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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
XGDS

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Thursday - June 12, 1975
4:30 p. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

President: That was an interesting session last night.

Schlesinger: Very. It was quite a performance.

President: I made the point of no linkage.

Scowcroft: Henry has given Jim a readout.

President: Good.

Schlesinger: You have done well on the DOD votes. On Diego Garcia, we have problems. Vest says there is only a 50-50 chance but I think we will win.

President: If you need my phone calls, let me know.

Schlesinger: The first subject I want to discuss is critical military writing. Admiral Moorer's Public Affairs Officer, still on active duty, has written an article critical of the Vietnam war. I favor having the military speak out responsibly, but criticism even of past policy, is a problem. I wanted to get your judgment.

President: How is his article critical?

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NARA PMH Date 8/3/2011



Schlesinger: He criticizes the fact that there was no mobilization of the Reserves, that we tried to have both guns and butter, etc. I think there is some merit in letting the military do things like this, when you consider there are no wraps on civil service in this regard.

President: What do you think Brent?

Scowcroft: I think there is a line between thoughtful, analytical articles, which I favor, and articles critical of the Commander in Chief or the Secretary which I think cannot be tolerated.

President: I tend to agree, if it is analytical and non-polemical, I think it is fine.

Schlesinger: I am inclined to go along, but this is not a particularly good article, and I wanted to warn you that it will open the flood gates.

President: Let's try it.

Scowcroft: It will make it tough for you to screen.

Schlesinger: That is true. But the military need to get out responsibly into print.

I will not go with Callaway and you on Saturday unless you want. It's his show.

President: Okay.

Schlesinger: I wanted to talk about ASW. There are two Soviet developments in ASW which we have found out about [redacted] 3.3(b)(1)

[redacted] 3.3(b)(1) One development relates to submarine tracking
[redacted] 3.3(b)(4)

[redacted] 3.3(b)(4) These developments show the major effort they are making in ASW, directed primarily toward our FBM forces.

President: [redacted] 3.3(b)(4)
[redacted] 3.3(b)(4)



Schlesinger: Yes.

President: That is unbelievable.

Schlesinger: We have been working on the aspects of this ASW phenomenology. We don't know what causes it.

		3.3(b)(4)	
3.3(b)(4)			
3.3(b)(4)	We were very lucky	3.3(b)(1)	
3.3(b)(1)		These programs	

show Soviet interest in reducing U.S. strategic capabilities. One conclusion I come to is that with development of their growing counterforce capability against our Minuteman silos and this possibility of growing submarine vulnerability, we should be careful about writing off mobile missiles in SALT negotiations. The arms controllers oppose mobile missiles because it is a new system and they take the position that anything not deployed shouldn't be.

Scowcroft: There is also the verification problem.

President: I remember the old railroad Minuteman.

Schlesinger: Laird killed that when the Air Force showed him a mockup of it going through the Chicago rail yards.

All this ASW is very sensitive. There is much phenology we are exploring and we don't know what it is we have. There are some approaches based on sampling of sea water, for example. But that depends on such small traces that practical development is in doubt. The Trident is more secure in this regard because it has such a great station keeping latitude.

President: Maybe we should go back to conventional submarines.

Schlesinger: That is an interesting thought -- but not while Rickover is still alive. Along those lines, we have sent to OMB our recommendations on nuclear versus conventionally powered ships. Mel Price is indignant we are not proposing all nuclear. OMB wants to go entirely conventional.

President: Without talking the merits I want to warn you I am a nuclear man.



Schlesinger: I told OMB that.

President: The Newport News Shipyard says they won't even bid on nuclear ships for the Navy while Rickover is around.

Schlesinger: The next item I want to discuss is intelligence. I would hope you would focus on legislative issues which will arise from the CIA investigation. You have two alternatives. You can take the initiative or you can let Church do it.

President: As you probably know by now I have written a memorandum to the relevant agencies asking everyone for comments and recommendations.

Schlesinger: The Rockefeller Commission recommendations are procedural. You may want to go further. The name itself is bad -- it is a lightning rod for everyone to beat the United States with. Clandestine operations may be in jeopardy. I think that before Church's suggestion he will have made a major assault on the clandestine business.

You earlier mentioned an interest in including some of the Mayagues crew in the Marine Commandant swearing in.

President: I think that time is past. Lets do the swearing in in the traditional way. Would he be opposed?

Schlesinger: Ordinarily no.

Now, some troublesome questions. First, on nuclear weapons deployments. I sent over a memo on April 16 with my recommendations. As yet we have heard nothing. We do have to be careful in Europe with MBFR Option III and we realize that there are political factors, and not just military efficiency factors which may govern.

3.3(b)(6), 6.2(a)

3.3(b)(6), 6.2(a)



then political factors should prevail on that, I agree. Last summer I spent much time worrying about the nuclear weapons

3.3(b)(6), 6.2(a)

3.3(b)(6), 6.2(a)

Walker has indicated you wanted to approve Schedule C appointments here. I suggest that is not a good idea. It was done under Johnson and there was a fuss about politicizing DOD. Laird got it changed. My judgment is you don't get much out of it and there are political drawbacks.

President: Let me check.

Schlesinger: You will overload your system. The first one under your new system was a systems test and evaluation man. He came over here for interview -- but no one here knows technical capabilities he should have.

Scowcroft: I will check it with our personnel people.



P/S Hulseiger

12 June 75

P Interesting dinner last night

S Very, almost a ~~total~~ performance

P I make a point of ~~not~~ no linkage

Sec. Henry has given Jim a readout.

P Good.

S You have done well on the DOD votes.

Do Diego, we have jobs. Best say only 50-50
but I think we will win.

P If you need my phone calls, let me know

S Critical military writing. Numerous former PR, still
an active duty, wrote critical of ON war. I want
military to speak out vigorously, but certain
even of past policy is a job. I wanted to get
your judgment

P What has Ham critical?

S No indignation, guess & butler, etc. I think
there is some merit in it, when there are
no wraps on Civil Service

P What do you think, best

Sec. I think there is a bias bet. thoughtful, analytical
criticisms, which I favor, and articles critical of Civil Serv
ing, which I think cannot be tolerated.

P I tend to agree, if it is analytical non-polemical

S I am inclined to agree. ~~But~~ It is not a
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gates.

P Let's try it.

Sec. It will make it tough to screen

S That is true. But a mail will get out
stop with print.



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E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3

MR# 08-91: #25

NSC memo 313016; OSD Ltr 111711; Navy Ltr 9125112

By dal NARA Date 11/12/12

S I will not go w/ Callaway + you on Saturday unless you want. It your show.

P Q

S I would like to talk about AS w.

P

S Yes.

P That unbelievable

S We have been working on this phenomenon. We don't know what causes it.

W's were back



This shows interest in reducing US street
capacities. One conclusion - w/ respect of
AF Cap against our sites & this possibility
of getting sub vulnerability, we should
be careful about writing off mobile missiles
Arms controls agree because it new system
& anything not deployed shouldn't be.

Sec also inspection problem.

P Remember cold railroad man

S Laird killed that certain AF channel working
if it going thru Chicago rail yards.

All this ASG is very sensitive. There is much
phenomenology we are exploring & we don't know that.
There are some who based on surplusing of
the water, for example. Tomlinson is more sure
because it has had a great station keeping
latitude.

P Maybe we should go back to environmental sub.

S Interesting that - but not white kitchen deal
along those lines, we have sort to OMB ideas
on some US cost power. That piece independent
we not proposing all more. OMB wants to wipe
out some things.

P w/o talking a minute, I am a sure man

S I told OMB that.

P Newport News Shipyard says they want more
bid on new ships while Perkins is around.

S Intelligence. I would hope you would focus
on legis issues which will arise. You can



take initiative or let Church do it

P We have asked everyone for comments

S Rourke. Crown never are finalized. You may want to go further. Two more is bad - a lightning rod. Clandestine ops may be in track.

Including Magary in Union Command
Reviewing in. You mentioned an interest.

P I think that time is past. Lets do it in traditional way.

S Now, some troublesome questions. New weapons deployment. Start date Apr 16. Haven't heard yet. We do have to be careful in F no w/ MBR Optim III + we realize political factors not just military factors may occur.



Walker has indicated you wanted to express
Sched C appts here. I suggest that not good
idea. It was done under Johnson & there
was fuss about publishing 100. hard get
it changed. My judgment is you don't
get much out of it & there are ful. drawbacks.

P But we check

S You will want your system. The 1st one
was an Systems list & book - he came over
here for interview - ~~the~~^{two} one here knows
what tech capability to need.

** See David check it w/ - personal people.

