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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN....

THE FORD ADMINISTRATION

Gerald Ford's seeming decision to avoid a rough, party-splitting June 8 California primary (which would probably be lost anyway) means that the GOP nomination will be decided by June-August post-primary delegate wooing and local convention maneuvering. Most observers rate the President a slight favorite, and we agree.

Putting California's 167 votes on Reagan's ledger -- a mid-May eight-locality statewide canvass by the Los Angeles Times found rank-and-file GOP voters preferring Reagan by better than 2:1 (LA Times, May 19) -- means that both candidates are heading towards solid summer delegate counts in the 1025-1060 range, with uncommitteds holding the balance of power (1130 delegates needed to nominate). May 18-25 primary results have tilted the lead to Ford again. Meanwhile, it's difficult to credit the delegate projections being released by Newsweek, Human Events, et al, that allocate nearly all delegates based on the situation prevailing right now. The roller coaster is too bouncy for that. A fair number of uncommitted delegates, and (obviously) others to be selected by June and July party conventions will be greatly influenced by June and July events. On the technical side, Reagan has the best delegate corraling strategist: manager John Sears. But the ex-California governor's people have a poor sense of national political strategy in the larger sense. That may do them in.

Several new factors have emerged from the May 18-25 primary results:

1) Northern industrial state party organizations and rank-and-file voters are becoming more motivated for Ford. Pennsylvania and New York delivered big uncommitted delegate blocs, Michiganders turned out a lopsided pro-Ford GOP primary vote. NBC News polling showed that actual GOP voters went 75-25% for Ford in Michigan, while crossover Democrats picked Reagan over Ford by 57-43%. But the important thing was that regular Republicans turned out in droves (partly to repel Democratic boarders) so that Democratic crossovers totalled only 15% of the GOP primary vote.

2) Wallaceite crossovers, while a plus to RR, are not coming in vast numbers. Texas was a sleeper situation, and in Indiana, crossovers were critical because the Ford-RR race was nip-and-tuck. Since then, the crossover tide has been a mixed blessing. In Michigan, the Detroit Free Press (5/20) estimates that only 50,000 of RR's 364,000 votes came from crossover Wallaceites. In Tennessee and Kentucky, Reagan's Wallace appeal helped turn out a whopping pro-Ford vote in the traditionally Republican mountain counties historically at odds with the Confederate (and Wallaceite) lowlands. But the bottom line is simple: RR's Wallaceite vote is relative peanuts -- 50,000 in Michigan (where Wallace got 809,000 in 1972), 20-35,000 in Tennessee (where Wallace got 335,000 in the 1972 primary), 15,000 or so in Arkansas, and so on. True, Wallaceites prefer RR over Gerald Ford, but the bulk of Wallace voters are not as

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enamored of Reagan as RR strategists think. Outside of a few hotspots (like southeast Michigan busing country), most Wallaceites either voted in the Democratic primary or didn't vote at all. Reagan, whose strategists until March favored a GOP "unity" approach over a broad-based attempt to woo Wallaceites, lacks firm socio-economic appeal to the Wallaceite majority. In Tennessee, Arkansas, Georgia and Texas, all crossover opportunity states, our estimate is that 1968-72 Wallace fans probably gave 3-4 times as many votes to Carter on the Democratic side as to Reagan on the Republican.

3) Note also the signs of neo-Goldwater parochialism in Reagan's Southern-cum-Sun Belt strategy. Of the 10 Southern and Border state primaries, RR has won five -- four in Wallace country (Alabama, Georgia, Arkansas and North Carolina), one in Texas. But RR has lost to Ford in the moderate conservative Southern periphery states -- Florida, Tennessee, Kentucky, Maryland and West Virginia. Issues are part of the problem. Reagan's enormous blunder in Tennessee over possibly selling the Tennessee Valley Authority, coupled with his Florida misspeaking on the Social Security issue, also raises the specter of a Goldwater-like lack of ability to understand the political side of economic issues. This theoretical conservative economic policy -- reprivatize things, give them back to private enterprise -- is a real loser with the Wallace constituency. Ford's campaigners took these issues and ran with them (reading the Kentucky and Tennessee papers make it clear that the TVA issue -- widely publicized at the last minute -- may well have cost RR primary victories in both states). The Democrats could be expected to hit Reagan again in the fall.

In some ways, the Ford brand of Republicanism is more parochial than Reagan's -- the "Old Minority" constituency of the GOP. But typical moderate conservative Republicans are comfortable with that parochialism, and sticking with it -- rather than venturing into neo-Goldwaterland with Reagan -- should boost Ford in Kansas City. It'll be close, but May 18-25 developments have given the edge back to Ford. In the next APR, after the June 8 Ohio-N. J.-California primaries, we'll turn to delegate situations in detail.

PARTY DISINTEGRATION?

Events in both parties continue to support the party disintegration thesis. As we see it, fragmentation is re-asserting itself on the Democratic side: 1) Edward Kennedy is playing stop-Carter tunes; 2) Mo Udall is running extremely divisive anti-Carter ads; 3) Gene McCarthy is warming up to run as an independent in November; and 4) George Wallace is now signalling new anti-Carter sentiments. (The May 19 Arkansas Gazette quotes Wallace saying "I believe Jimmy Carter will not win on the first ballot, and then he will fade because he won't take stands on the issues. Before this campaign is over, the people will recognize that Jimmy Carter has never told them how he stands on an issue yet." Wallace is a close Carter-watcher, and this could be a dangerous signal for the Georgian despite his success in wooing Wallace fans in May Dixie primaries.)

On the Republican side, we see disintegration in most scenarios. Here are the possibilities:

1) A Ford Nomination: If Ford wins a bitter July-August nomination fight, he can probably look for a substantial bolt by Reaganites. If Ford is up against Carter, polls suggest that anywhere from 25% to 40% of the Reaganites might bolt -- either to Carter or to rightwing (including Libertarian) splinter candidates. We think that Carter would beat Ford (although the Georgian is now losing ground in many Northern states). If Carter did beat Ford,

then new party conservatives would swing into action and try to build an alternative vehicle to the GOP, trading on across-the-board party weakness (see item 3). On the other hand, if Ford were to beat Carter, our guess is that Ford would have done so using a "Northern Strategy" that wouldn't sit well with conservatives, so that he would still face major post-election problems. But conservative new-party advocates will have a hard time as long as there is a Republican in the White House. Alternatively, suppose that the Democrats push Carter aside and nominate a Northern liberal. If so, Ford could probably beat said Northern liberal. Dixie would probably support Ford en masse after the Democrats sandbagged Carter, and that would give the Republicans another shot of putting together a new GOP-Southern (conservative) Democrat coalition. If Ford and his strategists did take advantage of a Carter rejection to mobilize this coalition (another "New Majority"), then re-alignment motivated conservatives would probably support it and try to pull the plug on rightwing splinter parties. Any such coalition would have to put aside "Old Minority" Republicanism for something larger and broader.

2) A Reagan Nomination: If Reagan wins a bitter nomination fight, it is also safe to look for a major bolt, this time from party liberals and moderates. If it's Reagan versus Carter, we think that 25-30% of GOP voters would swing to Carter (in some states, Gene McCarthy might pick up a small minority, too). A Reagan candidacy would help other GOP candidates in a few Deep Southern and Rocky Mountain states, but across most of the country, especially in big Northern industrial states, RR could lose badly and drag down other GOP candidates. In New York, Michigan, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Wisconsin, Minnesota and New England, the GOP could lose a collective net 5-10 House seats, and also lose its last chances in many counties and state legislatures. Our guess is that the damage would be well nigh irreparable, and that the "Old Minority" Northern GOP base would be fatally shattered. Offsetting Southern and Western gains would be minimal. The Reaganites could be left with a party that was more of a grave than a vehicle for putting together a "New Majority" coalition. The conservative movement would be badly impugned by a decisive Reagan defeat. On the other hand, if the Democrats push Carter aside for a liberal, then Reagan's Sun Belt-Southern Strategy could work, at least partially. RR's candidacy would still hurt the GOP in many traditional Northern support areas, but there could be enough success in the South and West to provide a new coalition set of building blocks for the future.

3) Longterm GOP Prospects: An unsuccessful candidacy by either Ford or Reagan pushes the GOP close to a disintegration process. There would be little left, at the state or local level, to convince angry moderates or conservatives that the GOP vehicle was worth bothering with again. GOP leaders in many big states worry that 1976 could see GOP hopes of controlling state legislatures vanish for the foreseeable future. There are few real prospects of major GOP House gains, and the Senate should keep about the same party ratios. In 1978, the GOP is likely to lose a few more Senators -- Scott (Va.), Domenici (N.M.), Curtis (Nebr.) and Tower (Texas) are all in varying degrees of trouble, according to local press reports. Without submerging its old identity in a new coalition, the GOP has no apparent future. If the GOP loses the White House, look for rightwing groups to mount a major new-party or new-coalition push. Alternatively, though, if the GOP holds the White House, after a divisive Democratic fragmentation, the conservative Democrats could be ready to talk coalition again. Either way, a party disintegration-cum-shake-up seems very likely in and after 1976, because the present party system is -- so clearly -- an obsolescent mess.

CAN CARTER GET THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION?

After Jimmy Carter's triple loss in the Nevada, Idaho and Oregon Democratic primaries (nobody in the last half century has won in November without an Oregon primary victory under his belt), real questions are being raised about the Georgian's ability to win the Democratic nomination.

We feel he is still -- obviously -- the frontrunner, but party pols are beginning to realize, it appears, that a Carter nomination and presidency would be dynamite for the Northern liberal Democratic Establishment. Carter represents a very different constituency, and he would probably be drawn into combat with Congress, labor, the national media and so forth. Moreover, in light of the most recent primaries, it seems safe to say that rank-and-file Northern liberal Democrats are waking up to what is implicit in the Carter candidacy. Of the last seven Northern primaries, Carter has won only one (the hairbreadth Michigan victory where he was nearly upset by a surging Mo Udall), stayed out of one (West Virginia, where he didn't tackle favorite son Robert Byrd) and lost five (Nebraska, Maryland, Idaho, Nevada and Oregon). No previous Democratic contender has ever won the nomination by showing strength in Southern primaries and bombing in Northern ones. Here's the historical record ...Note how Carter's pattern is entirely at odds with the primary patterns of the previous Democrats who went on to November victories.

State	Carter	FDR 1932	Truman 1948	JFK 1960	LBJ 1964
N. H.	30% Win	UD	UD	85% Win	95% Win
Vermont	46% Win***				
Mass.	14% Lose	27% Lose	UD	92% Win	73% Win
Ill.	48% Win***	*	82% Win	65% Win	92% Win
N. Y.	15% (Est.)Lose				
Wis.	37% Win (close)	98% Win	84% Win	57% Win	66% Win**
Pa.	37% Win	57% Win	96% Win	71% Win	83% Win
Ind.	68% Win***			81% Win	65% Win**
Neb.	38% Lose	64% Win	99% Win	89% Win	89% Win
W. Va.	* Not entered	90% Win	UD	61% Win	UD
Md.	37% Lose			70% Win	53% Win**
Mich.	43% Win (close)				
Idaho	12% Lose				
Nev.	23% Lose				
Oregon	28% Lose	79% Win	94% Win	51% Win	99% Win

* - Unopposed Favorite son

** - Stand-in candidate for LBJ

*** - No serious opposition to Carter UD - Unpledged delegates elected

As the chart shows, solid Northern Carter victories are limited to states like Vermont, Illinois and Indiana, places where the Georgian had no major opposition. Also, Jackson was an ineffective principal opponent. Now Western liberals -- Brown, Church and Udall -- have clearly pegged Carter's weaknesses, and the late May primary results suggest that they could be a real threat. If Carter does poorly in the remaining Northern primaries -- Rhode Island, Montana, South Dakota, Ohio, New Jersey and California -- conceivably his strength could peak in the 1150-1200 delegate range and then wither as his impetus and winner's image erodes. At this point, late primary results are pushing Carter back towards the role of a Southern regional candidate. That kind of image would make it hard for him to actually get the nomination. Conversely, strong Ohio and N. J. showings would probably sew it up for Carter, the above charted weaknesses notwithstanding.

JIMMY CARTER AND THE WEIMAR ANALOGY

There's a definite logic to Jimmy Carter's increasingly lopsided defeats in liberal suburbs from Michigan and Maryland to Oregon, and for his estimated 8:1 defeat in Baltimore Jewish districts on May 18. As APR readers will remember, for several years we've been suggesting that the configurations of Watergate and post-Watergate U. S. politics added up to a move to what can be more or less described as the Right, including a temptation or actual shift towards authoritarianism. Examination of the Carter campaign -- which embodies at least some of this reaction -- prompts us to update the analysis.

1. Center Extremism -- Some time back (see APR, 3/7/75), we discussed the relevance of Prof. Seymour Lipset's concept of "Center Extremism" -- radicalism that flows from the middle class rather than from the traditional Right (church, army, aristocracy) or traditional Left (proletariat). This develops, as in 1920s and 1930s Germany, when a mix of inflation, erosion of traditional values and disrespect for government alienates and mobilizes the middle class into radical action, usually in support of a leader who meshes social conservatism-cum-traditionalism (as electric and charismatic as possible) with economic activism. Concern for traditional democracy is invariably a casualty. Last year, we discussed this with pollster Pat Caddell who agreed that this was taking place in the 1974-75 U. S. Other pollsters agreed at least in part, and detailed analyses in Business Week and elsewhere analyzed middle class erosion. Neither the Ford nor Reagan campaigns have any real concept of these dynamics, but Jimmy Carter's campaign does. Pat Caddell is now Carter's pollster. Back last fall he laid out a three-pronged approach based on poll data: A) avoid focus on issue and develop a thematic campaign ("trust me", etc.); B) emphasize restoration of traditional values; and C) take the role of an outsider running against the worn-out governmental insiders of Washington. Carter has followed very much this strategy, and -- until recently -- it has been quite successful.

2. Strategic Comparisons -- All you have to do is compare the techniques. First, argue that it wasn't the people but only a clique of political insiders that let the nation down and betrayed its interests. Pitch to restore old values, to bring back traditional morality, patriotism and respect for hard work. Cap it with language about ethnic purity and resentment of alien intrusions. Next, invoke a kind of mystical national unity and create a religious overlay. Hint at having been chosen for the mission by some higher power. Finally, stay away from precise definition and debate of issues. In fact, blur most issues and emphasize cultural themes and personal charisma factors. Capitalize on not having been taken seriously at first to turn victory after victory into an aura of unstopability. Obviously, this strategic description fits Jimmy Carter, the clever Georgia peanut farmer. But those who have read up on the electoral approach of Adolf Hitler will appreciate that it is also a reasonably accurate description of his technique.

3. The Weimar Analogy -- Back in the 1969-70 period, scholars seriously debated a possible resemblance between the United States and pre-Hitler Weimar Germany, but they spent all their time talking about student demonstrations and leftist unrest, ultimately dropping the analogy. Much larger parallels have emerged in the last two or three years: A) The first U. S. defeat in war (to match German's of 1918 -- and the uproar over detente and the Panama Canal clearly has a kinship to the postwar German frustration with the treaty of Versailles); B) The inflationary destabilization of the middle classes (much less, of course, than in 1920s Germany but enough for various analysts and George Wallace to talk about "the destruction of the middle class"); C) The upheaval in culture and morality (New York has easily surpassed the black

lipstick and transvestites of "Cabaret" era Berlin); and D) The loss of faith in existing political leaders and institutions (the decline of confidence in the post-Watergate U. S. -- see APR, 4/16/76 for Harris poll data -- probably matches the alienation of the masses in Weimar Germany).

4. Constituency Comparisons -- In a "Center Extremism" situation, the primary reacting constituency is the non-cosmopolitan, lower-middle and middle-class element of the population. Nixon, Agnew, Reagan, Wallace and Carter have all tapped into major elements of this electorate. Again, to focus on the Carter-Weimar analogy, remember that Adolf Hitler was the choice of only 35-45% of Germans, most of whom were concentrated in the small towns, lower-middle-class suburbs and traditionalist rural areas (the "Bavarian Heartland", Franconia, Thuringia, etc.) plus nationalist, revenge-minded areas (the rolled-back eastern frontier areas touching Poland). Carter likewise comes out of the part of the United States closest to our "old values" -- the rural, flagwaving, God-fearing Anglo-Saxon Southern Baptist heartland. Obviously, the parallel is tenuous...but one is the U. S. response, and one was the German response, to a somewhat similar cultural-political malaise. Bear in mind, too, that a March Gallup survey found 49% of Americans agreeing that "what this country needs is some really strong leadership that would try to solve problems directly without worrying about how Congress and the Supreme Court might feel."

5. Psycho-Political Comparisons -- A political system ripe for "Center Extremism" tends to attract a certain type of messianic candidate who has certain traits and patterns in common with other practitioners of the art. For those who are interested, the secret wartime OSS study of "The Mind of Adolf Hitler" (Basic Books, 1972), contains some fascinating analyses, including ones showing how Hitler a) always said when, not if, he became leader; b) thought that he had been chosen so that what he did was historical; c) bragged about his will power; d) had an extraordinary mastery of organization and detail; e) pictured himself as a national messiah; f) was prone to say "when I decided" or "the decision will be made by me", not by aides or legislative bodies, and so forth. A lot of traits described in the book seem to apply to Carter. Last, here's a real psychological teaser...Jimmy Carter has the same favorite music as Hitler did -- Richard Wagner's eerie opera "Tristan und Isolde". Back in February and March, when Carter wanted to convey a sophisticated rather than hick image to national journalists, he told several interviewers that he spent hours listening to Tristan (see Washington Post, 3/28). Hitler's most recent major biographer, Joachim Fest, recounts that Hitler attended Tristan at least a hundred times and often went into an enraptured trance. Tristan's theme: Love turning into death!

6. Rightwing Extremism -- In Georgia, Carter used rightwing extremists (White Citizens Council) to help him get elected, but then, in office (and already, some cynics suspect, thinking of the White House), Carter assumed a more liberal posture. However, some rightwing elements believe that Carter's conversion is purely political, and that deep down, he's an ally. In early May, a coalition of rightist groups including the Minutemen, Ku Klux Klan, U. S. Taxpayers Union and Soldiers of the Cross met in Kansas City and decided that if Ford didn't agree to their ultimatum to sack Kissinger and drop anti-Rhodesia sanctions, they would back the Democratic nominee. Said Alabama's Robert Shelton, Imperial Wizard of the United Klans of America, about Carter: "If you got him out of the spotlight, he'd probably be a pretty good fellow and might even be qualified to be a member of the organization" (St. Louis Post Dispatch, 5/7). Carter has also been criticized for saying that his campaign doesn't need the Jews because they've got the Christians.

ELECTION 1976

I. U. S. Senate Race Update: In Delaware, angry ex-Democratic Senate hopeful Joseph McInerney has organized the "Delaware Party" to support his independent bid and undercut probable Democratic nominee Tom Maloney's attempt to unseat GOP incumbent William Roth (Wilmington News, 5/12). In Massachusetts, where candidates have until June 29 to get on the ballot for the Sept. 14 primary, the sacrificial GOP nomination situation is still fluid. Former State Administration Commissioner John J. McCarthy has decided not to oppose Edward Kennedy (Boston Globe, 5/6). There is now a clear favorite in the Maryland Senate race. Rep. Paul Sarbanes (D), the easy Democratic primary victor, leads incumbent Glenn Beall (R) by 42-29% per the latest Baltimore Sun poll. As for the Tennessee Senate race, here's the analysis from the May 17-24 Tennessee Journals...For the Democrats, informal polls at seven party rallies found this order of candidate preference: 1) ex-state party chairman James Sasser, 2) attorney David Bolin, and 3) 1970 gubernatorial candidate John Jay Hooker. Also, a poll of 71 of 95 Democratic county chairmen found 24 preferring Sasser, 16 for Bolin, 4 for Hooker. But although party leaders like Sasser (who announced on May 27), Hooker -- who is expected to announce before the June 3 deadline -- is the voters' favorite. If he enters the August primary, the Journal rates him the "strong front-runner for the nomination." If Hooker does not run, Sasser would be favored, although others could slip into the race at the last minute. In November, though, incumbent Bill Brock (R) has the advantage of record high job approval. The Memphis Commercial-Appeal (5/16) rates Brock an easy winner if Hooker is the Democratic nominee. In Nebraska, GOP nominee Rep. John McCollister faces a tough fight against Omaha Mayor Edward Zorinsky (D), a moderate conservative Republican who switched parties early this year. Zorinsky, who edged liberal Hess Dyas in the May 11 primary, is weak in outstate Nebraska, but strong in Omaha. This one could be tight if state liberal Democrats rally around Zorinsky. In Arizona, where the local GOP Establishment is out to block Rep. John Conlan from winning the Senate nomination to succeed retiring Paul Fannin (R), Conlan has come under fire (see the 5/16 Arizona Republic) for being deeply involved in a "national evangelical rightwing movement" designed to help "Christian conservatives" win control of the national government. In Florida, 1974 American (Wallace) party Senate nominee Dr. John Grady has turned Republican as part of GOP-American party coalition described by state GOP Chairman William Taylor as "a mutual effort undertaken in recognition of the political realities"...the GOP and American Party will work together in races where there is a chance for a single conservative to defeat a Democrat (Miami Herald, 5/10). Party leaders prefer Grady as the GOP-AP fusion candidate against incumbent Lawton Chiles (D), but first Grady must win a September GOP primary against State Senator Walter Sims, a conservative anti-busing stalwart. The Miami Herald (5/16) says that primary is "shaping up as a sizzler." Until the fusion deal gets through September in good health, Chiles rates as a solid early re-election favorite. In California, Mervin Field's latest poll finds the "Democratic Senate race no longer static." Leftist challenger Tom Hayden has scored "significant" gains, now trailing incumbent John Tunney by only 50-33%, whereas Tunney's March lead was 58-15%. Meanwhile, the GOP primary race has tightened. S. I. Hayakawa's age (69) has become a campaign issue. Hayakawa has slipped, and the May Field polls say it's now a three-way race...Hayakawa (down from 33% to 26%), Bob Finch (down from 28% to 26%) and Rep. Al Bell (up from 11% to 17%). Rightwing ex-lieutenant governor John Harmer has seemingly not caught on. The Sacramento Bee (5/15) reports that Finch, Hayakawa and Bell have edged to the right.

II. U. S. House Race Update: In this issue, instead of doing our usual catch-up, we're listing the GOP-held House districts that Capital observers and analysts feel possibly could or probably will fall to the Democrats. There are 32 of them, and the betting is that somewhere between 12 and 18 will actually tumble. When you balance this against a probable GOP pick-up of 20-30 seats presently held by the Democrats, it suggests a net GOP gain of 2-18.

<u>District</u>	<u>Incumbent</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Maine 1	D. Emery	5 serious Dem. hopefuls, Emery a slight favorite
N. H. 2	J. Cleveland	Young activist Joe Grandmaison (D) could pull upset
N. Y. 23	P. Peyser*	A tight open-seat race
N. Y. 4	N. Lent	Shaky, especially if Reagan is GOP nominee
Pa. 18	H. Heinz*	Open seat, GOP slightly favored
Pa. 8	E. Biester*	GOP slight favorite in open-seat race
Pa. 17	H. Schneeбели*	GOP favored, but shaky if Reagan runs
Pa. 23	A. Johnson	Incumbent in jeopardy after rough primary
Pa. 25	G. Myers	Incumbent in jeopardy in strong labor district
Ohio 2	D. Clancy	Incumbent shaky but favored
Ohio 13	C. Mosher*	Open seat, Democrat slightly favored
Ohio 12	S. Devine	GOP slightly favored in rematch of '74 race
Ohio 17	J. Ashbrook	Labor-targeted Ashbrook running scared
Mich. 3	G. Brown	Shaky, especially if Reagan is GOP nominee
Mich. 2	M. Esch*	A tight open-seat race
Del.	P. duPont*	GOP favored in open-seat race
Md. 8	G. Gude*	A tight open-seat race
Va. 9	W. Wampler	Wampler favored in '74 rematch
Va. 4	R. Daniel	Incumbent Daniel underdog if Democrats unite
Fla. 12	J. Burke	Incumbent personally shaky
Ala. 6	J. Buchanan	Tough threat from popular county sheriff
Texas 5	A. Steelman*	Close open-seat contest
Kansas 5	J. Skubitz	Incumbent shaky, but slightly favored
Kansas 4	G. Shriver	Incumbent shaky, but slightly favored
Nebr. 2	J. McCollister*	Tight open-seat race, Dem. slightly favored
Colo. 4	J. Johnson	Hard-to-assess threat from independent
Idaho 2	G. Hansen	Incumbent faces rough primary, personally shaky
Ariz. 1	J. Rhodes	Incumbent favored, but working hard
Ariz. 3	S. Steiger*	Open seat, conservative Democrat favored
Cal. 2	D. Clausen	Incumbent slightly favored
Cal. 16	B. Talcott	Incumbent slightly favored
Cal. 27	A. Bell*	Open seat, GOP favored to hold

* - Incumbent retiring

Note: The majority of these seats would be in greater danger with Reagan as the Republican nominee than Ford. In fact, if RR is the nominee, several other Michigan, New York and New England GOP-held districts might go on the list. But by and large, we don't see GOP congressmen nearly as vulnerable to the top of the ticket as in 1964. Too much dead wood has already been cut, few old hacks are left, and many marginal seats have already been lost.

In the next APR, we'll turn to the Democratic-held seats that could or probably will fall to the Republicans. There are about fifty worth noting, with 20-30 of them definitely shaky and within range of GOP or independent capture.