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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION	
briefing	Soviet Cruise Missiles <i>Declassified 3/21/96</i>	3 pages	9/14/76	A
2. briefing	ALCM/SLCM <i>Sanitized 3/21/96</i>	2 pages	9/14/76	A
3. briefing	Jordan HAWK Missile Purchase	2 pages	9/8/76	A
4. briefing	MBFR-French Issue <i>Declassified 3/21/76</i>	1 page	8/5/76	A
5. briefing	Most Recent Soviet MBFR Proposals <i>Declassified 3/21/96</i>	2 pages	8/5/76	A
6. briefing	Philippine Base Negotiations	2 pages	8/5/76	A
7. briefing	Relationship with Thailand	1 page	7/20/76	A
8. briefing	Thailand Reconnaissance Activity	1 page	7/20/76	A

FILE LOCATION

Special Files, Ford-Carter Debate Files

Second Debate--DOD Briefing Book (C) (box 2)

plc 3/28/84

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SALT

September 15, 1976

SUBJECT: SALT Talk Prospects


QUESTION: Recent news reports indicate possibilities for a SALT TWO agreement prior to the November elections. Is this likely? Can we expect a SALT Agreement with the Soviets in the coming months?

ANSWER: The Administration is continuing in its efforts to negotiate a mutually acceptable SALT TWO Agreement with the Soviets. However, the Backfire and Cruise Missile issues continue to be major obstacles. We would hope, of course, that these differences could be resolved in the coming months but a particular timetable has not been established. Even if agreement in principle could be reached on these two issues today, there would still be a great deal of work to be done to transform those principles into formal agreement language. Although not out of the question, I believe it is unlikely that a final agreement could be ready for signature before the end of the year.

BACKGROUND: None

SOURCE: DoD SALT Task Force

COORDINATION: Dr. James P. Wade, Jr., Director, DoD SALT Task Force



September 14, 1976

SUBJECT: Possible Deployment of Soviet SS-20 MIRV IRBM's

QUESTION: A recent ACDA report deals with deployment of Soviet SS-20's. Is the report true? Why was it announced by ACDA rather than DoD? What is the DoD reaction to the report? If it is true, what does it do to the balance of forces in Europe?

ANSWER: The ACDA report has been read as saying that older Soviet IRBMs, the SS-4s and 5s, are being MIRVed. They are not. As for the SS-X-20, it is equipped with MIRVs. However, deployment has not begun, although the Soviets are believed to be about ready to start. There is no conflict between this information and the Secretary of Defense's January report.

The DoD called public attention to the SS-X-20 in the Annual Defense Department Report FY 1977, published in January 1976.

The information in the ACDA report is consistent with DoD views on the subject expressed in the Annual Defense Department Report FY 1977.

No detailed DoD assessment has yet been made of the impact of SS-X-20 deployment on the balance of forces in Europe. We are still collecting and evaluating intelligence information on the capability of the missile. If deployed in large numbers, the SS-X-20 would represent a significant development in Soviet nuclear capabilities.

BACKGROUND: None

(continued)

SUBJECT: Possible Deployment of Soviet SS-20 MIRV IRBM's (Cont'd)

SOURCE: Mr. Kangas, DoD SALT Task Force

COORDINATION: Dr. Wade, Director, DoD SALT Task Force

September 14, 1976

SUBJECT: Soviet SALT Response

QUESTION: Can you provide a comment on the status of the U.S. response to the Soviet SALT note?

ANSWER: Meetings on this subject continue in the Administration.

I can report that progress is being made on the examination of the Soviet note, but I do not know when the study will be completed.

BACKGROUND: This is Secretary of State guidance to his Public Affairs Staff.

SOURCE: State Department, Public Affairs

COORDINATION: Dr. Sauerwein, Deputy Director, SALT Task Force



September 29, 1976

SUBJECT: Soviet Dismantling/SALT Violations

QUESTION: What is the current status of Soviet dismantling as they deploy new strategic weapons systems? In doing so, are they guilty of SALT violations?

ANSWER: Our intelligence information indicates that the Soviets have dismantled or destroyed the required number of ICBM launchers in a manner which would preclude their use for launching ICBMs and their reactivation in a time period substantially less than that required to construct a new launcher. We are continuing to carefully monitor Soviet activities related to completion of all the detailed requirements of the Agreed Procedures. Certain technical aspects of their dismantling activities are currently under discussion with the Soviets.

The dismantling procedures are quite detailed and complex. Our concern is with certain technical aspects of the procedures such as how much the launch site must be "cleaned up" following dis-assembly and destruction of components. We will not get into further details of these discussions at this time.

Additional SLBM submarines have gone on sea trials since May, but this appears to have been after the Soviets had dismantled or destroyed the required number of ICBM launchers (which should have been dismantled before these submarines went on sea trials) in a manner which would preclude their use for launching ICBMs and their reactivation in a time period substantially less than that required to construct a new launcher.

(continued)

The additional SLBM submarines on sea trials, of course, have created a requirement to dismantle or destroy additional older ICBM or SLBM launchers which are being replaced. We will be closely monitoring this Soviet dismantling or destruction activity.

BACKGROUND: None.

SOURCE: DoD SALT Task Force.

COORDINATION: Dr. Wade, Director, DoD SALT Task Force.



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September 14, 1976

SUBJECT: Soviet Cruise Missiles

QUESTION: What is the USSR's capability in cruise missiles?

ANSWER: The magnitude and diversity of the Soviet cruise missile threat is a direct result of an intensive development program initiated in the years immediately following World War II. It is aimed at the creation of a naval and Air Force capable of (1) neutralizing the threat posed by U.S. aircraft carrier strike forces; (2) obtaining control of the seas, and (3) providing limited strike capability against land targets.

The Soviet Union has invested heavily in the development and deployment of submarine, surface ship, bomber aircraft, and land-launched cruise missile systems. Over a dozen different cruise missile systems have been deployed to date and additional systems are believed to be in various stages of development at this time. Most of these missiles were designed as anti-ship missiles; however, several were designed for missions against land targets.

Soviet cruise missiles to date have had maximum operational ranges of approximately 600 km or less. The present Soviet technology base shows that the Soviets have the capability to design, develop, and produce a long-range (e.g., 2500 km) cruise missile or to modify existing cruise missiles for the long-range mission.

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By K3H, NARA, Date 3/21/96

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SUBJECT: Soviet Cruise Missile (Cont'd)

The Soviets are expected to continue to develop new and/or modified cruise missiles; however, the performance of these missiles has not been determined.

BACKGROUND: Classified chart attached.

SOURCE: Mr. Frank Pierce, DIA ET-2B

COORDINATION: DIA, RADM Harvey

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SOVIET CRUISE MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS & PERFORMANCE (1)

CRUISE MISSILE	IOC	LAUNCH PLATFORM	WARHEAD WEIGHT	SYSTEM RANGE	CURRENT RANGE POTENTIAL
			(Kg) NOTE: 2	(Km)	(Km) NOTE: 4
SS-N-1	1958	SHIP	900	240	
SS-N-2	1959	SHIP	500	46	
SS-N-3	1960	SHIPS/SUBMARINE	1000	463	1400
SS-N-7	1968	SUBMARINE NOTE 3	500	56	
SS-N-9	1969	SHIP	500	111	
SS-N-10	1970	SHIP	500	46	
SS-N-11	1968	SHIP	500	46	
SS-NX-12	1976	SHIP/SUBMARINE	1000	556	1700
SS-N-14	1974	SHIP	TORPEDO	56	
AS-1	1956	BOMBER	1000	100	
AS-2	1961	BOMBER	1000	185	1665
AS-3	1960	BOMBER	2265	650	1300
AS-4	1967	BOMBER	1000	460	
AS-5	1965	BOMBER	1000	230	
AS-6	1970	BOMBER	500	550	
SSC-1	1962	LAND	1000	520	
SSC-2	1956	LAND	1000	93	

- NOTES: (1) US provided information to NATO on these missiles may differ due to security restrictions.
(2) HE or Nuclear
(3) Submerged Launch
(4) Fuel exhaustion range. No CEP claims are made.

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September 14, 1976

SUBJECT: ALCM/SLCM

QUESTION: What sort of capability are we looking for in these missiles regarding range, payload, carrier, etc. In other words, what will these missiles be able to do when development is complete?



ANSWER: The Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is designed primarily as a weapon for the B-52 force to enhance bomber penetration and survivability by range extension and defense dilution and to increase bomber effectiveness by the extreme accuracy of the ALCM guidance system. ALCM is physically interchangeable with the SRAM weapon in the B-52 SRAM rotary rack and on the B-52 SRAM pylon. In the former case, the ALCM would be carried inside the B-52 bomb bay and can deliver a nuclear warhead to a target hundreds of miles away. When carried on the pylon under the B-52 wing, the ALCM could be lengthened or fitted with a jettisonable belly tank to more than double the existing range. The ALCM has a low cross section and cruises at subsonic speed at very low altitude to avoid defense detection.

The Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM or TOMAHAWK) is designed so that it can be launched from a submarine torpedo tube. The strategic SLCM has the same guidance and warhead (and engine) as the ALCM and hence the same accuracy and weapon yield. Because of the larger dimensions available within the torpedo tube, the SLCM has a range of about twice that of the ALCM without the belly tank. The SLCM is also designed to be compatible for launching from surface ships and

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By LCBH NARA, Date 3/21/96

SUBJECT: ALCM/SLCM (Cont'd)

land based platforms and is being studied for adaptability to the B-52. In the latter case, the length and thus the range of SLCM will be reduced in order to fit into the present bomb bay carriage.

BACKGROUND: (S)

	<u>ALCM</u>	<u>SLCM</u> (Strategic)
Range

Payload

Accuracy



SOURCE: ODDR&E (S&SS)

COORDINATION: Principal Deputy Director, DR&E
Deputy Director, DoD SALT Task Force

September 15, 1976

SUBJECT: Arms Control Impact Statements

QUESTION: Do you have any comment on charges by Congressman Aspin that the Arms Control Impact Statements submitted to Congress (August 9) are "totally useless because they are absurdly superficial"?

ANSWER: The Arms Control Impact Statements, submitted to the Congress on 9 August 1976, were prepared in accordance with the specific requirements of Section 36 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Although brief, they were carefully developed and phrased to provide succinct descriptions of the programs concerned so that a reader could quickly grasp the nature and purpose of each program and any implications it might have in regard to established arms control policy and negotiating positions.

BACKGROUND: The Aspin charge is contained in a 12 September New York Times article written by John Finney.

SOURCE: Colonel Mahlberg, Assistant for Conventional Systems Policy, Policy Plans and NSC Affairs Directorate, ISA

COORDINATION: Dr. J. Wade, DASD, Policy Plans and NSC Affairs Directorate
Mr. McAuliffe, ASD(ISA)



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This form marks the file location of item number 3
as listed on the pink form (GSA Form 7122, Withdrawal Sheet)
at the front of the folder.

August 5, 1976

SUBJECT: Senate Report on Military Sales to Iran

QUESTION: What is the Department of Defense response to a Senate report concerning problems with military sales to Iran?

ANSWER: The staff report on U.S. arms sales to Iran just released by Senator Humphrey's Subcommittee contains no information that is new to the Defense Department. All programs have problems; the program in Iran has its share.

Last year the Defense Department took action to improve the management of this increasingly complex program. It selected and sent out to Tehran in the autumn of 1975 a Special Defense Representative, Mr. Erich F. von Marbod. The Senate staff report applauds the Defense Department's initiative in sending a Special Defense Representative to Iran.

Mr. von Marbod, who is a member of the staff of the American Ambassador in Tehran, returns to Washington periodically for a thorough review of progress being accomplished in the U.S./Iranian Assistance Program. These periodic consultations will continue; the most recent having just occurred last month. Mr. von Marbod, working with Ambassador Helms, has the full backing of the entire Department of Defense and the Services in devising solutions to any problems that may exist and to those that may arise.

Iran is an independent sovereign nation state. The Government of Iran, must in the first instance, determine the country's present and

(continued)

SUBJECT: Senate Report on Military Sales to Iran

future military posture to respond to present and potential threats to the well-being of that country and its people. The numbers of weapons, the types of weapons systems and the defense capability which Iran believes it needs to deter conflict and to maintain regional stability are judgments which are for Iranian leaders to make in the enlightened self-interest of their nation. We give serious consideration to their perception of threat and what they believe is required to meet that threat.

The staff report prepared by Senator Humphrey's Subcommittee has raised certain questions about Iran's ability to assimilate defense weapons systems. The U.S. for its part is making a sincere, conscientious, continuing effort to provide the Iranian authorities with all pertinent data about the training, construction, maintenance and logistical support needed to procure and operate the various systems in which their Government has expressed an official interest. The ability to assimilate and manage modern systems and to acquire the defense capability sought depends in large measure on the priorities which Iranian leaders set and the way in which they allocate their manpower and their budgetary resources.

When asked, the Department of Defense and its Representative in Tehran provide data and advice to Iranian officials. It is the Government of Iran, however, which makes the ultimate judgment on the

(continued)

SUBJECT: Senate Report on Military Sales to Iran

rate of modernization it requires and the capability of that country to assimilate new technology of every type. As we have stated, we give their judgment serious consideration in responding to their needs as they perceive them."

The policy implications of Iranian requests are subject to continuing review by the Defense Representative to Iran and those officials in the Defense Department concerned with foreign military sales to Iran.

BACKGROUND: None.

SOURCE: LTG Fish, Director, DSAA

COORDINATION: Under Secretary of State Athreton
ASD(ISA) McAuliffe

NATO

September 23, 1976

SUBJECT: NATO Standardization

QUESTION: It has been said that standardization can save up to \$17 billion. What are the domestic problems with standardization? What are the international problems? How can we achieve the optimum degree of standardization? What are the issues associated with domestic vs. foreign procurement?

ANSWER: I view improved NATO standardization and interoperability as a major opportunity, and as a necessity for the Alliance. I say that because of the improved combat capability, military efficiency, and deterrence we can expect from better standardization. It has been estimated that through a lack of standardization NATO loses billions of dollars of its spending each year that might be more effectively used to buy real defense capability. In addition, when he was Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Andrew J. Goodpaster estimated that we (NATO) are losing 30 to 50% of our capability due to lack of standardization.

The obstacles to achieving these objectives are many. Most national procurement decisions are sufficiently large that considerations go beyond purely military aspects and cover such other vital national-level considerations as industrial production base, employment, technology base and balance of trade. However, we are finding ways to deal with these problems.

The major domestic concern which has been expressed is that increased standardization will adversely affect U.S. employment.

(continued)

SUBJECT: NATO Standardization (Cont'd)

However, today we enjoy a substantial trade advantage with our allies in defense procurements. This has had a beneficial effect on U.S. employment. Increased standardization -- whether it is brought about through increased purchases by nations from each other, or through production of standardized systems on both sides of the Atlantic -- will not likely have a significant adverse effect on U.S. employment.

The sheer number of countries involved in NATO makes common decisions difficult. Views on military doctrines differ. Time schedules for establishing requirements and making decisions for development and production usually differ from one country to another. However, we are working to agree more often on what we need and when.

The optimum degree of standardization falls far short of total standardization. Total standardization is not desirable for several reasons. First, diversity of operating characteristics helps compound an aggressor's problems, particularly in the areas of Electronic Warfare and Electronic Countermeasures. Second, total standardization limits the possibilities for maintaining competitive pressures -- so key to cost-efficient products. Furthermore, on both a NATO and a national basis, a high/low mix rather than total standardization of certain types of weapons is required in order to provide, with limited resources, both the high performance weapons and the adequate numbers of less costly weapons necessary to deal with the threat. An example of this is the high/low mix of the F-15 and the F-16 aircraft.

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SUBJECT: NATO Standardization (Cont'd)

Generally, the most satisfactory approach to contending with domestic problems associated with standardization is through licensed production of standard equipment in both North America and in Europe -- examples, are the ROLAND II Short Range Air Defense System and the F-16 programs.

Many of the benefits of standardization can be realized through ensuring interoperability of equipment -- for example, being able to service aircraft on each other's airfields, being able to communicate with each other, and being able to use common fuels and ammunition.

For the equipment needs of our Armed Forces, we must continue to select the most cost effective equipment available, whether of U.S. or allied origin. When an ally system is superior, factors such as cost, availability, mobilization base requirements, quantities required, and statutory requirements will determine whether the item should be produced in the U.S. or procured from a foreign source.

BACKGROUND: Standardization has been a goal of NATO for a long time. Previous efforts have met with limited success. One of the earlier major standardization successes was the F-104 fighter, which has been adopted by 9 of our allies. In 1973 the standardization effort received new emphasis when Secretary of Defense Schlesinger pushed for new NATO rationalization initiatives. Since then, standardization has been receiving the attention of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the U.S. Congress and individual NATO countries. the NAC organized a special "Ad Hoc Committee" to review problems of interoperability relating to: communications, jet aircraft fuels, NATO standardization agreements, aircraft rearming, and tank gun ammunition. The U.S. Congress has strongly endorsed the Defense Department initiatives by requiring annual reports on efforts to achieve standardization.

(continued)

SUBJECT: NATO Standardization (Cont'd)

The main efforts to achieve standardization within NATO are accomplished as bilateral or multilateral efforts. The most prominent of these are: the U.S./Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) efforts to standardize tank components; the decision by Netherlands, Belgium, Norway and Denmark to replace the F-104 with the F-16; and the NATO efforts to procure the AWACS. There are numerous other systems which have common usage or planned usage in NATO. For example, the U.S. developed MK-46 Anti-Submarine Torpedo (7 countries); the U.S. developed multinationally-produced NATO SEASPARROW Ship Defense Missile (6 countries); the U.S. HARPOON Anti-Surface Ship Missile (4 countries); the U.S. TOW Anti-Tank Missile (8 countries); the French/German MILAN Anti-Tank Missile (5 countries); the U.S. developed, multinationally produced HAWK Medium Range Surface-to-Air Missile (8 countries); the U.S. NIKE HERCULES Long Range Surface-to-Air Missile (8 countries); the German LEOPARD I Tank (6 countries); the French/German ROLAND II Short Range Surface-to-Air Missile System (4 countries); and the German-British-Italian MRCA Combat Aircraft (3 countries).

Other systems with good prospects for wide standardization in the future include, among many others: the U.S. PATRIOT (SAM-D) High Altitude Surface-to-Air Missile; 155mm howitzers; U.S. AIM-9L Air-to-Air Missile; Aerial Delivered Submunitions; and small arms weapons and ammunition.

SOURCE: Mr. DeJonge, OAD(IP), ODDR&E

COORDINATION: DDR&E (Mr. Parker); ISA (Col. Larsen)



September 14, 1976

SUBJECT: Communist Participation in NATO

QUESTION: Why would (does) the U.S. object to communist participation in governments within NATO?

ANSWER: Keep in mind that the raison d'etre of the North Atlantic Alliance is to provide for the common security of its members against possible aggression or military pressure from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Communist participation in one or more NATO country governments could profoundly change the character of this Alliance, in terms of cohesion, a common view of the threat, and/or determination to provide the resources necessary to maintain a satisfactory military balance. There is no secret about this. The Communists themselves say NATO could not remain as it is once they gain power and that the Atlantic relationship would be changed by their presence.

BACKGROUND: In the past there was some adverse reaction in Europe to U.S. statements about the consequences of Communist participation in West European governments. We feel that it is essential to bring to the attention of the general European public an issue which many people would rather not face. The Communists themselves say NATO could not remain as it is once they gain power and that the Atlantic relationship would be changed by their presence. With Italian elections now past, we believe it appropriate to be more explicit than simply noting that the Administration position is a matter of public record.

SOURCE: Mr. Jefferson, ISA (EUR)

COORDINATION: ASD (ISA) E. V. McAuliffe

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August 5, 1976

SUBJECT: MBFR - French Issue

QUESTION: Is it true that France is delaying tabling of Western figures in the Vienna MBFR negotiations?

ANSWER: In response to tabling of data by the East and the East's request for Western figures, we have told the East that we would give them our reply in due course. I have no further comment.

QUESTION: Are the French making difficulties about the MBFR negotiations?

ANSWER: As you know, the French are not participating in these negotiations. Therefore, it would not be appropriate for me to comment on French views.

BACKGROUND: (S) The French has recently taken the position in NATO deliberations that their forces in the FRG should no longer be included in the data on Western forces used in MBFR or in the common ceiling proposed by the West. This position has constrained Allied flexibility to provide new data to the East. Allies are discussing the issue with the French. The London Observer ran an article on this development on August 1.

SOURCE: MBFR Task Force

COORDINATION: ASD (ISA) E. V. McAuliffe
BG James M. Thompson, Director, PP&NSC
Louis G. Michael, Director, DoD MBFR Task Force

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By KAH NAWA, etc. 3/21/96

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August 5, 1976

SUBJECT: Most Recent Soviet MBFR Proposals

QUESTION: What is the DoD reaction to the MBFR proposals advanced by the East in February?

ANSWER: The Eastern proposal aims at contractualizing the existing disparities of the ground forces in the reduction area. The Western participants continue to attach great importance to their own proposals, which provide an equitable and comprehensive solution to the major issues of these negotiations, including the requirement to reach approximate parity in ground forces. The U.S. respects the confidentiality of the MBFR talks; I believe it inappropriate to discuss either the NATO or Warsaw Pact proposals in any detail.

BACKGROUND: (S) The February 1976 Eastern MBFR proposal includes these provisions:

1. Stage 1 (1976)

A. U.S./U.S.S.R. Reductions

-- U.S./U.S.S.R. reduce armed forces in Central Europe by an equal percentage (approximately 2-3 percent) of the overall numerical strength of armed forces of NATO and Pact countries in area.

-- Units and armaments to be reduced on each side:

300 tanks -- 2 or 3 tank regiments/brigades
54 nuclear-capable aircraft (F-4/Fitter)
equal number of missile launchers (Pershing/SCUD-B)
definite number of nuclear warheads for above means of delivery
36 air defense guided missile launchers (Nike Herc/Hawk and SAM-2)
one army corps hqs with combat support and service units

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B. Obligations of other states with forces in Central Europe

-- All other states assume clearly formulated obligations to "freeze" at present level the numerical strength of their armed forces and to reduce forces in subsequent stage (1977-78) so that in both stages all states will have reduced their armed forces by an equal percentage. Reduction commitment would define final volume and timing of reductions.

2. Stage II (1977 - 78)

- A. All other states reduce their armed forces by an equal percentage
- B. U.S./U.S.S.R. reduce additional nuclear weapons
- C. Remainder of Western direct participants having means of delivery of nuclear weapons reduce such means.

SOURCE: DoD MBFR Task Force

COORDINATION: ASD (ISA) E. V. McAuliffe
BG James M. Thompson, Director, PP&NSC
Louis G. Michael, Director, DoD MBFR Task Force

SECRET

August 5, 1976

SUBJECT: F-16 Co-production

QUESTION: What is the status of the F-16 co-production program with the European Participating Governments (EPG)? Have there been any changes in the estimated costs of the aircraft? How many are to be produced in Europe?

ANSWER: U.S. contractors continue to meet with representatives of industrial concerns in Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway to develop an understanding of the European production capabilities and interests relating to F-16 co-production. U.S. contractors issued requests for definitive proposals to specific European companies in the fall of 1975, and evaluated the responses. The national audit agencies of the four countries and the Department of Defense are finalizing the audits. Initial European sub-contracts were awarded simultaneously in each of the four countries on 13 July 1976 totalling over \$469M. Remaining sub-contracts are scheduled for release through the end of the year.

The cost estimate contained in the Memorandum of Understanding for a European co-produced aircraft is about \$6 million.

The programmed U.S. buy is 650 aircraft. The planned purchase by the Europeans is 306 with options to buy an additional 42. The co-production program calls for European industry to produce 40% of its own planes, 15% of those sold to third countries and 10% of U.S. aircraft. The Europeans will assemble their aircraft in the Netherlands and Belgium. The engines for the European aircraft will be

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assembled in Belgium. USAF aircraft assembly will take place at General Dynamics, Fort Worth, Texas.

BACKGROUND: On June 10, 1975, the U.S. Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding and bilateral Preliminary Contracts with Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway and Belgium for the procurement and co-production of the F-16. The F-16 will replace the aging F-104G's in the inventory of the European nations. Initially, the Europeans will procure 306 aircraft (with options for 42 more), and the U.S. Air Force plans to procure 650 and station 250 of them in Europe.

CURRENT STATUS: Status of implementing the European Co-production Plan (CPP) is:

- Definitization and award of European sub-contracts behind schedule.
 - Most major problems causing delay solved.
 - European governments fund excess tooling outside of \$6.091 million not to exceed cost.
 - Adjust exchange rates to reflect those on which the co-production plan is based.
 - Should permit implementation of approximately 90-95% of CPP.
 - Award of initial sub-contracts in July 1976. Award final sub-contracts by end CY 76.
 - Extend Preliminary Contracts (signed in June 1975) through end of 1976.
- Audit Reports
 - Excessive time in auditing European sub-contracts could cause further delay in contract awards.
 - Corrective action: DCAA working closely with USAF and EPA auditors in arranging procedures for accelerating the audit reports.

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-- Future Actions

- Solution to audit report problem
- Finalize LOAs by early 77 upon completion of sub-contract awards
- European support and maintenance concepts require refinement.

FACTS:

OPTION

Belgium - 102 aircraft	14
Denmark - 48 aircraft	10
Netherlands - 84 aircraft	18
Norway - 72 aircraft	--

\$6.09 million estimated not-to-exceed in FY 75 dollars.

First European aircraft deliveries occur in CY 79, last deliveries CY 84.

Flight test to start in December 1976.

SOURCE: Col Preston, Chief, Programs Division, OASD(ISA-SA) X72314

COORDINATION: ASD (ISA) E. V. McAuliffe
 General Fish, Director DSAA
 Mr. Hero, OSD General Counsel's Office
 LTC Pinkham, Air Force (I&L)
 Mr. Lloyd, ISA (European Region)



August 5, 1976

SUBJECT: U.S. Bases in Turkey

QUESTION: What is the status of the negotiations concerning U.S. bases in Turkey?

ANSWER: The United States and Turkey signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) on March 29 and the agreement was subsequently forwarded to Congress for approval. Following Congressional approval, it will be considered by the Turkish Parliament. We are hopeful that this process will be completed soon.

BACKGROUND: The President forwarded the Turkish DCA to Congress in June. At present, Congress is not inclined to approve or even consider the Turkish agreement until the Greek agreement, which is now under negotiation, has also been completed. Even then, prospects for approval are only fair. A feature of the Turkish agreement is provision for \$200 million in grant aid and \$800 million in credits over a four-year period, with credits to be repaid at interest rates comparable to other NATO countries for similar FMS credits and guaranteed loans. Turkey has stated that it will not permit the resumption of suspended U.S. operations in Turkey until the Congress and the Turkish Parliament approve the agreement. If the agreement is not approved, Turkey has threatened to close the affected bases permanently.

SOURCE: Col Donald E. Majors, Asst for Turkey, ISA

COORDINATION: Mr. Glitman, DASD, European/NATO Affairs
LTG Fish, Director, DSAA
Mr. Bergold, DASD (LA)
Mr. McAuliffe, ASD (ISA)



September 23, 1976

SUBJECT: U.S. Bases in Greece

QUESTION: What is the status of the negotiations concerning U.S. bases in Greece?

ANSWER: Our two governments signed, on April 15, a Statement of Principles which defines the general framework for a new security relationship between the United States and Greece. We are now in the process of negotiating a Defense Cooperation Agreement, which will contain detailed provisions governing the U.S. military presence in Greece and the manner in which we will cooperate in the operation of the various facilities. We hope to conclude this agreement in the near future. It will be similar to the Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey signed last March.

BACKGROUND: Intensive negotiations have been underway in Athens for the past several months. There has been much difficulty with issues such as the degree of Greek control over the facilities and their operations, the degree of Greek "sharing" or participation in, certain military activities, cost-sharing, and U.S. access to the various military installations. However, there has been progress, and there is now some prospect of concluding an agreement by early October, but no possibility of submitting a completed agreement to Congress before adjournment.

SOURCE: Mr. Jefferson, ISA(EUR)

COORDINATION: Mr. E.V. McAuliffe, ASD(ISA)
Mr. Glitman, DASD(ISA)



August 5, 1976

SUBJECT: NATO Airborne Early Warning (AEW) Force

QUESTION: What is the status of the proposed E-3A sale to NATO? Has a Letter of Offer been sent to NATO? Has any determination on price and quantities been made? When can we expect final decisions on a NATO AEW force?

ANSWER: The Department of Defense has prepared and forwarded to NATO an unsigned, preliminary Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for the proposed sale of a variant of the US E-3A. Although there has been no final determination on the size of the proposed AEW force, NATO requested data on 20 to 32 aircraft with an estimated program price ranging up to \$2.27 billion. As NATO further defines its proposed AEW program over the next few months, we will incorporate appropriate revisions in a follow-on LOA. NATO Defense Ministers discussed the NATO AEW force at their June 1976 meeting in Brussels and directed preparatory activity leading toward a decision on procurement at the December 1976 meeting of Defense Ministers in Brussels. Contingent upon guidance from the Ministers, a final LOA should be available in early 1977.

BACKGROUND: On 23 February 1976, NATO requested a Letter of Offer for the sale of a variant of the E-3A (20-32 aircraft) to NATO nations. DoD notified the Congress on 27 February of the proposed NATO sale pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act. Senator Eagleton and Congresswoman Schroeder introduced concurrent resolutions of disapproval, but the Congress did not adopt these resolutions. The 20-day legislative review period expired on 18 March; therefore, actions on the proposed sale are continuing. DSAA submitted, in June 1976, a preliminary (unsigned) LOA to appropriate NATO offices to help them prepare for the June DPC


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meeting at which Ministers' action were in line with U.S. expectations. Among other actions related to an AEW force, the Ministers noted the Military Committee's agreement that acquisition of AEW is a priority one requirement and agreed that they should make a final decision on procurement at their December 1976 meeting. In the interim, NATO has submitted a Request for Proposal for 27 aircraft, with preliminary specifications on configuration, production rate, and industrial collaboration. The Boeing response is anticipated on 15 September, which should allow time to prepare a draft LOA for consideration at the December Ministerials. The House Armed Services Committee has directed that DoD take no action toward consummation of any agreement to sell AWACS until 30 days after reporting the terms and conditions of any proposed sale to both Armed Services Committees. DoD intends to comply with this directive.

SOURCE: Col Dougherty, Staff Assistant, OASD (ISA-SA) X72314

COORDINATION: Mr. McAuliffe, ASD(ISA)
General Fish, Director, DSAA
MGen Pustay, Director, ATF
Col Koretz, AF (RDPW)
Col Larsen, European Region (ISA)



GENERAL

September 15, 1976

SUBJECT: Congressional Action -- DoD Budget

QUESTION: What is your comment on Congressional action on the DoD Budget?

ANSWER: I am concerned about Congressional action to date regarding the Defense budget in several respects. First, Congress has failed to authorize certain programs that are vital to national security if we expect to reverse the adverse trends between the Defense effort of the United States and the Soviet Union. Second, the Congress has added funds for programs which the President did not request in Fiscal Year 1977, funds which should be used instead for the programs Congress has not authorized. Third, Congress has failed to enact authorizing legislation required by the President to restrain the growth of manpower costs and to achieve other management economies. As a result, there is a gap ranging from \$3 to \$5 billion between the President's amended request and what has been approved so far by the Congress. We cannot afford another year of Congressionally-imposed Defense cuts.

That is why the President on August 23 found it necessary to resubmit authorization requests totaling \$2.4 billion to cover critical programs which were not approved by the Congress in the Authorization Bill. He also asked for deletion of programs totaling \$600 million, suggesting that those funds be applied against the programs requiring authorization. He also said that an



(continued)

SUBJECT: Congressional Action -- DoD Budget (Cont'd)

increase of \$1.4 billion in budget authority for the national defense function would be required if Congress failed to act on the economy initiatives the President has proposed.

With respect to the economy initiatives we are pleased that the Senate has voted to repeal the 1% kicker and that the House Armed Services Committee has agreed to authorize sale of the excess strategic stockpile materials as requested by the President. This is progress but of course both Houses must act on these matters and there are still other requests such as the request for reform of the Blue Collar wage system which if authorized would permit the President to save over \$1 billion a year by 1979.

We have noted that the House Armed Services Committee, Seapower Subcommittee has responded to the President's resubmission proposal by recommending that an additional \$1.1 billion be approved for shipbuilding. However, the full Committee has not yet acted and we are hopeful that the full Committee will promptly reconsider its position to table this matter. The Department of Defense considers the acquisition of these ships -- the strike cruiser, the conventionally-powered AEGIS destroyer, and the four additional frigates -- to be of utmost importance to national security and reversal of the adverse trend.

BACKGROUND: None

(continued)



SUBJECT: Congressional Action -- DoD Budget (Cont'd)

SOURCE: ASD/LA

COORDINATION: ASD/PA and ASD/LA

June 8, 1976

SUBJECT: Recruiting of Minorities

QUESTION: Do you have any comment on allegations concerning quotas imposed by the military to limit the entry of minorities into the Armed Forces?

ANSWER: It is the policy of the Department of Defense to recruit, train, and maintain a force capable of defending the United States in any situation that may arise. Recruit eligibility is based solely on the recruit's mental and physical ability to absorb and retain vigorous military training, rather than on his race or ethnic background. A racially based quota system for controlling the minority content is illegal and the Services have not imposed such a system. We are checking into the allegations.

BACKGROUND: Racial and ethnic representation in the military is a matter of primary concern to the Department of Defense. While the proportion of minority accessions in the Armed Forces as a whole is above the total American population, an under-representation of minority personnel exists among commissioned officers and the more technical enlisted skills. This imbalance may reflect an inability to attract minorities who possess the required qualifications. To alleviate this imbalance, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has initiated a study to determine possible alternatives in the recruiting and advertising programs.

SOURCE: Admiral Finneran, DASD (Mil Pers Policy)

COORDINATION: Same

September 15, 1976

SUBJECT: Panama Canal

QUESTION: What is the status of the Panama Canal negotiations and charges the U.S. will "give away" the Canal under Presidential orders? What is the DoD position on the Panama Canal negotiations?

ANSWER: This is a matter more appropriately addressed to the State Department or the White House. As you may know, the White House stated on April 14th that Ambassador Bunker was not under orders to "give away" the Canal Zone, and that any new treaty must guarantee American responsibility for the operation and defense of the Canal. However, I must refer you to the State Department or the White House for specific details on the negotiations. As for the DoD position on the negotiations, the Defense Department, as a member of the Executive Branch, takes its instructions from the President in this regard. These instructions are enunciated in the eight principles for Canal negotiations signed by the United States and Panama in 1974.

BACKGROUND: None

SOURCE: Transcript, White House Press Briefing, 14 April 1976

COORDINATION: LTG Dolvin, JCS

September 15, 1976

SUBJECT: Executive Dining Rooms

QUESTION: What can you tell us about the new management initiatives concerning the Executive Dining Rooms here in the Pentagon?

ANSWER: I examined the transcript from the press briefing with you earlier this week and there is not much I can add.

As you know, all menu items in the Executive Dining Rooms are priced 5¢-10¢ higher than comparable items in ARA-operated dining rooms. There is also a minimum \$1.50 charge in Executive Dining Rooms. Moreover, eligibility for membership in the Executive Dining Rooms has been increased for better utilization.

These steps were instituted to insure that no individual who has lunch in an Executive Dining Room could be considered to be subsidized. This does not suggest, of course, that the Executive Dining Rooms are totally self-sufficient. There are numerous examples of Pentagon activities which are subsidized -- building security, janitorial services, parking lots, even press parking and the Pentagon Press Room.

The new initiatives were designed to help offset operating costs in the Executive Dining Rooms as much as possible.

BACKGROUND: Certain members of the Pentagon Press Corps have been critical of the Executive Dining Rooms due to alleged subsidies for senior Defense Department officials.

SOURCE: DoD Morning News Briefing, Tuesday, September 14


COORDINATION: ASD (PA) Woods

SUBJECT: Sale of U.S. Defense Stockpiles

If sales are not authorized the National Defense budget ceiling will have to be increased accordingly.

SOURCE: Richard E. Donnelly, OASD(I&L)WP (57177)

COORDINATION: ASD(I&L), LA and GC



September 9, 1976

SUBJECT: Sale of U.S. Defense Stockpiles

QUESTION: It is reported that the Secretary of Defense urged Congress to approve the sale of \$746 Million of industrial diamonds and metals from U.S. defense stockpiles in order to maintain DoD's \$112 Billion FY 1977 budget, although it will cost the government three or four times as much to replace these stockpiles in the future. Is that true, and if so, what is DoD's comment?

ANSWER: Secretary Rumsfeld has urged the House Armed Services Committee to authorize the sale of quantities of Antimony, Industrial Diamonds, Tin and Silver from the National Stockpile of Strategic and Critical Materials which is operated by the Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA) of the General Services Administration. Although actual market conditions at the time of sale will determine the final price, FPA has estimated that sale of the commodities will generate revenues of about \$746 million during FY77. A recent interagency study thoroughly analyzed the policies and assumptions underlying U.S. stockpile inventory objectives. The quantities of materials proposed for disposal are clearly excess to all policy options which were developed during the study. Thus the stockpile sales will in no way jeopardize national security. A need to purchase quantities of these materials in the future, is not envisioned. If a purchase were necessary, the FPA would do so in a manner so as not to cause a market disruption and would pay the going prices at that time. Though not related to the basic issue of strategic stockpile needs, the President's budget assumes this sales authority and consequent credit of \$746 million.

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as listed on the pink form (GSA Form 7122, Withdrawal Sheet)
at the front of the folder.

September 16, 1976

SUBJECT: Funds in Iran

QUESTION: What can you tell us about the audit and investigation concerning funds in Iran?

ANSWER: In May 1976, the OSI detachment in Iran was asked by the local MAAG office to investigate an allegation of possible procurement irregularities in connection with Assistance in Kind (AIK) funds. AIK funding is support in the form of goods and services provided by foreign governments without cost to the United States. It may include, but is not limited to, buildings and facilities occupied by MAAGs, utilities, communications, supplies and equipment, travel, transportation of things, and services of foreign national employees.

In OSI's initial review it became apparent that the scope and complexity of the records involved would require a more in-depth study. The Defense Audit Office, Iran was asked to assist. Some of the pertinent files appear to be unavailable and apparently have been destroyed. The circumstances involved are being investigated. This investigation and the audit continue.

BACKGROUND: This information has been provided to AP, UPI, New York Times, CBS and Los Angeles Times in response to query.

SOURCE: ASD(A) and Defense Audit Agency

COORDINATION: ASD(A)-Mr. Cook
General Counsel-Mr. Wiley
DSAA-General Fish
ASD(PA)-Mr. Woods

September 15, 1976

SUBJECT: FY 1978 Budget Request

QUESTION: Are you requesting a budget of \$130 billion for FY 1978 (as reported in the New York Times September 15)?

ANSWER: Our budget process is continuing and at this point it is too early to have any set total figures.

Our projection for FY 78 contained in our FY 77 budget figures was \$120.6 billion in total obligational authority. Our projection was based on achieving a real increase in the baseline program for FY 77 and in subsequent years achieving a four percent growth per year in baseline program purchases.

All of our planning -- then and now -- is based on the nation's objectives of peace, mutual security, and international stability -- while making every effort at budget restraint.

As I have pointed out many times, Soviet defense spending over the past decade has increased steadily in real terms while ours has decreased -- in real terms.

Our FY 1978 request will have to be assessed against the background of trends in the military balance worldwide. It will have to be adjusted depending on Congressional action and inaction. As you know, the Congress has added programs we did not request and they have not acted on some of our cost restraint initiatives. These will all be factors in determining the final figures for our FY 1978 budget request.

(continued)

SUBJECT: FY 1978 Budget Request (Cont'd)

BACKGROUND: "Pentagon Will Seek \$130 Billion Budget" - "Request for 1978 is \$9 Billion Above the Estimate" article by Leslie Gelb appeared on page 1 of New York Times on Wednesday, September 15, 1976.

SOURCE: PDASD/PA
FY 77 Budget Documents

COORDINATION: ASD/C

September 15, 1976

SUBJECT: MIG-25

QUESTION: What can you tell us about DoD exploitation of the MIG-25 currently in Japan and the pilot who is in the U.S.?

ANSWER: Will we have a crack at that airplane? My inclination is to not answer your question which is not my first preference. I always like to answer questions. But given the fact that the Government of Japan is in discussions with the Soviet Union about the Soviet airplane that landed in Japan recently, and that that's a diplomatic matter between them, and given the fact that obviously there's an interest on the part of various people in that airplane and that complicates the problem of having it worked out well, I think that the contribution I could make here to having it worked out well is to keep my mouth shut.

As far as the pilot goes, he is in the United States under the auspices of the Department of State, and I would rather not get into any details on contacts he is having with government officials.

BACKGROUND: None.

SOURCE: SecDef Comments, Peoria Chamber of Commerce

COORDINATION: None

September 15, 1976

SUBJECT: Civil Defense Study

QUESTION: The Washington Star reports the U.S. is concerned about the extensive Soviet civil defense program and the lack of a similar U.S. effort. Is this true? Is a National Security Study Memorandum being coordinated by the Defense Department? Does the Defense Department consider the U.S. vulnerable to Soviet attack without a civil defense program?

ANSWER: Recent publications including translations of USSR civil defense manuals and the monograph by Professor Leon Goure, "War Survival in Soviet Strategy--USSR Civil Defense" indicate the broad scope of what could be an extensive civil defense program in the USSR. The effectiveness of implementation of the USSR civil defense plans cannot, of course, be validated before the fact. For a number of years, the Soviets have devoted considerable resources to their civil defense effort, which emphasizes the extensive evacuation of urban populations prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the construction of shelters in outlying areas, and compulsory training in civil defense for well over half the Soviet population. The importance the Soviets attach to this program at present is indicated not only by the resources they have been willing to incur in its support, but also by the appointment of a Deputy Minister of Defense to head this effort.

Civil defense in the United States is a part of our Strategic Defense posture. To the extent that an asymmetry has developed, this can bear on our strategic relationship with the Soviets and on

(continued)

SUBJECT: Civil Defense Study (Cont'd)

the credibility of our deterrent posture. You may be sure that this is under current review.

There is a National Security Study Memorandum on civil defense being prepared. As in all such studies the direction and scope are classified in part to protect national security information and in part to prevent speculation as to the study conclusions. I have no further comment on the NSSM effort.

If the Soviets executed a surprise nuclear attack against U.S. population centers there would be large casualties. I believe our strategic posture deters this type of attack now and for the foreseeable future. The consequences of any possible asymmetry growing in our mutual postures is being examined.

BACKGROUND: Excellent background summary of Soviet civil defense is contained in the Foreword by Ambassador Foy Kohler to Leon Gourevitch's book, War Survival in Soviet Strategy--USSR Civil Defense. Ambassador Kohler concludes that:

1. Civil defense and other war-survival measures have a central place in Moscow's strategic thinking and constitute a major element in its military preparedness effort.
2. The Soviet Union has stepped up in very substantial ways its war-survival program since the advent of the detente (peaceful coexistence) relationship with the U.S. in May 1972 and is today steadily increasing its attention and resource allocations to the program.
3. The Soviet leadership recognizes and evidently attaches great importance to the USSR's superior position as against the U.S. in war-survival capabilities from the

(continued)

SUBJECT: Civil Defense Study (Cont'd)

standpoint of both scope and effectiveness of civil defense and related programs and of degree of concentration of population centers and vital economic resources and activities.

4. The Soviet leadership believes that these asymmetries between Soviet and U.S. capabilities can so degrade the U.S. threat of "assured destruction" as to give the USSR a distinct advantage with respect to risk-taking in the nuclear age and improve its chances of not only surviving but winning a nuclear war should it come.

SOURCE: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy)

COORDINATION: DCPA
ISA

September 21, 1976

SUBJECT: Swedish Payments

QUESTION: Do you have any comment on press reports concerning cash payments made by the Government of Sweden to an Air Force general?

ANSWER: The Swedish Government has made it clear (in a September 14 press conference by General Stig Synnergren, Military Commander-in-Chief) that the payments were made for electronics equipment used for intelligence purposes. Further the payments were made bank-to-bank in a businesslike transaction.

The Secretary of the Air Force has asked his General Counsel to review the matter to assure the funds transactions were proper.

As to the allegations regarding General Triantafellu, they are not true. He has never received nor handled funds either on a cash or personal transaction basis.

BACKGROUND: Press interest arises from an article in a Swedish magazine that the cash payments were for services or information and had been done secretly to make the money impossible to trace. DAO Stockholm reports that in his September 14 press conference, General Synnergren made a factual and apparently persuasive statement. He adds that press coverage of the conference produced no sensational new questions and speculations.

SOURCE: Maj. Gen. Keegan, Air Force Intelligence.

COORDINATION: DepSecDef Ellsworth; ASD(PA) Woods; Air Force General Counsel; Air Force Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Keegan.

September 14, 1976

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Security

QUESTION: What positive steps have you taken to minimize the threat posed by terrorists aimed at gaining access to a nuclear bomb?

ANSWER: Until the early 1970's our security system for the protection of nuclear weapons was designed against a covert-type attack by only a few individuals. However, in 1972 the Munich Olympics incident established the possibility of a terrorist type attack to either damage, destroy, capture or steal one of our nuclear weapons for any of a number of reasons--all of which would do grave damage, let alone ✓? the embarrassment, to the United States and its national security posture. Because of this additional threat, in September of 1972, the Secretary of Defense required the Military Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct a world-wide review of the protection of these weapons. These site-by-site surveys resulted in closure of several vulnerable sites and the strengthening of others through improved procedures and self-help projects requiring limited funding.

Those sites requiring further improvement and for those items requiring major funding, a comprehensive upgrade program was undertaken. We are currently estimating the expenditure of over \$300 million for this program through the fiscal year 1978 time frame.

(continued)

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Security (Cont'd)

BACKGROUND: Major items in this upgrade program include hardened structures for the response force, hardened guard towers and entry positions, dual sensor detection systems for those sites lacking them, more fencing and lighting, and protection for emergency back-up electrical power.

SOURCE: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy)

COORDINATION: ASD(Comptroller)

September 14, 1976

SUBJECT: Article in 14 September issue of Washington Post entitled, "Schools Impede Recruiting, Marine Generals Complain"

QUESTION: Do military recruiters have adequate access to high schools?

ANSWER: There are schools which do not grant access to military recruiters. The majority of high schools, however, permit varying degrees of access. In 1976, 16,000 of the 19,000 high schools permitted the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) to be administered. The ASVAB is the entrance test given by all military services to determine aptitude and mental category of potential enlistees. This indicates some success in recruiters' access to schools, although that access may not always be as free and open as we would like.

BACKGROUND: The 14 September issue of the Washington Post carried an article by George Wilson covering a Marine Corps recruiting conference at Parris Island. The Marine officials are reported to have discussed the problem of schools which close their doors to recruiters.

SOURCE: Colonel W. B. Womack, USAF, OASD(M&RA), ODASD(MPP), A&R

COORDINATION: V/Adm. J. G. Finneran, USN, DASD(MPP)

September 9, 1976

SUBJECT: Air Force Academy Theft and Forgery Ring

QUESTION: What can you say about the alleged theft and forgery ring at the Air Force Academy?

ANSWER: The Air Force considers these allegations serious and has initiated a full-scale investigation. This investigation is being conducted by an official Air Force investigatory agency independent of the Academy.

BACKGROUND: On August 26, 1976, the Superintendent of the Air Force Academy received a letter from Mr. Edward Joel Meyer (a lawyer who represented a cadet accused of being a forger), containing allegations regarding the existence of a series of forgeries and thefts which took place at the Air Force Academy during the 1973-74 time period. The following day, August 27, 1976, the Superintendent initiated a full-scale investigation of these allegations. The investigation will encompass the entire time period from 1972 through the present.

SOURCE: Superintendent, USAF Academy

COORDINATION: Superintendent, USAF Academy
USAF Academy Group

September 14, 1976

SUBJECT: Denial of criminal justice information to recruiters as a major impediment to attaining a quality force

QUESTION: To what degree are military recruiters denied access to criminal justice information concerning enlistment applicants?

ANSWER: An Army survey in 1974 indicated that twenty states did not provide recruiters information concerning juvenile offenses, an additional five states permitted the sealing or expunging of juvenile records, and eighteen additional states left release of juvenile records to the discretion of local jurisdictions. It was estimated that Army recruiters were precluded from completing police record checks on 60% of its accessions.

BACKGROUND: The underlying purpose of moral standards -- which have been essentially unchanged over the years -- is to minimize entrance of persons who are likely to become serious disciplinary cases and thus divert resources from the performance of military missions. Then, too, the Services feel a responsibility to parents who have a right to expect that their children will not be thrown into close association with men who have committed serious offenses or whose records show ingrained delinquency behavior patterns. Under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 504, no person convicted of a felony can be enlisted in the military service. However, by definition juvenile offenders are not felons. The Secretaries of the Military Services can authorize exceptions, and the Services have established procedures for the enlistment of individuals with criminal records who have demonstrated their rehabilitation.

A 1975 survey of Defense Investigative Service (DIS) field representatives showed thirty-four states and the District of Columbia denied these investigators access to juvenile and/or youthful offender records. Two additional states deny information concerning discussed, non-processed and findings of not guilty. About 70% of our accessions come from these 36 states and the District of Columbia.

SOURCE: Colonel W. G. Womack, USAF, OASD(M&RA), ODASD(MPP)A&R

COORDINATION: V/Adm J. G. Finneran, USA, DASD(MPP)

September 9, 1976

SUBJECT: Litton Shipbuilding Lawsuits

QUESTION: What can you tell us about the status of the suit which Litton brought against the government on shipbuilding?

ANSWER: Several weeks ago Litton filed suit in Los Angeles seeking to stop work, as of August 1, 1976, on their contract with the Navy to build LHAs.

After careful consideration of all aspects of this situation, the government has taken two separate actions relating to this general matter:

First: The government filed its own action in the U.S. District Court in Jackson, Mississippi, against both Litton Systems, the contractor, and Litton Industries, which guaranteed performance by Litton Systems, to obtain an equitable order to compel the continued performance of the contract without interruption. On August 3, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction which ordered the contractor through April 1977 to continue work under the contract subject to the government advancing funds during such period for certain costs incurred subsequent to the date of the Court's order.

Second: A motion was filed by the government in the Litton-initiated action in Los Angeles, asking that court to dismiss Litton's suit because of lack of jurisdiction or, alternatively, asking the court to transfer the case to the U.S. Court in Jackson, Mississippi. I understand that this Litton suit has been dismissed.

SUBJECT: Litton Shipbuilding Lawsuits (Cont'd)

An action was recently brought in the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia by Litton's outside counsel, as an individual under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking certain Navy records. The U.S. District Court for D.C. has ordered the FOIA suit transferred to the U.S. District in Jackson, MS, in order to bring the FOIA suit under the judicial control of the court. The Navy is presently compiling and releasing to Litton's counsel all documents determined to be producible in connection with the FOIA suit.

For any further details, I refer you to the Justice Department, Mr. John Russell, at 739-2017.

BACKGROUND: None

SOURCE: John Russell, Justice Department PA

COORDINATION: Mr. Wiley, General Counsel



September 7, 1976

SUBJECT: Congressional Travel Funds

QUESTION: Do you have any comment on press reports that the Pentagon is moving to stop its subsidy of foreign travel by Members of Congress and their staffs which reached an estimated \$600,000 last year?

ANSWER: There is no effort on the part of DoD to restrict Members of Congress in the performance of their investigation of DoD activities in the field. However, efforts are underway to more precisely define the expenditures authorized for an escort officer in support of travel. We anticipate that this revised definition of authorized expenditures and accounting procedures will be perceived as being in the best interest of the American public, the Congress, and the Department of Defense.

BACKGROUND: None

SOURCE: ASD/LA

COORDINATION: ASD/LA

August 6, 1976

SUBJECT: Kiev Compared with U.S. Aircraft Carriers

QUESTION: How does Kiev compare with U.S. aircraft carriers?

ANSWER: Comparing in size to the Essex-class carriers of World War II, Kiev is smaller than the newly-commissioned U.S. Navy carrier NIMITZ (CVN-68). At a length of approximately 900 feet, Kiev displaces less than 40,000 tons. The NIMITZ is 1,092 feet long with a combat load displacement of nearly 95,000 tons. The NIMITZ carries three Sea Sparrow Basic Point Defense Missile System (BPDMS) launchers and no guns whereas Kiev has a large variety of guns and missiles for ASW, surface and air defense. Kiev has the capability of loading a mixture of helicopters and/or V/STOL aircraft totalling about 36 aircraft. In comparison, the newest U.S. carriers carry up to 100 high performance aircraft. The Soviet ship is conventionally steam-powered and able to attain speeds of over 30 knots. Our nuclear and conventionally-powered carriers are also capable of speeds in excess of 30 knots.

BACKGROUND: None

SOURCE: CHINFO

COORDINATION: Donald C. Davis, Acting VCNO
VADM, USN

August 6, 1976


SUBJECT: Hymn #286, "It Was On A Friday Morning"

QUESTION: Do you have any comment on the hymn, "It Was On A Friday Morning" which has become a controversial issue by some politicians and church people as being blasphemous?

ANSWER: The Book of Worship for U.S. Forces is a product of four years labor by many chaplains and respected civilian churchmen. It is clear, however, that including the hymn, "It Was On A Friday Morning," in the hymnal was a mistake. As a result, we are conducting a search for a replacement hymn to appear in subsequent versions of the hymnal. The search is being conducted by members of the Armed Forces Chaplains Board, chaired by Chaplain (Major General) Henry J. Meade, USAF. It has not been determined when another printing of the hymnal will occur.

BACKGROUND: In early 1969, the Armed Forces Chaplains Board appointed a Hymnal Task Force to review contents of the 1958 Armed Forces Hymnal. The task force consisted of three Protestant and three Roman Catholic Chaplains, two each from the Army, Navy and Air Force. In addition, one Jewish and one Orthodox Chaplain served on the committee to assist in providing materials for their faith groups. Over 2000 hymns and tunes were screened. Members of the Hymnal Task Force indicated singular hymns in this worship book merited special comment. They stated, "The hymn, 'It Was On A Friday Morning,' is the most controversial hymn in the book. Some has said that it is not even a hymn. Other critics have even denounced it as blasphemous." Members of the task force explained, however, that they recommend its inclusion in the new hymnal because it deals with real issues and concerns which many people struggle with in connection with the crucifixion. It was not included to be blasphemous or to destroy faith, but to provide a vehicle for dealing deeply and thoughtfully with the death of Christ, in order to encourage and strengthen faith in God. Their hope was that this hymn would not just be sung, but discussed and wrestled with in a constructive manner. They said, "This hymn cannot be simply sung and dropped. You've got to deal with it. We recommend you use it as a basis for a Good Friday meditation..."

(continued)



SUBJECT: Hymn #286, "It Was On a Friday Morning."

From time to time revisions and additions are made to our worship resources. Opinions will be considered in future deliberations pertaining to worship materials that may be prepared for the Armed Forces. In January 1975, 558,000 copies of the new hymnal were distributed. The cost of printing was \$1,050,000 or a little less than \$2 a copy.

SOURCE: Chaplain A. R. Saeger
(Captain USN-CHC)
Executive Director Chaplains Board

COORDINATION: ASD(M&RA) David Taylor

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