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MEETING WITH

DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN

Wednesday, August 27, 1975

2:00 P.M.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN....

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 27, 1975

MR. PRESIDENT:

NSC has submitted the following talking points for your meeting with Ambassador Moynihan at 2:00 p.m. today, Wednesday, August 27th.

1. We must project in the UN an image of strong and constructive leadership in keeping the peace and in finding solutions to the problems of the developing countries, and we must make clear our willingness to work within the UN as long as its members make intelligent and cooperative use of UN machinery.

2. We must make no secret, however, of our concern about the use of confrontation tactics and the excessive politicization of UN organs.

3. We must assign particular importance to maintaining an open dialogue on economic issues with the developing countries, based on mutual recognition that we have shared interests. We want this dialogue, once established, to be extended into the political area as well.

4. To keep the UN viable we must support and implement the principle of the universality of UN membership, oppose the suspension or expulsion of unpopular states, such as Chile, Israel and South Africa.

JIM CONNOR

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 26, 1975

MEETING WITH THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN

Wednesday, August 27, 1975
2:00 p.m. (60 minutes)
The Oval Office

From: James E. Connor

I. PURPOSE

To meet with Ambassador Moynihan in order to discuss several broad issues of mutual concern.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS PLAN

A. Background: This is your first private session with Ambassador Moynihan since his swearing-in on June 30, 1975. However, he has been present at two Cabinet meetings since that date.

This will be the fifth in a series of meetings with your new Cabinet officers. It is intended to enable you and the Ambassador to get to know one another better, and to enable each of you to indicate general policy areas and approaches you consider important.

B. Participants: Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan, James Connor and Brent Scowcroft.

C. Press Plan: Announcement to the Press. Press Photo opportunity at opening of meeting and David H. Kennerly photo.

D. Discussion: Ambassador Moynihan has suggested that instead of discussing several different items with you, he would prefer to have the conversation deal with an idea that he has been developing regarding the relationship that the United States has to multi-lateral international institutions. He has recently completed a paper on this subject which he has discussed with Secretary Kissinger who indicated that he was impressed with the approach. I have attached at Tab A a copy of this paper, which is in the form of a memorandum to Kissinger. You may find it a most interesting document.

Basically, the theme is that there are a large number of countries in the world with whom we have diplomatic relations but little or no serious bilateral concerns. Examples of such countries might be: Chad, Figi, Bhutan and Burundi. If we have any serious concern with these countries, it is most probably in how they behave and vote in multilateral institutions such as the UN. Unfortunately, there does not now seem to be any way in which we relate our bilateral relations to them with our concern for their behavior in multilateral forums.

Thus, for example, our Ambassador will make no representation to a country if it works and votes against us in a multilateral forum. Indeed, he is often not even aware of how the country is behaving in international forums. Moynihan suggests that this results from organizational defficiencies within the State Department as well as from the ways in which we tend to approach diplomatic relations with many newly emerging countries that are not particularly important to our national interest.

We tend, he suggests, to treat these countries essentially as we would treat major countries or even smaller ones in which we have definite interests. We strive to have good bilateral relations with them. Since we have no interests that are significant in these countries except for their multilateral behavior, Moynihan suggests that we might well organize ourselves better in the State Department and elsewhere so that we can recognize what is going on in the multilateral arena and use our bilateral relations to influence their behavior in multilateral forums.

NSC has not yet submitted items which they might wish to have you raise for discussion. These items will be available in the morning, and I will transmit them to you separately.

III. TALKING POINTS

1. Pat, I have made it a practice to meet with my new Cabinet members to discuss some broad problem areas that concern both me and them. I want to have an opportunity to get your views and to give you some of my own.

2. I understand there is an idea that you have been developing on ways in which we might reorganize ourselves to deal more effectively in multilateral organizations. Let's start with your ideas on that.

3. [Items to be submitted by NSC.]

4. I want you to know that you will have access to me whenever you need it. I have asked Jim Connor to meet with you regularly. If you need quick answers or need to see me, let him know.

BILATERAL TRADITIONS AND MULTILATERAL REALITIES

A New Approach to Relations with Sixty-four Countries

United States Mission to
the United Nations

August 14, 1975

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

Introduction

Inter-dependence is a term to be encountered in The Communist Manifesto, and so is an old idea. Marx and Engels saw well enough that the logic of capitalist economics would draw the nations of the world into an increasingly complex and reflexive set of political relations. They foresaw an international political movement -- that of workers transcending ethnic and national loyalties -- as an equally logical response to the emergent multinational reality.

They can be forgiven for not having foreseen the United Nations, for it can perhaps be agreed that if it did not exist it would be impossible to invent it. But it is possible to hope, given thirty years of experience, that the United States, which for practical purposes created the United Nations, would see the ways in which multilateral institutions -- and the realities they reflect -- require changes in traditional patterns of bilateral diplomacy.

It is common to hear that multilateral issues ought to be given prominence in various bilateral relations. This paper is an attempt to explain why they are not, and why they should, and to suggest what might be done about this. It attempts to show that we act in seeming ignorance of the fact that there are now sixty odd countries (and more to come) with which our multilateral relations are considerably more important than our bilateral ones. This is to say that the way these countries behave and vote in multilateral institutions -- the World Food Council, the Bureau of the Nonaligned, the Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Security Council, the Law of the Sea Conference, the Committee of 24 on Colonialism, the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly, the workers' caucus at the International Labor Organization -- the list goes on at startling length -- the way these countries behave and vote in these multilateral institutions truly affects American interests. By contrast, there is but little they do directly which matters that much to us.

If this is so, it follows that American relations with these countries should concentrate on their multilateral actions. In practical terms, this means that the American Ambassador in Ouagadougou, instead of being only vaguely aware that there is to be a ministerial meeting of the nonaligned in Lima at the end of the month, would at this moment be furiously busy seeking to influence the actions of Upper Volta at that meeting. He would know that the meeting will determine a number of matters of critical importance to the United States, as for example whether Israel is suspended from the General Assembly, with all the incalculable consequences that follow; or whether American forces in South Korea, after a quarter-century flying the United Nations flag, will be branded imperialist aggressors and summarily called upon to withdraw from the peninsula.

An attraction of the proposal to be made in this paper is that it gives the Ambassador in Ouagadougou something to do. What is more, it allows him to treat the government to which he is accredited as important in the principal

respect that it is important. To wit, the fact tht its vote in multilateral forums is counted equally with that of France from which it was once ruled.

Clearly, an argument such as this rests on the premise that events in multilateral forums are important. But it is not even necessary to think that they are very important -- simply that they are, on balance, more important than any other influence which Conakry or Dacca or Dakar routinely exerts on matters of interest to the United States. This is not to argue that our bilateral relations are unimportant. From time to time, with most countries, they will have moments of great saliency. But over the decades, year in and year out, as monsoons come and go, or fail to do so, how these particular countries vote in international forums will have the larger effect upon us.

These countries know this about themselves. They have made themselves important -- to the degree they are important -- by acting in concert in international forums. If they have understood this, so should we.

* * *

Toothless in Dacca

One need not look far to find behavior in multilateral settings which is hardly marginal in its consequences for us. On arriving at the United Nations last month, almost the first matter brought to my attention was the series of events which led up to the American veto of the Security Council draft resolution S/10974 on July 26, 1973. This resolution deplored Israeli occupation of Arab territory, rebuked Israel for a lack of co-operation with the Secretary-General's peacemaking efforts, and stated that Palestinian rights must be a basis for any Mideast settlement. Prominent among those who had moved this resolution forward was Ambassador Sen of India.

Not a week later, the Egyptian Ambassador to the United Nations remarked to me at dinner one evening in New York that it was the American veto of this resolution which had decided Egypt that it had no alternative to war, which led to the October war, the oil embargo, and much else. I have no way of knowing just how accurate the Egyptian Ambassador's claim may be. But he

did make it. What interests me most is that while Ambassador Sen was setting this alleged chain of disasters in motion, I was sitting in New Delhi utterly unaware that anything was going on. We have searched the files here in New York. No effort was made by the mission or by the Department even to inform the New Delhi Embassy that this was going on, much less to have me go into the Ministry of External Affairs to ask them to call off their man in New York, who I very much doubt was acting on direct orders. Even if he was, it was not on a matter of real concern to India. Any serious pressure from us could have turned it off. Or might have. The point is that under our present arrangements for the conduct of foreign policy, this effort was not made.

A less fateful but more representative episode was that of the World Food Council meeting in Rome, July 23 through 28. As you know, this was the first meeting of the council established by the World Food Conference -- both an American initiative and one with which you are especially identified. The meeting was reported in the press as a calamity. A typical comment:

WORLD FOOD PARLEY OFFERS LITTLE FOR THE HUNGRY

> Millions of hungry and undernourished people in Africa, Asia, and Latin America drew scant encouragement from the first meeting of a new United Nations body, the 36-member World Food Council, which ended in disarray here last week.

This perception was widely shared. Thus, eleven days later, for example, at a postmortem meeting of OECD officials, the Australians said they would never again send a minister to these meetings.

What happened? Very simply, the nonaligned, led by Mexico, Bangladesh, Senegal, and Guinea, had stormed in, charged that the Secretariat was unrepresentative of the new nations, and demanded, in effect, the resignation of the American executive director, John Hannah. There were no grounds for this charge. (The "Secretariat" consists of nine persons, five of them borrowed.) But it was made and believed and had its destructive effect.

Although I saw the Secretary General in Geneva shortly after this episode and made the strongest representations, when he returned to New York his spokesman, on July 7, merely said that Hannah would complete his one-year term of

office, and that there would be changes in the World Food Council Secretariat.

What was the reaction of the Department of State to this wanton wrecking of a serious international program and the savaging of a respected American?

There was no reaction.

On July 10 the Department sent instructions that when the World Food Council report came up before ECOSOC in Geneva, our "delegation should take a positive approach regarding the future of the WFC."

I happened to be in Geneva, and so were you. Out of channels, and in a way the system itself would never have permitted, I got word to you as to what had happened. And because you had a few hours on the way back across the Atlantic -- an unusual event -- you were able to respond. You sent word on Saturday, July 12, that you wanted protests made in Dakar, Dacca and Conakry.

How did the Department of State respond to your order? To the extent that it responded at all, it did so slowly, reluctantly, ineffectively.

On Wednesday, July 17, I happened to be in Washington. I asked when a cable would be going out, as you had instructed. It was explained that the country desk officers were holding things up. I then spoke to assorted Assistant Secretaries and Undersecretaries. Finally, on Friday, July 18, the cable did go out.

The cable was stillborn; there was no life in it when it left the Department. What surely should have been slugged "FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY" had no indication of any kind that you were interested in the matter. It was nowhere mentioned that this was a directive from you.

In my memorandum to Winston Lord I had suggested that each of the three countries to which we chose to protest should be made to pay some small cost regardless of its predictable explanation that the Foreign Office did not know what its representative was doing. I further suggested that we should seek the recall from Rome of those representatives who would have to return to considerably less attractive places (a particularly devastating retaliation, since jobs in international secretariats are fabulous rewards to the

nationals of most member countries. In most countries in the world a military dictator would have a hard time stealing as much money as an Assistant Secretary in FAO earns). Instead, in a communications system where the phases of the moon are classified Confidential, this cable was designated Limited Official Use.

Limited Official Use was precisely what it got. In Dacca, for example, the DCM saw a third-echelon civil servant who promised to "look into the issue." In each capital, the government claimed no knowledge of the event in Rome. This was reciprocal, of course. None of our Embassies would have known something important was going to happen in Rome either, nor that the behavior of the Bangladesh or Senegal or Guinea representative would be important. Certainly none were told that given the importance of American food aid to these countries, we should routinely discuss with them ahead of time how they planned to conduct themselves at this meeting, and how they might support us in the business at hand.

No cable at all went to Mexico.

And so it goes. There is almost no connection between our multilateral affairs and our

bilateral affairs. I have heard a long succession of U.S. Representatives at the United Nations bemoan the fact. Fellow Ambassadors elsewhere have wondered at it. (In my time in India, save where the redoubtable issue of GRUNK was concerned, little or nothing was asked of me on multilateral issues.)

It is typically said, "The country officers are to blame." This, I recall, was the conventional wisdom in the early Kennedy years. And they are, in the sense that this is the point in the system where multilateral concerns are blocked from entering bilateral channels. But they only perform the role assigned to them in the system. The system puts overwhelming emphasis on seeking friendly bilateral relations -- the presumed precondition of everything from innocent passage through territorial waters to the establishment of a military base. Even where nothing of any consequence is taking place, there is a presumption that something <u>might</u> take place someday, which is sufficient reason to seek friendly relations. Anything that interferes with this goal is resisted by the system. For some years now the one aspect of foreign policy that could most interfere is that of the behavior of so many

small or new nations in multilateral forums. Typically this behavior is hostile to the United States. In consequence the present bilateral system resists -- and usually successfully resists -- the effort to introduce multilateral considerations into the bilateral relation. It would spoil things. Friends would appear as enemies. Thus the world is full of Senegals and Bangladeshes, not to speak of Algerias and Yugoslavias, which are frequently and in some instances routinely savage enemies of the United States in international forums, but which in their capitals are on the best of terms with the American Embassy -- which is kept busy negotiating food aid, military assistance, development loans, and what you will.

The American relationship with half the nations of the world is, in effect, contradictory. Our bilateral posture is to strengthen nations whose primary multilateral posture is to weaken us.

* * *

Why Is This Problem Such a Difficult One?

There are two reasons, of which the first has the larger immediate weight. The State Department is organized to conduct bilateral, country-to-country relations. An Embassy, even in Ouagadougou, is the great prize in the career system. To the very extent the career service is dedicated to its work, it is dedicated to enhancing the primacy of country-to-country relations.

However, the more significant reason that this problem proves so difficult is that multilateral relations have a high ideological content, and the Department of State is a notably non-ideological institution. It is pragmatic, business-like, and rather uneasy with ideas, its own or other people's. This arises in part because the libertarian ideology of the early years of the American Republic is so very much recessive in the world at large, and now even at home. In his Helsinki speech the President said:

> The founders of my country did not merely say that all Americans should have these rights, but all men everywhere should have these rights. And these principles have guided the United States of America throughout its two centuries of nationhood.

This sort of thing is called "redemptive activism" by some, and it did somewhat guide American policy for the longest while. But of course it got into trouble in the 1960's. In any event it is a characteristic of a certain kind of libertarianism not to see itself as ideological, and to be gravely suspicious of doctrines that <u>are</u> seen as such.

And nowhere has ideology been more to be seen, more on display, than in multilateral affairs, especially those of the United Nations. Hence, nowhere has it invited more hostility from a widening range of American opinion.

There have been two phases of this history. At first the UN was seen as the instrument of American ideologues, much given to pronouncements about the parliament of man and to forking over American resources, even secrets. In 1946 we even proposed to give the UN the atom bomb. More recently the UN has been seen to be under the control of <u>anti</u>-American ideologues, and distrust has become even more widspread. A certain amount of labeling may be useful here. The United Nations and the multilateral activities which it is associated with was from the first the object of intense suspicion from American conservatives, as evidenced in the

Connolly Amendment of 1946. Next, it invited the disdain of centrists such as Dean Acheson, who was not so much disrespectful of the UN as of the pretensions made in its behalf. More recently, it is the liberals who have become more active in opposition to certain "Third World" policies that now dominate many UN forums. As an area of foreign policy, multilateral affairs remain ideologically charged.

Faced with this array of disapproval, American interest in the United Nations affairs more or less steadily declined. "Damage limitation" became our primary, basic tactic. As for an overall strategy, there was none. This situation has only begun to yield in the face of the realization that the situation is too dynamic for so passive a response. Increasingly it is seen that the damage can be very great indeed. The awakening comes, moreover, at a time when the United States has been taking considerably more punishment than we are accustomed to, and cannot with equanimity contemplate a good deal more.

The question is whether there might be a good deal less if we acted differently. It is at least arguable that the United States does not bring to bear anything like the influence it potentially has in multilateral forums. To reverse the se-

quence of the matters just discussed, this arises first because we have not felt comfortable in these settings, and of late have not even felt welcome. Second, it is because our system of bilateral relations simply does not respond very well to multilateral needs.

* * *

What Is To Be Done?

The Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy certainly sensed this situation. It has proposed all but abolishing the Bureau of International Organization Affairs and assigning lead responsibility for any given multilateral question to the appropriate functional bureau, the theory being that multilateral concerns ought to be an integral part of the work of, say, the African Bureau, and not something set apart as somehow special and different. This does deal with the problem that IO is evidently seen as biased in favor of multilateral activities and assumed to be less protective of American positions than it should be in order to advance this parochial and ideological interest.

But the Commission does not make the more important argument, which is that for a third to a half of the countries in the world, America's most important relations take place in multilateral forums.

This assessment arises from two basic facts. On the one hand, there is simply a very large, and still growing, number of countries, most of them former colonies, many of them scarcely inhabited, with which the United States just doesn't have much business. Or any business at all. Whilst they were part of the British or French or Portuguese or Dutch empires, we were scarcely aware of their existence. We have become aware of their existence mostly because of a second fact, which is that each of these new nations has one vote in the General Assembly, in UNCTAD, in UNESCO, in the Non-Aligned Conference, in the NPT Review Conference, in the Security Council, and so on almost ad infinitum. Serious issues are dealt with in these forums. It is not necessary to establish that they are immensely serious issues. It were enough if they were only somewhat serious. For the issue here is whether anything more serious transpires on the bilateral plane.

This is a matter which can be measured. It is possible to judge with respect to a given country whether bilateral or multilateral relations are likely over time to be the more important. Given such a judgment, it is possible to establish a relationship which gives priority to one or the other.

This is something we do not do now. With all nations, our most important relations are seen as bilateral. Multilateral concerns are seen as secondary, and, as noted earlier, are often seen as conflicting such that "good" bilateral relations will suffer if too much heed is paid to multilateral behavior. In practical terms this is a choice that sometimes has to be made. The problem at present is that the choice is <u>always</u> made in the interest of bilateral harmony. To repeat, for a third to a half of the countries of the world, the multilateral relations are the more important ones.

In a first attempt at classification, we have examined in this light the more than one hundred countries that at the moment comprise the ever-growing group of the non-aligned. As we are avowedly seeking to make the case that there are some countries with which our multilateral relations should be given priority, we have accordingly

sought to be conservative in our judgments as to which these might be.

We have excluded from our list of "multilateral countries" -

A. Any single nation from which the United States imports a significant amount of oil -- e.g., Kuwait, 0.1 per cent of current consumption (Table A);

B. Any nation from which the United States imports a significant amount of a critical material other than fuel, as defined by the Council on International Economic Policy -- e.g., Gabon, which provides 29 per cent of our manganese consumption, or Liberia, which provides 2 per cent of our iron ore (Table B);

C. Any nation to which the United States exports have a value of at least $500 million a year -- e.g., Singapore (Table C);

D. Any nation from whom we import at least $500 million worth of goods a year -- e.g., the Bahamas (Table D);

E. Any nation where our investments at book value exceed $100 million -- e.g., Guatemala (Table E).

We have further excluded some nations -- Cuba, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, the Vietnams, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan -- because our bilateral relations with them are at the moment especially important for political reasons.

We are left with the following 64 countries, participants in various forums of the non-aligned, that do not meet any of the above criteria of bilateral significance:

The Multilateral Countries

Afghanistan	Central African Republic
Angola**	Chad
Bahrain*	Congo
Bangladesh	Cyprus
Barbados	Dahomey
Bhutan	Democratic Yemen
Bolivia	
Botswana	El Salvador
Burma	Ethiopia*
Burundi	Fiji
Cambodia	Gambia
Cameroon	Ghana
Cape Verde Islands	Grenada

ITEM WITHDRAWAL SHEET
WITHDRAWAL ID 00502

Collection/Series/Folder ID No.	:	004700257
Reason for Withdrawal	:	NS,National security restriction
Type of Material	:	REP,Report(s)
Creator's Name	:	Daniel P. Moynihan
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Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Ivory Coast
Kenya
Laos
Lesotho
Madagascar
Malawi
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco*
Mozambique
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Oman
Paraguay
Qatar
Rwanda
Sao Tome & Principe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Swaziland
Togo
Tanzania
Tunisia
Uganda
Upper Volta
Uruguay
Western Samoa
Yemen

END UNCLASSIFIED

BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

END CONFIDENTIAL

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED
**Not yet fully independent.

This list is not presented as a definitive classification. Any list will be somewhat arbitrary. Data such as these raise inevitable questions -- of where our potential suppliers of critical raw materials might be, of whether one should consider our smaller foreign investments, of which countries might be counted as specially important to us for military-strategic reasons. But despite such questions, the list makes sense. Strategic-military issues have been narrowly construed, but we would make the case that it is the multilateral forums such as those of the non-aligned which are coming to have the predominant influence on the political climates that determine many strategic issues as, for example, whether a Caribbean island in the sun lying athwart our shipping communications with the Canal becomes anti-American or not.

In the same way, we do not think it a mistake that we have somewhat narrowly construed our raw materials dependence. Our short-run situation in these matters is not bad, and our long-run situation will depend on the attitudes that multilateral forums foster. We would do well to exploit our current leverage.

Finally, we do not think it right to exclude still more countries from our list on grounds that there is some American investment there. The time may be at hand when we must learn to be chary of considering a nation important because it has absorbed some American capital. Just as some of our ethnic groups have become hostage to the foreign policies of other countries, so are many overseas businessmen likely to become in years ahead. So some may already have become. In any event, the non-aligned attitudes towards investment in the coming years may be formed as much by actions taken in international forums as by our bilateral interactions. Such that the investments, first of all, may not be worth protecting at any price; and even if one places an extremely high value on them, it is not clear that setting little store by multilateral relations is the best way to protect them. One's strategy in these matters must be influenced by how much we have to lose, but one quickly comes to the point at which one kind of short-term loss must be forced to make its case against other long-term gains.

* * *

How might this new concept be put into practice?

First of all, it must be done "by the numbers." It is proposed to change the organizational habit of two centuries. It would be comparable to a basic change in strategic doctrine by the military. It will require a command structure flowing from you, acting for the President, through the Department, out to the sixty odd embassies concerned.

It could take twenty years for this new concept to become part of the Department's routine. But note it would be the first major change in Department functions since strategic arms issues became an integral part of modern diplomacy.

The basic list of "multilateral countries" -- those with whom our multilateral relations are considered likely to be more important than traditional bilateral relations -- should be drawn up by the Policy Planning Staff. A review system should be established to keep the list up to date.

The Undersecretary for Management should set up a command structure to put the policy in place.

As the voting record is a key element in this overall concept, the Department should proceed

directly to modify its computer system to incorporate the main roll calls of the past thirty years. A system should then be put in place for keeping ever more detailed records and doing ever more sophisticated analysis. As you know, this is one of the few things political scientists do well these days.* A weekly or monthly (or hourly) print-out can be run on each "multilateral country," giving the Embassy there precise information on which to guide its conduct. Obviously, also, a computer can give instructions. A voting index can be established, in the fashion of that of the Americans for Democratic Action or the American Conservative Union. As a country's index shifts from one category to another (say from "Ten Per Cent Right" to "Twenty Per Cent Right") our attitudes can shift accordingly.

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*This should be done even if you don't accept this overall proposal. Any Japanese dingbat manufacturer keeps his sales, orders, inventories and whatever on a computer. The Department of State no doubt keeps track of expense vouchers on a computer. But there is nowhere a readily retrieved store of information on voting records in the two dozen odd most important multilateral forums. I am sure if we were to ask Fred Mosteller at Harvard, John Tukey at Princeton, and Hayward Alker at M.I.T., they would be happy to devise a system for us. And we are not without considerable expertise in these matters in our own Department.

If this seems mechanical, the answer may be made that it is, and needs to be. A Secretary of State cannot keep track of the performance of one hundred and fifty countries, but a Secretary of State can lay down criteria by which that performance is to be judged. It is called management, and there has been no alternative since the 18th century. Which is perhaps why so many of our institutions remain 18th-century in much of their outlook and practice.

Further, it should be clear that computer techniques, while mechanical in an unimportant sense, can be exceptionally subtle and flexible on important matters. They are a management tool uniquely adapted to the task of keeping track of thousands of votes by scores of countries.

* * *

What are the disadvantages of the "Multilateral Country" Concept?

None notable. Some diversion of your time and the top Department staff. Not much. Keep in mind that this concept does not pose an opposition of bilateral to multilateral concerns. It simply

states that with respect to certain countries, multilateral concerns are ordinarily the more numerous and the more important. Nor would the practice add to an already overburdened system. The American diplomatic system is overburdened at the center. The problem at the periphery, frequently, is idleness and desuetude, and "Idle Hands are the Devil's Playthings." Some at least of the perfervid exaggeration of the importance of the People's Democratic Republic of This or That, of the mindless clientelism, and the wanton dispersal of resources is that there is no other way to get attention for Ouagadougou back home.

* * *

What are the advantages of the new Concept?

Clearly, the first advantage is to our multilateral diplomacy. Over time, the new practice should produce better results for us. If it doesn't, it will have failed. If it is thought that it will not, it shouldn't be tried.

But there are further advantages.

First, it gives those American Embassies a full time task. Each nation involved has an

equal vote with China and the Soviet Union. The Secretary of State can in good conscience tell the Ambassador that that vote matters.

Second, mirabile dictu, it provides an unambiguous record of ambassadorial performance, and for that of the desk officers at home. Has the voting record got better or worse? From 2 per cent "right" has Upper Volta gone to 4 per cent right? Or down to zero? Obviously this need not be a crude judgment. Nor need it be a cruel one. But in the end some kind of quantification is needed, if any true standards of performance are to be achieved. In any event, the voting record is a hedge against the Ambassador and the desk officer who seek to maintain the appearance of friendly and successful relations by avoiding any unpleasantness about voting in the Non-aligned Ministerial meeting or the NPT review conference. I could name thirty countries in the world with which the present system judges that we have friendly relations by emphasizing the willingness of the ruling President-for-Life to accept American food aid, while altogether ignoring, or even

repressing, a sustained record of hostile acts in multilateral forums. In the same way, if some of the non-aligned should happen to be voting with us, a prominent record of the fact would at least encourage the Department to reward both them and our Ambassadors to them for that behavior. There are few such records at present.

Third, the concept of the multilateral country" will serve to clear away what is left of our illusions about our relations with much of the world. It will be seen that in international forums about eighty per cent of the countries in the world consistently act in ways hostile to the United States. It is at least possible that many of these countries do not fully realize it. Or if they do, assume that we don't. Nothing but good could come from the American Ambassador making his monthly call on the Foreign Minister with his monthly printout in hand. The United States is increasingly isolated in a dangerous world. The danger is obviously compounded by concealing it from ourselves.

Fourth, if multilateral relations are seen to have been given priority with respect to half the nations in the world, they are likely to be

given somewhat more attention in the other half. The next time the Indian Ambassador sets out to start a war in the Middle East, the American Ambassador in New Delhi might be informed.

It is, further, just barely possible that some small part of our growing isolation is to be accounted for by our own behavior. Just possibly, a close accounting of the judgments others make of us might lead to some improvement in our own behavior, as well as theirs. To persist in ignorance is to invite calamity.

END UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE A

COUNTRIES EXCLUDED FROM THE LIST OF "MULTILATERAL COUNTRIES" BECAUSE THEY ARE EXPORTERS OF OIL TO THE UNITED STATES

Country	Contribution (%) to Total Consumption, 1974
Saudi Arabia	4.6
Kuwait	0.1
Libya	0.9
Iraq	0.1
UAE (primarily Abu Dhabi)	0.6
Algeria	1.3
Other Arab Countries	0.3
Iran	4.4
Venezuela	9.0
Indonesia	1.9
Canada (not a member of the nonaligned)	6.5
Nigeria	5.2
Ecuador	0.5
Other Non-Arab	2.6

Note: it is expected that the amount imported from Canada in 1975 will be substantially below that of 1974. This change will probably raise the figures for Nigeria and Venezuela.

Source: CIA, International Oil Developments, Appendix: Statistical Survey (Unclassified)

TABLE B

COUNTRIES EXCLUDED FROM THE LIST OF "MULTILATERAL COUNTRIES" BECAUSE THEY SUPPLY THE UNITED STATES WITH CRITICAL MATERIALS OTHER THAN FUEL

Country	Material	Per cent of U.S. Consumption Supplied; 1969-1972
Brazil	manganese	27
	columbium	39
	iron	2
Chile	vanadium	22
	copper	1
Gabon	manganese	29
Indonesia	natural rubber	39
Jamaica	alumina	8
	bauxite	48
Liberia	iron	2
Malaysia	natural rubber	40
	tin	42
Mexico	zinc	12
	mercury	13
	lead	3
	fluorspar	64
Thailand	tin	18
Zaire	cobalt	33
Peru	tungsten	4
	lead	4
	copper	1
	iron	2
Surinam	alumina	8
	bauxite	48
Venezuela	iron ore	9

Computed from figures in Council on International Economic Policy, Special Report: Imported Critical Materials (GPO, 1974), p.24.

TABLE C

COUNTRIES EXCLUDED FROM THE LIST OF "MULTILATERAL COUNTRIES" BECAUSE UNITED STATES EXPORTS TO THEM TOTAL AT LEAST $500 MILLION

Country	Value of Imports from U.S., 1974 (in millions of dollars)
Mexico	4855.3
Venezuela	1768.0
Brazil	3088.8
Iran	1733.6
Singapore	987.6
Saudi Arabia	835.2
India	759.8
Philippines	746.7
Columbia	659.4
Peru	647.2
Argentina	596.6
South Vietnam	675.1

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Social and Economic Administration, Bureau of the Census, Highlights of U.S. Export and World Trade (December, 1974)

TABLE D

COUNTRIES EXCLUDED FROM THE LIST OF "MULTILATERAL COUNTRIES" BECAUSE UNITED STATES IMPORTS FROM THEM TOTAL AT LEAST $500 MILLION

	Value of Exports to U.S., 1974 (in millions of dollars)
Mexico	3390.4
Venezuela	4671.1
Brazil	1699.9
Trinidad	1271.8
Iran	2132.2
Saudi Arabia	1671.2
Indonesia	1688.1
Philippines	1083.9
Nigeria	3286.2
Bahamas	957.0
Guatemala	786.1
Colombia	511.0
Peru	608.7
India	559.5
Malaysia	769.7
Singapore	550.4

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Social and Economic Statistics Administration, Bureau of the Census, Highlights of U.S. Export and World Trade (December, 1974)

TABLE E

COUNTRIES EXCLUDED FROM THE LIST OF "MULTILATERAL COUNTRIES" BECAUSE OF U.S. INVESTMENTS IN THEM

Country	Book value, 1973 (in millions of dollars)	Balance of Payments Income, 1973 (in millions of dollars)
Mexico	2249	109
Panama	1665	102
Argentina	1407	66
Brazil	3199	84
Chile	619	1
Colombia	727	24
Peru	793	68
Venezuela	2591	682
Liberia	256	16
Libya	895	281
India	351	27
Philippines	711	37
Costa Rica	126	26
Guatemala	175	- 2
Honduras	205	8
Dominican Republic	207	27
Ecuador	338	27
Bahamas (figure includes Bermuda)	1609	92
Nigeria (figure includes Gambia, Sierra Leone)	436	87
Zambia (Figure includes Rhodesia)	269	3
Indonesia	833	494
Malaysia and Singapore	563	31
Thailand	131	3

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business Vol. 54, No. 8, Part 2 (August, 1974)

U.S. Department of Commerce, unpublished investment data for 1973