

Ready for
Peter to check.



Snowcroft file
(June 28, 1974 Moscow
Summit)

No need to
transcribe
(already done)



6/28/74 17th Army, 2nd Remarks (20 July) 1030

In 72 we signed important agreements which laid groundwork.

It took a lot of effort to persuade them.

But we have succeeded in signing a # of additional sig. documents.

Improvement of US-SU relations is becoming a fact, whether anyone likes it or not.

UN, NLF, Berlin, FRG agreements w/ Poland GDR, G3 etc - all are of sig.

But there are still negative accretions we must do away w/ + we need to make further long term efforts.

This is why designed to show to world we are determined to make further progress.

I told my comrades I had invited me to visit US next year - in spirit of our relationship - Perhaps we should also add additional brief wpts to resolve near issues, w/o full range between us. (1 hr)

Press Response

I agree w/ a job sec process described by G.S. I do agree that, in addition to regular formal wpts, it is useful to have additional wpts or press which will not count.

Since we are not powerful, there will be areas where our interests are not parallel. Our relationship can avoid or resolve differences which might arise from misunderstanding or non-contact.

The more we can find areas to work together, the more we can strengthen our relationship + make it more binding.

Please w/ common agreement + say about MFR. We will continue to work w/ Corg. on MFR + credit.

We must learn to work together better w/ regard to crisis points in E world

- ESC EX NLF. We must discuss course E world is a critical area & we must reduce to minimum possibility of conflict bet us.

- We can't speak for our allies as easily as Buz can speak for his allies.

- I mentioned at EO that we would try for completion of ESC by end '73

- w/ trying + perhaps w/ limited compromise we can break stalemate.


But here + in NLF it's not question of footdragging but of ability to deliver.

ME another area where our interests are not identical. That doesn't mean we both not for peace, but because of long associations for both in area, we have had some differences.

US will play whatever role it is useful to play in bringing better atmosphere in ME

We will not try to push S out of ME its traditional role in ME

There are times when goal can best be achieved bilaterally, others when multilaterally - the key is we must insert.



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[Handwritten initials]

What counts is a result - if in larger
forum, that should be used; if individually,
that should be used.

UN self-determination - it not a usually
useful forum for resolving major
differences.

There are several areas before us

ABM - looks OK

TTB - problems, hopefully something
in firming

SALT - Treaty of all. Will finish
discussion to see if possibility to
reach MIRV agreement.

ARL is more important, but offensive
arms agreement is crucial to avoid
nuclear arms race. If we can't
reach agreement we inevitably will have
to go forward w/ our own programs - +SV
would inevitably do likewise.

Issue is can we control nuclear arms
race before it controls us.

Wish I had solution to offer at this
point - but this will require extended
discussion to see if we can narrow
diff.

I conclude by saying any part of our policy
is important,

We must establish our values in future
will find it diff. to break

50 minutes

Grange - 3 agreements ready for signing
at 3:30.

ABM + Ecom also approved but not
to be signed today. Two ~~per~~ ~~text~~

have been agreed in full (SEC
& ABM)

We have learned US side environmental
agreement draft - need some
counterdraft, which may differ. Your
draft creates parts to be discussed later.
If agreement reached, it could be signed
later.

Nothing to add on TTB - no agreed document

K - we had thought ABM could be signed
tomorrow, but not decided yet.

P - Speaking frankly, best we w/cold war
history, state of how relationship doesn't
happen instantly. It takes constant
attention.

2nd Plenary 6/28/74 1600

ABIN - Braz said little value in it
Kozmin said we should point out what we can do it but we giving it up

TTB

B - We feel there is no further need for underground testing. We have agreed on no new weapons and yet we tell our people we need to go ahead + test. People will be bewildered. Why test if arms are to be limited. We have stopped in every other machine - why continue underground.

P Problem is verification. Putting a ceiling of 100 KT would get around that. Not told to 100, but should be in that case. "Several hundreds" make no sense.

B An agreement like that would encourage proliferation. We would also encourage others not to test. Logic forces a total ban.

Ko If we don't reach agreement on CTB it will reduce a sig - for a public - fall our activities. It will be termed a message to Pentagon

P - We not able to negotiate CTB, and TTB would be very substantial step forward. Not resisting because of Portugal. But we have found a way for a TTB To be progressive we should have more eyes, but without first really that, in mind of world sit.

Braz - We speaking in a confidential group. Why do we need to continue testing? For whom are pleasing? Maybe Pentagon but certainly not Am. people - or Sov people.

Ko - Even press will ask if CTB was discussed + whose initiative it was to continue testing - it isn't ours.

Braz - On draft even push to you, ethics - urge them to stop but doesn't demand it - but if they don't it allows us after a time to resume. We really want to understand. We not trying just to talk your into something. Some may complain, but we are a leaders of our countries. Everything speaks for this step.

K - Discuss this in March. Also, in absence of SALT agreement, there will

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inevitably will be new issues requiring
testing. We then discussed ATB,
which would not preclude CTB later.
If we want ITB, there are a number of
language issues:

- (1) Threshold
- (2) PVE
- (3) Data exchange to assume threshold
crossed.
- (4) Q code

There are more, but if we could solve
these, we could sign protocol here.

Bez - If CTB, none of these parts exist.

P - R hot - issue. Until we get arms race
under control, we can't do it. And that's
tougher than this one.

We trying to negotiate on something we
can produce. Half a loaf better than none.

If I agree to CTB w/o verification, I
will be accused of going away more
than S.V.

Bez - We not trying to be clever - just honest.
We have had useful discussion. Also focus
us to look at verification.

Grumpy - Kevins per 20th 29 June
K - said 150 bt, PVE separately but
only after agreement, data exchange
G - asked we accept their version
of data exchange.
K - agreed

2nd plan

3rd Plenary 11:00 am

K - Reviewed action at 0930 mtg.
B - Reiterated some concern about
w/ C.T.B. Are we entering ourselves
off ~~way~~ permanently from such
an agreement.

150 bet is K.

No quota, but credit only - income
of tests.

Why should we be forbidden PNE?
For PNE, we would propose
notification and invite observers.

Agreed to do what we can to have
agreement + protocol ready for
signature.

B - How about no inches in head

P - No

B - Why

P - Inconsistent w/ our obligations
- in case - not trying to keep
SU out of head.

B - OK. How about ESCI?

P - Trying to keep our content out.

hope a content will justify
Stage II at summit. (Very
geologic). I would like to see
a principal areas of disagreement

K - Confidence building; Basket III
(relating introduction to a good principle
to take account of Soviet bond) - the Finnish
consequence was a way around this.
Only resolution here appears to agree on
content of Basket III + link it to Finnish
proposal. 2nd issue is peaceful change,
which Germans want in same ^{para} bond as
mutuality - as if in security, then
a point must be modified.

Orange - long discussion on Soviet
position & foot dragging.

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Second Plenary 28 June 1970

P - we didn't negotiate SALT by ourselves - just channelled efforts.

B - Let Henry respond on his proposals of March

K - SALT I gave SU advantage in launchers. Our proposal would give us advantage in MIRVs.

B - We proposed 1100 - 1000.

K - We gave D. by a proposal

B - That - but equal. If exist to better we are working on a P time.

K - But our offer gives you the right to build 750 MIRVs & over 150

B - We didn't have an advantage in SALT I. You had FBS, MIRVs, etc.

K - We recognize SALT I was fair (heavy discussion on equity vs inequality of our proposal)

B - US has today 1200 MIRV in silos
3520 " on SLBMs.
We would only have 4720



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

No need to transcribe
Memcon already
done by PWR 2

PARTICIPANTS:

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Minister
of Foreign Affairs
Maj. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME:

July 1, 1974
5:05 p. m.

PLACE:

~~(Check with State)~~

Moscow
USSR

Gromyko: Suppose we begin on the Test Ban. First I suggest we discuss PNE's. I propose a statement which wouldn't put a condition on TTB but would be strong enough to, and there is enough time, for agreement to be reached.

Kissinger: We can't implement the agreement unless the PNE loophole is closed. We can't permit you to exceed the threshold under the guise your explosions are peaceful.

Gromyko: But if there is a delay on PNE agreement, we could not agree that the TTB would not come into force.

Kissinger: There are two problems -- is the explosion PNE and does it violate the threshold. If below we don't care if PNE; if above we have to know it violates the threshold and that it is peaceful.

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Gromyko: I have two questions: (1) Does TTB come into force if there is no PNE agreement and (2) [Long discussion about relationship between TTB and PNE].

"with the expectation that"

PNE's will be governed

(1) Advocate the broadest possible measures of control over the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes

(1) Advocate the broadest possible safeguards against the harmful use.

(1) Advocate the broadest possible safeguards to deal with the dangers of the use of _____.


Broadest possible safeguards against the dangers of the _____

To replace next year an interim agreement by a 10 year agreement.

To conclude next year on a 10 year agreement.

Gromyko: I can't agree to conclude anything next year

The main purpose of the conference is that it should promote a just and stable peace in the Middle East. It is agreed that the Soviet Union and the United States will continue close contacts in _____.



In the course of the talks both sides subjected to a thorough and deep union of the question of a long term agreement but U.S. - Soviet Union on further limitation of strategic arms. (extending through 1985)

to conclude
They expressed their determination / before expiration of the interim agreement.

They hold the common view that a new agreement would correspond notably to the interests of the U. S. and Soviet Union but also to the relaxation of international tensions and universal peace.

It was expected that these talks would be started immediately.

Agreement which would consider quantity and quality aspect of these armaments.

HAK/Overmyer Wty 1 July 1905

G - Suppose we begin on Test Ban.
First I suggest we discuss PNE's.
I propose a statement which would not
put a condition on ITB but would be strong
enough, & there is enough time, for
agreement to be reached.

H - We can't implement a agreement
unless PNE loophole is closed. Can't
permit you to exceed threshold
under guise of explosion are peaceful.

G - But if there is a delay on PNE
agreement, we could negotiate that
a ITB would not come into force.

H - 2 problems - is explosion PNE and does
it violate a threshold. If below
we don't care if PNE; if above we have
to know it violates TH & that it
is peaceful.

G - I have 2 questions: (1) Does ITB come into
force if no PNE agreement? (2)
(long discussion about relationship bet
ITB & PNE).

"with the expectation that"

~~that~~

~~that~~

PNE's will be governed

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3Y ~~10/1/04~~, NARA DATE 8/6/04

1. Advocate the broadest possible measures of control over the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.

1. Advocate the broadest possible safeguards against a harmful use

1. to deal w/ a danger of the use of

broadest possible safeguards against the dangers of the

→ To replace next year's interim agreement by a 10 yr agreement

→ To conclude ~~agreement~~ agreement on a 10 yr agreement

6 - Can't agree to conclude anything next year.

The main purpose of conference
is that it should promote just
and stable peace in M.E. It is
agreed that USSR & US will maintain
close contacts in

which course of talks both
sides suggested to change to
help ensure a guideline of a
long term agreement but
US -'s can further limit
of that one. (extending them 1985)

They expressed their
desire to expand beyond
Xpansion of the interim
agreement

They hold common view
that a new agreement
encompassed entirely & is related
of US & USSR but also to relaxation
of - will tensions & universal
peace.

It was agreed that these

Work would be started
immediately.

Agreement which would
consider pros + cons of
of these arrangements.



Tuesday - Plenary
2 July 1974
2:20 or 4:20 p.m.

Brezhnev: The President and I privately discussed SALT, the Middle East and touched on MBFR.

Middle East - focus efforts on Geneva and consult closely. The Palestine issue is an important one.

SALT - No numbers ; longer time, "Maritime existing agreement."

MBFR - Some force reduction of national forces; others not.

Some don't want to include A. F. and _____.

This issue is not yet ripe.

Nuclear weapons are spreading in the world. It's a problem of the aggressive behavior of Israel. You admitted yesterday that Israel was a problem. They are still bombing the camps in Lebanon. The proposal which was made by Kissinger not to mention numbers on SALT is satisfactory.

President: There were other matters which could be of great importance the in/future but which are not ready. We two must put out from time to time subjects to think about and discuss at our next meeting.

Brezhnev has stated our positions on the Middle East.

He recognizes a time when bilateral discussions must take place-- on the basis of the closest consultations.

What we both want is results and to avoid being at odds.

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It is a matter of the closest consultation -- neither of us has the solution to the Pakistanis, but we both recognize the problem.

The people forum for MBFR is Vienna.

I had hope the communique would not brush this over lightly but have a strong statement. Brezhnev suggestion for a 5 percent U.S. - Soviet Union reduction is one approach.

On the Middle East, it is to no one's interest to be drawn into escalating arms race in the area .

In SEA there is thankfully an uneasy peace but the seeds of war are still there. North Vietnam up at a higher rate than permitted and Congress is preventing us from doing what is allowed. We should both exercise restraint.

We have made significant progress at this summit.

But we were both disappointed we were unable to make more progress in SALT. It is obvious we could not agree on numbers at this time. We are not even _____ to an agreement on a general statement. We both feel we must avoid an arms race.

I am concerned that all the good things may be downgraded by failure in SALT.

I give my contract that we won't wait a full year before discussing SALT seriously again. We should bite the bullet before our next annual meeting.

The communique should indicate as strongly as possible our determination to negotiate to reach an agreement. We are prepared to talk at whatever level is appropriate.

Brezhnev: What is our end goal in the Middle East? It should guarantee the existence of all -- including Israel.

President: It has to be based on the 242. We can't do it all at once but will work toward it. But we won't proceed in an unrealistic way.

We won't be satisfied with a temporary truce -- we want a permanent settlement.

Brezhnev: We have agreed to act jointly in CSLE so as to make the process in Europe irreversible. Is that so?

President: I made^a contract at the CD last year. We will continue our efforts to achieve those goals.

Brezhnev: Let's have our Foreign Ministers report on these efforts.

Kissinger: Agreed on -- TTB (including date, PNE) environmental, communique (we shouldn't let the language make it appear as _____) something about dealing with the issues of quantities, qualitative controls, ABM,

Four things to sign; TTB, Communique, ABM, Environment. Also SCC. This is where we are.

Brezhnev: The Interim Agreement goes to 1977, so it best we don't introduce new figures before then. If you can't accept our numbers we need^a to establish/new relationship between qualities and quantities.

Gromyko: There is a tendency to substitute bilateral talks for the Geneva conference. That would be bad. Unless the Pakistanis attend the conference, success would not come. They are prepared to participate on the basis of equality.

We have reached an agreement on prompt resumption of the SALT talks. Now agreement will take time and in the meantime nothing should the cast doubt on/existing agreement. We shouldn't indicate there is something wrong with the present agreement.

Kissinger: I told the Foreign Minister yesterday that there is no way we we could let the Soviet Union MIRVits whole force. If we can't make a balance between numbers and MIRVs we will never "_____ permit you cutting us in MIRVs."

Gromyko/Brezhnev: But that is a matter for future negotiation.

President: The forces which would welcome a MIRV race are strong.

****And will consult with interested parties to that end.

****With appropriate participation

****With participation as appropriate

*****The Conference and its participants.....

****With participation to be determined at an appropriate stage. (comment)

Talk Plenary 1420 - 2 July

Bug - P & I primarily discussed SAHT, ME, touched on MBER.

ME - focus efforts on Geneva & consult closely. Political issue is important one.

SAHT - KATs; longer time, "imminent" existing agreement.

MBER - Some favor reduction of nuclear forces; others not. Some don't want include A.F. & miss.

This issue not yet ripe.

Nuclear weapons are spreading in world. Problem of aggressive behavior of F. from admitted ^{proliferating} F. was a prob. They are still breaking comparison between. The proposals made by K not to maintain #s on SAHT is satis.

P - There were other matters which could be of great importance in future but which are not ready. We must put out from time to time subjects to think about.



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RY W . NARA DATE 8/6/04

draws at one opportunity.
B has stated our positions on ME.
He says times when bilateral discussions
must take place - on basis of a
closest consultation.
What we both want is results & to avoid
being at odds.

Inter closest consultation - whether
P has solution to Paks, but we
both very positive.

People from pro-VSBR is strong.
I hope our message would not
break this solidarity but have a
strong statement. Big target for
5% of US-SU reduce is approach.

On ME, it is to no one's interest to be
drawn into escalating arms race in
area.

In SEA there is thankfully an
emergency peace pact. Seeds of war
are still there. NVN building up
at higher rate than permitted & Corg
is preventing us from doing what is
desired. We should both exercise
restraint.

We have made sig. prog at this summit.
But we both disappointed we unable to
make more prog in SALT

Obvious we could not agree on #s at this time
but even easy to agree on general statements.
We both feel we cannot avoid an arms race.
I am concerned that all the good things may be
downgraded by failure in SALT.
I give my commitment that we won't wait
a full year before discussing SALT
seriously again. We should like for that
hope our next annual meeting.

Commitment should indicate as strongly
as possible our deter. to negotiate a
- reach agreement. We prepared to talk
at whatever level is offered.

B - What is our long goal in ME? It should
permanently exist all - incl I.

P - Has to be based on 2x2. Can't do it
all at once but will work toward it.
But we won't proceed in unrealistic
way.

Won't be ratio w/ temporary arms -
we want perm. settlement.

B - We have agreed to act jointly
in CSCE to establish a process
in Euro reviewable. Is that so?

P. I made comment at CS last year.
~~What~~ we will continue our
efforts to achieve these goals.

B - lets have our FM's report on their efforts

K- Agreed on - TT B, (incl. date, PNE),
environmental, Communiqué (we
don't want let lang. make it appear
as fairness - something about creating
w/c issue of parent, a graduation controls,
ABIN,
4 things to sign, TT B, Communiqué,
ABIN, Environment. Also SCC,
This is where we are.

B- The future agreement goes A
1977, so it best we don't introduce
new figures before then. If you
can't accept our #'s we need to
start new relationship but. gradual program.

G- There is tendency to sketch-outlined
talks for Geneva conf. That would
be bad. Unless Paks attend conf -
success would not come. They are
prepared to participate on basis
of equality.
We have reached agreement on principle
resumption of SALT talks. New
agreement will take time + in meantime
nothing should cast doubt on existing
agreement - we shouldn't indicate
there is something wrong w/ present agreement

K- I told Fox yesterday that no way
we could hit SD MIR cuts whole price.
If you can't make a balance but #s
+ MIRVs, we will work "not permit
you catching us in MIRVs".

G/B - But that is a matter for future
negot.

P- The price which would influence a
MIRV you are strong.



... and will consult with interested parties to that end.

... with appropriate participation

~~the case~~

... with participation as appropriate

... the Commission and its participants

... with participation to be determined at an appropriate stage (moment)

? You also have several missiles

K - But you will still have 1600 un-MIRVED missiles for total of 6100.

B - You are adding approx oranges. ~~that~~ If you launched everything you would hit us w/ over 16000.

We want to work w/ each other so we were giving you a zero tolerance edge of 1000 missiles.



SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Last Plenary

July 3, 1974; 12:15 p.m.

Wilson

*No need to
transcribe,
Full mem con already
done by PWR*

Brezhnev: Emphasis on avoiding confrontation. General wrapup. Said we didn't solve all the problems before us.

President: Too bad we didn't resolve SALT, but it demands our urgent attention to get the arms race under control.

We must be careful not to be dragged into confrontation over different areas of the world. Southeast Asia _____ are relative for years.

A new attempt by India to move on Pakistan could again put us on opposite sides.

The key to world peace lies in our relationship with each other and we must not allow collateral issues to destroy or impair that relationship.

Work should begin now on new ones where our cooperation should go forward -- not only in security, but also peaceful ones.

Podgorny: General comments.


Kosygin: The President's point about our respective friends who may get us into a conflict is very important. We must build our relationship so that nothing can come between us. We can now keep in close touch.

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Y. [initials] MAKE DATE 8/6/04



even before any possible conflicts involving our respective friends.

President: The most important thing about this meeting is not just signing but how we follow up in the months ahead. We will follow up when we have said we would -- including meetings where necessary.

Podgorgy: It is important that we have agreed on interim meetings if necessary.

Brezhnev:

B. I expect as we avoid any confrontation. Good wrapup. Said we didn't solve all parts before us.

P. Too bad we didn't resolve SALT, but it demands our urgent attention to get arms race under control.

We must be careful not to be dragged into confrontation over different areas of world. SEA program our solution for years.

Our attempt by India to move on Pakistan could again put us on opposite sides.

Key to world peace lies in our relationship w/ each other & we must not allow external issues to destroy or ruin our relationship.

Work should begin now on areas where our coop should go forward - not only in security, but also peaceful areas.

Policy - ~~write~~ Good environment

Resign - Point about our ~~relationship~~ expected friends who may get us into conflict is very important. We must build our relationship so that nothing can come bet. us. We can now begin to take touch, even before any possible explicit involving our expected friends.

P - Most important thing about this entry is not just requiring but how we follow up in a month ahead. We will follow up where we have said we would - incl. entry where necessary.



~~A~~
Pod - Important use have agreed on criteria only
if necessary.

B -



Have been told by R to
say that PVE ^{equipment}
with ~~equipment~~ ^{help}

