

*Scowcroft Mem Cont
File*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT'S FILES

FROM: B/GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT, USAF

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with
Ambassador Helms (Iran)

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, February 14, 1973
11:16 - 11:52 a.m.

PLACE: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Ambassador Richard Helms
B/General Brent Scowcroft



The President opened the meeting by asking Ambassador Helms when he planned to depart. Helms replied that the Shah would be in St. Moritz until March 15 and that he planned to present his credentials during the period between the Shah's return and his subsequent departure for New Year's events in southern Iran.

The President asked that Helms follow through in talking to Mr. Connally. Helms responded that he had talked to him once and would do so again, and that he also had a first draft of the paper which the President has requested on the Persian Gulf. Helms went on to say that our interests and those of the British in the Persian Gulf were not identical. Our security interests are similar, but there are differences with respect to trade and, especially, oil, inasmuch as we control most of the oil and the British wish to penetrate.

The President asked that Helms look at Middle East problems not just in terms of his CIA background, but in a general sense and especially with respect to the oil problem. One fundamental question, said the President, is whether the United States can protect its interests adequately without having government-to-government agreements. With regard to proposals for a Soviet/US pipeline, for example, the U.S. cannot afford to have this agreement negotiated solely between the Soviet Union and a couple of pipeline companies. The U.S. has to become involved.

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AUTHORITY *LAC* *Rev. 10/2/04* *State visit 3/2/04*
BY *lm* *NLF*, DATE *4/12/07*

In asking Helms about his recent trip to Mexico, the President commented that President Echeverria had been particularly obnoxious in his public statements recently and had ostentatiously rolled out a red carpet for President Allende. The President wondered whether these manifestations on the part of Echeverria were just a cheap shot at the U.S. or whether they reflected deeply held beliefs. If the latter were the case, we should be worried. Helms responded that Echeverria had sent a message to the President saying that he was making these statements for domestic consumption and that he wanted to maintain his close ties with the U.S. Helms further observed that he saw no softness in Echeverria's closest advisors on the things which are important to the U.S. The President said that U.S. businessmen, including Connally, were quite concerned and that he wished CIA to analyze the depth to which Echeverria's comments represented his actual beliefs.

The President then broadened the discussion of Mexico with the statement that we must not go overboard publicly against those countries who criticize us publicly but that it does constitute a problem. Leaders in many countries, such as the Philippines, feel they have to kick the Yankee occasionally in order to win elections, while at the same time hoping the U.S. will not go away. Trudeau has done it, the Japanese have done it, and many others. Only the British have resisted the temptation. The real issue, the President said, is not U.S. arrogance but respect for the U.S. We cannot afford to just ignore all these critical comments because each one contributes to the tide of isolationism in the U.S. The President concluded that a study was needed, perhaps together with an NSC meeting, to get everyone's views on this issue and to determine just how much criticism the United States should suffer without reacting. Helms concluded discussion of this topic by saying he felt that Echeverria was not anti-American, but that he would have the Agency analyze the Mexican situation.

The President observed that, far from our problems being over in Southeast Asia, they would probably get worse. Foreign Minister Malik of Indonesia, for example, had commented that the U.S. should get out of Southeast Asia. Prime Minister Thanom of Thailand wants to be with us but is afraid that we will go home. If foreigners continue to talk critically in public of the U.S., the President said, those who really want us to go home -- those in Congress and elsewhere -- will

be able to prevail. Helms pointed out that if it had not been for the U.S. position in Vietnam, Suharto never would be able to come to power in Indonesia or to maintain himself had he come to power.

At this point in the discussion (11:40 a.m.), the President asked for a private word with Ambassador Helms, and Scowcroft left the room.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017622

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum of Conversation
CREATOR'S NAME Nixon, Helms, Scowcroft
DESCRIPTION Early February 1973
CREATION DATE 02/1973
VOLUME 3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 031400010
COLLECTION TITLE National Security Adviser. Memoranda of
Conversations
BOX NUMBER 1
FOLDER TITLE February 14, 1973 - Nixon, Ambassador
Richard Helms (Iran)
DATE WITHDRAWN 03/31/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

Sanitized 9/1/04
7/1/10

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR 10-142, # 2
date rev 3/8/07, CIA-LTR 7/14/10
By dal NARA, Date 10/14/10

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Nixon
Richard M. Helms, Ambassador to Iran
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Early February 1973
11:00 - 11:40 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

Helms: The Shah is in St. Moritz until the 15th. I have to go and present my credentials in March before the Shah leaves for the New Year in the south. I need that time for preparation.

The President: Will you follow through in talking to Connally?

Helms: We talked once and will again.

I have a first cut on a paper on the Gulf.

The President: Will you talk to the British?

Helms: Our interests and theirs are not identical. Trade differences. On oil, we have a lock; they want in. The British will help on security, but not across the board.

The President: I want you not just to think of your CIA background. It is important, but apply yourself to the oil problem generally.

The question is whether the US can protect its interests adequately without government to government agreements.

CLASSIFIED BY Brent Scowcroft
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(B)(3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

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On the Soviet pipeline -- we can't let this go to agreement between the Soviet Union and the companies, it has to be handled by governments.

Immerse yourself in the oil problem.

On the Mexican thing -- Echeverria was particularly obnoxious when he was here and he rolled out the red carpet for Allende. What is he after? The cheap shot, or is it his deep beliefs? If it's his beliefs, we should be worried.

Helms: I sent you a message before he got here saying he was doing these things for domestic consumption.

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The President: American businessmen are concerned. Connally is.

Helms: This meeting he wanted you to attend -- he thought would give you a good forum -- no fishhooks.


The President: We must not go overboard publicly against those people who kick us around.

[Suharto story.] The Philippines has the same problem. He has to kick the Yankee in the ass occasionally. They win elections by giving the US hell and hoping we don't go away.

Trudeau has done it, the Japanese, etc. Only the British haven't. What would they do without us? The real issue is respect for America, not American arrogance.

Rogers feels strongly about these. Mrs. Gandhi.

You can't just ignore all these, though, because it contributes to the tide of isolationism.

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25X1

[REDACTED]

The President: You feel Echeverria is not anti-American?

Helms: Yes.

The President: We need a study, perhaps an NSC meeting, to get everyone's views. Just how much kicking around should we take without reacting?

The problems will get worse in Southeast Asia. Malik, for example, said the US should get out of Southeast Asia.

[REDACTED]

The Thai -- Thanom wants to be with us but he's afraid we'll go home.

If the talk keeps up, those who really want us to go home -- in Congress, etc. -- will prevail.

Helms: If it hadn't been for the US position in Vietnam, Suharto never would have come to power or maintained himself.

[At 11:40, the President had private words for Helms.]

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[REDACTED]

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017623

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Note
CREATOR'S NAME Brent Scowcroft
DESCRIPTION Handwritten notes of early February
1973 Nixon, Helms, and Scowcroft
meeting
CREATION DATE 02/1973
VOLUME 3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 031400010
COLLECTION TITLE National Security Adviser. Memoranda of
Conversations
BOX NUMBER 1
FOLDER TITLE February 14, 1973 - Nixon, Ambassador
Richard Helms (Iran)
DATE WITHDRAWN 03/31/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG