

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: August 16, 1975
(Evening Session)

PLACE: Vail, Colorado

Kissinger: Let me show you the real maps.

[They discuss the maps.]

Israel will now be able to claim they are still in the passes. It is pure domestic politics in Israel. The Israeli Cabinet is meeting tomorrow.

Dinitz called me. He wants agreement to the whole of Matmon-B. He also wants no political objection to the F-16. I see no problem, since they are getting the F-15. They want the Pershing with a conventional warhead. Then they have a lot of other technologically advanced items that they want.

What you have to think about is that a couple of years down the pike they are in a position to ignore us.

[Secretary Kissinger calls Ambassador Dinitz and conveys the following:]

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CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b)(3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. To Det.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Dep. inv. no. 3/10/04
BY dk, NARA, DATE 6/24/04

We will consider sympathetically the whole Matmon list. On the high-technology list we will have a joint study with a view to reaching a positive outcome. The F-16 is approved. On the Pershing we will need a joint study but we see no overwhelming problems.

The President feels strongly that there must be a satisfactory solution to the passes. You can call it what you like but our position is that it has to be substantially as I gave it. We have to avoid here that the shuttle breaks down in a way that we can't support you. If Egypt raises the passes, we will tend to support them.

All of these I have discussed with the President and he confirmed them.

[Dinitz call ends.]

[Reads the arms supply agreement language.]

I think Israel is committing suicide. With Americans in the Sinai and a \$2.1 billion aid submission in the middle of a recession. It will kill them here.

On the Iranian deal, I spoke to Simon, and Robinson spoke to him. He said it could be read as our endorsing the existing price. The discount is not enough to count.

President: But there is a discount and if price goes up we get that until the WPI goes up.

Kissinger: He says it is also a form of indexing. He is right there, but Zarb and Greenspan know that. He agrees that Cooper will work with Robinson about how to make the payments. I will call him tomorrow again, but he was softer than in his earlier opposition.

On my UN speech to the Special Session, I would like to present a number of technical proposals. Here are some of them. You agreed on a \$200 million fund for an agricultural development fund. We thought it could come from existing allocations. It turns out that isn't so. This is the only item with budget implications, and it could go into next year's budget.

We are looking at a new commodity arrangement to stabilize not the prices of commodities but overall earnings. We are looking into using IMF funds. We don't yet have full agreement within the government on these. The issues are highly technical. We are now coordinating.

We are looking at a tin agreement. Everyone's okay on that. And one on copper. All are agreed that we can enter negotiations. We have a list of conditions here but we won't push these to the point of interagency splits. There are a lot of other noncontroversial items [He reads them off.]. The major issues which might come to you are: Earnings stabilization -- that's a new concept. Simon is okay, but Greenspan might object.

President: As I understand, this session is for this specific purpose.

Kissinger: The danger is the underdeveloped will try to railroad their rhetoric in. What I would like to do is to submit a big list, so we would get through the Special Session -- since there is no way to discuss all these during the Session. There is almost no way it can impact on this year's budget.

What I would like to avoid while I'm gone -- Cheney said there was uneasiness. I would like to work through Seidman and keep Cheney and Rumsfeld out of it.

President: He is the Secretary of the EPB so he is the right one. Who will he work with?

Kissinger: Enders and Robinson. But I don't want them to edit the speech itself. I will let them clear every idea, but to give these guys a crack at every sentence is no good.

Brent, will you work with Seidman and Engers?

President: Have your people work with Seidman. And, Brent, you keep me posted on how the discussions are going.

Kissinger: I will give Brent a copy of the book with each issue.

I don't want to say, though, that the present economic system is the best. That would just turn 30 countries against us.

President: I am interested in practical results. You proceed along these lines.

Kissinger: This session is only an invitation to having technical discussions. I will clear the whole book, but not the drafts.

President: I would like to look at the drafts.

Kissinger: As soon as I have one.

On Soviet grain, here is a Robinson memo.

[Gives the President the memo]

President: It looks ingenious, but I will have to study it to understand it.

Kissinger: If we pull this and the Iranian thing off we will have covered about 18 percent of our oil imports by special deals.

Finally, on SALT we have two problems. On the NSDM, Defense is digging in on a couple of points. You had agreed with Brezhnev to ban cruise missiles on other than heavy bombers. I will hold off on that for now. The other is the definition of cruise missiles, which DOD wants to restrict just to nuclear weapons. That would make the whole thing a mess.

President: That sounds ridiculous.

Scowcroft: It is just a way to get around the limitation.

Kissinger: I would recommend you agree with the first, but not the second.

I had a good talk with Dobrynin. I think they are beginning to move. On cruise missiles, we could limit cruise missiles to 300 heavy bombers. And then to limit them to 2500 total. Give them 300 Backfire but not let it have cruise missiles.

President: Would Backfire be counted?

Kissinger: No. Another way would be to give them 100 Backfire free and count those in excess of that. If we go down on SLCM's to 600-900 kilometers and ban those in excess of that, I think they will compromise on ALCM.

President: Have you mentioned this to DOD?

Kissinger: I'd rather wait until I get back. And not accept any DOD ideas in the meantime.

President: Nothing.

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Assistant to the President for National
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DATE AND TIME: August 16, 1975

PLACE: Vail, Colorado

President: On the detente speech, I told them I didn't like the explanation of detente. Why don't you read this page-and-a-half.

Kissinger: I violently object to this phrase about translating detente into English and Russian. It is a tawdry phrase which will drive the Soviets crazy.

[More discussion about the speech.]

To me it is clear what the Democrats are trying to do. I don't think you have anything to fear from the conservatives.

[The press came in to take photographs and then left.]

President: I would like to look over the part you gave me and decide what to do. I liked what you said on Portugal more than what is here.

Kissinger: I would recommend you not mention the Soviet Union by name. I did, and to do so a second time I think may be too tough on them.

I can rewrite the Portuguese part to make the same points I did.

President: Good.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/2/69, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, STATE DEPT. 3/10/04
BY lm, NARA, DATE 5/24/04

Kissinger: You need one positive paragraph. I hate to think where we will be if we have a first-class crisis with the Soviets next year.

[More speech discussion.]

Kissinger (continues): I am worried we are driving the Soviets into a position where Brezhnev may have to turn on us at the Party Congress. If it looks like we are screwing him on detente, he may have to.

President: I want to be tough on intelligence. I think the Greek-Turkish portion is wrong with the Congress. That will be changed.

Kissinger: You shouldn't sound soft on detente, but it should be tuned to their fears. If they think you are turning on detente, they will want to try to get ahead of you.

On the Zumwalt article, you should know that the unilateral statements did not come from us -- they came from Gerry Smith, and the delegation worked them out.

President: I talked to Jim about two things: Zumwalt was for the A-7. What was the original rate? Cut it down if that is the original rate. And I said I wanted to see a DOD analysis of the Zumwalt article.

Kissinger: I would cut the rate if possible.

The Greeks have also stolen 60 million rounds of ammunition from Souda Bay. They want to buy it now, which is really condoning the stealing from us.

President: I think we should point these things out to Brademas. We have let the Greeks get away with a lot of things.

Kissinger: We are on the edge of what we can get away with on detente. To push much further will force a reversal from the Soviets.

On the Middle East. We have a good map coming. [He points out the passes on the map.]

I guarantee you the Israelis, once the agreement is signed, will announce that they are not out of the passes.

The passes are one big contested point. The next point is the warning stations. I told Dinitz the worst thing Israel has done is to insist on these stations. We will supervise Umm Khisheiba and can justify one station as needed to check Umm Khisheiba. This issue is pure Israeli domestic politics.

Jackson told Dinitz not to make an interim agreement because it would only help you and me. He said he would vote for the stations but they would damage Israel. I am getting turned off with Jackson. They say he turned on Vietnam; why wouldn't he on Israel?

I will shave some off the Israeli line.

Then there is the problem of moving the Egyptian line forward. In the South, they have agreed to broaden the narrow parts. There will be joint use of the road.

This is not a satisfactory agreement. The Israelis have not been smart to push Egypt this far. It will lead either to peace or another war.

[He reads the Sadat letter to the President.]

The problem with this letter is we can't be caught in a position where we look duplicitous, because the Israelis want the opposite. They have given us a 25-page memorandum of what they want from us. I will leave a copy of this with you.

[Reads from the Israeli document.]

They asked us not to make an overall proposal which they haven't approved and any proposals which they haven't cleared.

I would like to reaffirm what you have already said to Rabin -- that you will take the Israeli views very seriously.

I would tell Sadat that we will be ready in 1977 for an overall proposal.

[Gives the President a draft letter that Israel wants him to send to Rabin.]

On an agreement, there will be three sets of documents. We will leave a set of everything with Brent and let you know every day where we stand. It will be the most tawdry nitpicking.

There is the basic agreement, a protocol spelling out where the lines are, then a US-Israeli bilateral agreement -- that 24-page paper. They want to prevent your doing what you did last Spring -- hold up military equipment. [Reads all the military equipment they want.] For now they want just a military figure that we will promise. There are other items. The figure is now \$3.2 billion. Those demands -- and the warning stations -- may barely evoke their support for 1977. They want a figure today.

President: I can't, in good conscience, go above \$2.1 billion. We had been thinking of 1.6 to 1.8. We have cut back so much on other programs that it really is hard on us. What is the budget figure?

Scowcroft: We haven't given any, but the estimate was at the previous year -- \$700 million.

President: Tell them \$2 billion and not one cent more. Even that will be hard to sell to the Congress.

Kissinger: I think we can explain 2.1 better than 2.0.

President: O.K. But start with 1.6. For 3 million people that is a lot.

[Chatting about the Ink Spots and the evening social.]

Kissinger: On the Iranian oil, Simon is violently opposed to it. He still expects a price break. No one else in the world expects the price to drop. Jamieson [of Exxon] thinks the sellers' market is returning.

President: We are going to do it. Simon can like it or not.

Kissinger: We do need his cooperation.

President: Greenspan and Zarb are on board.

Kissinger: Yes. I want to talk about the UN speech also.



✓ P/K 16 Aug 1975

P On a detente speech, I call them 2 distinct lines
a explanation of detente. Why don't you read
this page ~~in~~ and a half

K I'm probably object to this phrase about translating
detente into Eng + Russian. It is a clumsy
phrase which will drive - Sovo crazy
(have discussion about a speech)

To me it is clear what Sovos are trying to do
I don't think you have anything to fear from a
symmetric

(Press photo)

P I would like to look over a part you gave me
& decide what to do. I liked what you said on
Portugal more than what is here.

K I would recommend you not mention S & C
by name. I did & it does no time I think my
do to tough on them.

I can rewrite a part part to make a same
points I did.

P Good.

K You need one further paragraph. I hate to
think where will be before have a 1st class
crisis w/c Sovo next yr.

(Have speech discussion)

I worried we driving Sovo into position where
Brez may have to turn on road party. I think
it looks like we scanning him on detente, ~~at~~
may have it.

P I want to be tough on intel. I want a G/T

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Review 3/10/04
BY lha, NARA, DATE 5/24/04

→ 3/ways for A-7 which were original vote. Cut down if that is very late.

→ Parents to see DOD ambiguity of Eminent ent.

✗ portion is wrong w/c Cary. That will be changed.
K You shouldn't sound soft on detente, but it should be toned to their fears. If they think you are turning on detente, they will want to try to get ahead of you.

Once Eminent ent, a ministerial statements we did not come from us - they came from Jerry Smith and a delegation worked them out.
P I talked to Jim about a thing (see above)

K I would vote a rate if possible.

Tom Greks have also started to visit of arms.
They want to buy it now, which is really condoning a stealing for no.

P I think we should point these things out to Graham. We have let a Greks get away w/a lot of things.

K We are on the edge of what we can get away w/ on detente. To push much further will force a reversal from Sovs.

One-NIE. We have a good wrap coming.
(Points out ^{passes} wrap)

I guarantee you & I, and a agreement is signed, that they are not out of a passes.

Tom passes are one big controlled point. The next part is ^{so-called} ~~affirming~~ ^{status}.

I told Dundy a most thing I has done is to visit on these stations. We ~~are~~ will supervise Umm Kishiba & can justify one station as needed to check Umm Kishiba. At this time I power I domestic politics.

Jackson told Dundy not to make any interim

Use another copy of a ~~copy~~ map.

agreement because it would only help you
& me. Said he would not go further but
they would damage I. ~~and~~ I getting tired
of w/f a ham. They say he turned off on
V14, why wouldn't he on I.

I will share some of the I line. There
there is a prob of moving a E line forward.
Gen. Smith, they have agreed to break
a narrow part. There will be joint use of
a road.

This is not a ~~the~~ ~~same~~ agreement. That
have not been smart to push E this far. It
will lead either to peace or another war.

(Reads Sadat letter to P)

The prob w/ this letter is we can't be caught in
a position where we look defeatist, cause I
won't ~~lose~~ a ~~point~~ a ~~point~~. They have given us a
25 page memo of what they want from us. I will
have a copy of this w/ you.

(Reads from I document)

They asked us not to make any <sup>on overall proposal which they
never agreed to</sup> proposals which they
haven't cleared (?)

I would like to confirm what you have said - you
will take I into my ~~view~~ ~~view~~ seriously.

I would tell Sadat ~~us~~ that we will be ready in
1977 for small proposal.

(Gen. P ~~and~~ draft letter I wrote him to call him.
On an agreement, there will be 3 sets of ^{documents} ~~documents~~,
We will have a set of everything w/ Brent &

P We are going to do it. Someone even likes it
as not

K We should need his comp.

P ^{just} getting from + E welcome over board.

K Yv. I want to talk UN speaker

P/R 16 Aug⁷⁵ (working session) 1975

H

K let me show you the real maps

(They discuss a map)

I will claim they are still in c passes. It is pure domestic politics.

I commit party towards.

Demitz called - he wants agreement w/ whole

Waterman B^{political}

Also wants ~~negotiation~~ to F-16. I see no prob since they getting F-15.

They want bombing w/ com. warhead.

Then they have a lot of other tech. advanced items.

What you have to think about is that a couple figures down a pipe they are in position to ignore us.

(K calls Demitz) ?

US will consistently support whole

material but on high tech we but we will have great study w/ view to

reaching ~~out~~ positive outcome. F-16 is approved

Knowing we will need quick study don't we see no rebuilding problems.

I feel strongly that must be a ratio solution to c passes. You can call it what you like

but one position is that it has to be substantiated as I gave it. We have to avoid that shuttle

breaks down here because we can't

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NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Rev. 10/04

BY lan, NARA, DATE 5/24/04



support yours if it appears that we will have
to support them. All these I had discussed
w/ C & he confirmed them.

(Diversity will end)

(Reals the arms supply agreement language)

I think it is something similar. Price in
Simon + a 2.1 bid submission in trading
version. It will bill them.

I spoke to Simon + Robinson spoke to him.

He said it could be used as our endorsing
a rotating price - discount not likely to count.

P But there is discount + if price goes up we
get that credit w/ PI goes up

R He says it also a form of indexing. He is
right there, but I don't know that. He
agrees that Cooper will work w/ Robinson
about how to make payments. I will call
him tomorrow again, but he softer than
earlier operation.

Our OIC speech I would like to present a lot of back
proposals. He are some of them. You agreed
on 200 million fund for agri ^{set up fund} ~~stabil~~. We think

it could come from existing allocations - not so.

This is a only item of budget imbalances + it
could go into next years budget.

We looking at a more complex arrangement
to stabilize not prices but earnings. We are
looking with raising IMF funds, etc.

(Something about trade negot. I'll put agreement

of interest. Don't have agreement w/ in
a lot on this. ~~Just~~ Highly technical.
We are now coordinating. We are looking
at a time agreement ^{at 7:30} ~~at 7:30~~ one on eggs, all
agrees to enter report. We have a list of candidates
but don't want push them to point of inter-
agency splits. There are a lot of other non-
controversial items (read them off)

The major issues which might come to
you are: leaving stable - it a new
concept. Service of last American project
project

P As I understand, this session is for this
specific purpose

J The danger is a unclipped will ~~to~~ try to solve
and rhetoric in. What I would like to
do is to submit a top list, so we would
get through a few sessions - and there
is a way to discuss it. There being a session.
There is almost no way it can impact
on this year budget.

What I would like to avoid while in your
Chudy said there was no session. I would
like to work through Siskin + help Chudy
+ Mansfield out of it.

P H is a secretary of a FIB so he is a right
one who will be work w/

K Evidently a Revision, but I don't want them
to edit a speech itself. I will let them

just to nuclear experts. That would make a
whole thing a mess.

P That would make sense.

S It is just a way to get around a transition.

K I would recommend you agree w/c 1st but not
a second.

I had good talk w/ D. I think they beg. to
move. On em, we could limit em to 3000
heavy bombers. And then to limit to 2500 total.
Give them ³⁰⁰ B-52s but not let it have more.

P Would B-52s be counted?

K No. Another way would be to give them 1000
B-52s free & count those in excess of that.
If we go down for SLCMs to 6-900 km & ban
in places I think they will compromise on ABMs.

P How you mentioned the 1000

K I'd rather wait till I get back. And not accept any
DOD ideas in meantime.

P Writing