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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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Vice Presidents' Office.  
Very helpful.

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

June 25, 1975

*JMR*

FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: The Vice President *had R*  
SUBJECT: Senator Mansfield's Comments on Murphy  
Commission Report

I thought you would be interested in a copy of Senator Mansfield's critical comments (Tab A) concerning the report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (Murphy Commission). These comments will be published in an annex of the report along with those of Congressman Broomfield, Jane Engelhard and myself. Although my supplementary remarks (Tab B) make some of the same criticisms, they are presented in a more constructive spirit.

Senator Mansfield's main concerns are that:

- The findings of the Commission do not justify all the time, effort and money expended. (As a key sponsor of the Commission he is obviously sensitive about the money spent by the staff in an effort which began three years ago.)
- The Commission has ignored the atmosphere in which it was created, a time when "the White House had come to a point of virtual belligerency in its relations with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee." At the same time, he criticizes the Commission for not looking "determinedly forward."
- The "entire thrust" of the report "goes toward enshrining the pre-eminence of the executive branch in the conduct of foreign policy."

-- There is an almost total absence of mention of the role of Congress until the last part of the report. (I raised the same objection from a different perspective, but the Commission staff felt Mansfield wanted discussion of Congress downplayed.)

The Senator also opposes "exhortations" about "creating a new era of cooperation between Congress and the Executive branch;" objects to the proposal for a Joint Committee on National Security, and feels (as do I) that Congress should move slowly on the issues of executive agreements and executive privilege.

In the area of intelligence, he expresses disappointment with the "modest" suggestions concerning CIA, calls for eliminating the Military intelligence agencies and reducing the size of the National Security Agency (NSA), and favors a "full house cleaning of CIA." He opposes giving the Director a White House office and changing the name of the agency. He also wants your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board disbanded.

The reference on page 4 to "a spokesman for an absent member who...was accorded unusual weight" is a thinly veiled reference to the role played by General Goodpaster. In fact, however, a number of other Commissioners were represented by staff who sat at the table and spoke during Commission deliberations. Mrs. Engelhard's representative was particularly active in her absence. She could not appear at meetings due to illness.

Senator Mansfield, himself, elected not to attend any Commission meetings during the five months that I served on the Commission and only occasionally had a staff member present. When the staff member appeared on the Senator's behalf, his abrasive comments were treated deferentially.

A

## COMMENTS BY SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD

With regret I must record my differences with some segments of the Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. My regret stems from several sources. I recognize how much time and attention Ambassador Robert Murphy gave to the activities which he faithfully chaired. Other members of the Commission are distinguished, busy citizens whose service in this undertaking obviously is not diminished by my disagreement with some of their decisions. My own participation in the arduous, frustrating work of editing staff-offered language necessarily had to be minimal because of my Senate duties.

My expression of personal disappointment naturally does not mean that there are not useful observations, wise comments and helpful recommendations contained in the pages of the Commission's report. On the whole, however, I fear that the ratio of effort to result has not been up to expectations. A surfeit of words masks an absence of clarity. Thin gruel is being served in a very thick bowl.

Whatever the reasons, the Commission paid little attention to the circumstances in which the legislative mandate for the Commission was created. The declared purpose was to look determinedly forward and not backward but the result is not in harmony with that purpose. In establishing the Commission, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate called for an investigation of the mechanisms for the conduct of foreign policy at a time of intense confrontation between the executive and legislative branches of the U. S. Government. But

the Commission seems to have interpreted its mandate largely as an invitation to conduct a sort of elaborate management study of certain Executive Departments, notably the Department of State.

Looking back to 1972, one has to remember that at that time the executive branch had sought to block every avenue to deny Congress a role in U. S. foreign policy, mainly in regard to Indochina. The so-called doctrine of Executive privilege had been invoked and extended to the point where it was offensive to representative government;\* efforts by Senate committees to obtain information were blocked, evaded or ignored; the White House had come to a point of virtual belligerancy in its relations with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

One can read the several hundred pages of the Commission's report without gaining much more than an inkling of this background. That is not to imply that a partisan or institutional bias should have been the motivating force behind the Commission's work. But to ignore the atmosphere in which the Commission was created represents a distortion of its purpose.

Even a cursory reading of the Commission's report is likely to impress the reader with its timidity and its paucity of substance. The Commission's

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\*See the testimony of former Attorney General Kleindienst on April 10, 1973, before three Senate subcommittees, as follows:

"Senator Muskie. I am talking about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  million employees of the executive branch; . . .

"Mr. Kleindienst. You do not have the power to compel me to come up here if the President directs me not to. . . .

"Senator Muskie. Does that apply to every one of the employees of the Federal branch of the United States?

"Mr. Kleindienst. I think if the President directs it, logically, I would have to say that is correct." (p. 46, Vol. I, Hearings on Executive Privilege, Secrecy in Government, Freedom of Information, before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on Government Operations and the Subcommittees on Separation of Powers and Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee of the Judiciary, U. S. Senate).

mandate was to make a full and comprehensive study of all Government agencies concerned with foreign policy and to come up with recommendations which might be quite sweeping in character--including the abolition of certain "services, activities and functions not necessary to the efficient conduct of foreign policy. . ." Unfortunately, the obvious lack of any consensus among the Commissioners has meant that in the various drafts of the report it has been necessary to water down progressively every recommendation. What is left leaves much to be desired.

Perhaps most remarkable is the almost total absence--until one reaches the concluding chapters--of any consideration of the role of the Congress in foreign policy. It may be argued that there are references to the Congress scattered through the report. These often amount to little more than a passing notation that there is indeed a legislative branch of our Government. It is astonishing to discover that the first article of the Constitution of the United States seemingly has been almost overlooked in the Commission's report. It may be that the reversal of roles which has placed Article II in the preeminent position is a mere recognition of fact. If so, then the American people should be informed accordingly by this report. The entire thrust of the Commission report goes toward enshrining the preeminence of the executive branch in the conduct of foreign policy. This appears to reflect a belief that the inflated role of the Presidency should not only be continued but bolstered, notwithstanding the experiences of the last several years.

The structuring of the Commission itself did little to counter the emphasis on the executive point of view. While Congressional members and appointees were named soon after the enactment of Public Law 92-352, the White House delayed its appointments process for a half-year. Moreover, far from

serving as a balancing force, much of the staff talent was not used, or was diverted into "make-work" projects. Most of the material printed in the appendices apparently had almost no effect on the Commission's findings.

The Commission is made up of duly appointed members. However, on occasion, a spokesman for an absent member who, in fact, had no legal status in the Commission's study, was accorded unusual weight. This spokesman sat at the table as a quasi-alternate Commissioner, despite my relayed objections. This dubious practice had the effect of a further diminution in the consideration of the Congressional role in foreign policy.

Lack of appreciation of the role of Congress appears as early as the second page of Chapter I. An illustration is provided to underscore the supposed importance of differences in the decision-making process--and the story is both incomplete and misleading. The fact is that after the Geneva Protocol was sent to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification it was discovered that there was no clear policy on whether tear-gas and herbicides were covered, and a letter went to the President of the United States from the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee requesting clarification. It took several years of argument before the issue was at least theoretically resolved. The renunciation of use of herbicides, in fact, did not come until well after the ending of U. S. military actions in Vietnam. It is not likely--as stated--that the decisions of the two Presidents "would have been similar."

There are typical exhortations in the Congressional report about creating a new era of cooperation between Congress and the executive branch.

We have heard such language for twenty or more years. Invariably what is proposed is a one-way street. In practice, it is Congress that is expected to "see the light" and accept the executive position. Much of the discussion in Chapters 13 and 14 would not be needed if the executive branch took seriously its duty to share information and to consult fully and freely with the Congress. The pendulum has swung so far toward the executive for so long that anything like a return to a vertical position is greeted with cries of outrage from the Executive Departments. By the same token, proposals for new committees and other such devices would be seen as irrelevant if proper use were made of the existing standing committees.

This last point leads me to a discussion of the Commission's major proposal of a new "Joint Committee on National Security." (This should not be confused with the idea of a Joint Committee on Intelligence--a subject to which I will return). First, the report speaks approvingly of a proliferation of subcommittees and staffs--a concept with which I entirely disagree--and then it finds that the executive branch will have problems dealing with such an increased number of power centers. So the old idea of a Joint Committee on National Security is brought out once again.

My objections to such a new committee are numerous. First, such a committee would cut across the jurisdictions and tasks assigned existing standing committees and in time inevitably would decrease their authority and powers. Second, it would become a favorite tool of the executive for centralizing Congressional oversight functions and diminishing their scope. Third, the committee would have no promise of access--quite the contrary--to NSC materials and deliberations, so it would be a one-way street. Fourth, the report anticipates that the Committee would be composed of the most senior members of Congress

and would squeeze out the junior members. Fifth, it would presumably take over intelligence oversight in time, but that would not be the main function and it could easily drop out of view. Sixth, it could become a barrier to the dissemination of sensitive material to standing committees, while having little or no power itself to initiate legislation. Seventh, and not necessarily finally, giving such a committee control over reports means control over information and soon over action; a "super-committee" might easily fall under executive dominance and reduce the overall authority of the Congress.

The Commission report reiterates time and time again themes like inter-dependence, the inter-relationships between foreign and domestic policies and the importance of economic issues. One might think these themes only recently discovered, instead of ideas we have long considered truisms. They certainly do not justify the creation of some amorphous Joint Committee on National Security.

Although the discussions of war powers, executive agreements, executive privilege and comparable topics are relatively brief, they do raise questions that require answers not yet forthcoming from the executive branch. In my view, Congress should move slowly on the issues of executive agreements and executive privilege: in the first case because before legislating we need further information, which even the State Department apparently does not possess; in the second case because I am fearful of giving the Presidency under the rubric of Congressional reform more power than the office now has under the Constitution. As for the war powers resolution, however, I believe there is every reason to press the executive vigorously on the consultation and reporting sections of the law. These have been tested several times in recent months and the executive responses have been far from adequate.

Returning to the subject of intelligence, I would strongly emphasize the fact that both the executive and legislative branches have been inexcusably lax in supervising intelligence activities. But I am also disappointed with the Commission's findings in this regard. After giving a brief outline of the "intelligence community" the report goes on to make some modest suggestions which represent little if any advance over the conclusions of the Rockefeller Commission, which had a substantially more restricted mandate. Everything is accepted as given and some delicate tinkering with the machinery apparently is considered a sufficient response to the profound issues which have emerged in this connection.

It is intolerable that the public should still be burdened with a swollen, expensive and inefficient intelligence "community." Since the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established in the early 1960s to consolidate and replace the several military intelligence agencies, I recommend that the task be accomplished and the latter abolished as soon as possible. If the Service chiefs say that is impossible, then the DIA should go out of existence forthwith as an expensive redundancy.

I would also recommend that the National Security Agency (NSA), thousands of employees larger than the CIA, be dramatically reduced in size--especially so long as each of the armed services maintains its own cryptologic agency.

My belief is that the CIA, with all its blemishes, remains at the heart of our intelligence operations. A full house-cleaning must be undertaken as the facts come in (obviously some may never be known) and the agency's standing thereafter at the center of the intelligence community should be restored and strengthened. I agree that the Director of Central Intelligence

(DCI) should be given enhanced control over coordinating intelligence and should have the fullest access to the President. I do not, however, agree that a White House office is needed or is desirable for that purpose--it would be far too seductive a place for the DCI. While the DCI's deputy clearly must take over more of the running of the CIA, I believe the time is long overdue to make both officials civilians. The practice of having either one a military man began a generation ago when the CIA was just beginning; it is no longer necessary or desirable especially when virtually every other intelligence component is run by military officers.

To accomplish the necessary restructuring of the so-called intelligence community I would look primarily to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Thereafter, I would hope to see the creation of a Joint or Senate Committee on Intelligence, which was first proposed twenty-one years ago. Such a Committee should have the most extensive oversight powers possible, it should include members of more recent vintage in its ranks. There might very well be, moreover, a limited term of office (on the order of four to six years) for members serving on such a Committee.

Finally, on the intelligence issue, I must register my dissent from two propositions in the Commission's report. Granted there is a certain logic in renaming the CIA the Foreign Intelligence Agency, the accompanying implication that we need a "domestic intelligence agency" is distasteful and subject to misinterpretations; the frequent name changes experienced by the Soviet KGB also cause me to reject such a course. Secondly, I disagree with the Commission's views of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) which has long been of dubious value as an impartial reviewing agency. It would be easier, cheaper and logical to abolish it.

With the several exceptions described briefly above, I would like to associate myself with a number of Supplementary Remarks of Commissioner Engelhard. This is especially the case with her views on the value of the Commission's effort to strengthen the departments and the cabinet, on the proper balance between State and Treasury on economic policy responsibilities, [on a greater role for the OMB in the formulation and review of the Defense budget,] and on the cliches surrounding the phrase "multilateral diplomacy." At the same time, I would warn against stressing the importance of economic events and the need for economic "experts" to the point where they become fads.

In conclusion, I would repeat my belief that there are a number of useful ideas and observations in the Commission's report, but that they seem to me too few in volume and significance to have justified all the time, effort and money required for their production.

B

SUPPLEMENTARY REMARKS

by

THE HONORABLE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER  
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

In July 1972 when the Commission on Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy was established, the situation, both at home and abroad, was quite different from the situation in the world today.

- American forces were deeply involved in helping South Vietnam meet an all-out invasion from North Vietnam.
- The President had made historic first trips to the Peoples Republic of China, where the important Shanghai Communique was issued, and the Soviet Union, where the first Strategic Arms Limitations Agreement was signed.
- An uneasy tension loomed over the Middle East.
- News of a break-in at the Watergate had just come to the public's attention.
- There were important elements of strained relations between the Administration and the Congress.

Much has happened in the intervening three-year period, during which the Commission's report has been developed.

Dramatic events have tested the vitality and resilience of our great nation:

- The President and the Vice President resigned from office and were replaced under the provisions of the 25th Amendment of the Constitution.
- A dangerous war in the Middle East has been followed by negotiations which may lead toward a lasting peace.
- An oil embargo has demonstrated our growing lack of energy independence, and a quadrupling of oil prices has affected the economies of industrial nations around the world.
- The resulting inflation and subsequent recession have caused high unemployment and a great challenge to the free nations of the world.
- Our sacrifices to support the independence and freedom of Indochina came to a traumatic and tragic ending.
- The Cyprus dispute between Greece and Turkey and Communist gains in Portugal and elsewhere have threatened the solidarity of NATO's western and southern Mediterranean flanks.
- A younger, more restive Congress has been elected.

The United States has rebounded from this difficult period under the leadership of a strong new President. In

President Ford we have gained a great leader with the courage and vision to deal with the difficult challenges we face in the international area. He is especially dedicated to working constructively and openly with the Congress.

The President is backed by an extraordinarily skillful Secretary of State to whom America owes a great debt for steady and imaginative initiatives in U.S. foreign policy during a tumultuous and complex period. His brilliant contributions are in many ways unprecedented in our history. In his joint capacities as Assistant to the President and Secretary of State, he has been able to be most effective in assisting the President in building a safer and better world.

In trying to develop a report which both reflects the lessons of history and anticipates the organizational problems we will face in the future, the Commission has had to cope with this difficult period of transition. Although I was only privileged to participate in Commission deliberations during the final five months of its existence, I have been impressed with the ambitious range of issues it undertook to study and with its dedicated efforts to grapple with extremely complex problems.

Creative organizational recommendations can help us better meet economic, military and ideological challenges.

One of the limiting aspects of this Commission's interpretation of its charter has been the decision not to attempt

to project American purposes and objectives for the future as a framework for evaluating various organizational mechanisms.

If we do not act on the basis of a clear conception of our national interests -- our human goals, economic and financial needs, and political purposes -- the assessment of organizational structures must necessarily be narrow.

We must be organized in the years ahead to ensure that democracy will continue to be a dynamic force in the world, dedicated to the best interests and well being of peoples everywhere and to respect for human dignity, justice and freedom. We must enhance our economic strength and national vitality. We must recognize that threats to our national security while far more complex are as real today as in the past and far more serious for the future.

But while the third century of our national existence presents complex dangers; at the same time, it offers increased and exciting new opportunities for building a better world.

A question we must face is how an open society, dedicated to the ideals of freedom, democracy and human rights, can protect itself and work in partnership to strengthen those who share the same ideals, in a world of ideological, military, political, and economic competition with closed societies. For this reason we must have a strong sense of national purpose and dedication to our basic beliefs in human justice and freedom with a powerful military, a skillful intelligence service, and a vigorous and healthy economy,

which is essential for the protection and expansion of equal opportunity and respect for human dignity.

In competing with authoritarian governmental structures, a democracy has inherent organizational disadvantages. Our system depends on effective Executive leadership together with effective and constructive cooperation between the Congressional and Executive branches.

The Commission has made a number of excellent suggestions for future organization. I believe, however, that more creative proposals might have been developed in some areas for strengthening our democracy to meet the challenges we face. This is particularly true in the area of Congressional-Executive relations.

Congressional-Executive Relations. The Congress shares the responsibility with the Executive in regard to foreign policy, but the relationship can be destructive if it paralyzes the President in meeting his broad responsibilities for national security and world peace.

The process of conducting and implementing our foreign policy is complex. The Congress has injected itself more assertively into that process. There has been a return swing of the power pendulum -- which has tended to shift over the years between the President and the Congress.

Although tension between branches is inherent in our system, we need a renewed unity of purpose and a spirit of

confidence, both at home and abroad, especially at this moment in history.

This thought was cogently expressed by the Prime Minister of Singapore in a May 8, 1975 toast to the President when he called for the

...restoration of confidence in the capacity of the United States to act in unison in a crisis. No better service can be done to non-Communist governments the world over than to restore confidence that the American government can and will act swiftly and in tandem between the Administration and Congress in any case of open aggression, and where you have a treaty obligation to do so.

Disunity within Congress itself, like organizational problems within the Executive, can also complicate the process of cooperation. Today, some of the challenges to past practices within the Congress make it more difficult for the President and the Congress to find a concerted position.

These developments have contributed to a number of foreign policy difficulties, and to the appearance in recent times of a disorganized, fragmented, and often immobilized American foreign policy. The following are just a few examples:

-- The exclusion of four important friendly oil producing nations from many benefits of the 1974 Trade Act, even though they did not participate in the oil embargo of 1973.

- The exclusion of the Soviet Union from Most Favored Nation trading status, with a markedly negative impact on Jewish emigration.
- The cutoff of military assistance and sales to Turkey, a key member of NATO with borders on both the Soviet Union and the volatile Middle East.

Broad goals have usually not been at issue. Rather, it has more often been a question of different views on tactics to achieve objectives. The situation is complicated by the fact that lobbies, both domestic and foreign, are increasingly influential in Congress on foreign policy issues. Failure to develop a concerted position has resulted in legislation and policies which are counter-productive, in most cases, to the aims of the sponsors of these restrictive resolutions.

The dangerous result has been an international perception by some that the U.S. does not always act responsibly -- even in accordance with its own interests. The image of 536 individuals' hands on the tiller of the Ship of State does not inspire confidence that we will hold a steady course.

Surely, the Founding Fathers did not intend the Congress to have a veto on the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs. The President must have the flexibility to manage our foreign relations, to negotiate with foreign governments, and to take

those measures necessary to safeguard our national interests, always with appropriate participation by the Congress.

We need the proper measure of Congressional involvement and the processes which best serve our national interests. We need to build mutual confidence and genuine communication. Greater understanding and cooperation from the Executive must be matched by a sense of responsibility and trust on the part of the Congress.

Our co-equal branches of government need to build together a new spirit of cooperation. A dynamic Executive-Congressional partnership can usher in a new period of achievement in foreign relations.

The Commission's report could have made more creative suggestions for bolstering this essential cooperation.

-- In the chapters on the Executive branch there is not enough emphasis on the shared responsibilities of the two branches and the important Executive responsibility of liaison with Congress. In recognition of this, the new President, his staff, and Cabinet officers have made a special effort to strengthen contact and communication with the Congress.

-- In Chapter 13, which deals directly with Executive-Congressional relations, the collective impact of the recommendations seems to amount to a further curtailment of Executive flexibility.

The Commission has also attempted in the chapter on Executive-Congressional relations to cover in a short space questions which raise deep and difficult Constitutional issues that do not lend themselves to brief treatment. The questions of war powers, executive privilege and executive agreements are three of these complex issues which have a long history of Judicial, Congressional and Executive argument.

Although I have some reservations about the formulations on these subjects, I am gratified by modifications during Commission deliberations. I commend to the attention of those interested in the complicated questions of executive privilege and executive agreements the attached letter from Attorney General Levi, which he thoughtfully prepared on behalf of the Commission during the course of earlier discussions.

The net impact of the formulations in these areas and in other areas addressed in the chapter, such as time limiting provisions in legislation and a system for statutory classification, may restrict the needed flexibility of the Executive in day-to-day operations.

While I question the practicality of defining by statute, rules for the entire classification system of the government, I wholeheartedly endorse the Commission's call for legislation to provide criminal sanctions for persons who endanger the national interest by releasing classified

information. I endorse, as well, the Commission's call for more responsible handling of classified materials on Capitol Hill, believing this will facilitate a fuller exchange of information without jeopardizing security interests.

Executive. In the Executive area, there is a commendable tendency in the report to encourage greater participation by the various departments involved with foreign policy. However, some de-emphasis on the role of the President's staff is also implied. It would be a mistake to take any step that would diminish the President's ability to receive a full presentation of conflicting views on broad questions of national interest and to make decisions.

The President must have a competent staff to be well informed, to ensure that the views of the many departments and agencies concerned with foreign policy are fairly represented, and to convey his policies to the departments which must implement them. The President must take the lead in providing policy guidance and ensuring that the activities of our government are consistent with that policy.

Pitting one department against another without systematic resolution of controversial issues at the Presidential level would lead to uncoordinated policies by competing agencies. The President would have less understanding of the implications of conflicting views. He might well be deprived of well-thought-out options for the many significant policy decisions which only he can make.

Intelligence. Because of the growing complexities of the challenges to free societies, no national requirement is more important today than an effective intelligence service.

With regard to the question of direction of the intelligence community, the Commission was divided on the issue of whether the National Security Council Intelligence Committee should be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or the Director of Central (Foreign) Intelligence. The Committee is designed to provide policy guidance on intelligence from the perspective of the intelligence user. I believe it would be a mistake to give leadership of this Committee to anyone other than a policymaker. That guidance is best provided, under the current system, by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who is in a position to understand the concerns of the President, the principal intelligence consumer.

Another committee associated with Intelligence is the Forty Committee which considers proposals for actions that lie in that grey area between diplomatic action and declared war. The report may be overly critical of a supervisory system which has functioned well. The primary reason the Committee has met less frequently over the last year has been a cutback of activity resulting from concern about the large number of persons who must be informed about such operations. The proposals in Chapters 7 and 14 of the report for establishing a

small joint committee on intelligence or one on national security could well provide the solution to this problem.

With regard to oversight of intelligence, the Commission has noted the recommendations of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States concerning the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. These recommendations have important implications for improved Executive oversight, including the assessment of the quality of foreign intelligence collection, estimates, organization, and management; and assessment of compliance by CIA with its statutory authority.

Other Areas. Although I have minor reservations about other aspects of the lengthy report, I mention here only five areas:

-- United States Information Agency. The Stanton recommendations concerning USIA deserve most careful consideration and appear to have merit. However, there should be further evaluation of them, and an especially careful study of the pros and cons associated with creating an independent Voice of America (VOA). In contemplating any change it would be necessary to assure that VOA will have policy guidance from the Department of State.

-- Defense Budget. Although I strongly favor taking those measures necessary to guarantee continued American military security, I do not believe that the Commission's suggestions will overcome existing organizational problems associated with Defense budgeting. The President

needs to be presented with genuine alternatives for structuring our forces in order to make those decisions which will safeguard our security and most effectively utilize our national resources. Military security has first priority, but it must be harmonized with domestic concerns and economic constraints.

-- Embassy Communications. In endorsing a strong role for the Ambassador in managing the country team overseas, the formulations in Chapter 9 of the report concerning his right to access to all communications, rather than just official communications, goes beyond his actual requirements.

-- Energy. The Commission was not able to deliberate sufficiently to develop proposals for solving the immense organizational problems associated with obtaining energy independence. These need urgent examination.

-- General Research. The studies commissioned by the Staff are of uneven quality and, as indicated in the preface, have not been reviewed or approved by the Commission as a whole.

Overall, the report contains a number of imaginative and valuable contributions. A thorough consideration by the Executive and the Congress of the findings of the Commission will undoubtedly lead to constructive improvements in organization.

I have thoroughly enjoyed working with the distinguished members of the Commission and have great respect for the

diverse views of the individual members. We are all indebted to the skillful leadership of our Chairman, Ambassador Robert M. Murphy, and to the dedicated efforts of Director Francis O. Wilcox, Counsel William B. Spong, Jr., and the other devoted members of the Staff. I am especially grateful to General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (Ret), and Captain Jonathan T. Howe, USN, who have so ably assisted me in meeting my own responsibilities to the Commission.