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TOHAK 283

PLEASE DELIVER TO BREMER/RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY

MAY 22, 1974

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

THE PRESIDENT MET WITH THE CENTO FOREIGN MINISTERS TODAY AND DELIVERED WHAT AMOUNTED TO A 45 MINUTE MONOLOGUE.


HE BEGAN BY DESCRIBING CENTO AS BEING CONSIDERED TO HAVE MUCH LESS MEANING TODAY THAN IN THE PERIOD DURING WHICH IT WAS FORMED. AS A MILITARY ALLIANCE, IT IS NOT VERY MUCH AND THE TURKS AND THE PAKISTANIS HAVE ON OCCASION WONDERED WHAT GOOD IT WAS WHEN THEY HAD A MILITARY PROBLEM OF THEIR OWN. BUT THE COUNTRIES OF THE ALLIANCE HAVE COMMON INTERESTS THAT OVERRIDE THEIR VARIOUS MILITARY CONCERNS -- SUCH AS THE SURVIVAL OF PAKISTAN. THE STRENGTH AND ECONOMIC VITALITY OF THE CENTO COUNTRIES IS IMPORTANT TO THE FUTURE OF THAT AREA OF THE WORLD. THE CENTO TREATY IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE STABILITY OF THE AREA BECAUSE IT GIVES AN ADDED ELEMENT TO DISCOURAGE THOSE WHO MIGHT BE TEMPTED TOWARD ADVENTURISM.

THE PRESIDENT THEN BEGAN TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT EACH OF THE COUNTRIES, BUT NEVER GOT FURTHER THAN PAKISTAN. REGARDING PAKISTAN, HE SAID THAT, WITH DUE REGARD FOR CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS, WE WOULD DO WHATEVER WE COULD TO SUPPORT PAKISTAN. THERE HAD BEEN ONE PARTITION OF PAKISTAN AND THERE COULD BE NO MORE. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE U. S. REESTABLISHES A DIALOGUE WITH INDIA, OUR INFLUENCE WOULD BE TO RESTRAIN INDIA.

DECLASSIFIED, w/wh Antonio exempt  
AUTHORITY SAC Levins 12/6/01/JSK visit  
BY [signature] NLF, DATE 4/23/07

\* \* \* \* \* W H S R C O M M E N T \* \* \* \* \*

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SECRETARY GENERAL ASSAR THEN THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR MEETING WITH THE GROUP AND FOR HIS WORDS OF ENCOURAGEMENT. HE SAID THAT THE MINISTERS ARE AWARE, AS THE PRESIDENT HAD POINTED OUT, THAT THE SITUATION FOR CENTO HAD CHANGED GREATLY BUT THEY STILL THOUGHT THERE WAS A NEED FOR THE ALLIANCE AND HAD DISCUSSED IN THEIR MEETINGS TRACING A COURSE FOR THE FUTURE.

THE PRESIDENT RESPONDED TO ASSAR BY REVIEWING AGAIN THE CHANGES SINCE THE FOUNDING OF CENTO. HE THEN SHIFTED INTO HIS STANDARD RUNDOWN OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. NO SURPRISES.

FOLLOWING THAT THE PRESIDENT DISCUSSED THE PRAGMATIC NATURE OF OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION, THE DIFFICULTIES OF SALT, ETC. -- ALL IN STANDARD TERMS. HE MOVED ON TO THE PRO AND TALKED ABOUT THE NEED FOR A DIALOGUE WITH THEM, THEIR INTEREST IN A STRONG U.S., AND THEIR RIVALRY WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

THE PRESIDENT THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE U.S. DIALOGUE WITH OUR POTENTIAL ENEMIES WAS IN SUPPORT OF, NOT IN OPPOSITION TO, OUR FRIENDS. HE POINTED OUT IN CONCLUSION THAT THE MIDDLE EAST, AND EVEN MORE SO CENTRAL EUROPE, WERE VITAL AREAS FOR SUPER POWER RIVALRY. ALLIES AND FRIENDS MUST TRUST EACH OTHER IN THESE CRITICAL TIMES AND THE U.S. WOULD MAINTAIN ITS STRENGTH AND SUPPORT OF ITS FRIENDS.

AS THE GROUP WAS WALKING OUT, CALLAGHAN EXPRESSED THE NEED FOR A NATO DECLARATION AND A TRADE BILL. THE PRESIDENT DID NOT COMMENT ON THE NATO DECLARATION BUT SAID WE WOULD HAVE A TRADE BILL PROVIDED CONGRESS WAS REASONABLE AND AT A MINIMUM DID NOT CUT OFF CREDIT FOR THE SOVIET UNION.

AT LUNCH AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY FOLLOWING THE MEETING, CALLAGHAN REMARKED TO ME THAT HE THOUGHT THE PRESIDENT HAD PUT ON AN AMAZING PERFORMANCE. HE SAID HE WAS MOST IMPRESSED AT THE PRESIDENT'S INTIMATE KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WITH ALL THE OTHER THINGS HE HAD ON HIS MIND.

WARM REGARDS.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Nixon  
CENTO Foreign Ministers  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, May 22, 1974  
12:50 p. m.

PLACE: The Cabinet Room

(The Press came in for photos)

President: How have you been?

Callaghan (UK): I remember our seminar in Number 10 Downing.

President: That was Callaghan's job.

(The press departs)

President: I am delighted to meet with you. CENTO in the minds of the world has much less meaning than there used to be. Even here, the Turks and Pakistanis say "What good is it when we have a military problem? We just sit around and talk." Candidly, the Iranians' feeling is that they can take care of themselves.

Why continue CENTO? Let's start with the bottom line: As a military alliance, it isn't there -- it's not like NATO. But we have common interests including military concerns -- like the survival of Pakistan. For us, that is of vital importance. To



~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINE, State Rev. on 3/19/04  
BY MM  
NARA DATE 4/5/04

have healthy, strong economies in this group of nations is vital. It is important in the future of South Asia, and the survival of each country with some sort of -- not guarantee -- but an added element to discourage those who might infringe on your sovereignty.

The United States is bilaterally committed to each of you -- not only to your survival but to cooperate economically for progress.

The fact that the U. S. has this commitment -- shared by Great Britain -- has a restraining influence on those who might be tempted -- to go under or over a border to destroy a country's independence.

So what we have should not be detracted. The situation is different from the Dulles days, but the need remains. Like the NATO situation has change, but if it weren't there, adventurism would be encouraged.

Callaghan: Don't even mention it.

President: But whatever the country in NATO -- Great Britain, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy -- if they didn't have association and the U. S. holding the ring against any super power -- if that didn't exist, the race to Moscow would go apace.

Callaghan: That's right.

President: Now individually. I wish we could have done more for Pakistan in the previous struggle. As far as the U. S. is concerned, one partition of Pakistan is enough. And, considering Congressional concerns, we will do whatever we can to support Pakistan's independence and strength. We have done something; perhaps we can do more. Pakistan's problem is most delicate. To the extent the U. S. reestablishes a dialogue with India, our influence will be to restrain India.

We don't want a monologue. We consider this alliance, which came in when the threat was very different... there have been many changes, with the Soviet Union, etc. Pakistan has had a tragedy. But no more.

What can CENTO do about all these things? What does the commitment mean if it is not backed up by military responsiveness? It does mean something, because if we share a common commitment we can be helpful to each other whatever the problem.

Assan: Thank you for seeing us. I know how busy you are. In the past two days we have referred more than once to the strong words you gave us last year. We all thank you for your strength and encouragement. We know the situation has changed but we think the need for the alliance continues. We have talked about tracing our course for the future. It has been a great meeting.

President: The original reason for CENTO -- like NATO -- was security. We now need more -- to broaden our relations.

If I could digress to the Middle East a bit. Basically in the Syrian-Israeli talks we have had a breakthrough. I have been bouncing messages to Israel and to a lesser degree to Syria over the past weeks. Secretary Kissinger has done a magnificent job. Disengagement will come -- maybe not this week. The major problem has been dealt with, but the lesser ones could hang us up -- they become relatively more important.

But disengagement is only temporary. And negotiations will now go forward in Geneva for a permanent solution -- like Jerusalem, that is the toughest nut. We are accused of playing a unilateral role by pushing others out.

The reason Secretary Kissinger is there getting a disengagement is because we are the only one who can broker it now. Our purpose is not to establish American domination or to exclude others from economic or political development in the area. Some other countries of the area don't want the Soviet Union, some may. Israel can't even talk to them.

The policy is to move all the parties to participate in a settlement. We carry the major burden because we can move Israel, and without that, no settlement can be made. For Israel, it is far better to have the U. S. as a friend of Egypt than an enemy of Egypt. Sophisticated leaders within Israel like Rabin understand; the Jewish community wants exclusive American support of Israel.

Israel feels that with arms they can win over the foreseeable future. Not as well as before, but they made it costly. But Israel's ability to survive must not depend on an acre of sand, but on the attitude of her neighbors and whether these neighbors make a confluence of power opposed to Israel's survival.

We feel the interests of us all here are served by our negotiating realistically with the Soviet Union. We have no illusions, nor do they. When the Soviet Union has to make a decision whether to meddle, they must weigh that against everything else they have on the plate with the United States. We need idealistic talk, but we have to be pragmatic.

In the Middle East, despite our different interests and vital as it is-- for the Soviet Union they see the resources and geographic position and their game is understandable; the US. has a special tie with Israel which has hurt us with the Arabs. This tie doesn't serve the United States. Looking down the road, the U.S., Israel and Arab interests will be served by the U.S. playing a constructive role and not tied just to Israel. As I told Prime Minister Wilson, there can't be permanent peace unless we are for it, to influence Israel. It can't be done if the Soviet Union is against it, because of their power.

Our policy is toward the whole world. With the Soviet Union, for example, we are working on SALT -- it is internationally important. Each of us can destroy the other within an hour. Neither one of us has illusions about the other, but if they are in isolation or in a posture of confrontation, they can't listen if we say "Don't push our friends around." But if they have some other things going....

With China, I am the original anti-Communist and Mao is the original Communist. But they are probably concerned about their isolation and possible threat from their neighbors. As they looked around, they saw India, with contempt, to the west the Soviet Union, to the east the United States, to the Northeast, Japan, an economic giant but economically a pygmy. Pragmatically they didn't want a hostile U.S. For the U.S. -- each of them has better relations with the United States than with each other -- right now the basic threat to survival is the US-Soviet conflict. But one fourth of the world is Chinese, and they have nuclear weapons. They are smart and energetic. In 20 years they will be a major nuclear power. Should we let them sit there in isolation? Or should we develop a dialogue? Now they need us; later they might not. We will try to play a constructive role in China's relations with its neighbors.



We can't insure peace, but our purpose is -- we believe in the right of all to chose their own way -- to help them to be independent. We fought in Korea and Vietnam for that. But to do that effectively, we must talk to potential enemies to see if there are different incentives for them to pursue different courses. When we go to the Soviet Union and China, we do it to make the world a safer place for our friends.

Callaghan: Outstanding. If you weren't President, you would have made a brilliant Foreign Minister.

President: I have visited all your countries. I have a strong feeling for each of them. We want you to survive and we are for you. Sometimes we can do as much as we would like, but our dialogue with the opposition is in support of, not opposition to, our friends. But the Middle East, next to Central Europe, is a vital area for the super powers. Unlike Vietnam--the Cambodia mission, the December bombing--some said the Soviet Union and China would intervene. I didn't think so, because they wanted North Vietnam to succeed but not at the cost of confrontation with the United States. The Middle East is different and Europe especially so.

We must realize we are participating in decisions which could decide the peace of the world. We must trust each other. We will maintain our strength so that noone thinks he can bluff us or go to war with us without cost.

Callaghan: We need the NATO declaration and the trade bill.

President: Provided they work out the credit restriction. Otherwise tye can't get MFN.

Assar: This is my last year.

(Cuff links are passed out.)

President: I can tell you a story. Israel was asking for too many F-4's. I told Golda the main thing was trust, that we had problems and that we would do what we could.





Pres/CENTO Foreign Ministers

22 May '24 (250) ✓

P Home again

E I remember one seminar on 10 January

P Callaghan job

P also left

P Delighted to meet w/you. Cento in mind of world has much less meaning than used to be. Events here - Tanks + Labs say what good it if someone have a military job. Just sit around + talk. Candidly, I'm in feeling they can take care of themselves. Only Central Cento. Start w/ both lines. As military alliance, it isn't there - not like NATO. But we have common interests concerning military concerns - like survival of Pakistan. For us that is vital importance. To have healthy strong economies in this group is vital. It is important in future of S-Asia, & survival of each w/ some safety - not generosity - but an added element to do enough that who might injure.

US is relatively committed to each - not only to survival but esp. even for progress.

Fact US has this content - shared by GB - has retaining influence on those who might be tempted - to go much or over a border to destroy multiple.

So all of us have should not be & betrayed. Sit. is different from Darker days, but not humanis - like NATO

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 3/8/04

BY lh NARA DATE 4/5/04



set has changed, but if it weren't there,  
administration would be encouraged

C Don't even mention it.

P But whatever - country in NATO - GB, FR,  
FRG, Italy - if they didn't have association  
+ US holding any agreement -  
if that didn't exist, - call to Moscow would  
go ahead

C Right

P How viciously. With <sup>hardness</sup> we could do more for  
Pakistan previously though. As far as US is  
concerned <sup>has been</sup> one <sup>remember was</sup> part of Pak is more than  
enough. And, considering any concerns,  
we will do whatever we can to support Pak  
independence & strength. We have no nothing,  
perhaps can do more. Pak prob is most  
delicate. To extent US restoration challenged  
w/ India, our influence will be to rehabilitate  
India.

Don't want a monopoly. We consider this  
alone, which came in when threat was  
very different, ... there have been many  
changes, w/ SO, etc. Pak has had a tragedy,  
but no more.

What can we do about all these things.  
What does control mean if not backed up by  
mutual responsibilities. It does mean something  
even if we shall common contact we can  
be helpful to achieve whatever a part.

Q: Thank you for seeing us. How busy you  
are. ~~For~~ ~~us~~ In past 2 days we have  
replied more than once to stray words you  
give us but your. We all thank you



you through a ~~disengagement~~ <sup>disengagement</sup>. We have  
known it has changed but think <sup>we need</sup>  
for all these countries. We have talked about tracing  
our course for a future - Has been a goal only.

P Original reason for NATO - like NATO - was  
security. We now need more - to know  
them. If I could digress to NATO a bit.

Basically, I-I talks we had back then. I  
have been having maps & I & losses  
to S. ever just weeks. K done mapping. got  
Disengagement will come - maybe not this  
week. Major problem dealt w/ but the  
bases also could hang us up - they become  
relatively more important.

That's changing. is temporary. And negotiations  
will now go forward in Geneva for permanent  
solution - like Geneva which is temporary meet.  
We are used of playing mediating role  
pushing others out

Reason K there getting disengagement because  
we are only one who can broker it now.  
One purpose is not to get US disengagement  
or to check others from here or for disengagement  
in ma. Some other countries of one don't  
want SO, some may. I can't even talk to  
them.

Policy is to include all to part. in  
settlement. we can't major Israeli cause  
we can make I + w/o that, no settlement.  
For I, it is far better to have US a friend than  
an enemy of E. Support. with I like Rubin  
in historical Jewish community demands  
explicit US support of I.



I feel w/ arms they can win over favorable  
future - not as well as I, but they need it  
costly. But I ability & survival must depend  
on an acre of soil - but an attitude of  
I neighbors & whether they neighbors make  
influence of power opposed to I survival - we  
full network of soil here are covered by us  
negotiating substantially w/ S U. We have  
no alliances, we do them. When S U has to  
make decision whether to meddle, they must  
weigh that against doing things else they have  
w/ or plata w/ US. We need icholastic  
talk, but we ~~so~~ have to be pragmatic. In  
M.E., despite our different interests & intent as it  
is - for S U they see resources & geo position  
& their game is understandable. US has special  
tie w/ I which has kept us w/ Arabs. I has  
tie doesn't seem US, looking down road, US,  
I, & Arab interests will be served by US  
playing constructive role & not tail fin to I,  
Q & talk between. There can't be permanent peace  
unless we are part (influence I). Can't be one  
if S U is against it (because of their power).  
Our policy is toward whole world. W/ S U, for example,  
we working on SALT - it initially important. Each  
can destroy other w/ in an hour. Neither  
has illusion about others, but if they are in isolation  
or confrontation, they won't listen if we say don't  
push our friends around - but if they have some  
other things going...

w/ China, I ~~was~~ original anti-Cuban & Mao  
original Coast. But they got concerned about  
isolation & possible threat from neighbors. As



they look around they saw in the (east), to west SU, to east US, FNE, Japan, a super giant but less pygmy. Pragmatically they would not want a hostile US. For US - each of them has better relations w/ US than w/ each other - right now basic threat to survival is US-SU conflict. But 1/4 of world is Chinese & they have more. They are smart, intelligent. In 20 yrs they will be major super power. Should we let them sit there in isolation, or should we bring dialogue? Under they need us, later they might not. We will try to play constructive role in PRC relations w/ its neighbors.

We can't invade place, but our purpose is we believe in right of all to choose own way, be independent. We fought in Korea VN for that. But to do that effectively, we must talk to potential enemies & see if there are different incentives for them or to pursue different courses. When we go to SU & PRC, we do it to make a world safer for our own friends.

C. Understanding of your commitment, you would make a brilliant FNI

V. I have visited all your countries - I have feel for each. We want you to survive & we are for you. Sometimes we can do as much as we would like, but our dialogue of opposition is in support of not opposition to our friends.

But NE, next to Central E. is a natural area for super powers. Unlike VN - Cambodia messiah, Dec banking - <sup>some</sup> said SU & PRC would intervene. I didn't think so, because they wanted N-N to succeed but not at

cost of competition w/ US. ME is different  
+ Eur. log. 10.

We must realize we are participating in  
decisions which could decide peace of world. We  
must trust rather. We will enter  
our strength so that none think we can  
bluff no a go to war w/ us w/ out.

© We must meet NATO declaration & trade  
bill

P Reminded they had not right  
with in, could get MFA

Arise this my last year

(Parasent w/ff links)

P Stay - I <sup>too many</sup> looking for f 4 s. I told Collier  
man thing was trust. We had party &  
this would do what we could.

I gave out copy

