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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


May 20, 1976

*Transp.
air*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES CANNON 

SUBJECT: ST. LOUIS REGIONAL AIRPORT



ISSUE:

A need has long been recognized for additional airport facilities in the St. Louis area. The issue is whether Lambert-St. Louis International Airport (Missouri) should be expanded or a new facility at Columbia/Waterloo, (Illinois) be built. This could mean a decision to improve Lambert (Mo.) only enough to handle commercial traffic until 1987, and begin building in Illinois.

An alternative is to erect a new airport in Illinois eventually but to improve Lambert (Mo.) to the maximum extent feasible to handle traffic beyond 1987, and defer decision on a new airport until later. Such new airport would not come into service until at least the mid 1990's or later. If this alternative is chosen, a further question is whether to buy or "land bank" the Illinois site for a time when this larger airport may be needed.

BACKGROUND:

In early 1972, the St. Louis Metropolitan Area Authority (created by the Illinois legislature in 1970) filed an application with DOT for preliminary funding of a new airport located at Columbia-Waterloo, Illinois, 15 miles south of East St. Louis. Strenuous opposition to this proposed airport has been raised by Missouri which contends that Lambert Field (Mo.) can be developed to serve as a first-class airport for at least 20 more years, and that a distant airport would be a hardship on area citizens because 78% of the people and 90% of the air travelers in the St. Louis area live in Missouri.

This is a sticky issue politically because Missouri leaders (Governor Bond) are against while Illinois leaders (Senator Percy) are for it.

Neither Secretaries Volpe nor Brinegar acted on this question. Secretary Coleman held a public hearing on the issue on January 13, 1976, in St. Louis, Missouri. His decision is expected to be announced on or about May 25, 1976.

Implications of Approval/Disapproval

If a Federal grant is approved, land acquisition for a major new airport will begin. During the next decade, an estimated \$450 million (minimum) to \$1 billion (maximum) will be expended on its development. The objective would be to make St. Louis a major hub for airport traffic and thereby generate much needed economic development. In all likelihood, Lambert field (Mo.) would not undergo major improvements during the decade and would continue to operate after 1985 only as a general aviation airport.

If the grant is disapproved, it is likely that the Lambert/St. Louis Airport Authority (Mo.) will apply for an airport development grant for upgrading the current facility. Costs are estimated to be about \$150 to \$200 million. It is now estimated that after improvement, Lambert would reach capacity some time after the year 2000. It is argued that Lambert would not provide the same economic stimulus to the area. (It should be noted, however, that approximately 11,000 Missourians currently work at Lambert and 70,000 other jobs--mostly Missouri--are indirectly dependent on Lambert.) Further, Illinois may still attempt to purchase the Waterloo land in the hopes of future reversal of the decision (land-banking).

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 3, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JIM CANNON

FROM:

STEVE McCONAHEY

SUBJECT:

St. Louis Airport Decision

*File - 9/6/76
Very good,
and thanks..
Would you
all in about
Bona.
SM Thanks.
Jim*

Background

The eventual need for a significant increase in commercial airport capacity to serve the St. Louis metropolitan area has been under discussion for many years. A number of studies in the late 1960's concluded that during the 1980's the present capacity of Lambert Airport would be inadequate to handle the airline traffic for the St. Louis area without intolerable delays, and that a new air carrier airport would be necessary.

Although studies were conducted by former Secretaries Volpe and Brinegar, Secretary Coleman commissioned a study by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co. to develop an overall analysis of the situation. It concluded: (1) Delaying construction and operation of a new Columbia-Waterloo Airport and maintaining an improved Lambert would result in lower economic costs compared to earlier construction and operation at Columbia-Waterloo, and (2) The "most likely" level of operations could be accommodated at an improved Lambert, but with increasing congestion over time.

In order to gain public approval, the Secretary held a public hearing in St. Louis on January 13, 1976. Representatives of State and local government, the business community, civic groups, and other elected officials participated.

The Decision

On September 1, Secretary Coleman approved the Columbia-Waterloo, Illinois, site. In reaching his decision, the Secretary considered the following factors:



090402

Columbia-Waterloo Airport Construction and Capacity

In the absence of advances in air traffic control technology that would increase capacity, the IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) capacity of Columbia-Waterloo would be 104 operations per hour and could increase. Also, additional runways can be readily constructed to meet higher demands.

Lambert Airport Improvements and Capacity

Lambert Airport has been estimated to have a possible 85 (maximum) IFR operations per hour in 1998. This is with all major technological advance changes. However, without these changes, projections would be for 67 IFR operations per hour.

Demand and Delay

Based on PMM's (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co.) "most likely" estimates of demand, it appears that peak hour air carrier and commuter operations alone will approximate the conservative estimate of Lambert's peak hour capacity in the early 1900's.

Compared to Lambert, Columbia-Waterloo would provide air service with considerably less delay. However, these forecasts of delay would not be unacceptable at Lambert until the early 1900's.

Environmental Impacts

Keeping Lambert field would impose a greater noise impact than transferring the operations to Columbia.

Employment, Business, and Growth

With respect to "direct" jobs now at Lambert, most jobs would be relocated to Columbia-Waterloo and few, if any, employees would lose their jobs.



The 33,000 "airport-related" employees consist primarily of the 30,000 employees of McDonnell-Douglas, who would not be affected by the transfer of air carrier operations. Of the remaining 3,000, most would continue to be employed at Lambert or would transfer to Columbia-Waterloo; probably less than 1,000 would actually lose their present employment in the years ahead.

General Aviation

If air carrier operations were transferred to Columbia-Waterloo, Lambert would constitute a major general aviation facility. On the other hand, if air carrier operations continue at Lambert at estimated future levels, general aviation operations at Lambert would be reduced and most general aviation operations transferred to other locations considered less desirable by general aviation. This could provide a shortage of general aviation facilities in the entire St. Louis metropolitan region.


Timing

Site acquisition, planning and development of a major new airport is generally expected to take 10-12 years or more. Thus, the development cycle, if begun now, would coincide roughly with the likely date of need. Also, it would be prudent to acquire it now, to assure its acquisition.

In summary, the Secretary feels that after careful evaluation, Lambert, even if improved, will not provide sufficient capacity in the long term. Columbia-Waterloo provides a superior location and he feels that he has found no documentation that a better site exists elsewhere. Also, Columbia-Waterloo would provide significant environmental advantages.

Reaction of Governor Bond

Governor Bond has been intensely interested in this decision and has contacted Secretary Coleman directly numerous times over the past several months. Secretary Coleman had indicated to the Governor on previous occasions that his decision would be forthcoming. However, it was delayed several times until Wednesday, September 1. Although Secretary Coleman felt that a delay of the decision until after the convention would minimize the "political" ramifications of the decision, this has not been the case.



Governor Bond has personally criticized the decision and indicated publicly that he feels it will adversely effect the President's election support in the State of Missouri. The local press has also suggested the decision was political, with one report referring to it as a "political deal" showing that Republicans are more interested in Illinois than Missouri. Governor Bond also expressed his feeling that there would likely be political protests and demonstrations concerning the airport decision if the President visited St. Louis in the near future, particularly to participate in the upcoming debates. It is fair to say that Governor Bond is very upset about the decision and its timing, and he plans to take legal and procedure actions to delay or reverse it.

Moreover, the Governor was informed of the decision simultaneously with Coleman's announcement. I think he feels he should have been treated a little more openly.

A final note is that the President talked with Governor Bond about this decision on Friday, September 3.



A

THE DECISION

After careful consideration, I have decided for the reasons set forth in this document to approve the application from the St. Louis Metropolitan Area Airport Authority for a grant for land acquisition for a new major air carrier airport at the Columbia-Waterloo site. This approval, however, is subject to the following conditions:

- (1) Any master planning grant for Columbia-Waterloo must be structured for commencement of air carrier operations not before January 1, 1992, unless a joint authority representing both Illinois and Missouri equally is developed, in which case such operations could commence as early as 1987, or even sooner if the joint authority so desires;
- (2) Priority in the filling of jobs at the Columbia-Waterloo Airport must be given to persons, if any, who lose jobs at Lambert as a result of the transfer of air carrier operations to Columbia-Waterloo;
- (3) Legal arrangements must be made to assure that construction and building trade employees from Missouri are given reasonably equal opportunities for employment in the development and construction of Columbia-Waterloo;
- (4) The farmland to be acquired at Columbia-Waterloo must have a delayed acquisition date or be rented to the current owners for continued farming use, if the current owners so desire, until such time as it is actually necessary to begin physical development work, and displacement of farming activities must be kept to a minimum consistent with the development and later operation of the airport;
- (5) The Authority must include in its purchase agreement in connection with farmlands acquired for the new site, for those farmers who desire it, the right of reversion to the current owners at the price of acquisition plus interest at 5% or the fair market value, whichever is lower, in the event that -- because of circumstances not now foreseen -- the land is not subsequently used for airport purposes;
- (6) Satisfactory assurances must be given that land in the vicinity of the airport will be utilized for purposes compatible with the estimated level of future airport noise;
- (7) The contractors and labor unions which will be utilized in the development and construction of Columbia-Waterloo must effectuate, in a legally binding document, the commitment they have already given for a no-strike guarantee in the construction of the new airport and related facilities of the Authority, even if the then current labor agreements have expired;

- (8) The Authority must effectuate its commitment, in a legally binding document, that it would "assume any outstanding debt obligations for Lambert improvements being supported by the airlines which the airlines will continue to support";
- (9) The Authority must give assurances that it intends to comply fully with section 30 of the Airport Act, relating to equal opportunities for minorities and women in activities financed from grants under the Act, and any regulations issued thereunder;
- (10) The Authority must file a letter with the Administrator of the FAA within ninety days hereof, or any extended time given by said Administrator, stating that it accepts the pertinent conditions set forth above as terms of this grant.

In addition, I have instructed the FAA Administrator, working with other Federal agencies as appropriate, to take the following actions:

- (1) To assist the Lambert authorities and local government and others to identify in greater detail the specific jobs that are likely to be lost and businesses that are likely to be adversely affected by the transfer of operations, and to develop plans for actions to provide substitute employment and business opportunities to the maximum extent feasible;
- (2) To cooperate with the Lambert authorities, including encouragement of the submission of a grant application, in proceeding with planning and development actions necessary and appropriate for Lambert's continued operation as a major air carrier airport until the date of transfer of air carrier operations to Columbia-Waterloo;
- (3) To cooperate with the Lambert Authority in making sure that Lambert, if the Authority so desires, can serve the needs of general aviation extremely well whenever the air carrier operations are transferred to Columbia-Waterloo;
- (4) To ensure complete compliance with the requirements of Federal statutes relating to relocation assistance and equal opportunity for minorities and women in both employment and contracting.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 4, 1976

*Steve - file
Mason
Jim*

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JIM CANNON

FROM:

STEVE McCONAHEY

SM

In answer to your specific question of how Governor Bond was notified of the St. Louis Airport decision:

1. At 10:30 EST (approximately 10 minutes before Coleman made the announcement) a copy of the decision was hand-carried to Bond in Williamsburg, Virginia, where he was attending the Southern Governors' Conference.
2. At 9:30 EST, Perry Roberts (aid to Bond) was given a full copy of the decision and allowed to read it in a "pre-reading" room in St. Louis where Coleman made the decision. At approximately 10:30 EST Roberts and others in the "pre-reading" room were escorted to Coleman's news conference. Roberts left the group at this point and presumably called Bond at or about the same time Bond received his copy in Williamsburg.

From this information (confirmed by Bond) I can only conclude that the Governor had at most 15 -- 20 minutes notice of the decision.

090412

St. Louis Airport

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 9, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: JIM CANNON
FROM: JUDITH RICHARDS HOPE *Raye*
SUBJECT: St. Louis Airport

Senator Eagleton has already initiated a law suit against DOT for an injunction against the implementation of Secretary Coleman's decision. DOT has until September 23 to answer. We will keep you up to date on the response.

cc: Steve McConahey

OK



090924

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file
St. Louis
Airport

September 13, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: JIM BAKER
FROM: JIM CANNON JMC
SUBJECT: St. Louis Airport Decision

You might be interested in seeing negative impacts in Missouri of the Administration's St. Louis Airport decision.

attachments



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 13, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: JIM CANNON
JIM CONNOR
JIM CAVANAUGH
ART QUERN
JUDITH HOPE

FROM: STEVE McCONAHEY *SEM*

SUBJECT: St. Louis Airport Decision.

Some of the articles which appeared in St. Louis newspapers following Secretary Coleman's recent decision regarding building the new airport in Illinois are summarized below.

Major Themes:

- Despite appeals and explanations from Secretary Coleman, the reaction was strong. Basically, the opposition and support are drawn along Missouri/Illinois state lines.
- Critics include Missouri state government officials, local residents and labor leaders.

The residents which will have to be involuntarily relocated are quite vocal.

Missouri labor leaders view the decision as purely a political matter which might hurt their workers. [But the Federal plan states that Missouri workers get a fair share.]

State government leaders feel betrayed; they feel their credibility has been damaged.

- Typical Comments:

"For Keim, [a Missouri farmer] the fact that the Illinois COP delegation to the convention

09/13/76

was overwhelmingly for [the] President -- and the majority of Missouri's delegates were for Reagan -- says all he needs to know" (St. Louis Post-Dispatch).

"[It] is total proof of what happens when a bureaucrat-holding federal office some 1,000 miles away attempts to tell the people on the scene" how to act. (W.R. Persons, Missouri-St. Louis Airport Authority.)

"the decision contradicts the Secretary's previously stated national transportation policy of 'not more capacity, but modernization ... and more effective utilization of existing capacity'." (Rep. Hungate (D-Mo.)

St. Louis Post-Dispatch

September 2, 1976

Labor Leader Here Assails Airport Choice As Political

By EDWARD H. THORNTON
Of the Post-Dispatch Staff

agree that workers from Missouri be given reasonably equal opportunities.

Horstman said. "We favor that." But Mantia said

St. Louis Post-Dispatch September 2, 1976



Calls Airport Decision Politically Motivated

By FRED W. LINDECKE
and JEFF GELLES
Of the Post-Dispatch Staff



Fri, Sept. 3, 1976

St. Louis Globe-Democrat

Ford aid may be asked to cool airport foes

By **ROBERT W. RYFFEL**
Globe-Democrat Staff Writer

Several supporters of the decision to

Mr. Ford that he believes Coleman made a serious error and he (Bond) intends to speak out on the decision.



Losers react angrily, winners soothingly

By ARTHUR J. THOMASON
Globe-Democrat Staff Writer

idents of the Columbia-Waterloo area,
where the airport is to be built.

"I don't want to live under the

cized Coleman face-to-face here Wednesday after he acknowledged that he had not personally inspected the Columbia-Waterloo site.

Farmers Bitter About Decision To Take Their Land For Airport

By JOHN M. McGUIRE
Of the Post-Dispatch Staff

GOP. delegation to the convention was overwhelmingly for President Gerald R. Ford — and the majority of Missouri's

take an even dimmer view of politicians than her husband.

St. Louis Globe-Democrat

September 2, 1976

Coleman's approval of Illinois site angers Missourians

By **ROBERT BLANCHARD**
Globe-Democrat Staff Writer



aviation (business and private aircraft) airport if that is what the people want. The people may find an even better use

DOMESTIC COUNCIL

Trans.

FROM:

Gov. Bond

SUBJECT:

Lambert Field

Date: 12/9

COMMENTS:

Gov. Bond makes the case that the Lambert Field decision included erroneous information and anti-Missouri bias on the part of the FAA.

He believes the President should reverse the decision before January 20.

McConahey and Hope have copies. Do you want to follow-up in any way?

A.



ACTION:

Date:

cc: Hope
McConahey



EXECUTIVE OFFICE
STATE OF MISSOURI
JEFFERSON CITY

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND
GOVERNOR


December 9, 1976

Mr. James A. Cannon
Assistant for Domestic Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Jim:

Following up on our telephone conversation today, I have checked the information on the distance of the proposed new airport from the air traveler centroid in St. Louis County. The present airport, Lambert International, is 11 miles or 15 minutes driving time from the population center. The new field in Columbia-Waterloo, Illinois, would be 33 miles or 45 minutes driving time. In addition, I mentioned to you the figures on the capacity projected for Lambert in the 1990's. Secretary Coleman said it could only handle 67 aircraft operations per hour. The study done for our airport authority, the Missouri-St. Louis Authority, showed that by the 1990's, 85 aircraft operations could be handled at Lambert. To do this they made the logical assumption that air traffic control techniques which FAA promised Congress would be in place in the 1980's would, in fact, be available at Lambert. To come up with the more conservative figure of 67 operations, Secretary Coleman had to disregard the promised technological advance assured by the FAA.

I am also taking the liberty of attaching an in-house working memorandum which may be of interest to you. I have underlined some of the pertinent points. The



12/1/76

Mr. James A. Cannon

Page 2


December 9, 1976

most important change, as we discussed in our telephone conversation, is the fact that noise appeared to be a factor in the Secretary's initial decision. Since the election, the FAA has now promised that new techniques will provide a 30 percent noise reduction at all airports. That would substantially relieve the problem at Lambert, which Missourians felt was never a real problem anyway.

The one final point which I mentioned and which is discussed in the memorandum, is the fact that throughout the FAA has been biased against Missouri and its position with respect to Lambert. I have personally seen that bias firsthand. Now it appears from depositions taken in the trial that a representative of the FAA even influenced some of the supposedly independent studies. Furthermore, from the information transmitted to Secretary Coleman, I am sure that the FAA put its bias on that also.

In short, this is a very bad decision on the technology. It is an even worse decision on the politics. I am confident that the decision will ultimately be reversed. I would hope that President Ford could make that reversal during his administration rather than allowing the credit to go to the succeeding administration.

Sincerely,



WARREN E. HEARNES
GOVERNOR

Enclosure

Attention: Perry Roberts

Reasons For Reconsideration of The
St. Louis Airport Matter

Secretary Coleman's decision to grant funds to an Illinois airport authority for the acquisition of land and eventual construction of an airport in the Columbia-Waterloo area of southern Illinois to serve the St. Louis Metropolitan area should be reconsidered. Never before to the knowledge of Missourians has the Secretary of Transportation selected the site for an airport in the face of the overwhelming opposition of the people whom the airport is intended to serve. Missourians have argued that the statute upon which the Secretary relies, the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, as amended, does not authorize him to act in such circumstances. Whatever the statute may imply for a metropolitan area in which sentiment is more evenly divided, this is a poor case in which to assert federal executive power to resolve the dispute because here the tail is so obviously wagging the dog: Missourians, who account for 80% of the St. Louis area's population and 90% of the area's air travelers are united in favoring a viable alternative to Illinois' proposed new airport, the continued development of Lambert. Reconsideration is appropriate now because since the announcement of that decision on September 1, 1976, major federal regulations have dramatically contradicted the premises underlying that decision. In addition, the decision was based on studies so restricted and limited that no complete study of St. Louis' need for a new airport was ever completed. Moreover, alternatives to the new airport and certain major costs were never studied.

Noise

1. Secretary Coleman concluded that "the environmental advantages of noise reduction of the Columbia-Waterloo alternative are a compelling argument for developing a new airport." Secretary's Decision at 7 (emphasis added). This conclusion was based on findings submitted by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company ("PMM") which, in turn, were based on an assumption apparently, imposed upon PMM by DOT and/or FAA before Secretary Coleman took office, that a relatively modest engine retrofit program was the only action likely to be taken over the next twenty-five years to solve the problem of airport noise. This assumption has been rendered invalid by a series of recent developments in the federal



regulation of airport noise. On November 18, 1976, at President Ford's direction Secretary Coleman and FAA jointly issued their Aviation Noise Abatement Policy, which goes far beyond limited aircraft retrofit. On November 29, 1976, the FAA published in the Federal Register its aircraft approach noise abatement regulation, which imposes restrictions on landing and takeoff procedures. FAA Administrator John L. McLucas stated at the press conference announcing this regulation that the total impact of all these abatement measures will be about a 30% reduction in aviation noise impact. Moreover, the FAA is actively considering all aspects of a recently published EPA noise abatement program under which airport operators would be empowered, where appropriate, to institute a whole arsenal of noise abatement techniques ranging from land use controls to curfews and other operational procedures.

Lambert's Capacity

2. Secretary Coleman approved the Columbia-Waterloo project only because he could not find that Lambert could be developed adequately to accommodate future air traffic demand. This conclusion was based on studies by PMM and by the Ralph M. Parsons Company (Parsons), the only two studies of Lambert's future capacity. However, both of those studies were performed subject to severe restrictions and assumptions lacking factual basis imposed by the FAA before Secretary Coleman took office, so that neither study was free to make a full study of Lambert's future capacity. PMM, for example, was limited to examining Lambert's capacity only to the year 2000, and it was not permitted to consider replacement sites other than Columbia-Waterloo (although a number of other potentially feasible sites had been identified). In addition, PMM was required to assume that there would be no improvements in air traffic control technology over the entire period of its study, although the FAA has publicly stated that new technology will be implemented by the mid 1980s which will greatly increase the capacity of all existing airports. Similarly, PMM was forbidden to consider noise abatement programs developed within DOT and the EPA which EPA believes can reduce noise to an acceptable level at all airports by the end of this century. PMM was also constrained in considering alternatives to accommodating St. Louis area general aviation at facilities other than Lambert's air carrier runways, despite the recognition of most experts that the relocation of general aviation would eliminate any foreseeable capacity problem at Lambert.



3. Despite strenuous protests from the Missouri parties, the FAA, which funded Parson's master planning study of Lambert, prohibited Parsons from examining Lambert's capacity beyond 1995, limited its study approximately to Lambert's present boundaries and forbade examination of alternatives for accommodating general aviation apart from Lambert's air carrier runways. An earlier preliminary study of Lambert which Missouri had paid for entirely was never given serious consideration by FAA.

4. The FAA consistently criticized Parsons for basing its 1995 forecast on technology the FAA expects to be implemented by the mid-1980s. Although the Secretary did not state that he was unwilling to take into account any improvement in air traffic control technology, his estimation of the significance of technological advances was distorted by the fact that PPM was forbidden to take such improvements into account and by the FAA objections to the Parsons report. Any other serious consideration of the implications of technology soon to be implemented was foreclosed by the absence from the record upon which the Secretary based his decision of any of the many documents by the FAA or its consultants describing this new technology and evaluating its significance.

General Aviation

5. Representatives of the majority of St. Louis area residents have long believed that the most acceptable means of relieving future capacity pressures at Lambert would be to follow the example of other major cities and provide alternative facilities for general aviation traffic apart from the air carrier airport. For reasons never explained, the FAA did not authorize PPM or Parsons to examine alternatives for accommodating general aviation. However, in passing, both studies observed that there are significant alternative general aviation facilities in the area. It is therefore clear that these alternative facilities warrant further study.

Alternative Air Carrier Airport Sites

6. In the course of preparing Missouri's case for trial, counsel for the Missouri parties have uncovered indications that FAA officials may have sought to exercise improper influence over the results of consultant studies performed for clients other than the FAA. This information was revealed by a former Missouri state official involved with the 1971 alternative site survey performed for Missouri

by the Northrop Airport Development Corporation. Near the end of the survey when it appeared that Northrop favored the Dardenne site in Missouri, the state official was told by a Northrop employee that the FAA administrator, Mr. John Shaffer, had asked officials at the Northrop Corporation, the parent of the Northrop Airport Development Corporation, to "cool it" with respect to its recommendation. Northrop subsequently released its report merely recommending further study of the Dardenne and Smartt Field sites in Missouri and the Columbia-Waterloo site in Illinois.

7. Over the course of the last five years, Missourians have repeatedly informed DOT that they would insist upon their right to a major role in selecting a replacement for Lambert if the need were ever perceived. Secretary Coleman disregarded this request, which was repeated at his January 13, 1976 hearing, and selected Columbia-Waterloo ostensibly on the basis of his belief that no other "site in Missouri exists which will serve the needs of the St. Louis metropolitan area as well as the Columbia-Waterloo site." Secretary's Decision at 7. However, no FAA official or consultant ever investigated alternative air carrier airport sites in the St. Louis area; the studies relied upon by Secretary Coleman were all commissioned by Illinois or Missouri groups. Those consultants studies were all completed between 1968 and 1971, long before Secretary Coleman took office, under the now discredited premise that phenomenal increases in air traffic demand would require an extremely large site. Moreover, those studies identified several environmentally acceptable sites in Missouri which would have been closer to the St. Louis area population centroid than Columbia-Waterloo. Finally, the site survey upon which the Illinois proposal is founded was based on the premise that Lambert would continue to operate as an air carrier airport, thus requiring the location of a new airport in southern Illinois in order to avoid air space conflicts with Lambert, which is located northwest of St. Louis. The airlines, however, have more recently taken the position that they will serve only one St. Louis airport.

Economic and Financial Considerations

8. Secretary Coleman concluded that the Columbia-Waterloo site could be constructed "at a likely cost (including related highway construction) being bracketed by estimates of \$325 million and \$600 million." Secretary's Decision at 42. These estimates completely omit \$400 million

of Missouri highway and bridge construction which Missourians had advised the Secretary at the January 13, 1976 hearing would be required to move traffic to the Columbia-Waterloo site. This estimate was formulated by Richard F. Daykin, Director of Highways and Traffic for St. Louis County. The Secretary dismissed this estimate without further study, thus narrowing by more than half the range of cost estimates for the Columbia-Waterloo project from a span reaching from \$325 million to approximately \$1 billion to the far narrower one of \$325 million to only \$600 million.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 20, 1976

Handwritten signature

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY COLEMAN

FROM: JIM CANNON *J.C.*

SUBJECT: St. Louis Airport Decision

Here is a copy of a letter Kit Bond has written me about the St. Louis Airport decision.

cc: Hope
McConahey



EXECUTIVE OFFICE
976 L.S. 10 28
STATE OF MISSOURI
JEFFERSON CITY

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND
GOVERNOR

December 15, 1976

Mr. James A. Cannon
Assistant for Domestic Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Jim:

In my previous letter to you regarding the St. Louis Airport decision, I noted that Secretary Coleman neglected to take into consideration new technical landing systems that the Federal Aviation Administration announced on November 13. The St. Louis Post Dispatch reported in an article that FAA spokesman Neal Callahan had announced that as early as 1979 eight major airports will be equipped with a new automatic landing system. One of Secretary Coleman's key points for making a decision for the new airport site at Columbia-Waterloo was that Lambert was not capable of handling the traffic projected to be operating at Lambert in 1998.

If FAA spokesman Neal Callahan can be taken at his word, by 1979 the electronic techniques will be available to reduce to absolute minimum any delays in traffic handling. Hopefully, this information will assist you and the President in your discussions with Secretary Coleman.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "C. S. Bond", written over a circular embossed seal.

GOVERNOR



prw

121703