

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.0

OSD-EE 11/8/09

MR08-126 #2; Date Rev. 3/8/04

BY dal NARA DATE 3/26/09

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Charles S. Whitehouse, American Ambassador, to Thailand
Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
W. R. Smyser, National Security Council Staff Member

DATE, TIME & PLACE: April 25, 1975
4:30 p.m.
White House

Whitehouse: I am looking forward to my assignment. It will take adroit maneuvering to show that we are sticking around but not in an old fashioned way. The Rush-Thanat communique is old hat. We have to show that we are now for the long haul.

The way we handle base negotiations is important. The consensus in this town is that we should close up Udorn, NKP and Korat. This will create a dazzle effect.

The Intelligence Community must figure out what to do about Ramasun.

Scowcroft: You have to find out what they really want. You may have some influence in this evolution. They are shaken. They doubt our constancy.

Whitehouse: I do not like the cable that went out. I want more latitude. I want to be able to say that we will withdraw and that we want to discuss it since we know that it will cause some problems for them. Then I want to say that, as a first step, we will close NKP, Korat and Udorn and will then see how best to proceed. At the moment, USSAG is still busy. After that, it can withdraw. We will ease our way into it. Then we will hang back and discuss Ramasun and Utapao.

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Scowcroft: A lot of it is in the approach. The problem is not to create the impression that we are pulling out. The impression we should create is that we want to reaffirm, in whatever language, that we are not interested in cutting and running. We will say that we know that there is a problem with our presence and that we want to talk about it.

Whitehouse: I want to be able to discuss more than the 19,000 issue. I want to be able to talk about broader things and I need a bigger wedge as an opening.

Scowcroft: We have often responded with alacrity to their statements and then create a reality in response to statements that did not reflect their real interest.

Whitehouse: Are you saying we will stay?

Scowcroft: I am saying that the Thai should know that we will not leave if they do not want us to. We want to restore a sense of confidence. Maybe we want to say that our presence is an issue and that we will help them solve it. But we should not create the impression that we are using their statements as a cloak to get out.

Whitehouse: But, in the context of Vietnam and of my arrival, we must be able to go further than the incremental cut that is authorized.

Scowcroft: The idea is to use it as a first step, and then talk about other things. Do not spread yourself out too far at once. We know what the government says, but we do not know what they really want.

Whitehouse: What about USSAG?

Scowcroft: USSAG has nothing to do with Thailand.

How we behave could be critical to how Thai developments evolve.

Whitehouse: I want to get another message to myself other than what I understand this one says.

Scowcroft: You can get something more in a week anyway.

Whitehouse: I want to get Phil Habib to write a new message.



Scowcroft: We may need to do a NSSM.

Whitehouse: There is also the question of when we pull out the B-52's and other aircraft.

The Thai should not think our forces have been there only in connection with Vietnam and that we regard Thailand as peripheral to Vietnam.

Whitehouse: Nobody can draw up the circumstances under which those aircraft would be used in the defense of Thailand.

They want us to go. They say so.

Scowcroft: I remember that they told us we should not use our aircraft for military ammunition lift to Cambodia. Then they did the opposite.

I think you should feel them out and see where they want to go. We should be pushing them, or drop back. It is not an easy job.

Whitehouse: I do not want to be in a strait jacket. I want to talk bases, not numbers.

Scowcroft: I think we can say that we are ready to talk and ask what they think of 19,000. We would do that instead of saying things to the effect that three out of four bases will be closed while we are talking. I would see how they respond to the 19,000. If they say they want more, we are in a new ball game. Perhaps they will say it's fine.

Whitehouse: What will be the Congressional heat?

Scowcroft: There will be some.

Whitehouse: How much room do we have?

Scowcroft: Perhaps more than most people assume. There may be a back lash.

Whitehouse: I want to be forthcoming at an early stage.

Scowcroft: I agree, but we must be forthcoming without being unsettling. If they are unsettled, they will feel that they need to get ahead of us.



Whitehouse: The pace is important. I do not want them to think that we are racing out. I think I can create a sense of no bug out while determining what to do. We have to talk about bases first.

Scowcroft: But not in the first talk.

Whitehouse: It will not be crisp. You slosh toward things. We can say that we agree that NKP is the first step, and that we can not do all at once. But I want agreement on more than 19,000.



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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July 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: W. R. SMYSER
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum of conversation covering your meeting with Ambassador Charles Whitehouse.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the memcon at Tab A.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY lh, NARA DATE 5/14/04



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR		
7	11	7	14	16	7504797	

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: Smyser ~~KISSINGER~~ REFERENCE: _____ CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
 KISSINGER _____ COLBY, W _____ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
 SCOWCROFT X _____ SCHLESINGER, J _____ LOU NO FORN NODIS
 DAVIS _____ ST EX SEC _____ OTHER _____ C EYES ONLY EXDIS
 S CODWORD
 TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: Memo on SCOWCROFT mtg w/ amb Whitehouse on April 25 1975 re Thailand

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO.		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK (_____)
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES (_____)
FAR EAST <u>Taylor</u>			<u>A</u>	REPLY FOR (_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION (_____)
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS (_____)
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO (_____)
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ (_____)
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? (_____)
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE (_____)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE:
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
7/14		Smyser	X	Decision (7/24)	
7/16		NSC/KS	C	5' draft approved memo on	

NSC/ S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____
 CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____
 NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____
 CROSS REF W/ _____
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: ✓ FOLDER: _____

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: _____
JUL 18 1975
 CRT ID: 11 SA SF
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