

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Max Fisher
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, March 9, 1976
4:25 - 5:20 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office


Fisher: I want to put the current situation in perspective. I told Brent we shouldn't answer Rabbi Schindler right away. Things are getting out of hand and there is a perception problem. There will be serious damage if this is extended past the C-130's. We will really get kicked around and I don't think it's worth it right now.

President: Let me put it in perspective. Through a great deal of effort, we made the Sinai agreement -- which was a good one. At the same time the Soviets cut off Sadat from any new military equipment and spare parts. He can't get anything at all. Meanwhile we are asking for \$3.5 billion for Israel alone. Match that against six C-130's for Egypt. That is the substance of the situation.

Some of the State people testified that the aircraft were just a first step. That was a mistake -- in timing. Maybe not a year from now, but now. This step is just symbolic; so is the heavy aid to Israel. If Congress turns us down, we could have Egypt turning back to the Soviet Union or the Soviet Union moving in on his own, perhaps through Khaddafi. Sadat will be so weakened through working with us that he can't hold out.

Fisher: I don't disagree. Some of the State testimony got people inflamed.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.1
NSC MEMO, MAR 09, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Reviews 3/12/04
BY Jan MARA, DATE 4/10/04



CLASSIFIED BY Brent Scowcroft
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp to Det.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

The question is how do we get over this and get through the planes without the feeling that arms will be poured into Egypt? How can we get out of it and get some credit, not blame?

The only real opposition is Jackson. He will demagogue it if he can.

President: What should we do?

Fisher: Clarify what it is you are doing. Say you are just giving six airplanes. You could make a statement, meet with a group, or answer the Schindler wire.

President: I am speaking in Chicago Friday for 15 minutes and then will answer questions. That might be good.

Fisher: What would you say?

President: Just off the cuff -- this is a request for six aircraft, nothing more. What situation may develop we would have to review, but this is just a request for six aircraft. Then talk of the danger to Sadat if we reject any help for him.

Fisher: How about saying the request is for six and there is nothing more on the table at this time? But I think a meeting has some merit.

[Discussion of handling it by letter, press conference, or a meeting. Discussion of transitional quarter funding.]

There is a world-wide feeling among the diaspora that Israel needs to show more flexibility. I would like to talk to you about that before I go back to Israel.

President: When are you going?

Fisher: April 1st. I want to talk to the Israeli Government about it.

One other point. Connally feels neglected. He is not in Reagan's camp at all.



P/Max Fisher

✓

9 Mar 76

F I want to put context in perspective. I told Brent we shouldn't consider Schindler right away. Things are getting out of hand & there is a perception problem. There will be serious damage if this is extended past 130's. We will really get behind around & I don't think it is worth it right now.

P Let me put it in perspective. There much effort we make since agreement - a guideline. At some time SD out of Sabot led from mid equip & spare. He can't get anything at all. Meanwhile we are working for 3.5 bil for F alone. Match that against 6 C-130's for E. That is a volume of a set.

Some of the State people testified that - a lot worse for the 1st step. That was a mistake - in trying to work into a year from now, but now. This step is just symbolic, as the heavy aid to I. If they turn us down, we could have E turning back to SD or SD moving in on his own, perhaps through Khaldeji. Sabot will be so weakened from working w/us that he can't w/hold it.

F I don't disagree. Some of the State testimony get people influenced. The question is how do we get over this & get them a plan w/a feeling that arms will be provided to E. How can we get out of it & get some credit out of it.

The only real opposition is Jackson. He will demagogue it if he can.

P What should we do?

F Clarify what it is you are doing. Say you are just getting out airplanes.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12065, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, statelev. ew 3/12/04

BY lml NARA DATE 6/11/04



{ Q + A on Sheldon
Q + A on P-150's

You could make a statement, most as (a group
or answer to Schmidt's wife.

P I am speaking in Chicago Friday for 15 minutes
& then answer questions. That might be good.

F What would you say.

P Just off the cuff - this is a request for 6 a ft, within
more, what set may they be would have to invest,
but this is just a request for 6. Then talk of a
donor to Sobat if we reject any help for him.

F How about saying the requests for 6 + there is
nothing more on table at this time. But I think
a party has some credit.

(Discussion of handling it by letter,
press conf, or a party)

(Discussion of T & funding)

F There is a world-wide feeling among a dispute
that I need to show more flexibility. I would
like to talk to you about that before I go to the F
1 Apr. I want to talk to I Govt about it.

One other point. Generally feels neglected. He
not in Reagan's camp at all.

Dev. crisis
Hiskida
234-0317

