

Note to the File:

From the content of this memcon, it appears to have been assigned the incorrect date when it was transcribed at the White House. The comment about Graham Martin, Ambassador to South Vietnam on page two would indicate that the conversation took place AFTER the evacuation of Saigon, April 28, 1975.

LET, 2/2000

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
 Assistant to the President for National Security
 Affairs
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
 to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: April 17, 1975
 3:10 p. m.

PLACE: Oval Office
 The White House

President: Any repercussions from the Israeli Embassy?

Kissinger: No. I think what you did was just right.

President: I wanted to throw in the PLO just to shake them a bit.

Kissinger: On your visit, it might be better to go to Italy than to Berlin.
To go to Berlin after going to Fascist Spain would be very confrontational.

Italy has the advantage there is really nothing to discuss. You could see the Pope and strengthen the Government a bit.

President: That would help back here.

Kissinger: It might help strengthen the opposition to the Communists.
You could tell the Pope, too, that we oppose the Communists.

You would go Friday night or Saturday to Spain -- probably Saturday morning, stay in Spain 'til Monday morning. Then go to Rome. See the Pope Tuesday morning and return to Washington right after. Then I would go to Berlin. You would get a big reception.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS



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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By JLX, NARA, Date 1/27/00

President: Or I could go to Berlin after CSCE.

Kissinger: There are two formal sessions at NATO -- Thursday and Friday mornings. Leave here Wednesday morning.

We should prepare a meeting with Caramanlis and Demirel. Separately and then maybe together.

President: Those demonstrations in Greece ought to scare them.

Kissinger: We predicted it. By 1980 we could have leftists in Portugal, Greece and maybe Italy.

Scowcroft: I revised the AHEPA talker.

Kissinger: I think it is a mistake.

President: I don't mind being very tough with them.

Kissinger: O. K.

See Wilson, Schmidt, on Friday but Giscard, Spaniards Saturday. Sunday, Sadat - probably not in Madrid. We can let them work this up. They are so touchy. If the Spanish don't like it, we could move the Sadat meeting to Italy.

The French are approaching the Soviets and Chinese to pressure us on the Vietnam negotiation.

The Soviet-Egyptian communique may have one thing troublesome. It attacks Israel -- that's okay -- but also the "imperialist forces" supporting it. That has to be us.

The Europeans are totally misunderstanding the situation in Portugal. They want to offer Portugal associate membership in the EC. That legitimizes the Communists and is a very dangerous precedent for Italy. I think you must talk seriously to Schmidt at least at the NATO meeting.

Martin is okay. He did a good job on the evacuation and prevented a panic.



President: I told Hugh Scott I wanted his help to get more money.

Kissinger: We have no cards so we have to operate on nerve.

We have one chance in five of getting anything. This is important for Hanoi.



Research prog from 69 on showing how Dems wanted
to buy out of UK.

P/K ✓

P Any expressions from T Emb.

K No, I think what you did was just right

A I wanted to throw in a PhD just to shake them a bit.

R On your visit, it might be better to go to study than
to Berlin. To go to Berlin after Forrest Spain would
be very complicated.

Italy has a advantage there is only nothing to
show. you could see Pope + strengthen a Govt
a bit.

P That would help back here.

K It might help strengthen a opposition to - Castro, you
could tell - Pope too on oppose Castro

You would go Friday night or Sat to Spain - just Sat AM.
Stay in Spain til Monday am. Go to Rome. See
Pope Tue am + return to work right after.
Then I would go to Berlin. you would get a big
celebration.

P Or I could go to Berlin after CSEF

K There are 2 personal sessions at NATO - Thursday
+ Fri am. leave here Wed am.

W -> should prepare mtg w/ Kana + Demmel. Separating
+ then maybe together.

P Those Demonstrations in Greece ought to + cure them

K ~~But~~ we predicted it. By 1980 we could have
leftists in Portugal, Greece + maybe Italy.

S (I revised I hope)

R I think it's a mistake

P I don't mind being very tough w/ them

K OK.

See Wilson / Schmidt / and for last Council /



→ Act as Secret at front of approach to Spain.
* Total Unice taken out so far

See Spain Saturday. Sunday Secret - pro not in
includ. We can let them ^{work} ~~work~~ this up. They are
so touching. If Spanish don't like it, we could move
← Secret party to Italy.

The Ex are supporting EU + PRC to pressure us on a
UN ~~of~~ report.

The SO-E ^{may have} evening ~~has~~ ^{has} our thing ~~travelling~~ -
it attacks I - ok - but also - implications for us
supporting it - that has to be us.

E cross totally misunderstanding & set in Post.
They want to offer Post Assoc membership in
E.C. That legitimizes & trust & is very dangerous
precedent for Italy. I think you must talk directly
to Schmidt at least at NATO mtg.

Martin is ok. He done a good job on case & presented
panic.

P I told Hugh Scott I would his help to get more money.

R We have no cards so we have to operate on nerve.
We have ~~one~~ one chance in 5 of getting anything. This
is important for Russia

no other dip play
→ ~~no~~ ~~rest~~ ~~of~~ ~~un~~ ~~der~~ ~~standing~~ of a govt
until we hear from a Soviet

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