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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 11, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

JIM CONNOR *JCC*

The attached newspaper clippings were returned in the President's outbox with the following notation:

"HAK might like to see these."

Attachments:

From THE PLAIN DEALER 4/11/76
"Politicians Should Lay Off Kissinger"

From WALL STREET JOURNAL 6/11/76
"Foreign Policy After Kissinger"

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Brent Scowcroft

HAK might
like to see there.

Politicians should lay off Kissinger

By Thomas Vail

Some presidential aspirants must have lost all sense of perspective when they started trying to make Secretary of State Henry Kissinger a campaign issue.


One wonders what constructive result can come from attacking one of the most brilliant and accomplished secretaries of state in this nation's history. By his superhuman effort, superb diplomatic knowledge and scholarly understanding, our perfectionist secretary of state has done more for this country than we could have hoped for in foreign policy.

The opening to China and the building of bridges in the Middle East are just two major accomplishments in which Kissinger played a major role.

In a changing world, Kissinger sees brilliantly that Europe is less important and Asia is more important; that the free industrialized western democracies are weaker and that communism is rampant by comparison. As secretary of state he must deal with the world as it is.

Continuity of U.S. foreign policy has been maintained these last few years against an American political background as unstable and precarious as any in this country's history. To have survived the political upheavals and maintained the fabric of an American foreign policy has been a major achievement in itself. That achievement belongs more to Henry Kissinger than to anyone else.

In the Middle East Secretary Kissinger sees new realities the world must contend with. While the Jewish lobby presses the Jewish secretary of state for "assurances," it is implying policies that may ruin Israel if carried too far.



The United States is more than ever dependent on oil from Arab countries. When this Arab oil was shut off in 1973, the United States learned in a hurry that Europe and Japan were not our allies when it came to oil and Israel.

So Kissinger and Anwar Sadat moved an inch and there exists a precarious bridge in the Middle East. Without these bridges and if oil is cut off again, the United States will simply lose its allies and Israel will lose many of its friends here and abroad. Kissinger, always the realist, knows this and tries to avoid the showdown that can only hurt Israel.

The presidential politicians and even the President's own campaign manager talk about how Henry Kissinger will not be kept on as secretary of state even if President Ford wins election this fall. Whoever is elected president will be lucky if he can persuade anyone half as good as Henry Kissinger to be secretary of state.

There are other reasons not to make a secretary of state a factor in a political election. Foreign policy is seldom a factor in a national election in the United States unless war is an issue. Foreign policy is not a major factor in the 1976 election.

Economics is the main election issue this year, with foreign policy near the bottom of voter concern.

One wonders what foreign countries think of the United States when presidential candidates go

after the personality of the secretary of state but fail to offer any constructive ways to improve our foreign policy. If they don't like detente, or the situation in the Middle East, what do these politicians suggest as an alternative? The truth is that none of the presidential contenders knows a damn thing about foreign policy or has ever had anything to do with it.

This is to say nothing about what some congressmen have done to please their constituents, get their names in the media and emasculate U.S. foreign policy. Angola, the Turkish bases, Cuban exporting of revolution, are only a few cases where Congress has exposed and weakened the U.S. presence abroad.

Meanwhile the communists gain everywhere — in Italy, France, Germany, England, Africa, Portugal and you name it. Even some of the media and some congressional investigating committees seem to be on a "get Kissinger" kick.

Henry Kissinger is one of our most effective and brilliant public servants. Who cares whether Kissinger thinks of himself as Germany's Bismarck or Austria's Metternich? Those who do care may remember that after Metternich and Bismarck left their posts, chaos and war were not far behind.

When Henry Kissinger becomes a political issue, no wonder most of the voting public is apathetic about the presidential contest.

The presidential contenders should stop talking about one of the few pluses in our government and tell us more specifically what they would do about some of the country's domestic problems, which are the main concern of the voting public anyway.

FRIDAY, JUNE 11, 1976

Foreign Policy After Kissinger

By ROBERT KEATLEY

WASHINGTON — As he meanders abroad these days, Henry Kissinger tries to convince friends and allies that U.S. foreign policy won't change much during the next four years — no matter what would-be Presidents are saying back home in America.

To the degree that successful prophecy is possible, he most likely is right. And, in large measure, he is also responsible.

If the Secretary of State is anything these days, he is controversial. Yet, despite all the political furor, it can be argued that Mr. Kissinger has set the main lines of American diplomacy for the years just ahead, when he will probably be gone. He has established basic policies which the President elected in November—be he Jimmy Carter, Gerald Ford or even Ronald Reagan—will find difficult, even undesirable, to change significantly. While some of these approaches aren't fundamentally different from those which Mr. Kissinger inherited nearly eight years ago, others have been modified greatly during his term as chief U.S. diplomatic operator.

"Any future foreign policy must be affected by what Kissinger did, and by what outlines for the future he will leave," concedes a historian who is at best a lukewarm admirer of the Secretary.

The narrow range of available options may explain why this presidential campaign has heard little serious debate about foreign policy. Most candidates promise to do things better rather than make fundamental changes. Even the conservative Mr. Reagan says he is in favor of detente and, except when talking about the Panama Canal, doesn't depart significantly from existing policies. Thus it seems unlikely these will change much in the post-Kissinger period.

This prospect doesn't mean the Secretary has directed foreign affairs with anything like perfection. Even close aides agree he has made serious mistakes and misjudgments, more than he cares to admit. He greatly underestimated the resiliency of Vietnamese Communists and overestimated U.S. capabilities against them. He has only begun considering some important issues—such as black African aspirations and most economic matters—rather late in his tenure. Closer attention earlier might have minimized or even prevented some problems, such as Angola, aides suggest.

A Sense of Direction

But Mr. Kissinger has given American foreign policy an overall sense of direction and purpose which were sadly lacking in the years preceding his arrival here. America's diplomacy then was dominated by Indochina wars, which Washington found increasingly expensive to fight and difficult to justify. Occasional stabs at other issues were tried; among these was the first serious U.S. effort at strategic arms control. However, the 1960s in general were not notable for diplomatic innovation and enlightened strategic thinking.

That situation changed for the better, though, during the Kissinger years with Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. What Henry Kissinger calls "conceptual thinking" began—an effort to analyze what was possible and desirable in foreign policy. (It's an effort for which Mr. Nixon doesn't get proper credit, thanks to the crimes and follies of that peculiar man in other fields.) Some new directions became clear.

The assumptions behind them included the realization that America's world power was declining in relative terms. This was due less to United States weakness than to increasing influence of the Soviet Union and China, among others, and the growing complexity of international relations, including the need to deal with Third World and OPEC nations. America's ability to

lead, and its desire to do so, ebbed together.

Most of all, the change was caused by the Russians' attainment of true superpower status. Not only did Moscow increase its numbers of guns and missiles but it expanded its ability to project this strength abroad via airlift and seafit. It also showed expanding economic strength, despite farm problems and general inefficiency at home. As Mr. Kissinger says repeatedly, there was no way for the U.S. to prevent this increase of power, for it reflected domestic decisions and national resources of the Soviet Union. The American task now, he maintains, is to limit ways this power is used.

From such considerations, and many others, has evolved the foreign policy outline which the next President will inherit. A brief look at its main features indicates little scope for fundamental departures, however much tinkering with details is ordered.

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DETENTE. Democrats often complain, a bit sourly, they began that policy long before Mr. Kissinger moved into the White House back in 1969. They're right, of course, but in recent years the effort to get along better with the rival superpower has taken more coherent form. A mix of carrots and sticks has been devised to try to bring the Soviets into more civil discourse with the Western world. The Russian intervention in Angola proves it doesn't always work, and the policy suffered from Nixon-Kissinger oversell in earlier years.

Yet there seems to be no escape from it. A relationship of mutual restraint appears to be the only alternative to dangerous confrontation, and the next President must act accordingly. He may be a "better bargainer," as many candidates promise, and he may prevent detente from "being a one-way street," as some sloganize.

But the policy hasn't worked all that badly to date. Among other things, Moscow has shown restraint in the Middle East and Berlin, and the U.S. has benefited from last year's grain sales accord with Russia. As a thoughtful article by Daniel Yergin in *The New Republic* concluded recently, "When the rhetoric and the outrage subside, we will see that detente is deserving of some modest praise and further effort."

STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL. This is the single most important aspect of Soviet-American relations, and one which any administration must continue—or run great risks. One useful, if oversold, agreement has been completed and another is nearly finished—stalled for 1976 by politics. The next President can tinker with the numbers, and demand more or accept less, but he is unlikely to abandon the sophisticated and comprehensive approach developed in recent years. That system will be part of the Kissinger legacy even if others bring off more significant results.

CHINA. Official U.S. policy is to seek full diplomatic relations with Peking, and will remain so; even Mr. Reagan says he wants improved ties with mainland China, though of course he worries more about the welfare of the Nationalists on Taiwan than do his political rivals. During 1977, it seems probable, the U.S. will recognize the Communist government, derecognize the Nationalists and sever the military treaty with Taiwan but also pledge to help keep the peace in the Taiwan area—partly by

selling defensive weapons to the island government.

These changes would have little immediate practical effect on Taiwan, and would bring only symbolic improvements in U.S. relations with Peking. But they would complete a process which enables the U.S. and China, for separate reasons, to conduct parallel policies in areas where both worry about the Russians. As with SALT negotiations, the need to continue seems inescapable.

THE MIDEAST. When Mr. Kissinger came to Washington, he knew little about that region. For him, it was another arena for Soviet-American rivalry, with the U.S. backing its Israeli clients and the Russians backing their Arab clients. But he learned otherwise, and American policy changed, perhaps irrevocably.

Now the Secretary sees the basic point: rival nationalisms are at work in the region, with the great powers serving as accessories. Thus Washington now tries to deal with specific Mideast issues in an "even-handed" way, to Israel's discomfort. Step-by-step diplomacy may be dead, and the amount and manner of future U.S. involvement can vary, but the next President, it would seem, must persevere with peacemaking. If new wars and oil boycotts are to be avoided, there can be no reversion to the Mideast policies of the 1960s.

U.S. ALLIES. There have been notable ups and downs in Washington's relations with them during recent years, including a foolish confrontation with France on energy and other issues and several Nixon shocks for Japan. But many observers think—as Mr. Kissinger claims—that relations with the main allies are as good now as they have ever been. There seems to be wider recognition of the basic interests which bind the industrial nations together, and less stress on the minor issues which separate them. The extra emphasis on interdependence, particularly in the economic area, seems sure to continue—as most presidential contenders promise it will.

For years, Mr. Kissinger was criticized for ignoring friends in his eagerness to hobnob with adversaries, and with some justification. But he is now a convert to close alliances in practice as well as theory, and he will leave behind a web of cozy relationships the next Chief Executive will find useful.

THE POOR NATIONS. Meeting their need for help may be the greatest frustration in foreign affairs these days. The world's poor states demand that the rich alleviate their problems. Yet they issue incoherent and conflicting demands, colored by often-fuzzy ideology. They don't like what they're offered but aren't totally clear about what they want.

However, these aren't demands which the rich can ignore safely, and for the first time U.S. policy recognizes the need to deal with fundamental economic relations between the rich and the poor—and by means other than conventional foreign aid. Though Mr. Kissinger came to this position only recently, he will leave the next President with a commitment to take action, though not a successful program as yet.

There can and will be infinite variations on these policy themes. Washington can be more or less nasty to the Russians, more or less flexible on arms control, more or less forthcoming on foreign trade, and so forth. But these are the topics which any future President will continue to find inescapable as he ponders the world scene.

And he will find what Mr. Kissinger calls "America's permanent interests" will prevent him from taking major detours from the road maps the present Secretary of State will leave behind.

Mr. Keatley, a member of the Journal's Washington bureau, covers foreign affairs.