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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 19, 1976

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JAMES E. CONNOR

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Telephone Conversation  
with Speaker Albert, Minority Leader Rhodes,  
and Chairman Mahon on the Tunney Amendment


The attached was returned in the President's outbox with the following notation:

"Vote set - Tuesday, January 27th"

Please follow-up with appropriate action.

cc: Dick Cheney

GENERAL SCOWCROFT HAS REQUESTED  
THAT YOU MAKE THESE CALLS THIS  
MORNING IF POSSIBLE.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Gen S.)

Vote set, Tues.

Jan. 27<sup>th</sup>

Brent's office  
advised by  
phone  
1/16  
gm



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TALKING POINTS FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION  
WITH SPEAKER ALBERT, MINORITY LEADER RHODES,  
AND CHAIRMAN MAHON ON THE TUNNEY AMENDMENT

From: Brent Scowcroft *B*

I. PURPOSE

To request a delay in the House vote on the Tunney amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill prohibiting the use of any funds contained therein for Angola.

II. BACKGROUND

When Congress reconvenes on Monday, January 19, we can expect great pressure to bring the Tunney amendment to the Defense Appropriations bill to a House vote almost immediately. There are clear indications that if an early vote does occur, the amendment will be adopted by a wide margin. Such action would preclude further covert U.S. assistance to the pro-Western FNLA and UNITA factions, signal a free hand to the Soviets and the MPLA, and undermine the position of the moderates in the OAU and our ongoing diplomatic efforts. It would be detrimental to our current efforts to find alternative sources, such as an overt funding request, to maintain our flexibility to counter the Soviets in Angola.

To avoid such consequences, at least in the short term, we need to seek a delay in the House vote. Initial soundings indicate that only a phone call from you would hope to convince Speaker Albert and Chairman Mahon to delay the vote until after Secretary Kissinger returns from Moscow. This delay can be justified on the grounds that:

- You have sent Secretary Kissinger to Moscow for further negotiations toward a SALT agreement. While he is in Moscow, his position should not be undercut, as would be indicated by House passage of the Tunney amendment.



- Congressional action would be a severe blow to the moderate members of the OAU which stood firm in their position for the first time against the more radical countries' support of MPLA recognition and calls for African unity.

To give us some chance of obtaining a delay in the House vote on the Tunney amendment, I recommend that you telephone Speaker Albert and Minority Leader Rhodes as well as Chairman Mahon to request their support for delayed House action until the Secretary returns from Moscow.

### III. TALKING POINTS

- (1) During the recess we have waged a very determined and effective diplomatic campaign leading up to the meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa. I believe the results of this campaign and the African summit were encouraging in terms of holding out hope for self-determination in Angola and would like to inform the House leaders and members about them.
- (2) At the summit a majority of sub-saharan black African states firmly refused to recognize the Soviet backed MPLA and sided with the United States in favor of a coalition government of National Unity and withdrawal of all foreign intervention.
- (3) This was an impressive showing of black African opposition to the Soviet/Cuban effort. From this promising expression of will we need to press forward on fronts to seek a cease fire and withdrawal of all foreign elements.
- (4) Since the conference we have been in touch with a number of African leaders on how best to proceed. These exchanges hold some promise. It is also clear, however, that these leaders are extremely wary of our staying power and are watching the House action of the Tunney amendment very closely.



- (5) I recognize that right now the Tunney amendment would be accepted. For that to happen at this point would destroy the progress we have made and any hope for a diplomatic settlement.
- (6) More importantly, as you know, I have sent Henry to Moscow for further negotiations on SALT. It is absolutely imperative that the Secretary of State not be publicly undermined by the Congress while these negotiations are in progress. Success in these negotiations depends upon strong bipartisan support. The Soviets will be watching closely for signs of weakness in U.S. resolve. A sustaining vote in the House would have a devastating impact on these crucial negotiations.
- (7) I am asking your cooperation in delaying a vote on the Tunney amendment. I would like to meet with the bipartisan leadership to lay out the events of the past month in Africa and to seek their help.
- (8) Finally, as you know Senator Clark has scheduled hearings on Angola and he and Secretary Kissinger have agreed to delay start of the hearings until January 26, after the Secretary's Moscow trip. A House delay on considering the Tunney amendment would be consistent with Clark's agreement to delay his hearings.

