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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ford  
Members of President's Foreign Intelligence  
Advisory Board (see attached list)  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
Assistant to the President for National Security  
Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:

Friday, August 8, 1975  
4:00 p. m.

PLACE:

Cabinet Room  
White House

Adm. Anderson: The unofficial job of the Board is to comment on intelligence estimates. 3.3(b)(1) we know what they will have in two years. Beyond that we don't know. We had problems with the '74 strategic estimate. Here is a paper, Mr. President, that is unanimously approved by the Board.



Foster: I would like to make a claim about the estimate, support that claim, and make a recommendation about what can be done.

We read it last November and were struck by statements on almost every page. [He reads a paragraph on long judgments about Soviet unlikelihood of first strike.] In our view this is misleading. It gives the reader an unwarranted complacency. It may be right, but it overstates a single point of view. It makes judgments based on damn few facts. The data is frequently flimsy, conflicting, or nonexistent.

People make decisions on force levels. The Congress makes decisions on the budget. When this document doesn't agree with the Secretary of Defense's testimony, it's like shooting ourselves in the foot.

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
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~~TOP SECRET~~

I can give three examples which make one suspicious: (1) On the SS-18 and 19, there are no facts on accuracy. There are some data indicating reentry vehicles going astray like Poseidon did.

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

There are two ways to do it: average the data, or the data could come from instruments that are deliberately offset.

Second, we hadn't worried too much about Minuteman vulnerability because of Polaris and our feeling is that it's invulnerable. Last summer the Soviets had exercises in the Philippine Sea. They are now using a combination of techniques. One is to take advantage of the fact that a submarine has to loiter in home port. They practiced some sort of tracking techniques. And when one of our subs transited the area, they picked it up also. We don't know how they are doing it. The Soviets have staffed a lab with people who were new to the field.

I think the sub is getting hemmed in. We don't think it is fair to say there is no way for them to get hold of the Polaris force for 10 years.

Third, on bombers, the estimate doesn't deal with the fact that the bombers are on bases that are subject to interdiction by subs. It is nip and tuck whether the bombers would get off, and if they used cruise missiles we might not ever see them. The estimate also doesn't deal with the bomber problem as they transit the oceans and can be picked up. On penetration, the average number of Soviet exercises against low level bomber attacks are about 3%, after '74, 30% were below 1500 feet. We have to deal with a variety of air defense systems, including mobile ones which can be moved in to fill gaps. They appear still to be trying hard to ensure high attrition -- and it may be even worse in 10 years.

What are the difficulties? First, they do it on the basis of not much evidence, and second, pressure to say what the analyst knows leads him to insert judgments where facts are lacking. Mostly they are very good, but as they get carried forward, it gradually gains the status of fact.

What the decision maker needs from intelligence is what is fact and what is judgment and what is the range of uncertainty.

Kissinger: To what extent are the judgments the product of service bias?

Foster: Strongly. The Navy has especially a problem. It doesn't want ASW information to get to the intelligence community.



We have complained about the estimate and can't seem to get through. They are not honestly trying to distort.

I have some suggestions: On important questions, the community should have two teams doing independent, competitive analysis. The DIA and CIA are not competitors.

President: But 10 years ago we put all of them together to get a single viewpoint.

Foster: Yes, but this would apply just to key issues.

Next, we need closer interaction between intelligence and user. Perhaps the user needs to ask questions differently so that the information is focused on his decision. The intelligence community should be asked to build the best case both for and against the decision.

Third, how to avoid the appearance of a net assessment, which is what this tends to include.

The right process maybe is to do an NIE, with the improvements of the kind we suggest, then a net assessment, then conduct a critique. When we have done net assessments in the past, we have never critiqued them.

We have tried to persuade the intelligence community to accept these critiques, but they don't see anything wrong with what they do now. They think their judgments are right.

Kissinger: We have found it very difficult to get the intelligence community to put forth competing views. The tendency is to waffle over disputes rather than sharpen them. Second, it is very hard to overcome Service bias. Third, they have a vested interest to support their previous judgments.

Land: Maybe we should institutionalize the process and have competing analyses presented as a matter of course.

Kissinger: If you ask for two views, that will become stylized and compound the problem. For 85% of the issues, nothing difficult is necessary. But for the few cases where they start with different points of view, those should be amplified and fully presented.



Teller: How do you get alternate evaluations? I don't know, but one way would be to get an experienced man -- like Foster -- to do it. He would have to have access to all the material.

Foster: Maybe you just have to try it - just tell the intelligence community you want a competitive estimate.

President: I doubt you can get that kind of competitive judgment in-house.

Kissinger: But no one outside has the knowledge to make the judgments.

Land: There are people outside who have had access over the years.

Kissinger: I have great sympathy for the problem. The solution is not so obvious.

Anderson: I would favor a directive to the DCI making it clear this is the kind of change which has to be made in this area. It should come directly from the National Security Council. They can do it for this year's estimate.

Kissinger: Why don't you draft one?

Anderson: We must make the intelligence community work the way it should.

President: Draft a directive.

Baker: I want very briefly to review the status of Soviet electronic telephone surveillance. Our interim actions have been effective, but we are very worried about the longer-term actions. The activity now in New York is perhaps even larger than Washington. It was against industrial, governmental, and other institutional activities. We think further progress can be made by simplifying procedures and if we operate under your direction and cut out Soviet access. Jamming is not a simple single solution -- they have [3.3(b)(1)] just in Washington. We think we need to establish communication facilities which will be invulnerable -- principally by encryption. We think a new directive is needed to establish clear responsibility for getting the job done. We have such a memo prepared for you. It includes a supervisory group under Ed David. Some are domestic and some overseas; [3.3(b)(1)]

[3.3(b)(1)]



Cherne: Let me add on the economic side that it's only since June that we are trying to find what they are doing in New York.

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1) The potential for market and price manipulation is enormous.

On a different matter, the most recent poll around New York showed strong feeling that the U.S. had to have a strong national intelligence system. While the citizen likes to read about the CIA, he wants a strong one but under your control.

Foster: One ironic point. There has been publicity about American citizens being spied on, and that others are doing it. Why not just tell them to take out all their equipment?

Baker: It might work for a year or two.

President: Would we not be able to detect whether or not they were putting it back?

Baker: They could probably circumvent it.

Teller: You could at least say we would be doing our best.

Baker: We believe you should put out a directive to take steps to minimize our exposure to the Soviets.

President: I thank you very much. We have some tough decisions to make and you are very helpful.



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Attendance confirmed by  
Mildred Zayac, PFIAB/  
--all present

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD (PFIAB)

The Cabinet Room  
August 8, 1975

The President

Members of the PFIAB

George W. Anderson, Jr., Chairman of the PFIAB, former Chief of Naval Operations; former U.S. Ambassador to Portugal

William O. Baker, Member, PFIAB; Member of the National Academy of Sciences

Leo Cherne, Member, PFIAB; Executive Director of the Research Institute of America, Inc.; Member of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs; member of the Board of Advisors of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces

John S. Foster, Jr., Member, PFIAB; physicist; Vice President for Energy Research and Development, TRW, Inc.

Robert W. Galvin, Member, PFIAB; Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Motorola, Inc.; Director of Harris Trust and Savings Bank; Director and past President of the Electronic Industries Association

Gordon Gray, Member, PFIAB; publisher; Director of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company

Edwin H. Land, Member, PFIAB; inventor of the Land Polaroid camera; Chairman of the Board of Polaroid Corporation; member of the National Academy of Sciences

George P. Shultz, Member, PFIAB; President of Bechtel Corporation

Edward Teller, Member, PFIAB; physicist; University Professor of Physics and Associate Director of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, University of California

----(Clare Boothe Luce, Member, PFIAB, did not attend)

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PFIAB Staff

Wheaton B. Byers, Executive Secretary of the PFIAB

Lionel H. Olmer, Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary, PFIAB

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Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State (did not remain for entire meeting)

Donald H. Rumsfeld, Assistant

Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs





