AND FURTHER MEETINGS

The participants believed that the "Willy Brandt" solution would not now be considered "feasible" by the present State Department. The latter would therefore probably ignore it and otherwise plump for a policy that represented progress with Peking along the lines of "recognition." If this solution here presented is to find its way, at least, for consideration in the White House, other channels than the State Dept. should be found to bring it there.

The conferees agreed that there should be no attempt made to influence the decision-making process through a "joint letter" or other public approach in any of the media. Quiet diplomacy to reach the President probably during the several weeks before he leaves on his trip and quiet diplomacy by the President if he were interested in this "solution" are absolutely required if there is ever to be any chance of getting the solution accepted by all parties here and abroad.

Certain other operational points were further elaborated. They are as follows:

- (1) The process of reaching the President, Congress, and the Congressional staff should be done on an informal basis with a non-organizational, non-institutional attachment. It was suggested that perhaps no more than two or three (changing) members of the Conference, at any one time, should be involved in reaching any one particular group or key individual;



- (2) A short, comprehensive and clear statement on the economic importance of the Pacific area should be compiled for distribution to Congress, Congressional staffs and the like (one participant agreed to prepare such a document);
- (3) It was further agreed that certain U.S. economic groups and councils involved in the Asian scene might be mobilized to assist in this serious decision-making process;
- (4) A further meeting of this Conference grouping should be considered for this September; and
- (5) A preliminary non-attributable summary regarding this Conference will be sent to the Conference participants for comment, correctional and otherwise.

+ + + + +

A PRIDE OF EXPERTS ON ASIA

SIREN A PLAN THAT WOULD SIMPLY AMAZE-YUH--

A CHINESE INNOVATION,

- TWO STATES AND ONE NATION--

TO BE LAUNCHED AFTER MAO'S EUTHANASIA



APPENDIX

BRIEF NOTES BY SEVERAL CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS (EXCERPTS)

". . . maybe we should have spent more time talking about what might be done to strengthen the role of Taiwan once the almost inevitable process of diplomatic erosion has gone further. The decision of the Philippines and shortly of Thailand will mean that Taiwan will have to make its way in the world without the benefit of formal diplomatic relations with an awful lot of countries. Obviously this is going to be a novel situation but at the same time it shouldn't be a particularly disastrous one. For a long time the people in Taiwan thought that the world would come to an end if they were dropped from the U.N., but of course that didn't happen. Now the task will be to see how Taiwan can make a commitment which goes beyond just its economic role. . . ."

+ + +

". . . We all concurred that China policy was only a part, albeit a major one, in U.S. policy thinking and formulization. . . the central relationships the U.S. has internationally are with the USSR, the chief and most dangerous adversary, and with our foremost allies, Japan and Western Europe. When we consider taking action in regard to fundamental changes in U.S.-Chinese relations, we must first look at the effect these changes may have on the central relationships referred to above."

"What possible fundamental change is being considered by our government? It is the diplomatic recognition of Peking, at the expense of Taipei, to take place during the President's visit to Peking later this year. The arguments in favor of such a proposition go something like this: The U.S. began in 1971 the process of normalization of US-PRC relations. The Shanghai Communique of February 27, 1972 pledged to continue to move toward normalization which eventually



means diplomatic recognition. Now is the time to consummate this act before Mao and Chou depart the scene. This may increase whatever leverage we have in contributing to the Sino-Soviet dispute and into playing off the PRC and the USSR, one against the other. Also, we have taken a beating in Indo-China and now is the time to take dramatic diplomatic offensive moves which will indicate our capacity for action.

In my opinion, the arguments for recognition of the PRC, while containing some merit, are not convincing at this time. The case against such recognition during President Ford's coming visit to Peking is a much stronger one, if one centers it on U.S. power, both military and moral, as this power relates to our chief protagonist, the USSR and our foremost ally in the Pacific, Japan.

The U.S. debacle in Southeast Asia has led other powers to question the moral fiber and will and determination of the U.S. in the basic struggle between the two communist powers divided as they may be and the non-communist world, or that part of it which, however grudgingly, accepts the U.S.'s leadership role. We must never forget that the PRC and the Soviet Union cooperated to the degree necessary to support the Indo-Chinese communists in their defeat of U.S. policy in that area. This cooperation, while based paradoxically on the conflict between the two, could be evidenced again in other areas of the world, the most immediate likely spot being the Korean peninsula.

The U.S. must show to our adversaries, the Soviet Union primarily and, to the PRC, secondarily, that we are not retreating in Asia, that we are going to maintain a stable position and not adopt a pull-out strategy from present commitments and objectives. It is particularly necessary that we adopt this stance to avoid any misjudgment by the Soviet Union in the overall, global relationship between them and ourselves.

The Soviet Union understands, just as we do, that the fundamental relationship in our world is the U.S.-USSR relationship. Power is the basis of this relationship. While the USSR may seem obsessed with the PRC, and in reality is so obsessed to a degree, she does not forget for one minute that while a war with the PRC would damage her, a war with the U.S.



would destroy her. The difference is unmistakable. . . We must not make any further move at this time which would indicate any weakening of our determination to remain a Pacific power. A fundamental change, such as diplomatic recognition of Peking, would, in my opinion, be such a move and would be so regarded by the Soviet Union. While it is true that the USSR is worried over the growth of U.S.-PRC relations, she is more desirous to see a weakening of her main enemy, the United States. Too often, I think the U.S. seems to have overlooked this prime Soviet objective.

The Japanese would also view U.S. diplomatic recognition of Peking as a U.S. retreat. This could have an incalculable effect upon the U.S.-Japanese alliance structure which is crucial to U.S. Pacific and global policy. Japan might attempt to strike out on her own by building up military strength outside of the U.S. alliance tie or she might try to reach agreements with Peking or even with Moscow detrimental to U.S. interests. The Japanese respect power, after all, and will remain a staunch and firm ally of the U.S. only so long as the U.S. represents power.

While the case for a stable posture by the U.S. in its relations with the PRC is the one which should be pursued based on the above and related arguments, it may also be desirable for the U.S. to consider taking some kind of initiative in these relations. Your suggestion that the U.S. propose to Peking a one China, two state solution, based on the German pattern, is probably the best possible initiative. Peking will surely see it as unacceptable if it is presented formally. But if it is discussed quietly, only after Peking has put further pressure on for U.S. diplomatic recognition, then the PRC may view it as a legitimate U.S. negotiating position, based on a real U.S. desire to move toward normalization of our relations. We could even use the argument (with the PRC). . . that it would be undesirable for the U.S. to abandon Taiwan because that would be looked upon by the Soviets as weakness. . ."



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 8, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY

FROM: JACK MARSH 

This is the material that the President spoke to you about concerning Frank Barnett. Dick Scaife raised a question about this to the President when he visited Pepperdine University.



S U M M A R Y
UNITED STATES/CHINA POLICY
PRIVATE CONFERENCE
Plaza Hotel, New York City
June 6, 1975

The Sino-American Shanghai Communique of February 27, 1972 concluded President Richard Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC). Its format allowed for the separate presentation of views by each party and an expression of several areas of agreement. These included a desire for "normalization of relations," reduction of the danger of international military conflict, avoidance of, and opposition to, hegemonial ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region, etc. The further development of the issues raised in the 1972 Shanghai Communique will most probably be discussed during President Ford's proposed visit to the People's Republic of China during the latter part of this year. In light of these developments, certain questions should be asked:

- What is or should be the meaning of "normalization"?
- How will such meaning affect the status of our recognition of the Republic of China and the Mutual Defense Treaty with that country?
- How will it affect our relations with other allies and friendly powers in the Western Pacific and Asia?

Reflecting current opinions and trends in Washington, it




appears that President Ford is being armed with but two alternative policies: either (1) maintain the status quo of diplomatic recognition of the GRC and a liaison office in Peking, while offering some trade and cultural concessions to the latter; or (2) derecognize the GRC and extend full diplomatic relations with the PRC, while offering some anomalous words of friendship and trade, if not protection, to the people on the islands of Taiwan. The conferees in our discussion generally felt that the either/or of recognition vs. derecognition was unacceptable diplomatic baggage for President Ford's visit. Equally convincing was the fact that derecognition of the GRC could not be "papered over" with promises of aid and trade. Furthermore, derecognition of Taipei would critically intensify the Asian/Pacific bandwagon psychology toward Peking while adding to the political-military consternation of our mutual security Asian allies.

A third policy option, however, does exist. This was called the "Willy Brandt" alternative. The participants at the Conference agreed that the Brandt solution to a divided Germany could be equally well adapted to the PRC and GRC. That is,

- There is one Chinese nation.
- Two Chinese Governments respectively rule in two geographically separate parts of this nation, each according to its own system.
- It is hoped that some day the Chinese nation may be peacefully reunited.



The Conference group recognized certain existing assets and liabilities in such a solution, but deemed the former far outweighed the latter. If this solution were to be adopted it would mean that the U.S. and any other state/government could, as in the German case, appropriately recognize both governments, i.e., exchange instruments of recognition and set up mutually accepted embassies both with the PRC and the GRC. Such a solution to the problem of PRC/GRC recognition could and should be among the options held by President Ford when he visits Peking.



Determined to be an
Administrative Marking

By SD NARA, Date 1/22/14

STRICTLY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NOT FOR QUOTATION,
PUBLICATION OR REPRINT

UNITED STATES/CHINA POLICY

PRIVATE CONFERENCE

Plaza Hotel, New York City
June 6, 1975

Sponsored by

National Security Program/New York University
American Asian Educational Exchange

Present:

Mr. Frank R. Barnett
Dr. Ray Cline
Dr. Raymon Myers
Dr. Franz Michael
Dr. Lucian Pye
Dr. Gaston Sigur
Dr. Richard L. Walker
Emb. William Kintner
Emb. Walter McConaughy (Ret.)
Dr. Frank N. Trager, Chairman
William L. Scully, Rapporteur

Absent with regrets:

Dr. Robert Scalapino
Dr. Donald Treadgold
Mr. Sven Kraemer
Mr. A. Doak Barnett



The Agenda for this meeting was in part predicated upon the proposed visit of President Ford to the People's Republic of China, at which time the further development of the issues raised in the 1972 Shanghai Communique will most probably be discussed.

INTRODUCTION

The Sino-American Shanghai Communique of February 27, 1972 concluded President Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC). Its format allowed for the separate presentation of views by each party and an expression of several areas of agreement. These included a desire for "normalization of relations," reduction of the danger of international military conflict, avoidance of, and opposition to hegemonial ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region, etc. The subject of Taiwan, said the Chinese, "is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations" between the two countries. Its "liberation" is China's "internal affair." The U.S. failed in the Communique (though Secretary Kissinger later offered a correcting statement) to refer to its Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China. It merely affirmed the policy (held by both Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek) that "there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." It also asserted "that the Taiwan question should be decided by the Chinese themselves"; and that the U.S. "ultimate objective" is to withdraw all U.S. forces and military installations from the Republic of China.

- What should be the meaning of "normalization"?
- How will such meaning affect the status of our recognition of the Republic of China and the Mutual Defense Treaty with that country?
- How will it affect our relations with other allies and friendly powers in the Western Pacific and Asia?

This report is divided into three parts: a summary of major issues; a summary of policy recommendations; and concluding remarks regarding operational materials and further meetings.

- - - - -

I. SUMMARY OF MAJOR ISSUES

The meeting began with the suggestion that each participant briefly report or comment on what he feels to be the most pertinent issues which this conference should discuss. The following, in no rank order, is a listing of such issues:

- (1) China policy in the wake of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, particularly with respect to the possibility of more "normalization" between the U.S. and the PRC and the mounting pressure in Congress for a "liaison" office in Taipei. How do we counter the appearance or reality of U.S. weakness and credibility in Asia?
- (2) The viability of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) in light of possible diplomatic recognition of the PRC.
- (3) The consequences of nos. 1 and 2 above on U.S. relations with our Asian allies and other friendly Asian states. How do we articulate and carry out the commitments of our bilateral, trilateral and multilateral defense treaties in Asia?
- (4) The recognition and implications of the fact that the Soviet Union is America's major adversary. How do we then address ourselves to ("exploit") the Sino-Soviet confrontation?
- (5) What will be the effect of U.S./China policy, especially on Japan and South Korea?
- (6) What are the current U.S. interests in Southern and Eastern Asia and in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the areas of economic, military and political issues? How do these interests relate to political stability; expanding/contracting trade, investment and development; and military capability?
- (7) In view of the political, economic and military penetration by the Soviet Union in Asia, the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf areas, are we (U.S.) too mesmerized by the nuclear threat and especially the European theater to attend to the economic and political penetration of the areas concerned?



- (8) Have we, as it is sometimes alleged, successfully taken advantage of the weaknesses inherent in the Sino-Soviet dispute? What perceptible gains have been accomplished?
- (9) Estimates of public opinion in the U.S. re China policy perceived as either "confusion/ignorance" or pressure from the articulate U.S.-based pro-PRC Chinese-American Friendship associations.
- (10) Estimates of Congressional and Executive (limited or implied) thrusts on what "normalization" should mean now or in the near future. These vary from
- a) Recognize Peking now- "get it over with" -associated with both neo-isolationist as well as anti-Soviet Senatorial expressions.
 - b) Recognize Peking but not immediately because it might be interpreted as "weakness" ("paper tiger") in light of Vietnam, etc.
 - c) What "quid pro quo" should be expected from the PRC on "more" normalization?
- (11) Estimates of the effects of further normalization with or without recognition on Southeast Asia, Australasia, Korea, Japan and, above all, the GRC. What happens to the U.S./GRC Mutual Security Treaty if "recognition" were to take place?
- (12) What of the Republic of China (GRC) if it becomes further isolated from the main streams of international intercourse? The "Willy Brandt" solution (see below).



II. SUMMARY OF POLICY FORMULATION

The following is a brief summation of the discussion on the foregoing agenda items. Needless to say there was not enough time adequately to address all items. However most were touched upon and will be reflected below. Several participants have also sent in brief notes which have been added as an appendix.

A. On Issues Generally Related to Current U.S. Policy Formulation

- (1) It was agreed that America's chief adversary is the U.S.S.R. and that, therefore, policy with respect to all Asian and Pacific areas must include this fact. However, the threat is not exclusively nuclear, another fact that has tended to inhibit U.S. policy-makers in making more effective use of the Sino-Soviet conflict when treating each of the disputants in that still serious conflict.
- (2) It was agreed that prevailing opinion in high Executive and Congressional circles tended towards pushing "normalization" further at the time of President Ford's visit. Pushing normalization further seems to mean "recognition" of Peking; derecognition of Taipei. The differences among these circles, despite their varying motivations, seems to be a matter of "timing." "Do it now," say some, "get it over with because it will be done sooner or later." They say also disregard the appearance of weakness after Vietnam. The sooner the issue is settled, the worry and uncertainty about the future will disappear even in Asian capitals. "Don't do it now," say others, "because it will appear as a weakness after Vietnam. . . but make moves toward its fulfillment." In sum, it would appear as if the President was being given two options: (1) Recognition now or at a somewhat later date; and (2) Derecognition of Taipei now with some kind of "sop" liaison or trade or "consular" office or the same at a later date. As one leading Senator is supposed to have remarked: "merely switch the 'Plates' on the outside of the two buildings: 'U.S. Embassy from Taipei to Peking'; 'U.S. Liaison office from Peking to Taipei.'"



- (3) It was agreed that the language of the Shanghai communique could be diplomatically translated so as not to represent "normalization" as "recognition"; not to represent "ultimate" pull-out of American Forces from Taiwan as "pull-out now," etc. However such a diplomatist translation of the Shanghai communique probably could not serve as a sufficient basis for President Ford's forthcoming trip though it could be used in debate.
- (4) The overall sentiment of the group held that the current formulation for U.S./China policy incident to the Ford visit was being held "too tightly" by the Secretary of State and his very immediate staff. This has tended to stifle discussion on the Hill, in the White House, and among the people. The Vietnam debacle among other liabilities on Asian policy formulation has added to the general confusion and uncertainty on Asian policies. If "recognition" and "derecognition" take place what of U.S. commitments to its Defense Treaty with the GRC? And what gains, if any, would accrue to the U.S. if "recognition" was indeed forthcoming? The group felt that the treaty issue would present a genuine hurdle not surmountable in this present "two-option" approach. The group also expressed skepticism as to any substantial advantages to the U.S. from the presumed policy of "recognition" and "derecognition."

B. The Soviet Union, the Chief Adversary

Without much discussion, there was immediate awareness and almost immediate agreement that any U.S. policy in Asia had to "crank in" the non-nuclear political, economic and military penetration of the Soviet Union in Asia. There were, for example, the unfinished but still active business of the 1969 Brezhnev proposal for an Asian Security Conference; the various moves, mostly naval, that the U.S.S.R. has made in Somalia, South Yemen (including Socotra) and India; the general and special support given by the U.S.S.R. to various Asian "national" groups conducting "wars of national liberation"; the various major economic proposals bidding for Japanese (and U.S.) investment in Siberia without, however, moving toward a final "territorial" solution over the Japanese claims to islands taken by the U.S.S.R. during World War II; and



above all its military capability on the Sino-Soviet border that parallels its retained political-military aid interest in what is now communist Indochina. There was some feeling that Soviet strategy is currently turning to Asia in a most significant sense since its Western flank in Europe has seemingly achieved its objectives in that theater along with some unexpected new dividends in Europe's southern flank and in the Middle East-Mediterranean areas.

No "China" policy could be formulated without taking into account this other - there are only two super powers!

C. People's Republic of China (PRC)

Although there was some disagreement as to whether full diplomatic relations with the U.S. was the immediate "top priority" of the PRC, all agreed that Peking wants the "American connection," and it wants this on its own terms: Taiwan as a province of China and the removal, as much as possible, of American power from Asia. Cognizant that a major priority of the PRC is its confrontation with the Soviet Union, it was generally agreed that Peking desires that some U.S. nuclear power (Seventh Fleet?) remain in Asia as a counterbalance to Soviet initiatives in the area, particularly of a naval nature. On the other hand, the group clearly indicated its awareness of Peking's priority of countering Soviet moves both "peacefully" and by support for wars of national liberation in Asia and other parts of the world as seen in Europe, Africa, Malta, Cyprus, etc. It was agreed that the PRC had put itself forward in the UN and elsewhere as the model and leader of the "Third World." In this connection it pursued with all political and economic means to press - (1) its attempt to oust Taiwan from various international agencies; (2) its preoccupation in attempting to curtail through international contacts Taiwan's superior economic position, 50% greater than its own; and (3) its hardline attitude towards the British in 1970 and 1971 over the question of withdrawal of their consulate on Taiwan. There was no doubt in the group that the issue of Taiwan was of very high priority in PRC policy formulation. There was, however, some disagreement as to the time sequence which may or may not be followed in the implementation of PRC policy towards Taiwan. Chou En-lai has spoken of Chinese "patience" in the matter but PRC's actions do not seem to be imbued with that characteristic.

D. President Ford, the GRC, the PRC & Other Asian Powers


The group had no disagreement in quickly summarizing a number of factors that had to enter into the calculations of policy-formulation and execution. Among these are:

- (1) The recognition of Taiwan and the GRC as part of the Northeast Asian religio-cultural pattern; the strategic location of Taiwan as the southern flank of Japan corresponding in effect to South Korea as the northern flank; the role of Taiwan as a major trading partner of Japan and the U.S.; and Taiwan as the major custodian of traditional Chinese culture.
- (2) The impact on all remaining U.S. Asian Defense Treaty allies-Korea, Japan, the Republic of China, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Iran, Australia and New Zealand- of (1) what the Japanese well called the "shocks" of the so-called Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine with respect to the PRC, following the Kissinger 1971 "secret" visit to Peking and the Nixon 1972 (Shanghai communique) visit; (2) the tragic debacle of policy (Laos Accords, Paris Vietnam Agreements, etc.) in the "Indochinese" states; and (3) the fears and anxieties caused by the American military withdrawal and "pulldown" in Asia.
- (3) The related, if not quite similar, impact of these policy events and consequences on friendly Southeast Asian states - Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia.

Central to these three above factors are the issues of the U.S. as

- a credible ally and friend
- a sustaining global power
- an Asian-Pacific power

It is, in this context, "after Vladivostok" and now "after Vietnam," that President Ford's visit to the PRC in late 1975 will be closely scrutinized and analyzed by all Asians - friends and foes alike - for clues to future U.S. policy, particularly our Asian policy.



Such questions as these will be among those considered by Asians when Ford meets with Mao/Chou:

- How much, if anything, does the U.S. have to concede re Taiwan in order to continue its special relationship with Peking?
- What is the U.S.-Peking tie really worth? To the U.S.? To Peking?
- Are any geopolitical plans re the "triangle" (U.S.-U.S.S.R.-PRC) valid without bringing in Japan and Japan's shields, Korea and Taiwan?
- If the U.S. eventually plans to derecognize Taiwan, will she postpone such action until her Allies "forget" Vietnam?
- If the U.S. sticks with Taiwan, does this mean that Peking is no longer worried about the 50 Soviet divisions on the border?
- If the U.S. too readily make concessions to Peking, will she seem such a "Paper Tiger" that even Peking may doubt the worth of her support vis-a-vis the Soviet Union?
- Is the "Liaison Office" in Peking just as effective as an "Embassy" in terms of expanding trade, exchanging visits, safeguarding U.S. nationals? etc., etc., etc.

The ostensible purpose of President Ford's visit to the PRC is to carry forward the terms and the implications of the Shanghai communique of 1972, that is to determine how "normalization" shall proceed. The Conference participants discussed at length the various policy options which would be open to the President, especially regarding the sensitive issue of GRC - PRC relations. Reflecting current opinions and trends in Washington, it appeared to the participants, as suggested above, that the President was being armed with but two alternative policies: either (1) maintain the status quo of diplomatic recognition of the GRC and a liaison office in Peking,



while offering some trade and cultural concessions to the latter; or (2) derecognize the GRC and extend full diplomatic relations with the PRC, while offering some anomalous words of friendship and trade, if not protection, to the people on the islands of Taiwan whose "human rights" we will help preserve.

(Parenthetically one could posit a third possibility for the President - a kind of "let's get acquainted visit," at least until after the 1976 elections.)

The Conference participants, however, felt that the either/or of recognition vs. derecognition was unacceptable diplomatic baggage for President Ford's visit to Peking, however much "recognition" would gratify Peking. They were equally convinced that derecognition of our increasingly isolated ally, the GRC, could not be "papered over" with promises of aid and trade. What is more, they added, derecognition of Taipei would critically intensify the Asian/ Pacific bandwagon psychology toward Peking while adding to the political-military consternation of our mutual security Asian allies. A third policy option for President Ford was proposed and generally agreed upon. It was called the "Willy Brandt" alternative.

E. The "Willy Brandt" Proposal for China

It will be recalled that not until Brandt became Prime Minister of the German Republic (West Germany) had any progress been made on the dangerously divisive post World War II issue of "Germany." Communist arms had been successful in creating and maintaining the Democratic Republic of Germany (East Germany). Several times during the past three decades the opposing Western and Soviet powers, occupying zones in Berlin, found themselves on the brink of war over the divided Germany. Willy Brandt, the then Prime Minister of West Germany, provided a solution to the issue of the divided Germany, acceptable to Moscow and therefore acceptable to the East German Communist regime. Essentially it consisted of three parts: a philosophical affirmation; a political decision and; an aspiration about the future.

- (1) There is only one German nation.
- (2) This German nation is geographically divided in two territories, each holding sovereignty (power to rule) over its own territorial state & each having its own type of government.



- (3) An expression of hope that one day the two states of German people will be united peacefully.

The participants agreed that this German solution could be equally well adapted to the PRC and GRC:

- There is one Chinese nation.
- Two Chinese Governments respectively rule in two geographically separate parts of this nation, each according to its own system.
- It is hoped that some day the Chinese nation may be peacefully reunited.

The Conference group recognized certain existing assets and liabilities in such a solution but deemed the former far outweighed the latter. Clearly, the late President of the GRC as well as Mao Tse-tung are on record against what has been loosely called the "two China" solution. But they are also on record registering their affirmation of one Chinese nation. Traditional Chinese law (exceptions with respect to treaties between Peking-Jakarta and Peking-Kuala Lumpur) have held that Chinese are always Chinese as the "right of blood," a view of nationality and citizenship contrary to Western law that has adopted the idea of citizenship as a "right of birth." Thus traditional Chinese law supports the idea that one Chinese people inhabit the China mainland and the Islands of Taiwan.

Further the Conference agreed that post World War II political life has, in fact, created and accepted, i.e. recognized the fact that one Korean nation inhabits Korea whose territory is divided at the 38th Parallel, each part, a state, in contemporary terms, ruled by separate governments, and both expressing current desire for future peaceful reunification. So too was the case for the Vietnamese from July 1954 at least until May 1975. That is there is one Viet people who inhabited two recognized states and governments in different parts of what had been at one time the territory of an independent, pre-colonial Viet Nam.

In short, historical and political precedents - and there are others not mentioned above - exist to support the



"Willy Brandt" solution for the PRC and GRC. If this solution were to be adopted it would mean that the U.S. and any other state/government could appropriately recognize both governments, i.e. exchange instruments of recognition and set up mutually accepted embassies both with the PRC and the GRC.

It was also clearly expressed by the conferees that in the present political climate neither the PRC nor the GRC could initiate, as Willy Brandt did, such a proposal. However, such a solution to the problem of the PRC/GRC recognition could and should be among the options held by President Ford when he visits Peking. It is an option to be carefully and quietly proposed at an appropriate time as the alternative to recognition/derecognition, neither of which is in the U.S. interest, nor in the interests of our allies and friends in Asia.


CONCLUDING REMARKS REGARDING OPERATIONAL MATERIALS AND FURTHER MEETINGS

The participants believed that the "Willy Brandt" solution would not now be considered "feasible" by the present State Department. The latter would therefore probably ignore it and otherwise plump for a policy that represented progress with Peking along the lines of "recognition." If this solution here presented is to find its way, at least, for consideration in the White House, other channels than the State Dept. should be found to bring it there.

The conferees agreed that there should be no attempt made to influence the decision-making process through a "joint letter" or other public approach in any of the media. Quiet diplomacy to reach the President probably during the several weeks before he leaves on his trip and quiet diplomacy by the President if he were interested in this "solution" are absolutely required if there is ever to be any chance of getting the solution accepted by all parties here and abroad.

Certain other operational points were further elaborated. They are as follows:

- (1) The process of reaching the President, Congress, and the Congressional staff should be done on an informal basis with a non-organizational, non-institutional attachment. It was suggested that perhaps no more than two or three (changing) members of the Conference, at any one time, should be involved in reaching any one particular group or key individual;



- (2) A short, comprehensive and clear statement on the economic importance of the Pacific area should be compiled for distribution to Congress, Congressional staffs and the like (one participant agreed to prepare such a document);
- (3) It was further agreed that certain U.S. economic groups and councils involved in the Asian scene might be mobilized to assist in this serious decision-making process;
- (4) A further meeting of this Conference grouping should be considered for this September; and
- (5) A preliminary non-attributable summary regarding this Conference will be sent to the Conference participants for comment, correctional and otherwise.

+ + + + +

A PRIDE OF EXPERTS ON ASIA

SIREN A PLAN THAT WOULD SIMPLY AMAZE-YUH--

A CHINESE INNOVATION,

- TWO STATES AND ONE NATION--

TO BE LAUNCHED AFTER MAO'S EUTHANASIA



APPENDIX

BRIEF NOTES BY SEVERAL CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS (EXCERPTS)

" . . . maybe we should have spent more time talking about what might be done to strengthen the role of Taiwan once the almost inevitable process of diplomatic erosion has gone further. The decision of the Philippines and shortly of Thailand will mean that Taiwan will have to make its way in the world without the benefit of formal diplomatic relations with an awful lot of countries. Obviously this is going to be a novel situation but at the same time it shouldn't be a particularly disastrous one. For a long time the people in Taiwan thought that the world would come to an end if they were dropped from the U.N., but of course that didn't happen. Now the task will be to see how Taiwan can make a commitment which goes beyond just its economic role. . . ."

+ + +

" . . . We all concurred that China policy was only a part, albeit a major one, in U.S. policy thinking and formulization. . . the central relationships the U.S. has internationally are with the USSR, the chief and most dangerous adversary, and with our foremost allies, Japan and Western Europe. When we consider taking action in regard to fundamental changes in U.S.-Chinese relations, we must first look at the effect these changes may have on the central relationships referred to above."

"What possible fundamental change is being considered by our government? It is the diplomatic recognition of Peking, at the expense of Taipei, to take place during the President's visit to Peking later this year. The arguments in favor of such a proposition go something like this: The U.S. began in 1971 the process of normalization of US-PRC relations. The Shanghai Communique of February 27, 1972 pledged to continue to move toward normalization which eventually

means diplomatic recognition. Now is the time to consummate this act before Mao and Chou depart the scene. This may increase whatever leverage we have in contributing to the Sino-Soviet dispute and into playing off the PRC and the USSR, one against the other. Also, we have taken a beating in Indo-China and now is the time to take dramatic diplomatic offensive moves which will indicate our capacity for action.

In my opinion, the arguments for recognition of the PRC, while containing some merit, are not convincing at this time. The case against such recognition during President Ford's coming visit to Peking is a much stronger one, if one centers it on U.S. power, both military and moral, as this power relates to our chief protagonist, the USSR and our foremost ally in the Pacific, Japan.

The U.S. debacle in Southeast Asia has led other powers to question the moral fiber and will and determination of the U.S. in the basic struggle between the two communist powers divided as they may be and the non-communist world, or that part of it which, however grudgingly, accepts the U.S.'s leadership role. We must never forget that the PRC and the Soviet Union cooperated to the degree necessary to support the Indo-Chinese communists in their defeat of U.S. policy in that area. This cooperation, while based paradoxically on the conflict between the two, could be evidenced again in other areas of the world, the most immediate likely spot being the Korean peninsula.

The U.S. must show to our adversaries, the Soviet Union primarily and, to the PRC, secondarily, that we are not retreating in Asia, that we are going to maintain a stable position and not adopt a pull-out strategy from present commitments and objectives. It is particularly necessary that we adopt this stance to avoid any misjudgment by the Soviet Union in the overall, global relationship between them and ourselves.

The Soviet Union understands, just as we do, that the fundamental relationship in our world is the U.S.-USSR relationship. Power is the basis of this relationship. While the USSR may seem obsessed with the PRC, and in reality is so obsessed to a degree, she does not forget for one minute that while a war with the PRC would damage her, a war with the U.S.

would destroy her. The difference is unmistakable. . . We must not make any further move at this time which would indicate any weakening of our determination to remain a Pacific power. A fundamental change, such as diplomatic recognition of Peking, would, in my opinion, be such a move and would be so regarded by the Soviet Union. While it is true that the USSR is worried over the growth of U.S.-PRC relations, she is more desirous to see a weakening of her main enemy, the United States. Too often, I think the U.S. seems to have overlooked this prime Soviet objective.

The Japanese would also view U.S. diplomatic recognition of Peking as a U.S. retreat. This could have an incalculable effect upon the U.S.-Japanese alliance structure which is crucial to U.S. Pacific and global policy. Japan might attempt to strike out on her own by building up military strength outside of the U.S. alliance tie or she might try to reach agreements with Peking or even with Moscow detrimental to U.S. interests. The Japanese respect power, after all, and will remain a staunch and firm ally of the U.S. only so long as the U.S. represents power.

While the case for a stable posture by the U.S. in its relations with the PRC is the one which should be pursued based on the above and related arguments, it may also be desirable for the U.S. to consider taking some kind of initiative in these relations. Your suggestion that the U.S. propose to Peking a one China, two state solution, based on the German pattern, is probably the best possible initiative. Peking will surely see it as unacceptable if it is presented formally. But if it is discussed quietly, only after Peking has put further pressure on for U.S. diplomatic recognition, then the PRC may view it as a legitimate U.S. negotiating position, based on a real U.S. desire to move toward normalization of our relations. We could even use the argument (with the PRC) . . . that it would be undesirable for the U.S. to abandon Taiwan because that would be looked upon by the Soviets as weakness. . ."



Cong.
~~Cong.~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 14, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: JACK MARSH
FROM: RUSS ROURKE R

Bob Wolthuis advises me that it is highly unlikely that the President will take Congressional types on the China trip. At the same time, Bob tells me that Max maintains a list of those MC's who have indicated their desire to go on such visits. Bob will ask Max to call Gillis, and will see to it that his name is placed on the aforementioned list.

cc: BWolthuis

R- also add Roth-

sent B.W. 10/15



OCT 16 1975

October 16, 1975



MEMORANDUM FOR:

DON RUMSFELD

FROM:

MAX FRIEDERSDORF

SUBJECT:

The President's China Trip

With reference to my memo yesterday on this subject, please be advised that Senator Roth has also indicated an interest in being included on the trip.

cc: Jack Marsh
Bill Kendall



OCT 21 1975

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 20, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VERN LOEN
BILL KENDALL
PAT O'DONNELL
CHARLES LEPPERT
TOM LOEFFLER
BOB WOLTHUIS

FROM:

MAX FRIEDERSDORF

SUBJECT:

China Trip

The President will not be taking any Members of Congress on his post-Thanksgiving trip to China.

cc: Jack Marsh



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 16, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DON RUMSFELD

FROM:

MAX FRIEDERSDORF *M.F.*

SUBJECT:

The President's China Trip

With reference to my memo yesterday on this subject, please be advised that Senator Roth has also indicated an interest in being included on the trip.

cc: Jack Marsh
Bill Kendall

*Max.
The Pres. felt No
on basis on
this trip.*



NOV 12 1975

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

6658

November 12, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: MAX FRIEDERSDORF

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Congressional Interest in
the President's China Trip

Senator Roth has written (Tab C) expressing an interest in accompanying the President on his forthcoming trip to China. Rep. Gillis Long has expressed a similar interest to Don Rumsfeld (Tab D).

There are no plans to include members of Congress in the President's official party when he visits Peking. It has been a long-standing practice to include only members of the Executive Branch in such official visits. At the same time, we have recognized the value of Congressional involvement in our relations with China and have encouraged the PRC to invite a number of Congressional delegations as part of our efforts to normalize relations.

We are therefore providing the draft responses at Tabs A and B to Senator Roth and Rep. Long which express appreciation for their interest, indicate that we will keep their suggestions in mind, but convey the impression that it is unlikely the President will be taking any members of Congress with him.

Because Senator Roth wrote his letter at the express suggestion of the President, you may want to show the President that letter and the proposed reply.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you use the draft letters at Tabs A and B in responding to Senator Roth and Rep. Long.

cc: Mr. Marsh

Max -
This may not
be negative enough.
Brent



Draft Response to Senator Roth

Dear Bill:

The President has asked me to thank you for your thoughtful letter of October 1 raising the possibility of your accompanying him on his forthcoming trip to China. He is very much aware of your long-standing interest in Asia and the expertise you bring to the Congress on developments in this important region of the world.

While the official party of Presidential visits such as the one to Peking are normally composed only of members of the Executive Branch, we will certainly bear your recommendations in mind as we make preparations for the Peking visit.

The President appreciates your expression of support for the Administration's China policy and your interest in being personally involved in our efforts to normalize relations between Washington and Peking. You can be assured that, even if arrangements for the President's trip do not make Congressional participation possible, he feels it is important to have the Congress actively involved in our relations with the PRC and will encourage further Congressional trips there. As such trips are contemplated, we will keep your particular interest in mind.

Sincerely,

Max L. Friedersdorf



Draft Response to Rep. Long

Dear Gillis:

Don Rumsfeld has brought to my attention your letter of September 24 expressing an interest in accompanying the President on his forthcoming trip to China.

We recognize the value of active Congressional involvement in the development of our relations with the PRC and appreciate your interest in becoming personally involved. As you know, the official party of Presidential trips, such as the China visit, are normally composed only of members of the Executive Branch. Nevertheless, we will keep your interest in mind as we make preparations for the President's visit. If the final arrangements do not make Congressional participation possible on this trip, we will bear in mind your particular interest as future Congressional trips to China are contemplated.

Sincerely,

Max L. Friedersdorf



United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 1, 1975

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

As you recall, I spoke to you yesterday about the possibility of accompanying you on your forthcoming trip to China, and you asked that I write you a letter about this subject.

My interest in East Asia dates from my military experience during World War II. When I was with Hercules, Inc., I was able to renew my acquaintance with the region, and since coming to Congress, I have devoted special attention to Asia because of the general lack of serious attention given it by most Members of Congress. Since 1971, I have visited Japan each year, twice leading Congressional delegations under the auspices of the Columbia University East Asia Institute's U.S.-Japanese Parliamentary Exchange Program.

I believe that such contacts add a very significant dimension to our foreign relations, not in terms of policy-making but in terms of the general rapport between the United States and foreign countries. Over the past few years, I have been able to develop contacts with a number of Japanese legislators, civil servants, and businessmen, and have been impressed by the extensive use the Japanese make of such ties in their relations with China and the United States. It seems to me that the establishment of a greater network of such ties between the United States and China would help strengthen the chances that the dialogue, so painfully and newly begun, would not be cut short by the eventual death of a few senior leaders.

Of course, a number of senior Congressional leaders have made individual trips to China. It is my feeling, however, as I previously expressed to your predecessor, that there could be several important advantages to Presidents of including small bipartisan delegations on important Presidential visits as a general practice.



The President
Page 2
October 1, 1975

First, this practice could help diffuse the tendency to make Presidential summit meetings the subject of partisan debate. Where trips to China or the Soviet Union are involved, it could help strengthen bipartisan and bi-institutional support for basic policies of detente.


Secondly, it could disabuse foreign governments of any notion that possibilities exist for playing different branches of government or political parties against each other on foreign policy issues of vital importance to all Americans. It is my impression also that the inclusion of Members of Congress could add to the prestige of any visit from the point of view of the host government.

Thirdly, where agreements are signed that require Congressional approval, such delegations could prove helpful to the Congress in evaluating these agreements. It would also be valuable to the Executive branch to have Members of Congress who are thoroughly acquainted with the considerations involved in arriving at those agreements.

Specifically with respect to the China trip, I believe your visit will have very widespread support among the American people and within the Congress. For this reason, it would be a good opportunity to begin the practice of involving the Congress on such trips in a relatively uncontroversial, non-political atmosphere.

In addition, the Congressional delegation would be an important symbolic gesture of the significance this country attaches to maintaining the dialogue with China. Although not unprecedented (the Versailles delegation, for example, is the best-known precedent), it would certainly be regarded as a significant departure with the recent past, and, I believe, would be strongly welcomed by the Chinese as indicative of our interest in strengthening Sino-American relations.

Sincerely,


William V. Roth, Jr.
U. S. Senate

WVR/bcg



for Stagger

6692

October 2, 1975

Dear Senator:

This is a brief note to acknowledge receipt of your October 1 letter to the President following up on your conversation with him.

I wish to assure you that I shall make certain he receives it at the earliest opportunity.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

William T. Kendall
Deputy Assistant
to the President

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

~~bcc:~~ w/incoming to General Scowcroft for further reply -
Presidential if appropriate. Please advise this office of
handling.

bcc: w/incoming to Max Friedersdorf - for your information

WTK:EF:VO:vo



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 2, 1975

Dear Gillis:

Thanks so much for your note. I will certainly pass it along to Jack Marsh so that he is aware of your interest and can visit with the Department of State about it.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,

Donald Rumsfeld
Assistant to the President

Honorable Gillis W. Long
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515



GILLIS W. LONG
5TH DISTRICT, LOUISIANA

COMMITTEE ON RULES
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
215 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
PHONE: 225-4926

ALEXANDRIA OFFICE:
POST OFFICE BOX 410
ALEXANDRIA, LOUISIANA 71301
PHONE (318) 487-4595

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

September 24, 1975

Mr. Donald Rumsfeld
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.


Dear Don:

I hear through the media that the President is planning his trip to China after Thanksgiving.

If you're looking for a Democratic Member of Congress (and even his wife) to go along to fill out the party, we'd be much interested.


Although I know that you had nothing to do with the fact that all House members on the August recess trip to China were from the other side of the aisle, I am sure you will want to see that the President is accompanied by a bipartisan group! Your help will be appreciated.

Best regards,


GILLIS LONG
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

GWL/Snm





THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

December 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: JACK MARSH

FROM: RUSS ROURKE *Rourke*

Jack, Gulley, unless instructed to the contrary, will keep the flight on a "stand by" status until 11:00 p.m. tonight. Past that point, we would never make the Peking connection even if we were set to go.



Eleven women members of Congress, headed by Rep. Margaret M. Heckler (R-Mass.), will leave Saturday for Peking and an extended visit to the People's Republic. The trip, which ends Jan. 10, has as its focal point "women's issues," which the congresswomen hope to discuss with prominent Chinese women, according to a spokesman in Heckler's office.

Heckler arranged the trip after an August visit to China as part of a mission dealing with trade and agricultural matters. Joining Heckler will be Reps. Bella Abzug (D-N.Y.), Corinne C. (Lindy) Boggs (D-La.), Yvonne B. Burke (D-Calif.), Cardiss Collins (D-Ill.), Millicent Fenwick (R-N.J.), Elizabeth Holtzman (D-N.Y.), Helen Meyner (D-N.J.), Patsy Mink (D-Hawaii), Patricia Schroeder (D-Col.), and Gladys Spellman (D-Md.).




Mike -

Let's get some de-
briefs, thru McCloskey at
State.

Jack

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



Dick:

Goldwater has sent Henry an ultimatum: either respond to his China letter within 24 hours or he will publicly announce he cannot support Ford.

State has a letter that they are getting ready to send. I have advised Hyland we want to see it here before it goes to the Hill this afternoon.

Jack

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

M

January 16, 1976

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH
FROM: PETE ROUSSEL PR

George Bush suggested today that the President might want to have Julie and David Eisenhower in for a low key, personal visit to discuss their trip to China. What downsides there are would obviously have to be considered, but George thinks this would be viewed significantly by the Chinese who greatly admire Nixon. Julie and David are doing "Face The Nation" this Sunday, thus George thought if the President were to do it, it should be before that. George said he would be glad to discuss this with you today if you thought it should be pursued.

cc: Dick Cheney



United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

COMMITTEES:
AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES
ARMED SERVICES
PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE
TACTICAL AIR POWER SUBCOMMITTEE
INTELLIGENCE SUBCOMMITTEE
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION SUBCOMMITTEE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

May 28, 1976


The Honorable Henry Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:

On numerous occasions you have told me that recognition of Red China was not even being considered. I heard on the news this morning that it is being considered and that we will recognize her after the elections.

I would like to have immediate verification or non verification of this because it will strongly affect whether or not I will support the President. It doesn't make any sense to me to forego our friends on Taiwan, and I don't intend to stay quiet about it, so please within twenty-four hours let me know what the truth is and I mean the truth.

Sincerely,


Barry Goldwater



Henry called the
Senator this afternoon
Says he turned him off. *ZM*

JUL 23 1976

July 21, 1976

Dear Senator Hollings:

The President is pleased that you have accepted his invitation to be a delegate on the Presidential Mission to China next month.

The entire delegation will consist of yourself and Mrs. Hollings, and Senators Curtis, Bayh, Stevens, Baker, Johnston and their wives.

We are discussing specific dates of the Mission with the PRC and have recommended August 23-September 4.

As soon as the dates are firm we will advise you and would like at that time to meet with the entire delegation to consult on the itinerary and other details of the trip.

Senator Curtis will serve as Chairman of the delegation, and Senator Bayh, deputy chairman.

If you have any questions or suggestions concerning the trip, please do not hesitate to call me.

Meanwhile, with cordial regards, I am

Sincerely,

Max L. Friedersdorf
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Ernest F. Hollings
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

bcc: Jack Marsh ✓
Brent Scowcroft
Bob Wolthuis
Les Janka

MLF:kir



JUL 23 1976

July 21, 1976

Dear Howard:

The President is pleased that you have accepted his invitation to be a delegate on the Presidential Mission to China next month.

The entire delegation will consist of yourself and Mrs. Baker, and Senators Curtis, Bayh, Stevens, Hollings, Johnston and their wives.

We are discussing specific dates of the Mission with the PRC and have recommended August 23-September 4.

As soon as the dates are firm we will advise you and would like at that time to meet with the entire delegation to consult on the itinerary and other details of the trip.

Senator Curtis will serve as Chairman of the delegation, and Senator Bayh, deputy chairman.

If you have any questions or suggestions concerning the trip, please do not hesitate to call me.

Meanwhile, with cordial regards, I am

Sincerely,

Max L. Friedersdorf
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

bcc: Jack Marsh
Brent Scowcroft
Bob Wolthuis
Les Janka

MLF:kir



JUL 23 1976

July 21, 1976

Dear Ted:

The President is pleased that you have accepted his invitation to be a delegate on the Presidential Mission to China next month.

The entire delegation will consist of yourself and Mrs. Stevens, and Senators Curtis, Bayh, Baker, Hollings, Johnston and their wives.

We are discussing specific dates of the Mission with the PRC and have recommended August 23-September 4.

As soon as the dates are firm we will advise you and would like at that time to meet with the entire delegation to consult on the itinerary and other details of the trip.

Senator Curtis will serve as Chairman of the delegation, and Senator Bayh, deputy chairman.

If you have any questions or suggestions concerning the trip, please do not hesitate to call me.

Meanwhile, with cordial regards, I am

Sincerely,

Max L. Friedersdorf
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Ted Stevens
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
bcc: Jack Marsh
Brent Scowcroft
Bob Wolthuis
Les Janka

MLF:kir



JUL 23 1976

July 21, 1976

Dear Birch:

The President is pleased that you have accepted his invitation to be a delegate on the Presidential Mission to China next month.

The entire delegation will consist of yourself and Mrs. Bayh, and Senators Curtis, Stevens, Baker, Hollings, Johnston and their wives.

We are discussing specific dates of the Mission with the PRC and have recommended August 23-September 4.

As soon as the dates are firm we will advise you and would like at that time to meet with the entire delegation to consult on the itinerary and other details of the trip.

Senator Curtis will serve as chairman of the delegation, and you will be deputy chairman.

If you have any questions or suggestions concerning the trip, please do not hesitate to call me.

Meanwhile, with cordial regards, I am

Sincerely,

Max L. Friedersdorf
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Birch Bayh
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

bcc: Jack Marsh
Brent Scowcroft
Bob Wolthuis
Les Janka

MLF:kir



JUL 23 1976

July 21, 1976

Dear Carl:

The President is pleased that you have accepted his invitation to be a delegate on the Presidential Mission to China next month.

The entire delegation will consist of yourself and Mrs. Curtis, and Senators Bayh, Stevens, Baker, Hollings, Johnston and their wives.

We are discussing specific dates of the Mission with the PRC and have recommended August 23-September 4.

As soon as the dates are firm we will advise you and would like at that time to meet with the entire delegation to consult on the itinerary and other details of the trip.

Senator Bayh will serve as your deputy chairman of the delegation.

If you have any questions or suggestions concerning the trip, please do not hesitate to call me.

Meanwhile, with cordial regards, I am

Sincerely,

Max L. Friedersdorf
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Carl T. Curtis
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

bcc: Jack Marsh
Brent Scowcroft
Bob Wolhuis
Les Janka

MLF:kir



JUL 23 1976

July 21, 1976

Dear Senator Johnston:

The President is pleased that you have accepted his invitation to be a delegate on the Presidential Mission to China next month.

The entire delegation will consist of yourself and Mrs. Johnston, and Senators Curtis, Bayh, Stevens, Baker, Hollings and their wives.

We are discussing specific dates of the Mission with the PRC and have recommended August 23-September 4.

As soon as the dates are firm we will advise you and would like at that time to meet with the entire delegation to consult on the itinerary and other details of the trip.

Senator Curtis will serve as Chairman of the delegation, and Senator Bayh, deputy chairman.

If you have any questions or suggestions concerning the trip, please do not hesitate to call me.

Meanwhile, with cordial regards, I am

Sincerely,

Max L. Friedersdorf
Assistant to the President

The Honorable J. Bennett Johnston, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

bcc: Jack Marsh
Brent Scowcroft
Bob Wolthuis
Les Janka

MLF:kir

