

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: President Nixon's Meeting with King Hussein,
Amman, June 18, 1974, 9:30 a.m. (as recounted
by the President to Gen. Scowcroft)

The President said he was very forthcoming to Hussein about the other Arab leaders' attitudes. He had described Sadat as not pushing, Faisal as his usual self.

He told Hussein we had put Jordan last on the itinerary because it was the most difficult, not because it was least important. He told Hussein there had been no give by Israel on any of the three issues. Allon would be coming to the U. S. at the end of July; after that, Hussein should send someone. Hussein said he would send Rifai.

Hussein expanded on the Palestinian issue. He was very flexible. There could be a state on the West Bank confederated with Jordan, whose economy would be consolidated with Jordan's.

Hussein did not indicate he would walk out of Geneva if there was no progress in negotiations between Jordan and Israel. The President had said that Hussein shouldn't leave the West Bank to Arafat. Geneva would not solve anything anyway. Our step-by-step process didn't mean it had to be slow.

The King wished to see Jerusalem as a city of peace. The weakest point in the Israeli position was Jerusalem and the West Bank.

The President had told Hussein that it would be September before bilateral talks showed anything. But we would push to have Jordanian concerns considered fully.

Hussein had asked for a doubling of U. S. aid to Jordan.

The President indicated to Hussein that we did not give a blank check for a long-term military assistance agreement to Israel. There were many reasons. For one thing, it was impossible to gauge the needs so far ahead.

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BY lh, NARA DATE 8/6/04



Secondly, in our system such aid depends on annual Congressional appropriations. Third, as a matter of Presidential authority he was reluctant to make such a commitment. This also gives us a negotiating lever with Israel. The President had left the implication with the King that the days of free Israeli aid were gone. We would keep Israel strong enough to feel they could negotiate but not so strong that there would be no need to negotiate.

Hussein was not upset at his reception by the others. He doesn't like the Syrians.

Hussein believed he would win a plebiscite on the West Bank for a confederation.

Hussein sensed the importance of the President's trip, beyond the specifics. He said we had changed an abnormal situation to a normal situation.



Me/Pres 18 June 74 ✓

Re Hussein mtg.

Very frustrating about other attacks
Salat not pushing
Faisal so overall

Pres Jordan had to make more of Hussein
not least important

As good try to on any of 3 items

Allen coming
after that he should send message
and for

H. said would send report
to ^{Hussein} ~~by~~ on Paks issue
Very F. bright

Confederated Path

- Consolidated economy

Don't hesitate to work with
P. said should be based on book & Map
America won't solve anything
Stop by stop don't mean slow
* H. work of Iran as city of peace

Jews work point is Jews & work

Said would be left before political work
showed anything

We would push to have Jordanian issues
considered.

Had called for double end

→ Don't give a blank check long term
with agreement for I

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Reasons:

Don't know what

Very unusual ~~effort~~

Pro authority

Gives us something lower w/ I.

Left impression w/ K. in that a day
of the I and more over

we would try I strong enough to
feel could negotiate but not so
strong as need to negotiate

Was not impact at reception by other
D. said like Lyons

He believes he would want a plebiscite
for a referendum

He seems unglad of my trip, but and
a specific

Said we had changed the normal set
to normal set.

