

**The original documents are located in Box 8, folder “Intelligence - Rockefeller Commission Report - General” of the Richard B. Cheney Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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While making large-scale use of human intelligence sources, the Communist countries also appear to have developed electronic collection of intelligence to an extraordinary degree of technology and sophistication for use in the United States and elsewhere throughout the world, and we believe that these countries can monitor and record thousands of private telephone conversations. This raises the real specter that American users of telephones are potentially subject to blackmail that can seriously affect their actions, or even lead in some cases to recruitment as espionage agents. Americans have a right to be uneasy if not seriously disturbed at the real possibility that their personal and business activities which they discuss freely over the telephone could be recorded and analyzed by agents of foreign powers.



The number of communist government officials in the United States has tripled since 1960, and is still increasing. Nearly 2,000 of them are now in this country -- and a significant percent of them have been identified as members of intelligence or security agencies. Conservative estimates for the number of unidentified intelligence officers among the remaining officials raise the level to over 40 percent.



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intelligence methods are used to collect it. Nor can any intelligence system ~~show~~ that its current estimates of another country's intentions or future capacities are accurate or will not be outrun by unforeseen events. There are limits to accurate forecasting, and the use of deception by our adversaries or the penetration of our intelligence services increases the possibility that intelligence predictions may prove to be wrong. Nevertheless, informed decision-making is impossible without an intelligence system adequately protected from penetration.

Therefore a vital part of any intelligence service is an effective counterintelligence program, directed toward protecting our own intelligence system and ascertaining the activities of foreign intelligence services, such as espionage, sabotage, and subversion, and toward minimizing or counteracting the effectiveness of these activities.

### Foreign Invasions of United States Privacy

This Commission is devoted to analyzing the domestic activities of the CIA in the interest of protecting the privacy and security rights of American citizens. But we cannot ignore the invasion of the privacy and security rights of Americans by foreign countries or their agents. This is the other side of the coin—and it merits attention here in the interest of perspective.

Witnesses with responsibilities for counterintelligence have told the Commission that the United States remains the principal intelligence target of the communist bloc.

The communists invest large sums of money, personnel and sophisticated technology in collecting information—within the United States—on our military capabilities, our weapons systems, our defense structure and our social divisions. The communists seek to penetrate our intelligence services, to compromise our law enforcement agencies and to recruit as their agents United States citizens holding sensitive government and industry jobs. In addition, it is a common practice in communist bloc countries to inspect and open mail coming from or going to the United States.

In an open society such as ours, the intelligence opportunities for our adversaries are immeasurably greater than they are for us in their closed societies. Our society must remain an open one, with our traditional freedoms unimpaired. But when the intelligence activities of other countries are flourishing in the free environment we afford them, it is all the more essential that the foreign intelligence activities of the CIA and our other intelligence agencies, as well as the domestic counterintelligence activities of the FBI, be given the support neces-



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sary to protect our national security and to shield the privacy and rights of American citizens from foreign intrusion.

The Commission has received estimates that communist bloc intelligence forces currently number well over 500,000 worldwide.

The number of communist government officials in the United States has tripled since 1960, and is still increasing. Nearly 2,000 of them are now in this country—and <sup>50 percent</sup> ~~25 percent~~ of them have been identified as members of intelligence or security agencies. Conservative estimates for the number of unidentified intelligence officers among the remaining officials raise the <sup>figure</sup> ~~figure~~ to over 40 percent.

In addition to sending increasing numbers of their citizens to this country openly, many of whom have been trained in espionage, communist bloc countries also place considerable emphasis on the training, provision of false identification and dispatching of "illegal" agents—that is, operatives for whom an alias identity has been systematically developed which enables them to live in the United States as American citizens or resident aliens without our knowledge of their true origins.

While making large-scale use of human intelligence sources, the communist countries also have developed electronic collection of intelligence to an extraordinary degree of <sup>access to</sup> technology and sophistication for use in the United States and elsewhere throughout the world. <sup>Key</sup> Recent defectors report that these countries regularly monitor and record telephone communications throughout the United States <sup>including</sup> ~~including~~ Washington, and New York City. Hundreds of thousands of conversations ~~are being~~ intercepted daily, including those of congressmen and other government officials, business and labor leaders, and private citizens.

American users of telephones who have anything to hide are potentially subject to blackmail that can seriously affect their actions, or even lead in some cases to recruitment as espionage agents. Even the millions of Americans who have nothing illegal to hide have a right to be uneasy, if not seriously disturbed, when they learn that their personal and business activities and thoughts they discuss freely over the telephone ~~are being~~ recorded and analyzed by agents of foreign powers. Such invasion of personal privacy are illegal and would not be tolerated if done by agents of our own government.

These foreign invasions of the privacy, rights, and security of Americans must be of the most serious concern to all citizens. They do not lessen censure of any unlawful activities of the CIA. But they do emphasize the need for vigilant counterintelligence activities by the FBI within the United States and for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of timely and accurate foreign intelligence by the CIA.

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[June 1975?]  
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DRAFT OPENING STATEMENT FOR MONDAY NIGHT PRESS CONFERENCE ON CIA

On Friday the "Commission on CIA Activities within the United States" presented their report to me. I read the report this weekend, and will make it available to the public, the Congress and the press tomorrow.

I want to thank publicly the Vice President and the other members of the Commission and their staff. It will be obvious to all those who read it that the Commission has done an extensive job of looking into the allegations that the CIA exceeded its authority by conducting domestic operations in violation of its statute. My reading of the report leads me to the conclusion that the Panel has been fair, frank and balanced.

I will ask the Attorney General to study the materials gathered by the Commission to determine whether any action should be undertaken against any individuals.

I am asking each of the Federal Agencies and Departments affected by the report to carefully study its recommendations and to report back to me with their comments on the report.



In addition to investigating the original allegations of improper domestic activities by the CIA, the Commission, at my request, looked into allegations concerning possible domestic involvement in assassination attempts. The Commission has reported that it did not complete every aspect of that investigation. The materials they have developed concerning these allegations have been turned over to me. These materials, (collected by the Rockefeller Commission regarding alleged assassinations,) together with other materials available in the Executive Branch, will be made available to the Senate Select Committee in accordance with agreed upon procedures. Because the investigation of assassination allegations is incomplete and because the allegations involve extremely sensitive matters, I have decided that it is not in the national interest to release materials relating to these allegations at this time.

I hope that the members of the Congress involved will exercise utmost prudence in handling this information. Fairness requires that we not, based on hindsight, characterize decisions made in previous Administrations. Historians will make those judgments.



For my part, I am opposed to political assassinations. This Administration has not and will not use such means as instruments of national policy.

After I have studied the recommendations of the Commission, it is my intention to recommend to the Congress any measures I find necessary to insure that the Intelligence Community functions in a way designed to protect the Constitutional rights of all Americans.

I state again my deep personal conviction that the CIA and other units of the Intelligence Community are vital to the country. In the months ahead as we take the steps necessary to insure the proper functioning of the Intelligence Community, we should remember that we must also be certain that the United States maintains the intelligence capability necessary to protect fully our national interest.

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Draft Opening Statement For Monday Night Press Conference on CIA

On Friday the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States presented their report to me. I read the report this weekend, and will make it available to the public, the Congress and the press tomorrow.

I <sup>want</sup> thank <sup>publicly</sup> the Vice President and the other members of the Commission and their staff. It will be obvious to all those who read it that the Commission has done an extensive job of looking into the allegations that the CIA exceeded its authority <sup>by conducting</sup> ~~and conducted~~ domestic operations in violation of its statute. My reading of the report leads me to the conclusion that the Panel has been fair, frank and balanced.

I will ask the Attorney General to study <sup>materials</sup> ~~all the evidence~~ gathered by the Commission to determine whether any action should be undertaken against any individuals.

I am asking each of the Federal Agencies and Departments affected by the report to carefully study its recommendations and to report back to me with their comments on the report.



In addition to investigating the original allegations of improper domestic activities by the CIA, ~~the~~ Commission, at my request, looked into allegations concerning possible domestic involvement in assassination attempts. The Commission has reported that it did not complete <sup>every</sup> that <sup>that</sup> aspect of their investigation. ~~They have~~ They have <sup>materials</sup> <sup>developed</sup> turned over to ~~me~~ the evidence they have concerning these allegations have been turned over to me.

~~The~~ <sup>Those</sup> materials collected by the Rockefeller Commission regarding alleged assassinations, together with other materials available in the Executive Branch, will be made available, <sup>to the Senate Select Committee</sup> in accordance with agreed upon procedures, ~~to the Congressional Committees investigating the Intelligence Community.~~ However, because the investigation of assassination allegations is incomplete and because the allegations involve extremely sensitive matters ~~[with international ramifications]~~, I have decided that it is not in the national interest to release materials relating to these allegations at this time.

I hope that <sup>the members of the bodies involved</sup> ~~these Committees~~ will exercise utmost prudence in handling this information. Fairness requires that we ~~should~~ not,



based on hindsight, characterize decisions made in previous Administrations. Historians will make those judgments.

For my part, I am ~~unalterably~~ opposed to political assassinations. This Administration has not and will not use such means as instruments of national policy.

After I have studied the recommendations of the Commission, it is my intention to recommend to the Congress <sup>any</sup> ~~those~~ <sup>I find necessary</sup> measures to insure that the Intelligence Community functions in a way designed to protect the Constitutional rights of all Americans.

I state again my deep personal conviction that the CIA and other units of the Intelligence Community are vital to the country. In the months ahead as we take the steps necessary to insure the proper functioning of the Intelligence Community, we should remember that we must also be certain that the United States maintains <sup>the</sup> an intelligence <sup>capability</sup> to protect fully our national interest.



[June 1975?]

Draft Opening Statement For Monday Night Press Conference on CIA

Last Friday the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States presented their report to me. I have reviewed the report this weekend and will make it available to the public by next Wednesday.

I want to thank the Vice President and the other members of the Commission and staff for their extensive work in compiling this report. I think it will be obvious to all those who read it that the Commission has done a very thorough job of investigating allegations that the CIA exceeded its authority and conducted domestic operations in violation of its statute. I found the report to be fair, direct, frank and balanced.

I am also asking each of the Federal Agencies and Departments affected by the report to carefully study its recommendations and to report back to me within two weeks as to what actions they believe should be taken to prevent any recurrence of the improper activities that have been discovered.

In addition, I should ask the Attorney General to study all the evidence gathered by the Commission to determine whether any criminal prosecution should be undertaken against any individuals.



In addition to investigating the original allegations of improper domestic activities by the CIA, the Commission at my request reviewed allegations concerning possible involvement in assassination attempts. The Commission did not have the time or the resources to complete that investigation. At my request, they have turned over to me all of the evidence they have concerning these allegations.

Because the investigation of assassination allegations is incomplete and because the allegations are enormously sensitive and could have diplomatic ramifications, I have decided not to release any materials relating to these allegations at this time. However, I have instructed my Counsel to review all documents and other evidence in the Executive Branch on this subject. This material together with that collected by the Rockefeller Commission will be made available in accordance with agreed upon procedures to the Congressional Committees now investigating the Intelligence Community.

I would hope that those Committees will exercise the same discretion I have in revealing information of an extremely



sensitive nature. I do not think it would be proper for me to in any way characterize decisions of previous Administrations based upon hindsight. I would prefer to leave it to the historians to determine those kinds of judgments.

For my part, I want to assure the American people that I am unalterably opposed to political assassinations in any form. This Administration will never use such means as instruments of national policy.

Once I receive the recommendations of the Departments and Agencies on possible changes in legislation or administrations orders, I will make a public statement. At that time, it is my intention to recommend to the Congress those steps I believe necessary to insure that the Intelligence Community functions in a way designed to protect the Constitutional rights of all Americans. I want to emphasize once again my deep personal conviction that the CIA and other units of the Intelligence Community are vital to the national interest of the country. In the months ahead as we take the

required steps to insure the proper functioning of the Intelligence Community, all of us should remember that we must also guarantee that the United States maintains an intelligence capability sufficient to protect our national interest.



[ca. 6/4/75]

- (1) Agenda
- (2) Comparison Between Rockefeller Commission Report  
and Other Executive Branch Material
- (3) Considerations both as to the Handling of the  
Rockefeller Report and the  
Proposed Presidential Speech are:
- (4) A Proposed Agenda for Presidential Attention  
to Matters Affecting the Intelligence Community





THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 4, 1975

AGENDA

The transmission of the Rockefeller Commission Report to the President on Friday, June 6, raises several questions of policy and procedure which should be addressed today and resolved prior to the actual transmission. The significance of the matter is heightened by the comments in the report concerning assassination:

"The Commission staff began its required inquiry but time did not permit a full investigation before this report was due. The President therefore requested that the material in the possession of the Commission which bear on these all be turned over to him. This has been done."

And, by the widespread reports (see Washington Post edition, Tab A) that 'the full report, including assassination matters, will be made public for Sunday's papers.

Specifically, the issues for resolution are:

(1) When will the Rockefeller report be made public?

(2) What should the President say to reassure the public, at the time of releasing the report, that there will be a full understanding of the implication of the alleged assassination planning.



(3) When should the President make a definitive statement on related matters:

- (a) Congressional investigation
- (b) Alleged assassination plans.
- (c) Steps to be taken with respect to Rockefeller Commission recommendations.
- (d) "Leaks" of security information, e.g., the Sy Hersh story.





# Assassination as a Weapon of Diplomacy

IT NOW SEEMS CLEAR that in the late Eisenhower years and the early Kennedy years, American officials contemplated measures to bring about the assassination of Fidel Castro of Cuba, a country with which the United States had sharp political differences but not one with which we were at war. President Kennedy, in particular, appears to have been prepared to consider this last resort after the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs when the United States failed miserably in its efforts to overthrow Castro by sponsoring an invasion of Cuban exiles in 1961. In view of that plain evidence that Washington felt threatened enough by the Castro regime to use covert violence against it, the allegations that the CIA was subsequently ordered to study a remedy as drastic as assassination should come as no great surprise.

In the current passion for scrutiny of the cold war, however, attention has been turned to new suggestions that the CIA conducted, or encouraged, or at least knew of other political murder plots, including some that actually took place, such as the killings of the Dominican Republic's Trujillo and the Congo's Lumumba. The degree and kind of CIA participation in these cases, if any, should become better known as the several investigations of the agency roll on; the President's own study, done by the Rockefeller commission, is to be made public on Sunday. In the meantime, there are several things to be said.

To play a part in the murder of a leader of a state with which our country is not at war is an abject confession of both moral and political bankruptcy. Far from being the mark of a great power, such acts are a demonstration of impotency, the more so when they are directed, as they apparently were, against the leaders of small, weak nations. It would be interesting and no doubt sobering to know whether the availability of murder as a feasible tactic for easing a particular foreign-policy problem has made our political leaders less ready to explore alternate diplomatic or legal approaches to it. In any case, it is significant that the resort to murder inevitably followed humiliating failure in the exercise of conventional political and economic efforts to influence the course of events.

All the same, no one trying to understand these allegations can ignore the political context of the times. In the case of Castro, the cold war was raging. Virtually no one in the political community was concerned that war had not been formally declared. The public quite fully shared the government's alarms over the new "Communist" regime "90 miles from Florida." The Bay

of Pigs invasion, for instance, was widely thought to be a tolerable, perhaps even valiant, enterprise mounted by patriots seeking liberty of their land. The chief criticism of it was that it was badly botched. The Latin countries which were the targets, real or imagined, of Cuban subversion were then linking themselves with Washington in what was purported to be a glorious new "Alliance For Progress." The details of assassination maneuvers now coming into public view convey a sense of the frustration and weakness of the plotters. But what is overlooked is that the plotters were not only carrying out presidential policy but were acting in furtherance of objectives which were widely perceived by the public to be very much in the national interest at the time.

The question for public consideration then, is not whether the United States should engage directly or indirectly in assassinations. There is not even the basis for a useful public debate over whether murder is a proper tool of public policy in a democracy. To that question the answer is relatively easy and not very meaningful—the answer, in short, is No. The real policy question is more difficult: How can the United States define its legitimate security interests in a way which does not even raise the question of resort to assassination and to a larger bagful of undercover activities. This is a problem which has to do with the preservation of traditional ideals and principles and one, we suspect, which no amount of scrutiny of the CIA alone will resolve.

A large part of the answer surely lies, however, precisely in that redefinition of American objectives and capabilities which began when John Kennedy passed through the crucible of the Cuban missile crisis and other international adventures and emerged with a new understanding of the need to tolerate diversity in the world. It has taken a decade and more of overly ambitious undertakings—notably in Indochina—to demonstrate by tragic failure that a world "made safe for diversity" may be as much as even a super-powerful United States can hope to attain. It cannot be said that this concept of a more limited and selective U.S. role in the world is widely understood or shared among the public or within the government. What does seem clear to us, however, is that a willingness to temper the objectives and moderate the ambitions of foreign policy offers the best assurance that the United States will not again be tempted to turn to assassination as a means of achieving its purposes and safeguarding its interests around the world.





Comparison Between Rockefeller Commission Report  
and Other Executive Branch Material

The Rockefeller Commission Report, which is due this Friday, June 6, will not contain any discussion of "assassination plots." Rather, it will state only that the materials in its possession which bear on the allegations of CIA involvement in plans to assassinate certain foreign leaders will be turned over to the President. These materials pertain primarily to Castro and Trujillo.

In fact, the materials accumulated by the Rockefeller Commission add very little to the internal reviews of the same matters conducted by the CIA's Inspector General in 1967. They contain very little discussion of the involvement of officials outside the CIA. They go beyond the 1967 Inspector General's reports only in the following respects:

- o The Commission materials contain a limited analysis of the August 10, 1962 Special Group Augmented meeting on Operation Mongoose. The Commission has also interviewed Robert McNamara, General Edward Lansdale, Maxwell Taylor, John McCone and others with respect to that meeting.
- o The Commission has materials indicating that Robert Kennedy knew of CIA-Mafia actions against Castro in 1961, a year before he was again briefed by the CIA on the same

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 91-27 #24, NSC LR. 3/1/93

By KBH NARA, Date 3/24/93

matters. The CIA Inspector General was unaware of these matters at the time the 1967 reports were done.

The Church Committee is aware of the 1967 Inspector General reports and has been provided with a sanitized version of at least the report on Castro. The Senate Committee also has copies of the 1961 documents concerning Robert Kennedy. In short, the Church Committee is already aware of virtually everything contained in the Rockefeller Commission materials.

However, the materials compiled by the Rockefeller Commission provide only a partial history. They focus on the CIA's involvement in the assassination plots, but contain very little with respect to the involvement of others in the Executive Branch. Standing alone, they create the impression that the CIA was largely acting alone in these matters -- particularly in the case of Castro, less so in the case of Trujillo.

The record of involvement of others in the Executive Branch on the Castro matter is contained almost entirely in the minutes and other records of the Special Group Augmented concerning Operation Mongoose. These materials consist of three file jackets, each about an inch or two thick. Other materials relative to the "assassination" matter are contained in a few minutes of National Security Council meetings and regular



Special Group (5412 Committee) records. The Defense Department has records on other aspects of Operation Mongoose, and the State Department has a number of materials relating to Trujillo. In view of the recent statements of General Lansdale, the Senate Committee is familiar with the terms "Special Group Augmented" and "Operation Mongoose," and will undoubtedly seek to obtain White House and other records with respect to those items. The Committee will also seek all documents pertaining to Trujillo.

To provide the Senate Select Committee with the Rockefeller Commission materials without the other materials -- particularly the Operation Mongoose files -- is to provide a partial -- and somewhat misleading -- record. However, providing the Special Group Augmented/Mongoose materials raises significant policy and practical problems:

- o It would be an unprecedented act; the minutes and other records of covert action groups have never been provided to any Congressional group under any circumstances.
- o There are incalculable diplomatic ramifications should any of the documents leak.
- o There are incalculable dangers to reputations of former officials of the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations; some of the individuals are now associated with major



international institutions (the World Bank and the Ford Foundation) which could be irreparably injured by unfair association with "assassination plots" or charges of improper connections with the CIA.

Accordingly, the procedure by which the Congress is apprised of these matters is just as important -- if not more so -- as the substantive decision to provide or not provide the materials. In this connection, it is obviously impossible for the President to refuse to provide either the Rockefeller Commission materials or the Special Group Augmented materials. Taken as granted that he must apprise the Congress in some way of these matters, there are only two options by which this can be accomplished:

1. Provide access to all of the materials at once, at the White House under controlled circumstances, with no copies permitted to leave the White House; or
2. Respond to individual document requests on a case-by-case basis.

OPTION I: Provide access to the materials all at once.

Under this option, the President would invite members of the Senate Select Committee (and perhaps the Nedzi Committee and other Congressional



leaders as well, including Speaker Albert, House Majority Leader O'Neill, and Minority Leader Rhodes; Senate Majority Leader Mansfield and Minority Leader Scott; and possibly additional Senators or Congressmen as appropriate from the Armed Services or Foreign Relations Committees) to review the documentary evidence at one session at the White House. The members would be apprised in advance of the ground rules. At the end of the review, it is possible that the joint statement might be issued or, alternatively, a statement by the President concurred in by the Congressional leadership.

#### ADVANTAGES:

- o Gets everything out on the table at once.
- o Given the nature of the materials, it is likely that there will be unanimity that further investigation or official comment on the subject of assassination is inappropriate.
- o Provides a basis for subsequent refusals to provide copies of individual documents to the Congressional Committees.

#### DISADVANTAGES:

- o Press and individual Congressmen may charge "conspiracy" to "cover-up."

- o Individual Senators or Congressmen might issue their own statements at variance with the group consensus.
- o Might establish a precedent for handling of other very sensitive materials, particularly specific covert actions operations.

Option 2: Respond to document requests on a case-by-case basis.

Under this option, the materials accumulated by the Rockefeller Commission would presumably be provided immediately. The Special Group Augmented/Operation Mongoose papers would be requested by the Congressional Committees; we would respond to these requests on an item-by-item basis.

ADVANTAGES:

- o Gives us more time to develop a position.
- o No likelihood of accusation of "cover-up."

DISADVANTAGES:

- o As a practical matter, would require production of actual copies of documents to the Congress; publication or leaks of these documents -- however sanitized -- would compound the diplomatic and similar repercussions.

- o Item-by-item review and paraphrasing would be onerous internally, and would increase the danger of confrontations with the Congress over the pace and manner of production.
- o Prolongs the process and keeps the issue alive.





THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 4, 1975

Considerations both as to the Handling of the  
Rockefeller Report and the  
Proposed Presidential Speech are:

1. Ways to handle printed report of Rockefeller Commission.

a) Have Commission members appear with President on Friday, June 6, when they can deliver "first" copy of report to him and he can:

(i) Commend them for their service;

(ii) Announce when other copies will be publicly released.

b) Have copies of the report available for the Press at 8 AM Saturday under an embargo until Noon on Saturday, which would allow evening TV news shows on Saturday and Sunday newspapers to run the story. (Rockefeller staff personnel suggest embargo for Sunday papers.)

c) A Presidential statement on his views of the report could be released when copies of the report are released, and at the same time, to deal with the separate confidential material on alleged assassination plots, the President in his statement could announce:

(i) His firm stand against ever using or encouraging assassination as a tool of U. S. policy.

(ii) His view that imposing firm restraints on future conduct is the responsibility of this President and that in order to assure adherence to the restraints, it is unne-

essary to fix blame on other Administrations for what may have happened in the past.

- (iii) His intention, however, to consult concerning the separate materials presented by the Commission with the Department of Justice and with the Select Committees of the Senate and House as to whether any further purpose would be served by additional investigations into past and long-since terminated plans to employ violence against foreign officials.

2. Possible early speech by the President:

- a) To announce steps he is taking to implement Commission recommendations.
- b) To explain the necessity for foreign intelligence operations and the need for safeguarding sources and methods from disclosure.
- c) To urge an early move by the Congress to cooperate with the Administration in passage of desirable legislation without waiting for exhaustive investigation and documentation of past activities.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 4, 1975

MEMORANDUM

FROM: RODERICK HILLS

SUBJECT: A Proposed Agenda for Presidential  
Attention to Matters Affecting the  
Intelligence Community

On Friday, June 6, at a Press Conference the President could formally receive the Rockefeller Commission Report, thank the Commission for its work, and announce his intention to release it publicly over the weekend. He could acknowledge the point made in the Report that matters concerning alleged assassination plans are incomplete and state that he will cause a complete briefing of matters affecting the Intelligence Community, including all information concerning the alleged assassination plans, be made to appropriate Congressional leaders at an early date. He should then reiterate his position that even contingent planning for the assassination of foreign leaders is repugnant to our system of government and state his satisfaction with the fact that this same conclusion had been reached by the Intelligence Community which had voluntarily taken some steps to correct such action.

He could conclude by announcing his intention to give a full statement to the American public on his views on all matters affecting the activities of the Intelligence Community following his study of all information in his possession and following his briefing of Congressional leaders.

The President's briefing of Congress could include the following features:



(1) The meeting to be held no later than June 16 at the White House might be limited to the Joint Leadership and the Chairman and Ranking Minority members of the Senate and House Select Committees.

(2) A paper should be presented at the meeting representing the President's views on the Rockefeller Commission Report, alleged assassination plans, the pending Congressional inquiries, and national security matters.

(3) All matters gathered by the Rockefeller Commission, including alleged assassination plans, plus an assortment of materials gathered by the Counsel's office on the assassination plans, could at that time be made available to the Senate Select Committee staff under the same procedures we have used in the past.

(4) The President could announce his intention to speak to the country on the same matters (i. e., (2) above).

In his briefing paper to Congressional leaders and in his following public statement the President may wish to make these points:

1. The prolonged and redundant investigations of the Intelligence Community must be concluded efficiently or the public benefit admittedly gained from the effort will be far outweighed by -

(a) the increased danger that major secrets will be exposed;

(b) the inability of the various agencies to continue and begin their necessary and proper intelligence gathering activities under the pervasive scrutiny of the investigations now in progress.

2. The investigation can be completed properly and quickly if the following procedure is followed.



(a) The Senate should now list the important alleged abuses for which they believe more information is needed and the staff has indicated that that list will be provided.

(b) Upon receipt, the Intelligence Community will be directed to brief the Committee as a whole as to each matter and the Select Committee staff can decide whether any further evidence is necessary.

(c) The House Select Committee can begin by reviewing the work of the Rockefeller Commission and determine whether the Senate Select Committee is apparently doing a full job. Following the Senate Committee's report the House should:

(i) Ascertain whether the two investigations are sufficient.

(ii) Investigate any matters it believes have been ignored.

(iii) Ascertain whether the steps the President will be taking are sufficient.

(iv) Introduce legislation if it deems such to be necessary.

(d) By this careful procedure all interviewing of witnesses and all requests for documents should be substantially completed before

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3. The President can announce at least in general the action he has or will take.

4. The President can reassert his strong recommendations made in his joint Congressional speech as to the value of the country's intelligence agencies.



5. The concluding and strongest comments could center on the increasing tendency of the country's press to willingly publish secrets. A broad reference to recent stories in several papers could be the basis for (a) strong condemnation, (b) promise of prosecution for future acts, and (c) the announced decision to seek stronger laws to protect against such stories.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 10, 1975

*Classified*

MEMORANDUM FOR: DON RUMSFELD

FROM: JACK MARSH



This is a copy of my notes on the CIA Report which I have given to the President.

Attachment

*Classified*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1975

*Top Secret*

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: JACK MARSH

Attached are my notes and comments on the Rockefeller Report.

Before reading it I would make the following general remarks.

- Based on personal recollection, the Commission's Report appears to track in large measure the Colby Report, and addresses the allegations contained in the Colby Report, particularly those operations in the Annexes, which were a part of the same.
- The discussion of the extracurricular activities, particularly Operation CHAOS, unfortunately when considered as a whole, raise a question in the reader's mind that these operations were not minor or insignificant. On the contrary, they appear large and extensive, conducted over a period of time, done with considerable secrecy, and very tight control. It portrays a rather unhealthy, undemocratic picture which will be exploited by critics of the CIA. The comments at Page 146 that representatives of OMB were not informed of areas in which they had a right to have knowledge adds to this appearance.  
It is my recommendation that you consider formation of a small task force made up of representatives of the intelligence community, members of your own staff, to address the recommendations contained in the Commission's Report.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

MR 91-30, #22, NISL/H, 4/2/96  
By UJ NARA, Date 1/8/97



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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JACK MARSH

SUBJECT: NOTES ON ROCKEFELLER REPORT

*Top Secret*

1. This is a very comprehensive report which represents a considerable effort. However, it does raise a number of questions which I think will be pursued by what it discloses and also by what it fails to disclose.

2. There are a number of recommendations which will require considerable time to evaluate. Some of them can be implemented readily, some should be modified, and some probably cannot be implemented at all in that they may not be desirable.

3. It would be helpful to have the recommendations of a number of agencies affected by these recommendations as well as the views of persons who are experienced in the intelligence community and with knowledge of the operations of the Agency.

4. Although the report is a comprehensive one nevertheless there are not only some unanswered questions but some statements which you may

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MR 91-20, #23, NSC Ltr 4/2/96  
By LT NARA, Date 1/8/97

well take exception at least for their lack of clarity. Therefore, I suggest that you maintain a posture of thanking the Committee for their effort but not completely embracing their work. An example of imprecise language appears on page 5, last sentence, paragraph 1 where it refers to "violent change by sleathy action."

5. Some of the matters discussed in the report will clearly raise questions about certain personnel of the Agency including the former Director, Helms. In light of the discussion of some of their activities, you may very well be presented with a question of what is your attitude toward these individuals in their present assignments.

6. One major recommendation which you will have to address quite soon is the establishing of a joint committee on intelligence. If you desire to explore or pursue this, I would recommend a meeting quite early to develop plans as well as laying certain groundwork on the Hill.

7. The criticisms leveled at the General Counsel's Office at the Agency is certain to cause further inquiry and discussion and there's one

that you may be able to direct immediate attention .

8. The reorganization of the Agency along the lines of the recommendations is another area where you may wish to establish a Task Force to review the total series of

9. The conclusions at page 22 on the CIA participation in the intelligence evaluation staff seems to be rather soft in light of the rather extensive involvement recited earlier. At Page 27, recommendation 16 is not clear.

It implies there can be infiltration under certain circumstances but what is confusing is the term "dissident groups." Page 30, the conclusion that permits physical surveillance because it is not unlawful is likely to develop argument.

10. At Page 31, although there is a reference to breakins having occurred there is never any real discussion of this subject in the report and I would predict it would be an area of further inquiry and interest.




11. The Committee's findings and allegations on the post-Watergate cooperation of the Agency or lack of the same are very serious and I expect will generate considerable interest. It also raises questions as to how credible are the reports that the Agency was not involved in the Watergate.

12. Recommendation 29 on the Civilian Agency Committee in reference to civilian uses of overhead photography is another area where the President can move quickly.

13. The CIA/FBI differences are another major area of a shortcoming that will be of interest in this report. It is also an area that calls for early Executive action.

14. Obviously, the Cambodia letter writing campaign will raise a number of questions. The discussion of this is not complete in the Report but it does disclose enough to assure follow up inquiry by the Press or by the Congressional Committees. At Page 41, the second full paragraph again raises the question of unauthorized entry. However, this is another subject that is not laid to rest in the Commission Report.



15. There may be serious efforts to change both the authority that exists in the Agency for the discharge of personnel and also to change their budget procedures. It is recommended any such changes of that nature be done very carefully. It is felt that safeguarding the budget process is an important one and it is an area where there can be substantial improvement.

16. At Page 65, the first sentence under conclusions is an important one wherein it does not recommend a redrafting of the National Security Act; however, some amendments to the same are suggested. At Page 75 under the Prosecution's arrangement between the Agency and Justice a subject is raised that is bound to require further response. This refers to those persons in the Agency who may have committed crimes but were not prosecuted. The question will occur as to what prosecutions, if any, did occur during this period of time.

17. At Page 83 the internal controls section which points out that persons whose duty it was to oversee CIA activities were denied access

is a serious charge that will have to be addressed.

18. Page 85, the recommendation to have greater infusion from the outside is arguable. This infusion can occur inside government without resorting to the outside. The recommendations on selection of a Director from the outside has considerable merit and is one of the major recommendations made by the Commission from the standpoint of organization and management of the Agency.

19. The description that was used in the mail cover operation to hoodwink senior postal officials will add significantly to the criticism directed to the opening of the mail. This particular Agency operation will probably receive considerable public attention. It is my view that the rank and file of our people will not be as upset about this as some might predict. The fact that the Agency did mislead postal officials, however, will subject them to considerable Congressional and editorial criticism.

20. It is important to point out that I believe early on in the Report as presented to us, there are two blank pages. Whether they will be in the

press inquiry and which Ron Nessen should be prepared to address.

21. The rather complete discussion on the various intelligence operations created on an ad hoc basis to handle the dissident problem in 1967 is going to raise some rather serious questions particularly on the Hill. Although it portrays an extra legal and unwarranted effort by many Federal agencies, it does also portray the problem that was presented in the United States domestic unrest.

22. In discussion of the operations of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee and related unauthorized operation, there is no mention of the effort that was made to obtain information in reference to the Democratic and Republican Conventions in 1972. I recall seeing a memo on both of those operations. This could be an oversight in the Commission's Report.

23. The CHAOS Operation is another operation that will cause serious Congressional concern. The fact that it operated so independently in the Agency warrants safeguards.

24. A question arises as to whose Congressional campaign was the CHAOS agent involved. At Page 142 the revelation that CHAOS received materials from another agency on international communications will cause further questions to be asked as to what were the communications, what was the Agency and how were they obtained. I assumed this was probably done through the NSA.

25. At Page 143 we see 300,000 names were in the CHAOS computer. There is a need to get a summary total of all of the different names that have been collected in different operations in the Agency and find out what the worst picture is.

26. In Chapter 13 there are discussed other investigations. Nowhere in the discussion do I find reference to the surveillance of one or two newsmen, arising out of the Anderson columns reporting the NSC minutes relating to the India-Pakistan war. It is my recollection that in early reports by Colby, he mentioned there was a surveillance by the Agency of newsmen in reference to that incident. It is also my recollection

that he mentioned another newsman who was surveilled on a previous occasion.

27. Page 167 the Report simply gives in a short paragraph the statistics of wiretaps, buggings and unauthorized entries, but there is no explanation of them. This is something that will evoke further questions.

28. The Hunt-Mullin Company relationship and the Bennett-Hughes (Summa Corp.) relationship are items which apparently the Commission did not explore. The Bennett Relationship to Hughes and the Hughes relationship to the Agency is one that is likely to become the subject of discussion. It is raised briefly in the Commission's report, but it is not discussed in any length. Additionally, and importantly there appears to be an inadequate treatment of the Plumbers operation and possible CIA involvement. This aspect of possible Watergate involvement leaves unanswered questions.

29. David Young, his role and function, is only briefly alluded to. See Page 190. His Plumber's role and possible assistance by the Agency is not discussed. This raises a question as to whether or not it was

investigated by the Commission. This also goes back to the earlier comment involving the surveillance of the newsman on the Jack Anderson story. The entire CIA role with Hunt and others in the Watergate matter still leaves a nagging question as to what Agency role might have been. This is compounded by the terse language from the Helms memo, shortly after the break-in. Although the weight of the evidence may be on the side of the Commission, that there was no connection, nevertheless that evidence is not so overwhelming to lay the matter to rest. For the language, Helms language, see Page 200.

30. The failure of key officials at the Agency to cooperate in the Watergate investigation as outlined on Page 201, is going to require explanation and raise questions about the President's attitude toward these senior officials. The Helms tapes destruction is further aggravates this situation. The Pennington role (page 205) in destroying the McCord papers also raises further questions.

31. In light of the rather significant revelations of this chapter involving

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life. The retaliation question remains unanswered.

36. Appendix 6 at page 292 deserves careful attention, where there is proposed certain changes in the basis statute, particularly the disclosure requirements when certain intelligence is being collected. The impact of the insertion of the word "foreign" at several places is one that should deserve careful study.

Watergate, the recommendations seem to be rather sparse, see page 207.

32. The interception capabilities mentioned on page 222, in reference to the narcotics problem will probably spark greater interest in NSA.

33. Page 46, indicates that the files are kept on a number of officials, including 75 seated Members of Congress. Without further explanation this could raise questions.

34. On page 249, the statement names in the file, which indicates there were 300,000 persons whose names were on file, who were arrested to offenses relating to homosexuality. This undoubtedly will be the subject of further questions.

35. The chapter relating to the assassination of President Kennedy is rather a complete one, insofar as the medical testimony and a recount of what occurred in Dallas. It should be noted, however, that this is limited to the question as to CIA involvement in the assassination. It does not address the question as to whether the assassination occurred as a result of a conspiracy by Castro forces, because of possible attempts against Castro's

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*PRESIDENT  
HAS SEEN.  
DR HAS SEEN.*

July 14, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *B*  
SUBJECT: Staffing of the Rockefeller Commission Report

This is in reply to your memo of July 12 noting the President's wish to receive completed recommendations for further action on the Rockefeller Commission report by Friday, July 18. The views of the Departments and Agencies concerned have been received and staffing can be completed to meet the Friday deadline. It is noted, however, that the report of the Commission to Study the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (Murphy Commission) has been submitted to the President and that it contains a number of recommendations for changes in the structure of the Intelligence Community and oversight arrangements. The Murphy Commission's Report is the product of more than two years effort. It deserves and is receiving careful attention by the Departments and Agencies affected. The comments of these Agencies on those portions of the report which concern intelligence have been requested by close of business Thursday, July 17.

To the extent that both the Rockefeller Commission and the Murphy Commission contain substantial comment on the role and structure of the Intelligence Community, both reports should be taken into account by the President in reaching decisions on initiatives to be taken to change the structure and functioning of the Community. In this light, it is recommended that the views of the Agencies concerned on both the Rockefeller and Murphy Commission reports be analyzed during the coming weekend with a view toward preparation of a comprehensive memo to the President making recommendations for follow-on action by next Monday, July 21. This deadline would allow submission of legislative proposals to the Congress prior to the August recess.



cc: Rod Hills  
Jim Connor