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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	1. <u>Wilderetter to Rumsfeld, 4/11/75</u>		
1a. Memo	James Wilderetter to Rumsfeld/Cheney re request for backup materials relating to Colby's 1/15/75 testimony (2 pp.) <i>prohms exempted w/ 1/27/93 Sanitized dat 6/20/03</i>	4/11/75	A
	2. <u>Wilderetter to Rumsfeld, 4/16/75</u>		
2a. Memo	James Wilderetter to Rumsfeld/Cheney re studies requested by the Church Committee (2 pp.) <i>declassified 1/27/93 w/ NSC letter 1/5/93</i>	4/16/75	* C(A)
2b. Summary	Summaries of Studies (9 pp.) <i>prohms exempted w/ 1/97; 7/20/11 dat</i>	Undated	A
3. Memo	Memo to the Record re meeting of James Wilderetter and David Belin (2 pp.) <i>Opened JFK 1781000410113 5/23/02</i>	4/16/75	C(A)
	4. <u>Wilderetter to Rumsfeld, 4/18/75</u>		
4a. Memo	James Wilderetter to Rumsfeld/Cheney re additional studies requested by the Church Committee (1 p.) <i>declassified 6/20/03 dat</i>	4/18/75	C(A)
4b. Summary	Summaries of Studies (4 pp.) <i>prohms exempted w/ 1/97 dat 7/11</i>	Undated	A
5. Memo	James Wilderetter to Rumsfeld/Cheney re studies requested by the Church Committee (7 pp.) <i>expanded declassified 1/27/93 w/ NSC letter 1/5/93</i>	4/21/75	C(A)

FILE LOCATION

Cheney Files
 General Subject File
 Intelligence - Congressional Investigations (1) Box 6

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WHM, 5/30/85

3/24/75 - Review of CIA materials -
Hugh Cunningham Study -

P. 67. Dep. limits of Plans - clandestine + covert
use of prot. labor, etc. org. - all major prog. +
projects are subject to policy approval by
a top level U.H., State - DOD - committee -

P. 15 - Clandestine operations to acquire codes,
ciphers, etc. SIGINT

P. 20 - location of clandestine services -
State or DOD rejected as alternatives -

(* p. 37 → daily reports of DIA + NSA
referenced - do we see them - are
they now consolidated in ~~the~~ NIB).

P. 38-39 - Implementing directives flow
from NSC down.

P. 51 - Authority of DCI for the coordination
of espionage + counter-intelligence abroad -

completed guide review - 57 pp. -
bibliography - could trigger additional
requests "Pres. Special Study Group
on covert activities of CIA - 30 Sept. 1954
J. H. Booktak - Ch. -

Schlesinger Report - 1973
Read - 3/24/75 w/ DR + Mark -

Study apparently edited. covering memo indicates it is "not a complete listing of DCI instructions + responses. It deals selectively w/ those activities that were domestic and does not include activities that related entirely to foreign operations.

Original Schlesinger memo appears linked just to Watergate -

P. 49. CIA provision of support for W.H.
\$33,655.68 for answering Cambodia letter.
Any support now being provided? - Seals,
in regard -

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Executive Registry

75-1265

Ad Hoc Staff

75-104

March 12, 1975


Mr. William E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Colby:

Enclosed is an initial request for documents approved
by the Committee at its meeting this afternoon.

Our respective staffs have discussed the request in its
draft form and I trust that they will continue to work together
in the spirit of mutual cooperation which we both recognize is
necessary to ensure a thorough and expeditious investigation.

Sincerely,


Frank Church
Chairman

Enclosure



The Agency has agreed to provide the Committee with (1) charts indicating the organizational history of the CIA; (2) identification of headquarters personnel; and (3) budgetary and cash flow information. The following is a further elaboration of the kind of material in each of these categories which is necessary for the Committee's basic understanding of the Agency:

A. Organization Charts and Personnel - The charts reflecting CIA organizational history down to the Branch level should be accompanied by annotations or a narrative explaining when particular units were formed, merged, expanded or abolished. The narrative should also indicate any changes in lines of authority, reporting responsibilities, and functions for each unit. Changes in unit designation which were not accompanied by substantive changes should be noted.

The charts should include the organization and staffing arrangements of the USIB, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and its predecessors, and the Forty Committee and its predecessors.

The identification of personnel should include all officials and supervisors down to the Branch Chief and Deputy Branch Chief level, and to the executive assistants for the directors or deputy directors of all Divisions, Offices and Staffs and similar assistants for any officials above those levels.

B. Budget and Cash Flow - The budgetary information should include both the budgets proposed to OMB and the final budgets approved. The cash flow data should include the funds actually appropriated, their location in the appropriations for other Departments and agencies, and an indication of whether funds transferred from particular agencies are earmarked for particular uses within the CIA.

II. SPECIAL REPORTS OR STUDIES

The following are requested in their unexpurgated form (at the highest level of classification) with all appendices, annexes and transmittal documents:

1. The Dulles, Correa, Jackson Report on the Intelligence Community
2. 1949 and 1955 Hoover Commissions, Intelligence Task Force Reports
3. 1953 Historical Study of the Expenditure of Confidential Funds prepared by the General Counsel's Office.
4. 1954 General Doolittle Report on the CIA
5. 1960 Bureau of The Budget study of intelligence activities
6. 1961 Taylor Report on covert action and the intelligence community
7. 1962 Organizational Study of the CIA initiated by John A. McCone
8. 1964 Study by John A. Bross, Frederick Nolting and Major General John Reynolds
9. 1965 Study of CIA initiated by Admiral Raborn
10. 1965 Study for the Director on CIA air proprietaries
11. 1967 Internal CIA study for the Director on CIA activities at educational facilities in the United States
12. 1967 Katzenbach Study (with John Gardner and Richard Helms) on CIA domestic activity
13. 1967 Cunningham Study on the intelligence community
14. 1967 (or 1968) Eaton Committee Report for the DCI on NSA and the National Intelligence Resources Board Study for DCI on NSA
15. 1967 (or 1968) report for DCI by the Senior Executive Group on the intelligence community
16. 1970 Study under Admiral Wilfred McNeil on CIA Financial procedures
17. 1971 OMB study under James Schlesinger of the intelligence community
18. Executive Order of November 5, 1971 restructuring the intelligence community
19. 1973 CIA internal review prepared for James Schlesinger on the CIA
20. Additional studies specified in Appendix D of book furnished the Committee staff on March 5, 1975

III. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND OPERATING PROCEDURES

A. Legal Authority

1. All files dealing with the history of the 1949 CIA Act and the CIA sections of the 1947 National Security Act.

REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION

TO: The Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency

FROM: The Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities

Guidelines

1. The attached request is not intended to call for a general file search of the Agency. Rather it is intended to call for various significant documents available in the upper levels of the Agency. Without foreclosing any further file review that may seem appropriate to agency personnel familiar with agency files, we would suggest the following offices (current and past files) as likely sources for initial review:

- (i) The U.S. Intelligence Board staff and ICS
- (ii) Offices of the Director and the Deputy Director/CIA
- (iii) Offices of the General Counsel and Legislative Counsel/CIA
- (iv) Offices of the Comptroller, Inspector General, Historical Studies, and Finance/CIA

2. The requests are addressed to the Director, both in his capacity as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and as Director of Central Intelligence and Chief Executive of the United States Intelligence Board.

3. Rather than waiting until all materials are available, it would be helpful if any particular group is produced when ready.

4. As previously discussed, please advise if there are categories of material where it would be appropriate for Committee staff members to review called for material on the Agency premises in order to cull out the most pertinent materials.

5. The request covers documents in the covered offices wherever originated (including other departments or agencies). If any document referred to is believed by the Agency to be in the possession only of another agency or department, advice to that effect plus an indication that the Agency would not object to its being made available to the Committee, would facilitate an expeditious inquiry.

2. All agreements on jurisdiction or operational authority between the CIA and other U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
3. All legal opinions, memoranda or other materials analyzing the 1947 and 1949 Acts, Executive Orders or National Security Intelligence Directives in regard to:
 - (a) the authority of CIA to conduct covert actions
 - (b) the authority of CIA to conduct particular categories of activity, or specific activities, within the U.S., including without limitation:
 - (i) the collection or maintenance of information or files on U.S. citizens;
 - (ii) the conduct of domestic surveillance on U.S. citizens or foreign nationals;
 - (iii) the organization and operation of proprietary organizations
 - (c) the appropriate scope or application of the agreements requested in #2 *supra*, including documents prepared in connection with their negotiation
 - (d) the applicability to CIA of restrictions placed by Congress on the use of funds included in appropriations from which CIA funds are transferred
 - (e) the generation or use of funds from any source other than appropriations transferred to CIA, and the investment for profit of funds from any source
4. All legal opinions, memoranda or other material analyzing the desirability or effect of legislation proposed or considered to alter the authority of the DCI or the nature, structure or powers of the Agency in areas other than employee compensation and benefits or headquarters construction. This should include analyses of the CIA amendment to the 1974 Military Aid Act, whether prepared before or after its adoption.
5. All Director Central Intelligence Directives ("DCIDS")

B. Operating Procedures

1. An index of all major directives, guidelines, regulations, manuals or similar materials which prescribe or explain authorization and reporting procedures
2. Directives, guidelines, manuals or similar materials describing the various filing systems of the Agency
3. Specifically, all directives, guidelines, manuals or other materials prescribing or explaining procedures to be followed and the authorization and documentation required in connection with covert operations, including without limitation:
 - (a) field or headquarters initiation of proposals
 - (b) planning and modification of proposals
 - (c) approval for commencement, continuation or renewal, and termination
 - (d) field reports on the conduct or results of operations
 - (e) evaluations following operations

The materials should indicate the criteria which determine the level of authorization required--Division Director, Deputy Director for Operations, DCI or Forty Committee--for a particular operation. They should also indicate the procedures and documentation involved in CIA inter-agency staff coordination and CIA staffing for the review by the principals on the Forty Committee. To the extent the procedures described differ from those previously in effect, furnish earlier directives, guidelines, manuals or similar material regarding such previous procedures and provide a narrative description of how and when these procedures have changed from 1948 to present.

(Request #3 is confined to procedures so that the Committee can subsequently better understand CIA operations in the covert action area.)

C. Financial Procedures

In addition to budgetary and cash flow figures, the Committee will need explanatory information to understand the financial operations of CIA. This request consists of all directives, guidelines, manuals and other materials governing or describing:

1. Procedures for preparing and discussing budgets with OMB, including identification of the documents involved in the process
2. The general procedures for expenditure approval, accounting or auditing which are used either within the CIA or in connection with Executive or Congressional oversight
3. All special procedures for expenditure approval, accounting or auditing in regard to particular funds or types of activity, e.g., proprietary organizations, currency transactions, or the discretionary fund of the Director.

4. All Bureau of the Budget and OMB examiners' reports on the Agency, and all memoranda and reports provided by the Intelligence Community Staff to OMB

D. All Annual Reports of the Inspector General and all Inspector General reports for the past five years on all components of the Agency.

E. The Agency's "Allegations and Responses" files

IV. DIRECTOR COLBY'S JANUARY 15, 1975 TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

All materials reviewed or used by the Office of the Director in preparation for Director Colby's testimony on January 15, 1975 before the Senate Appropriations Committee, including materials referred to in such testimony, (a representative list of which has been furnished to Central Intelligence Agency staff by the Senate Select Committee staff).

V. DIRECTOR COLBY'S PUBLIC SENATE TESTIMONY ON DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

Reference is made to Director Colby's public testimony on January 15, 1975 before the Senate Appropriations Committee, in which Director Colby identified several documents basic to an understanding of the Agency's domestic operations. The following requests are based on that testimony. Parenthetical page references after each request indicate the page of Director Colby's testimony where the items requested were identified.

1. The directive or other documents establishing the Domestic Operations Division, defining its authority and stating its missions; all subsequent directives or other documents revising its authority or missions; (p.13)
2. The directive or other documents in 1972 redesignating the Domestic Operations Division the Foreign Resources Division; (p.13)
3. The directive or other documents defining the authority of the "cover and commercial staff" and stating its missions (p.13)
4. The directive or other documents establishing on August 15, 1967, a unit within the Counterintelligence Office "to look into the possibility of foreign links to American dissident elements," or defining the unit's authority and stating its missions; (p. 19)
5. The August 29, 1967 letter from the Executive Director to the Kerner Commission; The September 1, 1967 reply of the DCI to the Kerner Commission and all attachments thereto; (p.19)
6. The directive or other documents establishing CIA participation in "an interagency program in support of the National Commission, among others." (p.20)
7. The document resulting from the DCI's review of the unit created on August 15, 1967 in which he concluded it was proper, "while strictly observing statutory and de facto proscriptions on Agency domestic involvement;" (p.20)
8. The directive or documents governing CIA participation in the preparation of the Ad Hoc Interagency Committee Plan (the "Huston Plan"), and the directive or documents governing CIA participation in the Interagency Evaluation Committee when the Huston Plan was abandoned. (p.20-21)
9. The document authorizing the operation in which "the Agency recruited or inserted about a dozen individuals into American dissident circles in order to establish their credentials for operations abroad; (p.22)
10. The 1973 directive limiting the program described in request #9; (p.22)
11. The directive or other documents which in March 1974 terminated the program described in request #9 (p. 22)
12. The directive or other documents authorizing the elimination from files of material Americans generated from the program described in request #9; (p.23)
13. The directive or document authorizing the destruction in March 1974 of the IDIU tape listing of 10,000 Americans received by CIA in May 1970; (p.23)
14. The directive or other documents authorizing the program to insert agents into dissident organizations in the D.C. area to protect CIA installations, personnel, and information.; if a new unit was established within the Office of Security to operate this program, the directive or other documents establishing the new unit defining its authority or stating its missions. (p.23)
14. The directive or other documents terminating the program described in request #14 (p.24)
15. Indicate all lists "developed at various times in the past ... which do appear questionable under CIA's authority" (do not supply lists); (p.26)
16. All "current directives" prohibiting maintenance of the kinds of lists described in request # 15; (p.26)
17. May 9, 1973 directive requesting employees to report questionable activity; all written responses and all other documents reflecting oral responses to this; (p. 27)
18. The documents prepared for or constituting the "internal review" which resulted from the responses described in Request # 17; (p. 27)
19. All documents containing "policy determinations and guidance that (Agency) activities remain within proper limits" issued in August 1973; (p.27)

20. The directive or other documents establishing any mail inspection programs within the CIA or at its direction between 1953 and February, 1973; (p.31)
21. The directive or other document terminating mail inspection programs in February, 1973; (p.32)
22. The documents prepared for the review of CIA assistance to other federal, state and local government components; all documents terminating or modifying such assistance as a result of that review; (p.33)
23. All directives subsequent to the directive of May 9, 1973 which similarly requested employees to report questionable activity; all written responses and all other documents reflecting oral responses to such directives; (p.34)
24. All internal regulations, policy statements or similar documents pursuant to the recommendations of the Katzenbach task force in 1967. (p.35)
25. The Presidential Directive of October 9, 1974 regarding reorganization of the intelligence community.

Investigations of the Intelligence Community

Problems

At the present time we have no ~~clear~~ clear guidelines, no coherent policy developed for responding to Congressional requests generated by their investigations of the intelligence community.



(F)

Thursday 3/13/75

11:20 Congressional office has just received this letter from
Senator Church -- Kendall will prepare an acknowledgment.

However, I asked if they would please send us a copy --
right away ---- see attached.



FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
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OK to Kuchner for
ACI
after
ack by
Bill Keubell
3/13 10:45

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 12, 1975

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, Senator Tower and I want to thank you for the opportunity we had on March 5 to discuss the work of the Committee. I want to express my personal appreciation for the direct and forthright manner in which you addressed some of the initial questions that lay before the Select Committee, and your willingness to assist the Committee to meet its responsibilities under the mandate of S. Res. 21.

We are in agreement that the work of the Committee should proceed as expeditiously as possible and the Committee is gratified at the full and complete cooperation that we have received from the Executive agencies up to this point. In every respect thus far, the agencies have been fully cooperative with the Committee and the staff and I believe this augurs well for a constructive and expeditious conclusion to our inquiry.

At our meeting on March 5th with you, we discussed the general areas in which the Committee would need initial documentation. As we discussed, our first requirements are to determine the legal basis for the activities for the intelligence agencies of the United States Government. In this regard, it will be helpful to the Committee to receive from whomever you may designate, the documents, files, and other papers that might be required to fully determine the legal basis for the activities of United States intelligence agencies. With the unanimous approval of the Committee, I respectfully request that the documents on the attached list directly relevant to the inquiry authorized by S. Res. 21, be supplied to the Committee at the earliest opportunity.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Frank Church
Frank Church



ATTACHMENT

1. The report furnished to the President by Director Colby in January 1975
2. All Executive Orders, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs) or Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs), and other White House* directives pertaining to the charter, structure or guidelines for any overt or covert foreign or domestic intelligence agencies or activities.
3. All Executive Orders, National Security Council memoranda and directives, and other White House instructions pertaining to the structure, functions or organization of intelligence policy organizations within the Office of the President, including the Forty Committee and the Washington Special Action Group (and their predecessor organizations, e.g., the Operations Coordinating Board, Special Group, 54/12 Group, 303 Committee, etc.).
4. Organization charts and staffing patterns (for the present and, to the extent reasonably convenient, back to 1947) for all intelligence-related organizations within the White House (NSC, Forty Committee, OEP, WSAG, etc.) including names of key officials and staff personnel.



* "White House" as used in this listing is meant to include the President, the Office of the President, including the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget.

- ✓ CIA Annual Financial Reports, 1953-1974
- ✓ Organization Charts for CIA Components with Personnel Names to Branch Levels

Five Additional Annex Papers:

1. Classical Espionage/Electronic Surveillance and Covert Action Under International Law
- ✓ 2. ~~CIA Organizational History~~ In Brief
3. Overview of CIA Resources Devoted to Activities in the United States Outside Headquarters
- ✓ 4. Foreign Resources Division
- ✓ 5. The Domestic Collection of Foreign Intelligence Information/
The Domestic Collection Division

Studies

- | | |
|------|--|
| 1953 | Historical Study of the Expenditure of Confidential Funds (Item 3) |
| 1960 | Joint-Study Group Report (Item 5) |
| 1967 | Cunningham Study (196) (Item 13) |
| 1967 | Eaton Report (Items 14 and 15) |
| 1973 | CIA Internal Review (Item 19) |



25 March 1975

A. RESPONSIBILITIES AND SUPPORT

In treating with Congressional inquiries, the Director of Central Intelligence will provide leadership to the Intelligence Community. The Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, supported by the Intelligence Community Staff, will provide the principal staff direction and congressional liaison for the DCI in these matters. He will serve as a focal point for coordination among Intelligence Community entities and assure communication with the Executive Office as appropriate. The IC Staff with the assistance of USIB Agencies will provide legal, security, substantive, and registry support structured so as to assure appropriate support to the DCI and the Intelligence Community. The AD/DCI/IC will chair an Ad Hoc Coordinating Group of USIB as a principal mechanism for exchanging information and coordinating USIB activities with respect to the inquiry where needed. The AD/DCI/IC and the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group will establish periodic and special time sensitive reporting to keep the DCI, the USIB principals, and involved Executive Branch agencies advised on USIB Agencies' liaison relationships with the Select Committees and on substantive exchanges in response to Select Committee inquiries. Where useful, common standards and procedures will be developed by the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group.

B. COORDINATION

1. Physical security is proceeding well. The Chairman of the Security Committee of USIB has been assigned as the principal Intelligence Community officer on physical security and clearance matters. Agreements have been reached with the Senate Select Committee on physical security standards. These standards have been provided to the House Select Committee Staff. The Senate has arranged for central facilities which meet the physical security standards and has appointed a full-time security officer who will provide certification of personnel clearances. The House at the present time is not planning central facilities and we understand will be dispersed in at least three different locations.

We're advised that Committee members do not intend to discuss subject matter of the inquiry outside the Committees or with personal staffs. Nevertheless, we must assume that discussion of classified information may occur between Committee members and Staff outside of the security-approved Committee rooms and particularly in the offices of the members of the Select Committee. Agreement has been reached that the FBI will approach the House and Senate Staff Directors and offer technical sweep services for the offices of Select Committee members.



2. Personnel security investigations on Select Committee Staff are under way by the FBI. It is understood that upon completion of Staff investigations, the Select Committee Chairman will certify to the DCI the Top Secret clearances of Committee Staff. The DCI, through his Intelligence Community Staff, will pass along the certification to the security elements of the respective agencies. Compartmented clearance arrangements and certification also have been agreed with the Senate Select Committee Staff. Similar arrangements have been discussed with the House Select Committee Staff.

3. Secrecy agreements for the Senate Select Committee Staff employees are being drafted and the AD/DCI/IC, supported by the CIA General Counsel and the Associate Deputy Attorney General, will negotiate similar arrangements with the House. The DCI policy is to insist upon secrecy agreements.

4. Arrangements will be established for the indexing and abstracting of documents, testimony and transcripts, and for procedures to protect sources and methods which may be contained in the material flowing to the Select Committees from all Intelligence Community agencies. A central index service will be provided by the Intelligence Community Staff to serve as a point of record on release of materials including sign off where Third Agency rule applies. The following describe the general content of this central index.

a. All requests received by Intelligence Community entities from the Select Committees.

b. All other communications from Select Committees on subject of interest to more than one agency.

c. Reports and responses by other non-intelligence elements of the Executive Branch (if desired by those elements).

d. Identification of document responses provided to the requests, listing of subjects covered, and record of clearing officers.

e. Prepared statements and transcripts of testimony made to Select Committees.

f. Selective material released or denied under the Freedom of Information legislation which relates to subjects of interest to the Select Committees.



Under this concept, all intelligence entities would have a reporting responsibility to keep the central index current. Procedures will be developed. All agencies would retain responsibility for the physical possession and accessibility of their documents. The third agency rule will apply in providing documents to the Select Committees.

C. PROTECTION AND HANDLING OF MATERIALS

1. It is suggested that in general there are four levels of security applied to documents supplied to the Committees.

a. The bulk of historical data, organizational directives, budgets, cash flow, command and control procedures, etc. should be made available to the Committees on request and transmitted by the agencies concerned directly to the Select Committees. This material will be under the control of the Select Committees. It should be properly classified as appropriate to assure downgrading under the Freedom of Information Act is consistent with the judgment of the originating agency. The agencies will inform the central registry of the IC Staff of such transmissions and provide a description of the materials. The record file will be maintained by the originating agency so that it may be retrieved if necessary for use by authorized persons.

b. A second level of material will involve more sensitive data where sanitization or compartmented arrangements may be desired. Agencies will be responsible for these determinations. The IC Staff and the USIB Security Committee will develop general guidelines for application of sanitization procedures. Emphasis will be placed on protecting sources and methods while providing meaningful response and documentation to the Select Committees. The record copy of all such material will be available in the originating agencies. The existence of the original file and its sanitized version and location will be recorded with the registry. Keys to sanitized versions will be held by the agencies concerned.

c. A third type of material will be made available to Select Committee members or staff at the originating agency or if desirable at a central point to be determined. (Facilities for a central reading room can be established by the IC Staff, if desired.) This material would be provided in the presence of an authorized representative of the originating



agency. These "fondling" files may have specific limitations placed upon them by the agencies concerned. Where such search limitations are determined, they should be consistent with the agreements contained in the DCI letter to Senator Church or with ground rules agreed among responsible agencies or with the Select Committees. The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group provides one forum for such determinations where interagency discussions are useful.

A fourth type of material for numerous reasons will not be available to Select Committee Staff in its raw form, e. g. , memoranda to or from the President, especially sensitive matters where Executive Branch prerogatives are involved. This material can be used to prepare briefs or provide briefings to Select Committee Staff or members but specific documentations normally will not be provided. If such briefs or briefings do not satisfy the Select Committees, negotiations will be undertaken with the Committees. The DCI should be kept advised in all such instances. Normally, if after negotiations there is provision of raw data, such data will be hand-carried to the Committees and read by the Committee or Staff members in the presence of an authorized representative of the originating agency as in c. above. This shall be made a matter of record by memorandum of the originating agency to the DCI and recorded in the IC registry along with the ground rules negotiated with the committees and the agencies in their negotiations. These ground rules will normally be an agenda item on the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group agenda.

2. Testimony given in informal interview with Select Committee Staff will be recorded normally in a memorandum of record and filed in the agency concerned. Employees not wishing to report such testimony are free from doing so. Notification will be given to the IC central index of the existence of the file, its location and access rules. To the degree possible, the registry will cross-reference all materials provided the Committees and will prepare current reports on such materials.

D. LEGAL SUPPORT AND QUALITY CONTROLS

1. The Intelligence Community Staff has several lawyers who will be assigned to provide support to legal matters relating to this inquiry. The leader of this group will be expected to have regular consultation with the



General Counsels of all USIB Agencies and the Department of Justice, the NSC, the OMB, and other Executive Branch elements involved in the inquiry. Since the inquiry can result in the introduction of legislation, the IC Staff lawyers will also provide to the DCI appropriate legal briefs for his use. The recording of these briefs will also be made by the central index. The lawyers will also assist the DCI and USIB in ensuring that the Select Committees' procedures are developed in consideration of the legal and constitutional position of the USIB agencies and employees thereof.

2. We can anticipate the Select Committees will have 40-50 staff personnel involved in the inquiries and that they will normally proceed directly to the agencies concerned within their functional areas of interest. Cross agency activity coordination and substantive comparisons will occur within the Select Committees' staffs. It is in the interest of the USIB Agencies to assure equally good coordination between and among the members and Executive Branch elements as appropriate in the material and testimony provided and that a general quality control of the product is exercised. The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group provides the forum for keeping intelligence entities informed on responses provided in the course of the inquiry and avoiding surprise. Further, the IC Staff will establish a small quality control and evaluative function and be alert to the indicators available as the investigations proceed of potential actions or further inquiries that could derive from materials or testimony provided by the various agencies.

3. There will be a range of "skeletons" and allegations which may surface in the course of the inquiry. USIB Agencies will seek to assure that all the facts are found and addressed so as to be responsive to the Select Committee inquiry and in consideration of the Administration.

E. ALLEGATIONS AND PUBLICITY

1. The nature of the investigation will undoubtedly continue to afford considerable public discourse. Many press allegations will cause further inquiry. A system to check the veracity of such allegations should be established by each USIB Agency. The IC Staff will also undertake to monitor press allegations and discuss them with the agencies involved as appropriate.



2. Senator Church intends to provide the press with commentary on selective testimony or facts pertaining to the inquiry. He has advised that he will clear with the Director these releases to avoid inadvertent disclosure harmful to U.S. intelligence agencies. Review of such releases will be undertaken by the IC Staff in concert with appropriate agencies.

3. In preparing statements or testimony to be given in open or closed hearings, senior intelligence officials should avail themselves of all previous related testimony or material furnished by other sources.

4. The DCI, through his IC Staff, will assure regular consultation with Executive Branch agencies on press matters and take steps to foster good communication between USIB entities and political officials.

Notification of all inquiries from press officials to intelligence agencies concerned should be provided to the IC Staff and a record of these inquiries maintained in the central registry.

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. RUMSFELD/MR. CHENEY
MR. BUCHEN/MR. HILLS
MR. MARSH/MR. WOLTHUIS
GENERAL SCOWCROFT/
COLONEL McFARLANE

FROM:

JAMES A. WILDEROTTER *JW*

SUBJECT:

Response to Church Committee request
for CIA backup materials, relating to
Director Colby's January 15, 1975
Testimony before the Senate Appropria-
tions Committee

The CIA has sent over a series of materials relating to Director Colby's testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee last January. These materials were requested in a series of 25 questions constituting Part IV of the Church Committee's request to the CIA (Tab A). They are available for your review from the Duty Officer in the Situation Room.

Many of the materials requested by the Church Committee were included in the Colby Report or have already been provided to the Rockefeller Commission. I propose that we handle those materials in connection with our own response on the Colby Report. These items are in a folder in the Situation Room marked "Materials proposed to be deferred at this time."

In my judgment, materials responsive to questions 1-8, 13, 20 and 22-25 can be provided to the Committee in the near future, with only minor deletions of those items which relate to points covered in the Colby Report. These materials are in a folder marked "Materials proposed to be provided." The items to be deleted at this time are

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With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)

DR 00-28, #108; CIA-44-1131103
By dal NARA Date 6/20/03

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based on or relate to the CIA's Inspector General's summary of employee responses to the May, 1973 instruction of former CIA Director Schlesinger to report "activities outside CIA's charter." (You should note that question 17 requested the actual employee reports, but these are not proposed to be provided by the CIA.)

With respect to these items proposed to be provided now, please note that Item 22 concerns CIA assistance to Federal, state and local governments. [redacted]

[redacted] Item 22 also includes two CIA internal bulletins concerning aid to Federal, state and local government components. These bulletins set up detailed reporting requirements. Provision of these bulletins to the Church Committee will undoubtedly trigger requests for the actual items reported.

With respect to the items as to which deferral is recommended, you should be aware of the following problem areas:

(1) Item 9 discusses [redacted]

(2) Item 14, concerning [redacted]

(3) Item 18, entitled "Potential Flap Activities," is a sanitized version of the CIA Inspector General's summary of the employee responses on activities "outside the charter."

(4) Item 20, concerning [redacted]

For your convenience, copies of these materials are in a folder marked "Special Review Materials."

I will call your office after noon on Tuesday, April 15, for your comments.



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A



DIRECTOR COLBY'S PUBLIC SENATE TESTIMONY ON DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

Reference is made to Director Colby's public testimony on January 15, 1975 before the Senate Appropriations Committee, in which Director Colby identified several documents basic to an understanding of the Agency's domestic operations. The following requests are based on that testimony. Parenthetical page references after each request indicate the page of Director Colby's testimony where the items requested were identified.

1. The directive or other documents establishing the Domestic Operations Division, defining its authority and stating its missions; all subsequent directives or other documents revising its authority or missions; (p.13) DC9
2. The directive or other documents in 1972 redesignating the Domestic Operations Division the Foreign Resources Division; (p.13)
3. The directive or other documents defining the authority of the "cover and commercial staff" and stating its missions (p.13)
4. The directive or other documents establishing on August 15, 1967, a unit within the Counterintelligence Office "to look into the possibility of foreign links to American dissident elements," or defining the unit's authority and stating its missions; (p. 19) of
5. The August 29, 1967 letter from the Executive Director to the Kerner Commission; The September 1, 1967 reply of the DCI to the Kerner Commission and all attachments thereto; (p.19)
6. The directive or other documents establishing CIA participation in "an interagency program in support of the National Commission, among others." (p.20)
7. The document resulting from the DCI's review of the unit created on August 15, 1967 in which he concluded it was proper, "while strictly observing statutory and de facto proscriptions on Agency domestic involvement;" (p.20)
8. The directive or documents governing CIA participation in the preparation of the Ad Hoc Interagency Committee Plan (the "Huston Plan"), and the directive or documents governing CIA participation in the Interagency Evaluation Committee when the Huston Plan was abandoned. (p.20-21)
9. The document authorizing the operation in which "the Agency recruited or inserted about a dozen individuals into American dissident circles in order to establish their credentials for operations abroad; (p.22)
10. The 1973 directive limiting the program described in request #9; (p.22)
11. The directive or other documents which in March 1974 terminated the program described in request #9 (p. 22)
12. The directive or other documents authorizing the elimination from files of material Americans generated from the program described in request #9; (p.23)
13. The directive or document authorizing the destruction in March 1974 of the IDIU tape listing of 10,000 Americans received by CIA in May 1970; (p.23)
14. The directive or other documents authorizing the program to insert agents into dissident organizations in the D.C. area to protect CIA installations, personnel, and information; if a new unit was established within the Office of Security to operate this program, the directive or other documents establishing the new unit, defining its authority or stating its missions. (p.23)
- 14b The directive or other documents terminating the program described in request #14 (p.24)
15. Indicate all lists "developed at various times in the past ... which do appear questionable under CIA's authority" (do not supply lists); (p.26)
16. All "current directives" prohibiting maintenance of the kinds of lists described in request # 15; (p.26)
17. May 9, 1973 directive requesting employees to report questionable activity; all written responses and all other documents reflecting oral responses to this; (p. 27)
18. The documents prepared for or constituting the "internal review" which resulted from the responses described in Request # 17; (p. 27) 21 May 1973 from 18.
19. All documents containing "policy determinations and guidance that (Agency) activities remain within proper limits" issued in August 1973; (p.27)

20. The directive or other documents establishing any mail inspection programs within the CIA or at its direction between 1953 and February, 1973; (p.31)
21. The directive or other document terminating mail inspection programs in February, 1973; (p.32) *Enter present*
22. The documents prepared for the review of CIA assistance to other federal, state and local government components; all documents terminating or modifying such assistance as a result of that review; (p.33)
23. All directives subsequent to the directive of May 9, 1973 which similarly requested employees to report questionable activity; all written responses and all other documents reflecting oral responses to such directives; (p.34)
24. All internal regulations, policy statements or similar documents pursuant to the recommendations of the Katzenbach task force in 1967. (p.35)
25. The Presidential Directive of October 9, 1974 regarding reorganization of the intelligence community.

SECRET ATTACHMENTS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 16, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Rumsfeld/Mr. Cheney
Mr. Buchen/Mr. Hills
Mr. Marsh/Mr. Wolthuis
General Scowcroft/Colonel McFarlane

FROM: James A. Wilderotter *JW*

SUBJECT: Studies requested by the
Church Committee

The CIA has sent over for our review a number of classified and very sensitive studies of the CIA or specific intelligence activities. Attached for your convenience are abstracts of the following studies:

1. "The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence," a Report to the National Security Council, January 1, 1949, prepared by a committee of Allen W. Dulles (Chairman), William H. Jackson and Mathias Correa.
2. "Report on the Covert Activities of the CIA," September 30, 1954 (The Doolittle Report).
3. "Final Report of the Working Group on (CIA) Organization and Activities," April 6, 1962, signed by Lyman Kirkpatrick, then Inspector General of CIA.
4. "Review of Select National Security Agency Cryptanalytic Efforts," February 19, 1965 (The Bissel Report).
5. "The Long Range Plan of the Central Intelligence Agency," August 31, 1965, signed by Mr. Kirkpatrick.

SECRET ATTACHMENTS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 91-13 #9, NSC letter 1/5/93

By KBH NARA, Date 1/27/93



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6. "A Review of the Intelligence Community," March 10, 1971, prepared under the direction of OMB (The Schlesinger Report).

The reports are available for your inspection from the Duty Officer in the Situation Room. They are in a folder marked "Studies." In reviewing these reports, you can assume that appropriate measures will be taken with respect to the national security sensitivity of any materials or parts of materials provided to the Church Committee.

I will call your office after noon on Monday, April 21, for your comments.

Thank you.

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MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: "A Review of the Intelligence Community," 10 March 1971, prepared under direction of Dr. James Schlesinger, OMB
2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Office of Management and Budget
3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: 47-page report
4. CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET, Handle via "Codeword" Channels Only
5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have
6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

The report analyzes the causes for the rise in the cost and size of intelligence operations coupled with an apparent inability to achieve like improvement in the scope and quality of its products, and concludes that what is needed is a fundamental reform of the Community's decision making bodies and procedures. It finds that Community activities have become dominated by collection competition, growth has been unplanned and unguided, production has remained the stepchild of the Community, and there has been a great lack of forward planning. It cites the failure of the National Security Act of 1947 to anticipate the problems arising from the complexities of the present technological world, analyzes a number of organizational problems and presents a range of options for reform. Areas which are singled out for consideration are leadership of the Community, direction and control of Defense intelligence activities, and functional reorganization. It recommends a stronger DCI with responsibility for resource as well as substantive matters for the Community, urges stronger central management of Defense intelligence resources, and suggests steps to improve the intelligence product.

This report formed the basis for President Nixon's memorandum of 5 November 1971 on "Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community."

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Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 exemption authority 52 (1), (2), (3) Automatically declassified on Date Impossibile to Determine



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Summary/Abstract of Report Requested by Senate Select
Committee, see II, 7)

I. Title: The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence, A Report to the National Security Council, by Allen W. Dulles, Chairman; William H. Jackson; and Mathias J. Correa, dated 1 January 1949.

II. Classification: TOP SECRET

III. Summary: The Survey Group, which was comprised of persons not in Government service, was instructed by the President, at the request of the NSC, to make a thorough and comprehensive examination of the structure, administration, activities and inter-agency relationships of the CIA. Its principal findings were that CIA had not fulfilled its responsibilities for the coordination of intelligence activities, especially for the production of coordinated national intelligence estimates; that it was involved in too many activities which were duplicative of the work of other intelligence departments, and that it had failed to coordinate and centralize other activities of common concern, such as the production of economic and scientific and technical intelligence.

The report called for a number of organizational changes, including the consolidation of all secret operations under a single head, in a semi-autonomous organization separated administratively and physically to the degree possible from the overt side of the Agency; the creation of an estimates division to prepare coordinated national intelligence estimates, and the reactivation and strengthening of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), particularly as regards the coordination of national estimates. The report recommended adding the Director, FBI, as a permanent member of the IAC to improve the coordination of counter and domestic intelligence, and the submersion of the Agency's secret functions within a CIA whose chief recognized activities were the coordination of intelligence and the production of estimates.

IV. Problem areas: The report cites two interim reports which were submitted to the NSC earlier: (a) a 3 May 1948 report on "Allocation of Department of State Cover to CIA Personnel," and (b) a 13 May 1948 report on "Relations Between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence," both of which could conceivably be of interest to the Senate Select Committee. Neither of these interim reports has been reviewed.

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REF ID: A109

CIA Sec 7/30/11

By: dal NARA Dec 3/16/13

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MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: "Report on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency," 30 September 1954, by Lt. General James H. Doolittle, USAFR, Chairman; William B. Franke, Morris Hadley and William D. Pawley
2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Office of the President
3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: 69-page report by a Special Study Group
4. CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET
5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have
6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

As a complement to the Clarke Task Force study on CIA and the Intelligence Community being undertaken for the Hoover Commission, President Eisenhower asked the Doolittle panel to conduct a "comprehensive study" of the covert activities of the CIA, in particular those carried out under the terms of NSCID #5 and NSC 5412 of 15 March 1954, and to make to him recommendations for improving the conduct of these operations.

The President's request was dated 26 July 1954, and the final report is dated 30 September 1954. In this nine-week period, the Panel made its investigations, including an overseas trip to "representative stations" in Paris, Vienna, Rome, etc., and wrote its report. The report contains a total of 42 recommendations concerning personnel, security, coordination and operations, organization and administration and cost, the most significant of which are that the IG should be authorized to operate on an Agency-wide basis and investigate all activities, and that the Comptroller should be provided with more information so as to exercise better control over expenditures for covert projects. The report assures the President that everything is going quite well, and the CIA is doing a very good job in spite of the need for the improvements it suggests.

7. DATE OF REQUEST: Part II, No. 4, of 12 March 1975 request from Senate Select Committee

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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption schedule 5D (1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine



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8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: White House
9. DATE OF RELEASE:
10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: USIB Ad Hoc Coordination Staff
11. PROBLEM AREAS: Appendix B (which lists names of 88 CIA personnel and 60 from other intelligence organizations who were consulted) will require review to determine whether any names should be deleted because of cover problems before the document could be released to the Committee.

2
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I. Title and Date:

Final Report of Working Group on Organization and Activities, 6 April 1962, signed by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick. (Responsive to II,7 of Senate Select Committee request.)

II. Classification:

SECRET

III. Summary:

Part I deals primarily with the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency and reflects the unanimous views of the working group. The second part contains comments and recommendations on areas dealing with the work of the CIA and activities of the intelligence community in which the working group was either unable to agree or felt that considerably more study was needed before action was taken. Part I contains recommendations dealing with the organization of the DCI's office and each of the four Directorates. Among the recommendations are: (a) removing the Comptroller's office from the DD/S and having it report directly to the DCI; (b) combining the Audit Staff and the IG Staff; (c) creating an Executive Committee to review major activities and proposed major projects. In Part II the group, with the exception of Mr. Coyne, recommends the creation of a position for an Assistant to the DCI for Coordination and Intelligence Community Guidance and recommends further study of the proposal to merge OCI and ONE. Mr. Coyne's dissents are spelled out.

IV. Problem Areas:

1. The paper indicates that the working group reported orally to the DCI regarding relations with the White House. The content of this briefing is not indicated.
2. Several portions of Part II discuss relations with State Department--particularly in the matter of cover--as well as relations between State and the White House.
3. The document clearly reveals methods of general operations in the CIA and the community as of 1962. The discussion is sufficiently general, however, as to present no apparent problem as long as the classification is maintained.

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MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: "Review of Selected NSA Cryptanalytic Efforts," 19 February 1965. (The Bissell Report)
2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: National Security Agency
3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: 15-page summary and 66-page report
4. CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET, "Codeword," Limited Distribution
5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have
6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

The report is essentially a one-man study by Richard Bissell after he left CIA. It contains information on current and projected costs of cryptanalytic programs [REDACTED] systems and discusses the prospects for success against such systems. The report frequently stresses the uncertainties involved in such an evaluation effort. The report recommends: (a) There should be no reduction in the overall U.S. cryptologic effort; (b) some reallocation of cryptologic resources as between the attack on the [REDACTED] systems and other cryptanalytic problems should be considered; (c) a more systematic evaluation, on behalf of the whole Intelligence Community, should be considered for handling raw information which over time might be produced through successful exploitation of some high-grade systems.

1.5(a)(c)
1.6(d)(1)(2)(3)

7. DATE OF REQUEST: Part II, No. 20, of 12 March 1975 request from Senate Select Committee
8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: National Security Agency
9. DATE OF RELEASE:
10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Staff
11. PROBLEM AREAS: The paper discusses details of success and failure against [REDACTED]

1.5(a)(c)
1.6(d)(1)(2)(3)

The NSA position is that the document can be examined at NSA, and if this indicates the document is needed by the Committee, the matter of necessary paraphrasing can be discussed.

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Automaticallly declassified on: 11/03/2000
Exemptions apply: (1), (2), (3)
Date Inapplicable to Determine



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MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: "The Long Range Plan of the Central Intelligence Agency," 31 August 1965, signed by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Central Intelligence Agency
3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: 186-page report with covering memo to DCI
4. CLASSIFICATION: Varies from section to section. Lowest is SECRET CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY; highest is TOP SECRET, with a variety of codewords
5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP:
6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

Part I gives an overview of the plan.
Part II states the long range planning assumptions.
Part III gives the long range outlook for the clandestine services, the production of intelligence, the overt collection and reference services, and support.
Part IV delineates special problem areas: the CIA image, CIA's role in intelligence coordination, requirements, early warning, ADP, systems analysis, scientific research, overhead reconnaissance, national photographic interpretation, personnel and training, medical views, communications and security.
Part V lists recommendations.
Part VI is the Index and Part VII the annexes (not attached).
7. DATE OF REQUEST: Part II, No. 9 of 12 March 1975 request from Senate Select Committee
8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Central Intelligence Agency
9. DATE OF RELEASE:
10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Staff

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Classified by <u>246321</u>
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 exemption schedule 53 (1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on Date Impossible to Determine



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7. DATE OF REQUEST: Part II, No. 17 of 12 March 1975 request from Senate Select Committee
8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Office of Management and Budget
9. DATE OF RELEASE:
10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Staff
11. PROBLEM AREAS: It has been suggested the copy provided CIA is not the final version of the paper, but there is no stamp to indicate it is a draft.

The report contains some specific examples of technical collection systems with their project names, and on page 7 has a table which breaks out the FY-72 intelligence budget by function. These could be paraphrased or deleted with little substantive loss. Such would ease handling of the document.

On page 42, the report lists possible savings from some of the proposed reforms, which could provide basis for subsequent inquiries.

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11. PROBLEM AREAS:

a. The paper, particularly in the subsection dealing with the Clandestine Services, outlines the Executive Branch authorities and controls over intelligence.

b. Several parts of Section III deal with relations with State Department, particularly stressing problems associated with cover.

c. The entire paper reveals both sources and methods. Human source collection and technical collection are discussed in considerable detail, although precise capabilities of technical systems are not spelled out, nor are any source names mentioned. The paper also identifies gaps in intelligence and the CIA's plans to remedy these situations.

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CIA

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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JFK Assass. Rec. Collection Act of 1997
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NARA date 5/24/00 By KBH

April 16, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: JAMES A. WILDEROTTER

SUBJECT: Meeting with David W. Belin,
April 15, 1975

I met yesterday with Dave Belin, Executive Director of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, in connection with the Church Committee's request to the CIA for a series of materials relating to Director Colby's January 15, 1975 testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee. A copy of the Select Committee's request is attached. The materials requested largely parallel the various items discussed in the "Colby Report."

Mr. Belin indicated that the Commission would complete its work by June 6, and that its report and recommendations -- although intended in the first instance for the President -- were being written with a view toward eventual publication. He also indicated that the staff has been sanitizing the transcripts of the Commission's proceedings and the various affidavits it has received.

Mr. Belin also indicated that the Commission is working on a special preliminary report -- expected to be completed on or shortly after April 30 -- on the allegations concerning "assassination plots." According to Mr. Belin, this preliminary report is also being drafted with a view toward its being provided to the Select Committee.



Mr. Belin stated that his only concern with respect to providing the Select Committee immediately with the materials it requested from the CIA is that leaks or premature public disclosures by the Committee -- before the Commission completes its work on June 6 -- would hinder the work of the Commission, impair its ability to meet the June 6 deadline and destroy the morale of the Commission staff. Mr. Belin said he would have no problem with providing the Committee documents responding to items 1-8 of its request, and items 15, 16, 19, 24, and 25.

Mr. Belin also had no problem with item 17 insofar as it relates only to the May 9, 1973 memorandum by former CIA Director Schlesinger to Agency employees directing them to report activities which, in their judgment, were "outside the CIA's charter." With respect to the rest of item 17 -- the actual employee responses -- I indicated that I had had preliminary discussions with Messers. Miller and Schwarz in which I indicated my personal view that it is inappropriate to provide the actual employee responses because of their widely differing degrees of sophistication, accuracy, maturity, etc., and that the Committee staff had generally agreed with this view. I also told Mr. Belin that Mr. Schwarz had indicated that in certain limited areas, the Select Committee would want to go beyond summaries or other such documents and review the actual employee responses. I told Mr. Belin that I had told Schwarz that we would attempt to be flexible in these kinds of extraordinary situations.

Mr. Belin and I also discussed item 18, which requested the CIA Inspector General's summary report of May 21, 1973. I told Mr. Belin that, as to this item, the CIA proposes to provide a sanitized version of the I.G.'s summary which omits materials relating to the "assassination plots." Mr. Belin had no objection to providing the sanitized summary, but suggested that the "sanitization notice" be changed.

Mr. Belin also had no objection to item 23 being provided to the Select Committee insofar as it related to "all directives subsequent to the Directive of January 9, 1973, which similarly requested employees to report questionable activities." The Select Committee also requested under item 23 "all written



responses and all other documents reflecting oral responses to such directives," but we are unaware that any such documents exist.

With respect to the remaining items -- as to which the risk of leaks or premature disclosure by the Select Committee is more substantial -- we agreed to seek either deferment or a special understanding with the Committee that would avoid any impairment of the Commission's work. These matters include items 9 through 12, relating to Project MPLODSTAR; item 14, relating to Project MERRIMAC; items 20 and 21, relating to Project SRPOINTER; and item 22, relating to CIA assistance to other Federal, State and local government components.

Attachments



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 18, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Rumsfeld/Mr. Cheney
Mr. Buchen/Mr. Hills
Mr. Marsh/Dr. Wolthuis
General Scowcroft/Colonel McFarlane

FROM: James A. Wilderotter *JW*

SUBJECT: Additional CIA Studies Requested by the
Church Committee

Please reference my April 16 memorandum transmitting abstracts of six studies of the CIA or specific intelligence activities requested by the Church Committee. Attached are abstracts of two additional studies in this category:

7. "Reports on Strategic Warning," February, 1967
(the Shute Report);

8. "Intelligence Activities and Foreign Policy,"
November 6, 1968 (the Dillon Report).

These reports are available for your inspection from the Duty Officer in the Situation Room in a folder marked "Additional Studies." In reviewing these reports, you can assume that appropriate measures will be taken with respect to the national security sensitivity of any materials or parts of materials provided to the Church Committee.

Please review these studies promptly. I will circulate on Tuesday, April 22, a memorandum asking for your comments and clearance for review of these materials by the Committee.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 2.0

SECRET ATTACHMENTS

MR00-28 #111; CIA-USA, 1/31/03

del JARA, Date 6/10/03



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MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: "Report on Strategic Warning,"
February 1967 (She [.....] Report)
2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Director of Central
Intelligence

(Report was prepared by [.....] in
response to a request from the Deputy to the DCI
for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation)
3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Covering letter with a 23-
page report and ten annexes
4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret, Compartmented
Codewords
5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have
6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

The report is an in-depth study of the performance, planning, and present and foreseeable future problems of the Intelligence Community in the execution of its early warning mission. Sections of the report are titled: Background and Conclusions, Indications Intelligence, Warning Sources and Warning Processes, Warning Costs and Warning Customers, and Recommendations (of which there are 27). Annexes A through E are detailed studies of what the various intelligence collection sources do or could contribute to warning. Annexes F through J examine the various processes for extracting warning intelligence from those sources.

The central conclusion is that "so long as the USSR possesses the means to launch a damaging assault on the U.S., it is essential to maintain continuous surveillance over all the elements of Soviet power which could be involved directly or in a supporting role in that assault."

7. DATE OF REQUEST: Part II, No. 20 of 12 March 1975
request from the Senate Select Committee
8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Director of Central Intelligence
9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:

DECLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
E.O. [redacted]

NR 90-024: A112

CIA [redacted] 7/30/11

By dal NARA Date 3/16/12

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Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 exemption schedule 1B (1) (2) (3)
Automatically declassified on Date impossible to Determine



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10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: DCI/IC Select Committee
Coordinating Staff

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

The report discusses in detail the Community warning mechanism and as such discusses the warning inter-relationships among the State Department, Defense Department, NSA and CIA. Assets of the Clandestine Services are discussed in some detail, but no sources are mentioned by name. The 1967 capabilities of overhead satellites are described.

The detailed description of capabilities, particularly in the case of highly compartmented systems, can still be considered highly sensitive information.



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MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: "Intelligence Activities and Foreign Policy," 6 November 1968. (The Dillon Report)
2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: A discussion group sponsored by the John F. Kennedy Institute of Politics at Harvard University, chaired by Douglas Dillon. (Meetings of the group were held in Washington, D. C.)
3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: A 17-page report and attached list of 21 participants
4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: "CONFIDENTIAL, Not for publication. Not to be quoted or cited"
5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: No
6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: The report is a distillation of a series of discussions by the group of problem areas of future concern in the field of intelligence, including the relation of intelligence and policymaking, the organization of the Intelligence Community, clandestine and covert actions, Congress and the Intelligence Community, and intelligence and the press. Of note is the discussion concerning the value of covert political action, how and when it should be used, and the problem of inadequate secrecy.
7. DATE OF REQUEST: Part II, No. 20 of the 12 March 1975 request from the Senate Select Committee referred to the "Lindsay Report," and since Frank Lindsay, President of ITEK Corporation, has a member of the Dillon group it was mistakenly considered this was what was referred to as the "Lindsay Report." It has since been determined the Lindsay Report is a separate document on "Covert Operations of the U.S. Government," dated 1 December 1968, which is in Mr. Lindsay's possession.
8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Mr. Douglas Dillon
9. DATE OF RELEASE:
10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: DCI/IC Select Committee Coordinating Staff



Classified by 246321
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption schedule E9 (1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

This paper reflects the views of a distinguished group from academia, business and the professions, including several with extensive former intelligence and diplomatic experience who met to prepare recommendations for the incoming President, whoever he might be, on the future role of intelligence.

So far as can be determined, the minutes were distributed to members of the group, but no further action was taken on this particular paper.

The same group was reconstituted after the 1968 election as a non-public task force of the President-elect, with Frank Lindsay as chairman, and completed a report on covert operations, the so-called Lindsay report.

Any release of this report would have to be cleared with Mr. Dillon.



~~SECRET~~

GA

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Rumsfeld/Mr. Cheney
 Mr. Buchen/Mr. Hills
 Mr. Marsh/Dr. Wolthuis
 General Scowcroft/Colonel McFarlane

FROM: JAMES A. WILDEROTTER *JW*

SUBJECT: Studies requested by the
 Church Committee

On April 16, I transmitted abstracts of six studies of the CIA or specific intelligence activities requested by the Church Committee. Since that time, these studies have been available for your review in the Situation Room.

I recommend that we permit the Church Committee Staff Director (Miller), Chief Counsel (Schwarz), Minority Counsel (Smothers) and Task Force Director (Aaron) to review at the CIA five of the six reports listed in the April 16 memorandum -- with the exception of the Bissel Report on a "Review of Selected NSA Cryptanalytic Efforts, February 19, 1965" -- and that we later provide the Committee with a classified paraphrased copy of these five reports. I also recommend that I be authorized to discuss the subject matter of the Bissell Report generally with Messrs. Miller, Schwarz and Smothers to elicit their views as to whether this is one that they prefer be discussed with Senators Tower and Church.

Attached are forms on which to indicate your approval/disapproval, etc. of these recommendations.

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 91-13, #10, NSC letter 1/5/93
By KSH NARA, Date 1/27/93



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TO: JAMES A. WILDEROTTER

FROM:	_____	Mr. Rumsfeld	_____	Mr. Cheney
	_____	Mr. Marsh	_____	Mr. Wolhuis
	_____	Mr. Buchen	_____	Mr. Hills
	_____	Gen. Scowcroft	_____	Col. McFarlane

SUBJECT: CIA and National Organization for Intelligence
(Dulles, January 1, 1949)

JW recommendation: Let Committee Staff read at CIA; later provide classified paraphrased copy to Committee

ACTION: _____ approve recommendation
 _____ approve on conditions:

 _____ disapprove

COMMENTS: _____

INITIAL: _____ (date)



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: JAMES A. WILDEROTTER

FROM:	_____	Mr. Rumsfeld	_____	Mr. Cheney
	_____	Mr. Marsh	_____	Mr. Wolthuis
	_____	Mr. Buchen	_____	Mr. Hills
	_____	Gen. Scowcroft	_____	Col. McFarlane

SUBJECT: Covert Activities of the CIA (Doolittle Report, September 30, 1954)

JW recommendation: Let Committee Staff read at CIA; later provide classified paraphrased copy to Committee

ACTION: _____ approve recommendation
 _____ approve on conditions:

 _____ disapprove

COMMENTS: _____

INITIAL: _____ (date) _____



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: JAMES A. WILDEROTTER

FROM: _____	Mr. Rumsfeld	_____	Mr. Cheney
_____	Mr. Marsh	_____	Mr. Wolhuis
_____	Mr. Buchen	_____	Mr. Hills
_____	Gen. Scowcroft	_____	Col. McFarlane

SUBJECT: Working Group on CIA Organization and Activities
(Kirkpatrick, April 6, 1962)

JW recommendation: Let Committee Staff read at CIA; later
provide classified paraphrased copy to Committee

ACTION: _____ approve recommendation
 _____ approve on conditions:

 _____ disapprove

COMMENTS: _____

INITIAL: _____ (date)



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TO: JAMES A. WILDEROTTER

FROM:	_____	Mr. Rumsfeld	_____	Mr. Cheney
	_____	Mr. Marsh	_____	Mr. Wolhuis
	_____	Mr. Buchen	_____	Mr. Hills
	_____	Gen. Scowcroft	_____	Col. McFarlane

SUBJECT: Long Range Plan of the CIA (Kirkpatrick, August 31, 1965)

JW recommendation: Let Committee Staff read at CIA; later provide classified paraphrased copy to Committee

ACTION: _____ approve recommendation
 _____ approve on conditions:

 _____ disapprove

COMMENTS: _____

INITIAL: _____ (date)



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TO: JAMES A. WILDEROTTER

FROM:	_____	Mr. Rumsfeld	_____	Mr. Cheney
	_____	Mr. Marsh	_____	Mr. Wolthuis
	_____	Mr. Buchen	_____	Mr. Hills
	_____	Gen. Scowcroft	_____	Col. McFarlane

SUBJECT: Review of the Intelligence Community
(Schlesinger, March 10, 1971)

JW recommendation: Let the Committee Staff review at CIA;
later provide classified paraphrased copy to Committee

ACTION: _____ approve recommendation
 _____ approve on conditions:

 _____ disapprove

COMMENTS: _____

INITIAL: _____ (date)



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: JAMES A. WILDEROTTER

FROM:	_____	Mr. Rumsfeld	_____	Mr. Cheney
	_____	Mr. Marsh	_____	Mr. Wolthuis
	_____	Mr. Buchen	_____	Mr. Hills
	_____	Gen. Scowcroft	_____	Col. McFarlane

SUBJECT: Review of Selected NSA Cryptanalytic Efforts
(Bissell Report, February 19, 1965)

JW recommendation: Defer decision on release until subject matter
discussed generally with Messrs. Miller, Schwarz and
Smothers

ACTION: _____ approve recommendation
 _____ approve on conditions:

 _____ disapprove

COMMENTS: _____

INITIAL: _____ (date) _____

