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Nuclear Program—when?

Undue Alarm Over Nuclear Spread?

By ERNEST W. LEFEVER

In his accelerated effort to slow down the spread of nuclear arms technology, President Ford last August sent Secretary of State Kissinger to Pakistan to persuade Prime Minister Bhutto not to buy a plutonium reprocessing plant from France. The mission was backed by thinly veiled congressional threats to withhold development of security assistance if Pakistan persisted in the French deal. On the same trip, Mr. Kissinger pressured Paris to cancel the arrangement. Just a few days ago, the French government indicated a new willingness to discuss limits on nuclear exports.

Mr. Kissinger sought to achieve in Pakistan what he achieved in South Korea last January. A congressionally-supported State Department threat to withhold Export-Import Bank financing for a \$292 million Westinghouse power reactor forced Seoul to cancel the planned purchase of a French plutonium reprocessing plant. In 1975 Washington failed to prevent the consummation of a comprehensive nuclear assistance agreement between West Germany and Brazil which in time will provide the latter with the technology for making nuclear weapons, though U.S. pressure helped to ensure the stiff safeguards against "weapons application" written into the pact.

A Widely-Held Assumption

The continuing U.S. efforts to halt, deter, or slow down the manufacture of nuclear arms by additional governments is rooted in the widely-held assumption that the danger of local or strategic war or nuclear blackmail will inevitably rise with the increasing number of governments that possess them. The chief corollary of this assumption is that the U.S. and the other nuclear-competent countries (the big nuclear powers plus West Germany, East Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Italy, and Poland) should refrain from exporting reprocessing plants, enrichment facilities, or other weapons-related nuclear technologies to states which do not now have them. Failing that, such exports should be accompanied by vigorous legal and physical safeguards against weapons applications. In mid-1975, Washington established a consortium for these purposes along with the Soviet Union, Britain, West Germany, France, Japan and Canada.

This denial-of-capability effort is seen by the participants as a more effective deterrent to new nuclear forces than the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which embraces 100 adherents, but not some of those most inclined to go nuclear, such as Israel, Egypt, India, Pakistan, Argentina and Brazil. (India had its first nuclear explosion in May 1974 and informed observers believe that Israel has a small, but militarily significant nuclear force.)

Two assumptions—that additional national nuclear forces will automatically increase the likelihood of nuclear war and that the most effective way to prevent or deter nuclear acquisition by Third World governments is to deny them the necessary technology—deserve more critical examination.

The stubborn problems of "nuclear proliferation" are made less tractable by the imprecise and often apocalyptic language in which they are discussed. The very term "proliferation" has confused the issue. Borrowed from biology, proliferation implies a natural or automatic multiplication of members of a certain species, e.g. the spread of the Swine Flu virus.

There is nothing natural or automatic about the spread of nuclear weapons. Nu-

clear technology spreads, but nuclear bombs do not "proliferate" from one country to another like reactors or power stations. As far as is known, not a single bomb has ever been transferred from one government to another by loan, gift, sale, or theft, in spite of rare attempts, such as that of Libya's Khadafy to purchase them from Peking. The chances of terrorists stealing a bomb or bomb-grade nuclear material have been exaggerated.

If additional governments acquire nuclear forces they will be of their own manufacture. Any decision to go nuclear is the result of a protracted, agonizing cost-benefit analysis, especially for a country with scarce human and technical resources. Once a decision is made, the road is long,

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hard, costly, and replete with political risks, as the cases of France, China and India demonstrate.

It took New Delhi 15 years and perhaps \$3 million to conduct its modest explosion; this expenditure was only a small part of India's extensive nuclear research program which only a handful of Third World states can match. Working at maximum speed, it would take years for India to build a small force capable of reaching targets in Pakistan. A force capable of striking China would require a sophisticated missile-delivery system.

J. Robert Oppenheimer once said of the hydrogen bomb: "It was so technically sweet, we had to do it." But the assumption that a technical nuclear arms capability always (or usually) leads to nuclear arms has not been ratified by recent history. Six or more European states have long had this capability, but for political reasons they have refrained from exercising it.

Neither Prime Minister Gandhi nor her father pressed ahead with their costly nuclear effort because it was "technically sweet," but because they felt severely threatened by China. Likewise, Israel's nuclear force was built to enhance its security and ensure its survival. The profoundly political decision to go nuclear is rooted in fear and nourished by the ever-present desire for prestige.

The four governments today that probably feel most strongly the need to develop a nuclear deterrent, or to make preparations for exercising that option, are confronted by remarkably similar external threats. Each faces a nuclear adversary and each lacks confidence that its chief ally, the United States, will come to its aid if it is attacked. South Korea faces a belligerent North Korea backed by China and the Soviet Union, Taiwan faces China, Pakistan faces India, and Iran faces the Soviet Union.

Since the fall of Saigon, each of these exposed states has felt an erosion of the

American commitment. The anxiety is sharpest in Seoul because of occasional congressional demands for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, and in Taipei because of pressure for Washington to normalize relations with Peking. Their fear of being abandoned virtually compels them to seek a substitute for the problematical U.S. commitment, a substitute of their own making and under their own control. And what better vehicle of self-reliance than a national nuclear deterrent?

Any nuclear force is a two-edged sword. Just like conventional arms, nuclear weapons can deter or provoke, but the post-Hiroshima experience demonstrates that nuclear arms have never provoked a nuclear war, or even a conventional war. To acknowledge that nuclear arms to date have had a stabilizing impact is not to assert that they always will, but it surely suggests that the apocalyptic voices predicting nuclear war by the 1950s or 1960s were dead wrong.

One does not have to love the bomb to caution against undue alarm over additional nuclear forces. The alarm was sounded in the case of France, but where is the evidence that the strategic balance of terror was weakened by France's independent deterrent? Has China's membership in the nuclear club or India's 1974 explosion made the world more dangerous? Does Israel's presumed possession of a dozen nuclear bombs enhance or detract from stability in the Middle East?

Looking to the future, the burden of proof certainly rests with those who would argue that additional national nuclear arsenals would be good for local and world stability. But an equal burden of proof rests upon those who maintain—as most spokesmen in the arms control community seem to—that all further acquisitions anywhere and in all circumstances are equally dangerous.

The Nub of the Matter

In pursuing its non-acquisition objective, Washington has overemphasized multilateral instruments such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the suppliers' consortium and neglected efforts to deal with the basic motivation of exposed states to go nuclear. This is the nub of the question. We cannot prevent the spread of nuclear technology, which is needed by many countries as a source of energy. But we can help undercut the impulse to make nuclear arms by continuing or increasing the U.S. security commitment to several crucial states. The extension of a nuclear guarantee, defense pact, or military assistance—and in some cases the provision of U.S. troops—is the single most effective way to encourage nuclear abstinence.

As Fred C. Ikle, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said in 1975:

"For many non-nuclear powers, protection against nuclear threat or attack rests on American commitments. America's self-interest dictates that we sustain our alliances. If we withdraw our protection—or if confidence in it were shaken—strong internal pressures would arise in many countries to acquire nuclear armaments for their own protection. . . . To the degree that we appear to turn inward, we encourage non-nuclear nations—from Asia to Europe and the Middle East—to create their own nuclear forces."

Mr. Lefever is director of the Ethics and Public Policy Program of the Kennedy Institute at Georgetown University and a former Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution where he studied U.S. policy toward nuclear arms in the Third World.

Harris Survey

Is anyone winning debates?

By Louis Harris

JIMMY CARTER has a serious problem facing him in the third of the presidential debates Friday night. Whether Carter wins or loses each specific debate, the doubts about him continue to increase, the most serious of which is the 52-to-32-per cent majority feeling "that he doesn't have enough experience in national and world affairs."

Carter lost the first debate by 40 to 31 per cent, but in the process the number of his own voters who said they were "very strongly" for him went up from 35 to 46 per cent. He lost that debate primarily because he dwelled too long on endless statistics and did not seem forceful enough.

In the second debate, Carter was the clear-cut victor by a decisive 54-to-30 per cent margin. The Democrat took a calculated gamble that by changing his style to an aggressive stance—openly attacking the President—he could rattle his opponent and force him into a grievous mistake. He succeeded when Ford made the patently ludicrous claim that Eastern European countries were not under Soviet domination. A thumping 74-to-10 per cent majority of the voters thought that was a "bad mistake."

IRONICALLY, HOWEVER, Carter's vote went down instead of up following the second debate. His lead over Ford declined from nine points in a two-way test down to five points, and from seven down to four points with third-party candidate Eugene McCarthy in the trial heat. Furthermore, the number of Carter voters who felt "very strongly" about him declined from 56 to 37 per cent.

The latest Harris Survey, conducted nationwide among 1,503 likely voters, clearly indicates why Carter has not benefitted from the debates. Before the first debate, a 48-to-29 per cent plurality worried about his "lack of experience." After the first debate, in which Carter reeled off a long string of statistics about the economy, the number who had doubts about his experience declined to 45-to-41 per cent.

After the second debate, when Carter was less factual, more assertive, and more argumentative, doubts about his "lack of experience in national and world affairs" rose to 52-to-32 per cent. More importantly, by 59 to 26 per cent, a majority of the voters thinks that President Ford, not Jimmy Carter, "has the better experience to be President for the next four years." This finding shows how crucial it is for Carter to overcome this feeling that he does not have adequate experience.

TWO OTHER Carter troubles have also grown rather than diminished in the course of the campaign. Despite two debates, a 49-to-41 per cent plurality now feels that Carter "makes me uneasy because I can't tell what kind of person he really is." After the first debate, only 44 per cent felt that way while 46 per cent did not. In addition, a 49-to-37 per cent plurality still feels that Carter "has ducked taking stands on issues to avoid offending anybody and that is wrong"—which represents virtually no change from the 49-to-34 per cent plurality who felt that way before any of the debates.

By any measure, it is clear that the debates have added to, rather than dispelled, the troubled feelings voters have about Jimmy Carter. It is also evident that in the debates the public is sizing up Carter in terms of his style and character far more than on the specific stands he is taking on issues—which clearly has not helped him.

By contrast, President Ford has gained marginally from the debates, even though he clearly lost the second one by 54 to 30 per cent, mainly because he goofed on the Eastern European issue. However, it is significant that the predebate majority of 56 to 30 per cent who felt that Ford "is not very experienced in foreign affairs, and that is his weak point" turned into a 47-to-40 per cent plurality who now disagree with this charge. And the mistake he made about Eastern Europe did not increase the number who think "he is not very smart about the issues facing the country." This was denied by 50-to-38 per cent before the second debate and now is denied by an only slightly smaller 46 to 40 per cent now.

IN ADDITION, ON "working for peace in the world," Ford holds a 46-to-36 per cent lead over Carter; on "handling relations with the Russians," the President is ahead by 48 to 29 per cent; and on "keeping the military defense of the country strong," he is preferred to Carter by 48 to 32 per cent. Even though Ford lost the debates, on every major foreign policy and defense issue, he outscores Carter.

The most crucial public attitude for Ford in these debates is the 59-to-27 per cent majority who believes he has "the better experience to be President," and the 48-to-29 per cent plurality who says "he seems to act and look more like a President." In short, incumbency seems to be working for Ford in the debates, while doubts about Jimmy Carter appear to grow.

In 1960, John F. Kennedy scored close to a knockout over Richard Nixon in the first debate and Nixon never did catch up to him. In 1976, it is now beginning to appear that the victor in the debates could well be President Ford by attrition. His presidential presence has been reinforced by each debate, while Carter continues to slip after each encounter. However, Friday's debate is likely to be the most decisive of the three, and perhaps Jimmy Carter can correct what up to now has been his failure to establish greater credibility with his debate performances.

The Country Needs President Ford

*Kiri Morrell
Editor*

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THE NASHVILLE BANNER today endorses Gerald R. Ford for President of the United States.

The choice, of course, is between two men — but there also is another aspect to that choice: what role government should play in our lives.

An overwhelming majority of the American public has reached the point where it wants less federal government, less intrusion into their lives and liberties, less tax burden and fewer grandiose programs which cost billions of tax dollars.

President Ford shares that view. His opponent does not, promising more and more costly federal programs which must be paid for by the people.

The Banner's Editorial Board of publisher, editors and key news and editorial staff members directly involved with the coming elections made its decision based on the strength and character Mr. Ford has displayed in the performance of his duties in the White House and from the sharply contrasting views of the two men, the party platforms they are pledged to carry out and our opinion of the mood of the country.

In the two years he has held the Presidency, Mr. Ford has restored integrity to an office left in shambles by Watergate; despite opposition of a Democratic Congress, he has served as a check against the liberalism that rants for greater deficit spending yet is deaf to the pleas of the taxpayer; he has been the encouraging force behind attempts to bring peace abroad; he has been instrumental in steering an economy — stricken by war and big government spending — back onto a course of eventual health.

Mr. Ford is a leader. Mr. Ford has brought a new dignity to the office. But dignity does not mean aloofness; it does not mean that he is blind to the concerns of those who truly need the services of government. He has made it clear that cities, that individuals, will continue to be beneficiaries of government. The key is that it be done responsibly. He has pledged more tax cuts, not more increases.

Government largesse, that would cut off one leg to help buy its owner a pair of shoes, is opposed by him.

By staying away from government-contrived, artificial cure-alls, Mr. Ford's administration has reduced double-digit inflation. Although unemployment still is higher than anyone wants, it is less than it was. Further, total employment is at an all-time high.

Productivity is up.
The gross national product is up.

We are not at war with anyone anywhere.

We are not reassured by his opponent, former Gov. Jimmy Carter of Georgia. He, too, has made pledges of tax reductions and more efficient government spending. But he supports a Democratic platform that is solidly contrary to those pledges. It includes heavier government spending in the area of unemployment, thus increasing the tax load. While advocating a more tightly-run government, the programs that he supports could push the deficit well above \$100 billion, the most serious economic problem the country faces. His own record as governor saw state expenditures rise by 50 per cent. It is a Neverland of promises, and he has made serious errors in attempting to explain who he would tax, who he would abort, who he would forgive. A Carter presidency would seem to open the door to a welfare state that Mr. Ford has been able to block.

Unlike the sincere, conservative, responsible image Mr. Carter was able to portray in the primaries, he now emerges as something different — a calculating politician who already has cheapened the presidency he seeks with his public use of gutter language, even while quoting the Scriptures, in a blatant grab for votes.

The thought of entrusting to his care the defense of this country and its foreign policy horrifies us only more than the thought of the economic ruin that surely awaits if the high-spending promises he dictated in the Democratic platform are carried out.

Mr. Ford is what President Nixon was not — and he is what Mr. Carter is not. A humble, non-scheming man who believes that the power of government belongs to the people, Mr. Ford has restored public confidence in the highest office in the land and in the total government once more.

Mr. Ford is the country's guarantee against fiscal irresponsibility, against confiscatory taxes on working people, against free-wheeling concepts that would bring only more inflation, more unemployment, more indebtedness. He is the country's guarantee against forfeiture of a workable foreign policy under which the United States is at peace.

We endorse Gerald Ford because the country needs him. And because he already has proved that he is worthy of that trust.

*Defects/join
Troop withdrawal
would abandon them
He would / I'll
answer.*

Imm
PRECEDENCE

Unclass
CLASSIFICATION

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TO: Bud McFarlane For
Gen Securoft

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POLL- (TOPS)

(RADNOR, PENNSYLVANIA) -- THE ASSOCIATED PRESS POLL SAYS THE FINAL FORD-CARTER DEBATE WAS A TOSS-UP WITH THE BROADCAST AUDIENCE. FORD WON THE DEBATE, TECHNICALLY SPEAKING, BUT THE MARGIN OF ERROR IN THE STATISTICS AND OTHER FACTORS MAKE IT A VIRTUAL DRAW. OF ONE-THOUSAND-27 VOTERS POLLED, 35-POINT-FIVE PER CENT SAY FORD WON THE DEBATE, 33-POINT-ONE PER CENT GIVE IT TO CARTER, AND 31-POINT-FOUR PER CENT DON'T KNOW WHICH OF THE CANDIDATES WON.

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DEBATE (TOPS) TAKE 2

THE MARGIN OF ERROR FOR A SAMPLE OF THIS SIZE IS ABOUT TWO AND NINE-TENTHS PERCENTAGE POINTS IN EITHER DIRECTION. THAT MEANS THE TWO-POINT-FOUR PERCENTAGE POINTS SEPARATING CARTER AND FORD CANNOT BE RELIABLY PROJECTED TO STAND FOR THE NATION AS A WHOLE.

THE INTERVIEWERS FOR THE A-P SURVEY FOUND A SMALLER PERCENTAGE OF THE SAMPLE AT HOME AND HAVING WATCHED THE DEBATE THAN AFTER THE TWO PREVIOUS DEBATES. THOSE VOTERS WHO DID WATCH TENDED TO BE OLDER AND WERE SLIGHTLY MORE LIKELY TO BE REPUBLICANS THAN DEMOCRATS.

THE A-P RESULTS APPEAR TO BE IN CONFLICT WITH A SURVEY OF 353 VIEWERS TAKEN FOR THE PUBLIC BROADCASTING SYSTEM WHICH FOUND THAT 40 PER CENT THOUGHT CARTER WON, 29 PER CENT WERE FOR FORD AND 31 PER CENT CALLED IT A DRAW.

HOWEVER, THE MARGIN OF ERROR IN THE P-B-S SAMPLE IS SIX PERCENTAGE POINTS IN EITHER DIRECTION, MEANING THAT THE RESULT COULD BE 35-10-34 FOR FORD.

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