

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT'S FILES

FROM: B/GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with
General Goodpaster

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, February 15, 1973
11:12 a. m. - 12:02 p. m.

PLACE: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President
General Goodpaster
B/General Brent Scowcroft

At the outset of the meeting, the President made some comments to the press pool which had been invited in for a photo opportunity. (Press pool report attached). Following departure of the press pool at 11:20 a. m., General Goodpaster commented that the President's statement to the pool and his receiving General Goodpaster would be received very warmly by our European allies. The President responded that, except for the British, Greeks, and Turks, our allies had been very critical of us during the recent bombing, pandering to their leftist constituencies. The President said that the U. S. always turns the other cheek, but in this case, what had been an alliance of interest and friendship is now just an alliance of interest. Why were we in Vietnam, after all? The issue was not a small strip of land but the credibility and dependability of the United States to its allies and friends. We will not bear grudges, but when an ally is so presumptuous that it attacks us without waiting, for its own political purposes, we will henceforth base our relationship solely on the national interest, not on friendship. The President stated that he greatly admired Prime Minister Heath as being a true European statesman. He was both an ally and a friend and the President would not forget how Heath had stood by him.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines, Mabm visit, 11/99
By lit, NARA, Date 11/18/00

General Goodpaster observed that a good deal of studying was going on related to the future of NATO, and the President interjected that he wanted NATO studies to have top priority. General Goodpaster said he felt that, while he had no particular scheme to advance, there was some way in which mutual reductions were possible in NATO without reducing security. The President thought that the principal problem was psychological. We need to work out, he said, what we can do and still preserve confidence in the alliance. General Goodpaster felt we should not be afraid to put out proposals simply for fear that the USSR would not accept them. He mentioned, as examples, ideas for a common ceiling on troop strength and mixed package reductions of elements which were of the most concern to each side. General Goodpaster observed that the opening of negotiations by the President with the USSR and the PRC had been one of the most constructive developments in the world today, that we must continue to negotiate, and that we should not let the USSR play one ally against another. Some force reduction was possible, even though the military were generally opposed.

General Goodpaster said that another subject he was investigating was the possibility of generating unified forces among our European allies. He felt they should integrate and rationalize their forces in the interests of strengthening the alliance and making it more efficient. Technology -- "smart bombs," helicopters, etc. -- could make an important contribution to the improvement of NATO's abilities. There are many proposals for restructuring NATO, and it is necessary to look at all possibilities. Goodpaster felt that what is required more than anything was to move to a lower level of confrontation. In doing so, however, NATO needs a strong sense of consultation in order to preserve the cohesiveness of the alliance. The President agreed, and observed that that was why the Vietnam positions of most of the NATO countries had hurt. The damage was in the area of personal relations. The President said that he did not love the PRC and the USSR and that his relationships with them were based solely on national interests. That is the way it would have to be now with the European countries -- no more totasts, no more state visits, except perhaps with Pompidou, but certainly not with Brandt.


General Goodpaster voiced his concern on certain areas in which some of the NATO countries were cutting back militarily. He specifically mentioned proposals for troop cuts in Denmark and



Belgium and a German proposal to restructure its forces. The President asked Goodpaster to be sure to get the point across to our allies that the Congress would jump at any indication that we should pull our troops out. If the allies make critical statements and cut their forces, Congress will increase its pressure to withdraw.

Goodpaster stated that the issue of tactical nuclear weapons had now been stagnant for 10 years. He feels we are now at the point where we have done enough preparatory work that we can begin to take a new position on this troublesome issue. Goodpaster also noted that he was trying to extend the areas of cooperation with the French and he felt that the French military were very much in favor of closer cooperation. With regard to Spain, Goodpaster felt that, while it was difficult to make progress with NATO, he was trying and it was not too early to think about the next renewal of the US/Spanish agreement. The President responded that it was time to get started on the renewal of the US/Spanish arrangement and that the main effort with regard to Spain should be to get them into NATO after Franco's departure. He asked that Goodpaster have a long talk with Ambassador Rumsfeld and explain the discussion above on the critical reaction of our allies to our bombing and the effect that it would have on our relationship with them -- we will continue to work with them, but the warmth has gone from the relationship. The President asked that Goodpaster take a personal interest in Rumsfeld and teach him the facts of NATO relationships. He observed that Rumsfeld was a very good public speaker and would be useful in that regard and noted that he would probably eventually run for the Senate.

The President asked Goodpaster if he had read the Fairlee book on Kennedy and called for a copy to give to the General. He said the book was good for its analysis of foreign policy, that it was harsh on the Kennedy foreign policy, and that it put Eisenhower's foreign policy into better perspective. Goodpaster observed that in Europe now one could see the careful professionalism of President Nixon's foreign policy as opposed to the "slap dash" policies of the Kennedy years. The President said he felt Cuba was Kennedy's finest hour, but that it was not really so great a triumph, since we had a ten-to-one strategic superiority. Even then, Kennedy had not followed up on the confrontation. Goodpaster felt that had we shown proper firmness earlier, the Cuban missile crisis would not even have



developed. The President agreed and commented critically on the refusal to grant air support in the Bay of Pigs operation. He felt that if something like that operation were going to be supported, then it should be supported adequately.

The President then turned to the POW return and said that we now have some heroes in this war. He said that when he renewed the bombing on December 26th after the Christmas pause, he had sent everything possible in to attack military targets. The prisoners were now reporting that that had been the biggest possible morale booster and had even given them the upper hand on their jailers. The President said that he had had to keep silent about the reasons for the bombing. Had he said anything publicly, North Vietnam could not have come to the bargaining table because there would have been too severe a loss of face. Bombing, he said, has turned out to be extremely important. Even back in World War II, he felt that the bombing had been vital. In the last 2-1/2 days of the bombing in Vietnam, Admiral Moorer had told him that the North Vietnamese defenses were all gone and that no bombers had been lost. The President said that, in general, the White House staff had not supported his bombing decision, although they did not criticize it. Congress had not supported it, and the press media had been terrible.

The President explained to General Goodpaster that, after consultation with Mrs. Johnson, he had the flag raised from half-staff in honor of the POW return. He pointed out that had we accepted the Mansfield Resolution, first of all the North Vietnamese would not have accepted it. But even if they had, the POW's would not have come home as heroes but as defeated men, and the country would have felt the same way. We have done what we could, concluded the President. The issue is now up to South Vietnam.

The meeting concluded at 12:02 p. m.



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
POOL REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GENERAL GOODPASTER

President Nixon said at one point -- there was chit-chat nobody could hear -- that he recalled something from 20 years ago. At one point he said, talking to the press, "I have said this is the year of Europe." These are not direct quotes. Then he said, "This is not to say that we are not placing enormous emphasis on completing the settlement in Southeast Asia and on continuing to build our relationship and dialogue with the PRC and the Soviet Union, and our policy in this Hemisphere -- in Latin America -- but the year of Europe becomes very important in both the economic context, which was brought on by the recent monetary situation, and also in terms of the national security context, because of the fact that MBFR, mutual balanced force reductions, will be a subject on our agenda this year, not only first with our European allies, but also with the Soviet Union, and also because of the European Security Conference. It will not be specifically military matters.

Then he told about General Goodpaster coming along to attend the meeting at the Pentagon, the meeting of the Joint Chiefs and the Service Chiefs, which would have first a report from the Joint Chiefs on the return of the POWs, after the return of the prisoners, the withdrawal program, and how the cease-fire is being implemented; and also the whole problem of our relations with Europe, including the MBFR and the level of American forces that are required in Europe. They will talk about all of these today at the luncheon.

"I have nothing substantive to say at this point on MBFR and the European Security Conference except to say these matters will be under very intense discussion within the Administration, and also between this Government and the governments of our European allies. They were a major subject of discussion with Prime Minister Heath. Naturally, you would expect that these would lead to economic considerations, the problem of trade, which can be very interesting and sometimes very difficult with our European friends as well as the Japanese.

"We must not overlook the fact that tied into all this are the security arrangements that we have with Europe and Japan. The United States at the present time, after going through Vietnam, will hear, understandably, voices raised, very sincere voices, that 'After Vietnam, let's throw up our hands, turn inward and withdraw from our obligations in the world.'



"One of the reasons I considered it vitally important that the war in Vietnam be ended in what I think was the right way, peace with honor, was that it was essential to demonstrate both to our allies in Europe, the Japanese, and other allies, the Thais and so forth, and to potential adversaries, that the United States is a dependable ally. All the power in the world lodged in the United States means nothing unless those who depend upon U.S. power to protect them from the possibilities of aggression from other powers, which they themselves would not be able to do, all the power in the world here means nothing unless there is some assurance, some confidence, some trust that the United States will be credible, will be dependable.

"I am quite aware of the fact that much concern was expressed by our good friends and allies in the world -- that we understand, too -- not only with regard to our involvement in Vietnam, the decisions we had to make to achieve peace with honor, to accomplish our goals, which I set forth in my May 8th speech.

"I would only suggest it is my conviction, very strongly, that in the perspective of history that many of our allies, particularly, will look back and realize that had we taken the easy way out, which we could have done years ago, certainly when I came into office in 1969, our failure there would have eroded and possibly destroyed their confidence in the United States and, of course, enormously encouraged those who might have aggressive intentions toward us."

Then Goodpaster came in. Goodpaster said, "The effect of this is to reinforce confidence in Europe; and since the outset of NATO that confidence has been its foundation. There has not been an erosion of confidence; instead, there has been a strengthening of confidence, particularly when this action has been coupled with the strong support you have voiced for the whole NATO enterprise, and the continued commitment of American strength and American contributions to NATO. Basically, as we go into this period of constructive negotiations, I think there is a feeling that as difficult and taxing as those negotiations will be, we enter with a foundation of mutual confidence and a sense of stability and strength."



THE WHITE HOUSE

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~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Nixon
 General Andrew Goodpaster, CINCEUR/
 SACEUR
 Brigadier General Brent Scowcroft,
 Deputy Assistant to the President
 for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, February 15, 1973
 11:10 a. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

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CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 B (L3)
 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON July 1, 2001

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines, Madam visit, 1/1/99

NARA, Date 1/18/99



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
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
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The meeting concluded.



Good pastor Mtg

?
Thurs. 15 Feb 73
11:00 AM

P. to Press) Year of George becomes very important, not only learn about NSC, w/ MBR

Mtg w/ DOD, on POW + close file last, w/ Goodpastor present, on matters of E. wa Security + MBR.

Many discussions this year on troops + other econ matters but all tied in w/ security

Many voices will say after UK lets w/ draw from Canada

One reason I insisted UK be excluded, right way was to demonstrate to allies, friends, + potential enemies that US is a dependable ally. ^{but} ~~and~~ means nothing w/o confidence that US is credible + dependable

we are aware that somewhere in our

expressed by our friends - we understand -

over UK + our goal of peace of course. My

conviction is that our allies will look

back in perspective of history + see that

if I had taken opposite ~~took~~ tack in 69

that effect would have been to erode that

conf in US + encourage aggression

Q - Dejeu. That confidence is all important

to NATO. your commitment of strength to

NATO lets us enter negotiations w/ a

sense of confidence

(Press left) 1120



G Better thing, how does Nixon doctrine apply to NATO

NSC is studying NATO

* P I want that study passed, Top Gunner

G I have felt that some way relations are possible w/o relying security. But I don't have a scheme

P It is all psychological. US could possibly have a conventional conflict.

We need to work out what we can do to still maintain a psychology, US trip will, but something which will preserve confidence.


G US shouldn't be afraid to put out proposals for USSR won't accept.

Common thing - let's propose it.

Unful packages - what is most common to us + them

We need to work on these & not hurry. Instead let USSR play one against another. You have general negotiations w/ other side - one of most constructive things in world today. Many military are opposed to reductions, but I favor it.

Another subject is generating unified press force European allies. They should integrate & rationalize their forces. Technology will help smart bombs



Helicopters accepted to European environment -
Turkey, but we are working on it.

There are proposals for reducing restrictions -
most are feasible but we need to look
at everything.

Need to increase levels of cooperation.
As usual, this, how we work w/ NATO & USSR will
be important. NATO needs sense of
insulation, to preserve sense of cohesion.

✓ 1/10, that is why their UN stands have hurt - are
personal relations. Don't have local PRC
USSR - it is interest.

* No more trusts, no more state visits
Kangaroo, Grand etc.

○ Sen. Germans already report what they did.
New form of defense is solved type. Better than
Schmitt who wants to be Chancellor.

On speakers: Denmark wants to cut back. Don
opposing. Some in Belgium German proposal
to restrict forces. German any opposed.

* P Be sure you get point across that Congress will
grab at any card we should have. If some
also make statements, because while I ~~can~~ wait
do anything, Congress will go for chance.
Even Denmark cuts give any opportunity.



G Richardson a general man

P Y 23

G Tax man copies - Statement here for 10 yrs.
We need to research this. Have done much
preparatory work. Told E that now at point
we can take a position on Tax man copies,
one next year & a half. Needs to be done
carefully

French - I keep trying to extend way to extent
possible. Fr. military force including areas
of cooperation.

Spain - Review reports. Hard to make progress
w/NATO here, but we are trying.

Not too early to think about next arrangement
w/ Spanish.

P Need to get started on that.

~~G~~ ~~Chairman~~ main thing is to get them into NATO
after Franco goes.

Have talk w/Russfelt. Get him into hand
him - get him the line on our allies taking
in us that we have observed. Our
relationship has changed - will work w/
you but even with has gone.

G Russfelt. I read this to him that you have an
interest & this is an education.

P Take him in hand & teach him. Wright
man for Soviets. Good public operator.

G Woman looks good. Health not too good

P ~~She~~ Her spirits are better than in WH



P Have you read Fairclough book on Kennedy
Don't read in terms of Kerouac, but on for July.
Don't agree w/ Cuba - he is honest but he
clothes K for pol & puts Ike's into perspective.

G In Fair you ^{could} see the careful professional
of a K-P model you, as opposed to slapdash
K-Ping.

P I always say Cuba was K's first move, but not
so great as 10-1 surprise, & then didn't
follow up.

G Cuba should have done it - previous w/ Cuba.

P But, ~~the~~ like Bay of Pigs - if you're going to
do it, do it (are support)

P Cuba's are now have some lines in this
war. Don't you stress it?

G ~~The~~ The spirit is serious.

P On Dec 26, after pause, I sent everything possible
in on Viet targets. That even turned down
jokers around.

I had to keep silent. Had I talked, they could have
stopped because of force.

G The people know this

P Bombing is important. In W.W.II bombing ~~was~~
vital.



P The last 2/3 days Moore said didn't last a plane.
Defuses all shot.

W H stuff didn't support me, long-people,
media was terrible. I don't care if they set
crow, but they should stop with pushing
you saw what I did at/flag?

W - need patriots in the country
Manchester buy out - 1st they wouldn't have done it
But, then Paul's wouldn't have come as these

G Tough but successful

A It's now SKN's, we have done our part.

G That was getting off that plane - can't be

