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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS-3

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 10-11: #12 state law 3/10/04
NSC guidelines; OSD Ltr 6/19/10
By dal NARA, Date 7/8/10

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador of Israel
Mordechai Shalev, Minister, Embassy of Israel

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Thursday - January 16, 1975
5:10 p.m. - 6:40 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

[The press was admitted for photographs. There were a few minutes of light conversation about the President's State of the Union Message, the size of the Knesset, and a Presidential visit to Israel. The press then departed.]



Allon: This is the room where the President works?

President: Yes, but I have one down the hall also. Every President has a separate working office. President Nixon's was across the street; mine is just 20 feet down the hall.

It's good to see you again. This must be the third or fourth time we've met. I have always thought that we could sit and talk frankly and in friendship. I hope we can talk about some headway we can make toward peace in the area.

I have been pushing Henry to some extent. I feel we have to make progress. I understand you were somewhat disturbed about my comment the other day. You shouldn't be -- our relationship is such that there is no reason why we should differ. I predicate everything on the basis that we can work together.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS-3

Organized 5/25/04
~~TOP SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

I want Henry to go to Egypt. But he has to have something more tangible to bring there than what came from our previous talk. I think we need another settlement by the end of February. We need stability for the next year and a half to two years, to recover our economy, our energy situation, and our position in the world. We need time, and a settlement will give that. But Henry has to have more for Sadat than you brought before.

Allon: First, Mr. President, I want to thank you for seeing me. I like the way we talk to each other. Dinitz said the Hebrew press says, when they heard I was seeing you and the Vice President, that Kissinger mobilized the heavy artillery of the Administration against me.

President: You have only friends here.

Allon: I told the [UJA] people on the West Coast that I heard you say a strong Israel is in the interest of the United States. I drew strength from your State of the Union speech.

Kissinger: Schmidt made a statement, Mr. President, that your speech was a great contribution to trans-Atlantic solidarity. That is very unusual.

Allon: I was very comfortable after hearing your speech. It was reassuring.

Kissinger: The European press reaction has been favorable.

Allon: We, in Israel, trust the intentions of the United States government, the President and Secretary Kissinger. We may sometimes disagree about points, but it is among friends. Let me say this: We want an agreement. We need it. We think Egypt needs it. It would be good for both parties. This is what I believe. Frankly, we have to face a bitter opposition in Israel.

Strategically, whoever controls the passes controls the Sinai. They are extremely important. The oil is not so much a matter of the money but mainly: First, once they get the oil back without important concessions they have no incentive for taking further steps. And second, the fields are so close to the straits that they are a strategic problem.

Kissinger: Since you don't want a third step, that is a small loss.

Allon: But because we are all mortal, things change and people change.



When I was here before, I said to you that the depth of our withdrawal will be highly influenced by what Egypt offers. I fear that once Egypt knows about the passes and the oil, it would be all over with Egypt.

I am glad we adopted a wait-and-see position on my last trip before the Brezhnev trip to Cairo. It was good for Brezhnev, too, because he knew we knew how to play our part.

We want to know with whom will we sign an agreement? With Egypt, or the United States? Will the land to be given up be turned over to Egypt, or will it be demilitarized? Fahmy commented on that.

Kissinger: Fahmy has made several statements which don't help. His problem is he is so pro-American that if this doesn't work out he will be out and maybe in prison. He therefore is compelled to make strong statements.

Allon: The question last is the stability of the peacekeeping force. Four of the contingents have left since the last agreements. Nepal, Panama....

Kissinger: That is a legitimate concern. We must look into it.

Allon: Sadat made a statement recently that any agreement should have an American guarantee. It was the first time he ever said that.

President: Did he say what he meant?

Kissinger: No. He said it. To President Nixon he said he wanted us to guarantee Israel. It solved his problem, and in that case he wanted Egypt to be guaranteed by the U. S. also.

Allon: I don't know how, but if we could get American troops in UNEF without the Soviets, that would be a tremendous contribution. I am trying to figure out how we can add to the stability of the peacekeeping force. I think Egypt would like it, and if so, what can the Soviets do?

Kissinger: They would veto it unless Soviet forces were included, and inclusion of Soviet forces I think would be a grave mistake.

Allon: So the problem is how to make UNEF more stable. This would give Sadat one excuse not to follow an adventurous policy. Sadat the other day said that the U. S. would not allow the Arabs to destroy Israel.

Now the most crucial problem -- the duration of the agreement. If it is short -- two to four years -- I don't think I could recommend it to the Knesset because this is just the time required to reorganize the Egyptian forces.

Sadat is probably planning for one or two years after the American elections. What is three or four years in return for the passes and the oil? Sadat knows he can get nothing by force; through negotiations he can get a lot. I gave Henry an idea which is a personal idea of mine, not the Cabinet's: Why not have an agreement that has no time limit, but to give Egypt an incentive we would agree that after a certain number of years we would negotiate a third step? The U.S. would have to agree not to pressure us to move earlier than that -- unless there is a good chance and then we would be happy to move.

I think Sadat accepted my earlier proposals better than Henry thinks.

Kissinger: He hid it well.

Allon: Except for the 10-year duration, what could he object to, except for the leaking to the press?

President: Those leaks are a deterrent to what we are trying to achieve. I know we ourselves are the leakiest government -- even my speech leaked out. But when we are talking peace and war, we just can't have it. I don't know how to stop it, but we must.

Allon: We both live in democracies. We just have to live with it and not to lose our tempers.

Kissinger: Leaking something against us is one thing; leaking something which has a tendency to make agreement more difficult can be disastrous.

Allon: And many times it is the wrong information. For example, about your pressuring us -- they don't believe you aren't doing it.

Kissinger: I don't believe it is possible to get a fixed term from Egypt. If Sadat were to agree in writing that a negotiation for a final peace wouldn't start for six years, he couldn't survive. You must at least address the contingency that he will reject it. It is not unreasonable, but we have to consider the consequences if this fails. Egypt could be driven into a war with Syria; people here are already saying we should settle it with the Soviet Union. You are better off, also, not linking any step to a final peace, but to focus on step-by-step.

There is no linkage between the Sinai and the Golan. If Sadat demands that, we will probably have to go to Geneva. Our fear is a massive blow-up caused by the frustration of the Arabs. What we want is that the Arabs see that they make progress only through us and that radical demands get nowhere.

Allon: We don't want a stalemate. But in addition to no fixed term, the UNEF mandate has to be given permanently. The Security Council should be able only to terminate, not to renew, the mandate.

President: We have never linked Egyptian and Syrian settlements. Do I understand that the passes and the oil fields can be settled if we can get something on time and UNEF?

Allon: That's a good question. I deliberately avoided a Cabinet debate. I felt the Cabinet was not well disposed when I left because of the Arab statements, so I have no authorization. But there is a direct relation between what we can give and what we can get.

Kissinger: If what you want can be achieved from Egypt, we are okay, but suppose we can't. Sadat has not been willing to talk frankly to Eilts. What we need to achieve is a concrete understanding on this trip, because if we keep talking along inconclusively, we may find one day that Sadat will blow up. We have to make a basic plan for contingencies. Even if his proposals are reasonable they may not be achievable. But all the problems must be weighed against the alternatives we will face.

Allon: But remember Damascus in May. You went to tell them you were breaking off and I said you would come back with something.

Kissinger: Just because you win a few times at roulette, you can't turn it into an assumption of your policy that you will win every time. If Sadat accepts, fine, but if I go there and fail, we have a monumental problem.

President: If Henry goes there with an inadequate package which is rejected, there will be an adverse impact in the United States. Under these conditions, it would be a terrible jolt in this country.

Kissinger: Also, thus far we have had no adverse European reaction. We would get a bad one and the Soviet Union would profit.

Allon: I suggested to Henry that he take a quick trip -- spend one day in each place. He should call it exploratory. That way it is riskless.

Kissinger: Sadat can't see me before the 3rd of February. If I got there on the 10th, I would have to promise a settlement within two weeks. Nothing new will be learned after I have left, through diplomatic channels. So unless I can give him a firm assurance that I will be back with an agreement in two weeks, it won't work.

Allon: We want to know what he is willing to give.

Kissinger: I proposed this to Sadat -- a meeting in Europe. He rejected it and said "Come when you can settle."

Dinitz: What concerns us is if you give him ten days or so, you give him leverage.

President: Can Henry go to Egypt and talk in terms of the passes and the oil fields and see what he can get on time and UNEF?

Allon: I think he should come to Israel first.

Kissinger: Tactically, if I know that the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Peres will back me, I would rather go with that than have a Cabinet meeting. If it leaks, the Egyptians are likely to quit. I would rather take my chances on the top two or three leaders.

President: So you would go to Israel first and then.....

Kissinger: I'd have to go to Amman, to Damascus, and to Riyadh also. I could do it in 3-4 days. I only need three hours in the other capitals.

Allon: Let me make one point. To concede more than the last time requires a Cabinet meeting. I think we should start out without knowing where we end up.

Kissinger: We must face the fact we can't have an endless delay. We have to move.

Allon: I said yesterday the time had come.

President: I have read the letter from Prime Minister Rabin on the arms. [Tab A]. I can assure you that the commitment for April 1 will be adhered to. On MATMON-B, you can send people here....

Kissinger: Better not send too many.

Dinitz: The Pentagon needs to talk with us on availability and delivery times.

President: On the LGB, the LANCE, and the emergency list -- it will be delivered.

Dinitz: On LANCE there is no real problem. On LGB....



President: We will deliver. On MATMON-B, I said I couldn't go to the Congress without results. If I can go to the Congress with results in Egypt, I can do better. That is not pressure, just the facts of the situation today.

Allon: But MATMON-B was promised at the end of the last disengagement.

Kissinger: A long-term relationship, not a plan.

Allon: Okay, but I was pleased when I read the record of Rabin's meeting with you [the President], and the reaffirmation of it. But if the Pentagon can't get our orders, the deliveries get later and later.

President: But the can't order without the money.

Allon: So until the climate gets better, let's go with the first year.

President: But at a time when I am telling the American people there are no new domestic programs, if I go to Congress for money, I have to be able to justify it.

Allon: But I fear that delay will be interpreted by Israel as indirect pressure. I know it isn't, but if I could go to Rabin and say we can start working out the techniques so that we don't lose time when the proper time comes.

Dinitz: We need delivery times, costs, and so forth.

President: I will talk to Henry tonight and we will figure out how we can start the process. It is a delicate situation -- how to proceed in a technical way to protect us and you. Henry can tell you tomorrow.

Allon: When Simon visited Israel, we agreed on setting up joint committees. Last month I thought everything was okay. Now I feel everything is not right.

President: I am not familiar with it.

Allon: We gave a paper on this to the State Department. If I can go back with some good news.... If we could take back that you are considering our FY-76 requests favorably....

I am afraid that as a result of the Trade Bill, the Soviet Union will punish the Jews there. We can't take it -- nor the Jews elsewhere. We know you will know how to pass the word.



President: We will do what we can. That would be the worst that could happen.

Kissinger: But you shouldn't get statements out about fear of a holocaust before something happens.

Allon: Whenever you want to visit the Middle East, you are most welcome.

President: I would like to whenever I have the opportunity. I think this meeting was very useful.

Allon: What should we tell the press?

Kissinger: We can say we continued detailed discussions in a friendly atmosphere.

[The statement issued to the press after the meeting is at
Tab B]



10

A



AO/560

12 January 1975

My dear Mr. President:

I have been instructed by the Prime Minister of Israel to transmit to you the following message:

"Dear Mr. President,

Pursuant to our conversation in Washington in September, may I address myself to the matter of U.S. military supplies to Israel.

I should like to refer first to the priority items list and to express my appreciation to you on the progress of its implementation. In this connection, may I draw your attention to two items which were specially appended to the list and concerning which problems of supply do persist.

(A) Laser Guided Weapons. Two months ago our representatives were told that the question of the types and quantities had been satisfactorily settled and that deliveries could immediately begin. Recently, however, we were informed by the Department of Defense that it still lacks specific directives on this matter. I would appreciate, therefore, early instructions to permit supplies to be delivered as soon as possible.

(B) The Lance Missiles. The Department of Defense has, as yet, not set any date for delivery. We consider it of great importance to assure the early arrival of one battalion and would be grateful if a date as close as possible to April 1, 1975, could be set. We note that the training of the Israeli crews on the Lance could be arranged to begin early in February 1975, as already approved.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By WV NADA, Date 5/10/04 state review 3/10/04



AO/560

-2-

12 January 1975

With regard to the matter of Israel's long-range supply program ("Matmon B"), you will recall, Mr. President, that this too was discussed during my visit. It was again taken up with Secretary of State Kissinger during his last two visits to Jerusalem in October and November 1975. We were encouraged when told in the course of these and other contacts, that even prior to the resolution of the financial aspect, which was, of course, a matter on which the U.S. Government would have to seek congressional authority, Israel would soon receive detailed replies on an item-by-item basis (quantities and types). We had, indeed, been given to understand that the "Matmon B" talks would be resumed in December/January. We have now been informed by the Department of Defense that it still has no instructions to deal with the Israeli requests under this program. As you will no doubt appreciate, the lack of such instructions could cause a delay in Israel's timetable for the staged implementation of her defense program. The matter has become most urgent, for already the placing of long-lead orders for 1975 has been regrettably held up.

If, Mr. President, I voice these requests before you in the manner that I do, it is because they are for us of great concern and urgency.

Foreign Minister Yigal Allon will be in Washington this week and will refer to these matters in the course of his discussions.

May I say that I thank you in advance for your kind consideration.

With warm personal regards,

Yitzhak Rabin
Prime Minister"

Respectfully yours,

Simcha Dinitz
for
Simcha Dinitz
Ambassador"

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.



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B



15
JANUARY 16, 1975

Office of the White House Press Secretary


NOTICE TO THE PRESS

President Ford and Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yigal Allon met in the Oval Office for one hour and twenty minutes. Secretary Kissinger and General Scowcroft were present on the American side, and Israel's Ambassador Simcha Dinitz on the Israeli side.

The President and Deputy Prime Minister had a full exchange of views of the situation in the Middle East. The President stressed the seriousness of that situation and repeated his commitment to assisting the parties to move forward toward a negotiated peace settlement. Minister Allon once again assured the President that the Israeli government shares this desire for a negotiated settlement. The meeting provided the opportunity for both sides to review developments in the peace-making process since Minister Allon was here December 9, and to go over possible approaches to this next stage of negotiations.

The talks were conducted with the cordiality and friendship usual when Americans and Israelis meet. As is normal on these occasions, the two sides also reviewed several bilateral matters. Both repeated satisfaction at the excellent state of relations between the two countries.

#



P/ Allon / K / Dinitz / Scovort / Shalev

1/16/75

(Press in)

(Discussion of SATU, size of Knesset, Priority, I, etc)

(Press out)

Q This is a room where I work?

P Yes, but I have a down hall also. Every P has a separate working office. It was across street, mine is just soft down hall.

Good to see you again. 3 or 4th time. I have always thought we could sit & talk frankly in privacy. I hope we can talk about some background we can work toward plan in a way >

I have pushed K to some extent. I feel we have to make progress. I don't understand you were somewhat obstructed about my comment a few days. You should be - our relationship is such there is no reason why we should differ. I prefer to put things on basis we can work together.

I want to go to E. But he had been meeting some people there on previous week. I think we need settlement by end Feb. We need stability for 1 1/2 years to recover our economy, energy, position in world. We need time for settlement and give that.

K has to have more for Sadat than you buy type

Q Thank you for seeing me. I like a way as told to each other. Dinitz said it shows how large K mobilized a heavy artillery of Admin against me

P You have only friends here.

Q I tell one way out that I heard you say a

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MR # 70-111, #12, N.S.C. guidelines
Date 3/21/04 by SP5 JCB/SLJ
By date NARA Date 7/8/10



Strong F is in interests of US.

I draw strength from your speech

K Submit modest statement upon perhaps joint contribution to transatlantic ^{solidarity} ~~coop.~~ Very unusual

Q I am very impatient of the hearing you

K Eno per se has been favorable

Q Western intention of US, P, UK. We may disagree about points, but it is very frank.

We want an agreement - we need it, we think E need it. It good for both sides.

Frankly we have to face a better opponent in F.

Strategically, who control = passes United States.

They are extremely important

The oil is not so much money but strategy
(1) Once they get a oil hole w/o important measures they have no incentive for further steps (2) The fields are also so strategic they are one strategic point.



K Since you don't want 7th step, that is small loss.

Q But we are all mortal, things change, people change.

Yes, I said a depth from us/charcoal will be highly influenced by what E offers. I fear that once E know about passes + oil it will be all over w/E.

~~But~~ I feel we adopted a wise position on my last trip before Bay trip. Good for Bay to know we know we have to play our part.

Especially with no sign agreement? Will

land to give up the ~~border~~ turned over or
demilitarized. Fakhri commented that

K Fakhri has made several statements which don't
help. His job is here to go - US if this doesn't
work out he will be out of his job in prison.

He is compelled to make strong statements

Q Last is stability of packaging force. 4 of
contractors have left since last agreements.
Uganda, Pakistan...

* H That is a systematic version. We must look
into it.

Q Saeed made a statement recently that any agree-
ment should have a US guarantee. First time

P Did he say what he meant?

K No, he said it. To H he said he wanted both
guarantees - I - it forced his job & in that case
he wanted E to be guaranteed by US also.

Q I don't know how, but if we could get US troops
in UNIFIL as/o Suez, that would be a ^{contribution}
contribution. I'm trying to figure out how we can
add to stability of packaging force. I think E
would like it & if so, what can SC do

K They would vote unless for force withdrawal &
inclusion of Suez force I think would be a gross
mistake.

Q So a job is how to make UNIFIL more stable
This would give Saeed an excuse not to follow
an ambiguous policy. I don't see other way that a
US would not allow Arabs to destroy I.

Another most crucial part - duration of agreement
if it is short - 2-4 yrs, I don't think I could
recommend it to a Kasset because this is



time required to reorganize E finance. Sadat is preparing for 1 or 2 yrs of total election. Actual is 3-4 yrs in return for a peace + oil.

Sadat knows he can get nothing by force - then negotiations he can get a lot.

I guess K is personal sides - if we don't want not have agreement w/ no time limit but to give

E an incentive to open start after certain # of years we negotiate a 3rd step as a phase. US would have to agree not to pressure us to go & move earlier, enables them good chance & then should be happy to move.

I think Sadat accepted my election proposals better than K thinks



K He had it well

A Except for 10 yr duration - ~~to what~~ - what could be object to, effort for building types

P This looks as a deterrent to what we trying to achieve. I know we are locked just now for my speech locked out - but when we taking part & war we just can't have it. But know have to stop it but we must.

A We live in discussions, we just have to live w/ it & not to live over it

K Talking something against us is one thing - talking something which has tendency to make agreement ~~is possible~~ more difficult can be discussion.

A And every time it is wrong info. For example, about your preparing us - they don't believe you are doing it.

K I don't believe it possible to get a final arm from E.

If Sadat were to agree in writing that a pact for final peace would not start for 6 yrs, he could not convince you that at least address a contingency that he will reject it. It not unreasonable, but we have to exercise our judgement.

E could be drawn into area by Syria. People here are saying we should settle it w/ S.O.

You better off also not looking any step to a final peace but to focus on step by step. There is no bridge between Sinai & Golan. If Sadat demands that, we probably have to go to Geneva. Our fear is massive blowup caused by frustration of Arabs. What we want is that Arabs see that they make progress in a radical demands to get nowhere.



A We don't want a stalemate. But in addition to the filed terms, UNEF mandate has to be given permanently - UNSC should be obliged to terminate, not to renew, a mandate.

P We have never linked E + Syrian settlements. Do be understood that peace & oil field can be settled if we can get something on time + UNEF

G Good question. I deliberately avoided Patrick debate. I felt Cabinet not well disposed when I left because of Arab statements, so I have no authority there. ~~But if~~ but there is direct relation but what we can give & what we can get.

K If what you want can be achieved from E, as we do, but I suppose we could. Sadat has not been willing to talk frankly to Eilat. What we need & achieve is concrete understanding on this


trip because if we keep talking about meetings
we may find one day Sadat will show up.
We have to make basic plan for contingency.
Even if his proposals reasonable they may not
be achievable. But all c jobs must be arranged
against alternatives.

Q Best remember Damascus. You want to tell them
you breaking off & I said you would come back as
something.

K (Certain minutes + minutes)

If Sadat accepts, fine, but if I go there & fail
we have a monumental problem.

P If K goes there w/ an inadequate package which is
rejected, then on a loose subject in a CS.



Consider those conditions, it would be a terrible
fall in this country.

K Also, this far we have had no abuse E use
election. We would get a bad one & CS would profit.

Q I may get to talk a quick trip - one day in each place.
He should call it explanatory - that way it makes

K Sadat can't see me before 7:30, if I get there on
10th I would have to promise a settlement
w/ in 2 weeks. Nothing new will be learned after
I have left, through other diplomatic channels.
So unless I can give him a firm assurance
I will be back w/ agreement in 2 weeks, it won't
work.

Q We want to know what he is waiting to gain

K I proposed this to Sadat - only in E use. He rejected
it & said come when you can settle

D What assurance is it if you give him 10 days
or so, you give him leverage.

P Can H go to E & talk in terms of peace & oil & EU what he can get on time & ONCE

A I think he should see some to I just.

R Tactically, if I have PM, FM, & Bank will work me & rather go w/ that than have Cabinet meeting. If I go, E are likely to protest. I rather take my chances on the try on 3 leaders.

I Suzanne would go to I, E & then

K I'd have to go to Amsterdam, Bonn, Madrid also. I would do it in 3-4 days. Only need 5 hrs in each capital.

A One point. To ~~with~~ ~~concede~~ concede more than last time requires Cabinet meeting. I think we should start out w/o knowing what we are doing.

K We must face fact we can't have an endless delay. We have to move.

A I said yesterday a time had come.

P Robin letter. I can assure you that contacts for 10 Sept will be addressed to Mr. B, you can find people here . . .

K Better not send to any

D Portugal needs to ~~put~~ talk w/ us on



P On HGB, home, a message list, with me delivered.

D On home there is no real prob. On HGB

P as will deliver. On Mr. B, I said I would get a copy w/o results. If I can get a copy w/ results in E, I can do better. That not pressure just a facts of a situation today.

A Mr. B was promised at end of last day agreement.

K long term relationship, not a plan

Q Ok, but I phased when I read Robin - Ford
memo w/ reappreciation - But if Pentagon
can't get our orders, & deliveries get better & better

P But they can't order w/o money

Q So ~~lets~~ ^{lets} ~~wait~~ ^{wait} & ~~orders~~ ^{orders} get better; lets go w/ a 1st
year.

P But at times when I talking ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~you~~ ^{you} people - we
were domestic prog, if I go to ~~you~~ ^{you} for money
I have to be able to justify it.

Q But I fear that delay will be interpreted by I
as ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~deliberate~~ ^{deliberate} pressure. I know it isn't, but
if I could go to Robin & say we can start
working out a ~~technical~~ ^{technical} so that we don't lose
time when the ~~paper~~ ^{paper} ~~time~~ ^{time} comes.

D We need delivery time, costs, & so forth.

P I will take to R tonight & figure out how we can
start a process. It is a delicate situation - how
to proceed in such way to protect you & you. I can
tell you tomorrow

Q When ~~you~~ ^{you} visited I, we agreed on joint work.
last month I thought everything was ok. Now I feel
everything is not right.

P I'm not familiar w/ it.



Q We gave a paper to state. If I can go back w/ some
good news. If we could take back that you are
accepting our Fy 76 requests favorably...

I fear that as result of trade bill, Sec will punish
a ~~just~~ ^{just} ~~other~~ ^{other}. We can't take it - we can't
take it. We know you will know how to
pass a word

P We will do what we can. That would be worst
that could happen.

R But I shouldn't get statements out of a fear of a
habeas corpus before something happens.

Q Whether you want to visit ME, you are most
welcome.

R I would like to wherever I have copies. I think
this city was very useful

A What else - press

R We continued detailed discussion in
privately advised

6

