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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Phillip Buchen  
FOR: General Brent Scowcroft

Attached for your information is a copy of the transcript of Director Colby's appearance before the Senate Select Committee on 23 May 1975.

Incidentally, the Committee has made an exception of its rules in making a copy available to the Director and your receipt of a copy should be considered to be sensitive.

Faithfully yours,

.....  
.....

E. H. Knoche  
Assistant to the Director

Attachment  
Director Colby 23 May Testimony - Copy 5

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WH. PORTIONS EXEMPTED  
EO 12958 and 13526 ( )

MR 91-26, #1 (IA) 8/31/92

By FBH NARA, Date 10/21/92

SECRET / ██████████



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1975

To: Brent Scowcroft

From: Phil Buchen

Attachment:

Secret/Eyes Only  
memo to Philip Buchen  
for General Brent Scowcroft  
from E. H. Knoche

\* Director Colby's 23 May Testimony  
(copy 5)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<p>1. <u>Buchen to Scowcroft, 5/26/75</u></p> <p><del>1a. Memo E.H. Knoche to Phillip Buchen re Colby testimony before the Senate Select Committee (1 p.)</del>  <i>Portions Exempted 10/21/92 GG</i></p> <p>1b. Transcript Testimony of William Colby before the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (117 pp.)  <i>Sanitized - JFK 1781000410112 KBH 6/8/00                      (continued in next folder)</i></p>	<p>Undated</p> <p>5/23/75</p>	<p>A</p> <p>A</p>

FILE LOCATION

Cheney Files  
 General Subject File  
 Intelligence - Colby Testimony before the Senate Select Committee (1)-(2)

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WHM, 5/17/85

# The United States Senate

5 of 5

Copy 5 of 8

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM F. COLBY,  
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Friday, May 23, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over  
to the Committee for destruction)

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003



C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

William E. Colby,  
Director, CIA,  
-- accompanied by --  
Scott S. Breckinridge, Jr.,  
Deputy Inspector General,  
Enno Knoche,  
Assistant to the Director,  
George L. Cary,  
Legislative Counsel

3

E X H I B I T S

NUMBER

PAGE

Colby Exhibit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, cardboard-backed  
photographs, deemed marked in an off the record  
discussion early in the transcript.

Colby No. 4

31

Colby No. 5

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Colby No. 6

110



~~TOP SECRET~~

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4 TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. COLBY,  
5 DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

6  
7 Friday, May 23, 1975  
8

9 United States Senate,  
10 Select Committee to Study Governmental  
11 Operations with Respect to  
12 Intelligence Activities,  
13 Washington, D. C.

14 The Committee met, pursuant to notice at 9:15 o'clock  
15 a.m., in Room 407, The Capitol Building, Senator Frank  
16 Church (Chairman) presiding.

17 Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,  
18 Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Mathias and  
19 Schweiker.

20 Also present: William Miller, Staff Director, F.A.O.  
21 Schwarz, III, Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority  
22 Counsel; William Bader, Professional Staff Member.  
23  
24  
25

~~TOP SECRET~~



1 Chairman Church. The hearing will come to order.

2 Mr. Scott Breckinridge is accompanying the Director this  
3 morning and may be called upon from time to time to testify.

4 For that purpose, Mr. Breckinridge, will you please stand  
5 and be sworn?

6 Do you swear that all the testimony you may give in this  
7 proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but  
8 the truth, so help you God?

9 Mr. Breckinridge. I do.

10 Chairman Church. Mr. Schwarz will commence the questioning  
11 this morning.

12 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Colby, did you have some things you  
13 wanted to supply to the Committee?  
14  
15  
16  
17  
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1 STATEMENT OF WILLIAM E. COLBY, DIRECTOR, CIA,  
2 ACCOMPANIED BY SCOTT S. BRECKINRIDGE, JR., DEPUTY  
3 INSPECTOR GENERAL, ENNO KNOCHE, ASSISTANT TO THE  
4 DIRECTOR, AND GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

5 Mr. Colby. I have an answer to a few of the questions  
6 that were raised at the meeting the other day and there are a  
7 couple of clarifications I would like to make.

8 One, with respect to the security investigations in the  
9 United States. The question was asked whether we ever used  
10 private investigators, and I said we normally used our own  
11 investigators. We have some relationships with private  
12 investigatory firms which provide cover for our investigators  
13 and, secondly, we have a few firms which we own which are  
14 proprietary, if you will, whereby our investigators appear to  
15 be private.

16 I said that in the past it is clear that on occasion we  
17 did ask for private investigator firms to help us to some  
18 degree. It was usually the one that was giving us cover, and  
19 for reasons of overload we asked them to have their own people  
20 to do a few of the investigations.

21 My General Counsel says that this is illegal. I have a  
22 strong question about its propriety, if not legality, and I  
23 am undertaking to review this matter to see whether we can not  
24 just eliminate that practice entirely, continuing the proprie-  
25 tary and continuing the use of private investigators as cover

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1 but using our own people.

2 But I did want to clarify that. I think I mentioned it  
3 last time that there have been occasions on which this was  
4 done.

5 Chairman Church. Mr. Colby, would you in connection with  
6 your review of this matter supply the Committee with the spe-  
7 cifics in those cases where the Agency has in fact engaged  
8 private investigators to do Agency work?

9 Mr. Colby. I will certainly try to, Mr. Chairman. I  
10 confess this may be a tough job to locate every case but I  
11 certainly will do my best.

12 Chairman Church. Will you provide the Committee with the  
13 opinion of your Counsel with respect to the legality of such?

14 Mr. Colby. I will.

15 Chairman Church. Such use of private investigators?

16 Mr. Colby. Yes.

17 Chairman Church. And then I would ask the staff also  
18 furnish the Committee with a brief on that question so that we  
19 are fully advised with respect to the law.

20 Mr. Colby. Right.

21 The second subject, Mr. Chairman. Senator Mondale asked  
22 for our command and control regulations for the approval of  
23 covert action projects. These were supplied to the staff on  
24 the first of May and are available to the staff.

25 Thirdly, I was asked if Mr. William Harvey was removed

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1 from the Agency because of his involvement in the assassination  
2 plans against Prime Minister Castro.

3 The facts are that in June 1963 he was assigned as our  
4 Chief of Station in Rome and in February of '67 he was  
5 reassigned to CIA Headquarters. He retired voluntarily under  
6 our retirement system on 31 of December 1967.

7 If I may, there is a reason why he was taken out and if I  
8 could go off the record and mention that to the Committee. It  
9 is a matter of his privacy.

10 Chairman Church. Very well, off the record.

11 (Off the record discussion)

12 Mr. Colby. Back on the record.

13 Senator Schweiker asked me whether Howard Hunt or James  
14 McCord were in charge of Mexican operations at the time of  
15 President Kennedy's assassination on 22nd of November '63.  
16 Howard Hunt from July '62 to August '64 was assigned as a  
17 Section Chief in the Division of Plans Directorate, which is  
18 now the Operations Directorate at CIA Headquarters, which had  
19 no responsibility whatsoever for Mexican operations.

20 Senator Schweiker. What were those dates again?

21 Mr. Colby. July '62 to August '64.

22 Senator Schweiker. Wasn't he at some point in Mexico  
23 City and in charge of that office?

24 Mr. Knoche. Way back in the '50's he served in Mexico  
25 City. Way back. He was not in charge.

~~TOP SECRET~~



1 Mr. Colby. He was a case officer then.

2 Senator Schweiker. So that is the period you are saying  
3 he had no jurisdiction in any way with Latin America or Mexican  
4 Affairs.

5 Mr. Colby. No, he was in what we call, and we have since  
6 changed the name, to Domestic Operations Division at that time,  
7 our operations here in this country, and that is a whole  
8 different subject I would have to explain some day.

9 Mr. McCord from June '62 to June '64 was assigned as a  
10 CIA Security Officer in the CIA station at Frankfurt, Germany  
11 and he had no responsibilities for Mexican operations at that  
12 point.

13 Senator Morgan last time asked what information was given  
14 to the Warren Commission concerning Agency assassination plans  
15 concerning Castro, and I have been advised our records do not  
16 indicate that the Warren Commission was provided with informa-  
17 tion on this subject.

18 Allen Dulles, of course, I would note, who was the CIA  
19 Director until the fall of '61, was a member of the Warren  
20 Commission, but beyond that fact I have nothing I could offer.

21 And then who made the decision not to provide it, if none  
22 was given? Our records do not indicate that there was a CIA  
23 decision on this matter not to tell the Warren Commission.

24 I could add that I believe the relationship with the  
25 Warren Commission was handled by one of our staffs which

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1 was not advised of the assassination activities. Quite likely  
2 I cannot say that for sure, but I know the compartmentation  
3 system was such.

4 Chairman Church. What was the name of the CIA agent who  
5 was given the responsibility for liaison between the CIA and  
6 the Warren Commission?

7 Mr. Colby. To my knowledge it is Mr. Raymond Rocca.

8 Chairman Church. Where is it now?

9 Mr. Colby. He retired at the end of December of last year.  
10 He remained working for us for a few months. I think he is  
11 retired. I think he is retired. I believe he is still in  
12 the Washington area.

13 Mr. Knoche. Yes, he is still working with us.

14 Mr. Colby. Still working with us to help on the transi-  
15 tion of the whole counter intelligence program.

16 Chairman Church. Why did he retire?

17 Mr. Colby. That was the Angleton case, Mr. Chairman, and  
18 the facts of that case were that I had had some professional  
19 differences in the organization with Mr. Angleton as to the  
20 way the counterintelligence business was run and the way the  
21 Israeli account was handled. I believed that it required a  
22 higher degree of coordination of the other elements of the  
23 Directorate and of the Agency. We had debated this on various  
24 occasions in the past. I did reorganize that staff in 1973 and  
25 took a number of functions away from it. The liaison with the

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1 FBI for instance, and a couple of other things. I gradually  
2 endeavored to open up the Israeli account to a better relation-  
3 ship with our other Near Eastern activities. We debated this  
4 over many months and on several occasions. We could never  
5 really agree to it because he insisted on the importance of  
6 retaining it where it was.

7 Mr. Angleton had done a very good job of establishing that  
8 liaison years ago and knew a lot of the senior Israeili who  
9 were involved in it.

10 I believed there was inadequate coordination in the Arab  
11 areas.

12 Also, I believed that there was a undue degree of compart-  
13 mentation of that staff, that it needed more interchange with  
14 our other divisions. We debated this and discussed it and I  
15 set as my time limit for this discussion the end of December  
16 because there were some very substantial retirement benefits  
17 that people would loose if they stayed after that point. Then  
18 unfortunately the Seymour Hirsh article of December 22nd came  
19 to our attention before it was actually published, and so I  
20 brought Mr. Angleton up and said that I was going to make two  
21 basic decisions. I was going to move the Israeli account from  
22 his control and I was going to put some sucessor leadership  
23 into the Head of the Counterintelligence Staff. I said I would  
24 offer him a post of tying together some counterintelligence  
25 doctrine, he could stay working with us. He did not have to

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1 retire. If he wished to retire the opportunity was there. He  
2 chose to retire. I insisted that I talk to him before the  
3 Seymour Hirs- article appeared. I knew it was coming. I  
4 didn't know what it was going to say. I wanted to make clear  
5 between him and me that the decision was based upon our long-  
6 standing discussion of how to run that particular activity.

7 The question then came up who would be his successor and  
8 Mr. Rocca was his Deputy. There were two other officers who  
9 were possibilities. One of the officers, Mr. Hood, had said  
10 in early December that he planned to retire at the end of  
11 December. The other two, Mr. Rocca and Mr. Miler, were informed  
12 that they would not be the successor Chief of that staff. They  
13 were offered a chance to stay on in their then current jobs.  
14 They chose to retire. All four of them agreed to stay with  
15 us on a consultant basis over the next several months to help  
16 us on the transition of new leadership into that job, and they  
17 have done so.

18 Chairman Church. Well, without getting off the track, I  
19 just have one further question here in connection with Mr.  
20 Angleton himself.

21 Is it true that he is still being paid as a consultant?

22 Mr. Colby. I believe it has dropped off, Mr. Chairman.  
23 He did help us for three or four months but I believe that it  
24 is terminated. It is about time to terminate it, I know, and  
25 whether it is on this particular date has been terminated.

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PAGE 10 Omitted

(MIS-NUMBERED IN TRANSCRIBING)





1 We set ourselves about six month period where we would have  
2 to --

3 Chairman Church. There is no plan to retain him indefi-  
4 nitely?

5 Mr. Colby. Absolutely not. It was to help us get over  
6 this transition and phase him out.

7 Chairman Church. Very well.

8 Senator Mondale. I asked for vouchers on payments with  
9 respect to assassinations?

10 Mr. Colby. I am looking for that. I don't have an answer  
11 for you yet, Senator.

12 The request was also made whether we had any information  
13 concerning plots to assassinate Chou En Lai. We have reports  
14 of two such examples, incidents, both conducted by the Chinese  
15 Nationalists without our prior knowledge and without our  
16 participation.

17 One in April 1955, an Air India aircraft crashed at  
18 sea off Indochina after departing from Hong Kong. Several  
19 Chinese Communist delegates for the Bandung Conference were  
20 on board and it had been rumored that Chou En Lai would be on  
21 the aircraft.

22 On the 11th of January 1956, the British Colonial Office  
23 in London issued an official statement reporting they had  
24 evidence that the Chinese Nationalists had bribed a Hong Kong  
25 airport employee to place a time bomb on the airplane. The

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1 Chinese Communists subsequently blamed the Chinese Nationalists  
2 and the US for sabotaging the aircraft. The aircraft employees  
3 had fled to Taiwan. We had nothing to do with that incident  
4 and frankly heard about it after it occurred.

5 In the fall of 1956, a senior Chinese Nationalist official  
6 informed an officer of CIA that a Chinese National planned to  
7 assassinate Chou En Lai during his visit to Cambodia in  
8 November '56 and had been thwarted by the Cambodian arrest of  
9 the Chinese Nationalist officer sent to Phnom Penh to supervise  
10 the attempt. We learned of this after it had happened and we  
11 had nothing to do with it.

12 [REDACTED] the Chinese Nationalists  
13 Intelligence Service over the years [REDACTED] clearly have done  
14 things without our knowledge [REDACTED], and in a number  
15 of areas, [REDACTED]

16 These are two that were separate.

17 Also I was asked to look at the photographs of Howard Hunt  
18 and Sturgis that appeared in Newsweek some years ago. We  
19 obtained this photograph from the FBI last night about 5 o'clock.  
20 We had not had it before. We had a copy of the Newsweek  
21 edition.

22 These are photographs of Howard Hunt in 1949, 1950 and  
23 1961. This is the only photograph we have of Mr. Sturgis.  
24 It is taken out of the Newsweek.

25 We have had no connection with Mr. Sturgis and so we have

~~TOP SECRET~~



1 no real photographs, so it is subject to the problems of it.

2 We had our photographic experts and analysts and so forth  
3 look at these two individuals here who were picked up. We  
4 examined them in considerable detail, and talking about the  
5 '61 Hunt photograph, comparing it with this, and this is the  
6 photograph, Newsweek photograph. You will see that there is a  
7 lot of sort of fundamental differences in the kinds of  
8 appearances they have, different characteristics of the  
9 individuals.

10 With respect to Sturgis, of course, we are not as confi-  
11 dent because we don't have as good a base to work from in our  
12 comparison but at the same time we see differences there also.

13 Now, we further looked, had one of our disguise people --  
14 we obviously have people who can disguise you -- the red wig  
15 episode. It wasn't red, they insist, it wasn't ill fitting.  
16 That is the thing that they get upset about. But they say that  
17 it would not be feasible to have them actually in a disguise,  
18 have these individuals actually in this disguise, that it is  
19 too big a jump, it differs.

20 Senator Huddleston. How about the size of the individual,  
21 are they pretty close?

22 Mr. Colby. These two are. He looks like a shorter man  
23 from the surroundings. And Hunt is about medium height, rather  
24 than this short.

25 Mr. Knoche. Hunt is five feet ten and a half inches.

~~TOP SECRET~~



1 Mr. Colby. This is the kind of analysis and they really  
2 were able to do a pretty good job on Hunt and, what they do is  
3 identify certain key points, make measurements and put adjust-  
4 ments, the same thing we do for the satellite photography in  
5 terms of these measurements, and things like that, and compare  
6 it in that sense, and their conclusion is that clearly this is  
7 not Hunt. They are absolutely confident that this photograph  
8 is not Hunt. They are less confident that it is not Sturgis  
9 because of the base on which they are operating, but they think  
10 it is not.

11 I point out that this analysis was done overnight, about  
12 3 o'clock in the morning. This is Sturgis.

13 Mr. Schwarz. And to the right?

14 Mr. Colby. This is a newspaper photograph of Hunt, a  
15 recent one. These are sort of Agency photographs of him when  
16 he was an employee.

17 Senator Hart Of Colorado. Were those men ever identified  
18 by the Dallas Police?

19 Mr. Colby. They must have booked them or something if  
20 they carried them in. I really don't know. If they took them  
21 in I would assume they would have had to book them.

22 Senator Hart of Colorado. What are these pictures on the  
23 lower right and left?

24 Mr. Colby. These are the blowups of the particular  
25 photographs.

~~TOP SECRET~~



1 Senator Hart of Colorado. Not the one you had earlier?

2 Mr. Colby. They are different.

3 Senator Hart Of Colorado. They are different angles?

4 Mr. Colby. This is reversed.

5 Senator Hart of Colorado. They are different photographs?

6 Mr. Colby. It is reversed.

7 Senator Hart Of Colorado. No. They are not A and B even  
8 reversed.

9 Mr. Colby. They can do that kind of a turn through the --

10 Senator Hart of Colorado. They can twist the photographs  
11 around?

12 Mr. Colby. They can make it appear at a different angle.

13 Senator Hart of Colorado. B at least is a totally dif-  
14 ferent pose. They turned his mouth down. His eyes are closed.  
15 They have really done a job if they changed B to that lower  
16 right.

17 Mr. Colby. They can change them, honest.

18 Let me get my brief on that and I will answer that  
19 question.

20 They magnified them to the same scale using the eyes and  
21 mouth. The contrast and texture differences were minimized,  
22 continuous tone photographs employed and angular compensations  
23 were made to offset errors incident to the different heads.

24 They can mix them around in that kind of fashion.

25 Senator Schweiker. Were these men detained? If they were

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1 detained maybe there are photographs from their detention.

2 Were these men arrested?

3 Mr. Colby. At the time we have had to work on this we have  
4 just looked at the photographs.

5 Senator Schweiker. I assume that is where they are going  
6 to be detained.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Wasn't the same analysis done for the  
8 Rockefeller Commission about two months ago? In other words,  
9 there has been an analysis at least once before last night,  
10 hasn't there?

11 Mr. Knoche. Not by us.

12 Mr. Colby. Perhaps by someone else.

13 Chairman Church. Mr. Director, that is a different  
14 photograph.

15 Mr. Colby. It does look like it.

16 I will answer that question next time I come up.

17 Chairman Church. All right. How can we follow up on the  
18 identity of these two people in connection with the Dallas  
19 Police? Would that be done through the FBI?

20 Mr. Colby. FBI. I could ask or you could ask, it might  
21 be better if you ask.

22 Chairman Church. Well, I think we should. I think these  
23 should be marked as Committee Exhibits and staff should be  
24 instructed to follow through with the FBI to get what further  
25 information there may be about the photographs and these two

~~TOP SECRET~~



1 individuals in it.

2 Senator Schweiker. Did you get the other photograph, the  
3 supposed Oswald photograph leaving the Embassy?

4 Mr. Colby. I don't have that with me. It is in the  
5 Warren Commission published report. It is in there.

6 Senator Schweiker. It is in there?

7 Mr. Colby. Yes. It was cropped slightly in order to  
8 conceal where it was taken but it was --

9 Senator Schweiker. It is in the Warren Commission?

10 Mr. Colby. Yes, it is in the Warren Commission.

11 Just one additional matter.

12 Chairman Church. Just one thing I would like to say to  
13 you, Mr. Colby, before I forget it. You have made reference  
14 to the Israeli account and the special way that it had been  
15 handled under Mr. Angleton. Before we finish our review with  
16 you of covert operations we would like to have a more detailed  
17 statement of that matter.

18 Mr. Colby. Right.

19 Chairman Church. And I think you should prepare to  
20 discuss it with us and we will have further questions to ask  
21 you in connection with it.

22 I just wanted to give you notice.

23 Mr. Colby. Right. In our lexicon it doesn't count as a  
24 covert action but that is all right, no problem, I will cover  
25 it.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 Chairman Church. All right. At some point then in our  
2 investigation?

3 Mr. Colby. Sure, no problem.

4 The only other one thing I would like to suggest for the  
5 record, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the discussion of the  
6 attempts made against Mr. Castro, in no way justifying them.  
7 My position on this is quite clear. I do think it important  
8 to put that exercise in the context of the times, which was  
9 the times of the Bay of Pigs, which was a decision made by  
10 the Government. The Cuban missile crisis, and following that,  
11 a program approved by our normal covert action approval mecha-  
12 nism to try to generate an overthrow of Mr. Castro from within  
13 Cuba by assisting various groups to go in with sabotage and  
14 by putting economic pressure on the country, and so forth.  
15 That went on for a number of years after the 1961-62 episodes  
16 and I think it does put a cover of policy attitude toward Cuba  
17 and toward Mr. Castro that is an important factor in evaluat-  
18 ing the thing, without in any way justifying the particular  
19 attempts to assassinate him.

20 Senator Hart of Michigan. But was there any evaluation  
21 done at or about the time of that Cuban missile crisis?

22 Mr. Colby. There was an evaluation done after the Bay  
23 of Pigs, a rather intensive Investigation Internal Security  
24 Branch Review of the activity and then the Cuban missile  
25 crisis came along shortly thereafter before anything very much

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1 get going. Thereafter, however, a number of programs were  
2 conducted, which I am sure the Committee might want a general  
3 summary of. I am just giving you one sort of a paragraph  
4 summary of it, which were aimed at putting economic pressure  
5 on Cuba in the hopes that this would put pressure against him  
6 and lead to its disorder and problems there and, secondly, to  
7 encourage revolutions, sabotage and so forth, from within  
8 Cuba through a variety of programs of propaganda, support of  
9 exile movements, landing of teams on the coast, things of this  
10 nature.


11 Chairman Church. The difficult with this is, as I see it  
12 although what you say is true, once an agency begins to engage  
13 in assassination attempts the disease spreads. Your own  
14 testimony shows it spread at least as far as the Dominican  
15 Republic and we are going to get into closer questions on  
16 other matters such as Lumumba and Chile.

17 So that I don't think this issue can be confined really  
18 to the emergency that did in fact exist between the US and  
19 Cuba and the seriousness of that emergency at the time.

20 Mr. Colby. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman. I am against  
21 it and have been against it for a long time, but nonetheless  
22 I think in fairness to the people involved at that period I  
23 think it is important to give total context.

24 Chairman Church. Yes.

25 Mr. Schwarz.



1 Senator Hart of Michigan. I guess we are trying ultimately  
2 to determine, assuming internally the CIA might have contemplated  
3 additional efforts to assassinate Castro after the Bay of Pigs,  
4 after the missile crisis, it would not have acted unless directed  
5 by the very highest authority, would it?

6 Mr. Colby. That is not that clear, Senator Hart. I think  
7 the evidence we have is that the then Director was not aware  
8 of some of these activities and, therefore, one would have a  
9 very difficult time saying that it was pursuant to a specific  
10 authorization. It was consistent with an overall policy which  
11 was the point I was saying, but nonetheless I think the spe-  
12 cific action we cannot say was approved even within the Agency  
13 at the Director level.

14 Senator Hart of Michigan. Is there any indication that  
15 the Director, who did know of at least an earlier attempt --  
16 is there any indication that following the Bay of Pigs, or  
17 following the missile crisis, he explicitly brought the sub-  
18 ject up for review?

19 Mr. Colby. There is one documentary evidence that Mr.  
20 McCone dictated in 1967, I believe it was, in which he recounted  
21 being informed of a meeting, of an inter-Agency meeting at  
22 which the subject of assassination was raised, and he made a  
23 particular point of indicating after the meeting -- he was  
24 not at the meeting, I believe, but he heard of the meeting and  
25 he made a particular point of saying he disapproved of this

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and did not agree with it, to the other members.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Who was at that meeting McCone heard about?

Mr. Colby. That was the meeting we were talking about at the last session.

Mr. Schwarz. You brought up a new document which was Mr. McCone's dictation of recollection of '67.

Mr. Colby. Yes; I think you have that.

Mr. Schwarz. That I have not seen. I know we do not have that.

Mr. Colby. I am sorry, I thought you did.


Mr. Schwarz. Could that be supplied?

Mr. Colby. No problems, yes. This is our document and Chairman Church. Will you supply the Committee with the document?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Excuse me, I beg your pardon. He states in '67, at one of these meetings, about this time, I recall a suggestion made being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro. I took immediate exception to this suggestion stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the US Government and CIA were concerned. The idea should not be discussed nor should not be discussed nor should it appear in any papers.

Senator Mondale. Mr. Colby, the other day when you



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1 testified there was a memorandum that you gave us from I think  
2 Mr. Osborn, which objected to a memorandum by General Landsdale,  
3 which referred to assassinations of political leaders, in a  
4 memorandum regarding Operation Mongoose, which was Cuba. And  
5 it referred to an attached memorandum which I think you said  
6 was the property of the FBI.

7 Mr. Colby. Of the National Security Council.

8 Senator Mondale. NSC.

9 I gather you have a copy of that, but you don't feel  
10 authorized to let us see it?

11 Mr. Colby. I do have a copy of it. The understanding  
12 we have had with the other agencies is that each of us gives  
13 our own material but we refer to the other agency for any  
14 documents belonging to the other agency.

15 Chairman Church. Well, it is very difficult for the  
16 Committee to operate that way. I think that since the Committee  
17 is entitled to this information, that when it is pertinent  
18 and as we proceed in our hearings from one subject to another,  
19 we ought to be able to secure the information without having  
20 to go back through executive channels.

21 Mr. Colby. May I undertake to get the permission to give  
22 it to you? I will undertake to do this today.

23 Chairman Church. Any observations that the Committee  
24 wishes to make on this kind of a problem?

25 It is the first time it has come up.



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1 Senator Hart of Colorado. Is this the understanding we  
2 have had or not?

3 Mr. Schwarz. It has been a total frustration to the staff  
4 and I am very happy it has come up here because we get chased  
5 around the corner by one agency to another. It is called the  
6 "third agency rule." It was intended to have nothing to do  
7 with Congressional hearings. Obviously, it had to do with  
8 declassification to the public, and it has happened to completely  
9 delay our ability to get information because we go at one agency  
10 and then they determine that it really isn't their document  
11 or it mentioned some other agency, and then we have to go to  
12 the other agency.

13 This is an example of how frustrating it is.

14 Senator Mondale. Have we tried to get this document from  
15 the NSA?

16 Mr. Colby. No; this particular document had just come up  
17 on Wednesday --

18 Senator Schweiker. Does the counsel have any suggestions  
19 as to what he feels the Committee position should be in this  
20 area to enable him and staff to do an effective job?

21 Mr. Schwarz. I think the Committee's position ought to be  
22 that pertinent information should be produced by any agency  
23 that possesses it, and if they wish to inform another agency  
24 that they are doing it, then that is their business. But I  
25 think they should have to produce it if they possess it.

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1 Senator Mondale. Apparently this memo from McCone refers  
2 back to the meeting about which Osborne memorandum and the  
3 Lansdale --

4 Mr. Colby. The series of two or three meetings at that  
5 time, yes.

6 Senator Mondale. I think this is very important because  
7 apparently this was a meeting at which McNamara and Rusk were  
8 present, and apparently McCone was present, so we had all of  
9 the top principals.

10 Mr. Colby. At least one of them.

11 Senator Mondale. And they discussed assassinations at  
12 that meeting. And then Osborne came back with a memo which is  
13 now part of the record.

14 Mr. Colby. I think it is Edwards in that case. Harvey,  
15 excuse me.

16 Senator Mondale. Harvey. He came back with a memo which  
17 the Director supplied, objecting not to the assassination but  
18 to putting it in writing.

19 Chairman Church. Of course what we don't know is whether  
20 the assassination or subject of assassination that came up at  
21 this meeting was conjecture or whether it had to do with a  
22 revelation of actual attempts that had involved the CIA or  
23 that it had to do with an ongoing assassination effort by the  
24 CIA.

25 Senator Mondale. Yes.

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1 Chairman Church. All we know is the subject of assassina-  
2 tions apparently came up in the course of the meeting.

3 Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, as one of the agencies involved,  
4 if I could offer one explanation for the Third Agency Rule  
5 even in this circumstance. And I am particularly interested in  
6 this because sometimes our documents have material whose  
7 sensitivity is not apparent on the face and we assume that this  
8 will be handled in certain compartmented channels, and if it  
9 gets out of the compartment it might give problems that the  
10 individual at the other end wasn't aware of. That is the  
11 basis for the rule. The thought being go back and ask the  
12 originator, and he has a feeling for that and could make the  
13 particular case if something particularly sensitive is involved.

14 Chairman Church. I would suggest, Mr. Colby, without  
15 binding the Committee to a precedent, with respect to dealing  
16 with the Third Party Rule, that in this case you undertake  
17 to secure from the NSA --

18 Mr. Colby. I will.

19 Chairman Church. -- its permission to turn this particular  
20 document over to the Committee so it may be made a part of these  
21 hearings.

22 Mr. Colby. I will endeavor to do that today, Mr. Chairman.  
23 Senator Morgan. I am going to inquire from Senator  
24 Mondale what memorandum were you reading about McCone and the  
25 group being present?

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1 Senator Mondale. We have a memorandum, it is right here,  
2 from Mr. Harvey. Do I have the wrong one?

3 Yes, it is dated, I will show it to you, in which he  
4 objects to --

5 Chairman Church. What is the date of it?

6 Senator Mondale. 14 August 1962.

7 Senator Morgan. Do we have that?

8 Mr. Schwarz. It was shown to us on Wednesday, marked  
9 or deemed marked as part of the record, and returned to the CIA  
10 who returned it to us today.

11 Mr. Colby. I have another copy of it.

12 Senator Mondale. It refers to a meeting in Mr. Rusk's  
13 office at which presumably McNamara and Rusk, I gather from the  
14 later memo, and McCone were present, and it says this.

15 "I called Lansdale's office and in his absence pointed out  
16 to Frank Head the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this  
17 type of comment in writing in a document. The words he objected  
18 to were including liquidation of leaders. I advised him as  
19 far as CIA was concerned we would write no document pertaining  
20 to this and would participate in no open meeting to discuss  
21 it."

22 I read that to mean we will go ahead and do it but we don't  
23 want anything in writing and don't want to be in a meeting where  
24 it is going to leak. That makes a lot of sense. No living  
25 politician wants to be associated with an assassination, ever.

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1 if he wants someone assassinated. I think that is common sense.

2 That is why I think these documents are so crucial.

3 Chairman Church. Of course they are crucial and we must  
4 have them.

5 The ambiguity, however, that we have yet to clear up is  
6 in the third paragraph, Senator Mondale, where the memorandum  
7 reads the question of assassination, particularly of Fidel  
8 Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at a meeting of  
9 the special group augmented in Secretary Rusk's office in  
10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in  
11 answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject  
12 which has been made a matter of official record, the subject  
13 being the question of assassination.

14 Now, that leaves us still without any documentary proof  
15 that it was revealed at this meeting that the CIA was in fact  
16 engaged in an effort to assassinate.

17 Senator Mondale. Was Lansdale working for the CIA at  
18 this time?

19 Mr. Colby. Pardon?

20 Senator Mondale. Was General Lansdale working for the  
21 CIA at this time?

22 Mr. Colby. General Lansdale was Assistant to the Secretary  
23 of Defense, not CIA, at that time.

24 Senator Mondale. Had Lansdale been with the CIA?

25 Mr. Colby. He was with CIA in about 1952 to about 1955,



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1 more or less.

2 Senator Mondale. During the Philippines---

3 Mr. Colby. During the Philippines and in Vietnam at that  
4 time. Then he left CIA. He was a regular Air Force officer  
5 all this time but he was assigned to CIA for the time he was  
6 in the Philippines and the time he was in Vietnam. He then  
7 reverted to the Air Force and was an Assistant to the Secretary  
8 of Defense until about 1964 or 1965. Then he went out to  
9 Vietnam where he was an Assistant to the Ambassador, not  
10 working for CIA. We were associated with him but he was not  
11 a CIA officer at that time.

12 Senator Mondale. Do we know what his job at the Pentagon  
13 was?

14 Mr. Colby. It was Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.  
15 I can't tell you exactly what the job was entitled but  
16 he was active in the Secretary of Defense's participation in  
17 a variety, you might call it a 40 Committee type of operation.  
18 I think he probably was most cognizant of the various 40  
19 Committee --

20 Senator Mondale. If he were involved with that, he  
21 would have close liaison with all members of the 40 Committee,  
22 including the CIA?

23 Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

24 Chairman Church. I would like to call your attention also  
25 to this sentence.

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1 I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on  
2 this point and the special group augmented in not expecting  
3 any written comments or study on this point.

4 There, again, the ambiguity.

5 It is within the range of the possible that one of the  
6 ongoing efforts of the CIA was in fact raised and discussed.

7 It is also possible that the question of assassinating  
8 Fidel Castro --

9 Senator Mondale. Do we have those notes?

10 Chairman Church. I was going to ask that.

11 And that it was agreed that no study or review of this  
12 should be submitted as an abstract matter, should be submitted  
13 in written form.

14 So we are left without an answer to this question.

15 However, with respect to the notes that are referred to  
16 here, can you tell us whether those notes exist?

17 Mr. Colby. I don't know of any, Mr. Chairman.

18 Chairman Church. He said he took careful notes.

19 Mr. Colby. I don't know of any but I certainly will look.

20 Mr. Breckinridge. When we reviewed this problem in 1967  
21 we found no such notes.

22 Senator Huddleston. Let me inject a thought or two along  
23 this line.

24 It seems to me like one of the things we are going to have  
25 to determine as we go along is as to what extent there was or



1 there is a standard operating procedure of your Agency an  
2 effort not to make notes, an effort for certain individuals  
3 not to have certain knowledge by design.

4 For instance, I was reading your memorandum here dated  
5 1 June 1973 in which you are reporting on a meeting that occurred.  
6 You make a point to say that you briefed someone orally. The  
7 word "orally" is in there -- assuming that for the purpose  
8 someone should know that you did not put anything in writing  
9 or you did not give him a written report.

10 You also say that I personally managed to avoid gaining  
11 any knowledge of what precise actions were taken.


12 I think a reasonable inference there is that there is a  
13 deliberate on your part here -- and maybe this is standard  
14 operating procedure -- for you not to get specific information  
15 so that you always will be in the position of not knowing some-  
16 thing.

17 Mr. Colby. I don't recognize the reference. Certainly,  
18 I think in past years there were situations we did not want  
19 to commit to writing.

20 There is a great deal of effort made by us to what we  
21 call compartment information so that it is known only to certain  
22 people and not known to others. The compartment is still to  
23 be open at the top, however.

24 There are things that I purposely try not to know. I don't  
25 want to know the name of an agent in the Soviet Union. I have

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1 absolutely no desire to learn his name because I don't need  
2 to know that information.

3 Senator Huddleston. Here we are referring to action in  
4 this case and not individuals.

5 Mr. Colby. I don't recognize that. I could perhaps put  
6 it in context if I could see the memorandum.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Perhaps we ought to mark that memorandum.

8 Senator Huddleston. Memorandum for Mr. William E. Colby.  
9 I thought it was by Mr. Colby.

10 Mr. Colby. I am sorry.

11 Senator Huddleston. Someone within the Agency apparently  
12 is informing you about something and the subject is special  
13 activities. I don't see a name on it.

14 It has information in it about both the President and  
15 Attorney General being involved in briefings.


16 Mr. Schwarz. I think for convenience of reference we  
17 ought to mark it as an exhibit.

18 Let's number as today's number, and we have put in the  
19 three charts so far, and we will call this, which is the 1  
20 June 1973 memorandum for Mr. William E. Colby, subject special  
21 activities, from stamped pages 00457, 00458, and 00459, of  
22 the so-called 694 pages.

23 (The document above referred to was  
24 marked Colby Exhibit No. 4.)

25 Mr. Colby. I recognize what that is, Senator Huddleston.

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1           The reason it was addressed to William E. Colby is we  
2 were going through that period in the middle of 1973 where I  
3 was technically, I guess, Director of Operations but had been  
4 nominated to become Director. This was the kind of thing that  
5 normally would be addressed to the Director but we had an  
6 Acting Director, General Walters, but it was pretty clear I  
7 was responsible for making the machinery run and we had a lot  
8 of things around the Agency addressed to me and signed by me.

9           I believe this follows a conversation I had with a Mr.  
10 Walter Elder, who was an Assistant to Mr. John McCone -- he  
11 was Executive Assistant when he was Director -- I think Mr.  
12 Elder told me that there were certain things that he knew of  
13 in the background that related to this effort of identifying  
14 various questionable activities of the Agency, and I asked  
15 him to go write them down so we could get them into the  
16 Inspector General's report.

17           Senator Huddleston. The only question I raise, I don't  
18 want to get off into the contents of a particular memorandum,  
19 but the context with the area you were pursuing, just whether  
20 or not standard operating procedure would require at times  
21 there be a deliberate avoidance by certain people in the  
22 Agency of facts and whether or not there is a great body of  
23 decisions that are made and implemented without anything written  
24 down, so that there would never be any documentary evidence  
25 of it?

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1 Mr. Colby. Well, I think that you certainly can say that  
2 there is an avoidance by a lot of people of learning things  
3 that they are not authorized to know. I mean the more loyal  
4 in a sense of our employees, say that they have authority to  
5 know what is going on in, say, Cuba, they don't have a right  
6 to know what is going on in, say, China, and they rather  
7 carefully keep themselves from learning what is going on in  
8 China. I think that is a prevalence.

9 I think the question you are asking, however, is whether  
10 we are trying to keep activities off of paper and it is pretty  
11 clear that the assassination story was essentially kept off  
12 the paper.

13 And I would think that is about the only one. No, the  
14 drug thing. I assume some of that was kept off of paper?

15 Mr. Breckinridge. Yes.

16 Mr. Colby. The lesson that I have frequently given to  
17 my colleagues in the bureaucracy is that however hard you try  
18 to keep it off of paper, you will not succeed in a bureaucracy,  
19 somebody will write it down and, therefore, it is a totally  
20 feckless exercise to pretend that you can keep it secret by  
21 not writing it down. But the fact is there were situations  
22 in which a conscious effort was made in the past to keep things  
23 off the record.

24 Senator Huddleston. To sum up, you, as Director, with the  
25 exception of individual names for which there would be no

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1 particular value to you and no advantage to you knowing, except  
2 for that you make no deliberate effort not to know about  
3 operations?

4 Mr. Colby. No. As a matter of fact, I take the opposite  
5 position, Senator. I say that to my subordinates and have  
6 reiterated a number of times, I cannot be subjected to surprise.  
7 You have got to let me know the things I ought to know. And  
8 I have undertaken the same obligations to my oversight committees,  
9 for example, that I am responsible getting to them before  
10 they hear about it some place else.

11 Senator Huddleston. The other is in this inquiry. Can  
12 the Committee expect that every effort will be made to supply  
13 to us information about various things, even though they may  
14 not be written down?

15 Mr. Colby. You have my commitment to that effect.

16 Senator Huddleston. Going further and looking through  
17 the files for notes and documents?

18 Mr. Colby. It is my hope, Senator, that I can help you  
19 on this investigation rather than defending myself against you.


20 Senator Huddleston. That is all.

21 Mr. Colby. That is what I would like to have the relation-  
22 ship, that I am trying to help you do this investigation.

23 Chairman Church. We want such a relationship and we  
24 are trying to work it out.

25 Mr. Colby. I know you do. You have said it a number of

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1 times and I agree with you.

2 Chairman Church. Now, Senator Mondale.

3 Senator Mondale. The memorandum from John McCone that  
4 we received this morning, dated 14 April, 1967, is addressed  
5 to the Director.

6 Was McCone an employee or related with the CIA at that  
7 time?

8 Mr. Colby. No, he left in 1965.

9 Senator Mondale. So this was a memorandum from a person  
10 no longer with the CIA, as former Director to the current  
11 Director, which begins "no memorandum can be located covering  
12 the August, '62 meeting."

13 That is the one that earlier says the question of  
14 assassination was discussed. However, it is highly probable  
15 that one exists.

16 Now, I would like all documentation, records, and notes  
17 that bear on the question of what McCone was referring to,  
18 because I get the impression that the then Director, Mr. Helms

19 Mr. Colby. Yes.

20 Senator Mondale. -- was reviewing the question of documenta-  
21 tions and records affecting that meeting, or the question of  
22 assassination, and I think we need to know what transpired,  
23 what was happening then, what kind of responses he received.

24 Mr. Colby. We will certainly give you that. I can give  
25 you a basic explanation.

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1 This exercise stemmed from the revelation in Jack  
2 Anderson's columns, I believe, of our relationship with the  
3 Mafia figures at that time. This then generated the request  
4 to Mr. Breckinridge to do an Inspector General's report of  
5 this whole subject, which he did, and which we will certainly  
6 make available to this Committee.

7 In the course of it, and with the publicity, Mr. McCone,  
8 who does maintain an occasional contact with the Agency, he  
9 is a friend of it and an ex-Director -- I see him every now  
10 and again and try to sort of keep him up with what is going  
11 on in general terms without getting into political or sensitive  
12 matters or anything -- but he does maintain this contact and  
13 I am sure that somebody made contact with him or he made contact  
14 with the Agency about the Jack Anderson column, and that then  
15 generated this particular memorandum.

16 Senator Mondale. And there was an Inspector General's  
17 study done at that time?

18 Mr. Colby. Yes, sir; and you will get access to that.

19 Senator Mondale. Can we have documentation as to how  
20 it was originated and the response to what was done?

21 Chairman Church. Yes, we should have that information.  
22 And I might say that you are aware, no doubt, that charges have  
23 been made that documents have been destroyed in the CIA which  
24 may have been connected with the general subject of CIA  
25 involvement in assassination efforts.

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1 Can you tell this Committee whether, to your knowledge,  
2 documents have been destroyed?

3 Mr. Breckinridge. I think we can talk in terms of what  
4 we know is there.

5 On the Castro assassination, the involvement with the  
6 Mafia, there were a few memoranda in the Office of Security,  
7 and I think you have copies of those.

8 On the second phase of that, there are practically no  
9 records at all and our investigation at that time was made  
10 entirely on interviews.

11 Based entirely on interviews, an attempt to reconstruct  
12 that activity.

13 The final action which involved a Cuban by the name of  
14 Cubella --

15 Mr. Colby. This was the Cuban major we discussed last  
16 time.

17 Mr. Breckinridge. Started in the minds of the people  
18 who were involved, was an attempt to generate an internal  
19 political action, revolt, and the records are very full because  
20 there was no attention on the part of the people who were  
21 involved at that time that that would be an assassination in  
22 the sense that the original work with the Mafia was engaged in  
23 and there is a full record and that exists today.

24 In the case of the Dominican Republic, this developed later.

25 Let me finish.

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1 I will go back to the Cubella case.

2 In the instance of the Dominican Republic, the record  
3 was very full then and it is still very full today. I am  
4 certain that record is complete.

5 Again, in the minds of the people who were involved, they  
6 drew a line between the support they gave to the coup group  
7 and conscious association with assassination as such. Those  
8 records are complete and those records were developed at the  
9 time and they were retained. It was in the period of the  
10 Mafia was involved where people knew the purpose was assassina-  
11 tion.

12 The records are practically non-existent and I believe  
13 they never existed.


14 Harvey, who conducted the second phase of that, at the  
15 time of our investigation had a handful of cryptic notes that  
16 only he could interpret. We couldn't interpret them. And  
17 it is my understanding that those notes no longer exist. They  
18 were retained by him and he brought them in at the time that  
19 we were questioning him. He was then on sick leave prior to  
20 retirement. Those notes were totally unrevealing.

21 I think that those records are in the same state today  
22 that they were then.

23 There were none in the Castro affair except the results  
24 of our investigation involving the Mafia.

25 The Cubella case is full. That case did progress to the

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1 point that on the very day of President Kennedy's assassination  
2 a man was meeting with Cubella in Paris, and in response to  
3 Cubella's request offered him an assassination device that at  
4 the time of the investigation we understood he accepted but  
5 I have since been told he did not accept. It was a ballpoint  
6 pen converted into a syringe for injecting poison.

7 Subsequently, arms were handed to Cubella by a Cuban  
8 refugee in Madrid, in the very early part of 1965, and two  
9 catches were put down by boats off Cuba for Cubella. I think  
10 he may have recovered one of those but not the other. The  
11 records on that are pretty complete.

12 So, generally speaking, on those things where the Agency  
13 was involved, with the exception of the association with the  
14 Mafia, where from the beginning the intent was assassination,  
15 the records are complete, and I think that if people look at  
16 those they will find this is so.

17 Mr. Schwarz. Is the understanding that all records dealing  
18 with this subject, whether they are in Inspector General  
19 reports or underlying documents, would be produced for our  
20 inspection?

21 Mr. Colby. Yes.

22 If I may ask only the Committee's consideration of the  
23 normal treatment of compartmentation and some discussion of  
24 possibly some individual names in it that we would hope that  
25 we might be able to handle very privately, or necessary, or even

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1 leave out. But the normal procedures.

2 Chairman Church. Very well.

3 Now, Mr. Schwarz.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Just to tidy up one matter.

5 Let me mark as Committee Exhibit 5 the John A. McCone  
6 to the Director memorandum of April 14, 1967.

7 (The above mentioned document was  
8 marked as Colby Exhibit No. 5  
9 for identification.)

10 Mr. Schwarz. Might I come down with you on this document  
11 and we will look at it together?

12 Mr. Colby. I have a copy.

13 Mr. Schwarz. As of April, 1967, Mr. McCone was no longer  
14 at the Agency, was he?

15 Mr. Colby. No.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Was he then in his position with ITT, or  
17 did he have some other position?

18 Mr. Colby. I really don't know.

19 Mr. Schwarz. In any event he wasn't at the Agency?

20 Mr. Colby. That is right.

21 Mr. Schwarz. The thing that is curious about this memo-  
22 randum, with respect to the state of the record, is paragraph  
23 one, which reads as follows:

24 "No memorandum can be located covering the August 10, 1962;  
25 however, it is highly probable that one exists."

~~TOP SECRET~~



1 Now, Mr. McCone, was not in the Agency, is writing a  
2 memorandum to the Director, who was in the Agency, referring to  
3 a search by or on behalf of Mr. McCone.

4 Now, did Mr. McCone have documents outside the Agency,  
5 or how do you explain?

6 Mr. Colby. I don't believe he has any documents. I have  
7 never asked him. But I don't believe he has any documents  
8 outside of the Agency.

9 Mr. Knoche. Mr. McCone wrote me that memorandum while on  
10 Agency premises. It was during a visit to the Agency and he  
11 had the benefit of his ex-staff assistant, Mr. Walter Elder,  
12 helping him in doing a little research in this connection.

13 Mr. Colby. All that says is that they hadn't located it  
14 by then. I think we have located some since that time.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Picking up on a question of Senator Hart  
16 of Michigan, he asked you whether there had been evaluations  
17 in connection with the Cuban missile crisis, and then you  
18 testified about evaluations post-Bay of Pigs and rather continual  
19 evaluations of the subject of Cuba. But I take it those were  
20 not evaluations or re-evaluations of the subject of assassinations?

21 Mr. Colby. All I can say is I think that question is  
22 a little obscure.

23 I know that after the Bay of Pigs failure there was an  
24 investigation made of the whole episode, and in the course of  
25 that a discussion of what we were then to do and a program was

~~TOP SECRET~~



1 developed. And I am speaking at second hand here. But a program  
2 was developed of keeping some economic pressure on Cuba, and  
3 that was a national policy, not just a CIA -- keeping an  
4 economic pressure on Cuba and continuing to support the  
5 various elements which might eventually lead to a change in  
6 the Cuban government through some overthrow or otherwise.

7 I think some propoganda programs were kept up, some exile  
8 activities were kept up, some training of teams to be infil-  
9 trated into Cuba were kept up, some sabotage operations were  
10 continued. And those continued over the following several  
11 months.

12 Right after the 1962 missile crisis -- I cannot identify  
13 right offhand here any particular review of that -- but I  
14 know that that was a subject of 40 Committee consideration at  
15 various times.

16 Whether that included assassination or not I cannot say.

17 My guess, as I say, is that if John McCone didn't know  
18 about it, it was not covered in those discussions because it  
19 would be very hard to cover them without his being involved.

20 Chairman Church. Are you telling us that the much publi-  
21 cized investigation of the CIA, which took place following the  
22 Bay of Pigs fiasco, and as I remember this review was ordered  
23 by the President in order to determine what had gone wrong and  
24 why, and it was a matter of great urgency and importance to the  
25

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1 government at that time -- are you telling us that in the  
2 course of that review the Agency's involvement in the assassina-  
3 tion efforts against Castro never came to light?

4 Mr. Colby. I just don't know, Mr. Chairman. That is  
5 the answer I have to give you. I do not know.

6 I believe the Inspector General report after the Bay of  
7 Pigs does not mention it, does it?

8 Mr. Breckinridge. No.

9 Mr. Colby. The report of the Committee that looked into  
10 it, General Taylor, and the Attorney General and somebody else  
11 there were three members of it -- maybe Mr. Dulles. I don't  
12 believe that report mentioned it.

13 Chairman Church. Do we have a copy of the Taylor Report?

14 Mr. Colby. I think it has been made available. Or is  
15 that a third agency problem?


16 Mr. Schwarz. That is another frustration. That one has  
17 been denied to us on the theory that it is part of the Kennedy  
18 Library and, therefore, we have to go through another channel  
19 to get that.

20 Does the CIA have a copy of the Taylor Report?

21 Mr. Colby. I don't believe we do. I know we looked for  
22 it a couple of years ago and at that time I was told we didn't  
23 have it.

24 I hate to say here under oath we do not have one, but I  
25 know I tried to get ahold of it and was told a couple of years

~~TOP SECRET~~



1 ago that we couldn't have one. But there are lots of drawers  
2 in those safes in that building.

3 I am not trying to evade the question. I am trying to  
4 say I don't think we have one. It could be.

5 We have a copy of our own Inspector General's report  
6 at that time.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Does that contain any mention of the  
8 assassination subject?

9 Mr. Colby. No, it does not.

10 Mr. Schwarz. Do you find it puzzling that the CIA doesn't  
11 have a copy of the report designed to review its activities  
12 in the Bay of Pigs, a report that led to substantial Presidential  
13 changes in the instructions with respect to your jurisdiction?

14 Mr. Colby. Yes.

15 Mr. Schwarz. I mean, it is an important document --

16 Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Schwarz. -- relating to the CIA.

18 Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

19 Senator Schweiker. I wonder if Mr. McCone has a copy?

20 Mr. Colby. I would doubt it.

21 Senator Schweiker. That is why he came in, because of that?

22 Mr. Colby. Roughly, yes.

23 Chairman Church. In the course of the investigation that  
24 took place, this investigation that led to the Taylor Report,  
25 that took place in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs.



TOP SECRET

1           Were records kept, that is to say --

2           Mr. Colby. Of contributions?

3           Chairman Church. No. Did the investigation involve  
4 written records? Did it involve testimony taken under oath  
5 and transcribed? Is there raw material relating to that  
6 investigation to which this Committee could gain access?

7           Mr. Colby. I don't know the answer to the question, Mr.  
8 Chairman. Maybe Mr. Breckinridge can help us.

9           Mr. Breckinridge. I am not familiar with that study.  
10 I am familiar with the approach that was taken at the time  
11 within our organization when the Inspector General -- I was  
12 not involved in that study but I have heard it discussed  
13 how they approached it.

14           Their understanding of the Bay of Pigs problem was the  
15 overall invasion plan and organization for that and concentrated  
16 on that.

17           By way of explanation for the omission of reference to  
18 the assassinations, so few people knew about it, and I think  
19 it came to no one's attention -- simply did not discover it  
20 at that time. And it may not have been by way of explanation,  
21 not a justification. It may not have been associated in the  
22 minds of the people who did know about it with the inquiry  
23 into the military operation.

24           Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bissel knew about it and he was certainly  
25 the main architect of the Bay of Pigs; right?

~~TOP SECRET~~



1 Mr. Breckinridge. Right.

2 Mr. Schwarz. And Mr. Dulles, at least the records we  
3 put in on Wednesday, knew about it and he was substantially  
4 involved in the Bay of Pigs. Those gentlemen surely would have  
5 been questioned by General Taylor and Attorney General Kennedy

6 Is that fair?

7 Mr. Breckinridge. I would assume so.

8 Mr. Colby. Certainly, yes. But again, if the focus was  
9 on the military operation, it might have been that that other  
10 operation was not involved in it.

11 Mr. Schwarz. The record further shows that on May 7, 1962,  
12 a meeting was held with Attorney General Robert Kennedy in  
13 which the contemporaneous document describing that meeting  
14 indicates that he was not told that there was a continuing  
15 and ongoing operation, but rather was told of something which  
16 was not called an assassination but was called a project. He  
17 was told of something which was referred to in the past tense;  
18 is that right?

19 Mr. Colby. It was in the past tense. Whether there was  
20 any other discussion in that meeting on this subject we just  
21 don't know.

22 Mr. Breckinridge. I think I can interpret what happened.

23 The people who briefed Attorney General Kennedy are the  
24 ones who knew about what we call the first phase of the operation  
25 with the Mafia.

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1 Colonel Edwards, who was Director of Security, under whose  
2 supervision the first portion of that activity was carried on,  
3 had withdrawn from it.

4 The operation, when it was reactivated later, was reactivated  
5 on a compartmented basis, and Colonel Edwards did not know  
6 about it.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Even though it continued to involve the  
8 Mafia until early 1963?

9 Mr. Breckinridge. That is correct. Colonel Edwards no  
10 longer knew what was going on. So when he briefed the Attorney  
11 General he did not know that this second operation, this  
12 reactivation of the operation that had formerly run under his  
13 responsibility -- he did not know that it was ongoing.

14 Mr. Schwarz. Who was responsible for the selection of  
15 Colonel Edwards and General Counsel Houston as being the  
16 persons who would go to brief Attorney General Kennedy?

17 Mr. Breckinridge. I am not sure I know that.

18 Mr. Schwarz. It would have been someone of higher  
19 authority within the CIA; is that correct?

20 Mr. Breckinridge. We have tried to determine.

21 Mr. Houston, if I understand it, feels that he would not  
22 have done this unless he thought the Director knew.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Knew what?

24 Mr. Breckinridge. Knew that he was going to do this. But  
25 he did not talk to the Director about it.



1 I gather that it is not all that clear in Colonel Edwards'  
2 either at this point in time.

3 Mr. Schwarz. So someone selected these persons to go  
4 and brief Attorney General Kennedy, number one.

5 Number two, they did not know the plot for assassination  
6 was ongoing, although in fact it was?

7 Mr. Breckinridge. Correct.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Number three: therefore, Attorney General  
9 Kennedy was given the impression that whatever was going on  
10 was over; is that correct?

11 Mr. Breckinridge. I think that is correct as I reconstruct  
12 it.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Can we determine then who was responsible  
14 for selecting those persons to brief Attorney General Kennedy,  
15 instead of including in the group other persons who knew that  
16 the Mafia part of the assassination attempt was ongoing?

17 Mr. Breckinridge. I don't think that we can now.

18 As I say, there is no written record.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Who could it have been? Who was in a  
20 higher position of authority, in a position to make a decision  
21 as to who should brief Attorney General Kennedy?

22 Mr. Breckinridge. I would assume that Mr. Bissel could  
23 have.

24 Mr. Schwarz. Was he still in the Agency in May of 1962?

25 Mr. Breckinridge. I don't know. I think he may have

